

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.387
6 August 1968
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIN RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. N. ECOBESCO (Romania)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. CHRISTOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U KYAW MIN U PE MYINT AUNG
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL Mr. J.R. MORDEN Mr. A. BERNIER
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. R. KLEIN Mr. J. STRUCKA
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
<u>India:</u>	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN Mr. N. KRISHNAN Mr. K.P. JAIN
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI Mr. R. BERLENGHI
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. J. CASTANEDA Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Alhaji SULE KOLO Mr. B.O. TONWE Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ
Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU
Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

The Rt.Hon. F. MULLEY
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. N.C.R. WILLIAMS
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. S. GRAYBEAL
Mr. C.G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the 387th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): Since I had the privilege of addressing the Committee at its opening meeting (ENDC/PV.381) I have followed its proceedings with close attention and have noted with satisfaction the general desire of all who have spoken for further measures of arms control and disarmament and for acceleration in the course of our proceedings to achieve those ends.
3. I think the time has arrived when we should be beginning to move from general statements to more detailed consideration of the various suggestions and proposals that have been made, so that we may the better assess the difficulties to be overcome and thus make progress in the lengthy negotiations which experience has taught us are invariably necessary to reconcile conflicting views and interests. We can assume, I think, following the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty, that the political will to succeed exists. Our task now is to turn good intentions into the hard language of draft treaties and conventions, grappling with complicated technical data in some cases and always with the inevitable, important, although usually difficult, question of safeguards and verification procedures.
4. As a contribution to that task my main purpose today is to fulfil the undertaking made when I spoke on 16 July (ibid., para. 91) to present for the Committee's consideration a working paper (ENDC/231) setting out in more detail my proposals for a convention to ban or proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals or crops. My Government suggests that States should (a) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity, and (b) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.
5. The Committee will perhaps have noted that I use the term "microbiological" rather than "biological". I do so because I am informed that man himself may be regarded as a "biological agent" and I do not wish to excite controversy by expressing views on a ban of the production of biological agents in that sense.

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6. I should stress again, as I did in my speech on 16 July, that our purpose is to supplement and not to supersede the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We consider that that Protocol should remain in force, and we should welcome the ratification of it by all States which have not so far signed and ratified it. But we do not consider that Protocol to be an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbiological warfare. The working paper sets out the reasoning which has brought us to that opinion; and indeed the threat to humanity from the use of these agents is perhaps even greater today than it was in 1925. As we seek to reduce and, I hope, ultimately to eliminate the terrible threat of nuclear conflagration, we must not neglect to take steps also to deal with the threat posed by these means of warfare which have a potential of misery and suffering of comparable severity.

7. I contest the view, therefore, that the 1925 Protocol or similar declarations against first use is all we need or that, as Mr. Roshchin suggested last week (ENDC/PV.386, para. 49), the Geneva Protocol has prevented the use of chemical and biological warfare in the past, notably in the Second World War, and that by implication the Protocol can be relied upon to prevent the use of these horrible weapons in the future. I cannot accept that argument. I know of no evidence to support the view that Hitler did not resort to the use of gas because of respect for the Geneva Protocol. Respect for international law was not one of his strongest points, as far as I recall -- and I had some first-hand experience of his concern for another Geneva Convention, concerning prisoners of war. In my opinion a more likely explanation of his restraint was fear of retaliation. And although chemical warfare was not used in the Second World War, it was used in the 1930s and has been used again since then.

8. But the most eloquent evidence of the fear of the use of these weapons, and the lack of faith in the Protocol's power to prevent their use, lies in the fact that the armed forces of all the major Powers are trained and equipped to defend themselves at any rate against chemical methods of warfare, and that those countries are engaged in expensive research programmes to produce counter-measures against attack by microbiological agents. I am sure neither of those precautions will be abandoned even if the Protocol is ratified by all States.

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9. Paragraph 2 of my paper explains why we think that it may be useful to make a distinction between chemical and microbiological methods of warfare, and why we should take action on microbiological weapons now, leaving aside for the present the question of supplementing the 1925 Protocol in the chemical field. That does not mean that I am content that this should remain the position. But, as I explained in my last speech (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 90 et seq.), and as I think the working paper makes clear, before we can make meaningful progress in going beyond the Protocol in the case of chemical weapons we need an international scientific consensus on some of the very difficult technical issues involved.

10. For that reason I proposed that we should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, which could be of assistance to our future consideration of this matter as the report on atomic weapons has been in our consideration of nuclear questions. This study should cover chemical weapons -- not in my view both chemical and microbiological, as the representative of Poland suggested last week in his interesting first speech in the Committee (ENDC/PV.385, para. 70). We look forward to hearing him again. I repeat this proposal, and shall propose that this recommendation be included in the report the Committee is to make to the General Assembly at the end of the present session.

11. I should make clear that I am not, of course, submitting a draft convention on microbiological methods of warfare. It is a working paper to stimulate discussion with a view to clarifying the points at issue which I have tried to set out. Indeed, in one or two instances alternative formulations are suggested. It would indeed have been wrong to proceed beyond this stage without first submitting the proposals to the critical examination which members of the Committee are so well qualified to give them. However, I am hopeful that the paper can be turned into a draft convention quite quickly after this examination.

12. I recognize that the greatest difficulty we have to face is that of verification, since understandably parties to any arms control or disarmament agreement are entitled to be reasonably satisfied to the greatest practicable extent that other parties are carrying out their obligations under the agreement. This principle is well illustrated by the safeguards requirements of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*, art. III).

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After much study we have been obliged to conclude that no comparable system is possible for microbiological or chemical weapons. Any such system would be so intrusive as to be quite unacceptable, and even then could not be fully effective. The principal difficulty arises from the fact that almost all the material and equipment with which we are trying to deal here have legitimate peaceful purposes; and it would be wrong to inhibit work of real value to humanity in combating disease, for example, and impracticable to inspect every laboratory in every country. We must accept, therefore, that no verification is possible in the sense of the term as we normally use it in disarmament discussions.

13. Thus we must make a choice --- balance the risks of evasion if we go ahead with the formulation of new obligations, against the risks for the world if we do nothing and allow the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare to continue and intensify. My choice is emphatically to go ahead; we cannot afford to do nothing. While we cannot offer a fully effective system of verification and we believe it is beyond the wit of man to devise one, we can provide arrangements which should satisfy States, given the intractable nature of the problem, that they will not be exposing themselves to unacceptable risks. No doubt other members may be able to make further suggestions and other improvements to these proposals.

14. In short, in paragraph 8 of the paper we envisage the establishment of machinery for the investigation of complaints either that microbiological methods of warfare have been employed or that one of the other obligations established by the convention has been infringed. It goes without saying that any allegations, to qualify for investigation, would have to be made by States, not individuals or organizations, and that they would need to be supported by the necessary evidence. We have consciously refrained from suggesting how the competent body of experts should be appointed or what the composition of this body should be; but clearly it would need to include experts both in microbiology and in the potential means of delivery of microbiological agents in hostilities.

15. In paragraph 9 we have suggested terms for the entry into force of the convention. We think it probable that States will be unwilling to accept the obligations established in the convention unless those obligations are very widely accepted by the rest of the

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international community; and, as will be seen, the conditions of entry into force which we suggest are much more stringent than those which figure in, for example, the non-proliferation treaty.

16. Finally, in paragraph 10 we have suggested that all parties should accept an obligation to co-operate in countering the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. We feel that if such an article were included this might do more than anything else to give parties the security they need if they are to assume the additional obligations which we envisage. In the non-proliferation treaty the security assurances took the form of a Security Council resolution (resolution 255 (1968); ENDC/226*), backed by declarations of the three nuclear-weapon Powers. But in this field there are no microbiological weapon States and non-microbiological weapon States -- we are all on the same footing; and we therefore felt that the best approach would be to write this undertaking into the convention itself, with the possibility that it might be strengthened by Security Council endorsement.

17. It is our belief that if a satisfactory system can be established for investigating allegations of infringement, if the convention receives sufficiently wide acceptance, and if States parties to it know that all other parties are committed to assist them if they are subjected to the use or threatened use of microbiological methods of warfare, the risks taken to achieve a convention to ban these fearful weapons will be very greatly reduced. Such a convention would contribute to world security and our peace of mind and would soon, I believe, create conditions in which it would be beyond contemplation that microbiological means should be used to wage war.

18. I ask leave to submit a United Kingdom working paper on microbiological warfare (ENDC/231), and request that it be circulated as a Conference document.

19. While I have the floor, I should like to take the opportunity also to reply to some of the comments that have been made on my other proposals concerning peaceful nuclear explosions and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and points made in my speech of 16 July. The representative of Italy suggested in his speech of 30 July (ENDC/PV.385, paras. 48, 49) that my proposal (ENDC/PV.381, para. 81) that we take a first step towards implementing article V by

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asking the Board of Governors of the IAEA to examine how they could assist in the tasks set out in that article was premature and that in some way it might impede the work of the forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

20. I fear I did not make my purpose clear. Let me say at once that I have no desire or intention to restrict in any way the work of that Conference, of which the United Kingdom Government was one of the early supporters. Nor do I think that my proposal would do so, since I am sure the Conference will discuss article V in any event and that we shall have the benefit of such discussion long before we could reasonably expect a report from the IAEA. It seems to me that we have a prima facie case for thinking that the IAEA would be the appropriate body to deal with the subject matter of article V, and my only motive is to avoid delay. If we do not approach the IAEA -- which is an independent international body and not subject to our instructions -- for its views this month, a lot of valuable time will be lost. Surely it would be sensible to have the information from the IAEA and to consider it together with the views of the non-nuclear-weapon States when we come to consider the implementation of article V.

21. I agree very much with Mr. Roshchin's observation at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.386, para. 67) that the development of such peaceful explosions is at an early stage. Indeed, as I have said previously both here and in New York, it is by no means clear as yet that the use of such peaceful nuclear explosions will be economically viable as compared with conventional means, or capable of use without unacceptable safety and health hazards. However, the work in this field is going on and tests will be required. Tests of these devices are inextricably involved with the question of a comprehensive test ban, to which many countries, to my great satisfaction, have accorded a very high priority. It seems to me therefore that consideration of the international machinery envisaged in article V, especially the regulation of the testing of these devices, is a matter of urgency. I hope, therefore, that my proposal in this matter will commend itself to the Committee and that action to give effect to it can be taken in the very near future.

22. Mr. Roshchin took me to task also (ibid., para. 48) in his speech last week for the preliminary observations I had to make (ENDC/PV.381, para. 70) about the Soviet Union's proposals for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (ENDC/227).

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I am afraid I remain unconvinced by his arguments and still consider that such a ban would not represent the major step forward towards peace and security that he claims it would, particularly as the proposal comes at a time when, as is well known, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons are being increased and vast expenditures are being incurred to increase the effectiveness of the weapons themselves and of their means of delivery. As far as I understand the proposal, there is nothing in it which would halt or reverse this process of nuclear escalation, although we all hope profoundly that this may be achieved through the negotiations that are to take place between the Soviet Union and the United States -- and we are anxiously waiting to learn that they have begun.

23. My position is simply that I do not think the threat of nuclear war can be removed by such a convention or declaration, and that to get rid of the threat requires the elimination or at least a very great reduction of nuclear weapons themselves and of their means of delivery. Indeed, I am encouraged in this view by what Mr. Roshchin himself said later in his speech:

"We advocate the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as such, and the exclusion once and for all of the threat of nuclear war from the life of mankind." (ENDC/PV.386, para. 62)

That is exactly what I had in mind when I said:

"For all those reasons my Government believes that the only sure way to remove the danger of nuclear war is by general and complete disarmament under effective international control." (ENDC/PV.381, para. 71)

I thought, therefore, that it was rather hard for Mr. Roshchin to use (ENDC/PV.386, para. 50) these words to attribute to me the view that I supported the well-known thesis of "all or nothing", especially as I was under the impression that I had been of some assistance to him in rebutting such arguments during the course of the non-proliferation treaty negotiations. It was even harder, I thought, to suggest that I was anxious to block all progress in the field of disarmament, since the sentence which I have just quoted and on which he based this harsh judgement was followed immediately in my speech by the sentence: "Every arms control measure that can be agreed in the meantime is a step towards that objective." Such general and complete disarmament remains the ultimate objective of my Government, as I hope it still remains the objective of the Soviet Union also.

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24. I turn now to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and would like to comment in particular on the important speech of the Swedish Minister, Mrs. Myrdal, on 30 July (ENDC/PV.385), and to try to answer some of the questions she posed.

25. I would immediately express my indebtedness to the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (SIPRI) for the unanimously-adopted summary (ENDC/230) of the report of the recent meetings of scientists and other experts to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground test ban, and to Mrs. Myrdal for making it available to delegations. As in this case, I am sure that the work of SIPRI is going to be of immense help to us in our work here in the future on a number of important topics and will enhance even further the very considerable contribution Sweden has already made to the study of arms control and disarmament questions. In congratulating SIPRI on its achievement in getting together, with such fruitful results, distinguished experts from ten countries, I recall that I made this suggestion over a year ago and that it was not then possible. This underlines the achievement and the progress recorded in the report before us, which I greatly welcome.

26. My own proposals have not dealt with this aspect of the matter; but of course any arrangements for assessing evidence that a nuclear explosion has taken place are entirely dependent on there being satisfactory evidence in the first place. It seems to me that as a result of this report there is now a substantial measure of agreement at the technical level on what the two main systems can and cannot identify as nuclear explosions. What I find even more encouraging is that there is also agreement on the kind of research that needs to be done in order to improve existing capabilities. The more progress we can make together in this field, the less disagreement there will be about the assessment of evidence and the easier we should find it to settle the verification issue.

27. Mrs. Myrdal has taken an outstanding part in this discussion over a number of years; and I was the more disappointed therefore to find that she was not able to endorse the suggestions that I made in my speech of 16 July concerning, first, a seven-member committee to deal with complaints of infringement supported by

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evidence, which would have the right by a five to two vote to on-site inspection if satisfied that a prima facie case of infringement had been made out (ENDC/PV.381, para. 76); and, second, a quota system for tests, diminishing to zero over a period of several years, if it were not possible to achieve an absolute ban in the near future (ibid., para.77). One of our co-Chairmen, Mr. Roshchin, also referred to these suggestions in his speech on 1 August (ENDC/PV.386, paras.58,59).

28. I should therefore like to make the position of my Government quite clear.

It is completely unequivocal. We favour the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible moment and as soon as terms that are generally acceptable can be agreed. We recognize that in this, as in all similar agreements, it is reasonable for the parties to ask for such verification to be provided as is possible, practicable and necessary to ensure that other parties are also honouring their obligations. As to what is necessary, we are flexible in our views and are quite prepared to be convinced by such evidence as is available. I hope other delegations will adopt a similarly flexible approach and seek to reach a consensus from which we can proceed to the consideration of a draft treaty. My suggestions are put forward on that basis -- and I stress they are only suggestions for consideration -- in an attempt to bridge conflicting views and positions.

29. Mr. Roshchin has reiterated that no on-site inspection is necessary; but all the technical evidence goes to show that at the detection threshold there can be no real certainty whether a given event was a nuclear explosion or an earthquake. What we maintain is that, when the evidence strongly suggests that an explosion has taken place, there should be the possibility of an on-site inspection. I find it difficult to see how Mr. Roshchin can maintain that in those circumstances there is no need for on-site inspection.

30. There is the further point that, as Mr. Roshchin has himself acknowledged, under article V of the non-proliferation treaty we have to provide for peaceful nuclear explosions -- and presumably their testing -- under internationally-agreed arrangements. One can envisage an arrangement by which IAEA experts -- possibly in conjunction with experts from other nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty

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-- checked the associated instrumentation in order to satisfy themselves and the international community as far as possible that the explosion in question was indeed for its stated purpose and was not a nuclear-weapon test. Does Mr. Roshchin rule out the possibility of on-site inspections in that context and, if so, how can the obligations of article V be carried out under a comprehensive test ban? Mrs. Myrdal has always stressed the importance of international supervision for peaceful nuclear explosions. Does she not accept that there may also well be a need for on-site inspections to achieve that international supervision?

31. My suggestion for a seven-member committee (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 76 et seq.)

-- and I should make clear I am quite flexible as to the number and composition of the committee and am only seeking first to establish the principle -- was designed to try and meet those difficulties. On 30 July (ENDC/PV.385, para. 17) Mrs. Myrdal said she would not comment on that suggestion for the moment, in view of the reaction to a similar proposal (ENDC/28) made by the non-aligned members of the Committee in April 1962. I think that in fact their proposal was rather different from my own suggestion, as regards both the composition and the powers of the suggested bodies. The non-aligned proposal was for the constitution of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff. My own proposal was for a committee consisting of the representatives of the three nuclear-weapon States, the representatives of three non-aligned States, and a nominee of the United Nations Secretary-General or the Director-General of the IAEA.

32. Admittedly, both the international commission suggested in the non-aligned proposal and the committee suggested by me would have the same basic task, the assessment of evidence that a nuclear explosion had taken place. But my suggestion was that this committee should have in addition the right to conduct on-site inspection if it decided by a majority of five to two that there was strong evidence that the treaty had been infringed. A party which refused to accept inspection in such circumstances would of course be in breach of its treaty obligations. The object of our proposal was to provide a right of on-site inspection, but to circumscribe that right in such a way as to ensure that it was not exercised

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irresponsibly or improperly. Under the kind of arrangements which I had in mind, any country which respected its treaty obligations not to conduct underground nuclear explosions could be reasonably certain that it would never have to face a situation in which it was required to accept on-site inspection.

33. Since I agree that a State which accepted the obligations of the treaty would not infringe its provisions, it could well be that the committee or commission I suggest would never have any work to do. No country adhering to the treaty would be submitting to any certain or automatic on-site inspection. Equally, it would solve the problem of whether all States or only nuclear-weapon States should be subject to such inspections, since only where there was a prima facie case of possible infringement would the question arise. As scientific knowledge and means of detection develop, the need for and the probability of such inspections would diminish.

34. A further difference was that the international commission proposed in 1962 was to be composed of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists. Our own concept is of a committee composed for the most part of governmental representatives, who would of course be assisted by their scientific advisers. We think that is more realistic.

35. I turn now to our quota suggestion (ENDC/PV.381, para.77). This too I consider a realistic suggestion, since it is based on recognition of the fact that it may not be possible to get agreement now to stop all nuclear-weapon testing overnight in isolation from other measures. If we can get such agreement, well and good; if not, then I think this idea is worthy of consideration. The object of the quota proposal is to put an increasingly powerful brake on the development of new nuclear-weapon systems, with a view to bringing this dangerous vehicle to a complete halt within a fixed distance.

36. Mrs. Myrdal has asked (ENDC/PV.385, para. 19) whether the suggested phasing-out period would allow experiments with verification methods -- particularly verification by challenge -- on suspicious events outside the permitted quota. It seems to me that the verification issue arises in virtually the same form whether

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there is a complete ban on underground tests or an agreed quota system. In the first case the object of verification is to ensure that no nuclear explosions at all are conducted; in the second case its object is to ensure that the quota has not been exceeded.

37. Mrs. Myrdal asked also (ibid., para. 20) how peaceful nuclear explosions would be treated in a quota system. Either they could be treated as part of the quota, or they could be treated -- as I envisage they would be under a complete test ban -- as permitted exclusions from the treaty provided they conformed to the internationally-agreed arrangements.

38. Finally, I would think the conclusion and effective implementation of such a quota system, leading to a complete ban in a relatively short time, would increase mutual confidence, since it would be a further and important step on the road towards our goal -- although, as I have already said, I would prefer a complete ban if that is possible in the near future.

39. The remaining matter I want to mention is the exercise in conventional arms control verification -- "First Look" -- which has been in progress as a joint United States-United Kingdom project in southern England since the beginning of June. I myself spent a day there recently with Members of Parliament and British experts and had the privilege also of meeting one of our co-Chairmen, Mr. Foster, when he paid a visit last week. I believe the experience gained from exercise "First Look" will be of much value to us in our future work and in particular for our consideration of regional arms control and disarmament possibilities. Indeed, I was greatly impressed with the knowledge of force strengths and movements that very small teams of inspectors could assemble unobtrusively and with little or no co-operation from the host country.

40. I am pleased that rather more than half of the members of the Committee have accepted my invitation to send representatives to visit and study the exercise next week on 14-15 August, but, frankly, rather disappointed that so many members of the Committee have not accepted an opportunity to see a verification exercise

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in operation, since inevitably we talk so much about verification and safeguards in our discussions. The invitation is, of course, still open and I hope that those who have not yet accepted will find it possible to do so.

41. At the end of what I acknowledge is again a very long speech I must resist the temptation to talk about our procedure in this Committee. I cannot, however, conclude without expressing my appreciation for your remarks, Mr. Chairman, of 1 August, and saying how much I endorse your observation that --

"I have stressed those aspects of organization because of my conviction that we must do our best to give an impetus to the disarmament negotiations."

(ENDC/PV.386, para. 35)

We must concern ourselves with providing a worthwhile report to the United Nations at the end of this session; and that means, I think, an agenda and a plan for our further work here as well as an indication of some progress -- for which I have made proposals and suggestions. It also means that in our next session we must try and evolve an effective method, as I said at the beginning of my speech, for translating general statements into the hard language of draft treaties and conventions. No doubt there will be other opportunities for discussing how that can best be achieved. I remain convinced that this Committee is the most practical and efficient forum for conducting negotiations in this field and making the progress the whole world is waiting for. We must put disarmament back into the forefront of international discussion and be seen to be making the progress the whole world expects of us.

The CHAIRMAN (Romania): I should like to inform the Committee that I have before me the following draft statement on behalf of the co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen have been giving consideration to ways in which the available time of the Committee may be used to maximum advantage so as to give all members a full opportunity of presenting their views on any subject relating to disarmament which they consider merits attention.

(The Chairman, Romania)

"The co-Chairmen have noted the need for adequate time for informal discussions among the delegations in order to lay the basis for further progress in our work. They have also noted the suggestions for an additional formal meeting each week. If members of the Committee wish to speak on Wednesday, such additional meetings may be arranged."

(continued in French)

43. Are there any comments? Since there are none, the statement on behalf of the co-Chairmen that I have just read out is adopted.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 387th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador N. Ecobesco, representative of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

"A statement was made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare (ENDC/231).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.