

# RACE, CLASS, AND SEGREGATION PATTERNS IN U.S. IMMIGRANT GATEWAY CITIES

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Previous studies have shown some tendency toward increased residential racial and ethnic integration, especially in large West Coast metropolitan areas. They have also shown in limited studies that integration, or at least declines in separation, occur with increases in socioeconomic status. The results of this study, using recently released 2000 census data for metropolitan areas with large numbers of foreign born, show that indeed separation does decline with increases in socioeconomic status though it also varies by geography, education, and income and is significantly variable across different ethnic groups in the large immigrant cities. The research in this study also documents the continuing hierarchy of greater integration of Whites with Asians and Whites with Hispanics than with African Americans. It is clear that the changing patterns of separation have moved beyond Black-White contexts. Still, class clearly matters, as integration is greater at higher education levels, and suburban areas in general are more integrated than urban cores.

**Keywords:** *migration; foreign-born; segregation; race; class*

**There has been an ongoing debate** in the U.S. research literature about the reasons for the continuing separation of racial and ethnic groups in the United States. That debate has been especially contentious with respect to the roles of own race preferences, discrimination, and class effects (economics) as competing explanations for the segregation that continues in the large metropolitan areas of the United States (Clark 1986, 1989; Galster 1988, 1989). Even though there is tentative agreement that the explanations of residential segregation are complex, and that no one factor is the primary explanation for patterns of segregation, there is still debate about class effects on residential separation. At the same time, there is increasing recognition that segregation is more than a Black-White issue, especially in large immigrant gateway

cities where native-born Whites are often no longer the majority population. How are patterns of separation changing as the large immigrant gateway cities receive continuing flows of new immigrants, and how is separation related to class, as measured by income and education in these new "melting pots"? These are important questions that can be examined with new data from the 2000 census.

This article reviews the debates about the causes of continuing separation and the extent to which race and class play a role in the patterns of segregation. But the real contribution of the article is to place the discussion of racial/ethnic segregation in the context of rapidly changing metropolitan population composition and increasing diversity, especially in the metropolitan areas where there are large flows of new immigrants. The evidence from the research presented in this article confirms a continuing role of socioeconomic status in segregation levels, although true class effects as measured by education are much more important than income in creating patterns of integration. The study also shows that integration is higher in the suburbs than the central city, which is consistent with both class effects and evidence of assimilation for foreign-born ethnic groups who have moved to the suburbs.

### **THEORETICAL CONTEXT: PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SEGREGATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS**

Our review of the role of socioeconomic status on the integration of racial/ethnic groups extends the literature on economic effects on separation and suggests a link between the research that examines residential separation and that which examines assimilation (see also Alba et al. 1999a, 1999b).

The debates about the causes of residential separation emerge out of attempts to understand urban patterns and their creation and modification over time. A large literature in urban ecology has documented the role of socioeconomic status, family status, and ethnic characteristics as the defining elements of urban structure (Berry and Kasarda 1977). In these studies, neighborhoods within cities are classified on the basis of the economic, family, and ethnic status, and to a large degree, the nature of neighborhood change is determined by the intersection of these classic measures. An important body of research shows that changing social status, especially that generated by education has an important effect on acceptance of "other race" residents in the neighborhood, and so on the nature of neighborhood change (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). If Blacks who move to suburban counties are more established, higher-socioeconomic-status families, then the lower levels of separation are understandable in the context of public opinion

surveys that suggest that there is less resistance to integration when households are of similar status (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). The data that show greater tolerance with greater education is a powerful underlying explanation for the changes in residential integration. The education levels of Black households have increased with the opportunities provided by the enforcement of affirmative action rules. Following this conceptualization, class may be a central variable that explains levels of separation (Wilson 1980).

The discussion of the future path of integration, in the light of educational and economic gains, centralizes the interplay of race and class. Some research, using data from earlier censuses to measure segregation across education, occupation, and income groups, found racial segregation much greater than class segregation (Farley 1977; Miller and Quigley 1990). Overall, the studies of the 1970s tended to support a race/ethnicity-based explanation for lack of integration. More recent studies have suggested that "twenty years of efforts to reduce the consequences of racial discrimination have had some positive effects" (Morrill 1995, 40). Garreau (1992) argues, too, that the new Black suburban middle class is nearly indistinguishable from Whites of the same educational and economic levels.<sup>1</sup> Although evidence of varying types and sources has been used to evaluate the interaction of race and class on levels of segregation (Farley 1977; Miller and Quigley 1990), in fact there is still only limited empirical evaluation of how the gains in socioeconomic status are translated into residential integration. The most recent work is leaning toward an explanation that a substantial portion of residential sorting is related to income. Fisher (2003) finds that 25% of total entropy (level of separation) was related to income in the Midwest and 39% in the West. The present work extends those findings, including an examination of separation and education as a factor in the patterns of residential integration.

The early debates regarding race, class, and same-group preferences as causes of neighborhood change focused in the main on Black-White integration experiences and paid much less attention to the coming diversity in U.S. metropolitan areas. Obviously, the tensions between race and class as aspects of separation can be extended to a study of all ethnic groups and their interactions. As the foreign-born population grows, the interactions between groups take on new and complex interactions in the most populous foreign-born metropolitan areas. The simple dichotomy between Black and White communities is no longer relevant, especially in the larger metropolitan areas and especially in the large immigrant gateway cities. Understanding the levels and patterns of separation across all ethnic groups is an important part of suggesting the future path of integration in U.S. cities.

Just as the processes of self-selection and avoidance operated in the past with early European migrant groups, the processes continue to operate for old and new migrants to the gateway cities. Preferences for particular combinations of ethnic neighbors continue to play an important role in the neighborhoods that individual families choose. However, not all groups have the same preferences or face the same difficulties in the assimilation process. It appears that Whites and Asians clearly have stronger preferences for neighborhoods of their own race/ethnicity than do Hispanics and Blacks (Clark 1991, 1992; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985).

There is already some support, based on 1990 census data, to suggest that unique racial segregation dynamics are emerging in multiethnic areas, particularly in the West (Clark and Ware 1997). However, there is a debate about how the high levels of Latino and Asian immigration will affect mixed-race neighborhood living as these immigrant gateway cities become increasingly diverse. Krivo and Kaufman (1999) suggest that greater Black-White mixing is less likely in multiethnic settings—is that true with measures from the most recent data?

The flows of the foreign born into the gateway cities are changing the dynamic of separation at both the high and low ends of the socioeconomic scale. This process is interwoven with their process of assimilation to the larger society as a whole. Debates about foreign-born segregation have drawn on classic notions of assimilation, particularly spatial assimilation through suburbanization. The spatial assimilation model predicts that minorities will attempt to convert gains in socioeconomic status into an improved spatial position, which implies assimilation with members of the majority group and suburbanization (Massey and Denton 1985, 1988). Mere residence in suburban areas results in more exposure to Whites than does central-city residence, given that 71% of all Whites live in the suburbs. Thus, increasing suburbanization of minorities in general reflects both socioeconomic advance and assimilation.

There is a contested debate about the residential integration of new immigrants (Rosenbaum and Friedman 2001). Several studies have indicated that the foreign born are experiencing increasing residential assimilation, whether through a move to the suburbs (Alba, Logan, and Stults 2000) or to central-city multiethnic neighborhoods, as in greater New York City (Alba et al. 1995). In contrast, other studies argue that it is not clear whether suburban settlement reflects the assimilation and dispersal of immigrants into nonimmigrant communities or the strengthening of high-income ethnic enclaves. Ethnic social networks are not as geographically restricted for new immigrants as they were in the past, and more recent immigrants enter the country with human capital, high incomes, and even professional jobs. In

fact, most groups currently have both the “immigrant enclave” (driven by constraint) and the “ethnic community” (driven by preference) options (Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002, 315). At the same time, living in ethnic neighborhoods, especially in the suburbs, may simply indicate a preference for living with coethnics and thus will not decrease separation (Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002).

The review highlights our need to get a better grasp of the changes in separation in just those cities that are changing their ethnic and racial makeup under the impact of large-scale foreign-born migration—the major immigrant gateway cities. Is there evidence of increased integration and integration across the different racial and ethnic mix, and if so, can we infer evidence of assimilation?

## DATA AND QUESTIONS

The analysis is built around two questions: (1) How does segregation vary by geography—across the urban core and surrounding suburbs? and (b) How is segregation influenced by socioeconomic status? We have included an analysis that differentiates between immigrant gateway cities’ core and suburbs to incorporate the insights of the spatial assimilation model. Both questions ultimately address the extent to which class (income and education) is playing a role in the increasing integration across immigrant gateway cities. To test the importance of socioeconomic status in residential separation across racial/ethnic groups, we examine the role of both education and income in the suburbs and metropolitan cores of five major immigrant gateway cities. If well-educated and higher-income ethnic minorities are more residentially integrated than ethnic minorities with less education and lower incomes, then we can argue that socioeconomic differences are important in explaining separation and that, consequently, increased income and education can be translated into greater levels of integration. To the extent that the foreign born also show this pattern by living in the suburbs, we can argue that the classic notion of economic advancement and integration are going hand in hand.

To appraise segregation levels, we compute dissimilarity and relative exposure ( $P^*$ ) indices for the urban core and surrounding suburbs for the subsets of major ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> We use the same indices to examine the nature of the relationship between education and income level and segregation. The indices are not without their problems, but the consensus in social science research is that when used in combination, they are the best well-understood tools to examine levels of separation.

It is important to note that the test of the relationship between segregation and income and education involves calculating dissimilarity (D) and relative exposure ( $P^*$ ) indices across tracts. Thus, indices of segregation are calculated across income groups (< \$15,000, \$15,000 to \$25,000, etc.) and these indices are then plotted against the income groups. The central question is whether Black (or Hispanic or Asian) households earning less than \$15,000 are distributed like White households earning less than \$15,000 as measured by the indices. Similarly, are Black households (or other ethnic households) with a college education distributed similarly to White households? The aim is to examine the extent of residential separation for Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites of equal education attainment and income level. By calculating the segregation measure in this manner, we are comparing only equal-status populations, and so we can answer the question, Is there a difference in segregation scores between different income and educational categories for the racial and ethnic groups? The data for each of these analyses is class specific. For example, the analysis of Whites and Blacks in the educational category "college graduates" only compares Whites and Blacks with that status across tracts.

The data are drawn from the SF3 files for census tracts. Issues about the appropriateness of using census tracts have occasionally been raised with respect to scale and autocorrelation. Clearly, levels of separation are greater at smaller spatial scales, but recent work suggests that the patterns of change over time are similar at different scales (Clark 1996). The changes in segregation across education and income levels are measured and graphed over all tracts in our five cities, and these changes constitute a descriptive measure of the nature of the relationship between the two independent variables. To assess the strength of the relationship across education and income categories, we compute the slopes of the fitted regression lines where the dependent variable is simply the index of segregation and income or education category midpoints are the independent variables. A similar analysis was used successfully in a limited study of the data for 1990 in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (Clark and Ware 1997).

We examine the patterns of separation by income and education for the major metropolitan immigrant areas with core urban populations greater than 1 million<sup>3</sup> and that are characterized by a "minority-majority" population (less than 50% non-Hispanic White) and significant proportions of foreign-born population: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Chicago, New York/New Jersey (Table 1).<sup>4</sup> The percentage of foreign born and of the various ethnic groups is quite different across these cities. For example, Hispanic populations are largely Mexican in Los Angeles, Dominican in New York/New Jersey, and Cuban in Miami. Similarly, Asian populations are largely

**TABLE 1: Population Composition of the Large Immigrant Cities (in percentages)**

	<i>All</i>		<i>Non-Hispanic White</i>		<i>Black</i>		<i>Asian</i>		<i>Hispanic</i>	
	<i>Foreign Born</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Foreign Born</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Foreign Born</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Foreign Born</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Foreign Born</i>	<i>Total</i>
Los Angeles	30.9	40.1	10.0	7.7	5.4	10.7	69.2	41.6	46.5	
San Francisco	29.3	49.7	10.0	7.8	5.1	22.0	68.1	20.5	44.6	
Miami	40.2	36.8	11.1	20.4	30.9	1.8	76.9	40.9	68.3	
Chicago	17.2	58.9	10.7	19.0	2.2	4.7	72.3	17.4	47.2	
New York/ New Jersey	28.0	51.2	14.1	19.9	25.3	7.6	76.6	21.3	44.1	

Chinese and Indian in New York/New Jersey but include a diverse mix of people from Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines in Los Angeles.

## ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To provide a context, we present the overall levels of separation for the five cities and the interactions between Whites and other ethnic groups. As is well established, the indices are higher for Black-White separation and considerably lower for Asian-White and Hispanic-White separation. The average indices, again consistent with other research, are lower for Los Angeles and San Francisco and considerably higher for New York/New Jersey and Chicago (Table 2). However, the main concern in this article is how those average values change in response to differential levels of education and income and to class effects.

In almost every instance, the indices of separation decline regularly with increasing education, are lower in the suburbs than the core, and show higher levels of integration as the panels move from White-Black interaction to White-Asian to White-Hispanic interaction (Figure 1). The graphs show that the levels of separation decline by about 10 to 15 points for the core areas and by 15 to 20 points for the surrounding suburbs. Not only are the levels of separation lower in the suburbs, they decline more substantially over the education classes. Levels of separation for those with some college or college, except for Blacks in New York/New Jersey, are in the range 35 to 55 across most metropolitan areas. In other words, substantial integration is taking place among the college-educated racial/ethnic population and its White counterpart.

**TABLE 2: Segregation Indices for White/Ethnic Relationships**

	<i>Black-White</i>		<i>Asian-White</i>		<i>Hispanic-White</i>	
	<i>Dissimilarity</i>	<i>Relative Exposure</i>	<i>Dissimilarity</i>	<i>Relative Exposure</i>	<i>Dissimilarity</i>	<i>Relative Exposure</i>
Los Angeles	65.0	48.3	50.0	28.7	58.4	42.0
San Francisco	63.9	42.4	46.0	26.0	50.8	32.2
Miami	67.9	54.1	35.6	4.7	56.2	38.2
Chicago	80.8	71.5	44.6	12.5	61.3	42.0
New York/ New Jersey	81.3	71.0	51.4	26.2	65.7	50.2

There are significant differences between metropolitan cores and suburbs, and White-Hispanic integration is higher than that for Asians or Blacks. However, the important contribution is the strong relationship between segregation levels and both education level and income level, although the relationship is stronger for education than income. Populations with college or some college education are significantly more likely to live together than are those with less than a high school education (Figure 1). The data are graphed for the exposure index, showing White interaction with each of the three main ethnic groups for each of the five cities. The data for the dissimilarity indices, which are broadly similar, are included in Table 3.

The dissimilarity indices, which are more influenced by very small numbers and thus not as sensitive to smaller groups in the suburbs, still show the declines in segregation with increasing education, but they do not reflect the much higher integration in the suburbs shown by the exposure index (Table 3). The exposure index is perhaps a better measure for capturing the integration of small numbers of highly educated ethnic groups in the suburbs.

The declines are more powerful in some cities than others. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 4, the *b* coefficients from the fitted regression lines are larger for Los Angeles and San Francisco and smaller in New York/New Jersey, a result which is consistent with the argument that integration is greater in the West Coast cities than in cities dominated by traditional Black-White relationships. The regression coefficients can be interpreted as a measure of the extent to which increased education leads to increases in integration. The larger the negative *b* value, the stronger the relationship. The relationships are strong and significant for all relationships in Los Angeles and for those in Chicago and San Francisco. In one or two instances, the significance is only at the .10 level. In Miami, in the core Black-White separation is hardly






Figure 1: Exposure Indices by Race/Ethnicity and Education

**TABLE 3: Dissimilarity Indices by Education Across Cities**

			<i>Ninth Grade</i>	<i>Less Than High School</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>Some College</i>	<i>College</i>
Los Angeles							
Black-White	Core		79.4	76.4	75.1	69.2	64.4
	Suburb		69.1	60.0	57.2	53.7	56.2
Asian-White	Core		67.4	57.7	52.7	48.7	49.9
	Suburb		62.4	62.1	50.9	45.3	39.9
Hispanic-White	Core		61.4	53.9	51.9	48.2	47.1
	Suburb		52.3	44.4	39.1	34.8	35.8
San Francisco							
Black-White	Core		72.2	71.4	67.7	61.7	56.8
	Suburb		76.7	66.6	56.8	49.0	50.7
Asian-White	Core		57.0	54.4	48.4	44.1	41.5
	Suburb		57.7	54.1	49.0	49.3	46.4
Hispanic-White	Core		52.6	46.1	40.8	33.7	31.6
	Suburb		55.9	48.5	45.7	38.5	36.7
Miami							
Black-White	Core		65.3	66.4	68.8	67.3	66.5
	Suburb		68.6	65.9	62.5	57.0	54.2
Asian-White	Core		62.3	66.3	52.3	43.0	44.7
	Suburb		62.8	54.8	42.7	46.0	38.8
Hispanic-White	Core		54.4	51.7	47.9	44.1	46.7
	Suburb		44.4	33.4	32.9	32.9	32.0
Chicago							
Black-White	Core		85.5	85.4	84.5	81.6	74.4
	Suburb		73.3	70.3	66.4	61.3	54.6
Asian-White	Core		68.7	67.7	59.8	47.7	41.0
	Suburb		66.9	65.4	54.3	45.9	40.0
Hispanic-White	Core		62.0	58.3	57.4	53.9	47.1
	Suburb		59.5	52.1	43.5	37.1	36.0
New York/New Jersey							
Black-White	Core		81.2	82.1	82.7	81.9	77.2
	Suburb		71.8	74.3	74.6	73.0	68.7
Asian-White	Core		64.0	62.1	58.7	53.7	48.5
	Suburb		57.6	53.6	48.5	48.5	39.5
Hispanic-White	Core		68.6	65.8	62.8	62.1	54.7
	Suburb		61.4	56.1	49.8	45.1	40.8

NOTE: Los Angeles core,  $n = 1,909$ , suburb  $n = 1,464$ ; San Francisco core,  $n = 665$ , suburb,  $n = 547$ ; Miami core,  $n = 348$ , suburb,  $n = 279$ ; Chicago core,  $n = 1,344$ , suburb,  $n = 533$ ; New York/New Jersey core,  $n = 2,855$ , suburb,  $n = 1,143$ .

affected by education, but it is significant and large in the suburbs. The same is true for White-Hispanic relationships—for those interactions separation

**TABLE 4: Regression Coefficients for the Relationship of Exposure and Education and Income**

	<i>Education</i>		<i>Income</i>	
	<i>Core</i>	<i>Suburb</i>	<i>Core</i>	<i>Suburb</i>
Los Angeles				
Black-White	-1.66**	-5.80**	-0.113***	-0.131***
Asian-white	-2.08***	-2.73***	-0.121**	-.160***
Hispanic-White	-0.52	-1.32**	-0.033***	-0.093***
San Francisco				
Black-White	-2.71**	-3.60**	-0.209***	-0.233***
Asian-White	-1.59*	-1.36**	-0.066*	-0.052**
Hispanic-White	-2.04**	-1.81**	-0.088**	-0.095**
Miami				
Black-White	0.24	-1.98**	-0.023	-0.167***
Asian-White	-2.27**	-1.97**	-0.043	-0.029
Hispanic-White	0.72**	-1.23**	-0.016	-0.011
Chicago				
Black-White	-1.44*	-2.07*	-0.053**	-0.232***
Asian-White	-2.66***	-1.81*	-0.148***	-0.061**
Hispanic-White	-2.08***	-3.29***	-0.101***	-0.145***
New York/New Jersey				
Black-White	-0.58	-0.67	-0.024	-0.096***
Asian-White	-2.23***	-0.64	-0.136***	-0.096***
Hispanic-White	-1.55*	-2.84***	-0.171***	-0.210***

\*Significant at .10. \*\*Significant at .05. \*\*\*Significant at .01.

actually increases in the core with more education, a reverse of our predictions. It is still notable that the relationships are correct in the suburbs. In New York/New Jersey, White-Black integration with education is not significant though the signs are correct. White-Hispanic relationships are negative and strong, as predicted. White-Asian relationships are negative but only significant in the core. Clearly, as we noted earlier, the general patterns hold, but there are subtle nuances from city to city and across race and ethnic groups.

A similar though less powerful story is portrayed by the figures for income (Figure 2). Again, we present the exposure indices in graph form and the dissimilarity indices in tabular form (Table 5). As before, there is a strong differentiation between levels of separation in the cores and suburbs. This is especially true for White-Black levels of separation. However, in some cases the relationship between relative exposure and income is nearly flat, as for White-Hispanic separation in the Los Angeles core and for White-Hispanic and White-Asian separation in Miami. At the same time, whereas the relationship does not decline with more income, the levels of exposure are

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


Figure 2: Exposure Indices by Race/Ethnicity and Income

**TABLE 5: Dissimilarity Indices by Income Across Cities**

		< \$15,000	\$15,000 to \$25,000	\$25,001 to \$35,000	\$35,001 to \$50,000	\$50,001 to \$75,000	\$75,001 to \$100,000	> \$100,000
Los Angeles	Black-White							
	Core	75.5	72.5	71.7	69.0	69.3	70	70.9
	Suburb	61.5	63.3	59.3	58.1	56.2	59.5	63.1
	Core	57.6	57.4	54.5	51.7	48.5	50.9	50.4
Asian-White	Suburb	62.6	62.3	59.3	51.4	47.9	46.3	42.7
	Core	60.5	60.5	60.9	59.8	58.4	59.2	60.2
	Suburb	47.2	49.6	47.7	46.8	44.7	43.9	45.5
	Core	65.2	65.4	64.9	61.5	61.1	62.5	62.7
San Francisco	Black-White							
	Suburb	66.9	72.8	68.2	59.3	57.6	61.6	54.7
	Core	45.0	47.1	46.0	42.8	42.1	45.6	44.6
	Suburb	50.6	52.6	50.0	47.6	46.3	47.5	45.7
Hispanic-White	Core	44.8	50	47.9	46.6	44.3	44.7	43
	Suburb	51.1	54.7	54.1	50.9	47.9	47.4	47.9
Miami	Black-White							
	Core	71.3	71.7	70.4	68.4	70.0	74.1	75.5
	Suburb	68.0	64.0	63.1	58.8	57.2	57.4	62.4
	Core	59.1	67.0	60.1	54.2	54.4	68.5	52.5
Asian-White	Suburb	60.9	60.6	64.7	54.6	49.3	55.5	52.6
	Core	56.1	54.5	53.0	50.8	49.0	49.3	45.4
	Suburb	36.4	40.3	40.0	34.3	34.4	40.7	40.1
Chicago	Black-White							
	Core	81.9	81.1	79.7	79.1	79.7	82.3	82.1
	Suburb	68.4	68.9	65.2	63.9	63.5	60.5	59.4

(continued)

TABLE 5 (continued)

		< \$15,000	\$15,000 to \$25,000	\$25,001 to \$35,000	\$35,001 to \$50,000	\$50,001 to \$75,000	\$75,001 to \$100,000	> \$100,000
Asian-White	Core	59.8	65.1	58.4	51.7	48.9	50.2	45.3
	Suburb	68.9	69.3	68.0	58.3	49.0	50.4	44.2
Hispanic-White	Core	60.8	62.7	60.2	59.9	58.4	58.7	60.9
	Suburb	59.6	58.5	53.4	54.1	48.2	69.7	48.8
New York/New Jersey								
Black-White	Core	81.6	83.1	82.1	81.2	81.8	83	82.1
	Suburb	74.4	76.1	73.9	71.8	71.7	74.3	73
Asian-White	Core	56.0	58.7	57.3	54.3	51.4	52.5	47.6
	Suburb	64.5	68.5	62.6	55.6	48.4	51.6	41.1
Hispanic-White	Core	68.5	67.6	65.1	62.9	62.1	61.8	60.7
	Suburb	58.0	60.8	58.6	53.5	50.2	50.3	45.5

extremely high. Thus, we might not expect to see the same effect of income when the levels of separation are low across all income categories.

The dissimilarity indices for segregation and income in general parallel the pattern shown by the exposure indices, but the dissimilarity indices for the suburbs are often substantially higher than their exposure counterparts (Table 5). In a few cases, the core-suburb values are reversed, but it is worth recalling that when the numbers of cases are small, as is certainly the case with high incomes for minorities across tracts, the exposure index is the preferred measure of separation. In any event, data for both indices is included in the article.

The regression coefficients follow patterns that we already established for education but with some important and striking differences. Income matters more than education in New York/New Jersey, where all groups except Blacks and Whites in the city core are significantly influenced by income in their degree of integration (Table 4). All ethnic groups are significantly affected by income in their degree of integration with Whites in Los Angeles, with the exception of Hispanics living in the suburbs. Income is a significant influence on integration in all cases in San Francisco and Chicago. Again in Miami, the relationships are less straightforward and even less obvious than for education. Only among Blacks and Whites in the suburbs of Miami does income significantly affect integration. Still, the directions are correct, and we can only assume that the nature of mixing is more complex in Miami than in the other four cities. The very strong Cuban presence in Miami, driven by several distinct waves of immigrants with somewhat distinctive residential patterns, may influence these complex outcomes. Furthermore, the number of Asians in Miami is small and somewhat residentially concentrated.

Even so, the evidence for class effects within the metropolitan cores and surrounding suburbs is compelling. These results are bolstered by the important differences in separation levels between metropolitan cores and their suburbs. In nearly every case, and more clearly with the exposure index, the levels of separation are smaller in the suburban surroundings of the metropolitan cores. In general, it is apparent that the gap between core and suburb separation levels is greatest for White-Black interactions, suggesting that when Blacks of relatively equal education and income are able to move to the suburbs, their levels of separation from Whites decline rapidly. The exposure index makes it clear that there are small numbers of Blacks at the highest income levels, but it also makes clear that they are living in integrated settings. Still, the hierarchy of lower levels of separation from Whites for Asians and then Hispanics holds true across the spatial scales.

On average there is a 25- to 30-point difference in the levels of separation between less than high school and some college or college education. This

point difference is true for the most part for both metropolitan cores and the suburbs. The point difference is larger for education than for income, emphasizing that education seems to be a more critical factor in creating integration than income. Clearly, class (education) and income matter in creating the patterns of residential separation that are observed in our large immigrant cities. Note, too, that many of the Asians and Hispanics in these large cities are new arrivals. In Los Angeles, foreign-born Asians make up 69% of the total Asian population and foreign-born Hispanics are nearly 50% of all Hispanics in the region.

What of the interethnic, Hispanic-Asian and Hispanic-Black interactions—are they following a similar pattern of increasing integration with increasing education and income, and how are these patterns variable across the geography of the metropolitan areas? Although there are overall similarities to the White-Black and White-ethnic interactions, the story here is more complicated and less clear-cut across either geography or ethnicity. The relationship between Hispanic and Asian populations is the most similar to the patterns for the White interactions that we have been discussing to this point. In nearly every case, there is between a 20- and 30-point decline in the levels of separation with increasing education and a somewhat similar decline for increasing income (Tables 6 and 7). In contrast, the relationship between Hispanics and Blacks varies considerably across cities and by education and income. Levels of separation, measured by exposure, increase with education in the Los Angeles core. In Chicago, the declines are very small. In New York/New Jersey, they are stable and only decline modestly at the very highest education levels, whereas in San Francisco, they follow the pattern for White ethnic relationships, declining significantly across educational levels. The fact that the patterns of interethnic relationships for Blacks and Hispanics are complicated perhaps reflects the rapidly changing relationships between the two groups at the local neighborhood scale. In particular, there is substantial Hispanic in-migration into formerly Black neighborhoods, especially in California. It also reflects the small number of high-income Blacks and even smaller number of high-income Hispanics in general and the low numbers of these two groups in the suburbs. It will be another decade before we can assess just how the interethnic relationships will be worked out, but for now there is at least evidence for some interethnic integration on the part of Hispanics and Asians. Whether the lack of integration on the part of Hispanics and Blacks will replicate older patterns of separation between Whites and Blacks or be transformed into new integrated patterns is not clear and will not be while the numbers of new Hispanic arrivals is fluctuating across the metropolitan space. As Hispanics relocate from the initial gateway cities, these patterns will change. The outcomes are not yet discernable.



**TABLE 6: Exposure Indices by Education for Interethnic Relationships**

			<i>Ninth Grade</i>	<i>Less Than High School</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>Some College</i>	<i>College</i>
Los Angeles							
Hispanic-Asian	Core		34.1	26.9	30.6	25.3	26.7
	Suburb		30.0	32.0	28.2	23.7	22.4
Hispanic-Black	Core		15.0	32.9	43.0	65.0	42.5
	Suburb		9.7	16.8	18.3	17.4	21.8
San Francisco							
Hispanic-Asian	Core		48.1	40.6	29.9	21.3	13.6
	Suburb		33.7	29.1	23.5	19.5	15.1
Hispanic-Black	Core		33.1	39.1	39.7	33.2	28.9
	Suburb		17.7	32.9	17.4	15.9	15.8
Miami							
Hispanic-Asian	Core		13.2	7.5	7.3	5.2	9.6
	Suburb		23.5	18.0	9.5	8.9	9.2
Hispanic-Black	Core		46.2	54.8	55.8	54.5	47.4
	Suburb		44.8	43.4	38.2	33.2	28.2
Chicago							
Hispanic-Asian	Core		45.7	45.3	42.1	37.4	35.3
	Suburb		39.1	37.3	27.8	29.0	23.8
Hispanic-Black	Core		77.4	76.7	73.9	68.6	60.7
	Suburb		26.8	38.6	33.2	31.4	32.4
New York/New Jersey							
Hispanic-Asian	Core		50.8	43.8	35.0	32.7	31.9
	Suburb		42.5	37.1	31.3	28.6	24.7
Hispanic-Black	Core		39.9	41.6	45.7	44.2	44.1
	Suburb		30.0	32.6	35.1	35.7	36.6

Analyzing the patterns of separation in the major immigrant gateways provides a number of new insights on the evolving patterns of separation. Despite earlier commentary on the questionable relevancy of class, this research shows that class matters. More education, and to a lesser extent more money, matters. It also shows that geography (though of course intertwined with class) is an essential component of the way in which patterns of separation are arranged across the U.S. metropolitan landscape.

Suburbanization is leading to decreased residential separation, however much we may wish to challenge the simplistic notions of core-suburban separation. Perhaps the most critical finding of the research reported in this article is to reiterate that understanding the continuing patterns of residential segregation in American metropolitan areas requires attention to the

TABLE 7: Exposure Indices by Income for Interethnic Relationships

		< \$15,000	\$15,000 to \$25,000	\$25,001 to \$35,000	\$35,001 to \$50,000	\$50,001 to \$75,000	\$75,001 to \$100,000	> \$100,000
Los Angeles								
Hispanic-Asian	Core	38.8	35.8	34.4	33.9	33.8	37.7	38.2
	Suburb	45.6	39.8	37.2	32.5	30.1	35.8	34.1
Hispanic-Black	Core	41.0	36.2	38.2	38.2	43.3	49.7	51.3
	Suburb	24.9	23.1	23.0	19.7	18.3	25.4	26.8
San Francisco								
Hispanic-Asian	Core	39.8	42.6	39.4	34.2	30.0	31.3	25.7
	Suburb	35.5	37.9	36.8	30.6	28.2	29.1	26.0
Hispanic-Black	Core	37.8	39.5	40.3	33.4	33.0	35.7	34.3
	Suburb	38.7	33.6	30.9	24.5	20.2	23.1	19.7
Miami								
Hispanic-Asian	Core	8.7	11.9	13.9	11.0	8.4	16.7	12.1
	Suburb	21.2	23.6	22.0	16.5	14.3	20.3	22.2
Hispanic-Black	Core	56.9	55.0	54.5	52.9	53.1	59.6	58.1
	Suburb	45.9	38.2	38.0	43.3	35.0	38.7	39.5
Chicago								
Hispanic-Asian	Core	58.4	54.0	48.8	47.9	47.1	50.3	52.4
	Suburb	59.6	53.0	47.1	45.1	39.8	47.1	44.7
Hispanic-Black	Core	70.3	74.9	74.5	72.8	73.7	77.9	76.0
	Suburb	42.4	41.9	41.3	38.4	36.3	43.0	43.1
New York/New Jersey								
Hispanic-Asian	Core	47.5	48.4	42.7	40.1	37.7	43.1	41.2
	Suburb	53.9	56.5	51.8	45.6	35.9	43.5	37.6
Hispanic-Black	Core	36.1	43.9	45.2	47.1	48.4	54.1	55.1
	Suburb	34.0	39.1	38.9	36.1	35.3	41.8	42.7

socioeconomic underpinning of the way in which people organize themselves in neighborhoods and communities in the large cities in the United States. People do not lightly undertake their decisions about where they will live. This is reflected in changing combinations of the population in the aggregate—the patterns suggest a slow but inexorable tendency to greater residential integration over time. It is not happening as expeditiously as some would like, but nevertheless it is happening. Integration in large immigrant gateway cities is greater today than even two decades ago. The future suggests more integration rather than less, and socioeconomic advance is the critical dimension of future integration.

### CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS

The questions posed and answered in this research are at the heart of debates about the future of race relations and the structure of the residential fabric. On one hand, there are those who continue to argue that additional enforcement of fair housing laws will solve the racial and ethnic separation of our metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the evidence of the analysis here suggests that income and education may be the important variables in creating greater levels of integration. This is not to argue that enforcement is unimportant; rather the issue is to emphasize that without the gains in resources that come with more education, enforcement will be unlikely to solve the continuing separation in the large cities. It is changes in education and income that will likely have the greatest effect on increasing residential integration.

In contrast to Tienda's (1999) observations, the analysis here suggests modest optimism about both assimilation and integration. Whereas Tienda predicts greater racial and ethnic inequality, the findings from this study suggest that new immigrants (recall that they make up a very large proportion of the racial and ethnic groups in our cities), like earlier arrivals, are finding a way to become incorporated. The evidence lies in the lower levels of separation that we see, especially in the bellwether region of Southern California. It appears that two forces may be at work—an integrative force from class and a segregative force from poverty. Whereas the gains in education and income for Black households in suburban areas may have decreased levels of separation, this may leave an increasingly isolated inner-city poor Black and ethnic population. Similarly, higher-income immigrant groups in the suburbs may be more integrated than poorer foreign-born residents in the central city.

The results here emphasize the power of education and income. If the hypotheses of their overall power across newer metropolitan areas are

sustained, then we can provide additional support for greater emphases on education and employment opportunities and, by extension, on the role of affirmative action in creating access to education and higher incomes.

## NOTES

1. There are those who argue that housing discrimination is still the major force in creating the separation of the races (Yinger 1995). This position suggests that even with improved socioeconomic status and declining racial prejudice and discrimination, the change in racial attitudes is still not enough to change separation in the urban mosaic. Some have argued that research has discredited the importance of socioeconomic differences in creating separation in cities (Denton 1996; Massey 1979, 1985), but the story is more complicated than a reliance on single factor explanations (Clark 1986; Galster 1989; Schelling 1971).

2. The analysis in this article is limited to racial/ethnic categories from the 2000 census that do not include multiracial categories; for example, data on "Whites" comes from the "Not Hispanic, white alone" variable.

3. Large sample sizes are necessary to calculate the dissimilarity and exposure indices across racial and ethnic groups by education and income.

4. The regions for analysis are (1) Los Angeles, Orange County, Riverside consolidated metropolitan statistical area (CMSA), and the Ventura primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA), core is Los Angeles County less the north county; (2) San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose CMSA, core is San Francisco City and Oakland City; (3) Chicago PMSA, core is the City of Chicago; (4) Miami-Ft. Lauderdale CMSA, core is City of Miami; (5) New York-New Jersey-Long Island CMSA, core is New York City, Jersey City, and Newark City. Dallas-Ft. Worth and Houston nearly fulfill the requirements, but preliminary inspection suggests that their inclusion would not alter the basic findings of the research.

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