

## Target 1: XSRF

The main vulnerability here is the cross-site request forgery prevention mechanism is weak. The first vulnerability is that the test string used to generate the expected response value is based off the account, routing, and challenge fields. However, the challenge field (which is randomly generated) is not required and can simply be left out, meaning that the expected response can be deterministically deduced. Second, when attempting to create this attack and guess the response, the expected value is actually printed out in the message saying the attack was prevented. This is a very poor security choice (though I realize it might just be to make it easier for us).

To prevent this attack, the form must require the challenge (CSRF token) field in order to allow edits to be saved. Alternatively, the standard headers could be checked to ensure that both requests come from the same origin.




Figure 1: Screenshot of account page before attack is executed





Figure 2: Screenshot of account page after attack is executed. This was accomplished by simply navigating to the attack page's HTML on the VM

## Target 2: XSS

In this case the weakness is that user input is not scrubbed before it is inserted into the webpage. All user input needs to be considered as being malicious and must be validated (<https://www.sitepoint.com/php-security-cross-site-scripting-attacks-xss/>). Proper validation of user input could prevent this attack, or simply not echoing back the user input into the webpage. The input should be validated, sanitized, and any escape characters should be treated as literal characters, not their escaped equivalents.



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Georgia Tech Payroll System - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar displays "payroll.gatech.edu/index.php". The page features the Georgia Tech logo and the title "Georgia Tech Accounting and Payroll System". It contains two login sections: "Please log in" and "First time? Register here:". The "Please log in" section has fields for "account ID:" and "Password:" with a "Log In" button. The "First time? Register here:" section has fields for "Name:", "account ID:", "Password", and "Repeat password" with a "Register" button. The layout and styling are identical to a normal login page, but the URL in the address bar is suspicious.

Figure 3: Malicious login page. Note that the look is identical and the address is the same as the normal login page




Figure 4: After successful login, email is sent with username and password information

### Target 3: SQL Injection

The vulnerability here is that the SQL query in `index.php` (or more specifically `auth.php`) is not properly validated before it is used. Single quotes are not removed from the input string. In fact, it seems that this website does not employ whitelisting as recommended. As such, it is possible to inject SQL commands into the query, allowing the user to login even without a password. Use whitelisting to prevent this attack or better input validation, though whitelisting is preferred. Alternatively, a parameterized query can be used in order to distinguish between code and data.



*Figure 5: Attack webpage with existing username in input field*




Figure 6: After clicking submit, successfully log into account for Bob

In general, OWASP is a great resource to consult on how to prevent these attacks.

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_\(Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL\\_Injection\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)