

# Constructive

Ben **Blanchard**, Ryan **Woo**, 10-27-20**24**, "Taiwan reports Chinese 'combat patrol' after Beijing slams US arms deal", Reuters,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows-countermeasures-after-2-bln-us-arms-sale-taiwan-2024-10-27/> // TT

**Taiwan's defence ministry said** on Sunday that **Chinese warplanes** and warships had **carried out** another

**"combat patrol" near the island**, after Beijing threatened to take countermeasures **in response to a \$2**

**billion arms sale package by the U** **S** **ates**. The United States is bound by law to provide Chinese-claimed Taiwan with the means to defend itself despite the

lack of formal diplomatic ties, to the constant anger of Beijing. The Pentagon said on Friday the United States had approved a potential \$2 billion arms sale package to Taiwan, including the

delivery for the first time to the island of an advanced air defence missile system battle-tested in Ukraine. **Taiwan's defence ministry said it had detected**

**19 Chinese military aircraft**, including Su-30 fighter jets, carrying out a "joint combat readiness patrol" **around Taiwan in conjunction with**

**Chinese warships** starting on Sunday morning.

Christopher S. **Chivvis et. al**, **10**-17-20**24**, "U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s: Toward a Realistic Scenario for Coexistence", Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/us-china-relations-for-the-2030s-toward-a-realistic-scenario-for-coexistence> // TT

The **Taiwan** issue, **with Beijing's heightened military pressure** on the island **and Washington's greater support** for it,

**poses the greatest risk of a U.S.-China war. The United States has been enmeshed in this** issue, through acts and

decisions not to act, almost **since its inception during the Chinese Civil War**. It has played a decisive role at every juncture, even while professing an

official position of not taking a position, other than that of urging the two sides to resolve the issue peacefully. **Beijing has made clear that if Taiwan or**

**Washington ignore its red lines, it will** quickly **move to** compel a return to the status quo through **hostilities or**, failing that,

**unification with the mainland by force** **The United States, Taiwan, and China today are much closer to**

**conflict than at any time** since at least the 1970s.

Christopher S. **Chivvis et. al**, **10-17-2024**, "U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s: Toward a Realistic Scenario for Coexistence", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/us-china-relations-for-the-2030s-toward-a-realistic-scenario-for-coexistence> // TT

**The year 2027**, which will be **the centennial of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)**, **has frequently cited by senior U.S. military figures as a "war date," and** hence a reference point for U.S. public discourse. By that year, the growing preparedness of the PLA **may make Beijing likelier to take risks**. But going to war with the United States over Taiwan would remain fraught with danger for the CCP and for China—Xi probably would take this step only if other options are exhausted.

## CI

### Subpoint A is De-escalation

Right now, U.S. military support makes conflict inevitable. When the U.S. increases aid, China responds by increasing military activities – locking us into a back-and-forth cycle.

Michael D. **Swaine**, 1/23/20**23**, Senior research fellow in the Quincy Institute's East Asia Program, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, served as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, What the US Gets Wrong About Taiwan and Deterrence,  
<https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-taiwan-and-deterrence/>)

Moreover, while some Asian countries are certainly hedging against China's growing military power and the danger of a Sino-American conflict by increasing their defense spending, **the region as a whole is more worried about economic issues such as**

recovering from the pandemic, overcoming recession, and promoting sustainable growth through continued close economic ties with both the United States and China. For the United States, a deterrence policy predicated on keeping Taiwan separate from China for strategic reasons is totally incompatible with its one China policy, whereby Washington opposes any unilateral move toward Taiwan independence, maintains strategic ambiguity regarding its defense of Taiwan, and remains open to the possibility of peaceful, uncoerced unification. This position remains the core of the understanding reached in 1972, which formed the basis of the normalization of Sino-American relations, in which the U.S. acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China while Beijing stressed that peaceful unification would be a top priority of its cross-strait policy. If the United States were to abrogate that critical understanding by, for example, extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, or making the island into a full-fledged security ally (as the deterrence-only approach advocates), China would without doubt respond by dropping its part of the understanding and proceed to reverse any such U.S. actions by all means necessary, including military force. The PRC government's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens would simply not survive if Beijing failed to respond to such a basic challenge to its nationalist credentials.

Equally significant, China's leaders would almost certainly resort to force even if the U.S. enjoyed superior military deterrence capabilities, a point that is apparently not fully grasped by proponents of the deterrence-only approach. Given the incredibly high political stakes involved, even a failed effort to forcibly prevent the loss of Taiwan would be viewed in Beijing as favorable to doing nothing. The latter would almost certainly result in a severe domestic crisis, putting at risk not only the personal positions of China's leaders but the stability of the entire PRC regime. The former, however, would leave open the possibility of future rounds of conflict over the island, since any U.S. "victory" in a conventional Taiwan conflict would by necessity remain limited due to the danger of nuclear escalation. The Biden administration seems to be inviting such desperate Chinese calculations with its erosion of the one China policy and its growing reliance on aspects of the deterrence-only approach to Taiwan. President Joe Biden has said repeatedly that the United States will intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan, thereby treating the island as a sovereign security ally. He has also asserted that Taiwan alone must decide whether it should be independent, which denies the long-standing U.S. stance of opposition to any unilateral move toward Taiwan independence. The government has also designated Taiwan as a non-NATO U.S. ally, giving it a status similar to sovereign nations with which it has formal security ties. It has sent senior U.S. officials to Taiwan under quasi-official conditions and sought to pressure countries against shifting their diplomatic representation from Taiwan to China, despite Washington having taken exactly the

same action in 1979. And one senior U.S. defense official recently indicated in congressional testimony that Taiwan is indeed a critical U.S. strategic node central to its entire defense position in the Western Pacific, implying that the United States would be opposed to Taiwan uniting with China under any circumstances. China's leaders have concluded from these and other actions that U.S. statements in support of the one China policy are no longer entirely credible. Beijing has responded by increasing military pressure on Taiwan, while acquiring capabilities to deter U.S. military intervention. The United States has in turn interpreted China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait as evidence of Beijing's bad faith intentions and possible rejection of peaceful unification. The two countries are thus increasingly locked in an escalating, interactive process, while each denies responsibility and accuses the other. This confrontational action-reaction cycle greatly raises the risk of a miscalculation that could spark a military conflict. If the United States and China are sincere in their desire to avoid going to war over Taiwan, they must take meaningful actions to end the existing vicious cycle. They can start by rejecting the military-centered, worst-case assessments of their hawkish strategists and defuse the Taiwan issue as an escalating object of Sino-American strategic competition. This can only be done by Washington reviving the credibility of the one China policy through actions, not just words, in return for credible Chinese actions that convey Beijing's clear, continued preference for peaceful unification. Washington should place clear limits on Taiwan-U.S. interactions to emphasize that they are unofficial and do not involve contacts between senior officials. The administration should also reject in unambiguous terms any strategic rationale for keeping Taiwan separate from China and reassert its acceptance of any peaceful, uncoerced resolution of the Taiwan issue. It should also clarify that it expects Taipei to do far more to defend itself and will actively oppose any efforts to establish unilaterally its de jure status as a sovereign, independent state. Beijing should affirm unambiguously that it has no timeline for unification, while reducing its military exercises and presence near Taiwan. Washington and Beijing should then agree upon reciprocal reductions in military plans and activities relevant to Taiwan, such as nearby surveillance and reconnaissance operations, the development of a large-scale Chinese amphibious capability, and the U.S. sale of offensive weapons such as ballistic missiles to Taiwan. None of this can occur in the context of continually escalating Sino-American rivalry centered in intense competition and ever greater levels of deterrence. Washington and Beijing

have the means of neutralizing Taiwan as a source of strategic competition and establishing a durable floor under their relationship, based on resolving problems and building incentives for real cooperation, not endless push-back. Let us hope they also have the will.

Historically, Taiwan and China have attempted to peacefully resolve their differences – but those attempts have been blocked by the continued supply of American weapons.

**Ndegwa 24** [Stephen Ndegwa prior to joining the World Bank, Mr. Ndegwa was Associate Professor of Government at The College of William and Mary (Virginia, USA, 1994-2002). In 2010, he was a Rice Family Faculty Fellow at Yale University and a non-resident Visiting Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy (Spring 2011). He is the author or editor of several books and his research articles have appeared in leading journals including award-winning work in the American Political Science Review, “How the U.S. Blocks China’s Diplomatic Path to Taiwan Reunification,” Capital Bank, <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2024/09/how-the-u-s-blocks-chinas-diplomatic-path-to-taiwan-reunification/>]

lay cgc // re-cut

**China’s proposal of “One Country, Two Systems” in the 1980s is a clear demonstration of its diplomatic**

**approach.** Originally put forward by Deng Xiaoping, **the policy was intended to offer Taiwan a high degree of autonomy**

**while maintaining its reunification with mainland China.** Though Taiwan has consistently rejected the proposal, it symbolized **Beijing’s**

**flexibility in seeking a non-military solution.** During periods of relatively warmer cross-strait relations, especially under Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou presidency

(2008-2016), **Beijing made significant diplomatic strides. The historic 2015 meeting between Chinese President**

**Xi Jinping and Ma was the first between the two sides’ leaders since 1949, marking a milestone in**

**Beijing’s efforts to foster dialogue with Taiwan. Despite these efforts, U.S. interference has remained a**

**major roadblock. Washington** has long inserted itself into the cross-strait equation, **perpetuating**

**tensions** and undermining China’s attempts at peaceful resolution. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

**is central to this interference. While the TRA does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, it**

**guarantees American support for Taiwan’s defense.** This has led to consistent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, emboldening pro-independence factions

and undermining China’s diplomatic efforts. The **U.S. narrative** of “protecting democracy” **in Taiwan masks its true geopolitical interests,**

**using Taiwan as a strategic buffer in its broader competition with China. In recent years, U.S. actions**

**have grown more provocative.** Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, for instance,

flagrantly violated diplomatic norms and escalated tensions. Such visits signal to pro-independence factions in Taiwan that they have U.S. backing, dampening the prospects for peaceful dialogue. Though Washington claims to support the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, its increasing militarization of U.S.-Taiwan relations—through arms deals and strategic dialogues—indicates a different agenda. The U.S. is

more focused on using Taiwan in its rivalry with China than on preserving peace. This approach blocks Beijing's diplomatic avenues and heightens distrust. U.S. influence also

stirs skepticism within Taiwan about Beijing's intentions. By casting China as an imminent military threat, Washington fuels fear among the

Taiwanese people, making any peace proposal from Beijing appear suspect or coercive. This perpetuates a cycle of distrust, making peaceful negotiations more difficult. If the international

community genuinely seeks peace in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. must step back and allow direct, unimpeded dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. Ending arms sales that

undercut diplomacy and ceasing provocations that escalate tensions are essential steps. Respecting

China's sovereignty and allowing the Chinese people to resolve their internal matters is key to a peaceful

solution. China has demonstrated its willingness to engage diplomatically. It is now up to the U.S. to

stop being the obstacle. Peace in the Taiwan Strait depends not on military might but on diplomatic

engagement, and the world should support that path.

China will never surrender Taiwan – the island is directly tied to the legitimacy and power of the Chinese government.

Denny Roy, 10-13-2023, "The Likelihood of U.S.-China War Still Hinges on Taiwan," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/likelihood-us-china-war-still-hinges-taiwan-206944> // MH // re-cut

Much has changed in the U.S.-China relationship over the past three decades as China has increased its global economic and political influence, built modern military forces, and grown to be the world's second-largest economy. One thing that has not changed, however, is that Taiwan is still the most likely trigger of a U.S.-China war.

There are many irritants in U.S.-China relations, but very few things that would foment a military

conflict. China and the United States will not go to war against each other over the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic

coercion, spy balloons, U.S. restrictions on the sale of advanced technology to China, Chinese cyber-theft, repression in Xinjiang and

Hong Kong, China holding U.S. citizens as hostages, China's rapid economic growth, alleged U.S. attempts to subvert the

Chinese government, U.S. security cooperation in the region, a Chinese naval base in one of the Pacific island states,

statements by Americans that “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people,” or China’s nuclear weapons buildup. The South China Sea

deserves mention as a “flashpoint.” An incident between U.S. and Chinese ships or aircraft could escalate into hostilities. Generally, however,

Beijing is maintaining if not gradually gaining ground, and this trend is unaffected by occasional U.S. “freedom of

navigation” sail-bys. A war on the Korean Peninsula could result in Chinese and U.S. forces shooting at each other, but only if both sides took a series of wrong turns. In

general, three contingencies would cause Beijing to consider going to war. The first is the emergence of a situation

that endangers the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) monopoly over political power in China and that could be

neutralized by opting for war. The second is the killing of PRC nationals by operatives of a foreign government. Probably a large number;

note that the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 by U.S. aircraft, which killed three Chinese, did not lead to U.S.-China hostilities. A third possible casus

belli would be foreign seizure of what Beijing considers to be Chinese territory. Two of these contingencies would apply

to Taiwan. The narrative built by the CCP forces it to resist at all costs the permanent political

separation of Taiwan from China, or else the party by its own criteria proves itself unfit to rule China. Faced

with a choice between fighting a war it did not think it could win and acquiescing to Taiwan’s

independence, the regime would likely see the former as offering the better chance of [to] keeping the

CCP in power. Beijing also defines Taiwan as Chinese territory that would be “lost” if it became the Republic of Taiwan—particularly valuable territory, as Taiwan by itself is the

world’s twentieth-largest economy. For the United States, the most likely path to a war on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean is the need to defend a friend or ally that is under attack.

Reducing arms sales allows us to defuse the region, avoiding U.S.-China confrontation and ensuring long-term peace.

Richard C. Bush, 01-14-2014, “Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan”, Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/thoughts-on-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan/> // TT

It is my great pleasure to provide a few comments on a policy report by Piin-Fen Kok and David Firestein. This is a really valuable resource that pulls together a lot of useful information. For example, when I worked on Capitol Hill, I kept track of way in which notification of defense articles to Taiwan differed sometimes sharply from deliveries, as this report does. That material is

probably somewhere in my basement, but if I had to find it I'm not sure I could. Now I don't have to worry because it's all in "Threading the Needle." So it will be on my shelf of studies that need to be accessible on a moment's notice. More importantly, I agree with the sound conclusions that are drawn from the report's analysis. Each of us comes at the general subject of Taiwan and at specific subsidiary issues in different ways. The authors of "Threading the Needle" have their way. This morning, I would like to provide my own analytical perspective. As an aside, I have long felt that the August 1982 communique, which figures a lot in "Threading the Needle," was not one of the shining hours of American diplomacy. Far from it. In terms of substance and process, it was not a good outcome for the United States. But I've discussed that elsewhere and won't dwell on it here. From my own perspective, I would make five basic points. The first point is that **any analysis of China's approach to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan must start with Beijing's own logic on**

**the issue.** The starting point here is Deng Xiaoping's conversation with Leonard Woodcock on December 15, 1978 on the arms sales issue. This was a difficult meeting that revealed that

the two governments had a fairly significant disagreement. Among other things, Deng told Woodcock that "continued arms sales would amount to retaining the essence of the MDT, that **such sales would block efforts to find a rational means of settling the Taiwan issue peacefully**, and that force

would be left as the last resort." Specifically, Deng warned that if Chiang Ching-kuo "should lean on certain powerful support, say the provision of arms, and refuses to talk to us about the problem of reunification," that was a circumstance in which China would use force against Taiwan. When Deng visited the United States in January 1979, he repeated this condition. He claimed that Beijing had a "fair and reasonable policy" towards Taiwan and would "try our very best to use peaceful means" to solve the issue. China had patience, he said, but the patience was not unlimited. **This link between Taiwan's willingness to negotiate and China's non-use of force continues**, I would

argue until today. It occurs in an important speech that Qian Qichen gave in 2001 on the "two hands" of Beijing's Taiwan policy. It occurs in the 2000 White Paper. And it was enshrined most authoritatively in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005. Note how this relationship sheds new light on the key linkage in the August 1982 Communique: between China's statement of a "fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question" and the U.S. agreement to reduce arms sales. **For Washington, China's stated policy**

**provided, it claimed, a context that made weapons sales to Taiwan less necessary. For Beijing, on the**

**other hand, a U.S. reduction in arms sales, "leading to a final resolution" is the precondition for**

**avoiding the use of force.** My second point has to do with odd, asymmetric character of the bargain undertaken in the August 1982 Communique. Simply put,

**Beijing makes a commitment about its intentions (that is, it commits to strive for a peaceful solution) in return for a U.S. commitment to restrict Taiwan's military capabilities. The problem, of course, is that intentions are eminently and quickly reversible while creating or restoring capabilities can take a long time.** Moreover,

Beijing's statement of its intentions has always been stated in an ambiguous way, and it has always reserved the right to determine whether circumstances have changed to the point that a change in intentions is necessary. This asymmetry between PRC intentions and ROC capabilities may not have been such a big issue at the time that the Communique was signed, but that has changed. As "Threading the Needle" clearly explains, China's acquisition and use of its capabilities since the early 1990s calls into question its peaceful intent. Based on its own logic, however, China would say that its acquisition and use was made necessary by actions by Taiwan leaders that frustrated China's desire for a peaceful solution. My third point is to question the very premise of the PRC logic that created the linkage between U.S. arms sales, Taiwan's willingness to negotiate, and whether China need to use force to fulfill its goals. Obviously, whether Taipei is willing to negotiate with Beijing is a function of its confidence that those negotiations won't hurt Taiwan's fundamental interests. Precisely because Beijing reserves the right to use force, the greater Taiwan's ability to deter, the more confidence it will have to negotiate. **And there is plenty of evidence that there is a weak**

**correlation at best between U.S. arms sales and Taipei's willingness to negotiate with Beijing.**



**McCoy 23** [Alfred McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison., 3-7-23, "The Devastating Consequences of a War Over Taiwan", Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-war-taiwan-military/> DOA: 11-1-24] cgc

Should China launch an all-out invasion, however, Taiwan would likely succumb within a few days once its air force of just 470 combat aircraft was overwhelmed by the PLA's 2,900 jet fighters, 2,100 supersonic missiles, and its massive navy, now the world's largest. Reflecting China's clear strategic advantage of simple proximity to Taiwan, the island's occupation might well be a fait accompli before the US Navy ships could arrive from Japan and Hawaii in sufficient numbers to challenge the massive Chinese armada. If Beijing and Washington somehow let the pull of policy and planning drag them into such an ever-widening war, however, the damage could still prove incalculable—with cities devastated, untold thousands dead, and the global economy, with its epicenter in Asia, left in ruins. Let us only hope that today's leaders in both Washington and Beijing prove more restrained than did their counterparts in Berlin and Paris in August 1914 when plans for victory unleashed a war that would leave 20 million dead in its wake.

### Subpoint B is Diplomacy

Currently, American arms sales to Taiwan hurt U.S.-China cooperation.

Michael E. O'Hanlon, Philip H. Knight, Ivan Kanapathy, Rorry Daniels, Thomas Hanson, 04-16-2024, "Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?", The Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/> // TT

Attempts to reassure China regarding U.S. intentions are misguided and fruitless. From Beijing's view, U.S. weapons and training cannot but support Taiwan's continued separation. Furthermore, Washington openly opposes the governance methods deployed in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong—presumptive models for a "unified" Taiwan. In the minds of PRC leaders, the United States remains the duplicitous "black hand" stirring anti-China dissent and the

“strong enemy” the PLA must prepare to defeat. By its nature, the PRC government cannot meaningfully separate U.S. support for Taiwan’s democracy from perceived U.S. support for Taiwanese independence.

Thankfully, reducing military support brings China back to the negotiating table – they want to cooperate. **Reuters 24** reports that previously,

**Reuters 24**, (July 17, 2024, Reuters, China says it has halted arms-control talks with US over Taiwan, China says it has halted arms-control talks with US over Taiwan, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-has-halted-arms-control-talks-with-us-over-taiwan-2024-07-17/>, 10-09-2024) sag

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said repeated U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in recent months had "seriously compromised the political atmosphere for continuing the arms-control consultations." "Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the U.S. on a new round of consultations on arms control and non-proliferation. The responsibility fully lies with the U.S.," Lin told a regular news briefing in Beijing. Advertisement · Scroll to continue Report

this ad Lin said China was willing to maintain communication on international arms control, but that the U.S. "must respect China's core interests and create necessary conditions for dialogue and exchange." U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said China has chosen to follow Russia's lead by asserting that arms-control engagement cannot proceed while there are other challenges in the bilateral relationship. 1.00 00:0001:36 "We think this approach undermines strategic stability, it increases the risk of arms-race dynamics," Miller told reporters. "Unfortunately, by suspending these consultations, China has chosen not to pursue efforts that would manage strategic risks and prevent costly arms races, but we the United States will remain open to developing and implementing concrete risk-reduction measures with China."

The only path forward is to affirm and scale-back.

Charles L. **Glaser**, 04-01-20**15**, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation”, MIT Press

Direct,

<https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/39/4/49/12308/A-U-S-China-Grand-Bargain-The-Hard-Choice-between?redirectedFrom=fulltext> //

TT

**U.S. unilateral adoption of** less dramatic changes in the government's Taiwan policy—most importantly, **slowing or ending U.S. arms sales**

**to Taiwan**<sup>110</sup>—is an option that might **provide a better balance of risks and benefit**. Even this much smaller change in U.S. policy, however, risks

sending China the wrong signal. Another way to balance feasibility and benefits, therefore, could be to look for a path that divides the grand bargain into smaller, more attainable increments.

One can **imagine a series of steps, including the United States ending its arms sales to Taiwan and China**

**ending its use of force to advance its maritime claims, that could be implemented sequentially to**

**create a phased grand bargain. This approach would enable the U**<sup>nited</sup> **S**<sup>tates</sup> **to** revert to its current Taiwan policy if China failed to

uphold its side of the phased agreement. Another possibility might include partial resolution of the maritime disputes. An agreement that delayed resolution of the sovereignty disputes far into the future, or indefinitely, while settling the resource disputes would be more feasible to achieve than a full resolution. This type of agreement could be possible because, for the most part, the

sovereignty disputes can be separated from the resource disputes. In fact, China and Japan reached this type of arrangement in 2008, although it has yet to be implemented.<sup>111</sup> **The**

**United States could pursue** a variant of **this** staged **approach** that would enable it to try **to push the diplomatic process**

**forward**. In this more proactive model, **the United States would make its initial concession unilaterally, while**

**explaining that further concessions would hinge on China's reciprocation** of its initial move.

**Rajagopalan 24,** (9-24-2024, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, China-US Nuclear Arms Control Talks: A Much-Needed First Step, No

Publication, China-US Nuclear Arms Control Talks: A Much-Needed First Step,

<https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/china-us-nuclear-arms-control-talks-a-much-needed-first-step/>, 10-9-2024) sag

**With China undertaking a significant expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, any effort**

**toward more sustained arms control talks** is a welcome step. Such efforts **can bring about a certain**

**amount of predictability and stability**. But for some time, China has dismissed the possibility of joining these arms control talks, saying that its nuclear arsenal

is nowhere near the size of the United States' or Russia's. However, an expanding arsenal could mean that China might end up with over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, as per the Pentagon's latest China military power report. The talks last week were led on the U.S. side by Mallory Stewart, assistant secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) at the Department of State, and on the Chinese side by Sun Xiaobo, director general of the arms control department at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A State Department press release on the meeting said that the two sides "held a candid and in-depth discussion on issues related to arms control and nonproliferation as part of ongoing efforts to maintain open lines of communication and responsibly manage the U.S.-PRC relationship," referring to China's formal name, the People's Republic of China (PRC). The U.S. side underscored "the importance of increased PRC nuclear transparency and substantive engagement on practical measures to manage and reduce strategic risks across multiple domains, including nuclear and outer space." The United States also called for both sides to "promote stability, help avert an unconstrained arms race, and manage competition so that it does not veer into conflict." Even though there was no joint statement, China also issued a similar statement that highlighted the "in-depth, candid and constructive exchange of views" that the two sides had on a number of areas including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), cooperation among the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members – who are also recognized nuclear weapon states under the NPT – nuclear security, non-proliferation and export control, and space security and broader arms control. The statement also said that the two sides noted the importance of "maintain[ing]

communication and exchanges, to increase mutual trust, pool more consensus, manage differences, and explore cooperation.” China’s statement went on to add

that Washington and Beijing “should carry out dialogue and cooperation on the basis on mutual trust.”

China also “stressed that the two sides should adhere to the vision of common, comprehensive,

cooperative and sustainable security, earnestly respect each other’s sovereignty, security and

development interests, increase strategic mutual trust, and remain committed to safeguarding the

international system of arms control and non-proliferation, so as to realize lasting peace and universal

security in the world.”

That the two sides additionally recognized the importance of addressing the growing competition in other domains, including outer space, is

significant. Space security conditions have worsened particularly in the last few years. The steady growth of counterspace capabilities, both vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the greater willingness shown by major space powers to demonstrate these capabilities are worrying trends. Reaching even an early common understanding of the nature and scope of space security threats at the bilateral level can be useful in making progress on the global space governance front. The November nuclear talks could possibly set in motion the first steps for a sustained constructive engagement between the United States and China in order to develop a common understanding of the challenges and threats as they pertain to strategic stability. But it is too early to say if it will follow a particular format in terms of the process or substantial aspects. In fact, a few days ahead of the talks last week the White House clarified to Reuters that the meeting “would not resemble formal arms reduction talks, like those the U.S. has had with Russia.” As nuclear analysts comment, there are not going to be any breakthroughs in the immediate future,

but these talks could be useful in establishing certain structural and institutional processes to develop

crisis management and stabilizing measures. There are multiple benefits to this kind of engagement

for the broader region as well as for the global non-proliferation regime. China entering the arms

control talks would have a calming and stabilizing effect on its neighbors, for one. A potential spiraling

arms race in southern Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, as a result of China’s nuclear advancement,

could be halted if these talks continue and there is some moderation to the nuclear trends. The talks

will have a significant impact also on the global rule making exercise in the area of outer space and halt

some of the negative trends in space security as well as strengthen the NPT and the broader non-proliferation regime.

Otherwise, **Gilber 05** concludes an arms race increases the likelihood of war by 5x.

**Gilber**, Douglas. “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270?seq=1>

In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as

Table II shows, **the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35% during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes [raises 5 times] from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.**

## **Rebuttal**

**The China of today isn't the China of 70 yrs ago.**

Michelle **Gavin**, 10-16-20**24**, "The Upside to Uncertainty on Taiwan", Foreign Affairs,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/upside-uncertainty-taiwan> // RB

**But past performance is no guarantee of future results. U.S. policy has succeeded** in part **because all sides** were content to **push off a definitive resolution to the future, believing that time was on their side.** For decades, **China's leaders hoped that its growing economic** dynamism and prosperity **would make unification increasingly attractive to** the people of **Taiwan** **and more acceptable to the United States.** This belief was reinforced by an observation Kissinger made to the Chinese during a 1971 meeting in Beijing: "As a student of history, one's prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai indicated to me. . . . We will not stand in the way of basic evolution." From the U.S. perspective, the passage of time was thought likely to narrow the differences between Taiwan and the mainland, so that the two sides could come to an understanding in which Taiwan could preserve its democracy and respect for human rights, perhaps under the rubric of "one country, two systems." **Today**, many argue, the **situation is far different,** with **none of the three parties believing that time is on its side.** From the perspective of some in the United States and in Taiwan, **China's**

growing military and economic might means that Beijing will soon have the capability to prevail in a military conflict; even today, many argue, a successful defense of the island would be problematic. According to this camp, only by dramatically enhancing deterrence through an unambiguous commitment to Taiwan's defense, including both military and political support, can a takeover be forestalled. From the perspective of China, political trends in Taipei and Washington are moving in the wrong direction. In January, Taiwan's voters elected Lai Ching-te as president, a leader whom Beijing considers much more pro-independence than his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. That, coupled with Congress's increasingly militant support for Taiwan, means that the island is at risk of slipping from Beijing's grasp. In a mirror image of the U.S. debate, hawks in China advocate accelerating their country's military capability to subdue Taiwan. It is this very mirror imaging that contributes to the current sense of crisis, a familiar pattern in which anxiety and insecurity lead one side to take preemptive measures that induce even more fear on the other side—what international relations theorists call the “security dilemma” or the “spiral model.” The more China flexes its muscles toward Taiwan, the more the United States promotes arms sales and Congressional visits to Taiwan to bolster deterrence. And the more it does that, the more China feels the need to escalate its threats to forestall future actions.

Deterrence is failing.

**AFP 24** [The AFP, "Xi Jinping calls to prepare for war as China launches live-fire exercise in Taiwan Strait", **10/22/2024**, The Hindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-jinping-calls-to-prepare-for-war-as-china-launches-live-fire-exercise-in-taiwan-strait/article68781757.ece>] ZG

**China's military began a live-fire exercise near Taiwan on Tuesday** (October 22, 2024), **maintaining pressure on the self-ruled island after staging large-scale drills and President Xi Jinping called for troops to prepare for war.**

China's Communist Party has never ruled the island, but it claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has said it will not renounce the use of force to bring it under its control. This month it sent planes and warships around the island in what Beijing said was a "stern warning to the separatist acts of 'Taiwan Independence' forces". On Monday, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in the eastern island of Pingtan announced that "gun firing" would take place in a limited area close to the Chinese mainland, about 105km (66 miles) from Taiwan. The MSA said they would start at 9:00 a.m. local time (0100 GMT) and take place for four hours in an area encompassing about 150 sqkm (60 square miles).

**Oxford Analytica '18**, 6-28-2018, Oxford Analytica is an international consulting firm providing strategic analysis of world events.

"Taiwan will benefit from US-China friction", expert briefings,

<https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB235783/full/html>

Taiwan-US relations got a symbolic boost when the US government opened a new 250-million-dollar institute to house the de facto embassy in Taipei, Taiwan's capital, on June 12. President Tsai Ing-wen, and a US delegation that included representatives from Congress and the State

Department, attended the opening ceremony. It may have received greater attention and perhaps higher-ranking US representation had the first US-North Korea summit not been scheduled for the same day.

Impacts

Taiwan's president will be constrained from improving China ties by anti-China sentiment at home. More businesses could come under Chinese pressure as cross-Strait relations deteriorate further.

**Taiwan-US military cooperation will prompt more aggressive Chinese efforts to diminish Taiwan's standing and increase military intimidation.**

Other alliances are unique.

Doug **Bandow**, 08-29-20**24**, "What Price Are Americans Prepared to Pay for Defending Taiwan?", Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/what-price-are-americans-prepared-pay-defending-taiwan>

Other arguments for war are similarly unpersuasive. Would failing to defend Taiwan ruin U.S. credibility, especially with Washington's Asian

allies? **Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea all have defense treaties with the U.S.**, the purpose of which is **to**

**provide a formal legal guarantee.** The U.S. formally ended its Taiwan treaty **in agreeing to mutual**

**recognition with the PRC.** **Washington has no obligation to go to war for Taipei, which America's** treaty

**allies** surely **understand.**

Deterrence by punishment maintains strategic ambiguity.

Jared M. **Mckinney &** Peter **Harris**, 11-22-20**21**, "Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan," USAWC Press,

<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/> // MH

Unlike strategies placing the threat of military reprisal at their core, a **deterrence-by-punishment** strategy **does not rely**

**on** the United States **bolstering** its **military forces** in Northeast Asia. This approach **leaves the U**nited **S**tates some **room**

**to adopt a force posture capable of reassuring allies such as Japan and South Korea** about their

collective defense, while also convincing both Taiwan and China the United States is truly committed to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It also frees the US military to divest itself from vulnerable bases in Japan that may on balance make great-power war more, rather than less, likely— via a preemptive Chinese attack in an active-defense situation. Shifting the burden of deterrence from military reprisal to non-military punishment might also reduce the likelihood of a war caused by miscalculation, while also removing the pretext that China's buildup is a response to US and Taiwanese provocations. Of course, there are dangers associated with reducing the US military footprint around Taiwan. Careful research and planning must be conducted in conjunction with regional partners to ascertain what level and type of US forward deployment would be necessary to reassure allies while also lessening the chances of war. There should be no drawdown of military forces until such a time as a credible deterrence-by-punishment strategy has been put in place; otherwise Beijing might perceive a window of opportunity to wage a successful attack. Additionally, Taiwan might be less encouraged to stage an independent fight against China if it no longer believes the United States would (or could) intervene on its behalf. That said, given reports about low morale in the Taiwanese Armed Forces, as well as low defense spending (around 2 percent of GDP), a shock to the status quo might be just what the situation requires. Regardless, relying less on threats of force is not the same as ruling out the use of force altogether. Ambiguity will always exist about whether the United States would use force in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.<sup>37</sup>

The U.S. would re-invest into other allies.

Charles L. Glaser, 04-28-2021, Glaser is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China," Foreign Policy, archive.is, <https://archive.is/5m5xT> // MH // re-cut



**A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and** scale back

its opposition to China's assertive policies **simply to avoid conflict**. Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or

tertiary interests. Retrenchment's success would not depend on whether China's goals are limited **or** on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.

What would this policy look like in practice? **The United States would make its revised position public**, thereby laying the foundation **to**

**minimize pressure** from foreign policy elites and the public **to intervene if China attacked Taiwan. It would continue to**

**make clear that China's use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms,** and it could even

continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, **Washington could boost spending**

**to** preserve and even **enhance its capability to defend Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a**

**clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the commitments it**

**hasn't cut**

**Klingner** Bruce, 10-30-20**24**, Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the Senior Research Fellow for

Northeast Asia. "South Korea Cannot Afford to Sit Out Taiwan Contingencies," Heritage Foundation,

<https://www.heritage.org/china/report/south-korea-cannot-afford-sit-out-taiwan-contingencies>, accessed 10-31-2024 //rqli

**For South Korea, American involvement in the defense of Taiwan could simultaneously**

**engender both fears.** Any reduction of American forces in South Korea, or **U.S. involvement in large-scale**

**military operations off-peninsula, would trigger South Korean fears of abandonment** by its

treaty ally to face the North Korean threat alone. South Koreans would be **gravely concerned that Washington**

**would no longer be willing or able to fulfill its commitments to existing war plans for the**

**defense of South Korea**. A perceived weakening of the U.S. security commitment might also embolden Pyongyang to

engage in coercion, greater provocations, and direct attacks.

Weapons sales have been slowing.

US-Taiwan Business Council, 9-20-2024, "USTBC President Comments on Taiwan Arms Sales Data",

<https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/ustbc-president-follow-up-comments-examining-data-on-taiwan-arms-sales/> //USAK

Over the next 12-18 months, Taiwan's 'backlog' of weapons — comprising so much of the well-publicized US\$20 billion in ordered weapons — will be delivered. The amount of remaining backlog is already falling rapidly. Then what? Arms sales and their dollar figures are not the only metric that we use to measure U.S. support for Taiwan's defense, but they are an important one and can show the strength of that support. **As the numbers note, and as USTBC's analysis has consistently stated, U.S. support for Taiwan's material force modernization has been waning since 2021. It now sits at its lowest point since 2001, bar the**

**Obama Administration's 4+ year arms sales freeze from 2011-2015, and it is continuing to fall.** It is unclear

why the Biden Administration is steadily reducing the value of arms sales to Taiwan. Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) are important new factors in material support, but they should be adding to the flow and not substituting for it. Since 2001, there has been only one reason that administrations, specifically the Bush and Obama administrations, have manipulated arms sales to Taiwan; consideration of China's response has impacted the timing, type, and volume of weapons sold to Taiwan. These administrations took the view that if material support for Taiwan was curbed, this would encourage China to soften or change aspects of its behavior. That never happened.

Empirically,

Wu **Xinbo**, 8-30-20**16**, "Assessing U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration", Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/>

Assessing **U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration**

**After eight years,** the scope of **U.S.-China relations** has **significantly expanded** and is no longer restricted to the conventional issues of **bilateral trade, cross-Strait relations, the RMB exchange rate, and the Tibetan issue.**

Given China's increasing importance in the Asia-Pacific and in the world economy, this **reformed relationship encompasses broader regional issues such as tensions in the East China Sea, the South China Sea dispute, various challenges in Asia-Pacific, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as global issues like climate change, denuclearization, cybersecurity, anti-terrorism, and poverty reduction.** The U.S.-China relationship has never been more complex.

Rest were analytics.