PSJ Policy Studies Journal

The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2018

Advocacy Group Messaging on Social Media: Using the Narrative Policy Framework to Study Twitter Messages about Nuclear Energy Policy in the United States

Kuhika Gupta, Joseph Ripberger, and Wesley Wehde

Increasingly, policy scholars are using the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to systematically study the narrative elements and strategies that policy actors and groups use to advance their agendas. The majority of these studies analyze reports, documents, and websites published by the actors and groups that are most active in the policy subsystem. Though useful, these "public consumption documents" can be difficult to find and relatively static. In this article, we suggest that the constant flow of messages and content that competing actors and groups publish on social media may provide a solution to this problem. To test this proposition, we use the NPF to analyze messages published on Twitter by competing advocacy groups in the U.S. nuclear energy policy subsystem from January 2014 to May 2014 (n = 703). We find that both groups use Twitter to disseminate messages that contain the basic elements of policy narratives. Moreover, the narratives they use include strategies that are consistent with their position in the subsystem. These findings demonstrate the utility of the NPF for research on social media and, more importantly, validate the use of Twitter data in future work on the NPF.

KEY WORDS: Narrative Policy Framework, nuclear energy, social media, Twitter

Introduction

In recent years much has been written about how the Internet and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have created new opportunities for policy actors or advocacy groups to interact with stakeholders and influence the policymaking process (e.g., Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012; McNutt & Boland, 1999; Saxton, Guo, & Brown, 2007; Waters & Jamal, 2011). Among other prospects, social media platforms provide a relatively low-cost way for groups to mobilize supporters and expand their scope of influence by reaching out to other advocacy networks and the public at large. In so doing, these platforms "level the playing field" between well-organized groups with plentiful resources and nascent or marginal groups looking to influence the policymaking process. With 140 characters and/or a home video and a click of the mouse, actors or groups can build powerful coalitions, mobilize

doi: 10.1111/psj.12176

public support, and instigate policy change (e.g., Goodman & Preston, 2012; Wong, 2012).

Intrigued by these possibilities, researchers have started to study social media usage among advocacy groups. Much of this research focuses on the popularity of social media with advocacy groups (e.g., Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Edwards & Hoefer, 2010; Greenberg & MacAulay, 2009), why groups are using it (e.g., Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Edwards & Hoefer, 2010; Greenberg & MacAulay, 2009), and, to a lesser extent, the impact of social media usage on advocacy efforts and public policy change. By comparison, relatively few studies have explored *how* actors and groups are using social media, and even fewer have systematically investigated the messaging strategies that advocacy groups employ on social media sites (Guo & Saxton, 2013; McBeth, Shanahan, Arrandale Anderson, & Rose, 2012).

In this study, we suggest that the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), as developed by McBeth, Shanahan, Jones, and their many collaborators, may provide a useful framework for analyzing the messaging strategies that policy actors employ on social media platforms. We assess the empirical legitimacy of our suggestion by using the NPF to study messages published on Twitter by competing advocacy groups—Greenpeace Nuclear, a wing of Greenpeace International that advocates for the dissolution of nuclear energy, and CASEnergy, a group that advocates for the growth of nuclear energy. Consequently, we simultaneously contribute to extant research on the NPF by exploring (i) the extent to which these groups are using social media to disseminate their narratives in structured and strategic ways; and (ii) the potential utility of social media data for systematically studying policy narratives and their evolution over time.

Literature Review: The Narrative Policy Framework and Social Media

The NPF posits that policy actors use stories (narratives) to influence the policymaking process. Policy actors do so by reducing complex policy problems into stories with settings, characters, plots, and morals that help people make sense of these problems. In the process of simplification, however, policy actors strategically construct narratives that are consistent with their view of the world to advocate for their preferred policy solutions (Jones, 2014; Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011). For example, they highlight some problems and ignore others, refer to their friends as heroes while vilifying their adversaries, and selectively attend to the benefits of policies they like and the costs of policies they dislike. They do so in order to manipulate the scope of conflict surrounding an issue, mobilize resources by engaging their supporters, and expand their influence by persuading members of the public to join their cause.

The NPF is not the first or only framework to highlight the importance of storytelling and narrative construction in the policymaking process. Rather, important works by Stone (1989, 2002), Fischer and Forrester (1993), Roe (1994), Hajer (1995), Yanow (1995), Fischer (1998, 2003), and Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy (2005) preceded and inspired the NPF (Jones & McBeth, 2010). However, most of the research in this vein is interpretivist in methodology and post-positivist in epistemology, whereas

the NPF offers falsifiable hypotheses about the way in which individuals and groups use narratives to influence public policy that can be tested with quantitative methodologies (Jones & McBeth, 2010; Petridou, 2014). The NPF accomplishes this by focusing on the *structure* and *content* of narratives.

On the structure side, the NPF posits that most policy narratives contain identifiable elements, such as a setting, characters, plots, and a moral of the story (Jones, McBeth, & Shanahan, 2014). However, the presence of these elements can vary rather substantially, depending on the policy problem addressed by the narrative, the actor(s) who construct the narrative, and/or the medium used to communicate the narrative. As such, the framework maintains that, at minimum, a policy narrative must include at least one character (such as a hero, villain, or victim) and articulate a policy preference (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, & Lane, 2013). More recently, Pierce, Smith-Walter, and Peterson (2014) have argued that a policy referent is the only requisite for a unit of communication to be a policy narrative. In this work, we adopt the prior, more stringent requirement because it encompasses both conceptualizations.

On the content side, the NPF maintains that the substance of a given narrative will reflect and therefore reveal the belief system(s) of the actor(s) who construct it and the communication strategies they use to change a given policy or preserve the status quo. Based on this proposition, the NPF offers hypotheses about the kinds of strategies that different actors will pursue. For example, the framework draws on Schattschneider (1960), Olson (1965), and Baumgartner and Jones (1993) to submit that: "actors will expand or contract the scope of conflict to control other actor involvement in a policy subsystem to favor their position" (Jones et al., 2014, p. 17). Actors and groups who believe that they are losing a policy battle will use narratives to expand the number of people involved in that battle by convincing others that a large number of people are *harmed* by a policy or problem, whereas relatively few people are *benefiting*. They do this by emphasizing the *diffused costs* associated with a policy or problem while downplaying the *concentrated benefits*. Conversely, advocacy groups who believe that they are winning a policy battle will use narratives to limit the number of people involved in that battle by convincing others that a large number of people are *benefiting* from a policy or problem, whereas relatively few people are *harmed* (Gupta, Ripberger, & Collins, 2014; McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007). They do this by highlighting the *diffused benefits* associated with a policy or problem and downplaying the *concentrated costs*.

In addition to offering these hypotheses, the NPF provides a number of methods to empirically test them. Most notably, the framework provides a relatively objective and flexible codebook that helps researchers identify, classify, and quantify the narrative elements and strategies that may appear in a given unit of communication (see the Appendix). To date, researchers have used this codebook (in some form or another) to study narrative communication via a number of "traditional" mediums, such as press releases, editorials, and newsletters from policy actors (e.g., Gupta et al., 2014; McBeth, Shanahan, & Jones, 2005; Shanahan et al., 2013), documents from organizational archives (e.g., McBeth et al., 2007), newspaper articles written by members of the media (e.g., Shanahan, McBeth, Hathaway, & Arnell, 2008), and government reports (e.g., Radaelli, Dunlop, & Fritsch, 2013). Among other things, these

studies have demonstrated (i) that advocacy groups routinely employ narrative elements when communicating with the public and (ii) that the hypotheses offered by the NPF about narrative strategies withstand empirical scrutiny. This is especially true of the "scope of conflict" hypotheses discussed above.

More recently, researchers have suggested that, in addition to using "traditional" mediums to disseminate their narratives, policy actors are beginning to use the Internet and social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit to tell their stories. To explore this proposition, McBeth et al. (2012) use the aforementioned codebook to study YouTube videos published by the Buffalo Field Campaign (BFC), an advocacy group in Montana that is working to protect free-roaming bison in Yellowstone National Park. The authors find that the majority of videos published by the BFC reference at least one character and mention the policy issue of interest by offering a policy solution or telling a causal story. Findings from this study also suggest that the BFC used a number of strategies that are consistent with their position on the losing side of the policy struggle. For example, they focused on the costs of bison management (i.e., hazing and killing), while neglecting the benefits. Moreover, they attempted to expand the scope of conflict surrounding the issue by suggesting that the status quo management policy was harming a large number of buffalo, other wildlife, and local property owners.

Subsequently, NPF scholars have continued to use YouTube videos as the unit of analysis when studying group narratives on "new media" platforms. For instance, Lybecker, McBeth, Husmann, and Pelikan (2015) use the NPF to compare the social construction of the U.S.–Mexico Border in YouTube videos to more traditional forms of media. Detecting the narrative elements of the framework in the YouTube videos they study, the authors validate the findings in McBeth et al. (2012) that the NPF is useful for understanding new forms of media. Specifically, the authors demonstrate that YouTube videos construct a more sympathetic view of the border region than traditional media forms. Because the narratives of new media differ from those found in traditional media, Lybecker et al. (2015) suggest that future research should be conducted to determine to what extent these differences are systematic across policy subsystems.

The findings presented in McBeth et al. (2012) and Lybecker et al. (2015) are significant for two reasons. First, the findings demonstrate that the NPF provides a research method that helps scholars systematically analyze advocacy group messaging on social media and a theoretical framework that helps them to make sense of it. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they suggest that advocacy groups systematically use policy narratives when communicating with their supporters and the public at large on social media platforms like YouTube.

Though significant, it is important to note that these findings are based on videos posted on YouTube, which represents one of the many social media platforms that advocacy groups might use to engage their network and the mass public. According to Obar, Zube, and Lampe (2012), YouTube is a popular platform among advocacy groups, but not as popular as Facebook and Twitter. Moreover, YouTube usage varies depending on the size of the organization—approximately 80 percent of the medium to large advocacy groups they surveyed use YouTube, whereas less than 50

percent of small groups use it. By comparison, 100 percent of medium and large groups use Facebook and Twitter and 80–90 percent of small groups use them. There are a variety of reasons for this disparity between small and larger advocacy groups. Most notably, YouTube is more expensive—both in terms of time and resources—than Twitter and Facebook. It is more difficult to produce a video than a few lines of text. As a result, smaller organizations tend toward less costly social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook.

Given this tendency, we are interested in the extent to which the findings presented in McBeth et al. (2012) and Lybecker et al. (2015) are generalizable to these, less costly, forms of social media communication. Do advocacy groups use low cost social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook to distribute their narratives? If so, does the NPF help us analyze and understand the way in which advocacy groups use social media to advance their agendas? These two questions are relevant to the advancement of the NPF for a two reasons. First, some researchers have struggled to find a sufficient number of documents to utilize the framework (i.e., Gupta et al., 2014). This is problematic because it may bias the use and subsequent maturation of the framework toward cases in which advocacy groups can afford to produce a large number of "traditional" documents. As noted in Gupta et al. (2014), this bias could limit the applicability of the NPF in developing contexts, like India. Second, the NPF (in its current state) says relatively little about the way in which narratives evolve over time as advocacy groups amass resources, learn new lessons, and respond to current events. This paucity stems (in part) from a dearth of longitudinal data. Even if they can afford to produce a large number of traditional documents, advocacy groups rarely produce a sufficient number of documents at regular units of time to identify patterns or changes in the narrative elements they use or the strategies they employ.

Given the low cost, widespread, and frequent use of social media by advocacy groups in a wide variety of contexts, we believe that group communication on platforms like Facebook and Twitter *may* provide the data that are necessary to solve these problems and advance the NPF. To verify this belief, however, we need to know if groups use social media to disseminate their narratives and, if so, if their messaging strategies are consistent with the hypotheses outlined by the framework. To answer these questions and thereby verify the applicability of social media data, we use the framework to study advocacy group messaging on social media in the ongoing battle between advocates and opponents of nuclear energy in the United States.

Policy Issue: Nuclear Energy in the United States

The nuclear energy policy subsystem in the United States is currently dominated by two competing coalitions—the pro-nuclear coalition and the anti-nuclear coalition. Members of the pro-nuclear coalition believe that nuclear energy is safe, affordable, and a crucial part of the national energy mix. They also believe that nuclear energy, which is zero-emission, represents a potential solution to climate change. Advocacy groups such as CASEnergy, American Nuclear Society, World Nuclear Association, and the Nuclear Energy Institute have expressed policy beliefs in line

with this broader view of nuclear energy. Members of the anti-nuclear coalition, by comparison, believe that the risks and costs associated with nuclear energy far outweigh its benefits; society should invest time and resources into the development of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy as opposed to nuclear energy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Bodansky, 2007). Advocacy groups such as the Clamshell Alliance, Greenpeace, Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research argue in a similar vein, that nuclear energy is too risky and expensive.[1]

Motivated by these beliefs, the two coalitions diverge rather substantially in the policy goals they pursue. The pro-nuclear coalition routinely lobbies for the expansion of nuclear energy, achieved through the construction of new power plants; re-licensing of existing plants; and continued R&D efforts to develop better, more efficient nuclear technologies (e.g., small modular reactors and molten salt reactors). The anti-nuclear coalition, on the other hand, advocates for a "no-nuclear" society, achieved by phasing out existing nuclear plants, halting the construction of new plants, and redirecting R&D efforts away from nuclear technologies to alternative sources of energy.

While nuclear energy may not be growing at the rate that the pro-nuclear coalition would like, six new reactors are scheduled to become operational in the United States by 2020.[2] In support of this cause, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently (2014) approved an $8.3 billion dollar loan guarantee for two companies building the next generation of advanced nuclear reactors in the state of Georgia. Additionally, U.S. policy makes no mention of a plan to phase out existing operational facilities. Instead, the DOE is continuing to invest a total of $12.8 billion dollars in the development of new nuclear technologies (such as small modular reactors) that may enhance the size and capacity of existing plants.[3] Therefore, it is clear that the pro-nuclear coalition is winning the nuclear energy battle in the United States, whereas the anti-nuclear coalition is losing.

Policy Actors: Greenpeace Nuclear and CASEnergy

In this study, we focus on the social media messaging strategies adopted by two advocacy groups, one with a pro-nuclear policy agenda and the other with an anti-nuclear policy agenda. For the former, we study messages published by CASEnergy, an advocacy group that is funded by the nuclear industry and supports the increased use of nuclear energy in the United States. According to their website:

> The Clean and Safe Energy Coalition (CASEnergy Coalition) is a national grassroots organization that supports the increased use of nuclear energy to ensure an affordable, environmentally clean, reliable and safe supply of electricity. The Coalition believes that nuclear energy is a vital part of America's energy portfolio, and we work with our members and partners to educate the public about nuclear energy's many benefits.[4]

From the latter, we study messages published by Greenpeace Nuclear, a wing of Greenpeace International that is working to "end the nuclear age." According to

their website, nuclear power represents an "unacceptable risk to the environment and to humanity" and the only way to stop it is to "halt the expansion of all nuclear power, and for the shutdown of existing plants."[5]

We focus on these groups for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, they are active members of the nuclear energy subsystem within the United States, which suggests that their actions will be subject to the theoretical dynamics outlined by the NPF—both groups will use narratives to communicate with their stakeholders and the public at large, but we expect that their use of narrative strategies will vary because one group (CASEnergy) is part of the winning coalition whereas the other group (Greenpeace Nuclear) is a member of the losing coalition. Second, we selected these actors because they focus on nuclear energy policy at the national rather than local level. Finally, we selected these groups because they are active on low-cost social media platforms (like Twitter and Facebook). For the time period studied, Greenpeace Nuclear and CASEnergy were among the most active actors in the policy subsystem on Twitter. This activity provides an opportunity to explore the utility of the NPF for systematically analyzing and making sense of the way in which advocacy groups use social media.

In the following section, we first discuss the data we use to study the applicability of the NPF to Twitter. We then explore whether tweets disseminated by the two groups contain the required narrative elements of the NPF, at least one character and a policy preference. Before we move on to analyze the strategic use of narratives on Twitter, the general presence of key narrative elements must be demonstrated. Finally, if narrative elements are present in a majority of the messages and if the NPF is applicable to content disseminated on Twitter, we will test the following hypotheses, adapted from previous NPF research (specifically, Jones & McBeth, 2010, and Shanahan et al., 2011):

Hypothesis 1: To contain the scope of conflict, CASEnergy (a member of the winning coalition) will publish a larger proportion of tweets that discuss the benefits of nuclear energy, stress the diffusion of those benefits, and the concentration of costs than Greenpeace Nuclear (a member of the losing coalition).
Hypothesis 2: To expand the scope of conflict, Greenpeace Nuclear (a member of the losing coalition) will publish a larger proportion of tweets that discuss the costs of nuclear energy, the diffusion of those costs, and the concentration of benefits than CASEnergy (a member of the winning coalition).

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, we used a reduced version of the NPF codebook referenced above and reproduced in Table 1 to analyze the content of every message ("tweet"), our unit of analysis, containing the word "nuclear" that CASEnergy and Greenpeace Nuclear published on Twitter between January 1, 2014 and May 31, 2014. We used five months as our time frame because enough tweets were published

Table 1. Narrative Categories, Definitions, and Examples

Narrative Elements	Definition	Example Message
Characters		
Hero	Fixer of the problem	Despite record cold weather across the US nuclear energy is able to meet our electricity demands & keep us warm
Villain	Causer of the problem	Running from Responsibility: How the nuclear industry evades responsibility
Victim	Those harmed by the problem	The price of nuclear power: Uranium workers dying after time at Namibia mine
Policy Preference	Policy stance or judgment about a policy-related behavior	The prospects for nuclear energy have never been brighter.
Narrative Strategies	**Definition**	**Example Message**
Concentration of Costs	Limiting the negative impacts of a problem or policy solution to a select few	French nuclear giant Areva stock falls as auditor questions business model
Diffusion of Costs	Expanding the negative impacts of a problem or policy solution to a broader group	140,000 Fukushima victims deserve not to be forgotten
Concentration of Benefits	Limiting the positive impacts of a problem or policy solution to a select few	This system essentially protects the nuclear industry, not the people
Diffusion of Benefits	Expanding the positive impacts of a problem or policy solution to a broader group	Nuclear projects being built now will produce electricity for more than a million US homes

during this period for appropriate analysis. Additionally, this five-month period was relatively uneventful in that no unexpected shocks occurred in the nuclear energy policy subsystem. As such, we expect the tweets produced during this period to be relatively representative of routine activities of the actors chosen and not influenced by focusing events in the policy subsystem. During this five-month time period, CASEnergy published 458 tweets containing the word nuclear. Greenpeace posted 245 tweets. We focused on tweets instead of Facebook messages because it provides a harder test of the NPF—if advocacy groups disseminate strategic policy narratives within the confines of the 140 characters limit imposed by Twitter, then surely they do so on Facebook, which does not impose a character limitation. Additionally, Twitter messages, as opposed to those on Facebook, are public and therefore available for data collection as well as accessible by a broader public.

When reading each tweet posted by these groups, we coded for both narrative elements and narrative strategies. Narrative elements consist of a setting, characters, a plot, and a moral of the story. Because we are interested in the extent to which tweets constitute narratives, we focused our analysis on the elements that a piece of text must have to qualify as a narrative—characters (such as a hero, villain, or victim) and a policy preference (Shanahan et al., 2013). Consistent with previous research (e.g., McBeth et al., 2012), we coded each tweet for the existence of a character and then the type of character present. Heroes are the people and/or anthropomorphized abstractions that can fix a problem.[6] In Table 1, for example, CASEnergy suggests that nuclear energy is the "hero" that saves U.S. residents from electricity deficits

Table 2. Inter-Coder Agreement by Category

Category	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Cohen's Kappa
Identification of at least one character	75 (75)	25 (25)	0.50
Identification of a hero	78 (78)	22 (22)	0.57
Identification of a victim	86 (86)	14 (14)	0.54
Identification of a villain	96 (96)	4 (4)	0.65
Articulation of a policy preference	82 (82)	18 (18)	0.62
Discussion of costs	95 (95)	5 (5)	0.76
Concentration/diffusion of costs[a]	7 (78)	2 (22)	0.57
Discussion of benefits	76 (76)	24 (24)	0.49
Concentration/diffusion of benefits[a]	25 (100)	0 (0)	—

[a]Sum is less than 100 because we only tested for agreement on concentration and diffusion when the coders agreed (during the independent coding phase) that a cost or benefit was discussed.

and cold weather. Villains, by comparison, are the entities that cause the problem. In Table 1 tweet that was posted by Greenpeace, the nuclear industry is clearly the villain. Victims are the entities that suffer because a problem, such as the uranium workers who are dying because of nuclear energy. In addition to looking for characters, we looked for indications of a policy preference, which the NPF defines as a policy stance or judgment about a policy-related behavior (Shanahan et al., 2013). In the Table 1 example, for instance, CASEnergy expresses a judgment about the "bright" future of nuclear energy.

To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we followed McBeth et al. (2012) by coding tweets that focus on the costs (negative impacts) and/or benefits (positive impacts) of a problem or policy solution, such as nuclear energy. Then, we classified each tweet that mentioned costs and/or benefits by the number of entities that were positively or negatively affected by the benefit or cost mentioned. Messages that concentrate costs imply that relatively few people and/or abstractions are negatively impacted by a problem or policy solution. For example, the message listed in Table 1 mentions costs, but suggests that they are borne by a small group (Areva). Messages that diffuse costs, by comparison, mention negative impacts, but highlight the large number of people that are affected, like the "140,000 Fukushima victims" mentioned by Greenpeace in one of the tweets they published during this time period. Messages that concentrate benefits suggest that relatively few people entities are positively impacted by a policy or solution. For example, the tweet listed in Table 1 suggests that the nuclear industry (a relatively small group) benefits from nuclear energy policy in the U.S., not the people at large. Messages that diffuse benefits, by contrast, focus on the large number of people that are positively impacted by a policy or solution, such as the "million US homes" that are powered by nuclear energy.

As with most attempts to quantify qualitative data, some of the coding decisions we made were subjective. To measure this subjectivity, two different researchers independently coded a sample of 100 tweets that included messages from both groups. The results of this analysis are numerically summarized in Table 2. As indicated in the table, intercoder agreement ranged from 75 percent to 100 percent, which is consistent with previous NPF research (Crow & Berggren, 2014; Lybecker et al., 2015; McBeth et al., 2007; McBeth, Shanahan, Hathaway, Tigert, & Sampson,

Table 3. Narrative Elements in Twitter Messages

	Greenpeace		CASEnergy		Comparison[a]	
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Test Statistic	Association
Identification of at least one character	162 (66)	83 (34)	273 (60)	185 (40)	$\chi^2(1) = 2.6$; $p > 0.05$	0.06
Hero	44 (27)	118 (73)	269 (99)	4 (1)	$\chi^2(1) = 259.5$; $p < 0.05$	0.77
Villain	129 (80)	33 (20)	32 (12)	241 (88)	$\chi^2(1) = 198.2$; $p < 0.05$	0.68
Victim	44 (27)	118 (73)	14 (5)	259 (95)	$\chi^2(1) = 40.8$; $p < 0.05$	0.31
Articulation of a policy preference	193 (79)	52 (21)	307 (67)	151 (33)	$\chi^2(1) = 10.2$; $p < 0.05$	0.12
Contains both narrative elements	139 (57)	106 (43)	234 (51)	224 (49)	$\chi^2(1) = 1.8$; $p > 0.05$	0.05

[a]Test statistic = Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates's continuity correction; Measure of association = Cramer's V.

2010; Shanahan et al., 2013) and appropriate given the exploratory nature of this research (Neuendorf, 2002). While common, measures of agreement fail to account for agreement that occurs by chance, so methodologists recommend the use of intercoder reliability statistics, such as Cohen's Kappa (κ), which adjust for chance agreement. As shown Table 2, κ ranged from 0.48 to 1.00 in this analysis. According to Landis and Koch (1977), κ values of 0.41 to 0.60 indicate "moderate agreement," values of 0.61 to 0.80 indicate "substantial agreement," and values of 0.81 to 1.00 indicate "almost perfect" agreement. Consistent with previous applications of the NPF (i.e., Heikkila, Weible, & Pierce, 2014), all of our categories met or exceeded the "moderate agreement" threshold, so we proceeded with the analysis.[7]

Results

The results of our content analysis are numerically summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 displays information about the existence of narrative elements in the Twitter messages published by Greenpeace and CASEnergy. Table 4 presents information about the narrative strategies employed by the two groups (to test hypotheses 1 and 2).

Narrative Elements in Tweets Published by CASEnergy and Greenpeace

In order for the NPF and its conception of a narrative to be considered useful for studying messages on social media, Twitter in particular, a substantial portion of messages published by both groups must meet the minimum definition of a policy narrative—they should reference at least one character (such as a hero, villain, or victim) *and* articulate a policy preference. As indicated in Table 3, our content analysis is consistent with the requirements of the NPF—62 percent (435) of the 703 messages published by the two groups referenced at least one character, 71 percent (500) of them revealed a policy preference, and 53 percent (373) of the messages published by the competing groups mentioned at least one character and a policy preference.

Table 4. Narrative Strategies in Twitter Messages

	Greenpeace		CASEnergy		Comparison[a]	
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Test Statistic	Association
Discussion of costs	72 (52)	67 (48)	12 (5)	222 (95)	$\chi^2(1) = 106.2$; $p < 0.05$	0.53
Concentrated	9 (12)	63 (88)	6 (50)	6 (50)	$\chi^2(1) = 7.5$; $p < 0.05$	0.30
Diffused	63 (88)	9 (12)	6 (50)	6 (50)	$\chi^2(1) = 7.5$; $p < 0.05$	0.30
Discussion of benefits	20 (14)	119 (86)	189 (81)	45 (19)	$\chi^2(1) = 153.3$; $p < 0.05$	0.64
Concentrated	11 (55)	9 (45)	0 (0)	189 (100)	$\chi^2(1) = 99.0$; $p < 0.05$	0.69
Diffused	9 (45)	11 (55)	189 (100)	0 (0)	$\chi^2(1) = 99.0$; $p < 0.05$	0.72

[a]Test statistic = Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction; Measure of association = Cramer's V.

There were, however, a number of substantively interesting and statistically significant differences in the narrative elements that the groups employed. For example, both groups used at least one character to tell their stories, but they used different types of characters. Greenpeace, a member of the losing coalition, used villains in 80 percent (129) of their messages, whereas CASEnergy, a member of the winning coalition, only used them in 12 percent (32) of their tweets. Greenpeace also used victims more frequently than CASEnergy, but the difference in proportions was smaller (27 percent, $n = 44$ vs. 5 percent, $n = 14$). The opposite was true of heroes—they appeared in almost all of the tweets that CASEnergy published 99 percent (269), and only 27 percent (44) of the messages that Greenpeace posted. Based on these findings, one might postulate that winning groups generally favor heroes to villains and victims, whereas losing groups favor villains and victims to heroes when constructing their narratives. Though intuitive, this pattern does not appear in other NPF studies. For example, Crow and Berggren (2014) find that winning groups are more likely to use villains than the losing groups. Heikkila et al. (2014) find that the same is true for victims. As such, we suggest caution in drawing this conclusion. Rather, these results suggest character usage may be dependent upon both position in the policy subsystem (winning vs. losing) as well as broader subsystem characteristics.

In addition to the *types* of characters they cast, the Greenpeace and CASEnergy also differed in their decisions about *who* to cast as heroes, villains, and victims. Greenpeace usually cast nuclear energy and the nuclear industry as villains that are inflicting harm on innocent victims, like the environment, residents of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, or the public at large. They did so using messages like, *3 years of #Fukushima nuclear tragedy, but no lessons learnt and 140,000 victims left on their own* and *Nuclear power is stealing from the future*. When including heroes in their stories, they generally cast renewable technologies (like solar, wind, and biomass) or anti-nuclear activists as protagonists working to save the victims from the villains. For example, they routinely posted messages like *Why restart #nuclear reactors when you can have an Energy Revolution with clean and safe renewables?* and *Huge respect to the 240 activists who have told world we say no to old nuclear reactors*.

CASEnergy employed a different cast of heroes and villains. Rather than casting nuclear energy, industry, and technology as villains, CASEnergy used tweets like *Read how nuclear energy helps keep the lights on in the Northeast*, *DOE Announces Nuclear Energy Scholarships*, and *Small #Modular Reactors Could Provide Safer Nuclear Energy* to cast them as heroes. When discussing villains, CASEnergy focused on nature by casting climate change and winter weather as the villains that the heroes are working to subjugate. To accomplish this, they used language like *As the long & cold winter comes to a close, thankful we have #safe #reliable nuclear energy* and *Only a total shift to low-carbon generation can tackle climate change, says IPCC. #nuclear*. Interestingly, however, in the few instances where CASEnergy identified a victim, they tended to agree with Greenpeace by selecting the environment. In their stories, however, the environment was not harmed by nuclear energy. Instead, it was saved by nuclear energy as exemplified in messages like *Global Climate Cannot Afford Loss Of US Nuclear Plants*.

Greenpeace and CASEnergy also differed in their articulation of policy preferences. Greenpeace was more consistent in their inclusion of a policy preference (79 percent, $n = 193$) than CASEnergy (67 percent, $n = 307$). More importantly, the policy preferences they advocated for in their social media narratives were polar opposites. Greenpeace frequently voiced their opposition to nuclear energy, by way of tweets like *Nuclear power and democracy don't mix*, *The only way to make sure that the next Chernobyl and Fukushima does not happen is to phase nuclear power out*, and *Greenpeace files a legal complaint against #Poland's #Nuclear Energy Programme. Government, listen to the people!* CASEnergy, by contrast, used messages like *No other energy source can match #nuclear's level of reliability*, *Existing nuclear plants are valuable and worth saving*, *If you're serious about climate change, you have to be serious about nuclear power*, to show their support for nuclear energy.

By demonstrating that a majority of tweets contain policy narratives, we suggest that the NPF is useful for studying group messages on Twitter. As such, we proceeded to use the subset of tweets that contain narrative elements to test the hypotheses we listed in the previous section.

Narrative Strategies in Tweets Published by CASEnergy and Greenpeace

As specified by the NPF, we hypothesized that Greenpeace and CASEnergy would employ different narrative strategies because the two groups have different goals. CASEnergy is winning in the policy subsystem thus, if the NPF is correct, they would try to maintain the scope of conflict surrounding nuclear energy policy by discussing benefits more often than costs and stressing the diffusion of benefits and the concentration of costs. Greenpeace, by contrast, is losing in the subsystem, so they would try to do the opposite with their narratives—expand the scope of conflict by highlighting the diffused costs of nuclear energy as well as the concentrated nature of its benefits. As indicated in Table 4, our content analysis reveals a pattern of messages that are generally consistent with these hypotheses. Greenpeace (52 percent, $n = 72$) discussed costs more often than CASEnergy (5 percent, $n = 12$), whereas CASEnergy (81 percent, $n = 189$) discussed benefits more frequently than

Greenpeace (14 percent, $n = 20$). The differences in both of these proportions are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). In other words, Greenpeace strategically framed their stories around negative impacts and externalities (losses) with hopes of drawing the attention of people who are not currently involved in the policy subsystem. CASEnergy, by comparison, strategically framed their narratives around positive impacts and externalities (gains) with hopes of reassuring people that the subsystem is working for them, and that there is no need to get involved. Messages like *Thyroid cancer cases continue to increase among young people in #Fukushima* and *Certain nuclear accidents not preventable, if not ready to have one, better quit* by Greenpeace and *Nuclear #energy provides nearly 14 percent of MA #electricity - avoiding 2.44 million metric tons of CO2* and *There are more than 100,000 high-paying American #jobs in the #nuclear energy industry* by CASEnergy illustrate this strategic discrepancy.

Moreover, the way in which Greenpeace and CASEnergy framed costs and benefits differed rather significantly. Table 4 reveals another set of statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) patterns in line with our hypotheses from the NPF literature. When discussing costs, Greenpeace focused on the large portions of society who bear them, using messages like *Nuclear will add considerable cost to UK energy bills* and *Again and again, nuclear profits and we pay: Big business dodges nuclear cleanup bills*. In other words, a significant majority of tweets disseminated by Greenpeace, as in Table 4, describe the costs of nuclear energy as diffused (88 percent, $n = 63$) as opposed to concentrated (12 percent, $n = 9$). When they discussed benefits, they did the opposite—they focused on the few people who reap them, with messages like *Nuclear makes the profits, the planet pays the price*.

CASEnergy, by comparison, concentrated costs and diffused benefits. In fact, as shown in Table 4, CASEnergy exclusively tweeted about the diffused benefits of nuclear energy (100 percent, $n = 189$). For example, when talking about benefits, they used messages like *4,150 #Pennsylvania businesses are involved in or benefit from the state's #nuclear power facilities*, *Per 1000 megawatts of electricity generated #nuclear has over 2.5 times the jobs as coal and 10 times the jobs of gas and wind*, and *Nuclear #energy provides more than 64* percent *of U.S. emission-free #electricity*, that highlight the many people who are positively impacted by nuclear energy in the United States. Alternatively, when talking about costs, they posted tweets like *[t]he nuclear energy industry is preparing for the pending wave of retirements*, to suggest that a relatively small group (the nuclear industry) is bearing the brunt of a large cost to society—retirement.

Conclusions

This study was motivated by an interest in the way that advocacy groups use social media platforms like Twitter to attain their policy goals. We suggested that the NPF may provide a useful theoretical framework for analyzing the messaging strategies that policy actors or groups employ on social media. So, we asked and answered a relatively straightforward set of questions: do advocacy groups use low-cost social media platforms like Twitter to distribute policy narratives, as defined by the NPF? If so, do they use the narrative strategies outlined by the NPF (i.e., expanding/containing the scope of conflict)? Our findings

suggest that advocacy groups use Twitter to systematically disseminate messages that contain the basic elements of a policy narrative—at least one character and a policy preference. Moreover, our findings suggest that messaging strategies vary in theoretically predictable ways—groups that are part of winning coalitions use social media narratives to contain the scope of conflict surrounding an issue. Groups that are part of losing coalitions use social media narratives to expand the scope of conflict surrounding an issue. In other words, our results suggest that Twitter messages conform to the theoretical expectations of the NPF (Jones & McBeth, 2010) as derived from the foundational work of Schattschneider (1960). Moreover, our results match the results from other applications of the NPF that rely on documents from more traditional forms of media (Crow & Berggren 2014; Shanahan et al., 2013). As a pair, these findings demonstrate the utility of the NPF for studying the way that advocacy groups use social media to advance their agendas. The NPF provides a method for analyzing message content and a theoretical grounding that helps us understand and forecast why, how, and when different groups will use different messaging strategies on social media.

More importantly, these findings exhibit the potential value of social media data for systematically studying the policy narratives that are disseminated by advocacy groups. This finding is especially valuable for the study of nascent or marginal advocacy groups that (for cost or other reasons) produce relatively few traditional documents for public consumption. They may not publish editorials, and newsletters, or government reports, but many of these groups use social media to communicate with the public and the messages they publish likely provide a rich source of data that will advance the NPF by enhancing generalizability. Moreover, the relatively constant flow of messages and content that competing actors and groups publish on social media will advance the framework by allowing for a more dynamic understanding of the way in which narratives evolve over time as groups encounter new information and respond to current events. This is a critical step if we, as NPF researchers, want to understand how, why, and when policy narratives cause policy change.

Though intriguing, it is important that researchers continue to assess the benefits and limitations of these data for studying narrative structure and content. Moreover, we urge researchers to think about the differences that may exist between advocacy group communication on social media and communication on more tradition mediums. For example, the number and combination of narrative elements and strategies that a group employs may vary in accordance with the medium they are using. If a group is using a space-limited medium like Twitter, the structure and content of their narrative may be rather simple—their messages may highlight a relatively small group of characters and employ a basic strategy, like highlighting costs and/or benefits. If a group is using a less restrictive medium like Facebook or their website to disseminate their narrative, then the structure and content of their narrative may be more complex—they may identify a larger cast of characters and employ a more complex strategy, such as the devil–angel shift (Shanahan et al., 2013). If this is true, then group's choices when space is limited may provide important insight into narrative priorities. When advocacy groups are forced to economize, what narrative elements do they use? What characters do they focus on? What strategies do they use?

Research in this direction will add to our understanding of how advocacy groups are using social media and, more importantly, the influence policy narratives on the policymaking process.

Kuhika Gupta is a research scientist at the Center for Energy, Security & Society at the University of Oklahoma.
Joseph Ripberger is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and the Deputy Director for Research at the Center for Risk and Crisis Management at the University of Oklahoma.
Wesley Wehde is a PhD. candidate in the Department of Political Science and a graduate research assistant at the Center for Risk and Crisis Management at the University of Oklahoma.

Notes

1. In this section, we use concepts and language inspired by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). In doing so, we employ the lens of the ACF and its conception of coalitions, without conducting an ACF analysis or attempting to contribute to this literature.
2. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/USA-Nuclear-Power/
3. http://energy.gov/lpo/articles/building-all-above-portfolio-loan-guarantees-advanced-nuclear-projects
4. http://casenergy.org/our-coalition/about/
5. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/nuclear/
6. As noted by Weible and Schlager (2014), the definition of a character within the NPF varies from study to study. Some studies adopt a narrow definition of the term, requiring that only people, groups, or organizations can be characters (i.e., Heikkila et al., 2014) or proper nouns (i.e., Crow & Berggren, 2014). Other studies adopt a much broader definition by including "anthropomorphized objects and broader categories" (i.e., McBeth et al., 2012). In this study, we adopt the broader definition.
7. It is important to note, however, that intercoder reliability remains a challenge for NPF research, and that future iterations of the framework might improve upon this by establishing better definitions and/or a generalized training protocol for NPF researchers.

References

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics. American Politics and Political Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bodansky, Daniel. 2007. *Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Bortree, Denise S., and Trent Seltzer. 2009. "Dialogic Strategies and Outcomes: An Analysis of Environmental Advocacy Groups' Facebook Profiles." *Public Relations Review* 35 (3): 317–19.

Crow, Deserai A., and John Berggren. 2014. "Using the Narrative Policy Framework to Understand Stakeholder Strategy and Effectiveness: A Multi-Case Analysis." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 131–56.

Dodge, Jennifer, Sonia M. Ospina, and Erica Gabrielle Foldy. 2005. "Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry." *Public Administration Review* 65 (3): 286–300.

Edwards, Heather R., and Richard Hoefer. 2010. "Are Social Work Advocacy Groups Using Web 2.0 Effectively?" *Journal of Policy Practice* 9 (3-4): 220–39.

Fischer, Frank. 1998. "Beyond Empiricism: Policy Inquiry in Postpositivist Perspective." *Policy Studies Journal* 26 (1): 129–46.

———. 2003. *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Frank, and J. Forrester. 1993. *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Goodman, David, and Jennifer Preston. 2012. "How the Kony Video Went Viral." *The New York Times*. http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/how-the-kony-video-went-viral/. Accessed March 25, 2015.

Greenberg, Josh, and Maggie MacAulay. 2009. "NPO 2.0? Exploring the Web Presence of Environmental Nonprofit Organizations in Canada." *Global Media Journal–Canadian Edition* 2 (1): 63–88.

Guo, Chao, and Gregory D. Saxton. 2013. "Tweeting Social Change: How Social Media Are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 43 (1): 57–79.

Gupta, Kuhika, Joseph T. Ripberger, and Savannah Collins. 2014. "The Strategic Use of Policy Narratives: Jaitapur and the Politics of Siting a Nuclear Power Plant in India." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 89–106.

Hajer, Maarten A. 1995. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heikkila, Tanya, Christopher M. Weible, and Jonathan J. Pierce. 2014. "Exploring the Policy Narratives and Politics of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 185–206.

Jones, Michael D. 2014. "Communicating Climate Change: Are Stories Better than 'Just the Facts'?" *Policy Studies Journal* 42 (4): 644–73.

Jones, Michael D., and Mark K. McBeth. 2010. "A Narrative Policy Framework: Clear Enough to be Wrong?" *Policy Studies Journal* 38 (2): 329–53.

Jones, Michael D., Mark K. McBeth, and Elizabeth A. Shanahan. 2014. "Introducing the Narrative Policy Framework." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–25.

Landis, J. Richard, and Gary G. Koch. 1977. "An Application of Hierarchical Kappa-Type Statistics in the Assessment of Majority Agreement Among Multiple Observers." *Biometrics* 33 (2): 363–74.

Lovejoy, Kristen, and Gregory D. Saxton. 2012. "Information, Community, and Action: How Nonprofit Organizations Use Social Media." *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 17 (3): 337–53.

Lybecker, Donna L., Mark K. McBeth, Maria A. Husmann, and Nicholas Pelikan. 2015. "Do New Media Support New Policy Narratives? The Social Construction of the US–Mexico Border on YouTube." *Policy & Internet*. 7 (4): 497–525.

McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Paul L. Hathaway, Linda E. Tigert, and Lynette J. Sampson. 2010. "Buffalo Tales: Interest Group Policy Stories in Greater Yellowstone." *Policy Sciences* 43 (4): 391–409.

McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, and Michael D. Jones. 2005. "The Science of Storytelling: Measuring Policy Beliefs in Greater Yellowstone." *Society and Natural Resources* 18 (5): 413–29.

McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Molly C. Arrandale Anderson, and Barbara Rose. 2012. "Policy Story or Gory Story? Narrative Policy Framework Analysis of Buffalo Field Campaign's YouTube Videos." *Policy & Internet* 4 (3-4): 159–83.

McBeth, Mark K., Elizabeth A. Shanahan, Ruth J. Arnell, and Paul L. Hathaway. 2007. "The Intersection of Narrative Policy Analysis and Policy Change Theory." *Policy Studies Journal* 35 (1): 87–108.

McNutt, John G., and Katherine M. Boland 1999. "Electronic Advocacy by Nonprofit Organizations in Social Welfare Policy." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 28 (4): 432–51.

Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2002. *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Obar, Jonathan A., Paul Zube, and Clifford Lampe. 2012. "Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action." *Journal of Information Policy* 2: 1–25.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Petridou, Evangelia. 2014. "Theories of the Policy Process: Contemporary Scholarship and Future Directions." *Policy Studies Journal* 42 (S1): S12–32.

Pierce, Jonathan J., Aaron Smith-Walter, and Holly L. Peterson. 2014. "Research Design and the Narrative Policy Framework." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 27–44.

Radaelli, Claudio M., Claire A. Dunlop, and Oliver Fritsch. 2013. "Narrating Impact Assessment in the European Union." *European Political Science* 12 (4): 500–21.

Roe, Emery. 1994. *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sabatier, Paul A., and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Saxton, Gregory D., Suny Chao Guo, and William A. Brown. 2007. "New Dimensions of Nonprofit Responsiveness: The Application and Promise of Internet-Based Technologies." *Public Performance & Management Review* 31 (2): 144–73.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Mark K. McBeth, Paul L. Hathaway, and Ruth J. Arnell. 2008. "Conduit or Contributor? The Role of Media in Policy Change Theory." *Policy Sciences* 41 (2): 115–38.

Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Michael D. Jones, and Mark K. McBeth. 2011. "Policy Narratives and Policy Processes." *Policy Studies Journal* 39 (3): 535–61.

Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Michael D. Jones, Mark K. McBeth, and Ross R. Lane. 2013. "An Angel on the Wind: How Heroic Policy Narratives Shape Policy Realities." *Policy Studies Journal* 41 (3): 453–83.

Stone, Deborah A. 1989. "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas." *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (2): 281–300.

———. 2002. *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, 3rd ed. New York: W. W. Norton.

Waters, Richard D., and Jia Y. Jamal. 2011. "Tweet, Tweet, Tweet: A Content Analysis of Nonprofit Organizations' Twitter Updates." *Public Relations Review* 37 (3): 321–24.

Weible, Christopher M., and Edella Schlager. 2014. "Narrative Policy Framework: Contributions, Limitations, and Recommendations." In *The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis*, ed. Michael Jones, Mark McBeth, and Elizabeth Shanahan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 247–60.

Wong, Scott, 2012. "Joseph Kony Captures Congress' Attention." *Politico*. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74355.html. Accessed March 25, 2015.

Yanow, Dvora. 1995. "Built Space as Story: The Policy Stories that Buildings Tell." *Policy Studies Journal* 23 (3): 407–22.

Appendix

Code Book

1. Does the narrative contain a hero (an entity which solves a policy problem)?

   A - Yes

   B - No

2. Does the narrative contain a villain (an entity which causes a policy problem)?

   A - Yes

   B - No

3. Does the narrative contain a victim (an entity harmed by a policy problem)?

   A - Yes

   B - No

4. Does the narrative discuss the benefits of a policy decision?

   A - Yes (go to question #5)

   B - No (go to question #6)

5. What best describes how the narrative constructs the benefits of the policy decision?

   A - The narrative is constructed as providing concentrated benefits (a few gain).

   B - The narrative is constructed as providing diffused benefits (many gain).

6. Does the narrative discuss the costs of a policy solution?

   A - Yes (go to question #7)

   B - No (skip to question #8)

7. What best describes how the narrative constructs the costs of the policy decision?

   A - The narrative is constructed as providing concentrated costs (a few pay).

   B - The narrative is constructed as providing diffused costs (the many pay).

8. What is the stance of the narrative towards the policy being discussed?

   A - Winning (supports the policy environment and actions discussed in the narrative)

   B - Losing (the group is under attack even if they are partially winning)