

# **An Introduction to Credit Risk**

QF622 Credit Risk Models

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Nanfeng SUN

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# **Practicalities**

# Who am I?

- Trained as an engineer, with a PhD in Chemical Engineering
- Having worked in London, Hong Kong and Singapore
- Having worked as a practitioner as well as a regulator
- Started as a risk quant at Deutsche Bank, working on CDOs
- Regional head of model risk at Bank of America in Asia Pacific
- Technical lead for internal models at the Securities and Futures Commission, the markets regulator in Hong Kong
- Head of Market & Counterparty Risk Analytics at DBS Bank

## The usual disclaimer

The opinions shared during this course are solely those of my own and not necessarily those of my current and former employers.

# What to expect?

## **You will**

- understand what credit risk is and where it originates from
- familiarise with the range of traded credit products
- study canonical models for pricing credit products
- learn the basics of counterparty credit risk (CCR) modelling
- get a general picture of post-GFC regulatory reform on CCR

## **You are encouraged to**

- stay focused and pay attention
- ask many questions as no question is dumb

## Lectures

- 1 Introduction to Credit Risk
- 2 Single-Name Models and Products
- 3 Multi-Name Models and Products
- 4 Counterparty Credit Risk and Exposure Modelling
- 5 Post-GFC Reforms: Clearing, Margining and Capital

## Grading

Exam : Assignments : Participation = 50% : 40% : 10%

## Contact

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
## Recommended reading

- 1 John C. Hull. *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*.  
Prentice-Hall
- 2 Dominic O'Kane. *Modelling Single-name and Multi-name Credit Derivatives*. Wiley, 2008
- 3 John Gregory. *Counterparty Credit Risk and Credit Value Adjustment*. Wiley, 2010



## **Definition of Credit Risk**

# Banking as a credit intermediation business



# A real story – the fall of Lehman Brothers



## Businessweek *The Last of Lehman Brothers*

Lehm  
Merr



By Andrew  
Sept. 14, 20

This art  
and And

In one o  
history,

Bank of America for roughly \$60 billion to avert a deepening financial crisis, while another prominent securities firm, Lehman Brothers, filed for bankruptcy protection and hurtled toward liquidation after it failed to find a buyer.

“The spirit of a bank, even in life, is debt, and debts don’t settle easily into a grave. Most of the assets banks own are the debts of others: the mortgages, commercial loans, and IOUs payable to the bank. On the other side, of course, banks owe - to their bond - and note holders, counterparties in financial trades, and a long list of other creditors.”

It turns out that when global financial institutions die, it can take a while. These deaths require caretakers. The spirit of a bank, even in life, is debt, and debts don't settle easily into a grave. Most of the assets banks own are the debts of others: the mortgages, commercial loans, and IOUs payable to the bank. On the other side, of course, banks owe—to their bond- and note holders, counterparties in financial trades, and a long list of other creditors. Banks such as Lehman topple over when they suddenly can't wring enough cash from their assets to meet their liabilities.

# Defining default (I)

Definition of default varies with **context** and could be legalistic.

## Example 1 – Moody's definition of default<sup>[4]</sup>

**For Credit Rating**

- A missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, including delayed payments made within a grace period;
- Bankruptcy, administration, legal receivership, or other legal blocks (perhaps by regulators) to the timely payment of interest and/or principal; or
- A distressed exchange occurs where: (i) the issuer offers debt holders a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount, lower seniority, or longer maturity); or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default.

## Defining default (II)

### Example 2 – Basel's definition of default<sup>[5]</sup>

**For Regulatory Capital**

A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when either or both of the two following events have taken place.

- 1 The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realising security (if held).
- 2 The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than current outstandings.

### Example 3 – Market definition of credit events

In credit risk derivatives context the definition of default is recorded in product documentation as a Credit Event, typically one of the following

**For Trade Settlement**

- Bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings
- Failure to Pay
- Obligation default and debt acceleration
- Repudiation / moratorium
- Restructuring
- government intervention

# Defining credit risk

- Credit risk is the risk of losses owing to the fact that borrowers or counterparties may be unwilling or unable to fulfill their contractual obligations.
- Broadly speaking, it includes:
  - Default risk** is the risk that a scheduled payment of interest or principal on an asset is not received.
  - Recovery risk** is the risk that following a default, the size of the recovered amount is much less than the amount owed.
  - Spread risk** is the risk that the value of a security falls as the market's view regarding the credit quality of the debtor changes. It is also the "price" to insure against the default of the issuer.

- The most traditional form of credit risk, which originates from the lending of a principal amount from one party to another.
- Typical instruments are commercial loans, mortgages loans, credit card receivables, bonds, etc.
- Characterised by a **fixed** amount of principal at risk and a **unilateral** exposure.



- “Lending risk” embedded in credit derivatives or securitisation products, whose values are exposed to the creditworthiness of the underlying issuer(s).
- Example instruments are bond options, bond forwards, credit default swaps, mortgage-backed securities etc.
- Provides a variety of different exposures to the issuer's creditworthiness: may be **isolated from interest rate risk**, may be either **long** or **short**, etc.

## Counterparty risk (I)

- The risk of not being able to crystallise profits from a portfolio of derivatives because of counterparty default.
- Example instruments are interest rate swaps, swaptions, credit default swaps, or any derivative (or repurchase) transaction for that matter.
- Characterised by **uncertain** and **bilateral** exposure. With netting arrangement in place, only meaningful at the **portfolio** level, which makes it even more complex.
- Could be **intertwined** with issuer risk in derivative portfolios: **right-way risk** and **wrong-way risk**.

### Right-way risk


- A situation in which credit exposure to a counterparty decreases as its creditworthiness worsens.
- Example: a gold producer selling gold forward to a bank as a hedge - as gold price falls, the producer is more likely to default but the forward is less in the money for the bank.

### Wrong-way risk

- A situation in which credit exposure to a counterparty increases together with the risk of the counterparty's default.
- Example: a bank selling a put option on its own stock - as the stock price falls, the bank is more likely to default and the option is more in the money for the option buyer.


# Credit contagion and systemic risk (I)

## CDS Spreads for US Banks<sup>[6]</sup>




# Credit contagion and systemic risk (I)

## CDS Spreads for European Banks<sup>[6]</sup>



# Credit contagion and systemic risk (II)

## Fear Cycle



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## Credit contagion and systemic risk (II)

- Systemic risk is the risk of disruption to the entire financial markets that is caused by the failure of a few market participants.
- The global financial crisis is a perfect example, where the bailout / takeover / bankruptcy of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, American International Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland are just a few notable events among many more (see a fuller list [here](#)).

## **Traded Credit Products**



# Overview of traded credit products

## Securities

- bonds
- floating rate notes

## Repurchase agreement

- repo
- reverse repo

## Securitisation

- asset-back securities
- mortgage-back securities

## Derivatives


- asset swaps
- total return swaps
- credit default swaps
- n-to-default swaps
- synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDO)

# Bonds

Per Cambridge Dictionary: an official paper given by the **government** or a **company** to show that you have **lent** them money that they will pay back to you at a particular **interest rate**.

*buying bond  $\rightarrow$  lending risk*


- The issuer could be a government or corporate entity
- Denominated in local or **foreign** currency (e.g., panda bonds)
- The coupons at a fixed annual coupon rate  $c$  may be paid with a frequency  $f$  (e.g.,  $f = 2$  for semi-annual frequency)



# Floating rate notes

A floating rate note (FRN) is a **bond** which pays a coupon linked to some **variable** interest rate index.


- The rate index  $R$  used to be predominantly Libor which is replaced by new benchmark risk-free rates across jurisdictions.
- The investor receives a coupon of a rate index plus an annualised fixed spread  $F(0)$ , paid with a given frequency and day count convention or  $c_n = \Delta(t_{n-1}, t_n)(R(t_{n-1}, t_n) + F(0))$ .



# Repurchase agreement

A repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing, where one party (the **borrower**) sells a **security** to another (**lender**) for cash and buys it back at a **later** date at a **higher** price.

- Equivalent to a cash transaction and a forward contract.
- The difference between forward and spot prices is the interest.
- Effectively a collateralised loan.
- A repo for the borrower is a reserve repo for the lender.



- ➊ Its payoff is contingent on the occurrence of a **credit event**.
- ➋ It makes it easier to go **short** credit risk, to hedge or to express a view.
- ➌ It's likely to be **unfunded** with minimal upfront cost.
- ➍ It's a tool for credit **risk transfer**.
- ➎ It (used to) offer(s) exposure to credit **volatility** and credit **correlation**.

# Exchange-traded vs. OTC derivatives


## Exchange-traded

- standardised contracts
- high transparency
- CCR exposure to clearing house
- margined per clearing house rules
- limited product offerings

## Over-the-counter

- bespoke contracts
- lower transparency
- CCR exposure to bilateral counterparty
- some are cleared through central counterparties
- uncleared OTCDs subject to margin rules

# Trend of outstanding notional amount for OTCs



Data source: BIS

# Asset swaps


An asset swap is a package consisting of a bond and an interest rate swap (IRS) which together cost par at inception.

- A **synthetic** position in an FRN by combining a fixed rate bond and an IRS.
- The asset swap seller delivers to the buyer a fixed rate bond with price  $P$  in return for a payment of par.
- The asset swap buyer enters into a payer IRS, where the fixed leg is **identical** to the bond. On the floating leg, the buyer receives a floating rate index  $R$  plus the **asset swap spread**  $A$ . The asset swap spread is a measure of credit quality of the bond.
- Upon bond default, the asset swap buyer could sell the bond for its recovery  $\pi$ . However, the IRS stays and may be unwound at market value  $V$ .




# Asset swaps


At Inception




Coupon Dates



At Maturity




Default Time  $\tau$



# Total return swaps

A total return swap (TRS) involves swapping interest payments based on a specified fixed or floating interest rate in return for receiving the **total return** on a bond (or any asset or index).


- A **synthetic** position in a bond, which could be long or short.
- **Unfunded**, i.e., the initial cost is minimal.
- The total return leg includes capital gain / loss as well as any interest payments. The interest rate leg pays a floating rate index  $R$  plus a spread  $s$ .
- The TRS terminates when the bond defaults.



# Credit default swaps

A credit default swap (CDS) protects the **protection buyer**, from the loss from par on a specified face value of bonds or loans following the default of their issuer, or the **reference entity**, until its maturity.

- A **synthetic** position in the credit risk of the reference entity, which is long for the protection seller and short for the protection buyer.
- The **protection leg** is effectively an insurance payout upon default of the reference entity.
- **Unfunded**, i.e., the initial cost is low, with running premium paid regularly by the protection buyer in the **premium leg**.



A default basket is almost identical to a CDS. The credit event in this case is the  $n$ th default in a basket of  $N$  credits.


- It provides exposure to credit correlation in addition to credit risk of basket constituents.
- The lower  $n$  is, the more expensive the protection is, e.g., 2nd-to-default is cheaper than 1st-to-default. Any intuition?
- The protection seller of a first-to-default takes a long position in credit correlation. Any intuition?

# Collateralised debt obligation

A collateralised debt obligation (CDO) transforms credit risk of a pool of assets into securities with **different** credit risk profiles.

- It provides exposure to credit **correlation** in addition to credit risk of assets in the underlying pool.
- Cashflow CDOs are sold in a funded format, where the sale proceeds fund the purchase of the underlying pool.
- All coupons and principal payments follow a waterfall structure when being distributed to different **tranches**.
- A **synthetic** single tranche CDO (STCDO) is unfunded and bespoke with underlying pool being a basket of CDSes.
- The underlying pool of STCDO is typically much larger than that of a  $n$ th-to-default basket.

# Collateralised debt obligation



Reproduced from O'kane<sup>[2]</sup>

## **Credit Risk Mitigants**

Financial institutions (FIs) employ credit risk mitigation techniques such as

- 1 Credit Risk transfer
- 2 Collaterals and guarantees
- 3 Hedging
- 4 Netting and Margining
- 5 Central clearing



- Bank guarantees and credit insurances are traditional examples of credit risk transfer arrangements.
- Trading, hedging and securitisation are newer forms of credit risk transfer.
- Risk may be transferred out of the banking system to investors with varying levels of sophistication and risk appetite, e.g., cash CDOs sold to retail investors.
- It may reduce the incentive to perform credit due diligence and ongoing monitoring.

Collaterals and guarantees are widely used to mitigate credit risk.

- In the small- and medium-sized enterprises sector, guarantees tend to be personal (e.g., by the business owner) in nature and collaterals are typically illiquid.
- When dealing with FIs and large corporates, third-part guarantees are more often and collaterals may be in the form of marketable financial instruments.

- FIs may hedge their credit risk exposures in the market, e.g., using CDS contracts.
- This is effectively a **transformation** from issuer risk to counterparty credit risk.
- The ability to hedge depends on market liquidity and therefore cost of protection.

# Netting and margining

- Widely used for bilateral OTCD transactions, in part thanks to the post-GFC regulatory reform.
- **Netting** is the aggregation and hence offsetting of transactions with the same counterparty. It allows counterparties to reduce exposure to each other in case of default by either.
- **Margining**: exchanges of **variation margins** to cover **current exposure** and **initial margins** to cover **potential future exposure** during the **margin period of risk**.
- Between B and C, there is a portfolio of six trades, with current MtM of 3, -3, 8, 2, -10, and -4 from B's perspective.
  - What are the counterparties' current exposure to each other?
  - What's the balance of variation margin between them?

*C exposed to B by 4.*

*Variation margin changes daily*

## Central clearing

- Increasingly being used for simple derivatives, in part thanks to the post-GFC regulatory reform.
- A **central counterparty** (CCP) stands as an entity to intermediate a set of standard contracts. It does not take on any market risk by entering offsetting trades with different **clearing members**.
- Effectively a transfer of counterparty credit risk from a bilateral counterparty to the CCP.
- Netting and margining.
- Default fund contribution and CCP's skin in the game.

## **Historical vs. Market**


# Probability of default

Cumulative default rates (%) for B-rated issuers<sup>[7]</sup>

Term (year)	1	2	3	4	5	7
Default rates	4.333	9.752	15.106	19.864	24.175	32.164

- Unconditional 1Y default probability  $Pr(\tau \leq 1) = 4.333\%$
- Unconditional 1Y survival probability  
 $Pr(\tau > 1) = 1 - 4.333\% = 95.667\%$
- Unconditional default probability in the 2nd year  
 $Pr(1 < \tau \leq 2) = Pr(\tau \leq 2) - Pr(\tau \leq 1) = 5.419\%$
- Conditional default probability in the 2nd year  
 $Pr(\tau \leq 2 | \tau > 1) = \frac{Pr(\tau \leq 2) - Pr(\tau \leq 1)}{Pr(\tau > 1)} = 5.664\%$
- Default intensity  $\lambda(t) = \lim_{dt \rightarrow 0} \frac{Pr(\tau \leq t + dt | \tau > t)}{dt}$


# Cumulative default rates by letter rating



Data sourced from Moody's<sup>[7]</sup>



# Annual default rates by letter rating



Data sourced from Moody's<sup>[7]</sup>

# Recovery rate

- Recovery rate is a source of **uncertainty** upon default.
- Rating agencies measure recovery rate as the price of a defaulted asset within a given period (say 30 days).
- Recovery rate is driven by the **seniority** of the debt in the issuer's capital structure, i.e., more values could be recovered from a senior debt than from a subordinated debt.
- The distribution of historically observed recovery rate is **broad**.
- Recovery rates are significantly **negatively correlated** with default rates.

## Average corporate debt recovery rates (1982-2008)

Data sourced from Moody's<sup>[7]</sup>

Bond Seniority	Issuer-Weighted	Value-Weighted
Sr. Secured	52.3%	53.0%
Sr. Unsecured	36.4%	32.4%
Sr. Subordinated	31.7%	26.4%
Subordinated	31.0%	23.5%
Jr. Subordinated	24.0%	16.8%

- Recovery rate is driven by the seniority of the debt.
- Lower values were recovered from larger issuers upon default, as value-weighted recovery rates are lower than issuer-weighted recovery rates.

# Recovery rates of FIs defaulted in 2008


Data sourced from Moody's<sup>[7]</sup>

Company	Domain	Default Volume (\$m)	Sr. Unsecured Bond Recovery
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.	United States	120,164	9.30%
Kaupthing Bank hf	Iceland	20,063	4.00%
Glitnir banki hf	Iceland	18,773	3.00%
GMAC LLC	United States	17,190	69.90%
Washington Mutual Bank	United States	13,600	26.50%
Residential Capital, LLC	United States	12,315	51.70%
Landsbanki Islands hf	Iceland	12,161	3.00%
Washington Mutual, Inc.	United States	5,746	57.00%
GMAC of Canada Ltd	Canada	265	70.70%
Downey Financial Corp.	United States	200	0.50%
Fremont General Corporation	United States	166	46.00%
Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc.	United States	131	27.30%
Triad Financial Corporation	United States	89	76.50%
Franklin Bank Corp.	United States	80	0.00%
GMAC International Finance B.V.	Netherlands	51	85.50%

# Market-implied probability of default

- **Market prices** of traded instruments contain information on issuers' default rates.
- Given a **modelling framework**, default probability (or intensity) may be **extracted** from these instruments, such as risky bonds.
- The difference in prices of a risk-free bond and a risky bond is driven by how likely the issuer is to default.

# Yield spread



$$\begin{aligned}
 P(0) &= \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{\frac{c}{f}}{\left(1 + \frac{y}{f}\right)^n} + \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{y}{f}\right)^N} \\
 &= \sum_{n=1}^N \frac{\frac{c}{f}}{\left(1 + \frac{(y_T + s)}{f}\right)^n} + \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{(y_T + s)}{f}\right)^N}
 \end{aligned}$$

Diagram illustrating the decomposition of the risky yield ( $y$ ) into a risk-free yield ( $y_T$ ) and a yield spread ( $s$ ).

The first equation shows the present value of cash flows discounted at the risky YTM ( $y$ ). The second equation shows the same cash flows discounted at the risk-free YTM ( $y_T$ ), with the yield spread ( $s$ ) added to the risk-free rate.

Handwritten note: *decomposing risky yield into risk free yield*

Labels in the diagram:

- risky YTM (purple arrow pointing to  $y$  in the first equation)
- risk-free YTM (green arrow pointing to  $y_T$  in the second equation)
- yield spread (pink arrow pointing to  $s$  in the second equation)

# The credit triangle

The diagram shows the equation  $s = \lambda (1 - R)$  with three colored boxes: a pink box for  $s$ , an orange box for  $\lambda$ , and a blue box for  $R$ . A pink line labeled "yield spread" points to the pink box. An orange line labeled "default intensity" points to the orange box. A blue line labeled "recovery rate" points to the blue box.

$$s = \lambda (1 - R)$$

- The credit triangle is a useful approximation, which we will revisit later.
- With the yield spread observed in the market and a recovery rate, default intensity may be extracted.
- With default intensity implied from the market, **risk-neutral** default probability could be derived.

## Historical vs. risk-neutral probability of default

- Risk-neutral default probability is almost always much higher than the historical one.
- The market charges a risk premium over the historically observed default rate.
- Default risk premium: to compensate that historical statistics do not reliably predict the future.
- Volatility risk premium: to compensate that the credit quality of an issuer may change.
- Liquidity risk premium: to compensate that a reduction in liquidity may prevent the debt being sold.



## References

- [1] John C. Hull. *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*. Pretice-Hall.
- [2] Dominic O’Kane. *Modelling Single-name and Multi-name Credit Derivatives*. Wiley, 2008.
- [3] John Gregory. *Counterparty Credit Risk and Credit Value Adjustment*. Wiley, 2010.
- [4] Moody’s. *Moody’s Corporate Default Risk Service – FAQ*. URL: <https://www.moody’s.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/FAQs%20Default%20Risk%20Service.pdf> (visited on 2022).
- [5] BCBS. *CRE 36.69 of Basel Framework*. URL: [https://www.bis.org/basel\\_framework/chapter/CRE/36.htm?inforce=20191215&published=20191215](https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/CRE/36.htm?inforce=20191215&published=20191215) (visited on 2022).

- [6] Bespoke. *A Look At Bank and Broker Credit Default Swap (CDS) Prices*. URL: <https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-big-blog/a-look-at-bank-cds/> (visited on 2022).
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