

#### **Project Description**

#### Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

NAME OF THE PARTY OF THE PARTY

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- Study Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
  - How does it work?
  - What are the main problems?
- Investigate XZDDF¹ bootstrapping
- Implement XZDDF¹ bootstrapping

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1564 Simon Ljungbeck XZDDF Bootstrapping

#### Outline

#### Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

- Introduction to FHE
- XZDDF bootstrapping
- Modification of XZDDF bootstrapping
- Benchmark tests of XZDDF implementation



Introduction

#### Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

# Fully Homomorphic Encryption



# What is Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)?

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrappin

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

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Conclusions

- Let  $c_1 = \text{Enc}(m_1)$  and  $c_2 = \text{Enc}(m_2)$  be two ciphertexts
- Assume we want to compute  $c_3 = \text{Enc}(m_1 + m_2)$ 
  - Normally:  $c_3 = \text{Enc}(\text{Dec}(c_1) + \text{Dec}(c_2))$
  - FHE:  $c_3 = c_1 + c_2$
- FHE:  $\operatorname{Enc}(f(m_1, \ldots, m_t)) = f(\operatorname{Enc}(m_1), \ldots, \operatorname{Enc}(m_t))$



### Why FHE?

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



- Keep privacy when third parties do computations on data
  - Cloud services
  - Fog computing
- Ex: training an ML model with sensitive data
- Today's problem: FHE too inefficient

#### Noise-based FHE

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

FHE ciphertexts usually contain some noise

Learning With Errors (LWE):

Enc:  $\mathbb{Z}_q \ni m \mapsto \mathsf{LWE}_q(m) := (\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + m + e \mod q) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ 

■ Dec:  $c = (\mathbf{a}, b) \mapsto b - \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle = m + e \approx m$ 



#### The noise grows...

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



Homomorphic property of LWE:

$$c_1 + c_2 = (\mathbf{a}_1, b_1) + (\mathbf{a}_2, b_2)$$

$$= (\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2, \langle \mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{s} \rangle + m_1 + m_2 + e_1 + e_2)$$

$$= (\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2, \langle \mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{s} \rangle + (m_1 + m_2) + (e_1 + e_2))$$




Figure: From Xiang et al.2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://iacr.org/cryptodb//data/paper.php?pubkey=33119 Simon Ljungbeck XZDDF Bootstrapping

#### Why is FHE slow?

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 


**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



#### Bootstrapping:



■ LWE :  $Dec(c) = b - \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle \mod q$ 

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions





### **XZDDF** Bootstrapping

#### XZDDF Bootstrapping Modification of XZDDE

**Benchmark Tests** 

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- Assume first-layer:  $(\mathbf{a}, b = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i \text{noised}(m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ 
  - applicable with Regev, BGV, CKKS
  - $\implies$  noised $(m) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i b \mod q$
- $\blacksquare \mathcal{R}_O := \mathbb{Z}_O[X]/(X^N+1)$  where  $N=2^k \implies X^{2N} \equiv 1$
- Assume  $q=2N \implies X^{\mathsf{noised}(m)} = X^{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i b \mod q} = X^{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i b}$ 
  - Let  $r(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} iX^{-i} \implies \operatorname{noised}(m) = \operatorname{coeff}_0\left(r(X) \cdot X^{\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i b}\right)$
- If a 2N instead:

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusion

# More XZDDF Bootstrapping



# **XZDDF** Bootstrapping

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

TO STILL

UNIVERSITY

- Assume  $c_i(X)$  encrypts  $X^{s_i}$  under f(X)
- Automorphism:  $c_i(X^{a_i})$  encrypts  $X^{a_is_i}$  under  $f(X^{a_i})$
- Problem 1: might have  $2|a_i \implies a_i$  and 2N not coprime
  - Solution: q|N instead of q|2N

$$\implies X^{\frac{2N}{q}a_is_i} = X^{(\frac{2N}{q}a_i+1)s_i-s_i} = X^{w_is_i}X^{-s_i}, \text{ where } w_i \text{ is odd}$$

- Problem 2: want key f(X), not  $f(X^{a_i})$ 
  - Solution: use NTRU encryption...

### NTRU Encryption

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

#### XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

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Define

$$( au, \Delta) := egin{cases} \left(1, \left\lfloor rac{Q}{t} 
ight
ceil 
ight), & ext{if noised}(m) = e + \left\lfloor rac{q}{t} 
ight
ceil \cdot m \ (t, 1), & ext{if noised}(m) = t \cdot e + m \ (1, 1), & ext{if noised}(m) = e + m. \end{cases}$$

- Scalar NTRU encryption:  $NTRU_{Q,f,\tau,\Delta}(u) := \tau \cdot g/f + \Delta \cdot u/f \in \mathcal{R}_Q$
- Vector NTRU encryption:

$$\mathrm{NTRU}_{Q,f,\tau}'(v) := (\tau \cdot g_0/f + B^0 \cdot v, \dots, \tau \cdot g_{d-1}/f + B^{d-1} \cdot v) \in \mathcal{R}_Q^d$$

### Homomorphic Multiplication for NTRU

#### XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 



$$lackbox{\textbf{c}} c \odot lackbox{\textbf{c}}' := \langle \mathsf{BitDecom}_B(c), lackbox{\textbf{c}}' 
angle = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} c_i c_i' = au \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} c_i g_i / f + c v \in \mathcal{R}_Q$$

**Lemma 4.1** (Homomorphic multiplication). Assume that  $c = \text{NTRU}_{Q, t, \tau, \Delta}(u)$  and  $\mathbf{c}' = \text{NTRU}_{Q, t, \tau}'(v)$ . Then  $\hat{c} = c \odot \mathbf{c}'$  is a scalar NTRU ciphertext of uv.


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# NTRU Key Switching

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 



**Lemma 4.2** (NTRU key switching). The product  $c \odot \mathbf{ksk}_{f_0,f_0}$  is a scalar NTRU encryption of the same message as c but under the new private key  $f_2 \in \mathcal{R}_O$ . ⇒ Problem 2 solved



## Generating the Blind Rotation Key

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



#### Algorithm 10 XZDDF.BRKGen

```
Require:
   q, n \in \mathbb{N}^*
                                                                         first-layer parameters
   \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n
                                                                          first-layer private key
   Q, N, \tau, \Delta \in \mathbb{N}^*
                                                                          second-layer parameters
   f \in \mathcal{R}_O
                                                                          second-layer private key
Ensure: EVK_{\tau, \Lambda}
                                                                          blind rotation evaluation keys
   \mathbf{evk}_0 \leftarrow \mathrm{NTRU}'_{O,f,\tau}(X^{s_0}/f)
   for i = 1 ... (n-1) do
         \mathbf{evk}_i \leftarrow \mathrm{NTRU}'_{O,f,\tau}(X^{s_i})
   end for
  \mathbf{evk}_n \leftarrow \text{NTRU}'_{Q,f,\tau}(X^{-\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} s_i})S \leftarrow \left\{\frac{2N}{q}i + 1\right\}_{i=1}^{q-1}
                                                                    // all elements j \in S are odd
   for j \in S do
          \mathbf{ksk}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{NTRU}.\mathsf{AutoKGen}(j,f)
   end for
    \mathbf{EVK}_{\tau,\Delta} \leftarrow (\mathbf{evk}_0, \dots, \mathbf{evk}_n, \{\mathbf{ksk}_i\}_{i \in S})
```

### Performing the Blind Rotation

Introductior

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



```
Algorithm 11 XZDDF.BREval
```

```
Require:
    (\mathbf{a},b) = \mathsf{LWE}_{\mathbf{s},q}(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q
    r(X) \in \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{O}}
                                                                                                               // rotation polynomial
\begin{aligned} \mathbf{EVK}_{\tau,\Delta} &= (\mathbf{evk}_0, \dots, \mathbf{evk}_n, \{\mathbf{ksk}_j\}_{j \in S}) \\ \mathbf{Ensure:} \ \ \mathsf{ACC} &= \mathrm{NTRU}_{Q,f,\tau,\Delta} \left( r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}) \cdot X^{\frac{2N}{q}(-b + \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i)} \right) \end{aligned}
    for i = 1 ... (n-1) do
           w_i \leftarrow \frac{2N}{a}a_i + 1
           w_i' \leftarrow w_i^{-1} \mod 2N
    end for
    w'_n \leftarrow 1
    \mathsf{ACC} \leftarrow \Delta \cdot r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}w_0'}) \cdot X^{-\frac{2N}{q}bw_0'}
    for i = 1 ... (n-1) do
           ACC \leftarrow ACC \odot evk_i
            if w_i w'_{i+1} \neq 1 then
                 ACC \leftarrow NTRU.EvalAuto(ACC, \mathbf{ksk}_{w_sw'...})
            endif
    end for
    ACC \leftarrow ACC \odot evk_n
```

#### Extraction

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

LUND

After the blind rotation, we get a ciphertext

$$c = \operatorname{NTRU}_{Q,f,\tau,\Delta}\left(r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}) \cdot X^{\frac{2N}{q}(-b + \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i s_i)}\right)$$

Define

$$\mathbf{f} = (f_0, \dots, f_{N-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_Q^N$$
  
 $\hat{\mathbf{c}} = (c_0, -c_{N-1}, \dots, -c_1) \in \mathbb{Z}_Q^N$ 

Then

$$(\hat{\mathbf{c}},0) \in \mathbb{Z}_Q^N imes \mathbb{Z}_Q = \mathsf{LWE}_{Q,\mathbf{f}}(m)$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

# Modification of XZDDF



#### The Problem...

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

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Want to compute

$$\mathsf{noised}(\mathit{m}) = \mathsf{coeff}_0\left(\mathit{r}(\mathit{X}^{\frac{2\mathit{N}}{\mathit{q}}}) \cdot \mathit{X}^{\frac{2\mathit{N}}{\mathit{q}}(-\mathit{b} + \sum_{i=0}^{\mathit{n}-1} \mathit{a}_i \mathit{s}_i)}\right),$$

where 
$$r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} iX^{-\frac{2N}{q}\cdot i}$$

■ But in  $\mathcal{R}_Q = \mathbb{Z}_Q[X]/(X^N + 1)$  we have that

$$X^{-i} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i = 0 \\ -X^{N-i}, & \text{if } 1 \le i \le N \\ X^{2N-i}, & \text{if } N+1 \le i \le 2N-1. \end{cases}$$

#### The Problem...

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

LUND

If for example q = 2N, we get

$$r(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} iX^{-i}$$

$$= -1 \cdot X^{N-1} - 2 \cdot X^{N-2} - \dots - N + + (N+1) \cdot X^{N-1} + (N+2) \cdot X^{N-2} + \dots + (2N-1) \cdot X$$

$$= -N + N \cdot X + N \cdot X^{2} + \dots + N \cdot X^{N-1}.$$

Same problem for any q|N

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

LUND

Assume Boolean operations

Binary messages

Regev-like first-layer encryption

$$= \mathsf{LWE}_{q,\mathbf{s}}^{\mathsf{Regev}}(m) = \left(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + m \cdot \tfrac{q}{t} + e\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$$

■ We will use t = 4

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

Benchmark Tests

Conclusions

UNIVERSITY

- Let ◊ denote a binary operation
- Let  $c_1 = (\mathbf{a}_1, b_1)$  and  $c_2 = (\mathbf{a}_2, b_2)$
- Start by computing  $c = c_1 + c_2 = (\mathbf{a}_1 + \mathbf{a}_2, b_1 + b_2) =: (\mathbf{a}, b)$

$$\implies \mathsf{Dec}(c) = \begin{cases} 0, & \mathsf{if}\ (m_1, m_2) = (0, 0) \\ 1, & \mathsf{if}\ (m_1, m_2) = (0, 1) \ \mathsf{or}\ (1, 0) \\ 2, & \mathsf{if}\ (m_1, m_2) = (1, 1) \end{cases}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



■ Define *t* intervals  $I_i = \left[i \cdot \frac{q}{t} - \frac{q}{2t}, i \cdot \frac{q}{t} + \frac{q}{2t}\right] \subset \mathbb{Z}_q$  for i = 0, 1, 2, t - 1

$$\begin{split} I_0 &= \left[ -\frac{q}{8} = \frac{7q}{8}, \frac{q}{8} \right), \\ I_1 &= \left[ \frac{q}{8}, \frac{3q}{8} \right), \\ I_2 &= \left[ \frac{3q}{8}, \frac{5q}{8} \right), \\ I_3 &= \left[ \frac{5q}{8}, \frac{7q}{8} \right). \end{split}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Test** 

Conclusions

LUND

If for example  $\diamond = OR$ , we now want a function  $f_{OR}$  that maps

$$f_{\mathsf{OR}}: \left(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^{\mathsf{noised}(m)} \mapsto egin{cases} 0, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in \mathit{I}_0 \\ 1, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in \mathit{I}_1 \\ 1, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in \mathit{I}_2 \\ 0, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in \mathit{I}_3. \end{cases}$$

**XZDDF** Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF



If for example  $\diamond = \mathsf{AND}$ , we now want a function  $f_{\mathsf{AND}}$  that maps

$$f_{\mathsf{AND}}: \left(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^{\mathsf{noised}(m)} \mapsto egin{cases} 0, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in I_0 \\ 0, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in I_1 \\ 1, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in I_2 \\ 1, & \mathsf{if} \ \mathsf{noised}(m) \in I_3. \end{cases}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



■ It turns out (see OpenFHE) that [0, q) can always be split into two intervals

$$I^0 = I_k \cup I_{(k+1 \mod 4)}$$
  
 $I^1 = I_{(k+2 \mod 4)} \cup I_{(k+3 \mod 4)}$ 

$$lacksquare$$
 Let  $I^0=[q_0,q_1)$  and  $I^1=[q_1,q_0)$ 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 



- Negacyclical property of  $\mathcal{R}_{\Omega}$ :  $aX^{i} \equiv -aX^{i+N} \mod (X^{N}+1)$
- Use

$$r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}) = -1 \cdot \left(X^{-\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^0 - 1 \cdot \left(X^{-\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^1 - \dots - 1 \cdot \left(X^{-\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^{\frac{q}{4}-1} +$$

$$+ 1 \cdot \left(X^{-\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^{\frac{q}{4}} + \dots + 1 \cdot \left(X^{-\frac{2N}{q}}\right)^{\frac{q}{2}-1}.$$

$$\implies m' := \operatorname{coeff}_0\left(r(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}) \cdot \left(X^{\frac{2N}{q}}(\operatorname{noised}(m) + (\frac{q}{4} - q_1))\right)\right) = \\ = \begin{cases} -1, & \text{if noised}(m) \in [q_0, q_1) = I^0 \\ 1, & \text{if noised}(m) \in [q_1, q_0) = I^1. \end{cases}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



Now, we just want to map

$$m' \mapsto \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } m' = -1 \\ 1, & \text{if } m' = 1. \end{cases}$$

- $lacksquare c' = \mathsf{LWE}_{Q,\mathbf{f}}(m') = (\mathbf{a},b' = \langle \mathbf{a},\mathbf{s} 
  angle + \Delta \cdot m' + e)$ 
  - Choose  $\Delta = \frac{Q}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{Q}{8}$

$$\implies c' = \mathsf{LWE}_{Q,\mathbf{f}}(m') = \begin{cases} (\mathbf{a}, b' = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle - \frac{Q}{8} + \mathbf{e}), & \text{if } m' = -1 \\ (\mathbf{a}, b' = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \frac{Q}{8} + \mathbf{e}), & \text{if } m' = 1. \end{cases}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



Finally, add Q/8 to b'

$$c=(\mathbf{a},b)=\left(\mathbf{a},b'+rac{Q}{8}
ight)$$

$$\implies c = \mathsf{LWE}_{Q,\mathbf{f}}(m') = \begin{cases} (\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e), & \text{if } m' = -1 \\ (\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \frac{Q}{4} + e), & \text{if } m' = 1, \end{cases}$$

$$\implies m = \mathsf{Dec}(c) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } m' = -1 \\ 1, & \text{if } m' = 1, \end{cases}$$

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

# Benchmark Tests



### Implementation

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusion

■ Implemented XZDDF in OpenFHE

■ See https://github.com/SL2000s/masters\_thesis\_xzddf



#### **Tests**

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



#### **Test Description**

S1: Generating a bootstrapping key.

S2: Performing a single bootstrapping.

S3: Performing an OR operation on two ciphertexts  $c_0$  and  $c_1$ .

S4: Performing an AND operation on two ciphertexts  $c_0$  and  $c_1$ .

#### Results

roduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

XZDDF Bootstrapping

**Modification of XZDDF** 

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions



Algorithm	Param.	<b>S1</b> (ms)	<b>S2</b> (ms)	<b>S3</b> (ms)	<b>S4</b> (ms)
AP	STD128	10541	182	175	175
GINX	STD128	2583	153	145	145
LMKCDEY	STD128L	2121	120	132	134
XZDDF	STD128	2438	174	184	185
XZDDF	P128T	6386	214	216	216
XZDDF	P128G	5820	194	195	195
AP	STD192	38489	651	662	645
GINX	STD192	8546	467	467	468
LMKCDEY	STD192	8833	493	512	435
XZDDF	STD192	8391	626	622	626
XZDDF	P192T	11808	700	699	699
XZDDF	P192G	9989	592	592	592

#### Conclusions

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphi Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

Benchmark Tests

Conclusions

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- XZDDF implementation performs quite well at key generation
- XZDDF implementation not as fast as it theoretically should
  - LMKCDEY still seems to be faster
- Bootstrapping is the main bottleneck in all FHE algorithms
- New rotation polynomial works, but only for a special case

#### Visions and Future Work

Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

**XZDDF Bootstrapping** 

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

Find a rotation polynomial r(X) for the general case?

More efficient XZDDF implementation?

FHE still needs to become more efficient

■ Bootstrapping 2010: 30 minutes

■ Today: 100 ms



**Fully Homomorphic** 

**XZDDF** Bootstrapping

Modification of XZDDF

**Benchmark Tests** 

Conclusions

# Thank you for listening!

Questions?

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