

# 1AC:

## FWK

### Framework

The Role of the Judge is to determine the better debater and the Role of the Ballot is to communicate that decision to tab – anything else is an arbitrary and self-serving impact filter which can't account for switching sides or the fact that one team has to take an L.

Framework – I get to weigh the impacts of the 1AC against the K – otherwise they moot 4 minutes of 1AC offense which kills off procedural fairness. They can still K my method – they just have to implicate it to a reason the normative statement of the plan is false – that solves all their offense. Their framework means that they can win off an epistemological indict to one sentence of the 1AC, which they can always do if I say a single thing that's incorrect. If the case is on balance a good idea, you should vote for it – make them win the thesis of the 1AC is false.

Policy simulation allows us to more effectively influence state policy AND is key to agency – studies prove

**Eijkman 12** (Henk, visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India, has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India, "The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice," [http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims\\_in\\_authentic\\_learning\\_report.pdf](http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf)) //BS 1-28-2018

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore. (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations – as forms of interactive or participatory modelling – are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action ('the five Cs'). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the

**“Epistemology first” entraps the debate in academia. Action is more important than epistemological purity.**

**Jarvis 2k**, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Sydney (Darryl, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism,” p. 128-130)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright

violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculcating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocuous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.<sup>37</sup> But to suppose that this is the only risk of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what!" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.<sup>38</sup> Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

**Focusing on epistemic consequences weakens anticolonial struggle and collapses the alt.**

**Temin, 24**—assistant professor of political science and on the faculty in Native American Studies at the University of Michigan, go blue (David, “A decolonial wrong turn: Walter Mignolo's epistemic politics,” *Constellations*, Early View, doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12744, dml) [inserted “it” for grammatical cohesion, insertion denoted by brackets]

In conclusion, I briefly suggest an alternative to Mignolo's epistemic politics, which I refer to as worldly anticolonialism. What I call worldly anticolonialism addresses epistemic challenges to colonial categories such as dominant universalisms with an eye targeted to their identifiable historically situated political effects. Accordingly, an analysis based on worldly anticolonialism would ask how such categories of thought take material form in relation to specific terrains of anticolonial political struggle that have been shaped by variable colonial relations of power. One analogous approach can be found in recent work by Mamdani (2020), who analyzes how continued investments in the category of the "nation" in settler and postcolonial societies alike have themselves been generated through the politically mediated fashioning of specific collective constituencies. The political identities and imaginaries of these constituencies are deeply bound to the colonial past not only as pure epistemology but through constitutive political and historical processes.<sup>7</sup> To illustrate some more specific benefits of worldly anticolonialism as a point of departure, I turn to the complex relationship between organized labor struggles and Indigenous peoples' struggles.

Consider that leadership of major trade unions throughout North America largely continues to believe that extracting more fossil fuels on Indigenous lands will furnish some of the few remaining good jobs in an environment of radical austerity and upward redistribution (Sanicola & Williams, 2021). This framing of worker interests makes it far easier for fossil fuel corporations to create a profoundly antagonized field of political contest pitting "workers' interests" (jobs) against those of "Indigenous peoples" and environmental movements (keeping oil in the ground) (Walia, 2015).<sup>8</sup>

The goals of more radical union membership and anticolonial movements must be to present compelling political-economic alternatives based on massive decarbonization. This means reorienting non-Indigenous working people toward the ways that their freedom and well-being also depend—albeit differently than Indigenous peoples themselves—upon securing and enhancing Indigenous sovereignty (Klein, 2014, pp. 398–407). To be sure, such union leaders and some rank-and-file union members certainly do participate in the pervasive colonial epistemic erasure of Indigenous peoples and the perpetuation of intensely gendered forms of colonial violence when they seek to construct new pipeline infrastructures to secure their livelihoods. I want to suggest, however, that it is not obvious at all that critical political theorists should primarily (let alone, only) foreground this colonial epistemic arrogance per se as the primary obstacle to an alternative anticolonial coalition praxis. Indeed, a key goal of worldly anticolonialism would be to reconfigure this framing of the political situation at hand by imagining more robust and compelling affinities, if not convergences, between projects of decolonization and decarbonization that would enhance the well-being of people and the planet.<sup>9</sup>

This is so because politics requires persuasion and organizing that can reorient the interests and horizon-making capacities of political subjects. The obstacles to this are not simply epistemic in the sense of diagnosing and deconstructing colonial worldviews. Instead, they are rooted in real interests, fears, hopes, and so on that make decolonization unsettling and fraught—anxiety-provoking—for those with power and for those without it but who see no other path beyond current arrangements of power (Bosworth & Chua, 2021). Such investments are both more stubborn and more mediated by genuine political conflict than the epistemological mechanisms that Mignolo proposes to dislodge.

To be sure, I would agree with Mignolo were he to suggest in response that colonial epistemic logics are clearly at work in the political situation I have described here. No one has to look far to find the frequent racist representations of denigrated Indigenous "tradition" as an obstacle to "progress" taking the form of ever-more environmentally ruinous fossil fuel extraction (Mignolo, 2010a, p. 326). Nevertheless, there is no necessary relationship between the diagnosis of such colonial logics and the aspirations that drive many modalities of critique (including anticolonial critique) to grasp the possibilities of transformation inherent in struggles over possible futures. Put bluntly, forcing open those alternative possibilities will not come from epistemic disobedience. It will more likely unfold through impure, "unlikely alliances" that bind together interested constituencies who come to imagine an "otherwise" to carbon-intensive colonial capitalism from different entry points. This might happen by reconfiguring their constitutive identities and "interests" via mobilization and new forms of solidarity—that is, through politics.<sup>10</sup>

**Turn- Decolonial epistemologies recreate colonial violence by essentializing "non-Western" cultures.**

**Filatova, 23**—Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town (Irina, “The decolonisation of the mind and history as an academic discipline,” *Social Dynamics*, Volume 49, Issue 2, pp. 313-331, dml)

It seems that the first to use the term “decolonising the mind” was Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, a Kenyan novelist (Citation1986), though only in connection with the language of African fiction. The “**decolonial turn**” in social sciences began in the early 2000s with the emergence of decolonisation theory or “decolonising” and “decoloniality” thinking in Latin America, in the power structure studies. Decolonial theory deals with the origins and nature of coloniality of power in the modern world, and, by definition, its scope is sociological and structural, rather than discursive. Yet, as with Afrocentrism and postcolonialism, it, too, **rebels against Eurocentric modernity by uncovering the “dark side” of its history which, it is thought will move this modernity away from the Eurocentric narrative, which, in the protagonists’ view, still dominates academic minds** (Tlostanova Citation2009, Citation2019).

Whatever the main academic field of the proponents of these (and many other) decolonising theories or philosophies, one of their main preoccupations is often history. **They believe that modernity was created exclusively by Europeans**, that it is “white,” “Western,” and consequently “colonial.” **Many are convinced that neither a particular vision of the world, nor the ways of understanding and rationalising it have been or can be – or even should be – shared across civilisations, races, nations, ethnicities and cultures.** Apart from everything else, **this means denying the universality of epistemology.** According to the predominant tendency in decolonial thought, the existing epistemology has been imposed on the colonised world by colonisers through their education. In the process it has been killing off local, native epistemologies. “The colonial conquest of Africans – body, mind and soul – has led to real or attempted epistemicide – the decimation or near complete killing and replacement of endogenous epistemologies with the epistemological paradigm of the conqueror,” writes Nyamnjoh (Citation2012, 129).

“Radical” **decolonialists believe that it is not enough to change, improve or supplement modernity and the present systems of knowledge.** As it is impossible to rid them of Eurocentrism, **the whole “project of modernity” based on European epistemology has to be erased or “overcome.”** Then the history of mankind can start again from scratch, and the new, “endogenous,” epistemologies, not distorted by Eurocentrism, will emerge and flower.

“Popular epistemologies in Africa are different. Indeed, popular epistemologies everywhere are different,” writes Francis Nyamnjoh (Citation2012, 131–132).

Popular epistemologies create room for ... “magical interpretations” where there are no obvious explanations for material predicaments. In them, reality is more than meets the eye. It is larger than logic ... Popular epistemologies build bridges between the so-called natural and supernatural, physical and metaphysical, rational and irrational, objective and subjective, scientific and superstitious, nature and culture, visible and invisible, real and unreal, explainable and inexplicable ... They constitute an epistemological order where the sense of sight and physical evidence has not assumed the same centrality, dominance and dictatorship evident in the colonial epistemology ... The real is not only what is observable or what makes cognitive sense; it is also the invisible, the emotional, the sentimental, the intuitive and the inexplicable. Emphasis is on the whole, and truth is negotiated. (Nyamnjoh Citation2012, 131–132, emphasis in original)

This description of “popular epistemologies” perfectly fits any religious worldview, and, as such, it is shared by Europeans and Africans alike. What such epistemologies do not fit is historical research, history as an academic discipline – or, indeed, any other academic research based on the need to prove the veracity of its arguments and conclusions by methods appropriate to each discipline, but certainly not by “magical interpretations.” All sciences and humanities study much of what is “invisible,” “irrational,” “subjective” and “superstitious” – but as objects, not methods of research.

And so does history – as long as it is an academic discipline, and not a rendition of politically fashionable ideas. Historians’ research methods may be less “exact” than those of natural scientists, but they still have their methods of verifying the veracity of their sources and texts. New methods get reinvented and supplement the old ones, becoming more reliable all the time. Historians have long known that there are no such things as the truth and the fact. We may never know exactly what happened in the past but there are more and more ways to get closer to understanding how and why it did. Attempts to make history work according to “endogenous” epistemologies would kill it as an academic discipline. History and magical interpretations can co-exist as epistemologies, but only in two different compartments – one as an academic discipline, the other as religion. As research methodologies they are fatal to one another.

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, a key strategist of the struggle for “epistemological decolonisation” thinks that epistemic freedom, at least on university campuses, may already be near. He writes:

The definitive entry of descendants of the enslaved, displaced, colonised and racialised peoples into the existing academies across the world, proclaiming loudly that they are human beings, their lives matter, and that they were born into valid and legitimate knowledge systems, enabled the resurgence of long-standing struggles for epistemic freedom. Epistemic freedom is fundamentally about the right to think, theorise, interpret the world, develop one’s own methodologies and write from where one is located and unencumbered by Eurocentrism. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni Citation2018, 3)

The question of why they need to enter Eurocentric academies at all is easily answered. Ndlovu-Gatsheni views epistemological freedom as an outcome of “provincialising Europe, deprovincialising Africa and epistemological decolonisation.” This process can only be played out on the European academic turf: you cannot “provincialise” Europe anywhere else.

Olufémi Táíwò (Citation2022, xvi) considers the “anti-modernity” onslaught “a misconception” and calls it “incorrect” and “problematic as a matter of theory and history,” arguing “for oneness of humanity and against the racialisation of humanity.” He also recognises the fact that “the literature by both Africans and non-Africans that came out of these historical errors continues to be dominant in scholarship about the continent” but leaves the “subscribers of this all-encompassing ‘decolonisation’ ... to their designs.” There is little else that a historian – and Táíwò is a historian – can say to those who propagate the creation of an alternative reality and its history. Those who are willing to try to implement this idea are welcome to do so, but it is difficult to see how the reality (modernity), or its history are going to be impacted by this exercise.

There is, however, a more serious threat to history as an academic discipline, coming from some less radical decolonialists who benignly agree that “overcoming history is hardly possible, for it has already happened and has become a very important part of our world’s structure and thought” (Vorobiova Citation2020, 69–70). So, to decolonise it they “expose its epistemic basis by deconstructing it, and thus making other ways of thinking about the past possible” (69–70). Proposals of purportedly novel ways of such deconstructions abound. They include, for example “multi-modernity,” i.e., the recognition of the possibility of multiple historical narratives, and the “concept” of “historical and cultural transfer,” which implies the possibility of the historical development of “cultures,” and even of cross-cultural exchanges. There is little new in these approaches: historians have been using them in their research for a very long time, albeit without the trappings of a terminology which is fashionable today.

Efforts to decolonise history exist in two dimensions: as an investigation of the impact of colonialism on colonised societies (and colonial societies, too), and as a theoretical reinterpretation of coloniality and postcoloniality. As the former, they perfectly fit the trajectory and landscape of the “traditional” historiography of twentieth- and twenty-first-century history. Understood as an investigation of the nature and depth of the impact of colonialism, decolonising approaches have enriched historiography with new themes, visions and perspectives. Among these are increased attention to the colonisation of value systems and spirituality, and its impact on literature, language, education, intellectual values and perceptions in both colonised and colonising societies. As the latter, understood as a complex of methodologies, theoretical reinterpretations of the impact of colonialism on the colonised world, decolonising theories have provided an insight into the depth of the emotional legacy of colonialism and its effects on many generations of the intellectual elite of both colonised and colonising societies. But there are pitfalls for history even in these, softer, approaches to decolonisation.

Whichever of the above dimensions they use, decolonialists see nations, ethnic or racial groups, or civilisations in essentialist terms. This means that for them, each of these entities, large or small, possesses a specific and immutable “culture” and a set of “traditions” and institutions which belong exclusively to it. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Citation2013, 6), for example, writes of “indigenous” institutions, values, systems and histories which need to be “recovered” and then used to reconnect with the reconstituted postcolonial state. In his view, Mueni Wa Muui and Guy Martin (Citation2009) do exactly that: they “recover” what they consider the authentic indigenous structures of power in Africa – as a whole.

First, they write,

there is a fundamental cultural unity of Africa that can be traced back to Egypt and Kush ... Second, indigenous Africa was characterised by social stratification and economic inequalities. Third, indigenous African religions were informed by a variety of belief systems found in Kimit (Egypt) and Kush ... Physical events were linked to the spiritual sphere, and communities’ leaders were involved in both. Fourth, power was not personalised, but was linked to the institution. The leader was the custodian of the peoples’ property and wealth – be it land or minerals – and held it in trust for the whole community. Fifth, political systems and institutions were based on kinship and ancestry (lineage) informed by a founding myth. They were also based on custom and tradition in which constitutions were not written ... Sixth, the gender division of labour also exhibited some similarities ... Seventh, organisations acted as support bases for the system by providing for the social welfare of the community. (Wa Muui and Martin Citation2009, 3–4)

I am not sufficiently qualified to judge how close African social structures are to those of ancient Egypt or Kush, but I know enough of Africa’s history to see that such generalisations are far too broad to reflect the continent’s rich social diversity and the historicity of its social structures. It is also obvious that Wa Muui’s and Martin’s “recovered” African societal features are devoid of historicity and that they are quite common in many societies outside Africa.

The appeal of “traditions” and “cultures” which are “authentic” or “indigenous,” not “spoilt” by foreign influences, to today’s intellectuals, who are engaged in a decolonising effort, is understandable. The problem of self-identification is most acute among the intelligentsia of the formerly colonised societies, often educated in the former imperial capitals and living and working there. The search for cultural roots and “authentic traditions” in this situation is only natural – never mind that such ahistorical authenticity never existed anywhere in the world.

The search for “traditional” or “indigenous” cultures leads decolonialists to think in dichotomies of insurmountable opposites, such as “indigenous” vs European, or Eurocentric; traditional vs modern; colonial vs post-colonial or pre-colonial. Táiwó shows that Africans actively participated in the creation and functioning of at least some colonial institutions, yet even he succumbs to thinking in dualities when he associates these institutions exclusively with coloniality (Citation2022, 65, 149).

But if, according to Nyamnjoh, “truth is negotiable” (it certainly is – historians know this very well), “tradition should certainly be too. And so should “coloniality,” and even colonial institutions of power. If they are de-historicised, notions of “traditions” and “cultures” (let alone “civilisations”) are returning us, in fact, to the 1930s, to the world of anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown and their structural functionalism theory. These scholars were engaged in doing exactly that – looking for traditional, “authentic,” cultures, not influenced by the then modernity.

Essentialist ahistorical notions of “cultures” and “traditions” have since been debunked by decades of scholarship coming from field work in Africa and elsewhere. Even the much-maligned Eurocentric anthropologists who came from Malinowski’s school tried to find out “how things become,” thus contributing to disentangling their discipline from the tenets of ahistoricism. Suffice it to look at the work of Monica Wilson (Hunter Citation1936; Wilson and Wilson Citation1945).Footnote1 This work was continued in the 1950s and 1960s by the first generation of African professional historians together with their European colleagues belonging to the “new historiography” school. They worked at African universities studying social and political histories of their peoples and regions on the basis of the new “African approach” which implied using not only new archival sources, but also what were then new sources of historical research such as oral tradition and interviews.

One of the main goals of the “new historiography” was exactly to bury the Eurocentric myth of Africa’s ahistoricity. African historians of that generation turned the analysis and interpretation of local oral traditions into a generally accepted method of studying the pre-colonial and early colonial history of African societies. Using their local knowledge and connections, they could organise a mass collection of oral tradition and interpret it. The works of such historians as Saburi Biobaku, Samwiri Karugire, Bethwell Ogot and several others have since become classics (Biobaku Citation1957; Karugire Citation1971; Ogot Citation1967).

Another “new historiography” goal was proving that Africans were the subjects, not objects of history, as Eurocentrists would have their readers believe. This meant the search for “African initiative,” particularly in the colonial period. A striking example was the project carried out by Gilbert Gwassa in Tanzania. He

commissioned his students to collect local memories of the Maji Maji rebellion during their holidays. These oral testimonies constituted a whole new archive of the rebellion, producing massive new research (Gwassa Citation1974; Gwassa and Iliffe Citation1967, Citation1969; Mabunda and Mpangara Citation1969)Footnote2

This early decolonising push by African and European scholars and their achievements are not only ignored but, in practice, negated by the present generation of decolonialists. Christopher Clapham (Citation2020) deplores the fact that so little original historical research comes from the present generation of African academics who engage with the decolonisation topic. He attributes this to the fact that they approach this subject mostly within the scope of interest of the prestigious Western universities, where they usually work, and calls on them to return to Africa and continue the field work of the older generations. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Citation2003, 1), moreover, thought that the fact that “the posts [poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonialism] emerged ... in the northern institutional locations” meant that their “promotion in the 1970s and 1980s as Northern intellectual fads gave them a distinctly Western accent.”

While accepting the Western location of much of the present decolonising effort as an explanation for the underperformance of historical research into African colonial societies, I think the main reason for it is different. It is the nature of the present decolonial theories and the pressure which the research paradigm they have created exerts on all disciplines that they touch. Their essentialist ahistoricity is a death-knell for any historical research, but particularly for such a complex subject as the history of colonialism. History studies interrelations, causalities, exchanges, mutualities, developments, continuities – a perpetual movement, not essential certainties, whether they refer to cultures, the character and dates of historical periods or borders between them. History’s cultures and traditions – as much as its borders – are permeable, interdependent and transient.

## ON The topical link

1. Every aff is a reason is why it's good for indigenous people. Reject nuclearism responses, it's coercive to take away util responses from nativ

**The US is a constellation that encompasses Native American nations and unincorporated territories as its postcolonial description.**

Brian Russell **Roberts 21**, xx/xx/2021, English Professor at Brigham Young University, *Borderwaters: Amid the Archipelagic States of America*, Duke University Press, pg 26-27, DOA: 2/02/2025, <https://books.ms/main/F531FDCAA8F6B7D5EE48D4AF694BCB12> JZ + leon

The scenes that come into view via this survey of Boundaries of the United States and the Several States should draw attention to commentary by Alyosha Goldstein in the introduction to *Formations of United States Colonialism*, wherein he reminds us that “the United States of America has never been a uniform or unequivocal geopolitical entity.... Rather, the United States encompasses a historically variable and uneven constellation of state and local governments, indigenous nations, unincorporated territories, free associated commonwealths, protectorates, federally administered public lands, military bases, export processing zones, colonias, and anomalies such as the District of Columbia.”<sup>58</sup> Also turning his sights on this multifarious version of the United States, Paul Lai has played on the phrase contiguous United States to coin the term discontinuous states of America, framing the United States as a geopolitical entity whose “discontiguous” qualities permit only a “discontinuous logic of unity, one in which leaps of logic are necessary to create a semblance of wholeness.”<sup>59</sup> Drawing on Lai’s terminology to assess not only “the discontinuous American Empire” but also the ways in which studies of US American cultures have themselves become discontinuous in assessing imperial and other US discontinuities, Craig Santos Perez has looked toward archipelagic American studies, asserting that an “archipelagic turn offers a promising analytic to navigate the transnational, transatlantic, transpacific, transindigenous, and transhemispheric turns in the now discontinuous archipelago of American studies.”<sup>60</sup> Bringing the US Geological Survey’s “several states” and Lai’s “discontiguous states” into the ambit of what Perez has referred to as an “archipelagic



turn,” the present study, as its subtitle suggests, limns a set of analytic categories that may aid us in assessing cultural formations that have arisen amid the archipelagic states of America, a phrase I use to refer to the archipelagic **portions and aspects of the United States** of America. This is **a postcontinental redescription of the United States** that **asks** vast and unintegrated **ocean** and island **territories to speak from their points of disjunction and quandary**, placing pressure as well on archipelagic spaces that have generally been seen as continental. Here the archipelagic as a framework does not promise to integrate these points or to make them anything other than discontinuous, and yet it does offer, as Perez suggests, a navigational heuristic, one that permits studied and dexterous movement among, to borrow from Cuban theorist Antonio Benítez-Rojo, their discontinuous conjunctions.<sup>61</sup> These are the conjunctions and discontinuities of the US borderwaters, realms **where** weird sovereignties and **nonsovereignties range** from those showcased in the Insular Cases to those infusing the seaborne plastic shards lodged in the digestive tracts of Laysan albatrosses.

Even if it’s federal, native

**Turk 24** [David M. Turk, 10-07-24, Department of Energy, Deputy Secretary @ Department of Energy, “U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED [REDACTED] TRIBES AND ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT CORPORATIONS”]

<https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-documents/100-series/0144.1-apolicy/@images/file>

//🔑🐼\*\*blacked out for colonial language\*\*

**It is the policy of the** Department of Energy **DOE** or the Department) **to recognize and fulfill its legal obligations to respect** and protect **Tribal** self-determination and inherent **sovereignty**; identify and conserve Tribal trust resources; carry out its unique

relationships with federally recognized [REDACTED] Tribes and entities identified in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) Corporations, as defined **in**

DOE **Order 144.1**; and invite [REDACTED] Tribes to **consult on a government-to-government basis**

**whenever there is a DOE action with potential impacts on Tribal interests**. DOE shall engage [REDACTED] Tribes in good faith and invite [REDACTED] Tribes to consult in the earliest stages and throughout the decision-making process to ensure robust, interactive, pre-decisional, informative, and transparent consultation. Tribal consultation should maximize opportunities to seek consensus wherever possible. This Policy and its governing principles provide a foundation and guideline for Departmental interactions and consultation with [REDACTED] Tribes and ANCSA Corporations, as further described in DOE Order 144.1 and other applicable requirements such as Sec. 161 of the Consolidate Appropriations Act of 2004. Definitions of terms in this document, such as “[REDACTED] Tribe” or “Tribe”, “Tribal implications”, “consultation”, and “engagement” are available in DOE Order 144.1. BACKGROUND Federally recognized [REDACTED] Tribes are sovereign nations whose unique political and legal standing predates the

**founding of the United States, as acknowledged in the United States Constitution, treaties,**

**Supreme Court decisions, Executive Orders, statutes, and existing federal policies. The Supreme**

**Court has recognized that the United States has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. [Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 US 286, 297 (1942)].** Its longstanding

government-to-government relationship with [REDACTED] Tribes forms the basis for the United States’ trust responsibility to protect Tribal sovereignty and self determination, Tribal lands, assets, resources, and treaty and other federally recognized and reserved rights. **For these reasons, prior to**

**taking or implementing any actions that may affect such Tribal rights or resources, the Department must consult with** [REDACTED] Tribes regarding a proposed Departmental action having Tribal

**implications as defined in DOE Order 144.1 in a collaborative and culturally sensitive manner.** Congress has directed federal agencies to engage and consult with ANCSA Corporations on a similar basis. DOE will seek to determine the impacts of legislation and Departmental proposed policy upon [REDACTED] Tribes and ANCSA Corporations through consultation or collaboration with them consistent with the intent and purpose of this Policy. In 2010, the United States government announced its support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

This support is nonbinding under international law and is not a statement of current international law but has significant moral and political force. **The**

**United States recognizes the significance of the Declaration’s provisions on free, prior and informed consent, which the United States understands to call for a process of meaningful consultation with Tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders,** before the actions

addressed in those consultations are taken. Given the nature of the Department’s history and missions arising from predecessor agencies, there is a recognition that DOE has an important and ongoing relationship with those Tribes with historic ties to DOE sites or who are impacted by site activities. Many DOE Elements, including programs, sites, power marketing administrations, and laboratories maintain longstanding and enduring relationships with Tribes to identify and resolve key issues, communicate in a collaborative manner, and consult in a meaningful way. Engagement between staff at the Department and staff of Tribal governments or ANCSA Corporations is necessary and important to prepare decisionmakers for consultation, ensure understanding of the issues being discussed, align expectations, ensure that technical aspects of proposed Departmental action are discussed at a level that allows decisionmakers to understand the implications of decisions and actions, and identify potential resolutions. POLICY I. DOE RECOGNIZES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITIES TO FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED [REDACTED] TRIBES AND ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT CORPORATIONS AND COMMITS TO FULFILLING

THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES. DOE will be diligent in fulfilling its federal trust responsibility to █████ Tribes and ANCSA Corporations through government-to-government consultation, implementation of its American █████ and Alaska Native Policy, and program management activities. DOE will pursue actions that uphold treaty and reserved and other federally recognized rights of █████ Tribes and ANCSA Corporations. The Department recognizes that certain █████ Tribes and ANCSA Corporations may have treaty, trust, or other federally protected rights to resources located on and off reservation lands, aboriginal territories, and potentially including usual and accustomed areas, and jurisdictional boundaries. DOE will, to the extent of its authority, seek to uphold and protect Tribal rights and trust resources. The Department will, consistent with and supportive of treaty and reserved and other applicable rights of █████ Tribes and ANCSA Corporations, maximize the inclusion of █████ Tribes and ANCSA Corporations in as many aspects of DOE's mission as possible. DOE commits to protecting the rights and trust interests of █████ Tribes during interactions with state and local governments and other stakeholders with respect to DOE actions having Tribal implications. The Department, in partnership and collaboration with █████ **Tribes, will inform** and educate state and **local governmental entities and other stakeholders about DOE's role and responsibilities** regarding its government-to-government relationship and trust responsibility to █████ Tribes and rights of ANCSA Corporations.

## [T] Substantial federal investment necessitates tribal cooperation—that drives cleanup AND numerous benefits

**Bazilian 24** [Morgan Bazilian, 03-19-24, The Wilson Center, Director @ The Payne Institute, Professor @ The Colorado School of Mines, “Nuclear Power is Tribal Power”]

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nuclear-power-tribal-power> // 🗝️👤\*\*blacked out for harmful language\*\*


The world departed Dubai and the annual UN Climate Talks with a bold, new set of commitments to nuclear power. At the same time, geopolitical tensions are adding new restrictions to an already limited global Uranium supply chain. As a result, the spot price of Uranium is now over \$100 per pound – the highest prices ever seen, outside the uranium bubble of 2007. With such economics, and a newly found bipartisan political will for American nuclear power, the **U.S. is poised for a uranium mining boom** once again. As the inevitable debate ensues, what is often not appreciated is the **essential need to gain support from** our **Native American communities from the very start and through the developments. A report by the NRG** **calculated that: “American █████ [indigenous] lands are estimated to include as much as 50 percent of US potential uranium reserves”.** That amount could meet most (or all) of the future **medium-term domestic demand growth.** Thus, **any attempt to reboot American uranium production that is not cast in full and willing partnership with sovereign tribal governments and their local communities will likely fail.** Neither technology nor regulatory reform can overcome the sins of the past, which must be set straight before the industry can move forward. It is hard to overstate the negative impact of uranium on the Native American community. In 1951, the first nuclear weapons field test took place on Shoshone land in Nevada. Over the next 40 years, almost a thousand more nuclear tests took place on Shoshone territory. Between 1951 and 1992 nuclear tests conducted on Shoshone land caused 620 kt of nuclear fallout, more than 40 Hiroshima bombs. The resulting health impacts on tribal populations are widespread and well documented, including the **doubling of cancer rates** within the Navajo Nation from the 1970s to the 1990s. From 1950 to 1980, 96% of all U.S. defense-related uranium mines were located in the Navajo Nation. The remainder of U.S. defense-related uranium mines were located on lands of the Pueblo of Laguna, the Pueblo of Zuni, the Hualapai Tribe, the Tohono O'odham Nation, the Spokane Tribe of █████, and the Ute █████ Tribe. These affected lands are located across what are now the **states** of Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Almost all this uranium was purchased by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and incorporated into the vast American nuclear weapons inventory of the cold war. In response, the Radiation Exposure and Compensation Act (RECA) was established in 1990 to provide payment and apology for the decades of exposing workers and the public to harm from uranium extraction and above ground nuclear tests in the American West and Pacific Islands. One of the shortfalls of RECA is that it only compensated individuals and communities that participated in this industry between 1942 and 1971 in support of the nuclear weapons program. However, we know that there were several locations like the Pueblo of Laguna and Navajo Nation that had uranium mines still operating well after 1971. Unfortunately, post-1971 miners were statutorily ineligible for the benefits of RECA yet experienced many of the same complex health complications that their pre-1971 colleagues experienced. In fact, the biggest single radioactive release in American history occurred on Navajo land in 1979 with the collapse of a containment dam at UNC's Church Rock uranium mill in New Mexico – a mill that fed civilian power reactors, not the nuclear arsenal. The bottom line is that today there are still over 4,000 formerly producing and now Abandoned Uranium Mines (AUMs) that are still impacting tribal communities. Over 500 AUMs and four abandoned uranium mills still affect the Navajo Nation. Historical Lakota tribal territory hosts thousands of AUMs still awaiting cleanup. The continuing generational health impacts on tribal populations is widespread and well documented, while funding has fallen through the cracks. The federal cleanup effort is clearly wanting. One example of the complex issues at hand is the proposed drilling outside of Bears Ears National Monument. The Monument was restored to its original size by President Biden after it was shrunk considerably in the Trump era, and a large-scale cleanup has been underway for years. New mining on the outskirts of Bears Ears has been proposed—and the resource appears significant. The area is sacred to several Tribes including the Navajo, Zuni, Hopi and Ute Mountain Ute. A new paradigm of engagement and revenue sharing is needed. Clearly, a new approach to Uranium mining and processing in the U.S. is essential and should include five key tenants: First, fully fund Cold War cleanup efforts. The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management was established to “address the nation's Cold War environmental legacy resulting from decades of nuclear



weapons production and government-sponsored nuclear energy research". Although progress continues in the reclamation of over 100 nuclear sites across the country, **the most difficult sites continue to be hampered by a lack of resources. Funding must address the gap created by the termination of RECA and should be focused on Tribal nation building for a clean-energy future, not just Tribal nation repair of Cold War damages. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would be a smart choice to manage and contract a comprehensive federal AUM clean-up effort.** Second, since the American nuclear power industry was blunted in the 1980s, the country has fundamentally lost its collective expertise on the subject. **A significant effort to expand graduate and undergraduate programs in nuclear engineering and associated sciences at American research universities is past due. The priority to receive such an education must be given first to tribal members - currently underrepresented in every related technical discipline.** Ideally, the tribal sector from being the researched to being the researcher. Third, much of the opposition to new mining and milling stems from the inevitable physical damage caused by activities like open pit mining, tailings disposal, wastewater treatment, subsidence, and the construction of surface facilities. Many new mining and milling technologies are being developed that could significantly reduce or eliminate much of this surface disruption. Priority funding support for such new technologies should be given, as is already allowed under federal law, to tribally- and native-owned companies and their affiliates. Technology research programs should integrate Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) into development plans to achieve meaningful and actionable results. **Fourth, all U.S. nuclear development efforts should seek Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) from affected tribal communities, in a manner similar to the Canadian model. Surely this international standard is warranted for the special case of nuclear development in the western U.S.** New effective protocols should be developed jointly between industry and Tribal leaders, and not by federal regulators. Fifth, **every uranium mine and mill built in the U.S. should generate direct financial benefit to all affected tribal communities, regardless of current property ownership rights. New and innovative business structures should be explored and developed jointly between industry and affected communities.** Maintaining a focus not only on mitigating environmental and public health issues, but on the economic development of the Tribes is key to success. This is an historic opportunity for both atonement and demonstrate value to the Tribes at a time of great national urgency. Success will require focusing on the sovereignty and economic vibrancy of Native American tribes, while also ensuring the country's legal and moral obligation to environment and public health.

## [T] SMRs are key to powering indigenous communities—prefer expert opinions

**Singh 24** [Jag Singh, 02-26-24, Stantec, Regional Tech Sector Lead & Clean Generation @ Stantec, Master of Science Degree @ Aston University, "Small modular reactors: Driving energy security with nuclear power"]

<https://www.stantec.com/en/ideas/topic/energy-resources/small-modular-reactors-driving-energy-security-with-nuclear-power> //  **\*\*SMR: Small Modular Reactor\*\***

The energy transition can leverage small modular reactors to provide a strong, clean baseload generation capacity and complement renewable energy. As we push forward with the energy transition, experts from around the globe are coming together to develop thoughtful solutions to some of the world's most pressing issues. The most obvious challenge we face is continuing to power our communities while reducing the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions being released into the atmosphere. But in trying to solve this problem, other challenges arise. How can we **deliver clean energy** to regions that can't generate it? How can we **secure the water supply** needed for large-scale hydrogen production? And most importantly, how can we establish a reliable energy grid with the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources like wind and solar power? Traditional fossil fuel-based power generation, while a significant emitter of GHGs, provides a reliable baseload generation capacity for our energy grids. Reliability is essential to communities and promotes confidence in our energy infrastructure. But as part of the energy transition, we are reducing our reliance on fossil fuels and moving towards cleaner forms of energy like wind and solar. However, these forms of energy are intermittent in nature—the wind doesn't always blow, and the sun doesn't always shine. So how can we reduce emissions while ensuring a reliable grid? One answer is small modular reactors (SMRs). **SMRs are advanced nuclear reactors that can help us generate reliable, consistent power while emitting no GHGs. This is why they are such a hot topic with utilities right now.** In

Canada, we are seeing multiple provinces adopt SMRs as they move away from traditional fossil fuels. Ontario has embraced SMRs and is leading the way on project development. Saskatchewan is planning enough SMRs to potentially provide a surplus of energy within the province. And my home province of Alberta isn't far behind, especially after a series of winter cold snaps in January 2024 almost compromised our energy grid. These events led Alberta's Energy Minister to announce the exploration of SMRs in the province. SMRs are important to me in my role as Nuclear Lead at Stantec. But in knowing that many people might not know a lot about the technology—or the benefits it can bring us—I thought it would be helpful to review SMRs and how they can help us provide reliable power to communities while driving the clean energy transition forward. What are small modular reactors? Before I get into the history of SMRs, let's call out the elephant in the room: nuclear power. When most people think of nuclear power, they probably think of the catastrophic failure in Chernobyl. And that's not unfair—the tragedy of Chernobyl had massive consequences that are still reverberating today. But for the sake of this discussion, let me be clear: **SMRs are safe and meltdowns like what happened in the past aren't**

**possible with this new technology. According to experts from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), most new SMR technologies “improve safety over existing reactors by employing passive safety systems that do not rely on electrical power sources or operators’ intervention to function during accidents.”** They are inherently walk away safe and present far less risk than traditional nuclear plants. SMRs generate power from nuclear fission, a process in which atoms of uranium (and in some cases plutonium) are split. This process creates thermal energy that generates steam to spin turbines and produce electricity. Scientists first generated electricity from nuclear fission in the mid-1950s. Early SMRs were used on naval applications like submarines and warships for decades. Then in 2007, nuclear scientists at Oregon State University invented the first commercial SMR. Since then, companies have been hard at work trying to implement SMRs at scale, working with local governments to make this nuclear dream a reality. However, there are a few barriers to overcome. Public perception: Our communities need to feel safe and secure when adopting nuclear technology. We can achieve this through education, robust stakeholder engagement, and strong community relations focused on correcting commonly held misconceptions regarding nuclear technology, which is actually one of the safest industries in the world. Cost: These **projects require a significant amount of economic investment**, which may seem daunting at first. How can we trust the economic viability of an energy program we haven’t really experienced before? **Spoiler alert: the economics of an SMR program can actually be quite valuable to communities who embrace it (but more on that later). And while the capital cost to build these facilities is significant, the cost of electricity to consumers will likely have a meaningful reduction over the amortization period for the life of the facility.** According to GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, the levelized cost of electricity for SMRs could be around \$60 per megawatt hour (MWh), far less than electricity produced from traditional fossil fuels. These estimates can vary and will likely change over time. Waste: People are often concerned with the waste material produced by nuclear power. The good news? **SMRs not only produce very little waste, but there are technologies—both available now and in development—that enable the recycling of that waste through the reactors.** This allows us to get the most value out of our resources and produce as little waste matter as possible. Now that we got through some of the perceived challenges facing SMRs, let’s review some of the key benefits that these facilities can bring to localities that embrace the technology. The benefits of SMRs The clearest benefit of SMRs is energy security. They give us the ability to generate consistent, clean power—24 hours a day, 7 days a week—as we move further away from fossil fuels and towards renewable sources of energy. Also, SMRs don’t depend on site characteristics like excess wind or sunlight. They can be installed anywhere and plugged into the electrical infrastructure we’ve been using for decades. But there are other benefits to adopting an SMR program as well. Let’s review a few of them below: Socioeconomics: **One of the biggest benefits of an SMR program is the billions of dollars of investment that these projects can bring to communities. Having reliable power at an affordable cost can bring great prosperity to those communities who adopt the SMR technology.** Plus, the infusion of that kind of capital into a local economy can have a profound impact on regional services, such as bolstering small businesses, increased school funding, and other social programs. Job Creation: Another benefit that SMRs bring is the creation of well-paying jobs to communities. The construction and operating lifecycle for SMRs is approximately 60 years. This includes everything from design, construction, transmission and distribution services, operations, and maintenance. The plants also need to be decommissioned, which could lead to many more years. Additionally, SMR projects require environmental planning, monitoring, and remediation services. It is critical to promote robust environmental stewardship from before these projects are started until long after they’re finished. Powering rural and remote communities: One of my favorite features of SMRs is just how **ideal they are for rural, remote, and Indigenous communities. A lot of these communities aren’t connected to the larger electrical grid and must generate power themselves. Microgrids have become an increasingly popular option when facing these challenges and SMRs can serve these microgrids well. They can help generate and distribute power for northern Indigenous communities, and they also can help remote mine sites to decarbonize.**

## **[T] Partnerships are key to indigenous jobs**

**INL 19** [Inl Media Relations, 12-9-2019, "INL finds energy solutions with small business partnerships," Idaho National Laboratory, ]  
<https://inl.gov/community-outreach/inl-finds-energy-solutions-with-small-business-partnerships/>,  
 accessed 3-30-2025/SidRev

One eastern Idaho small business that has been a key player in INL’s success is MarCom LLC. Founded in 2003 by Marcella Medor, a member of the Abenaki Tribe, **MarCom is a Small Business Administration (SBA)-certified, Native American-owned and woman-owned business with offices in Idaho Falls and Butte, Montana. The company provides management, administrative, engineering, nuclear operations, and health and safety services to DOE sites around the nation, with 90% of their work coming from INL.** MarCom’s main role with INL is **in waste management assistance and general support of its waste programs.**

This primarily happens through staff augmentation, which simply means hiring or subcontracting people to work on INL projects, and technical consulting work. "One of the bigger waste projects where we supported the lab was the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Project," Jim Jackson, MarCom's administration manager, said. "We made determinations about the waste that went into that project and supported the facilities working on it with staffing and consultation."

## **[NQ] Waste bills being introduced in Congress solve**

**Cooper 25** [Dick Cooper, 1-15-25, Congresswoman Dina Titus, "Rep. Titus Reintroduces Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act To Safeguard Nevadans"]

<https://titus.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4718> //  

"Over more than three decades and at every step in the process, the Yucca Mountain project has faltered because Nevadans do not want nuclear waste stored in our state," Rep. Titus said. "We must codify this opposition into law to protect the health and safety of our communities and guarantee a process that requires the consent of state, local, and tribal leaders. Nevada is not a nuclear waste land. We don't produce nuclear waste, and we shouldn't be forced to store it." "I've said for years that Washington shouldn't have the unilateral authority to make decisions that will impact communities and the environment in the Silver State for generations to come," said Senator Catherine Cortez Masto. "Nevadans have made it clear, Yucca Mountain is dead. This legislation will give local and Tribal leaders the seat at the table they deserve in decision-making about nuclear repositories in their communities – in Nevada and across the country. I will continue to fight to make sure Nevadans' voices are heard." "Nevadans have been overwhelmingly clear in their opposition to making Nevada the nation's nuclear waste dumping ground," said Senator Jacky Rosen. "This **legislation will ensure** that **states** like Nevada have a say in **opposing the storage of nuclear waste** in their backyard. I'll always fight against Washington's efforts to bring nuclear waste to our state." "Nevadans will not stand by at attempts to make our state a nuclear dumping ground," Rep. Steven Horsford said. "Our public health is on the line; our environmental safety is on the line; our ability to feel secure in our communities is on the line – so our voices will not be silenced. I'm proud to cosponsor the **Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act** to **require local consent for any attempt to store nuclear waste** at Yucca Mountain, and I will always work to prevent this ill-conceived project from moving forward." "Nevada has made it clear for decades that we refuse to become the nation's nuclear dumping ground," said Rep. Susie Lee. "This bill ensures that nuclear waste projects, like Yucca Mountain, cannot move forward without consent from the communities they affect. I'll continue fighting against attempts to revive Yucca Mountain." Congresswoman **Titus's long track record of elevating** Nevadans' voices in **consent-based** siting for **nuclear waste** and toxic material dates back to 2015 when she first introduced the consent-based legislation. She has introduced similar legislation in every congressional session since. Her efforts also include supporting funding for the Office of Nuclear Energy that advances the goals of the Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act. Congresswoman Titus also has worked with the State of Nevada's Agency for Nuclear Projects to urge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to consider Nevada's motion to reopen the licensing proceeding regarding Yucca Mountain so that a vote to suspend the project could be taken. Congresswoman Titus's bicameral Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act is based on the 2012 recommendations of the Department of Energy's Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America's Nuclear Future and that Department's consent-based siting report from 2017. The legislation would allow funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund to be used for **construction of a nuclear waste repository only if the Secretary of Energy secured written consent** from:

## **[T] Future initiatives need indigenous input. Wilson Center 24**

Wilson Center, 3-19-2024 "Nuclear Power is Tribal Power,"

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nuclear-power-tribal-power>, accessed 3-30-2025/SidRev

As the inevitable debate ensues, what is often not appreciated is the essential need to gain support from our Native American communities from the very start and through the developments. A report by the NRGJ calculated that: **"American Indian lands** are **estimated to include** as much as **50 percent of US** potential **uranium** reserves". That **amount** could **meet** most (or **all**) **of the future** medium-term **domestic demand growth**. Thus, **any attempt to reboot American uranium production** that is **not cast in full and willing partnership with sovereign tribal governments** and their local communities **will** likely **fail**. Neither technology nor regulatory reform can overcome the sins of the past, which must be set straight before the industry can move forward.

## **[T] SMRs good for Indigenous communities, but investment needed**

**Edwards 24**, Hatch, "Exploring sustainable nuclear energy in Indigenous communities: A balancing act", 6-18-2024,  
<https://www.hatch.com/About-Us/Publications/Blogs/2024/06/Exploring-sustainable-nuclear-energy-in-Indigenous-communities-A-balancing-act/> Lexmas

In the vast expanse of northern Indigenous communities, small modular reactors (**SMRs**) are emerging as a promising yet controversial frontier of sustainable energy in remote regions. These compact, versatile reactors **promise clean energy, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and economic development**. However, their implementation raises critical questions about community preferences, environmental impact, and historical context. This blog will explore preliminary preferences and issues that people in northern Indigenous communities have toward SMR technology and projects, and—with an understanding of remote Indigenous communities' diverse views on SMRs—will examine new ways for engagement, participation, and co-development to balance the benefits of this technology with the legacy of conventional nuclear and uranium mining in the north. Context review SMRs represent a departure not just from the current situation, but from traditional renewable energy. These modular reactors are designed to be smaller, safer, and more flexible—a significant deviation from large-scale nuclear power plants. Their compact size allows for easier deployment in remote regions, making them an attractive option for communities in the north. **With the potential** to provide reliable electricity, heat, and even desalination, SMRs offer a **path toward sustainable development**. A **cost-effective approach** compared to large reactors, they can be deployed in small increments, enabling siting flexibility and a compact footprint, even in challenging environments. However, the introduction of SMRs is not without controversy. **Indigenous communities have a complex relationship with nuclear technology, shaped by historical injustices; irreversible damage to their lands, water sources, and ecosystems; environmental concerns; and the displacement of people and cultural values**. It's also noteworthy that while nuclear energy may be championed by some Indigenous peoples as emphasizing a focus on the future and on building a legacy, nuclear power also involves mining the earth for uranium, using water in the reactors, and burying radioactive waste deep in the ground. For many Indigenous people, this is not perceived as "clean". Other **Indigenous peoples view SMRs as an opportunity for economic growth and energy sovereignty**, and this is being marked by significant changes to engagement and inclusion. The Canadian nuclear industry has initiated programs like the Nuclear Ambassadors to foster positive relationships with Indigenous Nations and communities<sup>1</sup>, and have been warmly welcoming Indigenous Chiefs to important conferences and industry events, ensuring that their voices are heard and their questions are answered. With this in mind, it's important to consider the fuller picture of **developing** new nuclear energy. Not only **will it take significant** private and public **investment**, but it also requires leadership, economic buy-in, **and economic reconciliation with Indigenous communities**<sup>2</sup>. Leadership, collaboration, and community engagement Northern Indigenous communities are intimately connected to their land, water, and wildlife. The environmental impact of SMRs—both during operation and decommissioning—must be carefully assessed to ensure responsible stewardship of natural resources while harnessing nuclear energy. Key considerations include radioactive waste management, water use, and potential habitat disruption.

## 2AC

We get new responses in rebuttal, no warrant why we don't. It's the norm in PF:

1] Perm do both; perm do the aff and the alt. The plan is key for empowering native Americans

2] Double bind – either the alt overwhelms links to the aff or it wasn't going to solve in the first place.

3] The alt doesn't solve the links nor the aff. There's no explanation of what "refusal" is---is burning down buildings refusal? They can't explain what they fiat or who does it. At best, it's way too slow.

4] Vague alts are a voter; not specifying how long it takes, who does it, where settlers go lets them spike out of offense.

**Representations don't shape reality.**

**Resnick '17** [Brian Resnick; science reporter for Vox; 2017; "7 psychological concepts that explain the Trump era of politics"; Vox;

<https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/3/20/14915076/7-psychological-concepts-explain-trump-politics>; accessed 11-10-2024] leon

In fact, studies show the exact opposite: The more informed people are about politics, the more likely they are to be stubborn about political issues.

<<TEXT CONDENSED NONE OMITTED>>

This concept is related to motivated reasoning, but it's important enough to warrant its own consideration. It shows how motivated reasoning becomes especially stubborn and ugly when it comes to politics. "People are using their reason to be socially competent actors," says Dan Kahan, a psychologist at Yale, and one of the leading experts on this phenomenon. Put another way: We have a lot of pressure to live up to our groups' expectations. And the smarter we are, the more we put our brain power to use for that end. In his studies, Kahan will often give participants different kinds of math problems. When the problem is about nonpolitical issues — like figuring out the whether a drug is effective — people tend to use their math skills to solve it. But when they're evaluating something political — let's say, the effectiveness of gun control measures — the trend is that the better participants are at math, the more partisan they are in their responses. "Partisans with weak math skills were 25 percentage points likelier to get the answer right when it fit their ideology," Ezra Klein explained in a profile of Kahan's work. "Partisans with strong math skills were 45 percentage points likelier to get the answer right when it fit their ideology. The smarter the person is, the dumber politics can make them." And it's not just for math problems: Kahan finds that Republicans who have higher levels of science knowledge are more stubborn when it comes to questions on climate change. The pattern is consistent: The more information we have, the more we bend it to serve our political aims. That's why the current debate over "fake news" is a bit misguided: It's not the case that if only people had perfectly true information, everyone would suddenly agree. So think of that when you hear politicians or pundits talk shop: They know a lot about politics, but they're bending what they know to fall in line with their political goals. And they probably don't realize they are doing this and can feel confident in their partisan conclusions because they feel well informed. 3) Evolution has left us with an "immune system" for uncomfortable thoughts. There's a reason why we engage in motivated reasoning, a reason why facts often don't matter: evolution. Critical thinking and reasoning skills evolved because they made it easier to cooperate in groups, Elizabeth Kolbert explains in a recent New Yorker piece. We've since adapted these skills to make breakthroughs in topics like science and math. But when pressed, we default to using our powers of mind to get along with our groups. Psychologists theorize that's because our partisan identities get mixed up with our personal identities. Which would mean that an attack on our strongly held beliefs is an attack on the self. "The brain's primary responsibility is to take care of the body, to protect the body," Jonas Kaplan, a psychologist at the University of Southern California, says. "The psychological self is the brain's extension of that. When our self feels attacked, our [brain is] going to bring to bear the same defenses that it has for protecting the body." It's like we have an immune system for uncomfortable thoughts.

<<LINE BREAKS CONTINUE>>

Recently, Kaplan has found more evidence that we tend to take political attacks personally. In a study recently published in Scientific Reports, he and collaborators took 40 self-avowed liberals who reported having "deep convictions," put them inside in a functional MRI scanner, and started challenging their beliefs. Then they watched which parts of the participants' brains lit up.

Their conclusion: When the participants were challenged on strongly held beliefs, there was more activation in the parts of the brain that are thought to correspond with self-identity and negative emotions.

4) The argument that's most convincing to you is not convincing to your ideological opponents

The only risk of offense is the affirmative it actually forces us to make changes in policy making.

If they win reps are key then we should win the aff, it influences