Constructive

See R2 OS.

Rebuttal

Migrants circumvent surveillance

Douglas S. **Massey**, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, 20**17**, "Why Border Enforcement Backfired", PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5049707/ // RB

Border enforcement, of course, **does nothing to address the economic drivers of migration**—**persistent labor demand and high wages in the United States and an abundant labor supply and low wages in Mexico**—**nor does it take into account the existence of well-developed networks able to support and sustain undocumented border crossing and thus circumvent enforcement efforts.** Under these circumstances, we argue that **the militarization of the border cannot be expected to deter undocumented migrants from coming, but will simply induce them to adjust their border-crossing strategies** while continuing to migrate to readily available jobs in the United States. An important constraint from the U.S. side is that the border is long and enforcement resources necessarily must be targeted to specific sectors. **As a result, the hardening of the border at one location will lead migrants to shift to new, less patrolled, likely more remote and riskier crossing sites As migrants were diverted away from relatively safe** and well-trod **pathways** in urban areas **into more remote, isolated, and environmentally hostile sectors of the border**, crossings grew increasingly difficult and hazardous and the share relying on the services of a paid guide, which had always been high, steadily rose. The solid line in Figure 3 shows the trend in the **percentage of** undocumented **migrants who used a** paid guide, or **coyote**, to cross the border from 1970 to 2010. Starting **from** usage levels around **70%** in the early 1970s **the utilization of coyotes increased steadily increased over time to reach 100%**

by 2010. As before, to assess the degree to which this trend stemmed from rising border enforcement, we used a logistic model to regress use of a coyote (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) on the Border Patrol budget instrument controlling for other variables in Table 1.

Consequently, smuggling empirically increased

Solis 21 [Gustavo Solis, xx-xx-2021, Drug smuggling, and the endless battle to stop it, USAToday, https://www.usatoday.com/border-wall/story/drug-trafficking-smuggling-cartels-tunnels/55981 4001/, accessed 7-18-2024] // BZ **edited for offensive language**

Fences went up, but drugs kept moving. After the government built fences in San Diego, drug smugglers turned to the ocean, **underground tunnels** and, most commonly, the ports of entry. Last year more than 90 percent of the drug seizures happened in the port of entry, where millions of cars drive into San Diego from Mexico every year. David Shaw is Unzueta's successor at Homeland Security Investigations. The unit investigates cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, money laundering and drug smuggling. Cartels "operate like a business," Shaw says. "If you put up one wall, they find a way to get around it." The USA TODAY NETWORK spoke with current and retired law-enforcement experts who have patrolled the border on a daily basis. Asked about President Donald Trump's proposed border wall, they seem to agree: San Diego, at least, would benefit more from additional personnel, training and investment in investigative tools like wiretaps and paid informants. Drug **smuggling** along the border is **like a balloon**, experts say. If you **squeeze one part, the air simply shifts to another.** The San Ysidro Port of Entry, which connects Tijuana, Mexico, to San Diego, is the busiest land crossing in the world. Every year, more than 14 million vehicles and 23 million passengers cross through one of 26 inspection lanes to get into the United States. "We probably lead the nation as far as smuggling attempts from [redacted] [undocumented immigrants] and narcotics, so we are very dynamic and very busy," says Acting Port Director Robert Hood. "It's a fun place to be if you're an officer. Something is always going on." During the 2016 fiscal year, Border Patrol agents in San Diego confiscated nearly 83,000 kilograms of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin from the three ports of entry in the area. The next closest border sector in terms of drug seizures was Laredo, Texas, which covers twice as much land and where agents confiscated 10,000 fewer kilograms of drugs, according to Customs and Border Protection data. The San Ysidro port is a giant bottleneck that funnels a seemingly endless flood of traffic to inspection booths. There, Border Patrol agents have about 40 seconds to find signs of smuggling. Agents look for anything that could point to drug smuggling, such as custom-made compartments, uneven tires, a nervous driver or a weighted down trunk. Inspectors do this while

knowing that drivers have been in line for hours and that those drivers contribute millions to the U.S. economy. “When I worked the primary lanes, my goal was to look at the folks as they are coming at me and to determine which one of all this traffic is not like everybody else,” Hood says. “It’s kind of like when the Secret Service identified counterfeit currency. They know what legitimate currency is like so well that when the bad one comes, you go, ‘That’s it.’ ” When drug smuggling moved to the ports of entry, it was by design. The idea was that fences would divert drug trafficking to one area: the ports. Here, the agents have the advantage of lights, drug-sniffing canine patrols, X-ray machines and other high-tech equipment. Diverting drugs to the ports was a safer option than sending agents to rural areas of the country, two hours away from their nearest backup. In this sense, the fencing has been a success. But there have also been unintended consequences. Since 2001, the San Diego Sector’s Tunnel Task Force has found more than 60 smuggling tunnels in the county. “With the advent of the infrastructure between the ports of entry, one of the unintended consequences were the huge narcotics tunnels that were created that went over **100 feet deep** and ran **seven or eight football fields in length**,” says Unzueta. Most of those tunnels are in Otay Mesa, a massive warehouse district just north of a commercial truck port of entry. The warehouses are the perfect spot to dig exits from Mexican tunnels. The constant truck traffic keeps the noise levels up so that much construction goes unnoticed. Subleasing of warehouses makes it difficult for law-enforcement officers to keep tabs on who is renting them out. The Tunnel Task Force finds and seals tunnels. Its members call themselves the "tunnel rats," in homage to the tunnel rats of the Vietnam War who cleared the tunnels the Viet Cong used to run their guerrilla warfare operations. San Diego’s soil, at least along certain stretches of the county, makes the area ideal for building tunnels. The soil is strong enough to support the weight of a tunnel but soft enough to dig through. Other parts of the border are too sandy, and sophisticated tunnels require infrastructure to support the weight. “We just happen to be in the right place at the right time where most of the tunneling activity takes place,” says Lance LeNoir, captain of the tunnel rats. “We’ve developed a niche. We didn’t have a script to go off in here so we borrowed from the fire department, from geologists, from everything. It’s just been a collaboration.” While the majority of smuggling attempts happen in the ports of entry, the biggest loads of drugs enter San Diego through tunnels. The ones equipped with rails can carry packages as big as 35 tons. It can take more than a million dollars to build one of these tunnels, but the drug-smuggling organization can get a **return on its investment** after **two successful shipments**. “Even if you put every single resource you have on something, I’m not sure you stop it because the other side has a lot more resources to actually move it along,” Shaw says. “It goes back to the demand side in the U.S. If the demand wasn’t so high, then you wouldn’t have the supply problem.” Smuggling in the ocean has evolved from Jets Skis dropping off packages on deserted beaches near San Diego to multiday expeditions taking ships 150 miles west into the ocean and as far north as San Francisco. A group of about 50 border patrol agents, mostly former military, patrol an area that’s larger than the state of Connecticut but has no roads and only a handful of visual landmarks. “They are going so far out of our area of operations that we can’t even cover that area,” says Kurt Nagel, a marine interceptor for Customs and Border Protection’s air and sea patrol. “We are trying to set up task forces in San Francisco to give us a hand. … Right now

with how far they are going, we can't keep up." After the border fences in San Diego were built, law enforcement noticed more pangas — small, open fishing boats that run on outboard motors — abandoned on the city's beaches. "We were completely overwhelmed," says Unzueta, the retired ICE investigator. When agents focused on pangas, the smugglers began using expensive recreational vessels that blend in with the boats San Diegans use for weekend fishing or scenic cruises. Border Patrol agents have to figure out which ones are coming from Mexico. "A lot of it is just knowing the people, knowing the seasons, knowing what fish is in season, what kind of tackle you use to go sea fishing as opposed to lake fishing," Nagel says. "Smugglers sometimes mix that up." If a wall is built, don't expect it — or the Border Patrol — to stop the flow of drugs. Border Patrol agents in San Diego agree that they need more people and funding for investigative work. "It's old-school police work," Shaw says. "That's where I think our best money is spent." Wiretaps and paid informants are among the unit's most effective tools for uncovering the inner workings of drug-smuggling organizations, he adds. "You can have all the technology you want and all the infrastructure you want, but if you have nobody to make an arrest when someone comes across illegally, it really doesn't do you any good because they are going to get right past that technology eventually," Hernandez says. "And if you have all the agents you want but no technology to help you find them, people are going to get away anyway. We want to try to find the right balance." And any wall that is built can't wall off the bustling border ports. Sealing San Ysidro would decimate a multimillion dollar, trans-border economy. "Some of our better tools are the officers' skill and the canines' ability," says Hood, the ports chief. Beyond that, their work is done with intelligence, paying informants in Mexico and building cases so that they know what is approaching the border before it gets there. "I think what we are likely to see with the border wall is probably increased levels of smuggling going on within the ports of entry, potentially increased levels in narcotics tunnels," Unzueta says.

Nowratesh 17, information for border security produces overload

(Alex Nowratesh: VP of econ policy at CATO. 6 December 2017, "More Information Won't Resolve Management Problems at Border Patrol Checkpoints", CATO,

https://www.cato.org/blog/more-information-wont-resolve-management-problems-border-patrol-check points .//. DOA: 7/8/24) TZL

The call for more information and better metrics for measuring border security is well intentioned but it can also backfire. Some information is required to make accurate decisions but, beyond a certain point**, too much information can produce information overload, whereby decisions become less accurate as the decision maker learns more** (Figure 1). **Information beyond the overload point will confuse a decision maker, affect his or her ability to set priorities, and worsen recall of prior information. A fundamental concept in economics is scarcity, which occurs when there is not enough supply of a good to satisfy all demand at a price of zero. Information overload is a reminder that human attention span, information processing capacity, and accurate decision-making ability are also scarce resources.** Information overload can take several forms. Some **scholars** emphasize how **much time it takes to absorb new information, which can diminish the accuracy of decisions that require timely action. That case is most similar to the timeliness of intelligence reports in guiding Border Patrol agent deployment. The value of most intelligence depreciates rapidly and, if it is accurate, must be quickly acted upon to have an effect.** Other **scholars** focus on the quality of information, as it is difficult to measure that without first absorbing it and comparing it to other information. Estimates of the size of black markets, a crucial metric for Border Patrol, are fraught with errors and it is nearly impossible to tell which one is correct. Tasks that are **reoccurring routines** produce less information overload than more complex and varied tasks. As mentioned above, the **organizational** design of a **firm** is another important factor that influences information overload. Smugglers and illegal immigrants compound the problem of information overload as they change their behavior in response to Border Patrol policies. Smugglers and illegal immigrants rarely want to be apprehended so they shift away from patrols or areas where there is more enforcement. In the mid-2000s, illegal Mexican border crossers moved **east** from California and west from Texas into Arizona because of border security. More enforcement in Arizona after 2010 then shifted illegal immigrant entry attempts back east toward Texas. Their constant movement and reaction to Border Patrol and immigration enforcement generally creates more complexity and information that the agency must process. **The symptoms of information overload are a lack of perspective, cognitive strain and stress, a greater tolerance for error, low morale, and the inability to use information to make a decision**. Those symptoms are all common at Border Patrol and its parent organization, the Department of Homeland Security. In terms of a lack of perspective, the chaos below the border is a supposed "**existential threat**." Meanwhile, the **tolerance for performance and**

discipline problems **in Border Patrol personnel has festered for over a decade, producing numerous errors of all kinds**. **Morale has historically been low** in Border Patrol and has only risen recently due to the election of President Trump. **One common reaction to information overload is that decision makers become highly selective, ignore vast amounts of information, and cherry pick that information which confirms their biases.** Information never speaks for itself and it must always be interpreted and applied. By increasing the quantity of information available to managers and supervisors at Border Patrol, their actions could become more erratic and less efficient because they will be able to pull from a vaster array of justifications for their decisions. Like any other self-interested actors, Border Patrol will always select and interpret information to justify the actions they want to undertake while discounting information that supports another course of action. The principal-agent problem means that this rarely gets corrected.

Empirics prove

Medium @ Una-Nca, 03-16-20**21**, "Op-Ed: The Dangers of Emerging Surveillance Technology in Immigration and Beyond", Medium, https://medium.com/una-nca-snapshots/op-ed-the-dangers-of-emerging-surveillance-technology-in-immigration-and-beyond-726133826f18 // RB

Surveillance encompasses measures like drones providing aerial views, facial recognition technologies, and monitoring social media activity. **Emerging surveillance technologies** spanning from **facial recognition in airports** to **drone surveillance** **by CBP showcase the systems already in place that aim to increase surveillance across the United States.** Surveillance has previously helped identify **individuals that pose a threat** to the public, **but has also led to the monitoring of everyone's communications — not only suspects' — causing investigators to miss critical information due to an excess of data. Historically, this has caused problems, like when the FBI**

collected and catalogued 100 million fingerprints by 1946 — overwhelming staff and decreasing efficiency when trying to match prints. **Even now with 21st century technology, too much information collected by U.S. government agencies still presents challenges with inefficiency and data overload.**

There will be hacking

Nathaniel **Janowitz**, "Cartels Are Using a Police Database to Track and Target Their Enemies", December 14, 20**23**, VICE, https://www.vice.com/en/article/4a3pww/mexican-cartels-government-security-software-track-target-enemies //MVSG

Mexican criminal organizations are allegedly **tapping** intelligence and **security software,** that is also used by the government, **to locate and disappear rivals and hide their crimes,** according to several sources within Mexican law enforcement and cartel members who spoke with VICE News. The software, called Titan, has been used by several Mexican state governments, a source familiar with the program said. Its users can geolocate persons across the country in real time, access minute-to-minute location logs, and obtain official identification documents, amongst other private information, according to sources. ADVERTISEMENT The different services available through Titan are being advertised on the black market for around 10,000 Mexican pesos (roughly $600) to 180,000 pesos ($9,000). They are being offered via Whatsapp groups managed by a “council” which includes both members of criminal organizations and Mexican state officials, according to one of the group’s admins speaking with VICE News. The council approves members of the list, as well as the provision of services.

Carlyn **Greenfield**, 03-11-20**20**, "As Governments Build Advanced Surveillance Systems to Push Borders Out, Will Travel and Migration Become Unequal for Some Groups?", migrationpolicy.org,

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/governments-build-advanced-surveillance-systems // RB

The data double is meant to create the most thorough profile of a traveler or migrant. This profile is processed through algorithms to assign risk levels and predetermine the aims of the traveler or migrant. However, **since algorithms are created by people, they carry the biases of the original creator**, **rendering** the process imperfect. The meanings assigned to specific data points, such as the significance of previous **visa rejections**, is decided by the creators. **In addition, as the machine learns from itself, patterns related to categorization become more fixed, further stratifying travelers. For instance,** according to U.S. officials, the addition of **Nigeria** to the list of countries facing **heightened travel restrictions** in January 2020 was said to be due to a heightened risk environment in Nigeria and the number of Nigerian **visa overstays.** The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explicitly noted the use of an assessment model to rank countries' performance against their criteria on information sharing, identity-management systems, and public-safety risks. It is not publicly known whether this assessment model includes machine learning or algorithms, but it seems likely that they would be in use. In such a scenario, **if several Nigerians committed a terrorist act** in the United States, it likely would **raise barriers for Nigerian would-be immigrants as the machine would input a higher level of risk for Nigerians.** Moreover, others with similar profiles to the terrorists, such as men of a similar age, from a similar area, or with a similar background could also find themselves moved into higher-risk categories. Yet a data double is not a person: humans cannot be fully summarized through data because certain traits, such as ambition or respect for the rule of law, cannot be quantitatively measured and assured. Therefore, **the system denies a holistic approach and instead opts for reinforcing assumptions about what certain data points mean. Indeed, algorithms are not only vulnerable to error and discrimination but may compound bias due to the nature of the system.** The human effect on risk analysis is evident: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)'s Risk Classification Assessment was reprogrammed in 2018 to remove the "release" option for unauthorized migrants, **creating a system that always recommended detention.** When the system was first introduced in 2013, it was modeled on other criminal justice reforms to reduce pretrial detention. Even prior to the reprogramming in 2018, however, the system hardly ever recommended "release"—with one DHS Office of Inspector General report finding release was suggested only 0.6 percent of the time between July 2012 and December 2013. **DHS called the system ineffective in managing**

complicated cases In Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has been working to procure a predictive analytics system for cases such as preremoval risk assessments. The efforts have been heavily criticized by immigrants' rights activists and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto for issues of bias and possible discrimination.

Arms race increase the chance of war by 5 times, disputes 2 times

Gilber, Douglas. "Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Mar., 20**05**)//AB

https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270?seq=1

(https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270)

In addition to escalation, **arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict**, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, **the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.**

Existing satellites solve

SSP 17 [SSPI, 6-11-2017, How Satellites Secure the Border, SSPI, https://www.sspi.org/cpages/how-satellites-secure-the-border, accessed 7-17-2024] // AZ

Defending the Invisible Australia has a coastline that stretches for 37,000 kilometers. How can such a vast expanse be monitored and managed? The only solution Down Under, as for most countries in the world, is satellite technology. **Satellite plays many roles in securing the border**. The first is **visibility**. Earth observation **satellites provide detailed images of hot spots where border crossings peak**. In the US, **the Department of Homeland Security shares data from military reconnaissance satellites with** local, state and Federal **agencies responsible for immigration** and anti-smuggling programs. Sensors are able to penetrate cloud cover, detect chemical traces and even identify objects inside buildings. India uses the RISAT and Cartosat spacecraft to capture still images as well as high-resolution video of the nation's disputed borders. South Africa has used satellite imagery to track activity at border control posts between that nation and Zimbabwe. The imagery picks up new roads and tracks, massed vehicles, temporary settlements and even places where fences have been compromised by migrants seeking access to one of Africa's most stable and prosperous countries. Connecting the Moving Pieces Visibility is not just a matter of sensors in space. **Satellites also provide data**, video and voice communications **with** aircraft, helicopters, **ground vehicles** and maritime vessels **on border patrol.** That makes it possible for widely scattered forces to share information and images, and to operate as a single unit. Monitoring Australia's coastline for illegal immigration and resource exploitation is only possible because satellite links a fleet of coast guard ships and small boats as well as camera-equipped surveillance aircraft. Satellite is even being used to link automated surveillance radar units set up at borders to detect moving targets over both land and water. They are particularly effective at spotting the tiny ultralight aircraft that drug smugglers use to bring their goods to market. Unmanned **aerial vehicles** (UAVs or drones) **have revolutionized warfare**. They are also **active in border patrols**. Flown via **satellite** by remote operators, they can stay in the air for long periods of time and send video from the field, which **effectively extends the reach of border control agencies for thousands of miles.** So successful have drones been on the southern border of the US that drug smugglers have begun hacking into their communications to throw them off course. Ironically, the cyberattack involved another satellite technology: GPS. After gaining access to the drones' control system, the smugglers feed the aircraft fake GPS coordinates that send them hurtling across the sky to the wrong location. A new generation of low-altitude satellites is delivering a solution by transmitting navigation data at 1,000 times the power of GPS.

Dr. Bruce G. **Blair 20**, Research Scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, PhD in Operations Research from Yale University, "Loose Cannons: The President and US Nuclear Posture", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 76, Issue 1 [language modified; abbreviation in brackets]

The **fog** of nuclear conflict will prove all the **thick**er because leaders and planners **lack adequate knowledge** about their adversaries' mind-set, resolve, wartime aims, and game plans. For instance, de-classified Soviet documents show clearly that the US strategy of "escalation dominance" was completely out of sync with Soviet nuclear strategy and that escalation to full-scale nuclear war was virtually inevitable if the United States struck first.13 After many decades of scholarly research, it is still not known what leaders in Moscow and Beijing were thinking during Cold War crises involving US attempts to threaten nuclear violence to coerce them.14 Today it would be foolhardy in the extreme to presume we would know Putin's, Xi's, and Kim's minds and behavior in wartime. A prudent leader would not only refrain from initiating the actual use of nuclear weapons because of the danger of escalation; that leader would also refrain from brandishing them at all during a confrontation. The **fear of an adversary striking first** is the leading **textbook cause** of **crisis instability**. To stabilize a military crisis situation, what is actually needed is predictability and reassurance that first use is not on the table. For many strategists, however, taking options off the table looks like weakness. Retired Gen. James Mattis (the recent defense secretary) has a favorite military maxim: "Never tell the enemy what you are not going to do." Strategists weaned on Thomas Schelling's classic game theory arguments believe threatening, manipulating risk, and blackmailing are the currency of savvy crisis diplomacy. And it is certainly true that past US presidents have regularly played nuclear **brinks**~~man~~**ship** with the Soviets and Chinese and displayed **incautious risk-taking**in their crisis maneuvering. This was in fact the playbook of the Nixon advisors who ordered the world-wide nuclear alert that my crewmate and I helped implement in 1973. This alert sent a provocative message to the Soviets: The United States was prepared to play nuclear roulette to gets its way.15 **Nuclear roulette** begins at the outset of a crisis as the belligerents **intensify their [ISR] intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations**. The aim is to maintain "situation awareness," but the activities lend themselves to the **worst-case interpretation** that the adversary is updating its targeting in **preparing to strike**.

Similarly, nuclear forces and command structures are **programmed to go to higher readiness** to prepare for war if the adversary will not back down. Although the **motives**may be **defensive**, these **activities** may appear to be precursors of a first strike and provoke an **action-reaction spiral** that **spins out of control**. Certainly, if even a **single** nuclear weapon were **use**d, the strategic nuclear forces on both sides would move rapidly to a maximum war footing and project credible mutual threats of large-scale preemptive attack. In sum, a nuclear posture gearing up for a possible enemy first strike risks becoming a **self-fulfilling** prophecy. From the perspective of presidential decision making, the first-use contingency could easily accelerate **escalation** to the point of causing mental duress. This contingency is also notable for its **absence of guardrails** and the **ease** with which a **misguided** or rattled president could **order** it. The launch protocol described earlier for **launch on warning**applies equally to first use. Although the timeline could be extended greatly, the president could choose at any time to end the discussion and order a strike. During the Cold War, I seldom practiced executing a first strike, and today there are no foreseeable scenarios that would justify transgressing the nuclear taboo of first use. Nevertheless, a first nuclear strike remains the default contingency of the US posture, owing to the huge uncertainties surrounding the alternatives – second-strike retaliation and launch on warning. A crisis that brings the belligerents to the brink of nuclear war would compel consideration of first use. Nuclear warfighters who reject the adage that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought may well brief and tout the purported warfighting advantages of going first. Even though first use runs counter to and undermines the entire framework of the global nuclear order, in which nuclear weapons exist only to deter, leaders may waver if it seems the least fraught choice at the moment of truth. An impulsive president may be drawn to it. Wiser advisors may counsel restraint, but nothing would stand in the way of the president ordering a first strike. The likely if not **inevitable** consequence of attacking a nuclear adversary with nuclear weapons is nuclear **retal**iation and **uncontrolled escalation** that crosses the threshold of acceptable damage to this nation. First use runs an **existential risk** to the United States and the world. It carries a huge risk of triggering a **nuclear exchange** of **cataclysmic proportions** with massive casualties to all the belligerent parties and beyond.