

Westlake affirms the resolution Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.

C1: North Korea

North Korea is escalating NOW: laundry list of reasons why

Khalid, Imran. "North Korea Again Raises the Specter of Nuclear Conflict." *The Hill*, The Hill, 15 Oct. 2024, thehill.com/opinion/4933684-north-korea-nuclear-threat/. //ZM

North Korea leader **Kim Jong Un** has once again raised the specter of nuclear conflict, issuing a stark **warn[ing]** **that his regime would not hesitate to unleash** its military might — **nuclear weapons** **included** — should any adversary attempt to use force against Pyongyang. **Reported by state media on Oct. 7, this latest verbal outburst was part of his speech at the Kim Jong Un University of National Defense.** The backdrop to Kim's remarks is significant. **North Korea's parliament**, in session since **last Monday**, is reportedly **set to amend the constitution to further label[s] South Korea as** its "**primary foe**," an unmistakable signal of **deepening hostility on the peninsula**. It is no accident that this message comes only a few days after South Korean President **Yoon Suk Yeol** warned that any North Korean use of nuclear weapons would invite an "overwhelming" response from the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The **escalating rhetoric on both sides denotes the persistent volatility in the region**, where decades-old tensions remain tightly wound around the nuclear question, with no resolution in sight. Not surprisingly, North Korea has again escalated its spate of provocations against South Korea in a rather derisory fashion. In addition to test-firing tactical ballistic missiles capable of carrying massive warheads, the regime has been conducting absurd yet **practically poignant gestures as sending garbage-filled balloons across the border and broadcasting propaganda messages**. These moves reflect Pyongyang's increased confidence with their bag of multi-pronged tricks. The missile tests not only show military strength but next-level psychological warfare, assessing how its rivals can take Kim grabbing headlines around the world about his pursuit of nuclear weapons. Perhaps even more alarmingly is the news that last month **North Korea unveiled** its **uranium enrichment facility for the first time**, broadcasting images of Kim Jong-un personally **inspecting the site** and urging that centrifuges be added. This rare nuclear display highlights the regime's eagerness to flaunt its strides in its nuclear program **with an unprecedented level of boldness, hinting at potentially faster weaponization plans**. **Despite intense pressure from the international community, Pyongyang is showing that it will press on with its nuclear project as well as diversify provocation and destabilization.** However, there has been no ambiguity in the response from much of the international community to North Korea's missile tests. **The U.S., South Korea and Japan all denounced the test as a threat to international peace and a violation of United Nations resolutions against North Korea's deployment of ballistic missile systems.** The three nations have said in a joint statement that they remained dedicated to the region's security and stability and warned Pyongyang "to abandon its illegal and dangerous" behavior. **The Putin-Kim meeting has adverse ramifications in terms of regional stability in East Asia.**

Current containment efforts fail--- China's slacking off.

Suderman 22 [Alan Suderman, Associated Press investigative reporter focusing on national security + cybersecurity, 3-24-2022, China supported sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program. It's also behind their failure, AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/china-north-korea-sanctions-6e69cd6c0c17fba261f62ea8e5bc25c5>]

WASHINGTON(AP)—**Chinese middlemen launder** the proceeds of **North Korean** hackers' **cyber heists** while **Chinese ships deliver** sanctioned **North Korean goods** to Chinese ports. **Chinese companies help** North Korean **workers** — from cheap laborers to well-paid IT specialists — **find work abroad**. A Beijing art gallery even boasts of North Korean artists working 12-hour days in its heavily surveilled compound, churning out paintings of idyllic visions of life under communism that each sell for thousands of dollars.

mountain of evidence that shows Beijing is helping cash-strapped North Korea evade a broad range of international sanctions designed to hamper Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, according to an Associated Press review of United Nations reports, court records and interviews with experts. "It's overwhelming," Aaron Aronoff, a former member of a U.N. panel on North Korea and a sanctions expert at the Royal United Services Institute, said of the links between China and sanctions evasion. "That's all part of what international authorities say is a growing

"At this point, **it's very hard to say it's not intentional**." China has had a complicated relationship with Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Though uneasy with a nuclear menace at its doorstep, China doesn't want its neighbor's government to collapse, experts say. China views North Korea as a buffer against the U.S., which maintains a significant troop presence in South Korea. Beijing has long maintained it enforces the sanctions it has supported since North Korea started testing nuclear weapons and forcefully pushed back on any suggestions to the contrary. "China has been fully and strictly implementing the (U.N. Security Council) resolutions," a

Chinese ambassador said in a recent letter to the U.N, adding that his country had "sustained great losses" in doing so. But **in recent years, Beijing** has sought to **weaken** those very **sanctions and** last year **vetoed new restrictions** on Pyongyang **after** it conducted **a nuclear test**. This summer a top ruling Chinese party official provided a vivid example of China's ambiguity on sanctions as he stood clapping next to North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un during a Pyongyang military parade. Rolling past the two men were trucks carrying nuclear-capable missiles and other weapons the regime isn't supposed to have. They were joined by Russia's defense minister, apparently part of a new effort by the Kremlin, struggling in its invasion of Ukraine, to strength ties with North Korea. The U.S. has accused North Korea of supplying artillery shells and rockets to Russia, while new evidence shows Hamas fighters likely fired North Korean weapons during their Oct. 7 assault on Israel. But while Russia and a handful of other countries have been accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions, none has been as prolific as China, according to court records and international reports. "China violates North Korea sanctions it voted for and says won't work because it's afraid they'll work. And, also, says it isn't violating them" said Joshua Stanton, a human rights advocate and attorney who has helped write U.S. sanction laws against North Korea.

US-China cooperation solves. NoKo relies on China, BUT concessions on Taiwan are key--- it's a bargaining chip

Hiim 18 [Henrik Stålhane Hiim, Associate Professor @ the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies & PhD in Political Science from Oslo University, 2018, Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Asian Security, <https://sci-hub.ru/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951>]

Chinese analysts acknowledge that Beijing has used the Iran nuclear issue as a card against the US. However, they also point out that playing the Iran card has risks and has to be done with caution, as maintaining positive relations with the United States is ultimately more important than protecting Iran.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, although applied selectively, there is little doubt that the Iran nuclear issue has provided China with a source of leverage over the United States.

North Korea: A less credible card The **North Korea** an nuclear conundrum **is a** another proliferation **concern** where **the United States is dependent on Chinese help**. Infact, China's impact on the North Korean nuclear issue is even greater than its influence on the Iran program. **Beijing** has closer political ties to the hermit kingdom than any other state, and its trade and aid **keep the regime's** moribund economy **afloat**. Efforts at sanctioning the regime are therefore ineffective without Chinese support. From the very onset of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China has attempted to use this influence to gain bargaining leverage with the United States. At an early stage, Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo hinted to US officials that a change in Chinese policy on North Korea **should be compensated by a change in US Taiwan policy**.⁶⁵ At times when the relationship faced setbacks, China has hinted that US policies that harm its interests may lead to a reduction in Chinese cooperation on North Korea. For example, during a meeting with Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control John Rood in June 2008, Chinese officials made the linkage very clear, with Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei remarking that strategic

Military support is a sticking point

Thomas 24 [Richard Thomas, 7-17-2024, US-China crisis as Beijing suspends arms control talks over Taiwan weapons sales, Army Technology, <https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-china-crisis-as-beijing-suspends-arms-control-talks-over-taiwan-an-weapons-sales/>]

Tensions between China and the US have escalated since the turn of the year over weapons sales to Taiwan. **China** has **suspended talks** with the United States **on** arms control and **non-proliferation consultations**, with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs blaming Washington **for continuing** to engage in defence **sales to Taiwan**, which Beijing regards as a rogue province. In an article published on the website of China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) on 17 July, citing state-run news outlet CGTN, it was revealed that China had "decided to suspend talks with the United States" on holding a new round of consultations over arms control and non-proliferation. The responsibility for the suspension "lies squarely on the US side", said Lin Jian, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to the MND article.

Chinese sanctions empirically work as a carrot for Kim to scale down nuclearization.

Jiang 19 [Yang Jiang, Senior Researcher @ the DIIS specializing in the contemporary political economy of China 2-22-2019, Sanctions are an important tool in China's North Korea diplomacy, Danish Institute for International Studies, <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/sanctions-are-an-important-tool-in-chinas-north-korea-diplomacy>]

It is widely believed that China holds the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue because **China is North Korea's biggest** economic **benefactor, accounting for around 90% of** the latter's **trade**, and being the main aid provider and investor. Many American and Japanese politicians and analyzers do not believe that China is genuinely pursuing denuclearization in North Korea and is not willing to pull North Korea's lifeline. However, an examination of China's use of economic sanctions against North Korea shows that it is indeed very sensitive about North Korea's nuclear program, having imposed economic sanctions on North Korea each time the latter has conducted a nuclear test. Moreover, **China's pressure** on North Korea **through sanctions**, though so far not comprehensive or devastating to North Korea's economy, seems to have **worked** to change the behavior of the regime in Pyongyang in some instances, **with the imposition of sanctions being followed by North Korea returning to** the **negotiating** table.

Recently, China has reportedly followed a strategy of gradually lifting sanctions, in particular since the first summit between North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump in June 2018. China's aim is to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and carry out economic reform under Beijing's mentorship. Sanctions against North Korea have also become a tool for Beijing to negotiate with the US on trade and other broader issues and to enhance its international position more generally. Adopting a new sanctions policy China is sensitive to North Korea's nuclear tests, as they provoke Beijing to carry out unilateral or collective UN-authorized sanctions. Prior to the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea in 2006, China opposed economic sanctions, arguing that they were not an effective way of resolving conflicts and might produce catastrophic results. However, in 2006 China began to change its policies. After North Korea tested its conventional missiles in July 2006, China followed the US' campaign by freezing North Korea-related assets at the Macau branch of the Bank of China in August of that year. This was the first time that China had imposed explicit economic sanctions on North Korea. China has recently advocated gradually lifting sanctions to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. After North Korea's first nuclear test in October, China approved UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and conducted intensive mediation between North Korea and the US, which led at the end of the year to the return of North Korea to the Six Party talks—since 2003 the main China-sponsored forum for negotiating the North Korea nuclear issue. In 2009, after North Korea tried to launch a satellite (in preparation for launching long-range missiles) and conducted a second nuclear test, China stopped oil exports to North Korea for four months, as well as endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 1874. In response to UN condemnation of its satellite trial, North Korea announced it was permanently pulling out of the Six-Party talks. After North Korea carried out a long-range rocket launch in December 2012 and its third nuclear test in February 2013, China endorsed two new sets of UN Security Council sanctions. The newly installed Chinese president Xi Jinping said that "no country should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains." Beijing is seeking to retain its leverage over Pyongyang and its seat at the North Korea nuclear talks. Sanctions have also become a tool for Beijing to negotiate with the US on trade and to enhance its international position more generally. Pressuring North Korea to return to the table beyond UN sanctions, China unilaterally stopped exports of oil to North Korea in February, June and July 2013, citing technical problems. The Bank of China also halted all business with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank beyond the list of institutions targeted by UNSC sanctions. These measures were followed by a conference chaired by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, in Beijing with the aim of re-launching the Six-Party talks. North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator, Kim Gye-gwan, subsequently stated that North Korea was willing to return to the negotiating table without preconditions. China was shocked when the young North Korean leader Kim Jong-un executed his uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013, as he had been a major conduit between Beijing and Pyongyang. In response, China stopped exports of crude oil to North Korea for five months in the first half of 2014. China also reduced food aid, halted investment in the special economic zones on the border, and started restricting work visas for North Koreans. In January 2014, China's official news agency Xinhua said on Twitter that North Korea had agreed to a resumption of the Six-Party talks, although ultimately nothing came of this. Assassination triggering more restrictions After North Korea's fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016, China endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 2270 and 2321, which sought to limit North Korea's coal exports. But it was the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother Kim Jong-nam in February 2017 that induced China to take a significant step in suspending coal imports from North Korea for the rest of the year. Chinese state-owned commercial banks also restricted the financial activities of North Korean individuals and businesses in mid-2017. After North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China moved to explicitly impose limitations on the supply of oil in October of that year in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2375. Although this fell short of being a complete ban on oil exports to North Korea, it led to soaring petrol prices in the country. Combined with restrictions on coal, textiles, agri-cultural and other imports from North Korea, the latter's many economic activities came to a halt, and its foreign currency reserves dropped sharply. North Korea responds to the Chinese approach. The summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump in June 2018 can be seen as the culmination of a combined strategy of US military threats and President Trump's openness to meeting Kim, coupled with harsh sanctions, including those imposed by China, and the mediation efforts of the South Korean president, Moon Jae-in. The three meetings in March, May and June 2018 between the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jong-un show that China supports the approach of gradually lifting sanctions to induce Pyongyang to denuclearize, as well as this being a card to

negotiate trade with the US and to enhance China's international position overall. Although **North Korea announced a unilateral halt to** nuclear and missile **tests** in April, **Kim later asked for** the gradual **lifting of sanctions in return for** North Korea **reducing its nuclear facilities**, an example of the reciprocal approach that China has advocated. According to Dan De Luce and Ken Dilanian of NBC News, China has relaxed its sanctions against North Korea since the first meeting between Kim and Trump was announced in March 2018. This can be understood as a move by Beijing to retain its leverage over Pyongyang and its seat in the North Korea nuclear talks. This also serves as a bargaining chip in China's trade war with the US.

NoKo provocations risk escalation cycles and war.

Mackenzie 23 [Jean Mackenzie, 1-3-2023, "North Korea: What we can expect from Kim Jong-un in 2023, BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64123657>]

Tensions on the peninsula In the meantime, a volatile situation is developing on the Korean peninsula. **For every** perceived "**provocation**" by the North, **South Korea** and sometimes the **United States** **retaliates**. This began in May 2022, with the arrival of a new South Korean president, who promised to be tougher on North Korea. President **Yoon** Suk-yeol is guided by the **belief** that the **best way** to stop the North **is** to respond with military strength. Here-started **large-scale** joint military **exercises with the United States**, against which **the North** **protest** **and launched more missiles**. This **set off a tit-for-tat cycle of military** action, which has involved both sides flying warplanes near to their border, and firing artillery into the sea. Last week, the situation escalated, when the North unexpectedly flew five drones into South Korean airspace. The South failed to shoot them down, exposing a weak spot in its defences and triggering concern among ordinary South Koreans, who are usually unfazed by the North's activities. The president vowed the South would retaliate and punish the North for every provocation. Chad O'Carroll, CEO of Korea Risk Group, an analysis service which monitors North Korea, predicts that in 2023, this could likely lead to a direct confrontation between the two Koreas, which could even result in deaths. "**Responses** by either the North or South could **escalate to** the point where we see the **exchange of actual fire**, intentional or otherwise,"he said. One mistake **or miscalculation** and the situation could spiral.

Extinction.

Webber '19 [Philip Webber; PhD, Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility; 05-18-2019; "We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it"; Metro UK; <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>; accessed 11-04-2024] recut leon

The **nuclear armed nations** have inadvertently **created a** global **Doomsday machine**, built **with 15,000 nuclear weapons**. Most(93%)have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours. **Pre-programmed targets include main cities** as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America. **One nuclear blast**, one mistake, one cyber attack **could trigger it**. But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable.We've drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation 'Satan') 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon- the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. ->Adeafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world's tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. Adevastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) twice the altitude of Everest- and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia's 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects. <- Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude **debris** clouds would severely **reduce sunlight** levels and disrupt the world's climate **for a decade causing drought**, a prolonged **winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life** on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer

C2: Displacement of Resources

The Houthis attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea with a deadly rate

Power 24 [John Power, 10-5-2024, "Houthi Red Sea attacks still torment global trade, a year after October 7", Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/10/5/a-year-after-october-7-houthi-red-sea-attacks-still-torment-global-trade>]/pwest yang Six weeks after Hamas launched the deadliest attack on Israel in the country's history last October, the Palestinian group's Houthi allies in Yemen seized control of a British-owned cargo ship in the Red Sea. The Houthis' audacious hijacking of the Galaxy Leader would mark the start of a sustained campaign of missile and drone attacks against commercial shipping in one of the world's most important trade routes. As the war in Gaza approaches the one-year mark on October 7, Houthi attacks are still disrupting commercial shipping, exposing the vulnerability of the supply chains that form the backbone of international trade. While a United States-led international force has been able to thwart many attacks, commercial ships continue to be targeted and operators remain hesitant to use the waterway, raising the likelihood that trade will continue to suffer as long as conflict persists in the Middle East. "Until a broader peace agreement is reached, the risks in the Red Sea are unlikely to diminish significantly," Majo George, a professor at the Business School of RMIT University Vietnam, told Al Jazeera. "In the meantime, shipping companies are expected to continue avoiding the Red Sea in favour of safer, but costlier, alternatives." The Houthis, which like Hamas are backed by Iran, carried out 130 attacks in the Red Sea between the start of the war and September 20, according to the nonprofit, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). Most of the attacks were directed at commercial shipping, although some targeted Israel or US military vessels. The Yemeni group has said that it considers any ship linked to Israel or its allies a target, casting its attacks as a show of support for Palestinians facing Israeli bombardment in Gaza. However, it has also attacked vessels with no obvious connection to the conflict. More than 41,700 Palestinians have been killed in Israel's war on Gaza over the past year. Even though the number of ships targeted is low relative to the volume of traffic, the Houthis' strategy has proven effective at raising shipping costs, including insurance and pay for sailors working in high-risk areas, said Stig Jarle Hansen, an associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. "The success rate of Houthi attacks is low, but they don't need to hit accurately, as long as they manage to scare international actors, they have achieved a victory, since they increase insurance prices and thus cause increased costs around the world," Hansen told Al Jazeera. Cargo traffic through the Suez Canal, which links the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and carried 10-15 percent of global trade before the war, has plummeted as shipping companies have moved to reroute shipments around the southern tip of Africa.

Escalation is occurring now, BFBS from 4 days ago finds

BFBS. "Red Sea Trade Declines as Houthis Grow in Strength despite Western Airstrikes." *Red Sea Trade Declines as Houthis Grow in Strength despite Western Airstrikes*, Forces News, 4 Dec. 2024, www.forcesnews.com/middle-east/red-sea-trade-declines-houthis-grow-strength-despite-western-airstrikes. //ZM

The Houthis are growing in strength and trade through the Red Sea is declining despite

ongoing international military pressure on the rebel group, a study has warned. The report from the

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said missions such as *Operation Prosperity Guardian*, Operation Poseidon Archer and EUNAVFOR Aspidos had made little impact. The paper, called Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis' Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, said military strikes had only temporarily disrupted the group's capabilities. *HMS Prince of Wales drops anchor and lifts new role as Royal Navy flagship* *Defence review will 'intimidate our enemies, inspire our friends', as long as it's within 2.5%* *US Navy fits first shipborne hypersonic missile system to stealth ship Zumwalt* The UK, as well as other Western powers, have made extensive

efforts to contain Houthi attacks. Two US Navy destroyers recently shot down **Houthi missiles and drones** that **were targeting** three **US commercial ships** in the Gulf of Aden. Earlier this year, *RAF Typhoons* carried out airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Meanwhile, *HMS Diamond* downed nine drones and a missile during her six-month mission in the region. Elsewhere in the southern Red Sea a French destroyer downed drones under the Greek-led Operation Aspidos. **Despite the effort**, since November 2023 the number of **transits of merchant ships through the Red Sea has decreased by roughly 50%.**

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, are a Shia-led rebel movement that emerged in the Sa'dah province of Yemen in the 1990s. Initially focused on addressing local grievances against the Yemeni government, the group evolved into a significant military and political force, gaining control of Yemen's capital, Sana'a, in 2014. Since then, the Houthis have become a central player in Yemen's ongoing civil war, which has drawn in regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Backed by Iran, the Houthis have developed an extensive arsenal, including ballistic and cruise missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval mines. Since Israel's war in Gaza following the 7 October attacks, the Houthis have expanded their operations to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, targeting merchant vessels and launching missile and drone attacks.

The US military can't be everywhere; anti-aircraft missiles to Taiwan directly trade off with fighting Houthi drones in the Red Sea

Economist 24 [Economist, 9/22/2024, "A new "quartet of chaos" threatens America",

<https://www.economist.com/international/2024/09/22/a-new-quartet-of-chaos-threatens-america>]/pwest yang

Another constraint is mistrust. China, which still has unresolved territorial disputes with **Russia, is jostling with its neighbour for influence in Central Asia and is wary of Russia's growing defence ties with North Korea, which it sees as its own client state. Meanwhile, many Iranians remain well aware of the Soviet invasion in 1941.** "All of these countries have bilateral ties, but there is not any kind of quadrilateral co-operation," notes Nicole Grajewski of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, another think-tank. "**This isn't an alliance,**" says Jon Alterman of CSIS of the quartet. "**This is a pickup game.**" The shortcomings of the grouping are most starkly revealed by a comparison with NATO, the West's main security pact, most of whose members share a deep alignment of political values, similar economies and a high degree of trust. **Yet despite its limitations, the quartet is already beginning to give the West headaches, and the pain looks likely to intensify. America's armed forces, organised to fight one major war at a time, are being forced to make hard choices and accept risky trade-offs over scarce resources. This was starkly illustrated by a shortage of 155mm artillery shells last year, when in January America drew down emergency stocks stored in Israel to send them to Ukraine, only to have to reverse course in October, diverting shells intended for Ukraine to Israel. Similarly every anti-aircraft missile fired by Western ships at Houthi drones in the Red Sea is one less available to defend Taiwan.** The exchange of technical know-how will dilute the efficacy of Western weapons around the world—Russian jamming has reduced the effectiveness of Excalibur, a GPS-guided artillery round, to below 10%, according to Mark Cancian, also of the CSIS. **It could, of course, be far worse: the four autocracies have yet to co-ordinate their nuclear-weapons efforts or conduct joint military campaigns.** Yet for all their shortcomings and differences the autocracies operate according to a simple shared calculus: the more powerful and troublesome each member becomes, the greater the opportunity the others have to capitalise on chaos. **This "distraction dividend", argues Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University, can "multiply the challenges that their members pose individually and collectively". The risks posed by the quartet's ever-closer alignment do not need to be vastly exaggerated, nor extrapolated far into the future, to be causes of concern.** They are worrying enough as they are

The aff solves; tradeoff allows the U.S. to go on the offensive in the Red Sea

Fox 23, Mark I. Fox, Former US Navy Admiral; 12-28-2023 [Mark I. Fox, Former US Navy Admiral; 12-28-2023; To deter Houthi strikes in Red Sea, US must turn from defense to offense; Breaking Defense; <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/to-deter-houthi-strikes-in-red-sea-us-must-turn-from-defense-to-offense/>; Accessed 11-9-2024; AT]

To deter Houthi strikes in Red Sea, US must turn from defense to offense. Two senior

commanders of US naval forces in the Middle East as well as an expert from JINSA argue the US must hit Houthi targets in Yemen to deter that group and other Iran-backed forces from widening the current conflict. By Mark I. Fox, John W. Miller and Ari Cicurel on December 28, 2023 at 1:02 PM USS Carney Engages Houthi Missiles and UAVs The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) defeats a combination of Houthi missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea, Oct. 19. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aaron Lau) As Israel continues its counter-attack against Hamas in Gaza, Houthi rebels in Yemen have stepped up their aerial assaults on international shipping in the Red Sea. In this op-ed, former vice admirals Mark I. Fox and John W. Miller, who each served in top positions for American forces in the region, and Ari Cicurel of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) argue that the US must do more to make the Houthi's back off — including direct strikes. The United States has hardly begun to stick its finger in the dam against the wave of Iranian and Houthi maritime aggression in Middle Eastern waters. On Dec. 18, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the creation of a new multinational task force, Operation Prosperity Guardian, to protect shipping through the Red Sea. The US must match the announcement of this important measure with substantive action. **Detering** and degrading the ability of the Iranian regime and the **Houthis** to launch these **attacks requires consistent and strong military strikes** against the Houthi fighters in Yemen responsible for conducting them — **something no one has yet been willing to do.** **Safeguarding the global freedom of navigation through international waterways**, in particular key Middle Eastern maritime chokepoints, **is a core US interest** as a maritime nation and is vital to the health of the global economy. Approximately 10 percent of global trade transits the Red Sea, and 8.8 million barrels of oil per day travel through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between Yemen and Djibouti in the Red Sea. Underscoring the importance of these passages, the Ever Given container ship's blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 cost an estimated \$9.6 billion daily.

Two impact scenarios

The First Impact is Famine;

The continued Houthi attacks delay humanitarian aid;

Harter, Fred. "Houthi Attacks in Red Sea Having a 'catastrophic' Effect on Aid to Sudan." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 16 Feb. 2024, www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/16/houthi-attacks-in-red-sea-having-a-catastrophic-effect-on-aid-to-sudan. //ZM

Attacks by Houthi forces against ships in the Red Sea are holding up shipments of vital aid to Sudan and driving up costs for cash-strapped humanitarian agencies in the east African country, where

conflict has put millions at risk of famine. The attacks mean ships carrying aid from Asia to Port Sudan must now circumnavigate Africa, traverse the Mediterranean and then enter the Red Sea via the Suez Canal from the north, resulting in huge delays and increased costs. "It's making our operations very expensive," said Eatizaz Youisf, Sudan country director for the International Rescue Committee. **Shipments** that took one or two weeks, maximum, now **take months to reach** us." Fighting since April between rival military factions has devastated Sudan. Half of the country's population of 48 million requires urgent food aid and nearly 8 million people have been forced to flee their homes, prompting the world's largest internal displacement crisis. **Aid groups responding to the crisis were already grappling with insecurity, crippling funding shortages and bureaucratic hurdles when the Iran-backed Houthis started attacking Red Sea ships** in November, demanding an end to Israel's Gaza offensive. Smaller shipments of aid are being disembarked at ports in the United Arab Emirates, driven across Saudi Arabia and then shipped to Sudan from Jeddah, a route that avoids the Yemeni coast. Other aid is being flown in from Kenya or driven across the Egyptian border. **All these routes take longer, cost far more and involve greater quantities of red tape than shipping supplies directly to Port Sudan**, the main hub for aid agencies in the country, said Omer Sharfy, the local head of supply chain management for Save the Children. "The Houthi issue has completely choked the market," Sharfy said. **Medical consumables are very scarce.**

International aid reduction continues excruciating famine, vote aff to halt the Houthis

Swanson et al. 24, Swanson, Zane, et al. “Conflict, Hunger, and Famine in Sudan.” Csis.org, 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/conflict-hunger-and-famine-sudan.

In April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces spread into a deadly civil war across Sudan. Now, 16 months since the onset of the conflict, **extreme violence and restrictions to** the flow of **humanitarian aid have led to widespread** acute **food insecurity and the worst internal displacement crisis in the world.** In July 2024, a judgment by the Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed the plausible presence of famine conditions in the Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp located in the state of North Darfur. As

ceasefire negotiations continue to falter and severe flooding events lead to greater suffering, it remains to be seen whether this recent famine determination will catalyze the response that is needed. Q1: How was famine determined, and why hasn't it been formally declared? A1: The confirmation of famine by the FRC is the first since the 2020 designation in South Sudan; however, it is not a formal declaration, which must come from an independent state or international body, like the United Nations. The Sudanese government has thus far denied the existence of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp, and the United Nations has declined to supersede that decision with its own famine declaration. The FRC—a team of UN-supported international food security and nutrition experts assembled to assess official speculation of famine—confirmed that famine conditions were present in the Zamzam IDP camp based on analyses produced by both the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Sudan Technical Working Group. The process of famine (IPC Phase 5) classification is a technical one, determined at a regional level when the following three thresholds are met or surpassed: (1) at least 20 percent of households experience an extreme lack of food, (2) at least 30 percent of children suffer from acute malnutrition, and (3) there is a malnutrition-related death rate of at least two people or four children per 10,000 people each day. In this case, however, the FRC was able to affirm the likelihood of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp despite a dearth of recent quantitative food insecurity data. Utilizing information gathered earlier this year, the FRC considered worsening local conditions and historical temporal patterns of limited food availability in the region. Data collected by Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, suggests that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition among young children may have been surpassed as early as January.Q2: How did famine emerge in Sudan, and what are the conditions

now? **A2: Conflict and a near-complete lack of humanitarian access are the primary drivers of famine in North Darfur and acute food insecurity across Sudan. More than half of the Sudanese population, 25.6 million people, are facing** acute **food insecurity** at IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) levels or greater.

While the civil war in Sudan began in the capital of Khartoum, violence quickly spread across the country. As of July 2024, nearly 19,000 people have been killed, while around 33,000 people have been injured in the fighting, and the number of people displaced or in need of critical humanitarian assistance is in the tens of millions. The current status of famine in Sudan applies specifically to the conditions in the Zamzam IDP camp located in the Al Fasher region of North Darfur in western Sudan. While, at present, the FRC's judgment does not extend beyond the Zamzam IDP camp, the FRC has also determined that famine may be ongoing in two nearby IDP camps, Abu Shouk and Al Salam, as well. Additionally, the FRC and FEWS NET do not preclude the possibility that famine is present across other areas of Sudan, with at least 13 regions likely experiencing similar conditions. The precise population of the Zamzam IDP camp is difficult to determine, but it is currently estimated to be between 500,000 and 800,000 people, about double its population size in April 2024. The rapid population growth of the Zamzam camp is met with already extremely limited humanitarian access, the confluence of which has generated extreme levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. Global leaders have accused the Sudanese government of intentionally blocking the delivery of aid into Darfur for several months. Before the recent reopening of the Adré border crossing—the primary access point into the Darfur region—just a single delivery of food assistance had reached the Zamzam IDP camp in 2024. It arrived in April with a quantity of aid sufficient for less than five percent of the camp's population. Based on observed trends in access to humanitarian aid and assessments of deficits in energy intake, excess mortality in Sudan could reach 2.5 million by the end of this month. Q3: Will confirmation of famine help? A3: How the international community will react to the growing humanitarian disaster in Sudan remains to be seen, and the tangible benefits of a formal famine declaration are unclear. At the time of writing, the funding goal to support the 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan in Sudan—outlined by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—remains only 41 percent fulfilled, leaving a gap of almost \$1.6 billion. While many experts suggest that the high thresholds and strict procedures for famine declarations delay vital food aid, there is little evidence supporting a significant relationship between famine declarations and the flow of international funding. Additionally, government resistance often hinders the famine declaration itself, eschewing international cooperation and delaying the delivery of life-saving aid. Despite the limitations of the famine declaration system, famine warnings and confirmations can serve an important strategic purpose. The threat of increased global scrutiny after a famine declaration can move governments and decisionmakers to action. This is particularly the case when famine results from human-caused conditions of violent conflict. Earlier this year, growing evidence for the risk of imminent famine in Gaza was mirrored by mounting pressure on the Israeli government by U.S. and international officials. While a causal relationship cannot be drawn at this time, the reopening of the Adré border crossing comes just two weeks after the publication of the FRC's confirmation of famine conditions. Little will change without sustained attention that continues well after famine has been confirmed, however. Despite unofficial statements that suggested famine conditions exist in Gaza, there has been no significant improvement to the conditions that have left nearly the entire population living with high levels of acute food insecurity and no ceasefire agreement. Although Sudanese officials reopened the Adré border crossing on August 15, UN organizations and aid groups still question what aid restrictions authorities will put in place. Between August 20 and August 30, just 59 aid trucks—carrying enough supplies to reach about 195,000 people—have been able to enter Sudan through the crossing from Chad. Q4: What more can be done to help those experiencing food insecurity crises? A4: The suffering of food insecurity does not begin when an area is deemed to be in famine, and neither should the delivery of aid and assistance to households and regions facing

acute food insecurity and malnutrition. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity Scale includes five phase categories. **Urgent action is required** at IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above—well before households fall into catastrophic states and regions into famine—as households in this phase are already subject to conditions of increased acute food insecurity and crisis-coping strategies that damage household health and livelihoods. Globally, there are currently more than 168 million people living in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) conditions or worse across the 43 regions covered by the IPC. It should be remembered that assessments of food insecurity and subsequent famine determinations are, by their nature, retrospective, building upon weeks and months of careful data collection and subsequent analyses. The confirmation of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp, for example, came months after FEWS NET reported initial warnings of credible famine risk in March 2024, with a reiterated warning published two months later in May. While declarations of famine are made in part to stimulate increased international action, they also represent a failure of the global community. The prevention of such conditions is at all times the goal of international food security monitoring systems like the FEWS NET and the IPC. **It is therefore the responsibility of governments, international aid agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to prioritize preventative action to stop the escalation of hunger before the next famine emerges.**

The Second Impact is Existential Risk,

Houthi conflict aims to bring in major powers and they're succeeding now, in order to prevent conflict we need to disrupt Houthi abilities

Cook '23 [Steven A. Cook; columnist at Foreign Policy & senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies; 12-29-2023; "Prudence Means Fighting the Houthis Now"; Foreign Policy; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/29/houthis-yemen-red-sea-biden-united-states/>; accessed 11-01-2024] leon

The White House's approach makes sense, but only in a limited way. If the president and his team are worried about the conflict expanding regionally, there must be pages missing from their briefing books. The Houthis (like Hezbollah in Lebanon) have already widened the conflict by targeting shipping in the Red Sea. The Biden administration also seems to misapprehend why the events in the Red Sea are happening. If it had a better understanding of the situation, it would know that a naval task force—no matter how formidable—will not by itself ward off attacks. It was not unheard of for the Houthis to target shipping before the conflict in Gaza, but it seems that the Iranians encouraged them to incrementally escalate now in order to disrupt the global economy, which would put pressure on the United States and other major powers to rein in Israelis as it pummels Gaza and weakens Hamas. If Israel can actually incapacitate Hamas, it would be a significant strategic blow to Tehran, which is why the Israelis will resist at all costs international pressure to bring Israel's military offensive to an end—which is why the Houthis will not stop attacking shipping. As a result, if the United States wants to protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and its environs, it is going to have to take the fight directly to the Houthis. There is precedent for this. Everyone remembers that in 1987, the United States agreed to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and provided U.S. naval escorts for those tankers after they came under near-constant harassment from Iranian forces in the region. What many forget is that, in parallel, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan ordered several military operations to destroy Iran's ability to disrupt freedom of navigation in the Gulf. One can understand why Biden has been reluctant to take a similar step so far. The president has the responsibility to use the United States' awesome force judiciously. But to compel actors not to act—to deter them—sometimes requires a country to not just brandish its military forces but actually use them. Critics will no doubt argue that this prescription risks ensnaring the United States in yet another open-ended conflict in the Middle East. Fair point, though the search for a risk-free policy is as close to a unicorn as one can get in foreign policy. Besides, disrupting or destroying the Houthis' ability to disrupt shipping is hardly akin to the overambitious policies of the past aimed at regime change and remaking of societies. Rather, it's a move to protect a vital national interest. Many in the American foreign policy community seem to have overlearned the lessons of the recent past. Either that or their analysis begins and ends with the idea that the United States is the problem in the Middle East. The fact remains that, as difficult as the last three decades have been for Washington there, the United States still has interests in the region and freedom of navigation is one of them. To be self-deterred in this instance is to be self-defeating.

Red Sea escalation leads to the perfect instability for global calamity and polarization

Alketbi 24, Alketbi, Dr. Ebtesam. "Risky Dynamics in the Red Sea: Implications for Regional Security." *Risky Dynamics in the Red Sea: Implications for Regional Security*, epc.ac, 18 Jan. 2024, epc.ae/en/details/brief/dangerous-dynamics-in-the-red-sea-implications-for-regional-security. //ZM

There is a growing military confrontation between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the United States in the wake of increasing Houthi threats to international waterways in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This has raised concerns that the situation might get out of control. It also increases the likelihood of continuing actions and reactions influencing the orientations of influential actors in the region. A looming regional security dilemma is raising concern as the Houthis stick to their escalatory approach under the pretext of helping Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the US and its Western partners continue their military buildup in the Red Sea to enhance deterrence against the Houthis and Iran. These profound dynamics cast shadows on the regional security formula at

several levels. **The Red Sea security – where riparian countries seek to avoid militarization and internationalization risks – faces the biggest and most serious challenge since the end of the Cold War.**

Recent developments have exposed the futility and looseness of regional security arrangements and structures related to this vital waterway. It is likely that the security formula in this vital waterway has completely ended due to the Houthi-triggered conflict in which Western powers got involved. This involvement might be extended and take a more sustained form if Western powers institutionalize their military presence in the Red Sea and neighboring areas by establishing security alliances and a multinational naval task force. The American and British attacks against Houthis cement the group's narrative. The group claims that its purpose is to fight the US and Israel. However, bringing international forces from all over the world to the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden is not in the Houthis' long-term interest. It deprives them of one of the key cards they have recently promoted. They claim that their internationally-unrecognized authority is vital to the security of the waterways near Yemen. The group also claims that it is ready to guarantee that trade routes through these waterways will remain secure and open in light of their control of the western coast of Yemen. Recent attacks by Houthis have proved that this claim is invalid, and the Red Sea's security has become a politicized issue. It is exclusively subject to their and Axis's perspectives and the ideological conflict's logic governing their internal and external orientations. This issue has started to strike a chord with global powers keen to ensure security and smooth flow of trade and ships through international waters.

Therefore, the Houthis risk losing the Red Sea card more than ever, especially considering concerns that **their reckless and opportunist behavior might set a precedent if not met with force and determination. It opens the way for other powers to imitate the Houthis tactics to impose their will on rivals in international waterways. This will establish** a possible and undesirable state of **global chaos**. This explains why the US and its several allies hastily formed a coalition to confront Houthi attacks targeting international shipping lanes, despite being aware that military action is not an easy option. This approach may face several legal, political, and logistical complications, which will pressure these countries to continue the declared mission until its completion. This may involve expanding their military operations against the Houthis, targeting their command and control posts, and imposing restrictions on commercial access to ports under their control. The **ultimate goal is to compel the Houthis to halt escalation**.

As much as the United States aims to assert its credibility through punitive strikes against the Houthis and their military assets, especially offensive capabilities, and remove legitimacy for their behavior by designating them as an international terror group,

Washington will continue to face the pressure of maintaining credibility and upholding its prestige as a major power. This requires a consistent response to Houthi provocations to the extent that this may escalate and inflame the security situation in the southern Red Sea region for a prolonged period....

In a broader regional and international context, it is crucial to recognize that the conflict in Gaza and the escalating tensions in the Red Sea could significantly amplify the significance of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor project, launched shortly before the Gaza War. The importance of alternative corridors has become even more evident, particularly with the Iran Axis trying to influence the unrestricted trade flow between the East and West through regional sea lanes.

This strategic move is driven by the objective of securing political advantages and seeking retribution. Given the numerous repercussions of the current situation and the potential trajectories it may take in the near term, it is evident that the ongoing **escalation in the Red Sea is** evolving into **a global concern**.

Addressing this issue effectively requires regional and international engagement to prevent or mitigate further expansion. Arab states, particularly those bordering this strategic corridor, must take concrete steps to minimize potential threats to their security and interests. This involves escalating diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict in Gaza and exploring the development of security and political structures centered around the Red Sea. Moreover, these states should readjust their security policies to address the challenges in

this corridor effectively, reinforcing collective security initiatives that necessarily include the internationally-recognized Yemeni government. Subsequently, **efforts should be**

directed toward establishing more effective arrangements to insulate the Red Sea **from** the **consequences of regional conflicts or**

escalating polarization among major international powers. This is crucial to contain the endeavors of forces opposed to the Arab moderation project, seeking to exploit this strategic corridor to undermine regional peace, development, stability, and prosperity.

Regional instability in the Middle East is enough to trigger nuclear war

Lantier 19, PhD @ Geneva (Alex, “Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria,”)

The **conflicts erupting** between the different capitalist regimes **in the Middle East pose an imminent threat** not only to the population of the region, but **to the entire world**. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. **With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers.** The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a **Third World War**.

C3: Technological Probabilities

A plan's coming to give Taiwan drones---it'll be authorized in a few weeks.

Defense News '10/29 [Defense News; news source dedicated to global defense; 10-29-2024; "Taiwan Secures US Deal for 1,000 Attack Drones Amid Rising PLA Drills"; Army Recognition Group; <https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/taiwan-secures-us-deal-for-1-000-attack-drones-amid-rising-pla-drills>; accessed 11-04-2024] leon

Taiwan's Ministry of Defense has recently formalized an agreement with the U.S. government to purchase 1,000 attack drones, marking a significant step in the island's defense strategy amid rising concerns over a potential military threat from China. Bloomberg reported on October 29, 2024, that **this agreement was solidified with the signing of a "letter of offer and acceptance" at the end of September, which precedes the final contracts specifying exact quantities, financial terms, and delivery timelines.**

While the final contracts have yet to be signed, they are expected to be formalized in the coming weeks, according to informed industry sources who remain anonymous due to the unannounced nature of the transaction. **A U.S. Department of State spokesperson declined to comment on ongoing sales to Taiwan.**

Attack drones have become increasingly central in modern warfare. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have ramped up their use of drones for reconnaissance and attacks, underscoring their effectiveness in active combat scenarios. Unmanned aerial vehicles were also deployed in an Iranian attack on Israel in April, reinforcing these systems as critical elements in contemporary military operations.

It's part of an offensive 'hellscape' strategy that's inevitable by 2025.

Michaelson '24 [Katherine Michaelson; international and global studies reporter focused on East Asia; 07-25-2024; "US, Taiwan, China race to improve military drone technology"; VOA News; <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-taiwan-china-race-to-improve-military-drone-technology/7713168.html>; accessed 11-04-2024] leon

Last August, **the Pentagon launched a \$1 billion Replicator Initiative to create air, sea and land drones in the "multiple thousands,"** according to the Defense Department's Innovation Unit. **The Pentagon aims to build that force of drones by August 2025.**

The initiative is **part of what U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo recently described to The Washington Post as a "hellscape" strategy, which aims to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan through the deployment of thousands of unmanned drones in the air and sea between the island and China.**

"The benefits of unmanned systems are that you get cheap, disposable mass that's low cost. If a drone gets shot down, the only people that are crying about it are the accountants," said Zachary Kallenborn, a policy fellow at George Mason University. "You can use them at large amounts of scale and overwhelm your opponents as well as degrade their defensive capabilities."

Taiwan's domestic development is too slow---they're dependent on the US.

Dnyuz '24 [DNYUZ; Armenian online news organization; 08-20-2024; "Facing the Chinese menace, Taiwan deploys its 'Smart Dragon' unmanned submarine"; <https://dnyuz.com/2024/08/20/facing-the-chinese-menace-taiwan-deploys-its-smart-dragon-unmanned-submarine/>; accessed 11-04-2024] leon + TM

Taiwan has a new drone submarine. For most countries, unveiling a new unmanned underwater vehicle, or UUV, would be a show of naval strength. But for Taiwan – a country desperately in need of new naval capabilities – it's actually a sign of weakness.

That's because the new Smart Dragon sub isn't capable of combat. Instead, it's strictly a test platform for the Taiwanese navy's planned flotilla of eight new manned submarines.

That's too bad for Taipei. An operational UUV could plug some critical gaps in Taiwanese defenses as the first manned Hai Kun-class sub undergoes trials, a necessary – and time-consuming – first step before Taiwan's CSBC Corporation can start building the next seven vessels in the class.

But Taiwan is struggling to develop certain classes of unmanned vehicle even as they assume a leading role in military operations.

"Taiwan's indigenous drone industry has produced a variety of military drones, but not in sufficient numbers," the Center for a New American Security, a Washington DC think-tank, explained in a report this summer.

Only the aff solves. US UUVs are an existential threat to China's second-strike capability which causes preemptive strikes.

Johnson '20 [James S. Johnson; Chief Petty Officer; Spring 2020; "Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability"; Air University; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-1/Johnson.pdf; ellipses in original; accessed 11-04-2024] leon

Finally, in the maritime domain, unmanned underwater vessels (UUV), unmanned surface vessels (USV), and UAVs supported by AI-enabled intra-swarm communication and ISR systems could be deployed simultaneously in both offensive and defensive antisubmarine warfare operations to saturate an enemy's defenses and to locate, disable, and destroy its nuclear-armed or nonnuclear attack submarines.⁶⁴ Despite continued advances in sensor technology design (e.g., reduced size and extended detection ranges) to overcome quieting challenges, other technical challenges still remain. These include communicating underwater between multiple systems, processing power requirements, generating battery life and energy, and scaling the system.⁶⁵

While some experts do not expect a technically reliable and effective capability of this kind will be operational for at least a decade, others are more optimistic.⁶⁶ From a tactical perspective, drone swarms would not need ocean-wide coverage (or full ocean transparency) to effectively detect and track submarines. According to UK rear admiral John Gower, a relatively even spread of sensors might be sufficient to enable "a viable search and detection plan . . . conceived for the open ocean" (emphasis added).⁶⁷ Moreover, advances in mobile sensing platforms could enable drones in swarms to locate submarines through chokepoints (or gateways) as they emerge from ports. Due to the current slowness of drones with extended sea ranges, however, trailing them autonomously seems implausible.⁶⁸ Future iterations of machine-learning-augmented UUVs and USVs may eventually complement, and perhaps replace entirely, the traditional role of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and manned surface vehicles in tracking and trailing submarines of adversaries at chokepoints while simultaneously mounting sparsely distributed and mobile distributed network systems (DNS) sensors on UUVs.⁶⁹

If a state views the credibility of its survivable nuclear weapons (especially nuclear-armed submarines) to be at risk,⁷⁰ conventional capabilities such as drone swarms will likely have a destabilizing effect at a strategic level.⁷¹ Thus, even if swarm sorties were not intended as (or indeed technically capable of) a disarming first strike, the perception alone of the feasibility of such an operation would be destabilizing nonetheless. Moreover, the speed of AI could put the defender at a distinct disadvantage, creating additional incentives to strike first (or preemptively) technologically superior military rivals. Consequently, the less secure a nation considers its second-strike capabilities to be, the more likely it is to countenance the use of autonomous systems within its nuclear weapons complex to bolster the survivability of its strategic forces. According to analyst Paul Scharre, "winning in swarm combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms" (emphasis added).⁷²

Combining speed, persistence, scope, coordination, and battlefield mass, AWSs will offer states attractive asymmetric options to project military power within contested A2/AD zones.⁷³ Enhanced by sophisticated machine learning neural networks, China's manned and unmanned drone teaming operations could potentially impede future US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas.⁷⁴ Its air- and sea-based drones linked to sophisticated neural networks could, for example, support the People's Liberation Army's manned and unmanned teaming operations. Were China to infuse its cruise missiles and hypersonic glide capabilities with AI and autonomy, close-range encounters in the Taiwan Straits and the East and South China Seas would become more complicated, accident-prone, and destabilizing—at both a conventional and nuclear level.⁷⁵ China is reportedly developing

and deploying UUVs to bolster its underwater monitoring and antisubmarine capabilities as part of a broader goal to establish an “underwater Great Wall” to challenge US undersea military primacy. US AI-enhanced UUVs could, for example, theoretically threaten China’s nuclear ballistic and nonnuclear attack submarines.⁷⁶

The deployment of new military technology in the nuclear domain, therefore, affects states differently depending on the relative strength of their strategic force structure. Thus, even if US UUVs were programmed only to threaten China’s nonnuclear attack fleets, Chinese commanders might nonetheless fear that their country’s nascent and relatively small— compared to US and Russian SSBN fleets—sea-based nuclear deterrent could be neutralized more easily.⁷⁷ Moreover, advances in machine learning sensor technology for enabling more accurate detection of Chinese SSBNs would likely reinforce Beijing’s concerns that it was being targeted by a militarily superior power—especially the United States. To test the veracity of this scenario, a better understanding of Chinese thinking on the utility of its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities—and how it could inform China’s attitude to escalation risk—would be required.

Extinction.

Webber '19 [Philip Webber; PhD, Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility; 05-18-2019; "We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it"; Metro UK; <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>; accessed 11-04-2024] recut leon

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours.

Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.

But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon.

Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War.

What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We've drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation 'Satan') 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead.

<<TEXT CONDENSED NONE OMITTED>>

A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world's tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Wharf (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive film deep crater, none of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia's 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

<<LINE BREAKS CONTINUE>>

Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world's climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer.

Extensions

C1: UUVs

U not getting the extensions...

C2: The Northernmost of the Korean Peninsula

Khalid '24 finds that North Korea is escalating now due to emboldenment from uranium enrichment. Additionally, current containment efforts fail and affirm this as China slacks off by Suderman '22. However, Thomas 24 and Hiim 18 found U.S. China coop solves this issue but Taiwanese troops are a bargaining chip for this diplomacy. Jiang 19 finds that Chinese sanctions

work as a carrot for Kim to scale down nuclearization. However absent action causes escalation cycles and war by Mackenzie '23. Webber '19 leads to extinction, even a small nuclear war is enough to increase smog.

C3: The Red Sea

Power '24 finds that houthi's are successful in 160 attacks, and they delay necessary trade. In addition, economist 24' finds anti air missiles trade off directly with taiwan and the u.s. Military can't be everywhere. However aff solves as fox '23 finds it pivots to the red sea when we reduce funding; it doesn't dissipate. There are two impacts if we don't affirm: the first is famine as harter and swanson '24 find a famine will be continued if the Houthis are not stopped. Lantier 19' finds that the second impact is existential risk, as Houthi aggression and blockade of trade causes regional conflict and strain , being enough to trigger a nuclear war.

Extra cards:

Heath '20 [Nathan Heath; Fares Center senior research associate and political risk analyst; 2020; "A Red Sea Geopolitics Primer"; Fletcher; <https://sites.tufts.edu/farescenter/a-red-sea-geopolitics-primer/>; accessed 11-01-2024] leon

One of the world's oldest waterways is becoming increasingly relevant in geopolitics. The Red Sea is positioned between two continents, bordering six countries in Africa and four in the Middle East, and approximately 10% of all global trade passes through its waters. It also serves as a strategic zone for both regional and Great Powers projecting their military might or openly engaging in conflict. There is the potential for either reward or disaster in the Red Sea, as increasing economic and military competition in its waters raises the possibility of intense economic growth while simultaneously foreshadowing potential conflicts between rival powers. High levels of trade, energy production, and innovation forecast significant economic opportunity in the Red Sea, but this prosperity is threatened by regional rivalries and the ongoing Great Power competition between the U.S. and China. The Red Sea's global importance is rooted largely in its role as a key waterway for trade. By 2050, Red Sea GDP is projected to more than triple, increasing from \$1.8 trillion to \$6.1 trillion, and trade is expected to grow more than five times, from \$881 billion to \$4.7 trillion. This enormous wealth will be driven by trade agreements encouraging countries with substantial Red Sea interests to increase exports, particularly in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology. Moreover, the construction of new ports and military bases to protect trade and investment interests will lead to even higher levels of trade throughout the Red Sea. The geographical positioning of the Red Sea, proximate to numerous top energy producers, both explains the area's current wealth and forecasts continuing economic growth. On the African side, Egypt and Sudan alone produce a combined 500,000+ barrels per day (bpd) of oil. On the Middle East side, Saudi Arabia and Oman produce more than 12 million bpd of oil. In total, more than 50 million bpd of oil from producers as diverse as the U.S., Russia, China, Libya, and Iran pass through the Red Sea on a daily basis, along with approximately 3.5 billion cubic feet per day in liquid natural gas. In the future, renewable energy will add even more value to this waterway, given the current interest in hydro, wind, and solar initiatives in numerous bordering states. In addition to serving as a leading trade route and home to multiple leading energy producers, the Red Sea is also becoming relevant as a hub of innovation. Saudi Arabia's megacity projects such as Neom, The Red Sea Project, and the Amalaa Project present an opportunity for the region to participate in sustainable urbanization through massive, renewables-focused initiatives integrating robotics and smart services into new economies designed to thrive on innovation and tourism alike. Saudi Arabia's megacities are projected to bring in hundreds of billions of dollars by 2050, but more importantly, Neom and its sister cities highlight the tremendous opportunity for innovation and economic diversification in a region where many countries have historically been dependent on homogenous or semi-homogenous revenue streams such as fossil fuels. The UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, all of

which heavily traffic their goods in the Red Sea, have unveiled similar visions for sustainable innovation to be completed in the next decade. In short, this crucial waterway may soon be home to innovation driving regional prosperity forward even faster. These terrific opportunities for prosperity rooted in trade, energy, and innovation face risks posed by complex economic and military competition among both regional and global owners. For one, African rivalries stretching from Egypt to Djibouti are adding to the Red Sea region's volatility. Egyptian and Ethiopian relations, although somewhat improved since the transitions to the al-Sisi and Abiy regimes, respectively, remain tense over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia views the dam as a strategic necessity, while Egypt fears the dam will deplete its water resources. Although Ethiopia's relations with Somalia and Eritrea have improved from Addis's historically hostile positions towards Asmara and Mogadishu, Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea ports remains a point of negotiation between the three countries. Sudan has also become increasingly problematic for its neighbors, as its resources, access to the sea, and ongoing political violence have attracted the attention of Turkey and the Gulf Nations, frustrating Egypt given Cairo and Khartoum's historically close relationship. And Djibouti remains caught in a tug of war between an ever-growing number of regional and global powers. The Middle East is home to its own set of conflicts fueling military and economic competition in the Red Sea. The primary regional rivalry continues to be between Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are each vying for regional supremacy via either direct or proxy engagement in conflicts. Iran's allies are Syria, Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen (and also Qatar to a limited extent). Saudi Arabia is allied with the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, and the Qataris have historically been Saudi allies but have in recent years struck a more independent foreign policy that resulted in their blockade by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE. The conflict between Riyadh and Tehran presents the most probable risk of a regional conflagration that could threaten the political and economic stability of the Red Sea region. At the moment, the risk of a tanker war or all-out military conflict between the U.S. and Iran is quite high, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or even the disruption of trade through the Gulf of Oman is a troubling and possible outcome of such an event. The formation of Middle East-African alliances has added a further risk of conflict to the region. In addition to its relationship with Sudan (where Saudi Arabia and Iran have competed with Eritrea), Turkey has poured significant aid and investment into Somalia, and Istanbul now owns all of the country's major ports. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sparred with Ethiopia over influence in Eritrea. Additionally, Qatar's alignment with the Turks, Saudis, and Emiratis at different times has increased Doha's influence in nations along the Horn of Africa. It is in Djibouti, however, that the greatest risk to the Red Sea itself lies, as the city-state has drawn the attention of the great powers. In addition to a slew of Middle Eastern and African powers including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, a number of global powers have set their sights on Djibouti as a strategic asset. The U.S., China, Russia, Japan, France, and Italy have all secured or pursued military bases in Djibouti, which is situated close to the critical Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. China's first overseas military base, positioned in Djibouti, is situated just miles from Camp Lemonnier, the only significant U.S. military base in Africa. Russia failed to secure a base in Djibouti and has looked further inland for African military partnerships; France, Italy, and Japan maintain smaller operations. The U.S.-China base rivalry in Djibouti (if it could be thought of as such), is symptomatic of the larger continental rivalry between two Great Powers, as both Washington and Beijing continue to vie for influence in Africa with rival political ideologies and systems of economic development. Djibouti is thus a true powder key, not merely for regional rivalries but also for the larger Great Power game between the U.S. and China. An economic and military conflict between Washington and Beijing would impact Djibouti, threatening to disrupt trade routes passing through the Red Sea.

\$1 trillion dollars of trade has been disrupted by Houthi attacks

SS 24, [Safety4Sea Editorial Team, 10-24-2024, "Houthi attacks cause \$1 trillion of commodities to be disrupted",

SAFETY4SEA, <https://safety4sea.com/houthi-attacks-cause-1-trillion-of-commodities-to-be-disrupted/>]/pwest yang

Why insurers need to understand their transit route accumulations Thus, the need to understand exposure accumulation through sea lane thoroughfares is vital for the industry and should be considered a key mitigation tool, alongside monitoring port and company trade. **\$1**

trillion of commodities disrupted by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, according to Russell's ALPS Marine

An analysis of trade through the Red Sea from October 2023 to May 2024 reveals an estimated \$1 trillion in total trade was disrupted. Crude oil, plastic materials, telephone equipment, cars, and

clothing were all impacted by the attacks. \$205 billion economic disruption caused by the drought in the Panama Canal, according to ALPS Marine analysis Furthermore, an analysis of trade through the Panama Canal during the height of transit restrictions caused by the drought reveals an estimated \$205 billion in commodities at risk. LPG, crude oil, cars, people carriers, inorganic chemical products, goods transport vehicles, and **industrial parts & machinery were identified as the most vulnerable.**

C3: The Transition of Troops

oneindia '24 finds Israel's Iron Dome, its main source of security is faltering, triggering mass panic. Kavanagh 23 finds that the aff can solve because funding tradeoff occurs—less funding and military resources for Taiwan means more for Israel. Iddon '24 affirms this, because funding is key to Israeli rationality. Freilich 17 finds Israel relies completely on the US for security---even marginal changes trigger Israeli threat perception. Absent action, Vaknin 24 finds Israel nukes hezbollah perceiving its existence at stake. Frank 23 finds moreover that an all out israel-hezbollah war causes Iranian draw in through escalation. With this in mind, a regional nuclear war would cause a world war 3 scenario by Stehling 19. Starr '15 finds Nuclear war would cause extinction because it would cause intense smog, making it too cold to grow food.

Israel's main source of security is faltering, triggering mass panic

"Is Israel's Famed Iron Dome Losing Its Missile Detection Ability? It Seems Hezbollah Has Found Out a Way T." The **Economic Times**, 15 Oct. 2024,

economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/is-israels-famed-iron-dome-losing-its-missile-detection-ability-it-seems-hezbollah-has-found-out-a-way-to-beat-it/articleshow/114262252.cms//SG

The Iron Dome is like **a beacon of hope** and strength **for Israel**; civilians as they often to missiles from enemy nations soaring over their skies, only to be beaten by the Iron Dome, which is a virtually impenetrable security system that wards off enemy aerial attacks on Israeli soil. **However, latest reports suggest that Hezbollah may have finally detected the vulnerabilities of the Iron Dome**, which can be a potential **danger to Israel's national security**. According to The Sun's report, there are looming fears that the **Iron Dome may be falling weaker**, as it could not manage to 'detect' a drone strike carried out by Hezbollah recently. This has reportedly led to IDF leaders to themselves question the accuracy of the Iron Dome, according to reports. The Golani Bridge base operated by the IDF was attacked in this drone strike by Hezbollah and it is reportedly the deadliest drone strike ever conducted on Israeli soil by an enemy, and the damages incurred were also very significant. Most interestingly, it led to the **rise of the fear that the Iron Dome has now become penetrable**, even though Tel Aviv boasts of a world-class air defense system. Israeli investigators are also perplexed as to why the Iron Dome was not able to pick up the signs of the drone strike, even though it was such a massive-scale attack. Even the air raid sirens were not able to alert the defenses at the Golani Bridge base, which is **even more surprising and scary for Israelis, who are now fearing for further attacks** that could lead to loss of lives and property. Yes, Israel possesses a one-of-a-kind Iron Dome that shield the country from any imminent aerial strike from hostile and enemy nations.

goofball ahh contention

Israel's main beacon of hope, the Iron Dome, is failing against missile strikes from Hezbollah, causing escalation and perceptual panic, OneIndia from a week ago finds

Oneindiahindi. “Iron Dome’s Effectiveness Questioned after 90 Hezbollah Missiles Strike Haifa.” *Oneindia*, Oneindia, 11 Nov. 2024, www.oneindia.com/videos/iron-dome-failure-90-hezbollah-missiles-hit-haifa-011-4194878.html. //ZM

In a recent attack, over 90 missiles fired by Hezbollah hit Haifa, Israel. This happened within a few hours. The missiles caused a lot of damage, especially to homes and cars. **The Iron Dome defense system**, known for intercepting missiles, **could not stop all of them.** This **led to** injuries and **panic** among people. The attacks mainly targeted residential areas. Many homes were damaged, leaving people worried about their safety. The video shows the aftermath of this missile attack. It highlights the growing tension in the region and the challenges Israel faces in dealing with such large-scale attacks. **The Iron Dome is designed to protect against missile threats.** However, this incident raises questions about its effectiveness when faced with a large number of missiles at once. **People are concerned about their safety and** the ability of the defense system to protect them in future attacks. Residents in Haifa are now dealing with the damage caused by the missiles. Many are **worried about more attacks in the future.** **The situation has led to increased fear and uncertainty among the people living there.**

Fortunately, funding tradeoff occurs when you affirm—less funding and military resources for Taiwan means more for Israel

Kavanagh 23 (Kavanagh, Jennifer, and Jordan Cohen. “The True Military Assistance Tradeoff Is Between Israel and Taiwan - War on the Rocks.” *War on the Rocks*, 20 Nov. 2023,

warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-true-military-assistance-tradeoff-is-between-israel-and-taiwan.//SG

Calling the United States “the indispensable nation,” President Joe Biden used his second Oval Office address to argue that America has the resources and the responsibility to arm Ukraine and

Israel “for as long as it takes.” Absent from the speech was Taiwan — the other U.S. partner in desperate need of U.S. weapons — along with any mention of the **tradeoffs** that

will be required to balance Washington’s competing demands. As our analysis shows, the most significant potential tradeoff isn’t between Ukraine and Israel, which have different armament needs, or between Ukraine and Taiwan, which have more overlap but still have different priorities. Rather, the tradeoff that Washington should be focused on is between Israel and Taiwan. In the best-case scenario, if the Israel-Hamas conflict remains limited, Washington may face no tradeoff at all. But if fighting

expands to include Hizbullah or direct conflict with Iran, **the United States will be unable to avoid making hard choices about how to allocate arms transfers and military aid between Ukraine, Israel, and allies in the Indo-Pacific.**

While there are important areas of overlap between the military needs of Taiwan and Ukraine — especially when it comes to air defense and unmanned aerial systems — their many differences make reconciling both marginally sustainable. Ukraine’s highest priority needs include heavy artillery, ammunition, tanks, short-range missiles, and mobile air defenses, while Taiwan has much more need for anti-ship missiles, Israel, long-range missiles, and more advanced, longer-range air defense systems. Adding aid to Israel changes this calculus. Israel’s needs overlap somewhat with Ukraine’s but more extensively with Taiwan’s and those of other Indo-Pacific allies. This means that a commitment to fully aiding Israel could leave Taiwan and other U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific facing longer delays for systems they require and could leave U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific ill-equipped to counter China. To avoid putting Indo-Pacific allies in this position, Washington should confirm the resource constraints and necessary tradeoffs it faces on military aid. The Indo-Pacific is America’s top defense priority, according to National Security Strategy, and Washington faces greater readiness to long-term assistance than it does elsewhere. China, however, the military threat posed by China is substantially greater than that of Israel or Iran. What’s more, Taiwan’s current military capabilities fall well below Israeli. As a result, Washington should place clear boundaries on its aid to Israel to prevent capabilities on its aid to Israel to prevent China in the Indo-Pacific. First, the United States should take off the table key systems needed by Taiwan, other Asian allies and partners, and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. These include long-range precision and anti-ship missiles, air defense systems like Stingers, Patriots, and terminal high-altitude area defense, and a substantial percentage of unmanned aerial and naval systems. Second, the United States should be explicit with Israel in private about the hard limits of U.S. material support, including capabilities, amounts, and duration, thereby allowing Israel to develop sustainable defense plans. Third, aid programs should deliver on each country’s needs for security and stability. The additional emergency and humanitarian support to Israel in this crisis period. Scenario 2. A limited U.S. response to Israel’s campaign in Gaza remains limited for small-scale offensive targeting. In the United States will have little trouble supporting it without compromising aid to Ukraine or Taiwan. With few exceptions, the capabilities in demand in Ukraine are not needed by Israel for operations in Gaza, and the overlap that do exist are probably manageable. Israel has so far relied most heavily on its Iron Dome air defense system with Patriot interceptors and air-launched precision-guided munitions including small-diameter bombs and gravity bombs equipped with joint direct attack munition kits to conduct thousands of precision strikes on targets in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Defense Forces have provided additional quantities of these weapons to Israel to meet needs, but they have not come at the cost of Ukraine or other U.S. strategic partners. Israel’s only capacity to operate the Iron Dome system, and Ukraine, does not have the 12 aircraft required for air-launched small-diameter bombs. The United States has provided a ground-launched version of the Iron Dome system to Ukraine and Taiwan, but there is a low capability to launch. Ukraine was joint direct attack munitions, which turn unguided weapons into guided ones, but they are relatively cheap and easy to produce in large quantities. As it continues to arm itself, Israel might use other air-launched precision-guided munitions, such as the Hellfire missile — which the United States has also reportedly provided in recent aid shipments — but with more capacity and the proven ability to target production, it should not be difficult to meet Israel’s needs for this weapon. For a conflict confined to the Gaza Strip, Israel should have little need for most capabilities in shorted supply and highest demand in Ukraine. For example, advanced air defense systems like the Patriot have missiles that are too expensive to expend on Israel’s less sophisticated needs. Ground-launched precision-guided weapons, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, have a range longer than what is needed for strikes in Gaza. Israel could make use of Stinger missiles, which have been in high demand in Ukraine, but there are no such short supply in U.S. stocks that the United States is unlikely to be able to provide them to any partner in the near term. On the other hand, requests for additional tanks, artillery, armored divisions, or aircraft are unlikely. Even if the Israel-Hamas conflict expands to include ground operations, the Israel Defense Forces likely have sufficient systems of their own. A more extensive ground operation into the Gaza Strip will create additional defense needs. This includes increased demand for the 155mm shells that Ukraine burns through at a rate of 6,000 per day — far above U.S. production capacity of 20,000 per month. Compared to Ukraine, however, Israel’s 155mm ammunition requirements are likely to be limited. For example, in the 51-day Israel operation in Gaza in 2014, the Israel Defense Forces reported using about 30,000 artillery shells. This is comparable to rates of fire for U.S. forces operating in urban environments against the Islamic State. Washington has already provided Israel

with tens of thousands of these shells, though the Pentagon pushed back on claims these were resold from Ukraine to Israel. Combined with a sizable ammunition order Israel placed earlier this year and access to what remains in the U.S. stockpile prepositioned on Israeli territory, this may be enough to meet Israel’s needs in Gaza. Meeting Israel’s ammunition needs may come at some marginal cost to Ukraine’s operations, but given that Ukraine’s counteroffensive is largely stalled, these effects should be

small and temporary. Scenario 2. An Expanded War with Hizbullah **An expanded conflict that includes Hizbullah, however, would dramatically increase**

Israel’s military requirements and potential requests for assistance from the United States. This would put

real but not unmanageable strain on aid to Ukraine. However, in this scenario, the impact on military assistance and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be the primary concern. Hizbullah is thought to have somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters and a stockpile of around 150,000 missiles, including relatively advanced precision-guided and short-range ballistic and anti-ship missiles and drones that could overwhelm Israeli air defenses and devastate critical infrastructure. In its 2006 war against Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, Israel relied primarily on long-range fires — hitting as many as 7,000 targets using 19,000 bombs and 2,000 missiles — supplemented by a more limited ground campaign and naval blockade with sea-based strikes. **Facing a stronger and better armed Hizbullah today, the Israel Defense Forces would almost certainly respond with increased airstrikes and artillery fire, creating additional demands for precision-guided munitions and ammunition.** Israel has also surged tank units to its northern border,

suggesting a ground operation might be possible as well. The United States could probably supply Israel with the short-range weapons it would need to take on Hizballah. But a longer or more intense campaign than in 2006 — a likely reality, given that Hizballah is stronger than in 2006 — could strain existing stocks, especially for systems like the Hellfire that have relevance in both Ukraine and Taiwan. Tradeoffs would become more difficult if Israel requests longer-range air-launched systems such as the joint air-to-surface standoff missile or the joint standoff weapon to strike Hizballah targets in Syria, where more modernized air defenses are capable of intercepting Israel's fighter jets and air-launched munitions. Israel might not need many of these longer-range missiles. But they would be central to any Indo-Pacific campaign, and U.S. stockpiles are quite limited — by some estimates already below what would be needed for a Taiwan contingency — so even a minor diversion could detract from both deterrence and warfighting capability in the Indo-Pacific theater. Meeting additional demand for 155mm ammunition would be harder. Over the course of the 34-day 2006 war with Hizballah, Israeli forces fired nearly 150,000 artillery rounds, including 155mm and other variants. With Hizballah stronger now, the Israel Defense Forces might need to increase their rate of artillery fire. At the very least, a ground operation that takes several months could increase Israel's 155mm ammunition needs by over 100,000 rounds, which would undoubtedly force tradeoffs with supplies sent to Ukraine. Once again, the stalemate in Ukraine and Israel's smaller needs should be factors in allocating resources across the two countries. Israel's need for air defense is also likely to increase if the war expanded to include operations against Hizballah. To protect against Hizballah's larger and more advanced arsenal of missiles, Israel relies on layered air defenses that include the David's Sling and the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile. But even these advanced systems might be overwhelmed by Hizballah's likely high rate of fire and cruise missiles. Both systems are produced in Israel, so the United States would not be able to backfill these systems directly. **To fill any gap, however, Israel might request U.S. Patriot air defense systems — which are already in short supply. Not only are they needed in Ukraine, but they are also high on the list of capabilities required in the Indo-Pacific, whether for Taiwan's asymmetric defense or for U.S. installations in the region. Sending them to Israel instead would leave both vulnerable.** Finally, as it did in 2006, Israel also might try to blockade Lebanese ports to limit the flow of weapons into Lebanon. Israel has a supply of domestically produced anti-ship missiles it could use to support this operation, but depending on the scope, it might request more, like the Harpoon missiles that Israel previously purchased from the United States. **With Taiwan waiting for 800 Harpoon missiles and other allies in the Indo-Pacific region interested in this capability, meeting an Israeli request for this or similar systems would create difficult tradeoffs.**

US military funding is specifically integral for both quelling Israeli threat perception and the genuine threat of Hezbollah strikes, empirics prove

Iddon, Paul. "Why Israel Has Always Been Skeptical about the Value of Defensive Weapons." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 3 June 20**24**, www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/05/10/why-israel-has-always-been-skeptical-about-the-value-of-defensive-weapons/. //ZM

Israel later only used the Patriot against drones and a Su-24 bomber coming from Syria in the 2010s. It ultimately decided to mothball all its Patriot batteries this May, less than a month after Iran launched an unprecedented barrage of over 300 drones and missiles against it. American funding helped Israel develop the much more advanced Arrow series of **anti-ballistic** **missiles.** The Arrow 3 can even intercept ballistic missiles above the Earth's atmosphere, which it proved capable of doing for the first time in combat against a Houthi missile fired at Israel from Yemen in November 2023. Israel's vaunted Iron Dome system has shot down thousands of short-range rockets fired by Hamas from the Gaza Strip during the repeated flare-ups and wars since 2012. **During that war, the Iron Dome, facing its most significant combat test hitherto, had an estimated 90 percent success rate. Had there been no Iron Dome,** Morris argued, the casualties and **damage caused by rockets would have compelled** any **Israel** i government **to order an enormous ground offensive to destroy Hamas rather than degrade it through airstrikes and limited ground incursions. "Iron Dome has 'saved' the Israeli government from launching such a massive ground assault,"** Morris wrote,

Israel relies completely on the US for security---even marginal changes trigger Israeli threat perception

The importance of the United States to Israel's national security cannot be overstated. Washington is usually the first, and often the sole, port of call for strategic consultation – almost always the foremost one, and inevitably the primary means of addressing the challenges Israel faces. **America is the be-all and end-all of most policy deliberations in Israeli**

impact on Israel's defence posture, unless a major reordering of national priorities took place, with profound economic and societal ramifications. Unlike Israel's adversaries, who can procure weapons from numerous sources with few political constraints, Israel's reliance on the US is

there were eventual differences over the means of doing so. No other country would have helped Israel build a rocket and missile shield, the only one of its kind in the world, or have engaged (reportedly) in joint offensive cyber operations. The US further provides Israel with a link to its global satellite missile launch surveillance system, which gives it an invaluable extra few minutes of warning time, enabling civilians to take shelter, and the IDF to prepare and take countermeasures. The military relationship also includes extensive bilateral exercises, allowing the IDF to learn some of the most advanced tactics in the world. Some of the exercises have been mutual, thereby contributing to the strengthening of Israel's foreign relations, in some cases with strategic importance. The US has threatened to stop sales and the IDF to weapons and munitions in Israel, to which Israel has partial access, and the two countries engage in a wide variety of counter-terrorism, homeland security and counter-proliferation measures. Unquestionably American

Concern over a potential lack of support by the incoming Obama administration led Israel to terminate

[illegible]

The political and cultural foundations of the relationship are sufficiently strong so that a US abandonment of Israel is virtually unthinkable. Moreover, the US is deeply invested in Israel's existence and

security, and the strategic relationship has become so institutionalised, that it would be difficult **for** the US to simply walk away. Israel can thus count on long-term **American support** for its security. **But the degree of support may change, and even a marginal change would have profound ramifications for Israeli national security.**

Absent action, The Samson Option guarantees a nuclear war

Vaknin '24 (Vaknin, Sam. "**Israel on the Path to the Nuclear Samson Option**" - the Brussels Morning

Newspaper." Brussels Morning Newspaper, 31 July 2024,

brusselsmorning.com/israel-on-the-path-to-the-nuclear-samson-option/52341.//SG

Israel is in possession of about 300 nuclear warheads of varying yields and launchable from a variety of platforms. This gives it the option of a devastating second strike. For decades now, Israel has maintained opacity and ambiguity regarding its nuclear strategy. Twice, it came close to making use of its ever growing arsenal. Recently, Israel embarked on a massive refurbishing program of its aging thermonuclear weapons, some of which date back to the 1960s and are unsafe. The world has been led to believe that Israel is committed to a "No First Use" policy and that it would leverage its doomsday pile only when faced with extinction. Both assumptions are untrue. **Israeli planning calls for the preemptive deployment and use of both tactical and strategic nuclear bombs in case Israel is faced with overwhelming conventional force, such as Iran's or Hizbullah's. When the territorial integrity of the State of Israel or the safety of the majority of its populace is at stake, Israel will most definitely nuke the sources of the menace.** In the wake of the targeted assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil and in view of the imminent acquisition of nuclear bombs by the theocratic, rabidly anti-Israeli regime in Tehran, it would make sense for Israel to strike first, sooner rather than later, and with full force. The likely targets are the nuclear facilities in Iran and Hizbullah's strongholds and hinterland in Lebanon. Israel has got nothing to lose.

In addition, all-out Israel Hezbollah war will cause Iran draw-in

Frank '23 (Joshua Frank is an award-winning California-based journalist and a coeditor of CounterPunch. He is the author of the book Atomic Days: The Untold Story of the Most Toxic Place in America. ; 11-24-2023, "The Looming Threat of Israel's Nuclear Option," Nation, dox: 1-9-2024 url:)

Many are concerned that **Israel's** cruel **war** on Gaza, **if it were to expand regionally to include Hezbollah in Lebanon, would drag Iran**, a prominent Hezbollah supporter, **in** to the fray. And **that**, in turn, **might be all the justification Netanyahu would need to strike Iran's** supposed nuclear sites. In fact, in response to drone and rocket attacks on American personnel in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-backed militants, the United States recently destroyed a weapons facility in Syria. As for the situation in Gaza, right-wing **Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu**, a member of Netanyahu's coalition government, recently **commented that "one way" to eliminate Hamas would be the nuclear option.** "[T]here's no such thing as innocents in Gaza," he added. In response to those comments, Netanyahu suspended Eliyahu—a largely meaningless act—in an attempt to quiet criticisms at home and abroad that the war was harshly impacting innocent civilians. Or, perhaps, it had more to do with Eliyahu inadvertently admitting to Israel's nuclear capabilities. No doubt fearing a broader war in the Middle East, the Biden administration is committing itself heavily to Israel's efforts to eliminate Hamas: not only by delivering interceptors for its Iron Dome missile defense system and upwards of 1,800 Boeing-made JDAMs (guidance kits for missiles) but also by replenishing stocks of weapons for Israel's American-made F-35 fighter jets and CH-53 helicopters as well as KC046 aerial refueling tankers. In addition, two US aircraft carrier task forces have been deployed to the Middle East,

as has an Ohio-class nuclear submarine. To top it off, according to a New York Times investigation, the United States is providing commandos and drones to help locate Israeli (and American) hostages in Gaza. While the Biden White House seems anything but eager for an expanded Middle Eastern war, it is nonetheless preparing for just such a scenario. Of course, any military escalation, especially one that leaves **Israel fighting on multiple fronts, would only increase the chances that things could get much worse. A cornered, nuclear-armed Benjamin Netanyahu would be the definition of a perilous situation in a war where nothing**, not journalists, schools, or even hospitals, **has proven off-limits**. Indeed, well over 25,000 tons of bombs had already been dropped on Gaza by early November, the equivalent of two Hiroshima-style nukes (without the radiation). Under such circumstances, **a nuclear-capable Israel that blatantly flouts international law could prove a clear and present danger, not only to defenseless Palestinians but to a world** already in ever more danger and disarray.

It escalates to include every global power

Hans **Stehling 19**, Analyst Based in the United Kingdom, "Israel Driving Trump White House to Catastrophic War against Iran", Global Research, 5/15/2019, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-driving-trump-white-house-war-iran/5677509>

If this continues to its logical conclusion it means that **there will inevitably be an attack** initially **by Israeli cruise missiles with nuclear warheads against Iranian targets** in an attempt to **demolish Iranian deep defence installations** and by the **US 5th Fleet in Bahrain** to keep open the strategic waterway through the Strait of Hormuz. **Such a nuclear attack would signal the start of WW3 as other nuclear states such as India and Pakistan, France and Britain, China and Russia, take up opposing positions**. As for the UK, as a supporter of the Netanyahu regime it will continue its bilateral trade with Israel from the safety of its distance. However, **the Middle East** as a whole including Israel **will also suffer the catastrophic effect of ionising radiation upon food and water supplies and upon the human population**. Casualties could run into hundreds of thousands on both sides **as the conflict escalates and extends into Europe**.

Nuclear war causes extinction;

Starr '15 (Steven Starr, 2-28-2015, Steven Starr: Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting to Happen, Symposium: The Dynamics of Possible Nuclear Extinction, <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html/>) SM

A war fought with 21st century strategic **nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history**. There is a profound difference between extinction and "an unprecedented disaster," or even "the end of civilization," because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world's leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. **Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food**. Their findings make it clear that not only **humans**, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life **would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making**. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. **Millions of tons of smoke would destroy Earth's protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth's surface, creating**

Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.