The best privacy defense is a good privacy offense: Obfuscating a search engine users profile

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
Overview

Introduction

2 Method

Results

Companies can't be trusted



- We trust that companies will protect our data
- Data breaches are commonplace today
- Unencrypted data is often leaked
- There is currently no or little legal requirement to protect data, and therefore represents an additional cost that some companies try to avoid
- Can we encrypt our own data before it is submitted to such companies?

Figure:

www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-16-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html

Other methods of obfuscation

- Private browsing no cookies stored, but... IP still revealed
- Proxy servers to hide IP web browser fingerprints still revealed
- Ultimately, TOR for maximum anonymity
- Problem lose benefits that personalisation of websearches provides
- Can an alternative means of securing privacy without more intensive [change intensive here] methods be found?

Structure of Presentation

- How do search engines 'know' what we want?
- Present a new method of obfuscation related to adversarial data mining
- Approach is explored in common setting of Internet search engines
- A learning method is presented for environments where a user can get feedback from her or his counterpart

Personalised Advertising



- Which ad is displayed depends on The submitted query The user profile
- Ads are assigned to categories
- Users are assigned to categories

Privacy Offense

- To implement a method to defend privacy, we need:
- A way to measure the privacy, i.e. objective function
- $\sigma(\kappa_i, P) = \sum (p_j d_T(\kappa_i, \kappa_j))$
- User interest category κ , distribution of probabilities P, category tree T , tree distance d_T
- \bullet Score σ is the weighted distance between user interest category and current category the user is assigned to

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Category Prediction of an Ad



- Search engines provide example queries for each category
- Use sample queries of category tree as input and train independent classifiers one for each category
- Classifiers can be applied to queries, as well as any other text
- Predictions on ads work very well due to similar structure of the text

Privacy Offense

- To implement a method to defend privacy, we need:
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- Method to use feedback (ads)
- A set of actions

Definition of actions to choose one category κ in the set of categories K using category tree T based on reference category $_{ref}$

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
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- Most specialized of sibling: $a_{specialized}(T, \kappa_{ref} = lowest_child(all_siblings(\kappa_{ref} \in K))$




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- Distance-based: $a_{dist}(T, \kappa_{ref}) = \kappa_r : \forall \kappa_t \in K, d(\kappa_r, \kappa_{ref}) \ge d(\kappa t, \kappa_{ref})$



Figure






Experiments

Users are given one interest category and either:

- Use the proposed method, or
- Submit queries from random categories, or
- Submit queries from the category that is the furthest away from their interest category
- All users submit in 10% of the cases random queries from their interest category

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Conclusions

- Does it work?
 - Maybe
- Simplified Model
 - Only one interest category
 - Discard more aspects of the search engines model, e.g., time and date
- Future Work
 - More sophisticated model
 - Use more feedback than just the ads
 - Extend the use beyond search engines

Questions