

Lahore University of Management Sciences

ECON 233 - Introduction to Game Theory

Instructor	Lyyla Khalid
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Course URL (if any)	

Course Teaching Methodology

- Teaching Methodology: In person
- Lecture details: Slides used in class will be shared with students. There will be a break midway into the session.

Course Basics				
Credit Hours	4			
Lecture(s)	Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week	2	Duration	100 minutes
Recitation/Lab (per week)	Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week		Duration	
Tutorial (per week)	Nbr of Lec(s) Per Week		Duration	

Course Distribution		
Core	No	
Elective	Elective	
Open for Student Category	Sophomore, Juniors and Seniors	
Close for Student Category	Freshman	

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course description can only be updated through dean's office.

COURSE PREREQUISITE(S)

- Statistics and Data Analysis
- The course assumes some familiarity with calculus and basic optimization.
- But most importantly, what is needed is willingness to engage with the material and the ability to do and sustain sophisticated thinking.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

- This course is an undergraduate level introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. It introduces the theory of non-
- cooperative games with emphasis on economic applications. Game theory is the study of multi-person decision problems where
- action of each decision maker (player) influences payoffs of others. In such environments, optimal decision may require strategic thinking; how one's action will influence the incentives of other players and whether others are aware of this interconnection. By the end of the course the students should be familiar with the basic tools used for modeling game theoretic situations and they should be able to structure, model and solve basic everyday strategic interactions.

Learning Outcomes



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At the end of the course, students should be able to formulate any strategic interaction as a game form,

Torritate any strategic interaction as a game form,

understand solution concepts in normal and extensive form games, and
 develop analytical and problem-solving skills to analyze games

Recognize and solve games of complete and incomplete information

Grading break up: Component Details and weightages

Quiz(s): 3 Quizzes = 50%- No quiz will be dropped

Attendance: 2%
Presentation = 3%
Final Examination = 45%

No weight of the following components:

Class Participation Midterm

Important:

If you miss a quiz, you will be awarded your average for that quiz, provided you have a valid OSA approved petition. In case you do not have an OSA approved petition, you will not be accommodated. This policy will hold to maintain class discipline. I strongly urge you to contact OSA as soon as possible if you miss an instrument.

Once the marks for a quiz are in, you will have THREE working days to contest the quiz if you wish to. After that the marks for the quiz will be sealed for the semester. We will NOT make exceptions to this.

Examination De	tail
Midterm Exam	Yes/No: No Combine Separate: Not Applicable Duration: Not Applicable Preferred Date: Not Applicable Exam Specifications: None
Final Exam	Yes/No: Yes Combine Separate: TBA Duration: 2.5 hrs Exam Specifications: Closed book Closed notes

OURSE OVERVIEW					
Module	Topics	Recommended	Objectives/		
	Topics	Readings	Application		
1.	The Basics of Game Theory	Watson Ch. 1			
2.			Modeling situations in a game		
	Concepts and Techniques	Watson Ch. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11	Theoretic framework. Understanding		
	 Static games 		the tools and language of Game		
	 Normal and Extensive Forms 		Theory.		
	 Dominance and Iterated Dominance 				
	 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium 				
	Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium				



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3.	Dynamic Games Revisiting Strategies and Extensive Forms Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection	Watson Ch. 14, 15	Learning to solve sequential games using tree diagrams, backward induction and the concept of subgame perfection.
4	 Applications Auctions: First and Second Price Auctions Hoteling's Model of Electoral Competition War of Attrition Cournot Duopoly Model- Cournot Nash equilibrium, Cartel solution, the Stackelberg model and Bertrand Pricing 	Handout- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. OUP Handout- Dutta, Prajit (1999) Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. MIT Press	
5	Repeated Games	Watson Ch 22, 23 Handout- Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. OUP Handout- Dutta, Prajit (1999) Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. MIT Press	
6	Bayesian Games	Watson Ch 24,26 Handouts	

Textbook(s)/Supplementary Readings

Main text: Watson, Joel. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. Third Edition. W.W. Norton & Company.

Additional Texts:

- 1) Dutta, Prajit (1999) Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. MIT Press
- 2) Osborne, Martin J. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. OUP
- 3) Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr. Games of Strategy.

All of these texts are in our library. There are a number of other introductory game theory texts too. Each text will have a bit of notational variation, but each of them covers the basic topics we will be covering.

Lecture Slides: My PowerPoint lecture slides will be available to all whenever used in class.