

Safety Assurance in Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Saber Jafarpour



University of Colorado **Boulder**

March 5, 2024

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

Introduction

Energy/power systems



Air mobility



Autonomous driving



Manufacturing



Transportation systems



Agriculture

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

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Energy/power systems



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Transportation systems




Agriculture

An important goal (Safe Autonomy)

Perform their tasks while ensuring **safety** and **robustness** of the system.

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

Abstraction



An important goal (Safe Autonomy)


Perform their tasks while ensuring **safety** and **robustness** of the system.

Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

Challenges for Safe Autonomy

Challenges for ensuring **safety** in autonomous systems:

- ① large number of agents
- ② complex and highly nonlinear components
- ③ uncertain environment with unmodeled dynamics




Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

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


Safety-critical Autonomous Systems

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My Research

Different aspect of autonomy with safety and robustness considerations

Tools: Systems and Control (dynamical systems, optimization theory)

Research summary

My past and current research

Large-scale systems

- threshold of frequency synchronization ([TAC 2020, SICON 2019](#))
- multi-stability via partitioning the state-space ([SIAM Review 2021, Nature Com 2022](#))
- dynamic stability of low-inertia power grids ([TCNS 2019](#))

Nonlinear systems

- weak and semi-contraction theory ([TAC 2021](#))
- non-Euclidean contraction theory ([TAC 2022, TAC 2023](#))
- small time local controllability ([SICON 2020](#))

Optimization-based systems

- time-varying optimization ([TAC 2021](#))
- non-Euclidean monotone operator theory ([CDC 2022](#))

Learning-enabled systems

- contraction-based reachability of neural networks ([NeurIPS 2021, L4DC 2022](#))
- interval-based reachability of neural networks ([L4DC 2023, ADHS 2024](#))
- safety verification of neural feedback loops ([submitted 2023](#))

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

In this talk: Autonomous Systems with Learning-enabled components

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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Machine learning was one of the deriving forces for developments

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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In this talk: Autonomous Systems with Learning-enabled components

Machine learning was one of the deriving forces for developments

- availability of data and computation tools
- performance and efficiency

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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Success stories and potential applications



NVIDIA self driving car



Amazon fulfillment centers



Manufacturing

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

But can we ensure their safety?



Tesla Slams Right Into Overturned Truck While on Autopilot



Robot accident at Amazon warehouse renews safety debate

Waymo driverless car strikes bicyclist in San Francisco, causes minor injuries



Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

But can we ensure their safety?

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance



Video courtesy of Dr. Taylor Johnson at CS department of the Vanderbilt University

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

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


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What is different with Learning-based components?



Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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- limited guarantee in their design



Image credit: MIT CSAIL

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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- limited guarantee in their design

MIT
Technology
Review

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The way we train AI is fundamentally flawed

The process used to build most of the machine-learning models we use today can't tell if they will work in the real world or not—and that's a problem.

By Will Douglas Heaven

November 18, 2020

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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


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- limited guarantee in their design
- large # of parameters with nonlinearity



$478 \times 100 \times 100 \times 10$

of parameters ~ 90000
of activation patterns $\sim 10^{60}$

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

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
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Rigorous and computationally efficient methods for safety assurance

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety in Machine Learning


ML focus on safety and robustness of **stand-alone** learning algorithms



Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety in Machine Learning

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
Different approaches:

- analysis (Goodfellow et al., 2015, Zhang et al., 2019, Fazlyab et al., 2023)
- design (Papernot et al., 2016, Carlini and Wagner, 2017, Madry et al., 2018)

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety in Machine Learning

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
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(controller, motion planner, obstacle detection)

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
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New challenges arise when learning algorithms are used **in-the-loop**


Example: Safety in Mobile Robots

In-the-loop vs. stand-alone

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance



In-the-loop




trained offline using images

Stand-alone


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
Stand-alone

- **stand-alone:** estimation of states using learning algorithm
- **in-the-loop:** closed-loop system avoid the obstacle

Example: Safety in Mobile Robots

In-the-loop vs. stand-alone

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance



- **stand-alone:** estimation of states using learning algorithm
- **in-the-loop:** closed-loop system avoid the obstacle

In-the-loop: how the autonomous system perform with the learning algorithm as a part of it.

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

Ensure safety of the autonomous system with learning algorithms **in-the-loop**

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

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
Safety of autonomous system using **reachability analysis**

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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
Reachability analysis estimates the evolution of the autonomous system

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety from a reachability perspective

Ensure safety of the autonomous system with learning algorithms **in-the-loop**

Safety of autonomous system using **reachability analysis**



Reachability analysis estimates the evolution of the autonomous system

In this talk:

- ① control-theoretic tools for efficient and scalable reachability
- ② applications to safety assurance of learning-enabled systems

- Reachability Analysis
- Neural Network Controlled Systems
- Future Research Directions



Reachability Analysis of Systems

Problem Statement

System : $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$

State : $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$

Uncertainty : $w \in \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$



What are the possible states of the system at time T ?


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What are the possible states of the system at time T ?

- **T -reachable sets** characterize evolution of the system

$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) = \{x_w(T) \mid x_w(\cdot) \text{ is a traj for some } w(\cdot) \in \mathcal{W} \text{ with } x_0 \in \mathcal{X}_0\}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Safety verification via T -reachable sets


A large number of **safety specifications** can be represented using T -reachable sets

Reachability Analysis of Systems


Safety verification via T -reachable sets

A large number of **safety specifications** can be represented using T -reachable sets

- Example: Reach-avoid problem



$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \cap \text{Unsafe set} = \emptyset$$




$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\text{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \text{Target set}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems


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$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\text{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \text{Target set}$$

Combining different instantiation of Reach-avoid problem \implies
diverse range of specifications
(complex planning using logics, invariance, stability)

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Why is it difficult?

Computing the T -reachable sets are computationally challenging

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Solution: over-approximations of reachable sets

Over-approximation: $\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W})$


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
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


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

Applications

Autonomous Driving:




Althoff, 2014

Power grids:





Chen and Domínguez-García, 2016

Robot-assisted Surgery:



Drug Delivery:



Chen, Dutta, and Sankaranarayanan, 2017

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Literature review

Reachability of dynamical system is an old problem: ~ 1980

Reachability Analysis of Systems

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Reachability of dynamical system is an old problem: ~ 1980

Different approaches for approximating reachable sets

- Linear, and piecewise linear systems (Ellipsoidal methods) ([Kurzhanski and Varaiya, 2000](#))
- Optimization-based approaches (Hamilton-Jacobi, Level-set method) ([Bansal et al., 2017](#), [Mitchell et al., 2002](#), [Herbert et al., 2021](#))
- Matrix measure-based ([Fan et al., 2018](#), [Maidens and Arcak, 2015](#))

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In this talk: use control-theoretic tools to develop scalable and computationally efficient approaches for reachability

Approach #1: Contraction Theory

A framework for stability analysis

$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is contracting wrt $\|\cdot\|$ with rate c if
the dist between every two traj is decreasing/increasing with exp rate c wrt $\|\cdot\|$


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Applications

- convergence to reference trajectories
- efficient equilibrium point computation
- input-output robustness
- entrainment to periodic orbits




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In this talk: contraction theory for reachability analysis

Approach #1: Contraction Theory and Matrix Measures

Characterization

How to characterize contractivity using vector fields?

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Characterization

How to characterize contractivity using vector fields?

Matrix measure

Given a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ and a norm $\|\cdot\|$:

$$\mu_{\|\cdot\|}(A) := \lim_{h \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\|I_n + hA\| - 1}{h}$$

- Directional derivative of norm $\|\cdot\|$ in direction of A ,
- **In the literature:** one-sided Lipschitz constant, logarithmic norm

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Closed-form expressions:

$$\mu_2(A) = \frac{1}{2}\lambda_{\max}(A + A^\top)$$

$$\mu_1(A) = \max_j (a_{jj} + \sum_{i \neq j} |a_{ij}|)$$

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$$\mu_{\|\cdot\|}\left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w)\right) \leq c, \quad \text{for all } x, w$$

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- Efficient methods to find minimum c (Aylward et al., 2006, Giesl et al. 2023)

Approach #1: Contraction-based Reachability

Input-to-state stability

Assume $\mu_{\|\cdot\|} \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w) \right) \leq c$ and $\left\| \frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x, w) \right\| \leq \ell$ for almost every x, u .

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$$\|x(t) - x^*(t)\| \leq e^{ct} \|x(0) - x^*(0)\| + \frac{\ell}{c} (e^{ct} - 1) \sup_{\tau \in [0, t]} \|w(\tau) - w^*\|$$

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Approach #1: Contraction-based Reachability

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
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Theorem¹

If $\mathcal{X}_0 = B_{\|\cdot\|}(r_1, x_0^*)$ and $\mathcal{W} = B_{\|\cdot\|}(r_2, w^*)$, then

$$\mathcal{R}_f(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq B_{\|\cdot\|}(e^{ct}r_1 + \frac{\ell}{c}(e^{ct} - 1)r_2, x^*(t))$$

where $x^*(\cdot)$ is the solution of $\dot{x} = f(x, w^*)$ with $x(0) = x_0^*$.



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
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(Computationally efficient): only need estimates of c and ℓ

(Scalable): efficient methods for computing c and ℓ for large-scale systems

¹A. Davydov and SJ and F.Bullo, IEEE TAC, 2022.

Approach #2: Mixed Monotone Theory

Stability using Monotonicity

- **Key idea:** embed the dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^n into a dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^{2n}
- Assume $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

Embedding system

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\underline{x}} &= \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w}), \\ \dot{\bar{x}} &= \bar{d}(x, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})\end{aligned}$$

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\underline{d}, \bar{d} are **decomposition functions** s.t.

- ① $f(x, w) = \underline{d}(x, x, w, w)$ for every x, w
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Embedding system is monotone (order preserving):

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{x}_i \uparrow &\implies \bar{x}_j \downarrow \text{ and } \underline{x}_j \uparrow \quad \text{for all } j \\ \underline{x}_i \downarrow &\implies \bar{x}_j \uparrow \text{ and } \underline{x}_j \downarrow \quad \text{for all } j\end{aligned}$$

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Every system has at least one decomposition function

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In this talk: we use mixed monotone theory for reachability analysis

Approach #2: Interval-based Reachability


Embedding Systems

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Assume $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ and

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Then $\mathcal{R}_f(t, \mathcal{X}_0) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$



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
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a single trajectory of embedding system provides **lower bound** (\underline{x}) and **upper bound** (\bar{x}) for the trajectories of the original system.

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
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a single trajectory of embedding system provides **lower bound** (\underline{x}) and **upper bound** (\bar{x}) for the trajectories of the original system.

(Computational efficient): solve for one trajectory of embedding system

(Scalable): embedding system is $2n$ -dimensional

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Approach #2: Interval-based Reachability

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

Approach #2: Interval-based Reachability

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

- Assume $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is scalar:

Mean-value Inequality

$$f(\underline{x}) + \underbrace{\left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- (\bar{x} - \underline{x})}_{d(\underline{x}, \bar{x})} \leq f(x) \leq f(\underline{x}) + \underbrace{\left[\max_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^+ (\bar{x} - \underline{x})}_{\bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x})}$$

where $[A]^+ = \max\{A, 0\}$ and $[A]^-=\min\{A, 0\}$.

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
Theorem³

Jacobian-based: $\dot{x} = f(x, u)$ such that $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \in [\underline{J}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \bar{J}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}$ and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial u} \in [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}, \bar{J}_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}$, then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{d(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u})}{d(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u})} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{M}]^- & [\underline{M}]^- \\ -[\bar{M}]^+ & [\bar{M}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{N}]^- & [\underline{N}]^- \\ -[\bar{N}]^+ & [\bar{N}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{u} \\ \bar{u} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} f(\underline{x}, \underline{u}) \\ f(\bar{x}, \bar{u}) \end{bmatrix}$$

$\underline{x} \mapsto R_1 \mapsto R_2 \mapsto \dots \mapsto R_n \mapsto \bar{x}$, then the i -th column of \underline{M} is $\min_{z \in R_i, w \in [\underline{u}, \bar{u}]} \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial x}(z, w)$

- Interval analysis for computing Jacobian bounds.
- immrax: Toolbox that implements interval analysis in JAX.



³SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, L4DC, 2023

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- Reachability Analysis
- Neural Network Controlled Systems
- Future Research Directions

Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems


Introduction

- **In this part:** Learning-based component as a controller

Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems

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
Learning-based Controllers in Autonomous Systems

Introduction


- In this part: Learning-based component as a controller

Issues with traditional controllers:

- ① computationally burdensome
- ② interaction with human
- ③ complicated representation



Self driving vehicles:




M. Bojarski, et al., NeurIPS, 2016.

Robotic motion planning:



M. Everett, et. al., IROS, 2018.

Collision avoidance:



K. Julian, et. al., DASC, 2016.

Analysis of Learning-based Controllers

Safety Verification



Safety of learning-enabled autonomous systems **cannot be completely ensured** at the design level⁴

⁴Institute for Defense Analysis, The Status of Test, Evaluation, Verification, and Validation of Autonomous Systems, 2018

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



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

Design a mechanism that can do **run-time** safety verification

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Analysis of Learning-based Controllers

Safety Verification

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Design a mechanism that can do **run-time** safety verification

Our approach: reachable set over-approximations for some time in future.

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Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems


Problem Statement

An open-loop nonlinear system with a neural network controller

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x} &= f(x, u, w), \\ u &= N(x),\end{aligned}$$

safety of the closed-loop system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w) := f^c(x, w)$$



Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems


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$u = N(x)$ is **pre-trained** feed-forward neural network with k -layer:

$$\begin{aligned}\xi^{(i)}(x) &= \phi^{(i)}(W^{(i-1)}\xi^{(i-1)}(x) + b^{(i-1)}) \\ x &= \xi^{(0)}, \quad u = W^{(k)}\xi^{(k)}(x) + b^{(k)} := N(x),\end{aligned}$$

Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems


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directly performing reachability on f^c is computationally challenging

Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems


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Rigorousness of control tools + effectiveness of ML tools

Combine our reachability frameworks with neural network verification methods

Neural Network Verification Algorithms

Interval Input-output Bounds

Input-output bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

$$\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \quad \text{for all } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$$

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Many neural network verification algorithms can produce these bounds.

ex. CROWN ([H. Zhang et al., 2018](#)), LipSDP ([M. Fazlyab et al., 2019](#)), IBP ([S. Gowal et al., 2018](#)).

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
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CROWN⁵

- Bounding the value of each neurons
- Linear upper and lower bounds on the activation function




⁵H. Zhang et al., NeurIPS 2018.


Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach


Reachability of open-loop system treating u as a parameter



Neural network verification algorithm for bounds on u



Reachability of open-loop system + Neural network verification bounds



Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems




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
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
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Composition approach over-approximation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$$


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
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Composition approach over-approximation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$$

It lead to overly-conservative estimates of reachable set

Stabilizing Effect of Neural Network Controllers

Issues with the compositional approach

Neural network controller as **disturbances** (worst-case scenario)
It does not capture the **stabilizing** effect of the neural network.

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$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\underline{x}} &= \underline{x} + \underline{u} + \underline{w} \\ \dot{\bar{x}} &= \bar{x} + \bar{u} + \bar{w}\end{aligned}$$

This system is unstable.

Interaction-aware approach

First replace $u = Kx$ in the system, then

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\underline{x}} &= (1 - \underline{K})\underline{x} + \underline{w} \\ \dot{\bar{x}} &= (1 - \bar{K})\bar{x} + \bar{w}\end{aligned}$$

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We need to know the **functional** dependencies of neural network bounds

Functional Bounds for Neural Networks

Function Approximation

Functional bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

$$\underline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x) \leq N(x) \leq \overline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x), \quad \text{for all } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$$

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- Example: CROWN⁶ can provide functional bounds.

CROWN functional bounds:

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x) &= \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \\ \overline{N}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}(x) &= \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \bar{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}\end{aligned}$$

CROWN input-output bounds:

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} &= \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \\ \bar{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} &= \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \bar{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}\end{aligned}$$

⁶H. Zhang et al., NeurIPS 2018.

Safety of Neural Network Controlled Systems

Interaction-aware Approach

Theorem⁷

Original system

$$\xrightarrow{\quad} \boxed{\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w)} \xrightarrow{\quad}$$

Embedding system

$$\xrightarrow{\quad} \begin{bmatrix} \dot{\underline{x}} \\ \dot{\bar{x}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} [\underline{H}]^+ - \underline{J}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} & [\underline{H}]^- \\ [\bar{H}]^+ - \bar{J}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} & [\bar{H}]^- \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{J}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}]^- & [\underline{J}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}]^+ \\ -[\bar{J}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}]^- & [\bar{J}_{[\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \bar{w} \end{bmatrix} + Q \xrightarrow{\quad}$$

\underline{H} and \bar{H} capture the effect of interactions between nonlinear system and neural network.

Interaction-aware over-approximation:

$$\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$$

⁷SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, under review, 2023

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Numerical Experiments

Dynamics of the j th vehicle

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{p}_x^j &= v_x^j, & \dot{v}_x^j &= \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j, \\ \dot{p}_y^j &= v_y^j, & \dot{v}_y^j &= \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,\end{aligned}$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$.



Unsafe

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Numerical Experiments


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where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$. First vehicle uses a neural network controller

$4 \times 100 \times 100 \times 2$, with ReLU activations

and is trained using trajectory data from an MPC controller for the first vehicle.



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Numerical Experiments


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where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$. Other vehicles
use PD controller

$$\begin{aligned}u_d^j &= k_p \left(p_d^{j-1} - p_d^j - r \frac{v_d^{j-1}}{\|v^{j-1}\|_2} \right) \\ &\quad + k_v (v_d^{j-1} - v_d^j),\end{aligned}$$

where $d \in \{x, y\}$.



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning


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- compositional approach
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable overapproximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

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
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- interaction-aware approach
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable over-approximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$

N (units)	# of states	Our Approach (s)	POLAR (s)	JuliaReach (s)
4	16	1.369	14.182	12.579
9	36	3.144	43.428	59.929
20	80	9.737	316.337	—
50	200	46.426	4256.435	—

Table: Run-time comparison



POLAR = C. Huang et al., ATVA 2022

JuliaReach = C. Schilling et al., AAAI 2022

Conclusions

Key takeaways

- reachability as a framework for safety certification of autonomous systems
- developed computationally efficient and scalable approaches for reachability: contraction-based and Interval-based
- run-time verification of neural network controlled systems
- capture stabilizing effect of learning-based components

- Reachability Analysis
- Neural Network Controlled Systems
- Future Research Directions

Data-assisted reachability of mechanical systems

⁸SJ and S. Coogan, "Monotonicity and Contraction on Polyhedral Cones", submitted 2023

Data-assisted reachability of mechanical systems

Safety in manufacturing robotics

- complex tasks and operations
- interactions with human
- availability of data

Safe control of transportation systems

- nonlinear dynamics
- learning-enabled components
- large mobility data

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- ① finite abstractions from reachability (formal methods)
- ② physics-informed metrics for run-time monitoring⁸
- ③ data to obtain suitable metrics for reachability analysis

funding: NSERC Alliance (possible partner: Electrans or LoopX AI)

⁸SJ and S. Coogan, "Monotonicity and Contraction on Polyhedral Cones", submitted 2023

Safe learning and control in learning-enabled feedback loops

⁹SJ and Y. Chen, "Probabilistic Reachability of Stochastic Systems", submitted 2024

Safe learning and control in learning-enabled feedback loops

Uncertainty learning and calibration

- learn uncertainties in run-time
- effect of feedback on uncertainty
- design a correction control

Safe control of feedback loop

- switch to back up controllers
- differentiable safety metrics
- correct-by-design training

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Future Research

Learning-based Autonomous Systems


Safe learning and control in learning-enabled feedback loops

Uncertainty learning and calibration

- learn uncertainties in run-time
 - effect of feedback on uncertainty
 - design a correction control
-
- utilize the statistical knowledge of uncertainty⁹
 - reachability analysis to obtain differentiable safety metrics

Safe control of feedback loop

- switch to back up controllers
- differentiable safety metrics
- correct-by-design training



funding: NSERC discovery

⁹SJ and Y. Chen, "Probabilistic Reachability of Stochastic Systems", submitted 2024

Future Research

Monitoring and Control in Large-scale Modern Power Grids

Detection and control in modern power grids

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Monitoring and Control in Large-scale Modern Power Grids

Detection and control in modern power grids

Far future grids = 100% penetration of renewables

Near future grids = hybrid with both renewables and synchronous machines


Future Research

Monitoring and Control in Large-scale Modern Power Grids

Detection and control in modern power grids

Far future grids = 100% penetration of renewables

Near future grids = hybrid with both renewables and synchronous machines



Unique features of renewables

- fast dynamics
- stochastic generation/consumption

Goal: transient stability of the grid

- ① fast and computationally efficient safety monitoring

funding: NSERC Alliance (possible partner: Canadian Solar Inc.)

Thank you for your attention!

Back up Slides

Contraction-based Reachability

Searching for norm and contraction rate

For $\|\cdot\|_{2,P}$ with a positive definite matrix P :

$$\mu_{2,P}(Df(t,x)) \leq c \iff PDf(t,x) + Df(t,x)^\top P \preceq 2cP$$

For $\|\cdot\|_{1,\text{diag}(\eta)}$ with $\eta \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}^n$:

$$\mu_{1,\text{diag}(\eta)}(Df(t,x)) \leq c \iff \eta^\top [Df(t,x)]^M \leq c\eta^\top$$

$$\mu_{\infty,\text{diag}(\eta)}(Df(t,x)) \leq c \iff [Df(t,x)]^M \eta \leq c\eta$$

where $[A]^M$ is Metzler part of matrix A .

If f is polynomial in t and x ,

- ① for a fix c , search for P (or η) can be done using SOS programming
- ② iterative bisection on c and SOS programming to find the minimum c

E. M. Aylward, P. A. Parrilo, and J.-J. E. Slotine. Stability and robustness analysis of nonlinear systems via contraction metrics and SOS programming. Automatica, 2008

Contraction-based Reachability

Proof of input-to-state stability


Assume $\mu_{\|\cdot\|} \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w) \right) \leq c$ and $\left\| \frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x, w) \right\| \leq \ell$ for almost all x, u

Theorem

If $\mathcal{X}_0 = B_{\|\cdot\|}(r_1, x_0^*)$ and $\mathcal{W} = B_{\|\cdot\|}(r_2, w^*)$, then

$$\mathcal{R}^f(t, \mathcal{X}_0) \subseteq B_{\|\cdot\|}(e^{ct}r_1 + \frac{\ell}{c}(e^{ct} - 1)r_2, x^*(t))$$

where $x^*(\cdot)$ is the solution of $\dot{x} = f(x, w^*)$ with $x(0) = x_0^*$.



Proof: let $x(\cdot)$ be a traj of $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$. Using Taylor expansion, for $h \geq 0$

$$\begin{aligned} x(t+h) - x^*(t+h) &= x(t) - x^*(t) + h \underbrace{\left(\int_0^1 D_x f(\tau x + (1-\tau)x^*) d\tau \right)}_{A(x,w)} (x(t) - x^*(t)) \\ &\quad + h \underbrace{\left(\int_0^1 D_w f(x, \tau w + (1-\tau)w^*) d\tau \right)}_{B(x,w)} (w - w^*) + \mathcal{O}(h^2) \end{aligned}$$

Contraction-based Reachability

Proof continued

$$\begin{aligned} D^+ \|x(t) - x^*(t)\| &= \limsup_{h \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\|x(t+h) - x^*(t+h)\| - \|x(t) - x^*(t)\|}{h} \\ &= \limsup_{h \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\|(I_n + hA(x, w))(x(t) - x^*(t)) + hB(x, w)(w - w^*)\| - \|x(t) - x^*(t)\|}{h} \\ &\leq \limsup_{h \rightarrow 0^+} \frac{\|(I_n + hA(x, w))(x(t) - x^*(t))\| + h\|B(x, w)\|\|w - w^*\| - \|x(t) - x^*(t)\|}{h} \\ &\leq \mu_{\|\cdot\|}(A(x, w))\|x(t) - x^*(t)\| + \|B(x, w)\|\|w - w^*\| \\ &\leq c\|x(t) - x^*(t)\| + \ell\|w - w^*\| \end{aligned}$$

- generalized version of Grönwall's lemma
- overly conservative since c and ℓ are defined globally

Embedding System for Linear Dynamical System

A structure preserving decomposition


- Metzler/non-Metzler decomposition: $A = [A]^{\text{Mzl}} + [A]^{\text{Mzr}}$

- Example: $A = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & -1 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow [A]^{\text{Mzl}} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ $[A]^{\text{Mzr}} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$

Linear systems


Original system

$$\dot{x} = Ax + Bw$$



Embedding system

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{\dot{x}} &= [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + [A]^{\text{Mzr}} \bar{x} + B^+ \underline{w} + B^- \bar{w} \\ \dot{\bar{x}} &= [A]^{\text{Mzr}} \bar{x} + [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + B^+ \bar{w} + B^- \underline{w}\end{aligned}$$



Interval-based Reachability

Proof of Jacobian-based Theorem

For a scalar vector field $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we show that $\underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = f(\underline{x}) + \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- (\bar{x} - \underline{x})$ is

- ① cooperative in \underline{x}
- ② competitive in \bar{x}

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \underline{x}} \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \underline{x}} f(\underline{x}) - \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \Big|_{x=\underline{x}} - \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- \geq 0.$$

Similarly,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \bar{x}} \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- \leq 0$$

Case Study: Bicycle Model



A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{\ell_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

$$\dot{p}_y = v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{v} = u_1$$

$$\beta(u_2) = \arctan \left(\frac{\ell_r}{l_f + \ell_r} \tan(u_2) \right)$$



Case Study: Bicycle Model


A naive compositional approach

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$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{l_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

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Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles

Case Study: Bicycle Model


A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{l_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

$$\dot{p}_y = v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{v} = u_1$$

$$\beta(u_2) = \arctan\left(\frac{l_r}{l_f + l_r} \tan(u_2)\right)$$



Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles

- train a feedforward neural network $4 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 2$ using data from model predictive control

Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7.95 & 7.95 & -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 & 1.99 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 8.05 & 8.05 & -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 & 2.01 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network



Embedding system:

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$\underline{u} \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}$, for every $x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$.

Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = (7.95 \quad 7.95 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 \quad 1.99)^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = (8.05 \quad 8.05 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 \quad 2.01)^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network





Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_1 = \underline{x}_0 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \bar{u}_0, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_1 = \bar{x}_0 + h\bar{d}(\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \bar{u}_0, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$\underline{u}_0 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_0$, for every $x \in [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$.



Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = (7.95 \quad 7.95 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 \quad 1.99)^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = (8.05 \quad 8.05 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 \quad 2.01)^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network





Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_2 = \underline{x}_1 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \bar{u}_1, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_2 = \bar{x}_1 + h\bar{d}(\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \bar{u}_1, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$\underline{u}_1 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_1$, for every $x \in [\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1]$.



Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7.95 & 7.95 & -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 & 1.99 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 8.05 & 8.05 & -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 & 2.01 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network





Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_3 = \underline{x}_2 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2, \underline{u}_2, \bar{u}_2, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_3 = \bar{x}_2 + h\bar{d}(\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2, \underline{u}_2, \bar{u}_2, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$\underline{u}_2 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_2$, for every $x \in [\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2]$.



Case Study: Bicycle Model

Numerical Experiments



- start from $(8, 7)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with


$$\underline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7.95 & 6.95 & -\frac{2\pi}{3} - 0.01 & 1.99 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 8.05 & 7.05 & -\frac{2\pi}{3} + 0.01 & 2.01 \end{pmatrix}^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network



Naive interconnection approach



interaction approach