

## **Security - General**

Module 4

# Learning Units covered in this Module

- Lesson 1: SQL Server Services Accounts
- Lesson 2: Row Level Security
- Lesson 3: Dynamic Data Masking
- Lesson 4: SQL Server Audit

## Lesson 1: SQL Server Service Accounts Best Practices

### **Objectives**

After completing this learning, you will be able to:

- Discuss the various Microsoft SQL Server Service Accounts.
- · Know the options available to better secure your environment.



### **SQL Server Service Accounts**

Partial List

SQL Server Database Engine
SQL Server Agent
SQL Server Browser – Might be disabled
SQL Server Full-text Filter Daemon Launcher
SQL Server Launchpad – Optional
SQL Server Integration Services – Optional
SQL Server Analysis Services – Optional
SQL Server Reporting Services - Optional

#### **Overview**

Local or Domain User Account Network Service Account

Virtual Service account (SQL 2012)

Managed Service account (SQL 2012)

#### Which one is "right"

- Consider the principle of least privilege
- Accounts should have the level of access required and nothing further.
- Accounts should be isolated (not used by any other service)

#### What is the best choice?

Largely dependent on your organizations needs, but there are recommended practices:

#### Non-administrative Local or Domain users

- Local users cannot access domain resources.
- Require regular service password management

## Virtual accounts (SQL 2012+)

- Auto-managed, auto-provisioned
- Ideal for nondomain joined or isolated servers

## Managed accounts (SQL 2012+)

- Auto-managed, manual provisioning
- Ideal for domain joined servers that must access domain resources or used linked servers

#### **SQL Service Identities**

## NT Authority Accounts

Local System
NT AUTHORITY\System

Network Service
NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService

Local Service
NT AUTHORITY\LocalService

#### **NT Service Accounts**

Virtual Accounts Service SID

NT SERVICE\MSSQLSERVER

NT SERVICE\SQLSERVERAGENT

NT SERVICE\MSSQL\$Instance
NT SERVICE\SQLAGENT\$Instance

## MSA accounts and gMSA

Domain
DOMAIN\ACCOUNTNAME\$

Domain Group MSADomain Global Security Group

#### **Virtual Accounts**

Managed local accounts

Automatically Provisioned and Managed

Default in SQL Server 2012 – specific during setup

Default instance of the Database Engine service: NT SERVICE\MSSQLSERVER

Access network resources by using: <domain\_name>\<computer\_name>\$



#### **Managed Service Accounts**

Active Directory

Domain Account

Assigned to a single computer, used to manage a service (not supported in Failover Clusters)

Provisioned by a
Domain Administrator,
then installed on local
computer

Provides automatic SPN and (SPN and password management) – supports delegation

Cannot be used to log in to an interactive desktop session

### Managed Service Accounts and gMSAs

Managed Service Accounts (MSAs)

- Limited to a single server
- Remove the need to manage a service account password
- Service Principal name (SPN) registration can be done automatically

Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs)

- Extend MSA functionality across multiple servers
- Supported in SQL Server 2014+
- Requires Windows Server 2012+ Active Directory Domain Controller
- Requires Windows Server 2012+

#### **Service Account Best Practices**



Separate account for each SQL Server service for each server



Use virtual service accounts, managed service accounts, or group managed service accounts



Do not grant service accounts local administrator permissions

**Questions?** 



## **Knowledge Check**

What are some of the best practices related to configuring SQL Server Service Accounts?

What version of SQL Server supports gMSAs?

**Lesson 2: Row Level Security** 

## **Objectives**

After completing this learning, you will be able to:

· Understand row-level security and how it can be used.



#### **Row-Level Security Overview**

Enables fine grained access control at the row level

Security logic is controlled at the database tier instead of the application tier

## **Row-Level Security Use Cases**



## **Row-Level Security Components**

Security Policy

Predicates (inline table-valued function)

### **Row-Level Security Predicates**



```
CREATE FUNCTION fn_RowLevelSecurity (@FilterColumnName sysname) RETURNS TABLE WITH
SCHEMABINDING
as
RETURN SELECT 1 as fn_SecureCustomerData
-- filter out records based on database user name
where @FilterColumnName = user_name();
```

### **Row-Level Security Policy**

Security policies are named objects, scoped to a schema that perform filtering using an inline table-valued function.

State setting determines if they are on or off.

```
CREATE SECURITY POLICY FilterCustomer
ADD FILTER PREDICATE dbo.fn_RowLevelSecurity(SalesPersonUserName)
ON dbo.Customer
WITH (STATE = ON);
```

#### **Row-Level Security Permissions**

Create, alter or drop policy

- Requires ALTER ANY SECURITY POLICY
- Creating or dropping a security policy requires the ALTER permission on the schema

For each predicate added

- SELECT and REFERENCES permissions on the function being used as a predicate
- REFERENCES on the target table
- REFERENCES on every column from the target table used as an argument

#### **Row-Level Security Best Practices**

Create a separate schema for RLS objects

Monitor who has the ALTER ANY SECURITY POLICY – intended for highly privileged users

If the security policy managers have the ALTER ANY SECURITY POLICY permission, they do not need the select permission on the table

Keep predicate functions as simple as possible to prevent performance issues

#### **Row-Level Security Limitations**

Filestream – not supported

Polybase – not supported

DBCC SHOW\_STATISTICS report statistics on unfiltered data (potential leak)

Memory-optimized tables – predicate must use WITH NATIVE\_COMPILATION option

Indexed views cannot be created on top of tables that have a security policy

Change Data Capture (CDC) – can leak rows that should be filtered to db\_owner

#### **Demonstration**

#### **Dynamic Data Masking**

Creating and Querying Masked Tables



### **Row-Level Security**

You will setup row level security to allow different people to see their territory without seeing data for other territories.



**Questions?** 



## **Knowledge Check**

What are some scenarios where row-level security would be beneficial?

Lesson 3: Dynamic Data Masking

## **Objectives**

After completing this learning, you will be able to:

 Understand how dynamic data masking can be utilized to enhance data security.



### **Dynamic Data Masking Overview**

#### Why use Dynamic Data Masking?

Limits sensitive data exposure to non-privileged users

Provides control over how much of the sensitive data is revealed

Minimal impact to the application layer

Data in the database remains unchanged

## Types of Data Masks

Default (based on data Email type) Random **Custom String** 

## **Dynamic Data Masking Limitations**

#### The following columns cannot be masked

- Using Always Encrypted
- FILESTREAM
- Computed Columns\*
- Column that is a key for a full-text index

### **Dynamic Data Masking Permissions**

ALTER ANY MASK and ALTER permission on the table

Required to add, replace or remove the mask of a column

UNMASK

Required to see unmasked data\*

#### **Demonstration**

#### **Dynamic Data Masking**

Creating and Querying Masked Tables



**Questions?** 



# **Knowledge Check**

Which permission needs to be granted for a user to see the full data view

What are the four types of data masks?

Lesson 4: Introduction to SQL Server Audit

## **Objectives**


After completing this learning, you will be able to:

· Understand what SQL Server Audit is and how to configure it.



## Some History...

- SQL 2005 and earlier
  - Server Level
  - Application Log
  - SQL Server Error Log
- Triggers
  - Login triggers
  - Server triggers
  - DDL triggers
- SQL Trace (Profiler)
  - · Detailed activity audits
  - Individual statements, include



### **SQL Server Audit**

Provides the ability to track and log events that occur in SQL Server engine

Built on Extended Events architecture Basic Server Audit available in all SKUs (Since SQL Server 2012)

 Database Audit only available in Enterprise, Developer, and Evaluation editions

# SQL Server Audit Components

- Allow pre-filtering and fine-grained auditing
- Allow multiple targets (File, Application and Security Event Logs)

# Key part of security strategy

Who has accessed or attempted to access your data

Ability to detect unauthorized access attempts


Piece together the actions of malicious insiders

Robust tracking capability

### **Primary Goals of SQL Server Audit**

Security The audit feature must be truly secure. Performance Performance impact must be minimized Management The audit feature must be easy to manage. Audit-centric questions must be easy to Discoverability answer

# **Audit Object Layout**



# Working with SQL Server Audit



Create an audit and define the target



Create either a server audit specification or database audit specification



Enable the audit specification



Enable the audit



Read the audit events


### **Create Audit**

Queue delay (in milliseconds)

On Audit Log Failure - Continue

On Audit Log Failure - Shut down server

On Audit Log Failure - Fail operation




### **Create Audit (Continued)**

#### **Audit Destination**

- Binary file
- Windows Application log
- Windows Security log

### File Settings

- File Path
- Audit File Maximum Limit
- Maximum File Size
- Reserve disk space



## **SQL Server Audit Events to the Security Log**

### The Audit object

• The Audit object access setting must be configured to capture the events. The audit policy tool (auditpol.exe) exposes a variety of sub-policies settings in the audit object access category. To allow SQL Server to audit object access, configure the application generated setting.

# SQL Server service Account

- The account that the SQL Server service is running under must have the generate security audits permission to write to the Windows Security log.
- secpol.msc → Generate security audits

### Registry


- Provide full permission for the SQL Server service account to the registry hive
- HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYS TEM\CurrentControlSet\Serv ices\EventLog\Security.

### **Create Audit Filter**

Enter a predicate, or "WHERE clause"

Audit events are filtered before they are written to the audit log

You can filter on every element of the Audit Records



### Server-Level Audit Action Groups

### LOGIN\_CHANGE\_PASSWORD\_GROUP

Whenever a login password is changed

### SERVER\_OBJECT\_CHANGE\_GROUP

• CREATE, ALTER, or DROP operations on server objects

### SERVER\_PRINCIPAL\_CHANGE\_GROUP

When server principals are created, altered, or dropped

### SERVER\_ROLE\_MEMBER\_CHANGE\_GROUP

Whenever a login is added or removed from a fixed server role.

### SUCCESSFUL\_LOGIN\_GROUP

• A principal has successfully logged in to SQL Server

### **Database-Level Audit Action Groups**

#### BACKUP\_RESTORE\_GROUP

• Whenever a backup or restore command is issued

#### DATABASE\_CHANGE\_GROUP

When a database is created, altered, or dropped

#### DATABASE\_OBJECT\_CHANGE\_GROUP

• When a CREATE, ALTER, or DROP statement is executed on database objects

#### DATABASE\_ROLE\_MEMBER\_CHANGE\_GROUP

• Whenever a login is added to or removed from a database role

#### DBCC\_GROUP

Whenever a principal issues any DBCC command

#### FAILED\_DATABASE\_AUTHENTICATION\_GROUP

A principal tried to log on to SQL Server and failed

## Database Audit Specifications Actions and Groups

select \*
from sys.dm\_audit\_actions
where class\_desc = 'database'
or parent\_class\_desc = 'database';

action_id	name	class_desc	covering_action_name
R	REVOKE	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
D	DENY	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
G	GRANT	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
GWG	GRANT WITH GRANT	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
RWG	REVOKE WITH GRANT	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
RWC	REVOKE WITH CASCADE	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
DWC	DENY WITH CASCADE	DATABASE	DATABASE_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP
R	REVOKE	ОВЈЕСТ	NULL
D	DENY	ОВЈЕСТ	NULL
G	GRANT	OBJECT	NULL
GWG	GRANT WITH GRANT	OBJECT	NULL
RWG	REVOKE WITH GRANT	OBJECT	NULL
RWC	REVOKE WITH CASCADE	OBJECT	NULL
DWC	DENY WITH CASCADE	OBJECT	NULL
R	REVOKE	TYPE	NULL
D	DENY	TYPE	NULL
G	GRANT	TYPE	NULL
GWG	GRANT WITH GRANT	TYPE	NULL
RWG	REVOKE WITH GRANT	TYPE	NULL
RWC	REVOKE WITH CASCADE	TYPE	NULL
DWC	DENY WITH CASCADE	TYPE	NULL
R	REVOKE	SCHEMA	NULL
D	DENY	SCHEMA	NULL

### **List All Server and Database Action Groups**

```
select name, class_desc from
sys.dm_audit_actions
where name in
(select containing_group_name
from sys.dm_audit_actions) order
by class_desc, name;
```


name	class_desc
DBCC_GROUP	DATABASE
FAILED_DATABASE_AUTHENTICATION_GROUP	DATABASE
SCHEMA_OBJECT_ACCESS_GROUP	DATABASE
SCHEMA_OBJECT_CHANGE_GROUP	DATABASE
SCHEMA_OBJECT_OWNERSHIP_CHANGE_GROUP	DATABASE
SCHEMA_OBJECT_PERMISSION_CHANGE_GROUP	DATABASE
SUCCESSFUL_DATABASE_AUTHENTICATION_GROUP	DATABASE
USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	DATABASE
USER_DEFINED_AUDIT_GROUP	DATABASE
APPLICATION_ROLE_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	SERVER
AUDIT_CHANGE_GROUP	SERVER
BACKUP_RESTORE_GROUP	SERVER
BROKER_LOGIN_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_CHANGE_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_LOGOUT_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_MIRRORING_LOGIN_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_OBJECT_ACCESS_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_OBJECT_CHANGE_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE_OBJECT_OWNERSHIP_CHANGE_GROUP	SERVER
DATABASE OBJECT PERMISSION CHANGE GROUP	SERVER

## Get Information About a Particular Group Name

```
select *
from sys.dm_audit_actions
where containing_group_name = 'USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP';
```

action_id	name	class_desc	covering_action_name	parent_class_desc	covering_parent_action_name	configuration_level
PWR	RESET PASSWORD	USER	NULL	DATABASE	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	NULL
PWRS	RESET OWN PASSWORD	USER	NULL	DATABASE	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	NULL
PWCS	CHANGE OWN PASSWORD	USER	NULL	DATABASE	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	NULL
PWC	CHANGE PASSWORD	USER	NULL	DATABASE	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	NULL
USTC	COPY PASSWORD	USER	NULL	DATABASE	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	NULL
UCGP	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	DATABASE	NULL	SERVER	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	Group
UCGP	USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD_GROUP	SERVER	NULL	NULL	NULL	Group

### **Database-Level Audit Actions**



# View a SQL Server Audit Log





SQL SERVER
MANAGEMENT STUDIO

SYS.FN\_GET\_AUDIT\_FILE

## sys.fn\_get\_audit\_file

### · file\_pattern

· Specifies the directory or path and file name for the audit file set to be read.

### · initial\_file\_name

 Specifies the path and name of a specific file in the audit file set to start reading audit records from

### audit\_record\_offset

Specifies a known location with the file specified for the initial\_file\_name

```
SELECT * FROM sys.fn_get_audit_file
('\\serverName\Audit\HIPAA_AUDIT.sqlaudit',default,default);
```

### Considerations



In the case of a failure during audit initiation, the server will not start.



Attaching a Database with an Audit Defined



Always On Availability Groups and SQL Server Audit



**Auditing Administrators** 

### **Demonstration**

Demonstrate how to Create an Audit and Audit Specification within SQL Server



**Questions?** 



## **SQL Server Auditing**

- Exercise 1: Create a Login with PowerShell
- Exercise 2: Create a Server audit and read its results



# **Knowledge Check**

How do you start an audit after creating the server audit specification login?

How do you stop the audit?

What are audit action groups in a server audit specification?

Lesson 5: Ledger for SQL Server

# **Objectives**

After completing this learning, you will be able to:

· Understand what Ledger for SQL Server is and how to configure it.



# Security enhancements - Ledger for SQL Server


Ledger for SQL Server -The ledger feature provides tamper-evidence capabilities in your database. You can cryptographically attest to other parties, such as auditors or other business parties, that your data hasn't been tampered with.

### Ledger for SQL Server

Tamper-evidence track record of data over time

Challenge: I want the power of blockchain in a centralized system like SQL Server

- Use a cryptographically hashed ledger detect tampering by malicious actors
- ✓ Built into SQL Server with T-SQL
- Establish digital trust in a centralized system using blockchain technology.
- Attest to other parties that data integrity has not been compromised
- Automatic digest storage



## Ledger Tables – Updatable and Append-Only

**Updatable Ledger Tables** are standard SQL tables which allow updates and deletes


The history of rows that have been updated or deleted are preserved in the history table and easy-to-query Ledger View

Integrity of the updatable and history tables are maintained through cryptographic links from the Database Ledger

System periodically uploads digital receipts to a customer-configured trusted storage service

Customer can use digital receipts to verify the integrity of data in Ledger tables

**Append-Only Ledger Tables** block UPDATE/DELETE at the API and remove the need for a history table



# How to use Ledger for SQL Server

Save digest Manual or auto Make changes Create a Ledger table INSERT, UPDATE/ DELETE (only updateable) Updateable or **Append Only** View ledger history Verify Ledger

# Creating an Account Balance Updatable Ledger Table

	ledger_table_name	history_table_name	ledger_view_name
1	Account.Balance	Account.MSSQL_LedgerHistoryFor_1525580473	Account.Balance_Ledger

# Viewing the Account Balance Updatable Ledger Table

```
SELECT ts.[name] + '.' + t.[name] AS [ledger_table_name]
, hs.[name] + '.' + h.[name] AS [history_table_name]
, vs.[name] + '.' + v.[name] AS [ledger_view_name]
FROM sys.tables AS t
JOIN sys.tables AS h ON (h.[object_id] = t.[history_table_id])
JOIN sys.views v ON (v.[object_id] = t.[ledger_view_id])
JOIN sys.schemas ts ON (ts.[schema_id] = t.[schema_id])
JOIN sys.schemas hs ON (hs.[schema_id] = h.[schema_id])
JOIN sys.schemas vs ON (vs.[schema_id] = v.[schema_id])
WHERE t.[name] = 'Balance';
```

	ledger_table_name	history_table_name	ledger_view_name	
1	Account.Balance	Account.MSSQL_LedgerHistoryFor_1525580473	Account.Balance_Ledger	

# Add 4 Accounts In 2 Separate Transactions

Tx1: Add Nick with an opening balance of \$50

Tx2: Add John, Joe and Mary

- 1. Each transaction has it's own unique transaction ID
- 2. Tx2 modified 3 rows, each tracked with a ledger sequence number

### Updatable ledger table

R	esults Mes	ssages					2		
	CustomerID	LastName	FirstName	Balance	ledger_start_transaction_id	ledger_end_transaction_id	ledger_start_sequence_number	ledger_end_sequence_number	
1	1	Jones	Nick	50.00	999	NULL	0	NULL	
2	2	Smith	John	500.00	1002	NULL	0	NULL	
3	3	Smith	Joe	30.00	1002	NULL	1	NULL	
4	4	Michaels	Mary	200.00	1002	NULL	2	NULL	

### **Update Nick's Balance From \$50 To \$100**

Applies to: Azure SQL Database, Managed Instance preview

#### **Updatable ledger table** – Nick's balance is now \$100

	CustomerID	LastName	FirstName	Balance	ledger_start_transaction_id	ledger_end_transaction_id	ledger_start_sequence_number	ledger_end_sequence_number
1	1	Jones	Nick	100.00	1055	NULL	0	NULL
2	2	Smith	John	500.00	1002	NULL	0	NULL
3	3	Smith	Joe	30.00	1002	NULL	1	NULL
4	4	Michaels	Mary	200.00	1002	NULL	2	NULL

### History Table – Shows the historical value of row containing Nick's opening balance

	CustomerID	LastName	FirstName	Balance	ledger_start_transaction_id	ledger_end_transaction_id	ledger_start_sequence_number	ledger_end_sequence_number
1	1	Jones	Nick	50.00	999	1055	0	1

#### **Ledger View** – Shows Nick's update as a delete followed but a subsequent insert

	CustomerID	LastName	FirstName	Balance	ledger_transaction_id	ledger_sequence_number	ledger_operation_type_id	ledger_operation_type_desc
1	1	Jones	Nick	50.00	999	0	1	INSERT
2	2	Smith	John	500.00	1002	0	1	INSERT
3	3	Smith	Joe	30.00	1002	1	1	INSERT
4	4	Michaels	Mary	200.00	1002	2	1	INSERT
5	1	Jones	Nick	50.00	1055	1	2	DELETE
6	1	Jones	Nick	100.00	1055	0	1	INSERT

# **Ledger Views**

Applies to: Azure SQL Database, Managed Instance preview

**Sys.database\_ledger\_transactions** - Records the table hashes for each transaction in the database as well as the user who issued the transaction

	transaction_id	block_id	transaction_ordinal	commit_time	principal_name	table_hashes
1	999	0	0	2021-03-23 20:18:08.2700000	janders	0xB982EE5A88DFE8EF08BE7564D62273BD17306231C8E22E052644805
2	1002	0	1	2021-03-23 20:18:12.9300000	janders	0xB982EE5AB931133CF9B8E6FCD06C9AF25C0F0C6A9A91A12C89A84AB
3	1055	0	2	2021-03-23 20:40:08.9500000	janders	0xB982EE5A38F20FA9D8ABFC3C3523284FE65466DAA9E91166447648B
4	1091	0	3	2021-03-23 21:36:22.2533333	janders	0x9D13BF5E345245E7456EC748BC895E0E1323379BD04EBC35638D91E

**Sys.database\_ledger\_blocks** – Records the hash of each block created in the database, along with the # of transactions in the block

	block_id	transactions_root_hash	block_size	previous_block_hash
1	0	0x8F3C4C8ADF99EAEE24A783CB1AC282A12E9C9ECA619DDE19B2C98D8ECCA5E4A5	4	NULL

# Ledger FAQ

#### How is this different from a temporal table?

- Built-in transaction auditing
- Append-only
- Database Ledger and digest for tamper evidence

#### How is this different than SQL Server Audit?

- Transaction history and audit built into database
- Digest verification

#### Can I disable ledger from a table?

- You cannot ALTER a table to "turn off" ledger
- You cannot turn off system versioning

#### Can I drop a ledger table?

• Yes, but a history of the dropped table and ledger is kept

# Ledger FAQ

#### How often do I need to save the digest?

• As frequent as you need to ensure the ledger is tamper proof

#### Does Ledger require more space?

- Updateable requires similar extra space as temporal
- Plus database ledger requires some minimal extra space for hashes and blockchain
- Digests small and separate but you may need a long history
- You can't archive or truncate ledger tables and database ledger

#### Any performance impact?

- Append only should see minimal impact
- Updateable would have similar impact as temporal

### **Demonstration**

Create and Update a Ledger Table



