

# Red Teaming at Scale: Automated Adversarial Evaluation Pipelines for Detecting Deceptive and Emergent Behaviors in LLMs

## Abstract

The robustness of large language models (LLMs) against adversarial threats is a pressing concern as their applications proliferate. Traditional red teaming methods, while effective, do not scale with the rapid advancement and deployment of LLMs. This paper presents the Adaptive Adversarial Evaluation Pipeline (AAEP), an innovative framework designed to automate the red teaming process, enhancing the security of LLMs through scalable, automated methodologies. AAEP integrates evolutionary algorithms, reinforcement learning with adversarial feedback (RLAF), and scalable automated risk evaluation to proactively detect, evaluate, and mitigate adversarial vulnerabilities. Our experiments demonstrate that AAEP significantly reduces the success rate of adversarial attacks compared to traditional methods and accelerates the adaptation of defense mechanisms in response to novel threats. By automating adversarial testing, AAEP not only improves the efficiency and effectiveness of security evaluations but also sets a new standard for the continuous enhancement of AI system robustness, offering a comprehensive solution to a critical challenge in AI safety.

## 1 Introduction

As large language models (LLMs) grow in scale and capability, ensuring their robustness against adversarial behaviors is crucial. Traditional AI red teaming relies on manual adversarial testing, making it time-intensive and unscalable. Current models exhibit hidden vulnerabilities, including:

- Jailbreak susceptibility (bypassing safety filters through adversarial prompting).
- Deceptive behavior emergence (e.g., models subtly manipulating outputs).
- Persuasive reasoning exploits (models leveraging rhetoric to convince users of misinformation).

The novelty of AAEP lies in its comprehensive integration of three cutting-edge components:

- **Evolutionary Attack Generation:** Utilizes evolutionary algorithms and multi-agent frameworks to autonomously generate and evolve adversarial prompts that expose new vulnerabilities.
- **Reinforcement Learning with Adversarial Feedback (RLAF):** Implements a dynamic learning process where the model iteratively updates its defenses based on real-time adversarial feedback, significantly improving its ability to counteract evolving threats.
- **Scalable Automated Risk Evaluation:** Leverages advanced scoring mechanisms based on model outputs to assess and prioritize threats, facilitating a more targeted and efficient defensive strategy.

This integrated approach not only addresses the scalability issues inherent in manual red teaming but also enhances the detection and mitigation capabilities of LLMs against a broader spectrum of adversarial tactics. By automating the generation, evaluation, and refinement of adversarial attacks, AAEP sets a new standard in the proactive defense of AI systems, making it a significant contribution to the field of AI safety and security.

To address these challenges, we propose the Adaptive Adversarial Evaluation Pipeline (AAEP), an automated red teaming system that integrates:

- Evolutionary Attack Generation – Using multi-agent self-play and genetic algorithms to discover novel adversarial prompts.
- Reinforcement Learning with Adversarial Feedback (RLAF) – Enabling models to dynamically learn from adversarial attacks and improve defenses.
- Scalable Automated Risk Evaluation – Leveraging LLM-based evaluators to score adversarial exploits and quantify failure severity.

We hypothesize that AAEP can proactively identify and mitigate LLM vulnerabilities more efficiently than current manual red teaming techniques.

## 2 Methodology

### 2.1 Evolutionary Attack Generation via Multi-Agent Red Teaming

We frame AI red teaming as an evolutionary optimization process, where adversarial prompts evolve over multiple generations. Using a multi-agent adversarial framework, we introduce:

- Attack Agent (AA): Generates adversarial prompts.
- Defense Agent (DA): Evaluates and patches against attacks.

- Mutation Engine (ME): Mutates successful attack prompts to create more sophisticated exploits.

Optimization Mechanism:

- Genetic Algorithms (GA): We evolve adversarial prompts based on fitness scores, selecting the most effective prompts for further mutation.
- Gradient-Based Adversarial Optimization: We perturb embeddings in latent space to discover hidden vulnerabilities in model responses.
- Self-Play Red Teaming: Attack and defense agents train against each other, continuously escalating adversarial sophistication.

Example attack generation workflow:

- Initial Prompt Attack: AA generates adversarial queries.
- Defense Check: DA evaluates responses for policy violations.
- Mutation & Evolution: If an attack is successful, it is mutated into harder adversarial prompts.
- Iterative Improvement: Over multiple iterations, the pipeline uncovers increasingly sophisticated exploits.

## 2.2 Reinforcement Learning with Adversarial Feedback (RLAF)

We introduce dynamic defenses where LLMs continuously learn from discovered adversarial exploits. Instead of relying on static safety patches, RLAF enables adaptive model training using:

- Self-Correcting Reward Signals: Models receive feedback on their own safety violations and iteratively improve.
- Adversarial Curriculum Learning: We start with simple attacks and gradually introduce more complex exploits, ensuring robust generalization.
- Gradient-Driven Defense Updates: Instead of filtering outputs via rule-based safety classifiers, we fine-tune models against adversarial counterexamples.

Mathematical Formulation: Given an adversarial input  $x_{adv}$ , the model generates an output  $y$ . If  $y$  violates alignment policies, a negative reward is applied:  $R = -\lambda \cdot RiskSeverity(y)$  where  $\lambda$  is a scaling factor and  $RiskSeverity$  quantifies the failure impact. The policy network is updated using RL-based optimization to minimize unsafe generations over time.

## 2.3 Scalable Automated Risk Evaluation

LLM-based evaluators score detected adversarial exploits on three dimensions:

- Deceptiveness Score (DS) – Measures whether the model intentionally misleads users.
- Persuasion Score (PS) – Assesses whether responses exhibit rhetorical manipulation techniques.
- Robustness Score (RS) – Evaluates model resistance against adversarial prompt variations.

These scores are aggregated into a composite risk metric, guiding further fine-tuning.

## 3 Experiments

### 3.1 Baseline Comparisons

We compare AAEP against:

- Manual Red Teaming (MRT) – Traditional human-driven adversarial testing.
- Static Jailbreak Filters (SJF) – Standard safety guardrails without adaptive defenses.
- Self-Play RLHF (SP-RLHF) – An existing iterative self-improvement method.

### 3.2 Evaluation Metrics

- Attack Success Rate (ASR): Measures how often adversarial prompts successfully bypass safety filters.
- Time-to-Patch (TTP): Measures how quickly models adapt to new adversarial exploits.
- Robustness to Zero-Day Attacks: Evaluates model performance on unseen attack strategies.

### 3.3 Experimental Setup

- Dataset: We use real-world jailbreak prompts, synthetic adversarial queries, and counterfactual examples for robustness testing.
- Models: Evaluations conducted on LLaMA-7B, GPT-4-tuned safety models, and Claude AI fine-tuned for adversarial resistance.
- Training Pipeline: Baseline Models trained on standard RLHF datasets and AAEP Models fine-tuned using self-play adversarial training.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Attack Success Rate

Attack success rates for different models (Lower is Better)

Model	MRT	SJF	SP-RLHF	AAEP (Ours)
LLaMA-7B	47.3%	41.8%	29.2%	<b>12.5%</b>
GPT-4-tuned	31.1%	28.4%	19.7%	<b>7.8%</b>

Table 1: This table shows the reduction in attack success rates when using our AAEP model, highlighting its superior defensive capabilities compared to traditional models.

### 4.2 Time-to-Patch

Comparison of time-to-patch metrics across different models. (Lower is Better)

Model	MRT	SJF	SP-RLHF	AAEP (Ours)
LLaMA-7B	12.4 days	9.8 days	6.5 days	<b>2.1 days</b>
GPT-4-tuned	7.2 days	5.9 days	4.3 days	<b>1.5 days</b>

Table 2: This table illustrates how our AAEP model significantly reduces the time required to patch vulnerabilities, enhancing responsiveness to emerging threats.

### 4.3 Generalization to Zero-Day Attacks

Model generalization capabilities on Zero-Day attack scenarios. (Higher is

Model	MRT	SJF	SP-RLHF	AAEP (Ours)
LLaMA-7B	52.1%	57.6%	68.3%	<b>84.7%</b>
GPT-4-tuned	73.4%	76.2%	81.5%	<b>92.1%</b>

Table 3: The data demonstrates our AAEP model’s enhanced ability to generalize effectively in unseen scenarios, substantially outperforming other models.

## 5 Discussion

### 5.1 Key Takeaways

AAEP provides a scalable and automated approach to adversarial robustness. Evolutionary attack discovery uncovers vulnerabilities that human testers may miss. Reinforcement-based adaptive defenses improve real-time resilience against adversarial behaviors.

## 5.2 Limitations & Future Work

- **Compute Cost:** AAEP is computationally intensive and requires distributed training.
- **Adversarial Overfitting:** Models may over-specialize against certain threats, requiring continual attack diversification.

## 6 Conclusion

We introduced AAEP, an automated adversarial evaluation pipeline that improves LLM robustness by iteratively discovering, evaluating, and mitigating adversarial vulnerabilities. Our results show that AAEP outperforms traditional red teaming methods, significantly reducing jailbreak risks and deception in AI outputs.