Part I
Foucault and education

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Introduction

Michel Foucault is an enigma: an iconoclast and intellectual who appears to come from nowhere (Lemert and Gilien 1982) and to claim no intellectual lineage. Describing himself, he said (Foucault 1984b: 383f.):

> I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares on the political checkerboard, (me after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal, etc. An American professor complained that a crypto-Marxist like me was invited to the USA, and I was denounced by the press in Eastern Europe for being an accomplice of the dissidents. None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean something. And I must admit that I rather like what they mean.

Foucault should be token for himself and not classified neatly into recognizable categories.

Academics, however, seem exasperated that Foucault does not fit into recognizable categories and does not employ recognizable methodologies. Some historians (e.g., Maxcy 1977) see him as a structuralist; others object that he plays fast and loose with historical data and time, appealing to concepts like rupture and discontinuity which, they claim, fail to explain (Megill 1979). Philosophers find him incoherent, or protest that his methodology wavers between the philosophical, the politically strategic, and a moral onslaught (Fraser 1985). Marxists believe that what appears as a radical position on the Left cuts across the central and basic tenets of Marxism, or perhaps transcends Marxism because it is a critique of these assumptions. In some cases, Foucault is seen as providing important insights into individualization and the operation of forms of power. One Marxist suggests, more radically, that the classic discourse of socialism is rendered problematic' (Smart 1983,1986).

But Foucault, like many French intellectuals, did not write just for an academic audience; for example, works such as *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (Foucault 1979a) were read by both criminologists and criminals alike. However, a burgeoning array of academic critiques attests to the interest that his work has aroused in academic and professional circles. In general, however, Foucault has been ignored by educationalists.

References are made to Foucault by educationalists interested in questions of social control and the exercise of power. With the exception of a chapter in a book by Madan Sarap (1982), these are generally passing references to his analysis of power. There are, however, some major exceptions. Henriques *et al.* (1984) explore the ways in which psychology is involved in constructions of the individual and society. In particular, Valerie Walkerdine (1984) examines the work of Jean Piaget in a section devoted to the effects of psychological practices in the social regulation of practices and the construction of notions of the individual. She adopts a Foucault-type approach to argue that the developmental psychology of Piaget, in so far as it has been

adopted by a child-centred pedagogy, has not had any hoped-for liberating effect but, rather, has become part of a set of scientifically legitimated practices whose object is the developing child. She argues that such practices through surveillance, observation, and classification normalize children but do not seem to acknowledge or even understand the point that the developing child is an 'object' produced by those very same practices (see also Walkerdine 1986).

It should be noted that Walkerdine's interest is in the notion of the developing child and the ways in which psychology has produced this 'subject' as its object for scientific investigation and thereby prohibits other formulations of the individual-social dualism. Her approach is to concentrate upon Foucault as archaeologist looking for the set of sociohistorical conditions that has permitted this 'subject' to become an object of scientific investigation. But Foucault is to shift his ground in his later work away from epistemes and archaeology *per set* and towards bio-power and how this produces subjects of certain kinds. Though he was to concentrate on modern forms of sexuality, his concern was more with the ways in which these were produced by modern forms of power. The developing child was not his concern as such; neither was psychology *per se*. The subject of the developing child reveals a particular set of parameters along which individuals are normalized. Thus WaLkerdine would be compatible with Foucault in that she has correctly seen that the notion of the developing child is not liberating. Yet her project, challenging the reduction of problems to formulations in terms of 'the child's acquisition of and 'the development of is seen by ha as a prerequisite to the reconstruction of a new 'liberating' psychological subject Foucault was not interested in the truth of such matters within the human sciences.

An archaeological approach is adopted also by Jones and Williamson (1979) to determine the discursive conditions that made possible the emergence of types of statements on mass popular education and pedagogic practices in the nineteenth century. As they freely admit, they concentrate upon 'writings of the nineteenth century' and the relations between these writings. Whilst their conclusion - that schooling cannot be reduced to notions of social control and socialization but should rather be seen in terms of the extension of forms of modern power or the securing of governance - is certainly very compatible with Foucault, their approach is perhaps rather narrow, concentrating as it does upon statements (which Foucault was to abandon). Foucault insisted also that the site for analysis must be the present. Jones and Williamson's 'present' is the nineteenth century.

Hoskin (1979) interprets examinations as essentially normalization procedures. Hie examination is an important part of school ritual and, for Foucault, an essential aspect of the exercise of power. Hoskin concentrates on the written statement, but Foucault's later comments on power relations direct attention to much wider notions of practices and methodology.

Arnold Davidson (1986) argues that for Foucault archaeology and genealogy are very different methodologies. The differences can be represented by these two succinct comments on 'truth':

> '[T]ruth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements....
>
> 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which induces it and which extends it A 'regime' of truth.

For example, in relation to sexuality, archaeology would identify changes in the rules for the production of discourse that first made it possible to speak about sexuality, and not merely sex, whereas genealogy would Indicate that sexuality was a positive product of power, incited by techniques of surveillance and examination. The former attempts to isolate the level of discursive practices and formulate the rules for the production and transformation of such practices, whereas the latter widens the scope of inquiry and concentrates on the forces and relations of power

connected to discursive practices. Power-knowledge is necessary for genealogy but not for archaeology.

It is not clear, however, that the radical nature of Foucault's thinking has been grasped by the majority of educationalists. Foucault does not just speak about such things as power, domination, and the construction of subjects in ways that can be tacked on, so to say, to resistance theory, reproduction theory, or whatever. Instead, his views radically undercut the ways in which such talk, as well as more traditional liberal talk of education, is even formulated.

While there is much that is problematic in his work (see Hoy 1986 for a collection of critical papers on Foucault), nevertheless what he says on the philosophy of the subject and the form in which power has come to be exercised in modern states is, as Walzer (1986) says, 'right enough to be disturbing'. Foucault's major concern is with what can be called loosely 'the philosophy of the subject', by which he means a problematic dominating modern way of thought, that privileges the subject as the foundation of all knowledge and of all signification. His philosophical project is to investigate the ways in which discourses and practices have transformed human beings into subjects of a particular kind. It is important to note that for him, 'subject' is systematically ambiguous; it means both being tied to someone else by control and dependence, and being tied to one's own identity by a conscience or self- knowledge.

These senses are not contradictory for Foucault. The subject is the basis upon which discourse is founded and, at the same time, the mode of objectification which transforms human beings into subjects. Such discourse serves all attempts at understanding, defining, and conceptualizing what it is to be human. In other words, 'subject' carries the twin meaning of an active knowing subject and of an object being acted upon - a product of discourse. In terms of discourse we can say that the subject both speaks and is spoken of; in epistemological terms we can say with Foucault (1970 : 323) that 'man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows'.

Foucault can be understood as launching a strong critical attack upon liberal post-enlightenment notions that enlightenment is to be obtained by a form of maturity achieved through the use of reason. Foucault, whilst acknowledging the importance of Kant's attempt to preserve the normative role of reason in the face of the collapse of metaphysics, sees Kant's philosophy as a response to a particular historical situation (Foucault 1984a). What Foucault sees as important and distinctive in Kant's thought is that it arises from and in response to his own sociohistorical condition. According to Foucault's (1984a) account of Kant,

> the way out that characterises Enlightenment is a process that releases us from the status of 'immaturity'. And by 'immaturity', he means a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us where the use of reason is called for.

This sense of enlightenment is important to Foucault as it permits a point of departure into what Foucault and others have termed an attitude of modernity, in which the notion of man as a rationally autonomous subject is a focus for critique.

Modern power has emerged in the name of governance. This latter notion is introduced by Foucault in his important paper 'Governmentality' (Foucault 1979b). In this paper he traces a shift in the relations between the sovereign and individuals from the time of Machiavelli to the modern state. Foucault notes a shift in thinking of obedience to a violent and imposed power where property was protected at any cost, towards a theme of governance of the self, children, family, and state. This notion of governance is identified initially in the notion of a family as model but modern notions of governance and power emerge when the family is seen no longer as a model but becomes instead the instrument of government Here the emergence of economic theory was

important because it permitted the identification of problems specific to populations and not reducible to the dimension of the family.

Population and its welfare then become the central theme of governance, according to Foucault. The control of populations to ensure political obedience and a docile and useful workforce for the demands of an emerging capitalism become the central concerns in this art of governance.

Rather than the violent exercise of power of the sovereign upon the body of the subject (see the harrowing account of the public execution of Damiens in the opening pages of Foucault's (1979a) *Discipline and Punish*), we see instead the emergence of lenience with offenders and other people classified as delinquent From the violence of Damiens' public execution we move to a quiet, ordered, and private scenario in which peoples' abilities and knowledge about themselves are gently and quietly shaped in a gende, 'caring' institution. There were many such institutions to emerge but Foucault notes in particular the prison, hospital, asylum, military, work place, and school. Within such institutions knowledge has been developed about people, and their behaviour, attitudes, and self-knowledge have been developed, refined, and used to shape individuals. These discourses and practices have not only been used to change us in various ways but are also used to legitimate such changes, as the knowledge gained is deemed to be 'true'.

Foucault identifies this knowledge, developed by the exercise of power and used in turn to legitimate further exercises of power, as power-knowledge (Foucault 1981). He refers to the institutions at which this power has been or is exercised as disciplinary institutions.

Disciplinary institutions organize physical space and time with activities that have been developed over time to change people's behaviour along a number of parameters. Here the examination plays a critical role, for it determines not only whether a person is governable that is, likely to lead a docile, useful, and practical life - but also because it identifies to the individual the 'true' self, whereby (s)he becomes classified as an object in various ways for others and is tied to the 'true' self as a subjected or politically dominated being.

This true self is a person with certain beliefs about him/herself. These descriptions in part permit the individual to be dominated through these classifications as hyperactive, homosexual, autonomous rational being, and so on. But in Foucault's thought these true selves are but fictions or constructions as there is no real *man*. In particular, autonomous man is a construction of post-enlightenment and humanist thought

Foucault inverts our normal beliefs about autonomous man by adopting a particular methodology - genealogy.

Foucault as Genealogist

One may consider Foucault's work (given that he does use historical data and in as much as this makes some historians shudder) as writing a new kind of history. Given the present splintering of history and historical methodology, there may be something to be said for this interpretation. In what ways then, if at all, is Foucault presenting us with a 'new' history?

At one time history could have been conceived as narrative writing within the humanities, concerned with great events, great people, and the emergence of our constitution and institutions. However, this comfortable arena has now been invaded by what can loosely be called 'social history'. Social history introduced not just a different set of topics such as the family, women, and classes, but also brought with it from other social science disciplines a bewildering number of

methodologies. These include economics, class analysis from sociology, and 'thick' interpretation from anthropology. Methodology in history had always been disputed historically, at a meta-level by philosophers, but this was a new conflict at the level of *doing* history.

The basic impact of Foucault's work is historical (with strong implications for philosophy) and its differences from other social history force consideration of these general questions. Whilst his work is read across a wide variety of disciplines, his work is often seen by historians as *anti-history* in the sense that he is not at all interested in pursuing these questions and revitalizing an hlstoriographic tradition once seen as sound. His work can be said to be anti-history in the following general ways.

1. He writes no complete history of the past *Discipline and Punish* opens with the execution of Damiens and ends with an analysis of the carceral, but is not treated as a development or emergence of one form of punishment rather than another. Historical data are suddenly injected into his 'story' with no apparent theory of selection. It is not perhaps the best account of the past of the prison, as it really was (see, e.g., Rusche and Kircheimer 1939). What annoys historians is that Foucault fully agrees on this point, claiming that he was not trying to present a conventional history. But if not, what was he trying to do? In what ways is his work historical?
2. He does not advance historical causes. For example, in the same work he notes the sudden incarceration of people in the early nineteenth century but gives no explanation, even though the fact of incarceration is critical for his account of the human sciences. At best, he identifies spaces in which possibilities were created and whereby certain events were 'outcomes'. But these were not causal outcomes. It might be thought that various moves in law, demography, and the rise of capitalism, say, might indicate a space out of which incarceration was a possible causal outcome. That is, we understand it because it makes sense against our general knowledge and understanding of human affairs. But the problem with Foucault is that he presents us with new relationships, and ones that present a new landscape. Given past understandings, there is not even a possible causal relationship.
3. Foucault employs a bewildering amount of data drawn from widely different sources. Details of the construction of military installations are juxtaposed in *Discipline and Punish* with details of the construction of hospitals, schools, and prisons. These at first sight are different kinds of structures, meeting different kinds of needs. Yet the analytic grid of power-knowledge which Foucault employs shows a new relationship between these constructions. Foucault has returned to the analysis of space, claiming that since Kant, western thought has been dominated by philosophical considerations of time. But why these spaces? Why not the home as in, for example, Philippe Aries (1962)? Why select these spaces rather than the home? Foucault does not tell us. The analytic grid of power-knowledge is not much help either as the home might well be selected as an appropriate locus for an analysis of power relations at the micro-level favoured by Foucault. If there is a theory for the selection of this data then it is not articulated or immediately obvious.
4. Foucault provides us with no teleological unfolding of reason in general, or the reasoning of particular thinkers or of great men. Indeed, in so far as he turns to reason, it is often to the house of unreason - the madhouse. There is no notion of a future for mankind, or of history preventing us from reliving our mistakes. Yet reason is, in

Foucault's history, a product of socio-historicai circumstances. Nevertheless, there is no account of history that provides hope or suggests ways to avoid a return to the abyss. At best, Foucault says that he is writing the history of the present, of the conditions that make us think now that we are people of a certain kind. History will not then offer us liberation from forms of domination.

5. Neither is Foucault writing a history of ideas, though this was the title of the chair which he held at the prestigious College de France. History of ideas tends to be written as though there is a development or emergence of an object in a more or less continuous or rational fashion. Against this view Foucault believes that there is no one object such as madness which can be tracked through time. There are ruptures that not only cut across the emergence or development of themes but which also make the notion of the continuous existence of an object called 'madness' problematic. Objects are constituted in particular epistemes and these have to be first understood.
6. Foucault can be seen as following Nietzsche's views on history (Foucault 1977a). There is little doubt that Nietzsche was adapted for Foucault's ends. Megill (1979) refers to it as a 'presentist' view of history.

But in so far as Foucault uses Nietzsche, he may not be fully responsible for the Nietzsche revival in France. According to Lash (1984) this responsibility should be attributed to Gilles Deleuze. Lash claims further that Foucault was heavily influenced by 'Deleuze's infectious interpretations of the May-June days'. While there can be no doubt that the events of May-June 1968 did affect Foucault (he states this himself on several occasions) nevertheless, it must be noted that Foucault was very well acquainted with Nietzsche as he had, after all, taught courses on him.

In the paper 'Nietzsche, history, genealogy' (Foucault 1977a) Nietzschean themes on the nature and role of history are asserted. Instead of leaching outwards towards an objective truth, history turns inwards for Foucault, becoming story, plot, myth, and fabrication. It is something that is to be used in the present and for the future; it is not something that captures 'reality', and certainly not a reality of the past In this sense then we can begin to see why Foucault is alleged to write anti-history.

He develops two Nietzschean concepts in this paper: the concepts of *herkunft* (descent), and *enstehung* (emergence). These are contrasted in the article against the notion of origin. On the differences, he says (Foucault 1977a; 144):

> A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their 'origins', will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and the accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked as the face of the other.

Genealogy as descent is not a continuous and uninterrupted notion. There is a multiplicity of factors that must be unravelled from lowly sources and subjugated knowledges that will play havoc with notions of continuity. There are errors and accidents to be discovered which will disturb notions of order. The search for descent is not a search for firm foundations; on the contrary, it discovers moving sands, fragmented and incoherent events with faults, more, omissions, faulty appraisals, and pious claims and aspirations. The move is in general to show that 'historical truths' rest upon complex, contingent, and fragile ground.

The concept of emergence sees the present not in any final way, as a result of historical development, but rather as a stage in the warlike confrontation between opposing forces in the

quest for control and domination. Historical developments are conceptualized then as manifestations of stable mechanisms of governance, as exercises of power to restore stability, or as out-and-out contests or struggles. Emergence concentrates on domination-subjection relationships as exemplifying the underlying balances of political forces. We are to look at historical 'developments' then not as culminations of historical processes, intentions of great actors, or hidden political designs, but instead, as manifestations of the balances of power over people, though no one parson or collective may have exercised that power or ultimately be held responsible.

In brief then, genealogy disrupts historical form by concentrating on historical objects not usually considered the province of historical enquiry - even in contemporary approaches under the rubric of social history. Hie body, for example, occupies a central theoretical position for both Foucault and Nietzsche, though their accounts differ (Lash 1984). The madhouse becomes a site for genealogical analysis of reason; the gaze or surveillance, a critical element in the development of modern power, and so on (for detailed analyses of these sites, see Cousins and Hussain 1984).

But, it might properly be objected, enough of this general account of genealogical method. What would one do if one did genealogy? What does Foucault do? How does genealogy work in practice? It is difficult to answer this short of reading or providing a total analysis, say, of *Discipline and Punish.* Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to look at the book's structure, presentation, and argument, in so far as these reflect genealogical method.

First, the book is divided into four sections, covering the 'history' of punishment from brutality to what might be called 'the gentle way'. The third section on discipline is concerned with generalizing the notion of discipline into wider contexts, or with seeing how discipline is diffused into many institutional settings. The fourth section is an analysis of the function of nineteenth-century prisons. The third section on discipline is the major section of the book and structurally represents a rupture or discontinuity with the earlier two sections. Similarly, the fourth section, returning as it does to an analysis of the functioning of the prison, represents a rupture with section three, which had been concerned with the infiltration of discipline throughout the social body. These structural breaks in presentation are important because the book is itself representative in its structure of the methodology that it purports to employ. There are important reasons for this, found in Foucault's total critique of modern culture, and especially in his views as to what was involved in being an author and thinking differently and creatively (Foucault 1977b).

Donnelly (1982) argues that these four sections employ different methodologies: the first two sections involve a genealogy of the birth of the prison, the third an evolutionary account of the general diffusion of discipline, and the fourth section a functionalist account of the later prison. I am not sure that Donnelly is correct, but in the first instance we will look at the first two sections which Donnelly seems happy to characterize as genealogical.

First, though the first two sections might be treated as a general history of the prison, this would be mistaken. It would be mistaken because Foucaalt is not primarily concerned with the prison - he is not writing a history of the prison - but is instead concerned with the present. The story that is told of the prison is an interpretation meant to help us understand modern power. Second, his concern is with the exercise of power so that the story of the 'emergence' of the prison is based on this aspect for the selection of data. Third, he detaches his 'history' of the prison from its traditional home in the juridical-legal framework - essentially the spheres of law and criminology (including early jurist versions of social contract theory). In asking the questions of

how power is exercised in general and how people are punished in particular, Foucault shifts enquiry from the 'what' and 'why' of punishment, and gives new insight to those who are interested, as philosophers, criminologists, and sociologists, in punishment or its effects.

This is clearly a Nietzschean turn. Foucault's concern is not with writing on the emergence of the prison or as seeing this as an evolution towards more humane treatment of offenders, or as the rational outcome of post-enlightenment knowledge of man. In the very selection of his data he is a Nietzschean and far from neutral observer, concerned to reconstruct facts as they really were. He is not so much concerned with facts as events. These are best exemplified, perhaps, by the complexity of *I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered my Mother, my Sister and my Brother* (Foucault 1975). In this co-authored book a whole arena of competing discourses are brought together as an event - the trial of a peasant boy for murdering three members of his family. The cacophony caused in the space where these discourses intersect shows us the complexity of any event; on the evidence, his 'guilt' is most difficult to decide, especially when his own lucid story is added to the space.

If the early sections of *Discipline and Punish* were seen as mere narrative, the 'story' would go like this. First, the old style of punishment is analysed and shown to be rational, though incredibly brutal by modern sensibilities. Second, programmes for penal reform from the judiciary, ideologues, and reformers are introduced, with none granted the distinction of being a causal move towards new forms of punishment. Third, contemporary practices of discipline and their concern with the pathology of the person rather than with acts against the law, are introduced. Finally, in these sections we are introduced to the notion that the prison becomes the main form of punishment But in this story there is no sense of a continuous development, no causal arguments, and no sense of the origins of the prison in some preceding 'facts'.

Rather, we are presented right at the outset with a very violent landscape - the public execution of the regicide Damiens. This can be contrasted very sharply with the later description of the activities in prison of young offenders. On the one hand we have the violent, horrible details of Damiens' execution as he died one thousand deaths; on the other hand, and only 80 years later, we have what appears to be an account of an institution in which the care, training, and rehabilitation of young offenders is of paramount concern, and which appears to be a forebear of a more modern, caring society. The contrast is not to shock (though it is certainly to defamiliarize) but rather to contrast two ways of exercising power. Indeed, he goes on to argue that what we find horrible and irrational in the case of Damiens is, given certain sociohistorical conditions, quite rational. On this issue Charles Taylor (1986) says, 'I find Foucault quite convincing'. But how can something be meaningful which, from our twentieth-century perspective in which the individual seems so important, seems to be only irrational barbarism? Here Foucault's point is that maybe this twentieth-century perspective is not as rational or as 'evolved' as we think, but merely different. This then opens up the possibility of viewing the changes in punishment as changes in the technologies of power and, viewed from this perspective, in the modern prison we are exercising power just as the king did on the body of Damiens. It is a different kind of power, but power nevertheless.

Foucault has shown us in the present that (modern) power permeates our society by tracking the disappearance of one form of punishment and its replacement by another. By asking the question of how punishment is exercised, he is able to show us how modern power is exercised. The body, which was also important for Nietzsche, remains the locus of the application of power, but it is a power not meant to destroy but to save; it is no longer so much a power over life but a power to make life. It is not a power exercised in public space with pomp and splendour, but power exercised in private concealed spaces. Space is an important concept in this analysis and it

is developed and discussed fully in section three. So, in answer to Donnelly (1982), the method of genealogy continues into section three with the contrasts between public space and cosmic order, and private space and normalcy.

In the public space of section one where order is manifested, individuals are made aware of their place in the grand cosmic order as it is restored by public executions on the scaffold. Spaces in the new form of power operate differently. It is important therefore for the genealogical method to continue into section three.

We are presented with changes in judicial practices, changes in patterns of offences, the development of disciplinary practices, and the control of populations through the control of bodies and souls - or 'bio-power', as it is called. But these changes are not familiar changes, and they are presented as changes, or differences, without underlying explanations. For example, incarceration becomes very popular although it had existed in the *ancien régime*, albeit not as a form of punishment Suddenly, and within a very short space of time, everyone is incarcerated; change, yes but explained, no, according to Foucault.

The violent landscape with which Foucault presents us depends then upon the denial of more traditional approaches to historical data. Punishment is not merely repressive and cannot be seen merely within the juridical-legal framework. It should be considered within the wider disciplinary roles of the human sciences.

Implications for Educational Research

Clearly, a genealogical approach to educational research would involve considerable shifts in methodology and outcomes. Where and how might a Foucault approach proceed in education? Where should or might such research proceed and what general procedures would be followed?

First, whilst several general points on genealogy have been made, and Foucault's approach in *Discipline and Punish* outlined, it must be stated that Foucault does not offer a systematic theory of genealogy - he was opposed to any such systematization. Second, what he says he does and what he does in fact do arc sometimes different; for example, section four of *Discipline and Punish* is not genealogical. But in general it can be said that he offers educational research a new framework - not for studying the past, but for assessing the present. The general framework is constituted by an analytic grid of power-knowledge, the method of genealogy, and new notions of time, especially of rupture and discontinuity.

Genealogy, however, takes each issue separately, exploring it in minute detail and reconstructing events so as to take account of subjugated and neglected knowledges. However, Foucault's failure to articulate this theory makes its application problematic. Rather than theorize about its limits of application, it may be better to see what can be done in practice.

The analytic grid is power-knowledge. The methodological imperative then is to examine processes of modern power in modern schools. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault questions how punishment has been exercised in modern times and in the *ancien régime*. In answering this question the school surfaces on many occasions as a disciplinary block. Yet it must be emphasized that Foucault, even if he is writing a 'history' of the prison, is certainly not writing a history of the school. Schools enter as exemplifications of the exercise of power and the emergence of modern power. Yet they are not merely exemplifications of modern power because the school was an important site in which techniques and strategies of power were developed and

refined. Perhaps what is needed is a study entitled 'Discipline and punish: the birth of the school', which would provide a unique analysis of the use and refinement of power-knowledge in the modern school in the cause of governance.

Important as the work of Walkerdine is, its concerns seem to be with the way in which the object - the developing child - has been constructed within developmental psychology and child-centred education. Foucault is of course intensely interested in the constitution of various types of subject like the developing child, but his major concern might be said to be the way in which forms of modern power constitute the subject - the developing child. Walkerdine of course realizes that the notion of the developing child is not one that permits a genuine liberation and that it is such versions of the subject, framed as they are within versions of a post-enlightenment humanist, or liberal framework, that are major concerns for Foucault. However, her concerns and approach are more with the conditions that have permitted a scientifically based and legitimated pedagogy based upon this notion of the subject to have emerged. In other words, her interests seem to be more in archaeological matters and epistemes than with how modern power per se permeates the modern school.

In an interview very soon before his untimely death, this point was reiterated by Foucault (1988):

> My problem has always been ...the problem of the relationship between subject and truth. How does the subject enter into a certain game of truth?... So it was that I was led to pose the problem power-knowledge, which is not for me the fundamental problem but an instrument allowing the analysis - in a way that seems to me to be the most exact - of the problem of the relationships between subject and games of truth.

This form of power also produces other games of truth and other notions of subjectivity within the school. More recently, in response to moral and social pressures we have seen the emergence of the hyperactive child and we may be about to witness the arrival of the unemployable child and the 'at-risk' child. If Foucault's thesis is correct these also must depend upon how modern power permeates the school and how a variety of other conflicting notions of the dichotomy of the individual and society can produce such subjects. That is, their production does not seem to depend upon quite the same notion of individual/social and requires wider data than that used by Walkerdine in her discussion of the developing child.

What is required then is a general question about the nature of modern power in the contemporary school. This should be an account that shows the general possibility of the developing child and the at-risk child, as well as other forms of subjectivity. In one of his last comments on power Foucault outlines a general grid for the analysis of power relations.

In general he says that an analysis of power relations should be conducted under five main headings (Foucault 1983a):

1. The systems of differentiations established by law, traditions, economic conditions, and so on which give some *prima facie* position for power relationships to be brought into play. For example, the legal, traditional, and pedagogic status of the teacher provides conditions for bringing power into play.
2. The types of Objectives pursued intentionally by those who act upon the actions of others when power relations are brought into existence. For example, the teacher may be pursuing pedagogical objectives yet bringing modern power into play through nonnalization procedures.

3. The means of bringing power relations into play, by force, compliance, consent, surveillance, economic reward, and so on,
4. Forms of institutionalization. These may be a mixture of legal, traditional, hierarchical structures such as the family, the military, or the school.
5. The degree of rationalization that, depending upon the situation, endows, elaborates, and legitimates processes for the exercise of power. Much of the early talk in the philosophy of education of teachers being *in* authority and *an* authority might be conceived in this light

Clearly, Foucault provides us with no ready-made formula for analysing power in education. Nevertheless, these is a programme here which, combined with a genealogical approach that tends to show that the present and its discourse/practice is not as rational, humane, or developed as we might think, can throw genuine insight into what we are doing with children in the name of education. But this programme needs yet to be undertaken in education.

Finally, Foucault's analysis of power has disturbing implications for us as educationalists and educational researchers.

1. In suspending the normative notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy, Foucault directs our attention with his concept of power to a host of shaping processes - learning to speak, read, and write, for example-which the liberal framework would not normally identify as acting contrary to the interests of the child. In recent liberal discussions of power in education, power is considered to be exercised only when it is contrary to the interests of the child (White 1983; Burbules 1986). But, to draw upon the developing child example, the notion of development is already heavily value-laden, depending upon the ways of identifying the subject - the developing child - and thus what is in the child's interests, for example, acquiring the concept X, is far from clear.
2. He directs our attention here because in pursuing such educational objectives we are bringing into play modern power which is directed towards governmentality and a form of political domination. There is a fragile element even in classical liberal theory. In the case of Hobbes, as Pasquino (1986) reminds us, there is the need for discipline to ensure obedience to the contract. In *De Cive* (vol. 1), Hobbes says that 'men can only become political subjects *ex disciptina'*. And in *Leviathan* there is considerable discussion of how this is to be achieved through education (Marshall 1981). Much of the talk of liberal education ignores what Hobbes, and Rousseau, were very well aware of, namely discipline. It is somewhat ironic to find at the very basis of classical liberal theory the recognition both of the necessity to ensure obedience to the contract and the realization that this is to be achieved through education. If we marry this to the traditional view of the educational pursuit of the rationally autonomous person then it would appear that such persons would be governable and not 'free'.
3. Whilst modern power permeates all of modern society, according to Foucault, it was developed and refined essentially in the disciplines and still has important bases and sources of legitimation in the disciplines and associated human sciences.
4. In the disciplines there are found certain views of man as a moral agent, sexual being, learner, or whatever. In the normalizing procedures of examination and 'confession' people are classified as objects and the truth about them is 'revealed' to themselves. In constituting the subject in these ways, modern power produces governable individuals.

Foucault seems extremely pessimistic about the possibilities of resistance and

deinstitutionalizing knowledge because we seem so enmeshed in power processes that we are hardly conscious of and therefore may not understand. It is not therefore a question of the redistribution of education, its reorganization, or its cleansing of ideological content-familiar enough demands from the left and those concerned about equality and education. Education, because of modern power, must take on a new form in which freedom is not the traditional freedom which is meant to be achieved under the guise of rational autonomy.

Clearly, Foucault (1988) is arguing for a form of freedom but it is not one that he was ever to articulate fully.

5. As professionals we must take note of Foucault's violent landscapes. He claims that he is not trying to ridicule, supplant, or falsify other approaches to power, but rather that he is trying to offer us another aspect, or another mask, that reality 'wears'. In his view, we don't have to have a total world view to resist and oppose forms of political subjection and domination; we can do it at any point in time, as the various resistance groups in the western world are showing us. But the problem is to recognize when modern power is being exercised and whether resistance is the appropriate response. Foucault denies that he holds any explicit normative position, but without one, it is most difficult to see how to proceed. On these matters, some of his critics see him as incoherent (Rorty 1984 , Taylor 1984).

There are then two broad parameters for educational research to pursue: first, in the area of the analysis of power relations in the contemporary school in accordance with the grid outlined above and Foucault's later (1983a) definitions of power and other concomitant relationships. Second, within the particular human sciences associated with education there is a need for more work like that of Walkerdine's in the search for practices that do not produce liberated children when such forms of 'liberation' are presupposed in the very formulation and practices of the production process.

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3 Foucault under examination

The crypto-educationalist unmasked

Keith Hoskin

The Mysterious Case of Discipline

Foucault was always one for rendering the familiar strange. He was also one to engage in a relentless pursuit of understanding the strangeness that he discovered behind the mask of familiarity. Now that his life's work has passed the definitive full-stop of death is perhaps the time to render that work, which has been rendered familiar by the large and flourishing Foucault industry, strange to itself. To do so is to investigate nothing other than 'the mysterious case of discipline', with all of its subplots: power-knowledge, the self, bio-power, the clinical gaze, and so on. But perhaps such an investigation, like all good detective stories, is really very simple, and it is just that we do not realize it until we reach the end. Let me at least suggest as much: Foucault really discovered something very simple (but highly unfamiliar nevertheless) - the centrality of education in the construction of modernity. Thus the mysterious case of discipline is solved by investigating it as an essentially educational mystery.

I intend hare to put Foucault himself under examination: to question what he meant by 'power-knowledge', to ask why he would have such strange digressions at the heart of certain texts (apparently obsessed with examining himself), and thus to answer a further question. Where does examining him and his work leave us? The conclusion will be transparent long before we reach the end. What he was doing all the time was an educational analysis, whether he thought he was talking about power or knowledge. Thus an early work, from his so-called 'archaeological' period, like *The Order of Things* (1966), is about nothing other than the nature of certain fields of knowledge - general grammar, natural history, and the analysis of wealth - and their transformation into other fields - philology, biology, and political economy - fields which, far from being logical consequents, were bizarre dislocations of their antecedents. But it is not about knowledge disembodied. It concerns the writing of one mode of knowing, the 'representational', in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and its rewriting as another mode as we move into the nineteenth. What we confront here is, of course, a problem in educational history. How did one series of generations who wrote and constructed modes of knowing in one fashion (Foucault's representational episteme) give way to another series of generations who wrote quite different modes? By learning to write in a new register, obviously. But how did the young ones learn this? By learning under the tutelage of the old generation. So Foucault has bequeathed us an educational history mystery. Nowhere in his work does he allow the easy solution that tempts the easy-going historian: either to attribute the change to socio-political or economic (i.e., external) reasons like the French or Industrial Revolutions, or to resort to internal, individualist explanation (change as the result of towering geniuses having new insights). He leaves us with a conundrum: somehow, even as the young one were being taught in the old register, under the old episteme,

they must have been learning how to learn in a new one. And how interesting - what they produced, out of an old, mosdy forgotten set of knowledges, was something recognizably like the modern knowledge 'disciplines'.

Coincidence? There, not for the first or last time, is the word which is so intimately woven into the Foucault project, particularly when one begins to investigate the construct he named *pouvoir-savoir,* or power-knowledge. For 'discipline' is such a marvellously supple term. It turns the ambiguous trick of serving both sides of his power-knowledge equation. Yet what is discipline, and whence does it come?

The answer to that little mystery is easily given. It comes from the Latin *disciplina,* and in the Latin it has the same double meanings that it retains today, referring both to the ancient knowledge arts such as philosophy, music, and rhetoric, and to the problems of power, as for instance in *disciplina militaris* (military discipline). Etymologically, the term is a collapsed form of *discipulina,* which is concerned with getting 'learning' (the *disci-* half) into the 'child' *(puer /puella* represented in the *pu*syllable in *-pulina*). Thus in its very etymological beginning the term is an educational one, and even there it manifests the two sides of a power-knowledge equation. For it concerns *ab initio* the dual process: the discipline that is presenting a certain knowledge to the learner, and the discipline of keeping the learner present before the knowledge. It concerns those technologies of control whose extreme form then was the *disciplina militaris*: yet it never ceases to concern the process of teaching and the objects of instruction.

Thus we have a promising clue. Discipline derives from an educational beginning, as *disciplina* , and appears intimately implicated in what Foucault would ultimately name as power-knowledge from its beginning. However, promising clues have a habit of turning out to be red herrings, and we must not put all our trust in etymology. Perhaps it is just coincidence, and Foucault had no educational object or discourse in view when he spoke of discipline, disciplinary power, and power-knowledge. We must proceed - *metis naturellement* - to the scene of the crime, the textual edifice he has left behind, and see what clues may be lurking in wait for us there. But as we go we should recall the lesson of every detective story: however hard people try to conceal and dissimulate the truth, that truth always reveals itself as their *modus operandi* discloses a hitherto unremarked pattern. But it reveals itself only to the true detective who knows how to examine and read what is, in retrospect, under the noses of everyone all the time. (Texts, of course, are always under one's nose as one reads them.)

Foucault under Examination

There is one particular text in which, with no argument, Foucault has recourse to an educational discourse at the very heart of the text, and offers us some well-made and thought-provoking ideas on the dynamics of educational practice. The text is *Discipline and Punish,* perhaps the most widely cited of his works in the Anglo-Saxon world over the past decade. The central section of the hook is entitled 'The means of correct training'. It contends, in brief, that discipline as exercised upon the parson, so as to produce 'docile bodies' (the term 'docile', interestingly, has its own educational connotation, being from the Latin *docilis,* or teachable), derives from little practices, or 'micro-technologies'. These micro-technologies bring together the exercise of power and the constitution of knowledge, in the organization of space and time along ordered lines, so as

to facilitate constant forms of surveillance and the operation of evaluation and judgment. This is, be it noted, in a book directly inspired by and focused upon the problematic of the prison within the modem world, and the power of what Foucault called 'the carceral'. Its enduring metaphor - so often cited since Foucault recovered it from long oblivion - is of the panopticon, the 'all-seeing eye' of a surveillance which is also a judgment, which does not even have to be looking to make one feel watched. Yet this metaphor is only the crowning evocation of the book, not its heart At that heart the concern with the carceral recedes, subordinated to a deeper problematic: that of discipline in general. Behind the Panopticon we find a particular and special micro-technology, identified as that which 'combines the deployment of force and the establishment of truth': the examination (Foucault 1977: 184).

Here is our obvious and non-controversial educational connection. The examination is, of all technologies, the most obviously educational, more so even than discipline, which tends over-easily to be misread as a technique solely of power and control. Both should be read as power-knowledge technologies, but as Foucault himself says, 'the superimposition of the power relations and the knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance' (1977: 185). (Of course this is not to deny that examinations are with much frequency and justification attacked as anti-educational. We are simply talking of the power of a technology whose genesis is educational; that examination, in all its varying forms, has maintained and extended its power to date is undeniable.) As Foucault puts it so well, examination spreads across the human sciences 'from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnosis of diseases to the hiring of labour', functioning as 'a constant exchanger of knowledge' from the powerful (teacher, doctor, employer) to the powerless (pupil, patient, worker) but also in the other direction, as the subjects must make themselves known in answering the questions put in the examination (Foucault 1977). Thus 'in this slender technique are to be found a whole domain of knowledge, a whole type of power'.

But of course this clue is too obvious. Any commentator-detective can come along, examine the *corpus delicti*, and choose one plausible extract to build a case upon. This is what the Inspector Plodders in the detective story have done since Conan Doyle's Inspector Lestrade and, before him, Edgar Allan Poe's Parisian Prefect of Police, Monsieur G—. The true detective sees further and deeper, suspending judgment. Rightly so, when Foucault nowhere else digresses into an explicit *hommage* to the power of education; indeed, when even in this passage, he identifies the power of examination as lying outside the educational arena. It lies, in his discussion, in the medical arena, in 'the organization of the hospital as an "examining" apparatus' (Foucault 1977: 185), as much as in the school (Foucault 1977:186) as it becomes an 'apparatus of uninterrupted examination [duplicating] along its entire length the operation of teaching'. It lies also in the military and bureaucratic fields, as examination yields *(ibid.*, p. 189) 'a whole meticulous archive constituted in terms of bodies and days' so that 'a "power of writing" was constituted'. But most of all it lies in the field of individuality, in the 'formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality', in which (a) 'the examination, surrounded by all its documentary techniques, makes each individual a "case"' *(ibid.*, p. 191) but only (b) by distributing and classifying the whole range of individual cases, with all *(ibid.*, p. 192) 'the features, the measurements, the gaps, the "marks"' that make them all, taken together, a population of cases, with norms and quantifiable deviations from the norm. This, in Foucault's account, is the real locus, or axis, of examinatorial power. It lies in the reversal of what it is to be an individual. Historically, the only individuals written about were the hero-figures of society, the 'memorable man' *(ibid.*, p. 193). Now under the new power of writing and examination, ordinary 'normal' people (and, of course, their newly invented opposite, the abnormal') no longer lie 'below the threshold of description'. We invent a

new kind of individuality: 'the individuality... of the:alculable man'. This is not so much an education change as a knowledge change, in Foucault's conclusion: 'All the sciences, analyses ar practices employing the root "psycho-" have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization.' Thus the education connection can be ruled out as anything more than a chance contingency. Inspector Plodder can eliminate it from his enquiries.

Those familiar with Peter Shaffer's *Sleuth* will know that Inspector Plodder has a near-anagrammatic double and *doppelganger*, Inspector Doppler, who appreciates double bluff and all the other shifts of duplicity. He, inevitably, is more in tune with the truth for our times double truth - and the double truth of detection is that one must examine the obvious carefully in two opposite ways. First, one must examine in detail, for where better to hide a crucial tiny clue than within an obvious and therefore discounted one? Second, one must examine in the large: Poe formulated this principle of concealment in *The Purloined Letter*. In a game in which one party requires others to find a word upon 'the motley and perplexed surface' of a map, the novice chooses 'the most minutely lettered names; but the adept selects such words as stretch, in large characters, from one end of the chart to the other'. So there are two questions from Inspector Doppler: first, the easily overlooked detail. Whence come the 'marks', the numbers by which human qualities can be assigned a quantitative value? This is die precision tool that makes possible the science of the individual, as it makes possible the generation of popular statistics, norms, and deviations. Does it come from the medical, military, bureaucratic or 'psycho-' arenas? Or does it come from the educational? This question of the genesis of disciplinary power will certainly merit further enquiry. Second, the larger picture. The good Inspector, sensitive to the danger of overlooking the excessively obvious, will certainly want to know why there should be this digression into an educational, or quasi-educational, topic at the heart of a text ostensibly dealing with prisons and 'the carceral'. This apparent fascination with examination will have to be put under examination in its turn. Is it really only an isolated incident, or is it part of a larger pattern?

It is no doubt past time to leave the literary-sleuth ploy aside. However, there is a real double mystery here: first, of the fascination and examination to be found at the heart of Foucauldian texts (and of why it has been overlooked); and second, what is Foucault's power-knowledge really about, and how are we to understand it? The point of the ploy is to heighten the requisite sense of strangeness, which is necessary in putting Foucault under examination in this way.

In Search of Examination’s Mark

There is a particular passage, often quoted, in which Foucault reflected upon what power-knowledge relations might be about It comes from an interview in the mid-1970s, when he was engaged on the *Discipline and Punish* project, and he was in a position to look back over his earlier major works, *Madness and Civilization*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things*, with a new vision. In a sense, as I have already intimated, that work had as its primary object knowledge and its discourses: the knowledge necessary to construct the category 'madness', the knowledge of the body and disease necessary to constitute the 'medical subject' (or 'subject of medicine'?), and the knowledge involved in establishing and disestablishing epistemes. None of

these texts was just about knowledge or the history of ideas, as suggested by the still-unsolved mystery of what made die transition in epistemes happen. Foucault's own reflection on them says as much (Gordon 1980: 115):

> I ask myself what I could have been talking about... if not power? Yet I am perfectly aware that I practically never used the word and did not have that field of analysis at my disposal.

Foucault was talking at the point that power-knowledge was the new idea taking shape in his work, most notably in *Discipline and Punish.* (This is often seen as the first of his major 'genealogical' works, in which the concern was primarily with the practices and technologies of power, in contrast to the earlier 'archaeological' works in which in retrospect the emphasis was more on knowledge and the discourses that construct it.) But, as Foucault himself is saying here, the archaeological/ genealogical distinction should not be taken as an absolute distinction. First, he was a man of too many parts to be conveniently divided into two; second, we would be ignoring how, in all the multiplicity, there was only one project. Even in all that early concentration on knowledge discourses, what could he have been talking about, 'if not power'?

But how, specifically?

At the heart of *The Birth of the Clinic*, that text on the genesis of modern medicine and the epistemological basis for the modem concerns with health, disease, life and death, there is a digression. At the same central point *that Discipline and Punish* develops the anomalous section on "The means of correct training', *The Birth of the Clinic* has as its Chapter 5 'The lesson of the hospitals'. It too is anomalous. It abandons the epistemological concern with the invention of the modem 'medical gaze' and directs itself to die more mundane question of the reform of medical teaching, a reform which

> in a very short time... was to assume a much wider significance; it was recognized that it could reorganize the whole of medical knowledge and establish, in the knowledge of disease itself... more fundamental, more decisive forms of experience.
>
> (Foucault 1973: 64)

The details of the chapter do not need rehearsing at great length here. All that needs emphasizing is that Foucault devotes the chapter to describing how a new, professional, and rigorous mode of learning to do medicine and become a doctor was constituted: that 'how' turned out to be a new rigorous mode of examination.

He documents the cut-and-thrust of debate over the structure of medical training during the post-Revolutionary period between two groups who can loosely be called 'republicans' and 'professionalizers'. The former were committed to the maximum open dissemination of expert knowledge and training (their emblematic organization being the *Société de Santé,* which was designed as a 'free, neutral organ of information'). The latter were not against dissemination necessarily, but they were for control first and openness only as a distant second. For the former one might become a doctor 'without having attended a school' so long as there were 'proof of capacity'. For the latter, only proper training in properly constituted institutions, duly examined, would do. The outcome of the debate is important. The professionalizers carried the day for their principle of prescribed and supervised institutional training and systematic, rigorous examination. A new professional regime of training and licensing doctors came into operation. This followed the general outline of a report submitted in 1797 by Calfes (proof of the old maxim that 'he who draws up the first draft writes the final outcome'). Calfès suggested that there should be five medical schools spread around France which all physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries would

attend and in which 'studies would be checked by six examinations'. Thus all doctors would be qualified 'by a system of standardized studies and examinations' (Foucault 1973: 75-6). The final system adopted in 1803 with the full support of the Paris School of Medicine, simply improved on the draft. Where Calfcs had a simple unitary system of training, there was now a two-tier one. Six full medical schools examined and licensed doctors, while a network of teaching clinics in 20 civil hospitals provided a more basic course of instruction that would license a second category of 'health professional', the 'officers of health' whose remit was to treat the 'industrious and active poor'. The key difference between the groups was the scale of examination. The doctors did a four-year course involving four examinations and a final test in clinical medicine, 'internal or external, according to whether they wished to become physicians or surgeons'. The officers of health did only a three-year course, and then 'would be examined by a department jury' *(ibid.,* p. 80).

Foucault, indeed, does not use die word 'power'. But he describes the moment when education discovers a new positive power to construct both a new kind of social-institutional force, the modern medical profession, and a new kind of 'knowing subject', the trained and licensed professional expert These students were suddenly required to learn (and thus to learn how to learn) in a new way, particularly for the test in clinical medicine. They had to actively engage in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and then be examined on their performance, in contrast to the traditional pedagogic regime which seldom demanded active engagement of this kind, depending instead upon lecture and demonstration by the professor or teacher. Foucault himself remarks upon the change by saying (Foucault 1973:64) 'education was given a positive value as enlightenment', and expresses a sense of the historic shift in the mode of learning how to learn: 'a way of teaching and *saying* became a way of learning and *seeing'* (emphasis in the original). (One needs, perhaps, to stress how far this was an educational rather than a political-legal change. Foucault himself points out earlier *(ibid.,* p. 45) that a political-legislative precedent had been set under the Marly decrees of 1707. These stipulated that medicine should be taught in all French universities, that all students should follow compulsory courses in anatomy, pharmacy, and the use of plant remedies, and that examinations should be passed for each succeeding grade of qualification *bachelier, licencié,* and *docteur.* In addition, Article 26 prohibited anyone below the degree of *licencié* from practising medicine or prescribing remedies. But students did not have to engage in active clinical learning, and the examination system was easily evaded. Those who chose to 'bought their examinations and got needy doctors to write their dieses for them'. No modern profession of trained knowledgeable subjects ensued then. It ensued only as students learned in a new active way under, and for, examination, where they were graded, ranked, passed and, where the results objectively showed as much, failed.)

When we re-read *The Birth of the Clinic* in the light of *Discipline and Punish* we can see how specifically Foucault was already talking about power and dealing with the question of power-knowledge relations. The *modus operandi* is the same in both: a digression at, or into, the heart of the text, where examination lies in wait. Now, as Ian Fleming once said in similar circumstances, once may be an accident, twice coincidence, but if it happens three times something serious is going on, no mistake.

Foucault's last series of works, volumes two and three of the *History of Sexuality* project, *L'Usage des Plaisirs* (The Use of Pleasures) and *Le Souci de Soi* (The Care of the Self), have since his death been seen by some commentators (e.g., Cook 1987) as representing a third turn in his thinking, one towards subjectivity and the formation of the self. For Gilles Deleuze, Foucault proves to have worked with three 'ontologies': power, knowledge, and the self. For Cook (1987:

222), 'it is clear that Foucault himself claimed for subjectivity its own region in counter-distinction to the regions of power and knowledge'. Now it is certain that Foucault had not stood still, and that his concern with how humans construct a 'rapport with the self (*rapport* à *soi)* did mark a new direction, in the same sense that it was 'neither a simple afterthought nor a subordinate move' (Cook 1987: 216). But how different is that direction? He was still talking about an aspect of the power-knowledge problematic, for he was concerned to describe the varying and historically changing ways that human beings have formed themselves, known themselves, and acted upon themselves in our western, Greco-Roman-derived, past. He was still - in fact more so - talking about the educational and pedagogic arena. From early in *L' Usage de Plaisirs* it is apparent that the rapports which the self is to discover for itself have a pedagogic connection. In the classical Greek period Foucault singles out a (homosexual) 'morality of men' (*morale d'hommes)* which depends upon self-knowledge (a variation on the Socratic theme 'know thyself) as shared among the powerful elite. How is this developed? As 'a morality thought, written and taught by men and addressed to men who were manifestly free' (Foucault 1984a: 29), and then as a set of practices (in the ancient Greek, *askesis*), which will ensure 'mastery' (*maîtrise*) over the appetites so long as the requisite effort is devoted to 'developing, perfecting and teaching them' *(ibid.,* p. 38).

What are we to make, then, of the following? At the heart of the last published volume, *Le Souci de Soi* (Foucault 1984b), the key practices involved during the high Roman era of the Greco-Roman past in the making of the *rapport* à *soi* are discussed. These practices are analysed at some length in Chapter 2, 'The culture of the self *(La Culture du Soi).* They prove to be a life-long pedagogic practice practised on the self wherein one learns to internalize the pedagogic voice, which recommends the proper art of good living, within oneself until it becomes oneself. (One develops a teacher-learner duality, in which the pedagogic voice is, in a pattern still familiar today, taken inside and made so familiar a double to one's ignorance and incompetence that, like the cuckoo in the nest, it completely dominates. Unlike the cuckoo, though, it keeps the other self, to have it to kick around.) But what, specifically, do these practices boil down to?

Well, they require adults to turn themselves into 'over-age schoolboys' *(écoliers vieillis),* and to follow 'various formulas' *(formules diverses).* These include 'morning or evening, keeping a few moments for recollection, for examining what one has to do, for memorising certain useful principles, for examining the day just past'. Foucault sees this as a Stoic continuation of 'the morning and evening examination of the Pythagoreans' (1984b: 64-5). There may also be exercises - 'care for the body, regimes of health, physical exercises but not to excess' and not bodily (Mies alone: for instance, 'meditations, lectures, notes taken on books or extended conversations which erne will re-read subsequently, die recalling to mind of truths already known but which must be internalised still better'. As Foucault (p. 66) observes: 'S'occuper de soi n'est pas une sinecure' (to busy oneself with oneself is no sinecure).

There can be no doubling the centrality of educational discourse to this analysis of practices. Around the 'care of the self, a whole activity of speaking and writing developed'. It was not a solitary practice but 'a veritable social practice', frequently grounded in 'more or less institutionalised structures' (p. 67). 'Epictetiss fear his part taught in a cohort which resembled nothing so much as a school [with] various categories of pupils' *(ibid.).* And when we finally reach the point that the central, focal practices involved in caring for the self are detailed (pp. 74-81), are we any more surprised to learn that Foucault names them as 'formes specifiées d'examen et des exercices codifiées' (specified forms of examination and of codified exercises)?

Three times is no coincidence. However, this is not to say that Foucault is here talking about 'examination' in the modern sense. He lays out, on the contrary, an exemplary clarification of the ways in which this particular Greco-Roman practice is neither the older Greek nor the newer modem rapport with die self. It was a particular kind of tripartite set of 'procedures of testing' *(procedures d' épreuve*): involving (a) exercises of self-denial such as sleeping on boards and wearing harsh clothing; (b) 'the examination of conscience' (*l' examen de conscience),* undertaken in the morning for the day ahead and the evening for the day just done; and (c) a constant 'work of thought upon iiself' having the form of a 'continual filtering of one's mental pictures' (which seems to me the best rendering of *un filtrage permanent des representations)* so as 'to examine, control and test them' (Foucault 1984b: 75-9). This diverged, he maintains *(ibid.,* p. 80), from the old Socratic maxim, 'The unexamined life *(anexetastos bios* in the Greek, *une vie sans examen* in the French) is not worth living'. The Socratic way was to test both self and others 'before the bar of ignorance, understanding, and non-understanding of one's ignorance'. The new Greco Roman way was 'an examination bearing upon the mental pictures and looking to test and discriminate one from another, thus transcending what one accepts "at first sight"'. It was thus a critical kind of reading of what was totally interior to the self with no rapport to those others that Che Socratic way implicated. But it was not to be confused *(ibid.,* p. 81) with the later in-depth reading of the self to be found 'in Christian spirituality', which is a self-questioning 'on the deep-lying origin of the idea that surfaces... a deciphering of the meaning hidden beneath the surface representation'. This kind of interior self-reading sought purely to discriminate those mental pictures that were properly one's own from those that were not, and to reject the latter before they could become a threat to one's self-mastery.

Foucault, then, clearly establishes how far this practice of examination stands from any immediate modern connotations. And yet it is transparent that the terminology (*examen*, *épreuve)* is littered throughout his analysis here, which leads me to suggest that there can only be one conclusion. Foucault was a crypto-educationalist. Why else is there this thematic obsession with examination to be found consistently at the heart of some of his greatest works for over two decades - a theme that can only be described as welling up, despite the surface disparateness of the topics discussed, from hospitals to prisons to constructions of the self? The mark of examination was upon him, and so it would leave its trace each time he came close to the hidden heart of his life's project - a trace which every true detective will now recognize as the vital pattern of clues.

But there is no 'smoking gun', and since Watergate nothing less will do. So let us make one final examination, and move back just a few pages in this last passage of this last work (Foucault 1984b), to the very heart of its heart, between pages 77 and 79. Let us examine what Foucault has to say about the central technology of the self, the *examen de conscience.* In the space of these two pages Foucault, in citing the account of this technology given in the *de Ira* of the Roman neo-Stoic Seneca, uses the term *examen* some ten times. There is examination morning and evening: examination as a kind of 'little judicial scene', in which Seneca 'makes an examination' of his whole day; or rather, less a judicial 'examination' of the self accused before a judge, than an inspection or appraisal, striking out the errors as from an account-book and weighing up words and deeds. In such an examination one must be an inspector (*speculator*) whose concern is not to punish infractions but to correct errors and reinforce good practice. The 'ball-game' *(l'enjeu*) is about getting one's 'rational equipment' in shape. The examination is, in the current educationalist terminology, formative, designed to lead to future 'wise conduct'. But surely, one may object, the

point is made; it does not need labouring. Why get obsessive about Foucault's apparent obsession with examination?

Precisely because it is an obsession, and an uncompromising proof of the mark that examination had placed upon Foucault (and *a fortiori* upon us, who have generally overlooked this hidden obsession in his work). For the strange, arresting truth of the matter is that one cannot attribute any influence or agency to Seneca for any one of these ten instances of the word *examen*; the simple reason being that Seneca never once uses the term *examinatio* or any cognate form in this passage. He uses *(de Ira* III: 36) *rationem reddere* (to render an account), *interrogare* (to question); he speaks of being the *speculator sui censorque secretus* (the inspector and secret censor of self); he writes *apud me causam dico* (I state my case at the bar of myself), and *totem diem scrutor* (I scrutinize my whole day), and *factaque... dicta mea remetior* (I measure over my deeds and words). But the one thing he does not ever do is examine. Only Foucault, the successful child born of die modem examinatorial world - graduate of the Sorbonne, man of two *Licences,* one *Diplôme,* a *Doctoral d' Etat,* and finally *Professeur* in die College de France - finds it natural and inevitable to call upon examination each time he discusses, as here, the intimately internalized practices of power and knowledge. He is, however unwittingly, the grand master of pedagogic power.

Power-Knowledge in Educational Perspective

Let me sum up to this point We have so far solved the minor mystery of the etymological provenance of 'discipline', and found it to be, from its beginnings, an educational term. We have discovered the hidden principle of coherence that runs like a thread through the whole textual corpus of Foucault's work and named it as examination, thereby unmasking him as a crypto-educationalist. But again, so what? Do we now pull that thread and watch as a kind of Derridean deconstruction takes place, as if this is the hidden point of contradiction in the textual weave which, once snagged, unravels the whole? On the contrary: we are now in a position to unsnag the Foucauldian text firom the horns of a dilemma which has begun to become apparent, and perhaps to repair what would otherwise turn into a gaping hole in any continuance of his project.

The dilemma concerns the term that lies behind the mark, the examination, and discipline, to name but three obviously educational terms: power-knowledge. The dilemma is that power-knowledge as Foucault left it was a curiously unfinished and unresolved idea, and the problem with being unfinished is that people are quick to conclude that you are unresolvable. This is particularly true since the temptation is to grasp only one, and not both, horns of the dilemma before coming to one's conclusion.

The horns of the dilemma that is power-knowledge are (a) historical and (b) theoretical. And the problem with the construct is that it is unfinished in both respects. But perhaps it had to be. For things to have been otherwise Foucault would have had to be other than a *crypto-cd* ucationalist. That at least is the conclusion to which this whole detective story has led. For each of the horns (and thus the whole dilemma too) can only be resolved by pursuing the educational conundrum explicitly until all its implications are laid bare, and this Fbucault never did. He could not, in the last analysis, turn the power of examination inside out and resolve the theoretical horn. He did not, in fact, answer the rhetorical question that he posed at the heart of *Discipline and Punish:*

> But who will writs die more general, more fluid, but also more determinant history of the 'examination' - its rituals, its methods, its characters and their roles, its play of questions and answers, its systems of marking and classification? (p. 185).

And so the historical project that kept bursting through remained unresolved as well. It is perhaps time to answer the rhetorical question, and thus put power-knowledge under examination from the educational perspective. In this way it is possible to resolve both horns of the dilemma in one move, simply by writing the general, fluid, and determinant history of the examination - that examination which we now can see marking the various stages of his life's work.

Writing such a history is not an easy task: as with many Foucault-inspired projects, one is investigating the kind of overlooked ignoble practices that nobody at the time treated particularly seriously. (For instance, finding an old examination answer-paper from before 1850 is a frustrating business: question-papers may be preserved, being the work of those who count - the teachers - but seldom the humble pupil-work.) But it remains an important task: if it is not done, the great, long-term project that Foucault initiated may, all too quickly, go by default

New History? New Theory?

Interestingly, there were only two major historical assaults on his work that Foucault took time out to respond to. The first was that launched by the then-young pretender, Derrida, in his 1963 lecture, later published as '*Cogito* and the history of madness' (Derrida 1978). The second was the 1982 attack in the *New York Review of Books* by the aged socio- logical historian, Lawrence Stone. The first is usually seen as more of a theoretical critique, the second as the first shot in a still-flourishing Anglo-Saxon counter-revolution. Each found its crucial point of leverage - the point that drove Foucault to respond - in the historical arena. Derrida's was the more significant critique, at least for Foucault's own work. He argued that the kind of enterprise Foucault had begun at that time with *Madness and Civilization* - could not be restricted to the limited, though important, time-span of relative modernity (i.e., from the seventeenth century, Foucault's 'classical age', on). He had, despite himself, begun on a history of the *logos*, that way of reason and reflection that has been the precondition of our (western) thinking and knowing since the (alphabetic) era of ancient Greece. In his words:

> The reason and madness of the classical age had a common root. But this common toot, which is a *logos*... is much more ancient than the medieval period Whatever the momentary break... of the Middle Ages with the Greek tradition, this break and alteration are late and secondary developments as concerns the fundamental permanence of the logico-philosophical heritage *In all cases* a doctrine of *tradition,* of the tradition of *logos* (is there any other?) seems to be the prerequisite implied by Foucault's enterprise.
>
> (Derrida 1978: 39-41)

Foucault and Derrida, of course, never reconciled the theoretical differences between them, which were first marked out in this lecture. For Foucault, Derrida was - somewhat ironically (or was it prescience?) the *petit pedagogue*, the little pedagogue. But the last series of his works are an acknowledgement that only a longer history, and a history of the culture of *logos*, no less, would do. Buried in the lengthy theoretical arguments was a central historical commonality. (This is not to say that Derrida did, or has done to date, much better than Foucault at following his own

advice. His *Of Grammatology* set a pattern for his writing: of appreciating the ancient beginnings of the *logos* problem, particularly as represented by Plato and Aristotle, but then moving swiftly on to the familiar world of the Enlightenment and after, Rousseau, Saussure, and others of their ilk. There has been all too little serious appreciation given to the medieval moment, no pause to dwell on the nature of the 'break and alteration' that manifestly then took place.)

This agenda, which both Derrida and Foucault came to share even while neither of them was fulfilling it with adequate historical caring, is the one now to be followed, particularly in the light of the Stone critique, whose main concern was to rubbish the Foucault project as history by indicating that it was bad empirical history. Such a critique has a strong rhetorical fascination. (The logical flaw is transparent: bad data does not necessarily invalidate a theory. The data employed may not prove the conclusion reached. It may be inadequate to do so, as most famously was the case with the data on which Copernicus thought he had proved his heliocentric theory. But that does not prove, as in Copernicus' case, that the theory should necessarily be rejected.) The critique continues to be made, and now re-made (perhaps because Stone was the first to put into purple print what a lot of Anglo-American historians wanted to be true). That being the case, the fatal response is to belittle die critique as mere rhetoric: the proper response is to answer by constructing a more careful empirical history which does not thereby become mere empiricism, so turning Foucault's apparent weakness into a strength.

It is such a twin goal that a true history of examination can aspire to: a proper respect for the empirical concern, combined with a longer view than was apparent in Foucault until the last texts. If it is not a new history, it is certainly a new look to that made familiar in Foucauit's works.

For instance, the explanations proposed in *Discipline and Punish* for the emergence of disciplinary technologies frequently resort to some kind of Christian precedent. The organization of an enclosed space for control and surveillance is related to monastic rule. The principle of cellular division comes from a 'monastic model'; discipline 'encountered an old architectural and religious method: the monastic cell' (pp. 141-3). The timetable 'is an old inheritance: the strict model was no doubt suggested by the monastic communities' (p. 149). Similarly, the earliest educational example that he gives of a numerical system for grading individuals and, of course, simultaneously generating a distribution of such grades is the Christian Brothers' system of giving merits and demerits for conduct La Salle, the founder of the system, wrote his *Conduct of the Schools* just after 1700, and thus produced a judgemental system based on 'normal' behaviour and measuring deviations from it This is described (p. 181) as 'a transposition of the system of indulgences'.

We now must pose a double question to such an explanation. First, after Derrida, why should the Christian moment be given a special privilege? Do we not question whether this particular disciplinary organization of time and space comes out of some ancient disciplina? How far is this an other-than-educational history? What we find, of course, is that the discipline of inculcating teaming demanded certain delimited educational spaces - institutions in which teaching (in Latin often rendered as *instiiutio)* might take place. It also required equally the delineation of teaching time, both in the form of a school calendar and of a more-cir-iess formalized timetable. Marrou's still-unequalled *History of Education in Antiquity* (1964) provides the empirical data (pp. 207-8), as it also does for such other Christian and disciplinary practices as catechism, which (pp. 232-3) was developed for the study and retention of the words of Homer long before it was adapted for the study of the word of God. Versions of a disciplinary organization of time, space, and learners are an integral part of ancient educational practice, as first developed in Greece and then copied and maintained throughout the Latin *and* Greek institutions of the Greco-Roman world. From

these institutions as Marrou remarks (pp. 439-44), they progressed into the Christian versions of Greco-Roman education. In such works as the *Rule* of St. Basil and die *Institutes* of Cassian, control of conduct, organization of space, and regulation of time were combined with provisions for the teaching of reading and writing, and for catechizing the future lifeblood of the monastery. These Greco-Roman practices passed definitively into the western monastic tradition via the *Rule* of St Benedict (c. 525 AD), which devotes some six chapters to the education of young novices, as well as the punishment proper to them (corporal). Thus, on the one hand, the Christian precedent turns out to lead us back beyond Christianity to the Greek tradition.

On the other hand, do we not have to look forward, past the monastic moment, to the immediate and proximate models for the disciplinary technologies that crystallize into a new power-knowledge apparatus, as 'disciplinary power', around the end of the eighteenth century? Once freed from the obligation to look for a specifically Christian model, we find an obvious educational genesis which presents itself for consideration. This is the set of institutions and practices that both disseminates and transforms the old monastic way, a set whose power was first, memorably, analysed in a work that was to initiate an entire new field of history, Philippe Aries's *Centuries of Childhood* (1962). It is a work which bears reading alongside *Discipline and Punish* as a companion piece, for the whole central section, Part Two, 'Scholastic life', demonstrates that our construct of 'childhood' is produced via the delineation of educational arrangements and practices that took up but went beyond older pedagogic traditions. The educational world he analyses is that of that medieval invention, the university, and all its offshoots. Within the university is developed, during the fourteenth century, the college as a safe space for student residence and controlled instruction. Within the college is developed the class, during the sixteenth century, as an instructional (and later architectural) subdivision. Once there are colleges and classes (as in the Jesuit system set down in the *Ratio Studiorum* just before 1600) there are timetables, attendance lists, codes of conduct, punishment books, rewards, and incentives. The 'child' is the object and product of this power-knowledge apparatus, where a power of writing implements a constant surveillance and judgment throughout the institutional space. At every prescribed moment, in every prescribed place, somebody should be doing and learning something. The schools of the Christian Brothers were an eighteenth century distillation of this set of pedagogic prescriptions, and demand to be understood as such.

The problem, the point of divergence, in reading Aries and Foucault together as companion pieces is that they focus on different time periods. Aries is looking at changes that take place for the most part before 1600; Foucault at ones that really only obtain some two centuries later. But here, Anally, comes the beginning of a *denouement.* We can solve this apparent paradox and begin to resolve the dilemma of power-knowledge by doing the general but empirically careful and always educational history of the examination.

For what transpires immediately and beyond any equivocation is that Foucault got his history of the examination wrong. It appears in certain small but important ways, most importantly where he suggests that La Salle had, by around 1700, introduced a merit-demerit system. Inspection of the *Conduct* reveals that there is no such 'penal accountancy' integrating and measuring good and bad acts on a unilinear scale of so many 'plus points' for good acts and so many 'minuses' for bad ones. There was one system of punishments, including reprimands, penances, beatings, and expulsion, and a quite separate system of rewards, including praise and prizes. Merit-demerit systems of penal accountancy will be developed, but the evidence at present suggests that it is about a century later. The error is small but important, because behind it lies a much more significant one. Foucault, in suggesting that examination was an *invention* of the eighteenth

century, perpetrated a fundamental and critical confusion. Examination as an educational practice within the culture of the *logos* was an invention of the twelfth century. Its invention is intimately bound up with the invention of the institution whose history Aries spends so much of his bode investigating - the university. Examination in this medieval world is from its genesis a complex practice. It is both a certain mode of reading and rewriting textual authorities - the critical reading that looks beneath surface contradiction towards inner truth and that then writes its commentary upon the authorities so as to bring that truth to light This reading, named by Abelard in his *Sic et Non* (c. 1120 AD) as *inquisitio*, or critical enquiry, is an essentially silent reading (Saenger 1982). The rewriting, as developed by the scholars of the twelfth century, is an essentially visually-oriented system of information technology (Rouse and Rouse 1979), involving the invention of visual lay-out devices from paragraphs, punctuation marks, and chapter division to alphabetical ordering, footnotes, and indexes. This close examination of texts cannot be dissociated from the emergent new stress on the examination, first informal and then formal, of learners. In the schools at Paris and Bologna, as best we can see, somewhere between 1150 and 1200 examination of learners by their teachers became formalized, as a final proof of pedagogic and disciplinary competence before admission into the guild of professors. This latter was a way of doing to people what was already being done to texts: subject them to scrutiny, look beneath the surface, and discover their inner truth. But it also proved to be the discovery of a new kind of power. This came about as the knowledgeable professors began, on the basis of examination, to discriminate worthy from unworthy apprentices. There was a prior right, vested in bishops, Cathedral chancellors, and the like, to giant a 'licence to teach', or *licentia docendi*, in a given geographical area. This was now challenged on the basis that licensing should be the prerogative of the knowledge experts, deciding on the basis of the new formal examination. It all erupted into a major quarrel at Paris between the professors and the Chancellor of Notre Dame. In 1213 Pope Innocent III (himself a former student of Bologna) decided in favour of the professors, and thus was established the legal basis for a new professional power: the power of the experts who professed in a certain knowledge field to examine and then give a licence or qualification to practise in that field on the basis of that examination. Such a licence was something quite new. It respected not geographical boundaries but disciplinary ones. Not surprisingly, the institutions empowered to grant such licences proliferated. By the sixteenth century there were several hundred spread around Europe. They, and the learning how to learn that they activated - under examination, naturally - are the educational focus of *Centuries of Childhood.*

How did Foucault go so wrong? It has seemed to me (e.g., Hoskin 1979,1986; Hoskin and Macve 1986, 1988) he erred by confusing the invention of formal academic examination with the invention of modern formal academic examination. The difference between them is that the former was an oral form of examination, primarily, and the assessment made was on a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative basis. Written examination and arithmetical marks appear to develop, and then to predominate, from around 1800. The change in format and technology is decisive. Only the modern modes of testing activate the full power of writing (where everyone is required to write in order to demonstrate the inner truth about themselves) while putting an objective numerical value upon and inside you.

The Jesuits, for example, had a highly developed form of qualitative assessment before 1600, using constant emulation: pupils were ranked in their classes according to performance, and would change ranks as others did better or worse than them, but there was no objective mark or grade put upon each piece of work, there was no objective self-validation for the perfect '10 out of 10' or '100%', and no big, fat zero to signify total failure. There was no discourse to put such

value upon the self, in the way that since 1800 has become familiar, for instance, in the most notorious numerical offshoot of the examination mark - the intelligence quotient The link between the invention of numerical grading and of IQ is not often made in such an explicit way. But it remains the case that no culture before our nineteenth century one ever had recourse to such a tactic of quantifying human qualities. Furthermore, it is worth recalling these words of Francis Galton's, who while not the inventor of the intelligence quotient as such is still the acknowledged progenitor of the field of intelligence studies. They were written at the beginning of the main body of his seminal 1869 text *Hereditary Genius:*

> I look upon social and professional life as a continuous examination .... In ordinary scholastic examinations marks are allotted in stated proportions to various specified subjects - so many for Latin, so many for Greek, so many for English history, and the rest The world, in the same way, but almost unconsciously, allots marks to men. It gives them for originality of conception, for enterprise, for activity and energy... and much besides of general value, as well as for more specially professional merits Those who have gained most of these tacit marks are ranked, by the common judgement of the leaders of opinion, as the fore-most men of their day (pp. 49-50).

Thus begins the first 'scientific enquiry' into the 'objective quantification' of the inner truth of the self, the 'genius' that is henceforward presumed to underlie and guarantee brilliant examination performance. It is quite touching to see Gallon prove this by reference to those tests of genius and merit whose 'fairness and thoroughness... have never had a breath of suspicion cast upon them' (p. 59), the Cambridge University mathematics examinations. He moves effortlessly from comparisons of performance as measured by these exams - the lowest man with honours has fewer than 300 marks, the lowest wrangler ('top honours' man) about 1,500, and one senior wrangler (the 'top of the top') more than 7,500: 'Consequently the lowest wrangler has more than Ave times the merit of the lowest junior optime, and less than one-fifth the merit of the senior wrangler'' (p. 60) - to conclusions about underlying competence. In one year the senior wrangler (p. 61) 'obtained 9,422 marks' while the bottom man with honours had only 'one-thirtieth the number'. But, if anything, this observed difference underestimates the difference in 'mathematical power' because the best are slowed up by 'the mechanical labour of writing': 'in other words, the senior wranglers mentioned above had *more* than thirty or thirty-two times the ability of the last man on the lists of honours. They would be able to grapple with problems more than thirty-two times as difficult' *(ibid.).*

My point is only secondarily to poke fun at the fatuity of the Galtonian calculus of ability. Primarily, it is to signal the strangeness of it all; a world which a century earlier did not think of - perhaps would not have dreamed of - quantifying human qualities in this way could find it perfectly acceptable, and indeed 'natural', for remember, Gallon was one of the cultural successes of 1869 and the bode made him world famous. But then he was writing for a world in which written examination and numerical grading had become 'natural', a world that had learned how to learn under modern examination.

That transformation, which Foucault mistook for the invention of examination, is the secondary elaboration of examination's power, It marks the onset of the period in world history when education, the perennial handmaiden of power, power's supplement, has become its centre. It is the time of the credential society, suffering from the diploma disease, a society even deemed ripe by some for deschooling. Yet even deschooling suffers from the paradox that Foucault named as power-knowledge, since it is, first, an idea proposed by those most highly educated, and second, a proposal that founders constantly on the rock of examination - the now-universal need to attend institutions and obtain their various kinds of qualifications.

The point that I would stress about Foucault is that despite the egregious errors in his history, he had that ability, or knack, or nose even, for sensing the significant. Now it is our task - humbler but still important - to broaden and deepen the furrows he ploughed. For instance, in relation to Aries, once the error in his history is pointed out, the resolution between *Discipline and Punish* and *Centuries of Childhood* is straightforward. Aries traces one way in which power-knowledge operates to construct the human subject in the first epoch of examinatorial power. He demonstrates that as people come to learn how to learn under examination, in the institutions and internalizing the practices that proliferate around the university, there emerges a new object of this whole apparatus, the child. It is not yet the psychologized child, the differentiated child who is variously labelled from genius to defective (or gifted to 'special needs'). That child is the product of the second epoch of examinatorial power, Galton's work obviously being one strategic step along the path to its production. While we still await an adequate account of the transformation from the one to the other, we can at least grasp the way in which the two constructions, like the Aries and Foucault projects, are linked. Both are reflections of and upon stages in the progress of examinatorial power.

The same can be said in relation to other Foucault texts. Once viewed via a two-stage history of examination, *The Birth of the Clinic* becomes an account of the transformation in 'learning how to learn' to be a doctor. During the thirteenth century the universities developed three higher faculties, law, theology, and medicine, which licensed their graduates as doctors. Through examination these groups became the first (sometimes today called the 'old') professions. Down to 1800 law, the church and medicine remained the only real professions, with their university-sanctioned licenses and all the abuse of privilege that this entailed. Students continued to learn by observing dissections, hearing lectures, taking oral examinations, and being assessed qualitatively (one does 'brilliantly', 'fairly well', 'abysmally', etc.) - by 'teaching and saying', as Foucault puts it. This suddenly changes to 'learning and seeing', or rather to doing dissections, working in clinics, writing examinations, and being quantitatively marked on them. Here the profession begins to reconstruct itself in a more modern guise, with new abuses of privilege, naturally, but also finding itself in a field of expanding professionalization: not just doctors, surgeons, and officers of health, but dentists, pharmacists, nurses, health visitors, and even funeral directors (Hoskin 1986).

In such a re-reading we can begin to see how a text like this, supposedly 'archaeological', was in a very precise way about power-knowledge all the time, even though Foucault did not then employ the term. And we can see finally that Foucault's historical dilemma was that he was always, until the last works, writing only half a history, because we can begin to render explicit the other tacit, earlier, half. We do so by bringing the full power of examination out of concealment

This brings me finally to the other horn of the Foucauldian dilemma, which, like the historical one, is a dilemma in itself: the theoretical problem of power-knowledge. Just as Foucault produced only half a history, he arguably produced only half a theory. In the light of his dictum that

> power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations

we should have anticipated a form of double theory. There would have been the analysis, as in *Discipline and Punish*, of how power relations shape and direct modes of knowing and knowledge, but there would also have been its correlative, the analysis of how knowledge

relations shape and direct modes of power. This is one well-made criticism in J. G. Merquior's *Foucault*, (1985): that the roles of 'hard science' and 'sustained cognitive growth' in the construction of modern power-knowledge relations were never properly addressed. As Merquior goes on 'no history of the present can ever be truly cogent that makes little or no room for an account of science, its nature and impact' (p. 150).

One does not have to rest content with Merquior's intemperate conclusion - 'to put it bluntly, the historian of the present bungled his project' - so discharging oneself from further thought on the matter. One can observe, for instance, that the omission derives in part from the fact that the work that had as its primary object knowledge and its discourses was the earlier archaeological work, when by his own admission Foucault was not thinking in terms of power. None the less, once he moved on to the genealogical approach, the criticism is valid: he developed only half a theory, of power-knowledge but not of knowledge-power.

The resolution of the first half of the theoretical dilemma, so trenchantly put by Merquior, is simple (in conception, at least). It is necessary simply to apply a genealogical analysis to the problem of knowledge-power, which is precisely what Rick Jones, as he demonstrates in this volume, has set about doing. He has returned to analyse the emergence of a 'hard science', biology, discussed in archaeological terms by Foucault in *The Order of Things*, in terms of a rupture or discontinuity in the practices of knowing, that is, genealogically. And what do we appear to be confronted with? A transformation in the mode of 'learning how to learn': a new power of examination: the fact, as in *The Birth of the Clinic*, that a practice of learning and seeing was replacing one of teaching and saying for the very generation who appear to produce the key figures, such as Bichat, in the development of the new biological discourse.

The double question - is all of this, with its privileging of the 'educational', a 'new history' and a 'new theory' - is ultimately trivial. If, by plying an educational analysis, one can develop a fuller and deeper analysis of the ways in which power and knowledge have functioned to imply and promote each other, that is surely all that matters. Surely so, except that there is one theoretical problem that still awaits consideration. I have left it till last because, in the last analysis, the whole Foucault project and any future post- Foucauldian project stands or falls on the answer to it, and if it cannot be satisfactorily answered, any lasting worth in any such project falls with it. The problem is, just what is 'power-knowledge'? Is there any substance there? Or is it, in that famous last analysis, empty, vacuous, no more than a piece of almost Keatsian poetics: '"Knowledge is power, power knowledge" that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'

> Michael Walzer (1983) has raised this possibility, when he says
>
> > Sometimes Foucault seems to be committed to nothing more than an elaborate pun on the word 'discipline' - which means, on the one hand, a branch of knowledge and on the other, a system of correction and control Social life is discipline squared. Discipline makes discipline possible (the order of the two nouns can be reversed).

It is the most significant point of all. There is a certain plausibility in what Foucault writes. We can appreciate that there is something there, something we can recognize operating in the world and within us, not just knowing, but a *frisson* beyond the pure act of knowing; not just power but a power which feels beyond reproach because it is validated by expertise. But knowledge is also not power, and power not knowledge. How are we to - *indeed*, are we to - get beyond the easy option of the pun and get a purchase on power-knowledge that is substantial?

There can be only one way: by treating with all seriousness the doubleness in a word like 'discipline', which is from its Latin beginning about both power and knowledge, but only while

paying attention to the provenance of the word. Power ami knowledge do not in any simple way imply each other; they do so only in certain specific and specifiable respects, through the operation of a third term, which is not the same as, or reducible to, either one of them. Discipline is one candidate for such a third term, as is examination; examination after all was the term which for Foucault embodied 'the superimposition of the power relations and the knowledge relations'.

What we may well need to consider is how the educational may in different epochs, in different ways, function as the hyphen in the power-knowledge relation. We may come to regard hitherto unregarded shifts in 'learning how to learn' as the principle by which we can interpret fundamental shifts both in social organization and in the construction of the individual human subject. Foucault himself named examination (which we can now see is a quintessentially educational practice) as the key that simultaneously turns the trick of power (discipline) and knowledge (the disciplines) in the modern epoch since around 1800. For the earlier medieval transition in power-knowledge relations - a transition that gave us among other things, such terms as the university, the college, the class, the nation, the profession, and the network of *disciplinae* (all of them terms which gain their modern positive connotations first in the arena of 'the educational' during this epoch) the appropriate hyphenating term may well turn out to be *inquisitio.* Where Abelard saw purely 'critical inquiry' and a careful reading of texts, the next generation discovered the power of examination, and two generations later, when a whole new process of 'learning how to learn' under examination had become second nature, *inquisitio* took on a very different connotation, as a new mode of judicial examination. How interesting, in this connection, that the fust practitioners of the new inquisitorial mode of justice should be principally drawn from the new mendicant orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscans. And how interesting that they should almost all be graduates of the new universities. Is it coincidence that the Inquisition, before 1300, invented the first correctional use of imprisonment? As the graduate-inquisitors discovered the inner truth that most of those whom they examined, being poorly educated non-graduates, were heretics, they discovered the need to construct prisons, known as the *murus longus* and *murus strictus* (solitary confinement) for them. But these prisons were not for unrcgenerate heretics; they were, in the happy phrase, 'relaxed to the secular arm', that is, burned by civil authorities, since the church did not take life. Prison was the place for those who confessed their heresy, and who were then held until they were deemed to be purified and safe to send out again into society. Here again, what Foucauk took to be a constitutive feature of the modem epoch turns out to have a longer, double, history.

The identification of the third term which functions as the hyphen, or principle of coherence, between power and knowledge will doubtless differ for different epochs. For the Greco-Roman world of Seneca it cannot be examination, as we have seen. But then the relations between power and knowledge were not those that have obtained in the modern epoch, so we would not expect it to be (even though that does not rule out some level of affinity between power-knowledge then and now, that affinity which led Foucault to name 'examination' as the practice which Seneca executed upon himself). Perhaps it might be *disciplina.* Perhaps for the still-earlier and purely Greek epoch, it must be *paideia,* the term that came to connote the 'culture' of the educated man, but whose etymology reveals it as denoting the bringing up, and shaping up, of the *pais* - the child, but also, in the Greek, the slave.

Again, in the long term and the last analysis, it makes no difference. What Walzer's argument makes clear is that the operation of power-knowledge can be understood only through paying attention to the hyphen, and to identifying die third torn which lies concealed there. The name of the term like the specific powers and knowledges implicated in power-knowledge is inevitably

bound to change at certain moments of discontinuity. Foucault's legacy to us is the identification of this mysterious but potent reality, power-knowledge, and his further obsession with examination. He thereby provided us both with a new construct for comprehending the stubbornly different levels of explanation usually known as the 'sociological' and the 'psychological', and with a clue to the secret (which he never revealed in so many words) of its operation. Thanks to Walzer, we appreciate that the operation of power-knowledge demands a third term: it operates perhaps via examination, or *inquisitio*, or *discipline*, or *paideia*. The intriguing question, and continuing mystery, is: can that third term properly be other than an educational term? Is there any conclusion except that Foucault was a crypto-educationalist?

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