

FAQAS Framework - DAMAt Verification Report ESAIL-ADCS Case Study

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Chapter 1

Executive Summary

This document is a report on the issues identified via Data-driven Mutation Analysis, on the ESAIL-ADCS case study using the *DAMAt* tool, which has been developed in the context of the FAQAS-framework.

DAMAt is a data-driven mutation analysis tool. It generates mutants by modifying the data contained in the SUT buffers through the insertion in the source code of Mutation Probes. The mutation probes generate mutants following mutation operators defined in a Fault Model.

The code we analyzed was the ESAIL SVF test suite, which evaluates the ESAIL OBSW and in particular the test cases regarding the interaction between the ADCS (Attitude Determination and Control System) component and the OBSW (On Board Software).

1.1 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms

- FAQAS: activity ITT-1-9873-ESA
- FAQAS-framework: software system to be released at the end of WP4 of FAQAS.
- SUT: Software under test, i.e, the software that should be mutated by means of mutation testing.
- FMC: Fault model coverage, the percentage of fault models covered by the test suite.
- MOC: Mutation operation coverage, the percentage of data items that have been mutated at least once, considering only those that belong to the data buffers covered by the test suite.
- MS: Mutation Score, the percentage of mutants killed by the test suite (i.e., leading to at least one test case failure) among the mutants that target a fault model and for which at least one mutation operation was successfully performed.
- SVF: Software Validation Facility.
- ADCS: Attitude Control and Determination Software.

Chapter 2

Configuration of the toolset

2.1 Probe insertion

In the *ESAIL-ADCS case study* the mutation probes were inserted in the function of the *ADCS_IF_SW* that manages the communication between the ADCS and the OBC, i.e., *ObcRecvBlockCb*. The function is implemented in the file *AdcsIf.c*.

ObcRecvBlockCb mainly consists of a switch command that generates a response for the OBC after invoking a data generation method (i.e. a function that gathers and writes the necessary data) selected according to the request received on the data link. For example, method *GetIfStatus* prepares a response packet containing the information about the ADCS status.

Each data generation method receives as input an object of type *std::vector* that will be used to store the data to be sent to the OBC. The vector is called *newBlock* and acts as a buffer and it contains elements of type *UInt8*.

Each invocation of a data generation method generates a response that may either contain the desired result or an error code. The response generated in the first case is referred to as a nominal response message, the response generated in the second case is an error response message.

In both cases, a *Mutation Probe* has been inserted to mutate the data contained in the buffer.

An example of this probe insertion strategy is reported in Listing 2.1.

```
1
2  if(Status->ADRD || ((cmdId == 1) && (subcmdId < 3)))
3  {
4      switch(cmdId)
5      {
6      case 1:
7          {
8              switch(subcmdId)
9              {
10             case 0:
11                 {
12                     cr = GetIfStatus(newBlock);
13
14                     //MANUALLY INSERTED PROBES
15                     if(cr != CR_Failure){
16
17                         mutate_FM_IfStatus(&newBlock);
18
19                     }
20                     //END PROBES
21
```

```

22     }
23     break;

```

Listing 2.1: Probe insertion Strategy

2.2 Fault Model

A different Fault Model was defined for every type of message (and consequently for every data generation method), based on the structure of the buffer and on the data contained in it. They are:

- SpaceCraftHK
- MagnetorquerSetPWMRSPFailure
- SSTP
- SunSensorTMFailure
- SunSensorTM
- GYTMFailure
- IfHK
- IfStatus
- SSTPFailure
- MagnetorquerSetPWMRSP
- GYTM

The Fault Models for the *ESAIL-ADCS case study* were defined in the .csv file format. It is reported in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Fault model for the *ESAIL-ADCS case study*

FaultModel	DatalItem	Span	Type	FaultClass	Min	Max	Threshold	Delta	State	Value
IfStatus	0	1	BIN	BF	3	3	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	0	1	BIN	BF	4	4	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	0	1	BIN	BF	5	7	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	1	1	BIN	BF	0	4	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	0	2	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	2	4	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	5	7	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	5	1	BIN	BF	0	1	NA	NA	-1	1
IfStatus	5	1	BIN	BF	2	7	NA	NA	-1	1
IfHK	12	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	3.6	0.1	NA	NA
IfHK	12	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	3.6	0.1	NA	NA
IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	33.53	0.01	NA	NA
IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	33.53	0.01	NA	NA
IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VBT	NA	NA	24	1	NA	NA
IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	FVBT	NA	NA	24	1	NA	NA
IfHK	24	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA
IfHK	24	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA
IfHK	28	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	28	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	30	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	30	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	32	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA

IfHK	32	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	34	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	34	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	36	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
IfHK	36	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA
GYTM	0	1	BIN	BF	0	0	NA	NA	-1	1
GYTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51
GYTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x52
GYTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x53
GYTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54
GYTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56
S.SensorTM	0	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	0	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	2	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	2	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	4	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	4	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	6	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	6	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	8	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	10	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	10	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	12	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	12	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	14	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	16	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	16	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	18	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	18	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	20	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	20	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	22	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	22	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	24	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	24	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	26	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	26	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	28	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	28	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	30	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	30	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	32	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	32	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	34	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	34	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	36	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	36	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	38	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	38	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	40	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	40	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	42	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	42	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	44	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	44	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	46	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTM	46	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA
S.SensorTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51
S.SensorTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54
S.SensorTMFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56
SSTP	0	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	0	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	2	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	2	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	4	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	4	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	6	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	6	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	8	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	8	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTP	10	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA

SSTP	10	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA
SSTPFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51
SSTPFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54
SSTPFail.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56
SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	3.3	0.1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	3.3	0.1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	VB	NA	NA	0	0.1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	FVB	NA	NA	0	0.1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	2	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.5	2.75	NA	0.01	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	2	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.5	2.75	NA	0.01	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	4	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	4	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	6	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	6	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	8	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	8	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	10	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	10	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	50	NA	1	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	12	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	12	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA
SpaceCraftHK	14	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	0	1	BIN	BF	0	0	NA	NA	0	1
M.SetPWRMRSP	16	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	16	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	18	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	18	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	20	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	20	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	22	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	22	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	24	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	24	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	26	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	26	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	28	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	28	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	30	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	30	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	32	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	32	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	34	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	34	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	36	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	36	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.14	0.21	NA	0.01	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	38	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA
M.SetPWRMRSP	38	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	NA

Every line of the file represents a mutation operator, while every column represents a configuration parameter for that operator.

- Column *FaultModel* contains the name of the Fault Model containing the operator. Typically the user shall define a fault model for every different kind of message exchanged through the buffer.
- Column *DataItem* refers to the index of the first element of the targeted data item in the array representing the buffer.
- Column *Span* reports the number of array elements that make up the data item target by the mutation.
- Column *Type* reports about the type of data targeted by the mutation: INT, LONG, FLOAT, DOUBLE, BIN or HEX.
- Column *FaultClass* contains the type of fault that the mutation will emulate, depending on the chosen mutation operator. A summary of the mutation operators can be found in Table 2.2.

- The other columns represent configuration parameters and assume different meanings depending on the mutation operator they refer to. More details on the data-driven mutation operators and their configuration can be found in Table 2.2.

A mutation operator can generate one or more mutants performing a *Mutation Operation*.

Table 2.2: Data-driven mutation operators

Fault Class	Types	Parameters	Description
Value above threshold (VAT)	I,L,F,D,H	T: threshold Δ : delta, difference with respect to threshold	Replaces the current value with a value above the threshold T for a delta (Δ). It simulates a value that is out of the nominal case and shall trigger a response from the system that shall be verified by the test case (e.g., the system may continue working but an alarm shall be triggered). Not applied if the value is already above the threshold. Data mutation procedure: $v' = (T + \Delta)(if v \leq T); v' = v(otherwise);$
Value below threshold (VBT)	I,L,F,D,H	T: threshold Δ : delta, difference with respect to threshold	Replaces the current value with a value below the threshold T for a delta (Δ). It simulates a value that is out of the nominal case and shall trigger a response from the system that shall be verified by the test case (e.g., the system may continue working but an alarm shall be triggered). Not applied if the value is already below the threshold. Data mutation procedure: $v' = (T - \Delta)(if v \geq T); v' = v(otherwise)$
Value out of range (VOR)	I,L,F,D,H	MIN: minimum valid value MAX: maximum valid value Δ : delta, difference with respect to minimum/maximum valid value	Replaces the current value with a value out of the range $[MIN; MAX]$. It simulates a value that is out of the nominal range and shall trigger a response from the system that shall be verified by the test case (e.g., the system may continue working but an alarm shall be triggered). Not applied if the value is already out of range. Data mutation procedure 1: $v' = (MIN - \Delta)(if MIN \leq v \leq MAX); v' = v(otherwise)$ Data mutation procedure 2: $v' = (MAX + \Delta)(if MIN \leq v \leq MAX); v' = v(otherwise)$
Bit flip (BF)	B	MIN: lower bit MAX: higher bit STATE: mutate only if the bit is in the given state (i.e., 0 or 1). VALUE: number of bits to mutate	A number of bits randomly chosen in the positions between MIN and MAX (included) are flipped. If STATE is specified, the mutation is applied only if the bit is in the specified state; the value -1 indicates that any state shall be considered for mutation. Parameter VALUE specifies the number of bits to mutate. Data mutation procedure: the operator flips VALUE randomly selected bit if they are in the specified state.
Invalid numeric value (INV)	I,L,F,D,H	MIN: lower valid value MAX: higher valid value	Replace the current value with a mutated value that is legal (i.e., in the specified range) but different than current value. It simulates the exchange of data that is not consistent with the state of the system. Data mutation procedure: Replace the current value with a different value randomly sampled in the specified range.
Illegal Value (IV)	I,L,F,D,H	VALUE: illegal value that is observed	Replace the current value with a value that is equal to the parameter VALUE. Data mutation procedure: $v' = VALUE(if v \neq VALUE); v' = v(otherwise)$
Anomalous Signal Amplitude (ASA)	I,L,F,D,H	T: change point Δ : delta, value to add/remove VALUE: value to multiply	The mutated value is derived by amplifying the observed value by a factor V and by adding/removing a constant value Δ from it. It is used to either amplify or reduce a signal in a constant manner to simulate unusual signals. The parameter T indicates the observed value below which instead of adding we subtract. Data mutation procedure: $v' = T + ((v - T) * VALUE) + \Delta(if v \geq T); v' = T - ((T - v) * VALUE) - \Delta(if v < T);$
Signal Shift (SS)	I,L,F,D,H	Δ : delta, value by which the signal should be shifted	The mutated value is derived by adding a value Δ to the observed value. It simulates an anomalous shift in the signal. Data mutation procedure: $v' = v + \Delta$
Hold Value (HV)	I,L,F,D,H	V: number of times to repeat the same value	This operator keeps repeating an observed value for V times. It emulates a constant signal replacing a signal supposed to vary. Data mutation procedure: $v' = previous\ v'(if\ counter \leq V); v' = v(otherwise)$
Fix value above threshold (FVAT)	I,L,F,D,H	T: threshold Δ : delta, difference with respect to threshold	It is the complement of VAT and implements the same mutation procedure as VBT but we named it differently because it has a different purpose. Indeed, it is used to verify that test cases exercising exceptional cases are verified correctly. In the presence of a value above the threshold, it replaces the current value with a value below the threshold T for a delta Δ . Data mutation procedure: $v' = v(if v > T); v' = (T - \Delta)(otherwise)$
Fix value below threshold (FVBT)	I,L,F,D,H	T: threshold Δ : delta, difference with respect to threshold	It is the counterpart of FVAT for the operator VBT. Data mutation procedure: $v' = v(if v < T); v' = (T + \Delta)(otherwise)$
Fix value out of range (FVOR)	I,L,F,D,H	MIN: minimum valid value MAX: maximum valid value	It is the complement of VOR and implements the same mutation procedure as INV but we named it differently because it has a different purpose. Indeed, it is used to verify that test cases exercising exceptional cases are verified correctly. Data mutation procedure: $v' = v(if MIN \leq v \leq MAX); v' = random(MIN, MAX)(otherwise)$

Legend: I: INT, L: LONG INT, F: FLOAT, D: DOUBLE, B: BIN, H: HEX

Chapter 3

Results

3.1 Metrics

Starting from the mutation operators represented in Table 2.1, *DAMAt* generated **177** mutants. Every mutated version of the program was executed against the *ESAIL-ADCS case study* test suite.

The results were expressed with the following three metrics:

1. **FMC**: Fault model coverage, the percentage of fault models covered by the test suite.
2. **MOC**: Mutation operation coverage, the percentage of data items that have been mutated at least once, considering only those that belong to the data buffers covered by the test suite.
3. **MS**: Mutation Score, the percentage of mutants killed by the test suite (i.e., leading to at least one test case failure) among the mutants that target a fault model and for which at least one mutation operation was successfully performed.

A low score in one of the metrics indicate one of following scenarios, respectively:

1. **Low score in FMC**: the **message type** targeted by a fault model is **never exercised**.
2. **Low score in MOC**: the message type is covered by the test suite, but it is not possible to perform some of the mutation operations. It depends on the fact that **not all the input partitions are exercised** by the test suite.
3. **Low score in FMC**: the mutation is performed but the test suite does not fail. It may depend on two reasons: (1) **the oracles are imprecise** (e.g., they do not verify all the state variables), (2) the system is not brought into a state where the effect of the mutation is noticeable: **the scenarios exercised are insufficient**.

The aforementioned metrics for the *ESAIL-ADCS case study* are reported in Table 3.1

3.2 Fault Model Coverage

The **FMC** is **91.67%**. There is **1** fault model that is not covered by the test suite of the *ESAIL-ADCS case study*.

Fault Models	12
Covered Fault Models	11
FMC	91.67%
Covered Mutants	140
Applied Mutants	105
MOC	75.00%
Applied Mutants	105
Killed mutants	45
MS	42.857%

Table 3.1: DAMAt metrics for the *ESAIL-ADCS* case study

The uncovered Fault Model is *MagnetorquerSetPWMRSP* (reported in Table 2.1 as *M.SetPWMRSP*). This implies that the function implementing the mutation probe linked to this fault model has never been called during the execution of the test suite.

This means that the code for that message type, reported in Listing 3.1, was not covered.

```

1  case 8:
2  {
3      switch(subcmdId)
4      {
5          case 0:
6          {
7              cr = SetMgtqPwm(newBlock);
8
9              //MANUALLY INSERTED PROBES
10             if(cr == CR_Failure){
11                 mutate_FM_MagnetorquerSetPWMRSPFailure(&newBlock);
12             }
13
14             //END PROBE
15
16             if(cr == CR_Success)
17             {
18                 if(newBlock[2] == 0x55)
19                 {
20                     // Bypass Magnetometer response
21                     newBlock.resize(2);
22                     cr = GetMgtqTm(newBlock);
23
24                     //MANUALLY INSERTED PROBE
25                     mutate_FM_MagnetorquerSetPWMRSP( &newBlock);
26                     //END PROBE
27
28                 }
29             }
30             else
31             {
32                 cr = BuildMgtmDataRequestCmd(newBlock);
33                 cr = GetMgtmTm(newBlock);
34             }
35         }
36     }
37     break;
38 
```

Listing 3.1: Uncovered portion of source code

Suggested Action Item: check the code coverage of the *AdcsIf.c.* file and, if necessary, write a test case that exercises the missing message type.

3.3 Mutation Operation Coverage

The *mutation operation coverage* was **75.00%**. A total of **35** mutants were not applied: the function implementing the mutation probe was called, so the message type is covered by the test suite, but it was not possible to perform the corresponding mutation operation. The conditions for this are summarized in Table 2.2 for all the operators. The mutants are presented in Table 3.2, which contains the definition of the mutation operator that generated them and a description of the **Suggested Action Item**.

Table 3.2: Mutants covered by the *ESAIL-ADCS case study* test suite, but unable to apply the mutation.

#	FaultModel	D.Item	Span	Type	F.Class	Min	Max	Thresh.	Delta	State	Value	Action Item
10	IfHK	12	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	3.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of VCCb > Threshold is ever tested
12	IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	33.53	0.01	NA	NA	Check if value of VBUS > Threshold is ever tested
13	IfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VBAT	NA	NA	24	1	NA	NA	Check if value of VBUS > Threshold is ever tested
16	IfHK	24	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA	VCC Software 1 > Threshold is ever tested
39	SunSensorTM	0	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q1 ADC3 > Threshold is ever tested
41	SunSensorTM	2	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC3 > Threshold is ever tested
43	SunSensorTM	4	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC3 > Threshold is ever tested
45	SunSensorTM	6	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC3 > Threshold is ever tested
47	SunSensorTM	10	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC2 > Threshold is ever tested
49	SunSensorTM	12	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC2 > Threshold is ever tested

51	SunSensorTM	14	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC2 > Threshold is ever tested
53	SunSensorTM	16	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q1 ADC6 > Threshold is ever tested
55	SunSensorTM	18	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC6 > Threshold is ever tested
57	SunSensorTM	20	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC6 > Threshold is ever tested
59	SunSensorTM	22	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC6 > Threshold is ever tested
61	SunSensorTM	24	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q1 ADC5 > Threshold is ever tested
63	SunSensorTM	26	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC5 > Threshold is ever tested
65	SunSensorTM	28	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC5 > Threshold is ever tested
67	SunSensorTM	30	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC5 > Threshold is ever tested
69	SunSensorTM	32	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q1 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
71	SunSensorTM	34	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
73	SunSensorTM	36	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested

75	SunSensorTM	38	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
77	SunSensorTM	40	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q1 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
79	SunSensorTM	42	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q2 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
81	SunSensorTM	44	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q3 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
83	SunSensorTM	46	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	2.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of Photodiode Q4 ADC4 > Threshold is ever tested
109	SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	FVAT	NA	NA	3.3	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of TMTC Software 1 > Threshold is ever tested
111	SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	FVBT	NA	NA	0	0.1	NA	NA	Check if value of TMTC Software 1 < Threshold is ever tested
112	SpaceCraftHK	2	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.5	2.75	NA	0.01	NA	NA	Check if value of TMTC Software 2 inside range Min-Max is ever tested
113	SpaceCraftHK	2	2	DOUBLE	VOR	0.5	2.75	NA	0.01	NA	NA	Check if value of TMTC Software 2 inside range Min-Max is ever tested
127	SpaceCraftHK	12	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA	Check if value of SC Temperature 5 inside range Min-Max is ever tested
128	SpaceCraftHK	12	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA	Check if value of SC Temperature 5 inside range Min-Max is ever tested

130	SpaceCraftHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA	Check if value of SC Temperature 6 inside range Min-Max is ever tested
131	SpaceCraftHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VOR	9.9253	29.9979	NA	0.0001	NA	NA	Check if value of SC Temperature 6 inside range Min-Max is ever tested

3.4 Mutation Score

The *mutation score* was **42.85%**. A total of **60** mutants were applied but not killed. This implies that the mutation was performed but it did not lead to failures in the test suite; this situation could be due to absent or not well-defined oracles, or to not properly exercised scenarios. The mutants are presented in Table 3.2, which contains the definition of the mutation operator that generated them and a description of the **Suggested Action Item**.

Table 3.3: Mutants that applied the mutation and were not killed by the test suite of the *ESAIL-ADCS case study*

#	FaultModel	D.Item	Span	Type	F.Class	Min	Max	Thresh.	Delta	State	Value	Action Item
1	IfStatus	0	1	BIN	BF	4	4	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item containing OBC communication error
2	IfStatus	0	1	BIN	BF	5	7	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item-containing Unit communication error
3	IfStatus	1	1	BIN	BF	0	4	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item containing Unit in error
4	IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	0	2	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item containing Gyroscope enable
5	IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	2	4	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item containing Reaction Wheel enable
6	IfStatus	4	1	BIN	BF	5	7	NA	NA	-1	1	3 Check oracle for data item containing axis Magnetorquer enable
8	IfStatus	5	1	BIN	BF	2	7	NA	NA	-1	1	S. Check oracle for data item containing Sensor board ADC enable

9	lfHK	12	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	3.6	0.1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing VCCb
11	lfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	33.53	0.01	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing VBUS
14	lfHK	14	2	DOUBLE	FVBT	NA	NA	24	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing VBUS
15	lfHK	24	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing VCC Software 1
20	lfHK	30	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 2
21	lfHK	30	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 2
22	lfHK	30	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 2
23	lfHK	32	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3a
24	lfHK	32	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3a
25	lfHK	32	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3a
26	lfHK	34	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3b
27	lfHK	34	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3b
28	lfHK	34	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 3b

29	lfHK	36	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 4
30	lfHK	36	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 4
31	lfHK	36	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-20	50	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing PCB Temperature 4
32	GYTM	0	1	BIN	BF	0	0	NA	NA	-1	1	Check oracle for data item containing Unit identifier
33	GYTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
34	GYTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x52	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
35	GYTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x53	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
36	GYTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
37	GYTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
84	S.SensorTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
85	S.SensorTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
86	S.SensorTMF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
87	SSTP	0	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 3
88	SSTP	0	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 3
89	SSTP	0	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 3

93	SSTP	4	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 6
94	SSTP	4	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 6
95	SSTP	4	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 6
96	SSTP	6	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 5
97	SSTP	6	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 5
98	SSTP	6	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 5
99	SSTP	8	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 4
100	SSTP	8	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 4
101	SSTP	8	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 4
102	SSTP	10	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 7
103	SSTP	10	2	DOUBLE	VOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 7
104	SSTP	10	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	-70	100	NA	1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing Temperature reading from ADC 7

105	SSTPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
106	SSTPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
107	SSTPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56	Check oracle for data item containing type
108	SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	VAT	NA	NA	3.3	0.1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing TMTC Software 1
110	SpaceCraftHK	0	2	DOUBLE	VBT	NA	NA	0	0.1	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing TMTC Software 1
114	SpaceCraftHK	2	2	DOUBLE	FVOR	0.5	2.75	NA	0.01	NA	NA	Check oracle for data item containing TMTC Software 2
170	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x51	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
171	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x52	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
172	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x53	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
173	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x54	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
174	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x56	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
175	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x5d	Check oracle for data item containing Error type
176	M.SetPWMRSPF.	0	1	HEX	IV	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0x5e	Check oracle for data item containing Error type