* Answer questions, give details, discuss originally
* 看review session note，回答问题，看slides灌水
* 总结观点checklist
* What is Descartes’s method of doubt? How does the method guide the development of the Meditations?
  + Method of doubt
    - Negative methods for positive purpose
    - Put all former belief into doubt in order to argue for things indubitable
      * because cannot build epistemic structure on a bad foundation(dubitable), a sturdy epistemic structure
      * Method of doubt is like a test: A claim is certain if and only if it is immune from any kinds of doubt doubt
  + How does the method guide:
    - All start with cartesian skepticism and then builds everything up
    - 1st meditation(negative phase)
      * Dream argument, evil demon argument
    - 2nd meditation - 6th meditation(positive phase)
      * I think therefore I exist is the foundation of everything to come
        + First use of skepticism as a filter of certainty
        + It is a single intrinsically indubitable proposition
        + Established without presupposing a criterion
    - Skepticism as a tool:
      * 1. As a filter of certainty 2. As an instrument of analysis
      * Thinking thing does not imply embodiment: First use of skepticism as a tool for how things should be understood
      * Cogito: First use of skepticism as a filter of certainty
      * Criterion of knowledge: clear and distinct as a feature from cogito argument
  + Cartesian skepticism → indubitable argument → criterion
  + Negative approach → positive product
* What does Descartes mean by clear and distinct perception. How does he arrive at the rule that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true. What does he regard as the main objection to this rule, how does he propose to deal with this objection, and how successfully.
  + Clear and distinct perception is the criterion of knowledge for Descartes
    - Clear: Beyond doubt, attempts to doubt utterly reinforce the conclusion (doubt leads to no doubt) Once I start to doubt my own existence, then it is a property, so that I exist
      * Clarity is objective certainty. A proposition is “clearly” perceived when attempts to doubt it break down. “Sum” and “cogito” are the original and paradigm examples
    - Distinctness: Understanding the meaning of the proposition makes you get certainty (if distinct, its constituent concepts going to be fixed, not going to be any alternate meaning of terms within the proposition), ex. 2+2=4, if I understand 2,+,=, no way to understand what +,2,= means and not be certain, analytic, meanings has to be fixed and not vague, entertain the concept of x, cannot be confused of what x means, then you will understand y immediately
      * Distinctness is precise and exact understanding of a proposition: knowing exactly what it means (or must mean, given its peculiar certainty). In the case of a basic certainty, you can’t have a precise understanding of the proposition involved and still be in doubt as to its truth.
  + How does he arrive at the rule:
    - As Q1, microscope
  + What is the main objection:
    - Turn back to 1st meditation, even if math is the last to be doubted, maybe we get the false certainty by evil demon
    - Seems to satisfy clear and distinct perception are not indubitable
    - Consider some of Descartes’s previous beliefs—that there are **external things resembling his ideas**. Theses have a powerful “natural” appeal and may be true. But their truth is not given through “the strength of [Descartes’s] perception”. He can understand them perfectly and still wonder whether they are true.
    - Could the Demon put Descartes in the same position even with respect to simple mathematical propositions, such as ‘2 + 3 = 5.’ These seem to be clearly and distinctly perceived. But could the Demon just make it *seem* that way?
  + How does he deal with this objection:
    - How did he deal:
      * Two kinds of epistemic moments:
        + Direct entertainment of proposition: when I entertain 2+2=4, it seems clear that it cannot be doubt when I focus on the meanings
        + But when I stop thinking about 2+2=4, I can actually doubt it, that’s the only time that this CDP seems dubitable
        + “Slight metaphysical doubt”
        + Since Descartes has no reason to think there is a Demon (or for that matter a God), the doubt is “slight and metaphysical.” But we are in quest of absolute certainty, so it must be removed.
        + A vital point: not even the Demon doubt can undermine the certainty of a clearly and distinctly perceived proposition **while Descartes’s attention is focused on it**. The doubt arises **only at the reflective level** (when Descartes thinks about the reliability of his faculties, rather than the truth of par propositions).
      * Solve by God, and the nature of god
        + The central idea: **only God’s actual existence could account for Descartes’s having the idea of God**. This arguments provides D with a “bridge” to something that transcends his own subjectivity.
        + depends on the existence of a natural phenomenon (the existence of the idea of God, or on that of Descartes as having such an idea)
        + the ultimate cause of an idea must be something with a sufficient degree of formal (actual) reality
        + Why god exists
        + Deception implies trickery and malice, which are defects. Deception is thus incompatible with God’s absolute perfection.
        + Since God cannot intend to deceive, Descartes’s God-given faculty of judgment cannot be such as to lead him astray, when correctly used. But if so, why does D *ever* fall into error? (This is an epistemological version of the Problem of Evil or **Theodicy**.)
        + Descartes is finite, i.e. limited (midway between the absolute plenitude of God and its polar opposite, absolute nothingness). There is no need to postulate a faculty of error, just limited cognitive powers.
        + 两者都是上帝的设计产物，就其自身而言，具有“类的完满性”，而错误则起源于它们两者之间的联系。由于意志的广阔程度超出理智所限，所以会常常附加到理智所不确定的事物之上。而只有当理智获得了“清楚明白的知觉”以后，意志才会作出正确的断定。意志依据它作出判断的真假，也拥有两种类型的自由：一种是对“理性自然的光明”作出反应的自我决定，也就是追求真理的积极的自由，另一种是对真理无所谓的情况下任意决定的消极的自由。因此错误判断的产生也被归结到对自由意志的不正确运用上来。
        + 通过对理智、意志、上帝之间的关系的论述，笛卡尔丰富了“真观念即清楚明白的知觉”这一判断准则的内涵，也总结出了除自由意志外上帝还赠给人的两条教诲：第一，理智的清晰的知觉应该先行于意志的决定；第二，当理智没有清晰的知觉时，意志应该悬置判断，以免错误产生。
        + Cause and limitation!!!
        + Distinguishment of idea and will!!!
        + By principle of sufficient reason, he cannot understand
    - How successful:
      * 对象至少要具有和观念的客观实在性一样多的形式实在性 This is dubitable
      * 他通过上帝观念的清晰完满性直接断定它是与生俱来的 circular
      * How do you know levels of reality
      * 为什么god就是好的呢
* Explain and critically discuss Descartes’s arguments for what he calls the “real distinction” between mind and body.
  + Explanation:
    - Why mind and body is distinct
    - In 2nd meditation, you cannot have a property without a thing → all I know is a thinking thing, nothing in thinking thing presupposes physical body
    - Imagination is mixed with perception and images, you cannot have perceptions without consciousness, it seems physical thing depends on mind, but not opposite
    - Make a clear and conceptual distinction. Does this lead to metaphysical distinction?
    - Whatever can be clearly and distinctly perceived can be brought about by God. So since Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself as existing separately from his body, it is possible for mind to actually exist separately from body. This establishes the real distinction (as the capacity for separate existence). *Meditation* 2 only established the rational (conceptual) distinction: i.e. that the concept of mind is logically distinct from the concept of body.
    - Though the mind does not require sensory faculties, such faculties depend on the mind (as the subject of consciousness). These passive faculties do not depend on acts of thought, so must have some kind of external cause.
    - If these causes were not (as Descartes naturally believes) bodies, but something “nobler” or even God himself, God would be a deceiver, which is impossible. Thus corporeal things exist.
    - Pain and pleasure are guides for taking care of the body. But ordinary experience is not a good guide to the physical nature of things
    - The senses are useful for practical matters (the care of the body) But even here, they are not perfectly reliable. E.g. we may feel thirsty when it is medically inadvisable to drink
    - Vulnerability to perceptual error is an **inevitable consequence of embodied existence**.
    - We have as good a system for dealing with the external world as is compatible with belonging to it ourselves. Experience is a **useful guide** to external reality but **not a source of metaphysical certainty**
  + Discussion
    - “我思”的第一原则需要上帝的存在来加以解释，这无疑是荒谬的
* What does Leibniz mean by the “complete notion” of an individual substance? Why must an individual have a complete notion? Explain some consequences of Leibniz’s view. Does the theory of complete notions mean that everything that happens does so necessarily? Is it compatible with freedom of the will?
  + Complete notion:
    - An individual substance has **a complete notion**: a description that logically entails every truth concerning it. A complete notion distinguishes and individual from all other *possible* (and not just all other *actual*) individuals.
      * Intrinsic: how many molecules I have, how tall I am
      * Relational: I am 20 feet away from Adam (will not understand this if I only have intrinsic notion about me), temporal relational fact
    - It follows (DM9) that every individual substance expresses the whole universe. (Every individual implies a complete possible world.) An individual’s complete notion contains everything that is true of that individual, including its relations to all other individuals
  + Why must have a complete notion:
    - DM 8. To distinguish the actions of God from those of his creatures (essential for Leibniz’s moral-theological aims), we must explain what is meant by an individual substance. It is not enough to say that a substance (thing) is the subject of predicates (properties) and not the other way round.
    - This is required by the Principle of the Best
      * On the basis of His infinite understanding, infinite power and infinite goodness, God chooses (freely) to create the best of all possible worlds
  + Consequences:
    - C
  + Does the theory mean everything happens does so necessarily?
  + Is it compatible with the freedom of the will?
    - Some truths (e.g. mathematical truths) are absolutely necessary: they depend on the Law of Noncontradiction alone
    - Other are only necessary *ex hypothesi*: they depend on *God’s free decision* to actualize individuals with their particular individual notions.
    - God acts for what he *knows* to be the best. Human beings act on the basis of what they *take to be* the best.
    - A person’s actions are intelligible (thus often predictable) in the light of his or her desires/values/purposes, together with his or her beliefs about the situation. In this sense, human actions are explicable by *reasons* rather than *causes*.
    - Predictability is thus compatible with free will. If you know what someone wants, and how she assesses her situation, you can probably figure out what she will *choose* to do.
    - Leibniz sums up: in both God and humans, reasons **incline without necessitating**.
    - Leibniz takes a dim view of such subversive ideas. Since we can’t know the details of God’s grace, we must always do our best
* How does either (a) Leibniz or (b) Spinoza propose to overcome Descartes’s dualism of mind and body?
  + Leibniz:
    - There is no special problem about mind-body interaction because (a) matter isn’t ultimately real and (b) substances don’t interact *at all*.
    - To be active is to proceed from a higher degree of expression: a clearer representation of what is happening. In this sense, some things can be said to act and other to be acted upon.
    - This connects action with self-consciousness (knowing what you are doing).
    - Against materialism
      * In DM 17-22, Leibniz rejects strict materialism **even within physics** itself.
      * Cartesian mechanics conceives the material world purely in terms of matter and motion It lacks a dynamics: a theory of forces. As a result, it cannot get the conservation principles right. (DM 17.)
      * Quantity of motion must be distinguished from “force.” But force isn’t “stuff.
    - The “great mystery” of the union of soul (mind) and body is solved.
    - Strictly speaking, substances do not interact. But the human mind is closely related to the substances that compose its body.
    - Since all things are interrelated, all substances, including the human mind, correspond to the total state of the Universe. But a mind corresponds most “particularly and immediately” to the state of the body assigned to it.
    - This is because the mind relates to other bodies through their relation to its associated body.
    - The PEH solves the problem of mind-body interaction. Minds and bodies act according to their own laws. The PEH keeps them in sync.
    - Souls (minds) act according to final causes (purposes). Bodies act according to efficient causes. (Scientific laws.)
    - Descartes thought that souls could change the direction of motions without affecting their quantity. He didn’t know about conservation of direction. (Velocity as a vector quantity.)
    - Bodies acts as if there were no souls; souls as if there were no bodies; and both act as if they influenced each other.
  + Spinoza
    - Contrary to Descartes’s problematic metaphysical dualism, Spinoza argues for **substance monism**. There is (indeed can be) only one substance: the whole of Reality. Spinoza calls this substance “God.”
    - Whereas Descartes’s dualism, with its non-mechanical conception of mind, allows for human free will (only material things operate mechanically), Spinoza is a **strict determinist**. Everything that happens does so necessarily.
    - Nothing could have been or can be other than it was, is or will be.
* The purpose of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to investigate the “scope and limits” of human knowledge. What does Locke mean by “knowledge”, what sorts of knowledge does he recognise, and how does he think we get them? Give some examples of what Locke takes to be important limits to human knowledge, explaining how they are determined.
  + Knowledge: perception of agreement and disagreement between ideas
  + Sorts of knowledge and How does he think we get them
    - By degree of certainty
      * Intuitive knowledge
      * Demonstrative knowledge
      * Sensitive knowledge
    - By types
      * Identity or diversity
        + Direct comparison of ideas involved
      * Coexistence
        + Rely upon careful observations of the coincidental appearances of the secondary qualities as powers
      * Relation(mathematics and morality)
        + Demonstrative, intuitive and link
      * Real existence
        + Intuitive knowledge of own existence
        + Demonstrative knowledge of existence of god
  + Examples of limits to human knowledge
    - Powers of conception
    - The ability to grasp logical and material relations between ideas
    - Our power of deduction
    - **Locke’s key idea**. Everything we can conceive (represent), thus everything we can even potentially know, is limited by our representational capacities: i.e. by the ideas we can generate by putting our mental capacities to work on our store of simple ideas
  + How they are determined
    - Actual relations of agreement and disagreements between ideas
* Explain Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities and why he thinks that the distinction should be made. Why does Berkeley reject the distinction? What are the implications of this dispute for their conceptions of scientific knowledge?
  + Distinction
    - (quality are the power to produce ideas in our minds)
    - Primary: fundamental physical properties, according to corpuscular mechanical theory, inseparable from bodies(solidity, extension, figure, number)
    - Secondary: perceiver dependent, a disposition causing certain kind of sensation, powers to produce characteristic sensations(color, taste, smell)
    - Such power depend on primary qualities of the micro-constituents of the objects, and ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities of the objects, but ideas of secondary qualities doesn’t.
  + Why the distinction should be made
    - Corpuscular mechanical theory
  + Why does Berkeley reject the distinction
    - “draw a line”
    - Substance don’t have power vs god → you cannot make such distinction(passive) → cannot be without senses???
    - All the color, taste smell qualities etc are all mental, associated with mind(mental) → not in substance
    - KEY POINT: Berkeley has to individualize concepts
  + What are the implications for conceptions of scientific knowledge
    - Berkeley
      * Detecting regularity in our sense experience
      * “Instrumentalism”
      * Not get ultimate reality, we just find regularity and predict future experience
      * Berkeley is an important pioneer of the position in philosophy of science that today we call “instrumentalism.” According to this view, the business of science is not to speculate about unobservable entities but to systematize and predict observations by bringing them under laws (“the explication of phenomena.”)
    - Locke
      * Science is get to know the true nature, why constituents make senses
* Berkeley thinks that the very idea of material substance is contradictory: why? Does his rejection of material substance yield a satisfactory solution to Descartes’s sceptical problem about our knowledge of the external world?
  + Why
    - (Knowledge come directly from senses we feel)
    - (Key point: Everything is in imagination)
    - (Talk of of material objects is either empty or contradictory)
      * The First Horn
        + Conceive the matter in itself→ requires conceiving matter in terms of its (supposed) sensible qualities. But sensible qualities are ideas; and to attribute ideas (conscious states) to what is by definition ‘unthinking’ is a contradiction.
        + conceive it *relationally* as the cause of ideas → entails attributing activity to what is by definition passive, another contradiction
      * The second horn
        + If Hylas accepts the first horn, but still insists that there is matter, he has no conception of matter other than that of a bare entity. He cannot say what it is or how it exists. In effect, his talk of matter is completely *empty*.
      * So pick your poison: the supposed idea of matter is either contradictory or no idea at all.
    - Berkeley’s argument for immaterialism turns on three fundamental premises:-
    - (1) Ordinary things—trees, houses, everything we encounter in the world around us—are known through their sensible qualities. Indeed, ordinary objects, as sensible things, just are collections of sensible qualities.
    - (2) Sensible qualities, or properties, must be properties of something: in the jargon, they must inhere in or be supported by some substance.
    - (3) Sensible qualities are ideas: conscious mental states.
    - Matter is by definition “unthinking”: i.e. incapable of being in conscious states.
    - The idea that sensible qualities inhere in (are states or properties of) material substance is **contradiction**.
    - Both cold and hot → contradiction
    - Sound as motion, but cannot be heard
    - Color
    - It is true that, in some way, the things I perceive do not depend for their existence on *my* mind.
    - But this does not entail that they exist independently of *all* minds
  + Discussion
    - Once we get rid of the dualism of mind and matter, we also get rid of the conception of truth as correspondence between ideas and material things
    - Immaterialism is thus an *escape* from metaphysics. Surprisingly, it returns us to common sense
    - He is addressing this problem by tweaking terms of existence. In his view, existence is defined as existing in mind, no matter whose mind is. This is an avoidance. Uses God to account for existence in mind. Didn’t justify passivity argument that it relies on. Didn’t address why matter is passive, how do you know senses are only in the mind if you don’t know material substances? (If substance is passive, you cannot perceive it, you don’t have idea of it, it can BOTH in god’s mind and as a material object)
* Why does Hume deny that inferences from the observed to the unobserved are guided by “Reason”? Why does he think of this denial as skeptical? What is his “sceptical” solution to his own sceptical doubts? In what sense is it sceptical? In what way is it a solution?
  + Why does hume deny “reason”
    - 1a. Rationalists’ concepts of reason is a source of a priori knowledge
      * Provide insight into propositions
      * Provide insight into relations and logical entailment
    - 1b. Hume: in no case is knowledge of causal relations attained from reasons, but depends entirely on experience
    - 2a. The feeling that certain causal relations “is just familiarity of disguise”
    - 2b. The more it appears, the less we are aware of it.
    - 3a. Two events that are believed to be causally related are actually independent
    - 3b. Anything could be imagined to follow with no contradiction
  + Why skeptical
    - We cannot justify to use past evidence to tell what happens next
      * No such argument
      * No epistemic judgement for such argument
    - Maybe Hume agrees with Locke in that we don’t have knowledge of unobservable microstructure
    - Maybe he takes contingency all the way down
  + What’s his skeptical solution
    - Theoretical argument has no effect on our actual use of inductive inference. Theoretical skepticism(a procedure to form belief and justify them) does not lead to practical skepticism(rational)
  + In what sense is it skeptical
    - Because it is guided by some other non-rational principle, which is habit or custom
  + In this way it is a solution
    - Treats probability a degree of belief
    - We cannot do otherwise
* According to Hume, what does the cause-effect relationship consist in and what sense can we make of concepts like “power” and “necessary connection”? Explain the implications of Hume’s view of causation, as he understands them, for the problem of free will versus determinism.
  + Cause-effect relationship consists:
  + In what sense:
  + Implication for the problem of free will vs determinism:
* “A miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion.” Explain and evaluate Hume’s reasons for making this claim.
  + Reason1: Since various religions reject each other’s miracles
    - Eval1
  + Reason2: we should accept a miracle report only if the falsity of the testimony is even more improbable than the occurrence of the miraculous event.
    - Eval2
  + Reason3: causal reasoning is far from the only psychological influence on belief, People who traffic in miracle-reports generally have an interest in convincing themselves and others of their truth: belief is strongly influenced by bias
    - Eval3
* Kant asks “How is pure mathematics possible?” What, according to Kant, is so problematic about mathematics that the question of its possibility needs to be answered? What is Kant’s is the question to be answer?
  + What is problematic
    - A priori necessarily true
    - Observation only yields knowledge of how things are but not must be
    - How can synthetic a priori judgement possible(not possible), mathematics like this but not trivial
    - How can we get things out of it
  + His answer:
    - Mathematics judgements, in arithmetic and geometry are like this
    - Synthetic, and a priori(is possible)
* Kant claims to have answered Hume’s skepticism about causal reasoning. How does he understand Hume’s skepticism. Has he answered it? If so, how. If not, why not?
  + How does he understand skepticism
  + Has he answered
    - how/why

Error

Hume: cannot say about triviality

General idea from section

* Cartesian doubt
  + Methodological
    - Hypothetical doubt
    - Universal doubt
    - Base on a foundation that is indubitable
  + Aim: Use doubt to find things that are indubitable
  + Put all beliefs, ideas, matters in doubt, avoid believing in things that are not completely certain →
  + Doubt → no certain → no knowledge
  + Dream argument: We cannot be sure what we experience/sense is actually real
* Descartes’ criterion: clear and distinct, this may be doubted → objection, but clear contains “beyond doubt”, how may clear thing (2+2=4) be doubted
* --- Meditation 4: why do we still make errors, this is because our faculty cannot distinguish, will drags us
* Should Descartes deny the existence of God? No. If he were the product of chance, he would have even less reason to suppose himself capable of certain knowledge. Note the absence in the seventeenth century of an evolutionary perspective. But could adaptation account or metaphysical certainty???
* Last two pages of Descartes 1???
* Lei’s principles?
* Again, epistemological argumentation furthers an analytical project. Descartes analyzes his prior conception of “sensation” into two logically distinct components: conscious experience and its physiological basis.
* Why Descartes’s old way of thinking is confused???
* How does Descartes answer imagination problem?
* Why the distinction should be made?
* Berkeley thinks of ideas a mental pictures. For him, all thinking involves what Descartes calls ‘imagination’. This argument wouldn’t worry Descartes. But it is a genuine problem for Locke, why?
* Locke, too general?
* What are complex ideas? Conceptual glue
* The distinction of R and E: no innate ideas, Empircists: thought is pictured, just imagination, they also have problem with pure math. But B is necessitist
* Hume’s power, something about the microstructure of the shirt that makes you sense it is red
* negative aim: undermine as Hume did

Slides:

* Intro
  + A prior: prior to experience
  + Metaphysics
    - Mind-Body problem
    - Determinism vs free will
  + Epistemology
  + Theology
    - Role of God
  + Skepticism
    - Rationalists skeptical about empirical knowledge
    - Empiricists skeptical about a priori knowledge
  + Problem
    - What we sense are not actually themselves
* Descartes (skepts in order to find certainty)
  + Meaningful
    - He discovers (or perhaps invents) a brand new skeptical problem: the problem (in its fully general form) of our knowledge of the external world
    - The argumentative path that goes through this problem sets much of the agenda and puts in place the intellectual framework of the philosophy that comes after Descartes
  + Meditation
    - Goal: to clear way for new mathematical physics, implicitly undermine Scholasticism
    - Tasks:
      * Metaphysical: clarify distinction between mind and body
      * Epistemological: bring out the role of reason and innate ideas as basic source of knowledge (against Aristotle’s perceptual experience)
    - Two phases:
      * Destructive: general doubt, progressive
      * Constructive: reinstate what were called in question
      * Result: reestablish world picture
  + Ancient learning’s problem:
    - Relying too much on logic
    - Dominated by common sense and overly generalizing(从外vs从内)
  + Skepticism as method:
    - Philosophical skepticism is distinguished from methodological skepticism in that philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certainty in knowledge, whereas methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims
  + D’s revolution:
    - If an argument resists skeptical attack, it must be absolutely certain
    - How it comes to be known as certain and what it contains(cannot logically imply anything uncertain)
  + D’s condition:
    - Knowledge is absolute certainty + Uneliminated possibility raises the bar of assent
    - A criterion
  + General Doubt:
    - Error → madness → dream argument → theological question
  + Science:
    - Astronomy is in doubt but math and physics are not
  + Note: Descartes still takes for granted in the 1st med that certainty comes through senses
  + God:
    - Good nature
  + The human mind is more certain and better understood than the body
  + Cogito
    - First use of skepticism as a filter of certainty
    - It is a single intrinsically indubitable proposition
    - Established without presupposing a criterion
  + What am I:
    - I exist refers to an object
    - Body: contrast to brute matter
    - A thinking thing(involves thought with consciousness)
  + Skepticism as a tool:
    - 1. As a filter of certainty 2. As an instrument of analysis
    - Thinking thing does not imply embodiment: First use of skepticism as a tool for how things should be understood
    - Cogito: First use of skepticism as a filter of certainty
  + Imagination
    - How can I be understood(not imaginable)?
    - How does imagination deal with understanding?
  + Body
    - Essential and accidental property, what is essential to body?
    - As an extended thing, no imaginative concept
  + Distinguish conceptual understanding from imagination, perceived by mind alone
  + Summary:
    - Metaphysics: two basic categories of existence: mind characterized by thought(consciousness) and body by extension(spatiality) ← has not established real distinction
    - Epistemology: Knowledge and understanding are grounded by reason than senses ← hasn’t solved demon doubt and reason
* Leibniz
  + Pre established harmony
* Spinoza
* Locke(Skeptic)
  + The essay
* Berkeley(Not skeptic)
  + No material objects
  + The dialogue
* Hume
  + “Enquiry”
  + Copy principle: ideas ⇔ copy of impression
  + Impression are not only experiential source of concepts but also observational basis of beliefs
  + Association: similarity, continuity, cause and effect
  + Judgements: relation of ideas and matters of facts
    - Relation of ideas ⇔ analytic ⇔ a priori
      * (depends only on the meaning)
      * (needs initial experience)
* Kant
  + **Analytic(al)** judgments are merely explicative: the concept expressed by the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject: e.g. “All bodies are extended.” Their “principle” (i.e. what determines their truth or falsity) is the principle of non-contradiction.
  + Why “analytic”? Because the truth of an analytic judgment can be determined **by conceptual analysis**: making its meaning explicit
  + Analytic judgments are opposed to **syntheti**c. In a synthetic judgment, the predicate “adds something” to the concept of the subject.
  + Why “synthetic”? Because such judgment involves putting things together (*synthesis*) rather than extracting something already present (*analysis*).
  + All judgments of experience (judgments of how things are in the world) are synthetic
  + H and K debate over analytic and synthetic