

UNIT-4

FAULT TOLERANCE IN RELIABILITY OF DS

Byzantine Agreement / Consensus Problem:-

Faults in D.S:-


Communication fault

processor fault

Malicious fault (processor intentionally puts in a fault - Ex: Byzantine)

Ex:-

If someone changes the command from one to 0, it is a malicious fault.



The command is not signed, thus it may lead to a problem.


Assume P_4 as a Faulty processor, sometimes it changes 1 to 0 & other times correctly as 1.

to overcome the problem:-

processes exchange msgs. among each other.

when we aggregate the data P_2 would have $(1, 1, 0)$, $P_3(1, 1, 0)$ and $P_4(1, 1, 1)$.
 P_2 can take ^{value} majority & take the decision.

Ex:-



$(1, 0, 0)$

(Also called ARBITRARY FAILURE)

P_3 & P_4 are faulty. at a time.
 P_2 action leads to taking '0' on value majority, which is wrong.
 we cannot take consensus if the no. of faulty processors is 50%.
 we have a condition:-

$$n \geq 3f + 1$$

where f = no. of faulty processor


The system breaks if failed at this condition

$n \geq f + 2$

If n becomes very ~~low~~ high, it becomes hard for survival.

If the source is faulty, sustainability is difficult.

Ex:-



$M=3$

Thus f should be

zero.

The system becomes indecessive. Atleast the system should have totally 4 processors.

If the system is asynchronous, the agreement does not hold.

This has been identified by Manya Liskov. and a different algo should be used.


Properly following the leader is \propto to prove correctness.

limitation :-


- ① Value majority changes ~~the~~ if P is an asynchronous process & no proper result
- ② The system breaks if $n \geq 3f+1$ condition is not met
- ③ If the source is faulty, it is not possible to maintain sustainability

these conditions are called livelocks.

SYNC CHECKPOINTING (optimized version):




unwanted checkpoints are not Recorded in this algo. \Rightarrow Motivation




$LR_Y^X \Rightarrow$ last message received from X
 $LR_Y^X : 2$
 $FS_Y^X : 1$
 $LR_X^Y : 1$
 $FS_X^Y : 1$
 (First msg)

Application of Byzantine Agreement / consensus :-
Block chain technology (since it requires trust)


FOULURE'S :-



So affects performance
(no. of sends \neq no. of receiver
& msgs are sent but not delivered)
These are lost msgs. that does not affect consistency but degrades the performance. These msgs. are always in transit according to the system.



(sender crashes after sending msg 1, so send is erased)
These are orphan messages
(only rec is recorded, so in case of S1 & S2 rolls back)



roll back to prev snapshot \rightarrow msg of m12 is erased, but rec is recorded so S2 becomes orphaned
S2 rolls back
S2 sends m23 to S3
This msg becomes orphan msg. S3 rolls back
only receive is recorded, no send.

LD DOMINO'S EFFECT.
(cause of one affects another & goes on - chaining effect)
& cascading effect)

Initiator takes snapshot of checkpoint.
 Initiator does not broadcast the marker,
 instead he sends it only to
 the cohorts.


$$\text{Cohort}_x = \{ y \mid LR_x \prec y \}$$

(y will be part of x, only if y has
 messaged x)

y checkpoints only if this condition is
 true :-

$$LR_x \prec y = FS_y \prec x > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad FS_y \prec x > 0$$

ex:-



A starts algo. (only if there is a change
 in state of A)

(2 phase algo, first temporarily record the tentative ckpts.)
(does not worry abt topology)

A sends marker only to B and B checks for the condition to checkpoint

$$LR_A^B \geq FS_A^A \text{ \& \& } FS_B^A > 0$$

$$2 \geq 1 \text{ \& \& } FS \rightarrow 0 > 0 \quad \checkmark$$

B takes tentative checkpoint

C is a cohort of B, so it sends marker to C.

$$LR_B^C \geq FS_C^B \text{ \& \& } FS_C^B > 0$$

$$1 \geq 1 \text{ \& \& } 1 > 0 \quad \checkmark$$

C takes checkpoint tentatively

A is a cohort of C and sends the marker.

$$LR_C^A \geq FS_A^C \text{ \& \& } FS_A^C > 0$$

$$1 \geq 0 \text{ \& \& } 0 > 0 \quad \times$$


(consider msgs. only after the tentative checkpoints).

A does not take any tentative checkpoint again


A should give Act to C.

No new checkpoints at D.

Ex 1-



①



Algo :

if A starts the Algo by taking the checkpoint.

At X after taking checkpoint :-

① I identify cohorts of X

② for each cohort Y_i

X shares $LR_X \leftarrow Y$ with Y_i .

Algo

At y :-
 $\frac{y}{x} \quad LR_x^y \rightarrow FS_y \rightarrow x \quad \&\& \quad FS_y \rightarrow x > 0$
 then checkpoint at y
 y behaves as x

Algo

Explanation of sum:-

(i) At A :-

$$coh_A = \{B\}$$

$$LR_A^B = 2 \quad (\text{shared with } B)$$

(ii) At B :-

$$\text{check } LR_A^B \geq FS_B^A \quad \&\& \quad FS_B^A > 0$$

$$2 \geq 1 \quad \&\& \quad 1 > 0$$

True ☒

\therefore B checkpoints.

$$coh_B = \{C\}$$

$$LR_B^C = 1 \quad (\text{shared with } C)$$

(iii) At C :-

$$\text{check } LR_B^C \geq FS_C^B \quad \&\& \quad FS_C^B > 0$$

$$1 \geq 1 \quad \&\& \quad 1 > 0$$

True ☒

\therefore C checkpoints

$$coh_C = \{A\}$$

$$LR_C^A = 1 \quad (\text{shared with } A)$$

(iv) At A :-

check $LR_C^A \geq FS_A^C$ and $FS_A^C \geq 0$

$1 \geq 0$ & $0 > 0$ [since no msg sent after the tentative checkpoint]
False [X]


∴ A does not checkpoint. checkpoint

A just acknowledges C that job is done by sending reply msg.

In turn C sends Reply to B & B sends it to A.

Taking the permanent checkpoints, D does not have to take a new checkpoint and consistency does not change.

②



(i) At A :-

$Con A = \{B\}$

get ACK from immediate
receives while Backtracking

no cohorts \rightarrow termination \rightarrow
can send ACK

$$LR \downarrow_A^B = 2 \quad (\text{shared with } B)$$

(ii) At B :-

$$LR \downarrow_A^B \geq FS_B \rightarrow A \quad \&\& \quad FS_B \rightarrow A > 0$$

$$2 \geq 1 \quad \&\& \quad 1 > 0$$

True ☒

⊖ B checkpoints \rightarrow already took T.O.S
coh B = {C3, A3}

$$LR \downarrow_B^C = 1 \quad (\text{shared with } C)$$

$$LR_B \downarrow^A = 1 \quad (\text{shared with } A)$$

(iii) At C :-

$$LR \downarrow_B^C \geq FS_C \rightarrow B \quad \&\& \quad FS_C \rightarrow B > 0$$

$$1 \geq 1 \quad \&\& \quad 1 > 0$$

True ☒

⊖ C checkpoints

$$coh C = 1-3$$

⊖ C sends ACK to B

(iv) At A :-

$$LR \downarrow_B^A \geq FS_A \rightarrow B \quad \&\& \quad FS_A \rightarrow B > 0$$

$$1 \geq 0 \quad \&\& \quad 0 > 0 \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{since no} \\ \text{msg after} \\ \text{tentative ckpts} \end{array} \right]$$

False ☐

⊖ A does not checkpoint

but sends an ack Reply to B.

Finally permanent checkpoints are recorded.

True ☒

☹️ B checkpoints
 $coh_B = \{A\}$

☹️ B sends ACK to D.
 $LR_{B \leftarrow A} = 1$ (shared with A)

(IV) At C :-

$LR_{D \leftarrow C} \geq FS_C \uparrow^D \&\& FS_C \uparrow^D > 0$
 $1 \geq 1 \&\& 1 > 0$

True ☒

☹️ C checkpoints

$coh_C = \{A, B\}$

☹️ C sends ACK to D

(V) At A :-

$LR_{B \leftarrow A} \geq FS_A \uparrow^B \&\& FS_A \uparrow^B > 0$
 $1 \geq 0 \&\& 0 > 0$

False ☐

False ☒

☹️ A does not checkpoint & sends ACK to B which in turn sends to D.

thus, permanent checkpoints are taken

⑤ $2 > 0$ (true) . . Thus B Recovers to the previous consistent checkpoint.

Now B has to check if it creates any dominoes effect. Thus, it sends alert msg to all of its outgoing channels (C & D).

At C:-

$$LR_C \xleftarrow{B} > LS_B \xrightarrow{C}$$
$$1 > 0 \quad (\text{True})$$

⑥ C should also Recover. & B creates a dominoes effect.

At D:-

$$LR_D \xleftarrow{B} > LS_B \xrightarrow{D}$$
$$0 > 0 \quad (\text{False})$$

⑦ D does not have to Rollback.


At C:-

$$LR_C \xleftarrow{D} > LS_C \xrightarrow{D}$$
$$0 > 0 \quad (\text{False})$$


⑧ D does not have to Rollback

The msg. cd is always in transit, but does not affect the performance.

⑤



topology :-



Soln:-

(i) At A :-

Crash, thus Rollback & alert to B, C.


(ii) At B :-

$$LR_B^A > LS_B^A \quad (False)$$


∴ B does not Rollback.

(iii) At C :-

SYNC RECOVERY



Topology :-



Explanation :-

There is a crash in A, so it Rollbacks to its previous checkpoint & ab1 & ab2 becomes orphan msg's. Now B is req'd. to Rollback. B can know about the crash either by
 1. A can voluntarily send msg to B. But if it is not able to ^{after recovery} Recover, A sends alerts all other system to check for consistency.

B checks the condition :- $LR_B^A > LS_A^B$
 C B has to Recover, if this is true in order to detect inconsistent msg's.)

$$LR_C^A > LS_A^C$$

$$2 > 1 \quad (\text{True})$$

⊙ C RollBack and alerts B.

(iv) At B :-

$$LR_B^C > LS_C^B$$

$$1 > 0 \quad (\text{True})$$

⊙ B RollBack & alerts D.

(v) At D :-


$$LR_D^B > LS_B^D$$

$$0 > 0 \quad (\text{False})$$

⊙ D does not Rollback.

Message dc1 is in transit. But does not affect consistency.

↓ (synchronous checkpointing)



sent $A \rightarrow C = 0$

rec $C \leftarrow A = 1$

rec $C \leftarrow A >$ sent $A \rightarrow C$

② C rollback.

Dp systems - 5th unit

Routing
Architecture

Lampert's Bakery

Algo - 5th unit

Now checking for B, C, it seems correct.
So they are the final consistent rollbacks.


(Processes are not connected logically)

1/1

ASYNCHRONOUS RECOVERY.

Any process can take checkpoint without informing other process.

No specific algorithms and they are uncoordinated.



At A :- After A crashes, it rolls back and sends Broadcast msg. to make other process know how many msg. it has sent.

Everyone should send back how many no. of msg. they have sent back to A.

At B :-

sent $A \rightarrow B = 1$

rec $B \leftarrow A = 2$.

If $\boxed{\text{rec } B \leftarrow A > \text{sent } A \rightarrow B}$, then Rollback

Cannot Rollback to prev. ckpt, the checkpoints are not coordinated.

It should satisfy the condition $\boxed{\text{sent } A \rightarrow B = \text{rec } B \leftarrow A}$, \rightarrow then it is a rollback point.

At C :-