

# Nocember Neg Case

## Contention One is War

### Subpoint A is Deterrence

**Chase 19 writes that** (Michael S. Chase, Ph.D. in international affairs from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Political Scientist at RAND

"Averting a Cross-Strait Crisis", Council on Foreign Relations, 2-26-2019,

<https://www.cfr.org/report/averting-cross-strait-crisis> // DOA 3-7-2022 | MSH)

**President Xi has staked** his **political** fortunes and personal **legacy on realizing** the "Chinese dream" of "national rejuvenation," especially in the context of the approaching centenaries of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 and of the People's Republic in 2049. Xi has not set a deadline for **China's unification with Taiwan**, but it is an important part of this policy agenda and it is clearly linked to the realization of these broader strategic goals. This approach could **result[ing] in a China that is more assertive** and willing to tolerate more risks in cross-strait relations. **A slowing economy might also tempt Xi to try to resolve the Taiwan question to bolster his legitimacy at home.** Additionally, changing perceptions within China of the regional military dynamics and growing confidence in the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or doubts about U.S. willingness and ability to intervene on behalf of Taiwan, could embolden China to exercise its leverage over Taiwan more aggressively, potentially leading to the most serious crisis in the cross-strait relationship in more than two decades

**Despite this, U.S. support guarantees peace, Roy 24 finds**

Denny Roy, 2024-04-01, "Why China remains unlikely to invade Taiwan," No Publication,

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-remains-unlikely-invade-taiwan>, Date

Accessed: 2024-10-24T02:32:59.537Z //MA recut

The United States, and Washington DC in particular, is awash with expectations of war against China in the near future, most likely caused by a Chinese decision to forcibly annex Taiwan. Beijing's attempts to intimidate the US government into abandoning support for Taiwan have failed. Plenty of Americans — including senior military officers, academics, and politicians — think Chinese leader Xi Jinping sees war as the best option. Those making this argument typically say Xi is tired of waiting for unification to happen peacefully, sees a military window of opportunity, or has set a deadline for finishing the job. Some think China's recent economic problems create an incentive for Beijing to launch a diversionary Taiwan war. We cannot know Xi's priorities with certainty. Nevertheless, from what we can observe, **an elective war against Taiwan is hardly a compelling proposition for Xi's government.** Even with China's massive arsenal of modern warships, combat aircraft and missiles, **Beijing is nowhere near the level of superiority that would guarantee a successful invasion given the probability of US and Japanese military resistance.** Xi would need to worry about more than ferrying enough forces and their supplies across the Strait through the gauntlet of Taiwanese, US and Japanese ships, missiles, submarines, mines and drones. A cross-Strait war would disrupt regional economic activity, threatening the livelihoods of millions of Chinese. The resulting social turmoil could endanger Xi's rule. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's ports would be less risky, but would have disadvantages. Taiwan's government may choose to resist. Beijing's action would stimulate increased anti-China cooperation around the world; China could expect to suffer sanctions over a long period. And the United States would have ample time to surge forces into the region to assist Taiwan. Xi reached the pinnacle of the Party hierarchy through a career of careful positioning and quiet ruthlessness, not by taking grand gambles. Beijing's attempts to intimidate the US government into abandoning support for Taiwan have failed. Helping Taiwan to defend itself remains bipartisan US policy, even supported by Republican Party politicians who want to stop arming Ukraine. Despite the longstanding US policy of "strategic ambiguity", President Joe Biden has publicly stated four times that US forces would intervene in Taiwan's defence

**Rapp-Hooper, senior fellow for Asia Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, finds in 2020** (Mira Rapp-Hooper is senior fellow for Asia Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2020, "THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY", Aspen Strategy Group, <https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/TheStruggleForPower.pdf>, DOA: 10/31/24) ST

Undesirability of this condition notwithstanding, **the strategic picture in Asia is more fluid than structural trends or CCP goals would suggest. Xi's declared objectives of regional hegemony and global power status hardly guarantee that Beijing will achieve them or elucidate the form they will take if it does.** Xi's goal of cross-Straits reunification, for example, may be accomplished in two radically different ways, and along a timeline that will remain malleable.<sup>15</sup> Regional and global power status may also be defined in a variety of ways, and we should expect the exertions of a twenty-first-century great power to look different than those of its nineteenth-century peers. We do not anticipate the CCP will engage in outright territorial conquest to reassert its role in Asia, for example, with the possible exception of Taiwan. It is much more likely to attempt to secure its vision for twenty-first-century power through economic, technological, and sub-conventional approaches, and its choice of means will be at least somewhat responsive to the international environment. **The exact form that China's regional influence takes is far from determined. This is all the more true because rising powers have a reliable history of risk aversion.** Precisely because they seek to reach global heights, **ascending states often eschew forms of belligerence that would catalyze countervailing coalitions or derail their rise.**<sup>16</sup> While he has adopted an assertive foreign policy, **Xi has also demonstrated risk aversion, preferring to advance China's aims where little or no general U.S. deterrence is present,** as with his South China Sea campaign or the westward push with the Belt and Road Initiative.<sup>17</sup> When Washington has sought to establish immediate **deterrence** in the face of **Beijing's advances, these have proven effective, as with the establishment of a clear declaratory policy around the Senkaku Islands in 2013-2014 and a stark warning about Scarborough Shoal in 2016.**<sup>18</sup> **Indeed, the vagaries of and risk aversion embedded in Beijing's stated objectives bestow the United States with valuable advantages—namely, the ability to deter and defend against some of China's most significant advances, so long as it can define its own vital interests and accept some risk. The loss of American military primacy in Asia, therefore, does not portend an Asia dominated by hostile Chinese power. Washington will retain the ability to secure its vital interests in Asia and, to some extent, to shape China's own conception of its regional objectives.**

Jim Garamone, 3-9-2021, "Erosion of U.S. Strength in Indo-Pacific Is Dangerous to All, Commander Says," U.S. Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2530733/erosion-of-us-strength-in-indo-pacific-is-dangerous-to-all-commander-says> / //MA

"In stark contrast to our free and open vision, the Communist Party of China promotes a closed and an authoritarian system through internal oppression and external aggression," the admiral said. "China's pernicious approach to the region includes a whole-of-party effort to coerce, corrupt and collapse governments, businesses, organizations and the people of the Indo-Pacific," he said. On the security side, China is investing heavily in building the Peoples' Liberation Army and has learned from the United States the efficacy of joint warfare. "The military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more unfavorable for the United States and our allies," Davidson said. "With this imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may embolden China to unilaterally change the status quo before our forces may be able to deliver an effective response. The greatest danger the United States and our allies face in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-à-vis the People's Republic of China." If this imbalance continues **Chinese leaders could be "emboldened to continue to take action** to supplant the established rules-based international order and values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific," he said. **"Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate** the capability, the capacity and the will **to convince Beijing [that] unequivocally, the costs of achieving their objectives by the use of military force are**

simply **too high**. Indeed, we must be doing everything possible to deter conflict: Our number one job is to keep the peace. But we absolutely must be prepared to fight and win should competition turn to conflict."

## Otherwise an invasion is inevitable as Yen 22 explains

Hope Yen, 11-19-2022, "CIA chief: China has some doubt on ability to invade Taiwan," AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-taiwan-politics-united-states-government-eaf869eb617c6c356b2708607ed15759> //MA

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence shows that China's **President Xi Jinping** **has instructed his country's military to "be ready by 2027" to invade Taiwan** though he may be currently harboring doubts about his ability to do so given Russia's experience in its war with Ukraine, CIA Director William Burns said. Burns, in a television interview that aired Sunday, stressed that the United States must take "very seriously" Xi's desire to ultimately control Taiwan even if military conflict is not inevitable. "We do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA, the Chinese military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan, but that doesn't mean that he's decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well," Burns told CBS' "Face the Nation." "I think our judgment at least is that President **Xi and his military leadership have doubts today about whether they could accomplish that invasion**," he said. Taiwan and China split in 1949 after a civil war that ended with the Communist Party in control of the mainland. The self-governing island acts like a sovereign nation yet is not recognized by the United Nations or any major country. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter formally recognized the government in Beijing and cut nation-to-nation ties with Taiwan. In response, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, creating a benchmark for a continuing relationship. Taiwan has received numerous displays of official American support for the island democracy in the face of growing shows of force by Beijing, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. President Joe Biden has said that American forces would defend Taiwan if China tries to invade. The White House says U.S. policy has not changed in making clear that Washington wants to see Taiwan's status resolved peacefully. It is silent as to whether U.S. forces might be sent in response to a Chinese attack. In Sunday's interview, Burns said the support from the U.S. and European allies for Ukraine following Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of that country may be acting as a potential deterrent to Chinese officials for now but said the risks of a possible attack on Taiwan will only grow stronger. "I think, as they've looked at Putin's experience in Ukraine, that's probably reinforced some of those doubts," Burns said. "So, all I would say is that I think the risks of, you know, a potential use of force probably grow the further into this decade you get and beyond it, into the following decade as well."

## Subpoint B is Drones

### O'donnel 24,

<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/06/20/1094051/how-underwater-drones-could-shape-a-potential-taiwan-china-conflict/> A potential future **conflict between Taiwan and China would be shaped by** novel methods of **drone warfare** involving advanced underwater drones and increased levels of autonomy, according to a new war-gaming experiment by the think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

The report comes **as concerns about Beijing's aggression toward Taiwan have been rising**. China sent dozens of surveillance balloons over the Taiwan Strait in January during Taiwan's elections, and in May, two Chinese naval ships entered Taiwan's restricted waters. The US Department of Defense has said that preparing for potential hostilities is an "absolute priority," though no such conflict is immediately expected. The report's authors detail a number of ways that use of drones in any South China Sea conflict would differ starkly from current practices, most notably in the war in Ukraine, often called the first full-scale drone war.

### O'donnel 24 furthers,

<https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/06/20/1094051/how-underwater-drones-could-shape-a-potential-taiwan-china-conflict/> **A chief advantage for China** in a potential conflict **is its proximity to Taiwan**; it has more than three dozen air bases within 500 miles, while the closest US base is 478 miles away in Okinawa. But **an even bigger advantage is that it produces more drones than any other nation.**

"China dominates the commercial drone market, absolutely," says Stacie Pettyjohn, coauthor of the report and director of the defense program at CNAS. That includes drones of the type used in Ukraine.

For Taiwan to use these Chinese drones for its own defenses, it would first have to make the purchase, which could be difficult because the Chinese government might move to block it. Then Taiwan would need to hack them and disconnect them from the companies that made them, or else those Chinese manufacturers could turn them off remotely or launch cyberattacks. That

sort of hacking is unfeasible at scale, so **Taiwan is effectively cut off from the world's foremost commercial drone supplier and must** either make its own drones or **find alternative manufacturers**, likely in the US. On Wednesday, June 19, the US approved a \$360 million sale of 1,000 military-grade drones to Taiwan. For now, experts can only speculate about how those drones might be used. Though preparing for a conflict in the South China Sea is a priority for the DOD, it's one of many, says Kallenborn. "The sensible approach, in my opinion, is recognizing that you're going to potentially have to deal with all of these different things," he says. "But we don't know the particular details of how it will work out."

## The gap is increasing

### Michelson 24

<https://www.voanews.com/a/us-taiwan-china-race-to-improve-military-drone-technology/7713168.html>

This week, as Taiwan was preparing for the start of its Han Kuang military exercises, its air defense system detected a Chinese drone circling the island. This was the sixth time that China had sent a drone to operate around Taiwan since 2023. Drones like the one that flew around Taiwan, which are tasked with dual-pronged missions of reconnaissance and intimidation, are just a small part of a broader trend that is making headlines from Ukraine to the Middle East to the Taiwan Strait and is changing the face of warfare. The increasing role that unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, play and rising concern about a Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan is pushing Washington, Beijing and Taipei to improve the sophistication, adaptability and cost of drone technology. Last August, the Pentagon launched a \$1 billion Replicator Initiative to create air, sea and land drones in the "multiple thousands," according to the Defense Department's Innovation Unit. The Pentagon aims to build that force of drones by August 2025. The initiative is part of what U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo recently described to *The Washington Post* as a "hellscape" strategy, which aims to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan through the deployment of thousands of unmanned drones in the air and sea between the island and China. "The benefits of unmanned systems are that you get cheap, disposable mass that's low cost. If a drone gets shot down, the only people that are crying about it are the accountants," said Zachary Kallenborn, a policy fellow at George Mason University. "You can use them at large amounts of scale and overwhelm your opponents as well as degrade their defensive capabilities." The hellscapes strategy, he added, aims to use lots of cheap drones to try to hold back China from attacking Taiwan. China has its own plans under way and is the world's largest manufacturer of commercial drones. In a news briefing after Paparo's remarks to the *Post*, it warned Washington that it was playing with fire. "Those who clamor for turning others' homeland into hell should get ready for burning in hell themselves," said Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese defense ministry. "The People's Liberation Army is able to fight and win in thwarting external interference and safeguarding our national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Threats and intimidation never work on us," Wu said. China's effort to expand its use of drones has been bolstered, analysts say, by leader Xi Jinping's emphasis on technology and modernization in the military, something he highlighted at a top-level party

meeting last week. **"China's military is developing more than 50 types of drones** with varying capabilities, **amassing a fleet** of tens of thousands of drones, **potentially 10 times larger than Taiwan and the U.S. combined**," Michael Raska, assistant professor at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, told VOA in an email. "This quantitative edge currently fuels China's accelerating military modernization, with drones envisioned for everything from pre-conflict intel gathering to swarming attacks." Analysts add that China's commercial drone manufacturing supremacy aids its military in the

push for drone development. China's DJI dominates in production and sale of household drones, accounting for 76% of the worldwide consumer market in 2021. The scale of production

and low price of DJI **drones could put China in an advantageous position in a potential drone war**, analysts say.

## Insinna 24 puts it simply.

<https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/us-needs-to-invest-in-cheaper-long-range-drones-for-taiwan-scenario-report-says/>

WASHINGTON — **In order to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan**, the US military needs to buy a diverse fleet of uncrewed aircraft that spans the gamut from sophisticated long range stealth aircraft to cheap commercial drones, says a new report from the Center for a New American Security. But greater US investments in drone technologies won't be enough to erode China's advantages, the authors of the report warn, adding that Taiwan needs to also invest heavily in its own fleet of

uncrewed capabilities. "Today, China is positioned to take advantage of its large fleet of drones, which could provide it with an edge in a war over Taiwan," the report states. **"The United States and Taiwan need to close this gap rapidly and develop a layered system of counterdrone defenses or risk being on the losing side of a war."**

### Chi-wei 24,

<https://www.voanews.com/a/us-taiwan-look-to-boost-drone-collaboration/7802406.html>

TAIPEI, TAIWAN —

Drone companies from Taiwan and the United States are exploring ways to work together in a market dominated by China, bringing together Taiwanese enterprises and more than two dozen American companies and officials this week in Taipei. Attacks by swarms of drones have become an almost daily occurrence in Russia's war in Ukraine, with Kyiv and Moscow using unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, to carry out strikes and defend themselves from attacks. As the threat China poses to Taiwan grows, many see drones playing a crucial role in a potential conflict there

as well. China's leader, Xi Jinping, has tasked his troops to be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. And **with Chinese companies dominating the market and critical resources used in making drones**, analysts say **it is important for Taiwan and the U.S. to find ways to create a China-free supply chain.**

At a drone expo at National Taiwan University in Taipei this week, hundreds of Taiwanese producers met with several officials from the U.S. Department of Defense and Raymond Greene, director of the American Institute in Taiwan, which serves as the de facto U.S. embassy on the island. Patrick Mason, the deputy assistant secretary of the Army for defense exports and cooperation, and Andrew Hong, deputy director of the cyber portfolio of the Defense Department's Defense Innovation Unit, or DIU, spoke at the expo. Mason spoke about "The Pathway to U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industrial Cooperation" and Hong's remarks centered on "Defense Innovation with Taiwan." For U.S. drone companies, the forum offered the potential to expand business ventures with Taiwan and grow the bilateral trade partnership, according to a statement from the American Institute in Taiwan on Wednesday. Demand for drone technology in Taiwan is large, especially given China's drone production prowess. Chinese drone company DJI held 76% of the consumer market for household drones in 2021. These drones have also been deployed on the battlefield in places like Ukraine and Myanmar, a practice that the Chinese government and DJI have condemned. Hsu Chih-hsiang, an assistant researcher at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, described drones as "combat force-multipliers," and explained that, **even in peacetime, China has already begun sending**

**large drones into Taiwanese territory** and even uses small civilian drones to hover in Taiwanese airspace in the Kinmen Islands. In 2022, former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen made the drone industry a development priority in Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan has established the “Drone National Team” program, subsidizing domestic production of these systems. Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo revealed in mid-September that Taiwan would procure 3,422 units of six types of domestically produced military drones, including mini-drones, before 2028, and that Taiwan would also separately acquire two types of missile-type attack drones, totaling 976 units, before 2026, to enhance

precision strikes and anti-armor capabilities. Wang Shioh-wen, who is also an assistant researcher at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research, said **American**

**support of Taiwanese drone modernization presents an opportunity for Taiwan to break through barriers in production capacity and ensure the security of the supply chain**

for drones. Taiwan’s government has set a goal for domestic manufacturers to produce 15,000 drones per month by 2028. That is three times current production levels, according to Taiwan’s government-funded Central News Agency. Ja Ian Chong, a political scientist at the National University of Singapore, said the three most important considerations for the U.S. and Taiwan in the future of drone production without Chinese components are cost, mass production capacity, and the impact that this might have on American and Taiwanese budgets, technology transfer and scientific development.

**Chi-wei 24,**

<https://www.voanews.com/a/us-taiwan-look-to-boost-drone-collaboration/7802406.html>

TAIPEI, TAIWAN —

Drone companies from Taiwan and the United States are exploring ways to work together in a market dominated by China, bringing together Taiwanese enterprises and more than two dozen American companies and officials this week in Taipei. Attacks by swarms of drones have become an almost daily occurrence in Russia’s war in Ukraine, with Kyiv and Moscow using unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, to carry out strikes and defend themselves from attacks. As the threat China poses to Taiwan grows, many see drones playing a crucial role in a potential conflict there

as well. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has tasked his troops to be prepared for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. And **with Chinese companies dominating**

**the market and critical resources used in making drones, analysts say it is important for Taiwan and the U.S. to find ways to create a China-free supply chain.**

At a drone expo at National Taiwan University in Taipei this week, hundreds of Taiwanese producers met with several officials from the U.S. Department of Defense and Raymond Greene, director of the American Institute in Taiwan, which serves as the de facto U.S. embassy on the island. Patrick Mason, the deputy assistant secretary of the Army for defense exports and cooperation, and Andrew Hong, deputy director of the cyber portfolio of the Defense Department’s Defense Innovation Unit, or DIU, spoke at the expo. Mason spoke about “The Pathway to U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industrial Cooperation” and Hong’s remarks centered on “Defense Innovation with Taiwan.” For U.S. drone companies, the forum offered the potential to expand business ventures with Taiwan and grow the bilateral trade partnership, according to a statement from the American Institute in Taiwan on Wednesday. Demand for drone technology in Taiwan is large, especially given China’s drone production prowess. Chinese drone company DJI held 76% of the consumer market for household drones in 2021. These drones have also been deployed on the battlefield in places like Ukraine and Myanmar, a practice that the Chinese government and DJI have condemned. Hsu Chih-hsiang, an assistant researcher at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research in

Taipei, described drones as “combat force-multipliers,” and explained that, **even in peacetime, China has already begun sending**

**large drones into Taiwanese territory** and even uses small civilian drones to hover in Taiwanese airspace in the Kinmen Islands. In 2022, former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen made the drone industry a development priority in Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan has established the “Drone National Team” program, subsidizing domestic production of these systems. Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo revealed in mid-September that Taiwan would procure 3,422 units of six types of domestically produced military drones, including mini-drones, before 2028, and that Taiwan would also separately acquire two types of missile-type attack drones, totaling 976 units, before 2026, to enhance

precision strikes and anti-armor capabilities. Wang Shioh-wen, who is also an assistant researcher at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research, said **American**

**support of Taiwanese drone modernization presents an opportunity for Taiwan to break through barriers in production capacity and ensure the security of the supply chain**

for drones. Taiwan’s government has set a goal for domestic manufacturers to produce 15,000 drones per month by 2028. That is three times current production levels, according to Taiwan’s government-funded Central News Agency. Ja Ian Chong, a political scientist at the National University of Singapore, said the three most important considerations for the U.S. and Taiwan in the future of drone production without Chinese components are cost, mass production capacity, and the impact that this might have on American and Taiwanese budgets, technology transfer and scientific development.

**Klare 24,**

[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-09/news/us-supply-taiwan-attack-drones#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20approved,worth%20an%20estimated%20\\$24360%20million.](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-09/news/us-supply-taiwan-attack-drones#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20approved,worth%20an%20estimated%20$24360%20million.)

**The United States has approved its inaugural sale to Taiwan of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and attack drones, estimated [at] \$360 million.**

The transaction, announced by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency on June 18, is worth an **estimated [at] \$360 million.** Previous U.S. sales to the self-governing island largely have involved major crewed platforms such as F-16 fighters and M-1 Abrams tanks, but the drone sale involves small, man-portable devices employing artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies to locate and attack enemy targets with minimal human oversight. “Until now, we have no real loitering munition for the army to use. So after about nine months, the U.S. government decided to sell these to Taiwan,” Chen Kuo-ming, a Taipei-based defense analyst, told *Defense News*. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the new arms package on June 18. Because no objection was raised within 30 days, negotiations are proceeding on its final provisions. Although the numbers could change, the package is slated to include the Switchblade 300 loitering munition and the ALTIUS 600M-V multipurpose UAV. Armed drones of this sort largely are intended for use by ground combat forces against an opponent’s armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and command posts located beyond line of sight. The Switchblade 300, made by AeroVironment, can carry an explosive payload of 3.7 pounds and has a flight range of 30 kilometers and a loiter time of 20 minutes. It is described as a “kamikaze” drone because it is intended to seek out enemy armored vehicles or other enemy assets and crash into them, detonating its payload on impact. The plan is for Taiwan to receive 720 Switchblade missiles plus 101 SB 300 fire-control systems, for a total of \$60 million. The ALTIUS 600M-V UAV, made by Anduril Industries, can be used as a loitering munition as well as a reconnaissance drone or communications relay. It is equipped with electro-optic/infrared cameras for target acquisition and possesses greater range (440 kilometers) and flight endurance (up to four hours) than the Switchblade. According to Anduril, the ALTIUS 600M-V “has demonstrated autonomous coordinated strike, target recognition, and collaborative teaming,” allowing a single operator to control multiple drones. The proposed sale to Taiwan incorporates up to 291 ALTIUS missiles plus their launch systems and transport trailers, worth a combined \$300 million. The sale of

such devices reflects a growing Pentagon consensus that **Taiwan could not match China’s military on a one-to-one**

**basis** in conventional military platforms, such as tanks, destroyers, and jet fighters. Instead, Taiwan must adopt an asymmetric strategy, using drones and other unconventional weapons

to inflict heavy losses if Chinese forces attempt to invade and occupy the island. By providing the Taiwanese with plentiful short-range defensive weapons such as the Switchblade and ALTIUS, U.S. officials hope China will think twice before undertaking an invasion or, if the Chinese military does invade, the assault will be slowed long enough to allow U.S. and other friendly forces to come to the island's rescue. The same philosophy undergirds the Pentagon's Replicator strategy, intended to speed the delivery of small unmanned weapons to U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region. "Replicator is meant to help us overcome [China's] biggest advantage, which is

mass. More ships. More missiles. More people," Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said when announcing the program in August 2023. By arming **U.S. forces with "multiple thousands" of autonomous weapons systems**, she said, "[w]e'll **[will] counter the [Chinese military's]** mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat." On May 6, Hicks announced that Switchblade drones would be part of the first tranche of munitions to be procured under the Replicator program. "U.S.-supplied Switchblade drones have already demonstrated their utility in Ukraine, and this system will provide additional capability to U.S. forces," the Pentagon said in a statement. When viewed together, the decision to supply armed **drones to Taiwan** and to U.S. forces in the **Indo-Pacific region can be seen as part of a larger U.S. strategy for countering China in a future war over Taiwan**, a scenario that many Pentagon leaders believe is increasingly likely.

## **Military support is key to our deterrence posture, and we must maintain current commitments. Episkopos '23 confirms**

Mark Episkopos, Managing Editor, Center For Military Modernization, 8-28-2023, "China Might Invade Taiwan As Early as 2024," Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization, <https://warriormaven.com/china/china-might-invade-taiwan-as-early-as-2024> //MA

Investor and prominent China observer Kyle Bass warned earlier this month that Beijing will attack Taiwan by the end of 2024, a claim with which other high-profile analysts have disagreed. Yet, however unlikely, a Taiwan invasion scenario is a real contingency for which the U.S. military must continue to prepare. War games conducted since 2018 have painted a bleak picture of U.S. ability to repel a full-scale Chinese assault on Taiwan. Simulations conducted in 2021 resulted in U.S. forces successfully fending off a Chinese attack, but at a steep cost to U.S. and Taiwanese forces. A series of war games organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2023 reached similar conclusions, forecasting **a costly U.S. victory premised on a sufficiently rapid and decisive U.S. military response [and]**, the ability of U.S. forces to freely operate from American bases in Japan, **the continued flow of U.S. military aid to Taiwan**, and further efforts to expand the U.S. arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles.

Bowman, G.; Caccioli, F.; Coburn, A.W.; Kelly, S.; Ralph, D.; Ruffle, S.J.; Foulser-Piggott, R, June 2014, "CHINA-JAPAN GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICT SCENARIO" Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies , <https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/141031-ccrs-geopolitical-conflict-scenario-report.pdf>, accessed: 4-24-2022 //ZD

Nearly half of the world's shipping traffic passes through the South China Sea and this is significantly reduced while the conflict continues. Direct impacts Human cost The human cost is high, with 100,000 to **500,000 civilian deaths as a result of the strategic bombing campaigns against key cities** in both countries. Many of these deaths are employees in commercial facilities. Millions more people are injured. Property damage costs Bombing results in extensive damage to physical facilities. Reconstruction costs are estimated at \$120 to \$500 billion. The insurance industry mainly excludes claims from war damage in its policies, so is not expected to have large property losses. It is however likely to pay claims from indirect consequences, for example in liability lines, life and health insurance, contingent business interruption, and in other lines where there are ambiguities around exclusion. Insurers need to ensure that their war exclusion terms are robust to avoid major losses. Consequence analysis The world's economy suffers from the shock waves of the conflict. Exports from China and Japan to other countries are severely reduced, along with their imports. We shock exports and other variables in the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics to estimate global macroeconomic impact in terms of losses to global GDP output over 5 years. There are many other side effects and systemic consequences – counterparty risk increases, and more severe variants of the scenario trigger a financial crisis that causes a cascading failure of financial institutions and a liquidity crisis. **Lost global output of more than \$17 trillion. The conflict triggers a global recession**, which persists over several years. The overall effect is measured in



lost GDP output over 5 years ('GPD@Risk') ranging from \$17 trillion to \$34 trillion in the more extreme variant, the latter dwarfing the \$20 million estimated loss of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2012. GDP losses in the US and EU are substantial, in total \$5 billion, which is just shy of the \$6 billion damage that is jointly experienced by China and Japan.

## **Contention Two is Allies**

**The network of American power in the Pacific has allowed us to become an unmatched leader.**

**Clark wrote in June** [Wesley K. Clark, Clark is a former NATO Supreme allied commander and the current leader and founder of non-profit of Renew America Together, 06-23-24, "America Is Already Great Again", Washington Monthly, <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2024/06/23/america-is-already-great-again/>] wrong + DS

Joe Biden came to office determined to repair relations with American allies. He said, "America is back"—and he's right. We've strengthened NATO, our most crucial alliance. European allies, with the exception of Hungary, have backed away from closer relationships with China and rebuffed recent Chinese efforts to dominate European infrastructure investments. The Biden administration has helped our two allies in northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan, to overcome their long-painful relations with each other and forge a bilateral security agreement to counter China's rising power in the region. Elsewhere in Asia, the U.S. has strengthened our long-standing alliance with Australia, and informally joined with Japan, Australia, and India—the so-called Quad—to manage the challenges of China. The administration also has negotiated new basing agreements with the Philippines and increased diplomatic attention to the islands of Micronesia and other islands of the Pacific. Of course, there are challenges ahead. The American government is running an annual deficit; our national debt is now equal to our GDP. The long-term funding of Social Security and Medicare must be assured. Some tax rates will need to be adjusted to better protect the middle class. The use of electric vehicles must increase, and other measures will be necessary to get the U.S. to net zero carbon by 2050. But Biden and his economic team have put in place the critical foundation that will ensure the fiscal and monetary means to deal with these challenges, including enhanced tariffs on Chinese EVs. But the geopolitical environment is dynamic. The halcyon post-Cold-War era of American exceptionalism is over. The Biden team must deal with the most dangerous period in American history since World War II. Four potential adversaries—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—are increasingly working together against the United States and the international rules-based order that emerged under American leadership in the 1940s and beyond. The countries have different but complementary strategic aims. Russia wants to regain control and absorb Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic states, Georgia, and part of Poland into an enlarged imperial Russia; roll back NATO and U.S. security guarantees in Europe; secure strategic minerals in Africa and the Middle East; isolate the United States; and hobble the independence of Western European states. China seeks its historic place as the world's most powerful nation. It wants reunification with Taiwan, control over the western Pacific, and the marginalization of the United States in international institutions. Iran aims for regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and the destruction of Israel. North Korea has recently declared South Korea its "principal enemy," heightening tensions on the Korean peninsula. For now, these potential adversaries are engaged in a hybrid war against the United States: espionage; economic and military pressures; propaganda and disinformation; penetration of U.S. and Western political systems; cyber probes and minor attacks; and insertion of malware into Western infrastructure in preparation for disabling attacks on power, water, and transportation systems. But, as demonstrated by Russia's war against Ukraine and Iran's attacks on Israel, they are also willing to use force to gain their ends. They are enhancing their nuclear arsenals, threatening nuclear use, and undercutting the credibility and survivability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The outcome in Ukraine is far from certain, and should it collapse, the rest of eastern Europe will be the next target of open aggression. Russia and China have undercut the American and Western presence in Africa; blunted the effectiveness of international institutions in containing human rights abuses, war crimes, and nuclear proliferation; and managed to wriggle out from under the most comprehensive set of sanctions yet applied by the U.S. and other Western nations. Diplomacy is, of course, the first response. But diplomacy has always rested on hard power and our record of success—and the hard power of the United States rests on our economy. The U.S. has the economic means and the alliances to deal with all of our potential competitors simultaneously, from strengthening our nuclear deterrent and reinvesting in our military-industrial base and our volunteer armed forces to

winning the technology race with China **and deterring further aggression abroad**. We should face the future with optimism and confidence. President Xi and former President Trump are wrong. **American power is not declining—it is on the rise. We have the ability to deal with every challenge, at home and abroad.** This is a truth that American voters need to understand, so they can make an informed choice in the elections this November and summon the will to meet these challenges.

**Taiwan is the central link in this system. It's an image of American commitment with high geographic, economic, and psychological value.**

**Cunningham found in March** [Michael Cunningham is a Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. 03-27-2024. "The American Case for Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation. <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-american-case-taiwan>] mac

**Taiwan's importance** to the first island chain **cannot be overemphasized. Taiwan is the biggest island between Japan and the Philippines.** American **and** Chinese strategists agree that if China gained control of Taiwan, it would effectively have broken through the first island chain and would be in a position to execute **sea-denial operations** against the U.S., Japan, and other allies and use Taiwan as a springboard from which to expand its military reach deep into the Pacific.<sup>13</sup> **Retaining control** of the first island chain is the best way to **contain China's aggressive ambitions and deter** it from acting on its **revisionist aims. Failure** to do so would have several dire implications for U.S. national security. Specifically, it **would: Undermine America's alliance network.** America's network of regional allies is one of its **greatest assets** in the Indo-Pacific. The United States' global alliance system helps to keep adversaries and conflicts largely **contained** far from the U.S. homeland. It also raises the costs associated with aggressive military action by hostile powers abroad, especially against U.S. allies. Arguably, nowhere are America's alliances more important than in Asia, a region characterized by world-class powers, mutual hostilities, and numerous territorial disputes that is now at the **center of global economic activity.** Taiwan is not part of the U.S. alliance system, and Washington does not have a formal security commitment to the island. The mutual defense treaty that then-President Dwight Eisenhower signed with his Taiwanese counterpart Chiang Kai-shek in 1954 was dissolved on January 1, 1980, a year after the U.S. forged diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, **the U.S. is widely viewed as Taiwan's committed security guarantor, and** discussions with officials and diplomats from throughout the region confirm that **failure to fill this role would spark concern about** Washington's **commitment to regional security.** More important, a loss of Taiwan would **weaken America's ability to fulfill** the **obligations** that it does have, including its security obligations toward **Japan and the Philippines.** Perhaps no country stands to lose more from a Chinese takeover of Taiwan than Japan, which in many respects is America's **most important ally in Asia.** Contrary to conventional wisdom, **Taiwan's main island is closer to Japan than it is to China:** Japan's Yonaguni Island is just 70 miles from Taiwan's eastern coast. With Taiwan under Beijing's control, **the security of this island and the other islands that make up Okinawa Prefecture would be compromised. Even more worrying, Japan relies on the waters around Taiwan** for most of its energy and resource imports and would face an **existential danger** if these waters fell into the hands of its principal geopolitical adversary. Ian Easton of the Project 2049 Institute reports having reviewed a confidential handbook for the PRC's mid-career People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers, which states that **90 percent of Japan's oil imports, 99 percent of its mineral resources, and 100 percent of its nuclear fuel flow through the waters around Taiwan.**<sup>14</sup> The same source states that **80 percent of Japan's cargo ships travel directly through the Taiwan Strait at a rate of approximately one ship every 10 minutes.**<sup>15</sup> The PLA handbook **outlines a post-Taiwan unification plan to use blockades to limit Japan's imports of raw materials gradually until its "national economy and war-making potential will collapse entirely" and there is "a famine within the Japanese islands."**<sup>16</sup> Were China ever to execute such a plan, **Japan would be at its mercy.** Ultimately, the responsibility for Japan's security falls primarily on Tokyo, which must take bold steps to improve its own defense posture and contribute to Taiwan's security so that this threat does not materialize.<sup>17</sup> Fortunately, the Japanese government in recent years has been moving in the right direction by increasing defense spending, boosting foreign security assistance, and relaxing constitutional limits on arms exports and tactical



defense cooperation with the U.S. Most recently, in December 2022, Japan announced new plans to double defense spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027; acquire new counterstrike missile capabilities, including hundreds of U.S. tomahawk missiles; and “cooperate [with America] in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles.”<sup>18</sup> **Nevertheless, as Japan is a treaty ally and host to 56,000 U.S. soldiers, its security is also of critical importance to the United States.**<sup>19</sup> **If China controlled Taiwan and its surrounding waters, it would have extreme leverage over Japan. Even if Beijing did not act on this leverage, Tokyo would likely question the commitment of a U.S. government that was either unable or unwilling to keep one of the world’s most strategically important islands from falling into the hands of its primary geopolitical rival. This crisis of confidence would be shared by the Philippines and other regional allies and could result in any number of unfavorable outcomes. For one, the lack of a credible U.S. security guarantee could lead some allies to develop their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against China and other potential adversaries. This is exactly what South Korea flirted with doing recently amid concerns about the durability of the U.S. commitment to that alliance.**<sup>20</sup> The downstream consequences of such a development are hard to foresee, but in a region saturated with strategic distrust and historical grievances— even between U.S. allies—this would not be a healthy development from the perspectives of international security or alliance cohesion, let alone the damage it would inflict on the nonproliferation regime.

**Thus, turning our back on decades long commitments signals to the world that the US cannot be trusted to stick with our allies.**

**Herzinger furthered in 2021** [Blake Herzinger, 05-03-2021, "Abandoning Taiwan Makes Zero Moral or Strategic Sense", Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/taiwan-policy-us-china-abandon/>] **leon**

How could that possibly be considered the truth? **Abandoning a 70-year commitment to Taiwan’s continued freedom** in the face of risk the author himself deems “small” **could not possibly be viewed positively** by Tokyo and Seoul. Instead, **it would beg the question of Washington’s price for its freedom as well. Japan’s Senkaku Islands, vigorously disputed by China, would certainly be next on the menu. It is ludicrous to postulate that abandoning Taiwan would not raise fears of abandonment among Washington’s other Asian allies. It could just as easily bring down the entire hub-and-spoke system of alliances that U.S. policy relies on in the region.**

**Maintaining our alliances is crucial.**

**Beckley wrote in 2015** [Michael Beckley (Poli-Sci professor @ Tufts); The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts. International Security 2015; 39 (4): 7–48. doi: [https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00197](https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197)] **squasha + OA**

On the other hand, the deterrence model of conflict, which holds that the best way to prevent war is to stand firm against enemies, <sup>60</sup> suggests that **alliances prevent conflict by committing members to form a united front against aggression.** <sup>61</sup> Even when deterrence fails, **alliances can facilitate peaceful settlement by encouraging belligerents to make smaller demands of each other; in other words, “the shadow of the alliance influences the bargaining stances of both challengers and targets” and expands the range of potential settlements.** <sup>62</sup> **Alliances** also “serve as vehicles to **facilitate communication and transparency**” <sup>63</sup> and as “tools of **power management and control**” that enable allies to resolve intra-allied conflicts **peacefully** and to restrain each other from engaging in reckless behavior. <sup>64</sup> **As the most powerful member of the world's largest alliance network, the United States is especially well positioned to reap these advantages of alliances and practice “dual deterrence,” simultaneously deterring aggressors and restraining allies** <sup>65</sup> **Adversaries** of the United States or one of its allies **must consider the possibility that they will face a superpower backed by a posse of nearly seventy states** if they engage in aggression. Meanwhile, **U.S. allies know that what they do will be watched by an overwhelmingly powerful actor, so they are less likely to jockey with one another for**

military supremacy. Allies also know that their security depends on continued U.S. protection. As a result, the United States can run what Victor Cha calls a “powerplay”—that is, use its leverage over weaker allies to prevent them from initiating conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. 66

**Empirically, Jackson found in his 2015 study that military alliances in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century reduced the number of interstate wars by 90%.**

Jackson terminalized in 2015 [Matthew O Jackson , Stephen Nei, (both profs of economics @ Stanford) “Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , volume 112 , issue 50 , p. 15277 - 15284 Posted: 2015 [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=4762802](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4762802)] squasha + OA

The incidence of interstate wars has dropped dramatically over time: The number of wars per pair of countries per year from 1950 to 2000 was roughly a 10th as high as it was from 1820 to 1949. This significant decrease in the frequency of wars correlates with a substantial increase in the number of military alliances per country and the stability of those alliances. We show that one possible explanation of this is an accompanying expansion of international trade. Increased trade decreases countries’ incentives to attack each other and increases their incentives to defend each other, leading to a stable and peaceful network of military and trade alliances that is consistent with observed data.

**It is highly possible it could lead allies to proliferate nuclear weapons in destabilizing ways.**

**Bradley found this year** [Jennifer Bradley, 02-15-24, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation”, National Defense University Press, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3679143/preventing-the-nuclear-jungle-extended-deterrence-assurance-and-nonproliferation/>] wrong + AG

Today, most people do not remember a time when the United States was not allied with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. As these alliances span over seven decades, it is easy to take for granted that the relationships will continue as they always have into the future. In fact, this phenomenon is not as common as it may seem, as only a handful of alliances have had this kind of longevity in the modern era.<sup>1</sup> Based on shared values, common interests, and a shared threat perspective, these alliances have had the safe, effective, and reliable nuclear deterrent of the United States throughout the decades to serve as the cornerstone of the security guarantees provided. The changing security landscape and the emergence of the two-peer nuclear environment will challenge extended deterrence in ways not yet well understood. This requires reexamining deterrence strategies and potentially acquiring new capabilities to effectively assure allies and close the growing “assurance gap.” U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence The U.S. policy of extended deterrence was born out of the overwhelming conventional threat posed to Western Europe by the Soviet Union at the dawn of the Cold War. To deter Soviet invasion and expansion, the United States extended nuclear deterrence abroad. NATO was created as a nuclear alliance in 1949, with nuclear deterrence made credible by U.S. nuclear forces forward-deployed to NATO serving as the foundation of the collective defense agreement.<sup>2</sup> The policy of extended deterrence was not limited to Europe. In the Pacific, to defend against growing threats from China and North Korea, the U.S. nuclear umbrella expanded to include Australia, Japan, and South Korea, with U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed to South Korea, though without NATO-style nuclear-sharing arrangements and fully under U.S. control. The policy of extended deterrence remains a key component of the security strategy of the United States and its allies. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review released by the Joseph R. Biden administration affirms the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence, stating that the United States would “[ensure] our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, and our extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible.”<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, allies under the nuclear umbrella have reiterated the importance of relying on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for their security. The Secretary General’s 2022 annual report reaffirmed NATO’s status as a nuclear alliance, stating, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”<sup>4</sup> In 2023, the Washington Declaration affirmed that South Korea “has full confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments and recognizes the importance, necessity, and benefit of its enduring reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”<sup>5</sup> Japan’s Defense White Paper provides a summary of a U.S.-Japan defense ministerial meeting in which Japan “stated that bilateral efforts at various levels to ensure nuclear deterrence remains credible and resilient [are] more important than ever under the current international security situation.”<sup>6</sup> And finally, Australia’s National Defence Strategic Review states, “In our current strategic

circumstances, the risk of nuclear escalation must be regarded as real. Our best protection against the risk of nuclear escalation is [U.S.] extended nuclear deterrence.<sup>7</sup> Both the United States and its allies remain committed to extended deterrence, but changes in the security environment mandate a review of the consultative mechanisms and the forces available, as they remain largely unchanged from when they were adjusted after the conclusion of the Cold War. During the Cold War, extended nuclear deterrence was made credible by forward-deploying nuclear weapons into Europe and the Pacific. However, as the security environment changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States shrank its nuclear footprint, returning most of its nuclear weapons from Europe, and retiring the Tomahawk nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).<sup>8</sup> While these decisions made sense for the security environment that they were made in, that era has passed. Renewed focus on ensuring the credibility of extended deterrence is necessary to assure allies of their security in a changing security environment. Challenges to Extended Deterrence Russia's invasion of Ukraine brought into sharp relief the challenges that the United States and its allies face from revisionist powers dissatisfied with the international system. Threatening nuclear weapons use against both NATO and non-NATO states has become commonplace for Russian officials—a threat made credible by a robust nuclear modernization program focused on improving existing forces and developing novel capabilities.<sup>9</sup> More concerning, the poor performance of Russian conventional forces in Ukraine may lead Russian military strategists to rely more heavily on Russia's expansive tactical and strategic nuclear capabilities to compensate for weakness in its conventional forces. While the prospects of China's forced unification with Taiwan have dominated security analysis in the last few years, China's ambitions extend much further and include reforming the global governance system to be more in line with its interests. These interests include establishing its own sphere of influence, which places China at odds not only with its regional neighbors concerned about their sovereignty and access to natural resources but also with global nations committed to the rules-based international order.<sup>10</sup> The revelation of Chinese ambitions has been underscored by full-scale conventional and nuclear modernization and expansion. Due to a lack of transparency, China's intentions for its nuclear force remain opaque. However, each year the Department of Defense's report, the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, increases its estimate of the future size of China's nuclear arsenal, with the 2022 report stating China could possess a nuclear stockpile of 1,500 weapons by 2035.<sup>11</sup> The rapid growth of China's nuclear arsenal allows it to adapt its nuclear strategy in any way it deems necessary to address its security concerns and achieve its strategic objectives. When comparing the challenges posed by Russia and China to those of North Korea, it is tempting to diminish the threat because it is not to the same scale. But that could be a mistake. Continued advancements in North Korean missile technology and growth of its nuclear force means that it poses a credible threat to the homelands of the United States and our Indo-Pacific allies.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, North Korea's nuclear doctrine calls for "preemptive and offensive nuclear strike," with credible nuclear forces capable of preemptive attack and nuclear warfighting.<sup>13</sup> Coupled with North Korea's history of provocation, the potential for miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula continues to increase. While it is customary to examine each threat separately, the threats become more acute when examined together. Furthermore, strategists must consider the potential for these adversaries to work in unison to achieve their aspirations, especially given that each adversary has identified the United States and its allies as security threats and an impediment to achieving its national security objectives. Prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia released a communiqué describing their relationship as a no-limits friendship. While the latest communiqué reframed the relationship as a "comprehensive partnership," what is clear is that cooperation between these two states will continue and grow for the foreseeable future.<sup>14</sup> While North Korea's relationship with China and Russia has often been volatile, with North Korea always careful not to become overly reliant on—and therefore vulnerable to—both nations, recently it has increased its overtures of cooperation to build strategic partnerships with both China and Russia.<sup>15</sup> The prospect of cooperation and potentially collaboration between or among these nations will challenge extended deterrence in the next decades. nonproliferation Maintainers assigned to 393rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron prepare B-2 Spirit for its first hot pit refueling at Ørland flystasjon Maintainers assigned to 393rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron prepare B-2 Spirit for its first hot pit refueling at Ørland flystasjon, Brekstad, Norway, August 29, 2023 (U.S. Air Force/Heather Salazar) The Assurance Challenge The terms extended deterrence and assurance are often used interchangeably, but while the concepts are related, they are focused on different audiences. Extended deterrence is directed at influencing adversaries to prevent attacks on allies, while assurance is directed at convincing allies of U.S. commitment to their defense. Just as deterrence is a cognitive function in the mind of the adversary, assurance is a cognitive function in the mind of the ally. Both rely on perceptions of the capability, credibility, and will of the United States to defend its vital interests and meet its security obligations. Assuring allies is inherently difficult. While Thomas Schelling's Nobel Prize-winning research on deterrence described the benefits of uncertainty or "the threat that leaves something to chance" for deterrence, assurance of allies requires a greater level of certainty and credibility because allies are unwilling to leave their security to chance.<sup>16</sup> Nor should they be expected to. This challenge has been deliberated for decades, with analysts and policymakers debating the question, "Would the United States sacrifice San Francisco for Tokyo or Boston for Prague?" It is a question that generates tremendous anxiety for the allies under the nuclear umbrella because their security depends on the answer. This anxiety is made substantially worse because the most likely pathways for potential nuclear use begin with regional conventional conflict escalating to limited nuclear use, meaning that our allies are on the frontlines for this threat. Compounding this anxiety are the investments both Russia and China have made into low-yield

theater nuclear weapons. These weapons can hold the allies at risk and grow North Korea's nuclear arsenal while potentially lowering the threshold for use. Furthermore, deterring opportunistic aggression in one theater while the United States is fully engaged in another will challenge extended deterrence, heightening allies' anxiety and decreasing their confidence in extended deterrence meeting their security needs. Risk to the Nonproliferation Agenda The 2022 National Defense Strategy reiterates the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a commitment the United States has held since the mid-20th century. A key driver for providing a nuclear umbrella for allies was to reduce the necessity for them to develop their own nuclear capabilities to meet their security needs. This allowed allies to forgo their nuclear ambitions and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states, strengthening the nonproliferation regime. In fact, the Department of State has stated, "Nuclear umbrella security agreements, whether unilateral or multilateral, have been, and are expected to continue to be, effective deterrents to proliferation."<sup>17</sup> The risk if allies under the nuclear umbrella lose confidence in extended deterrence, determining that their security needs are no longer met by U.S. guarantees, [it] could potentially put pressure on allies to develop their own nuclear weapons, undermining the nonproliferation regime. Recently, this risk has become more acute. President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea suggested in 2023 that the Republic of Korea may have to consider building its own nuclear weapons to confront its deteriorating security environment. These suggestions came after the announcement that South Korea will stand up its own Strategic Command in 2024 charged with the mission of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat and commanding the South's strategic forces, to include conventional ballistic missiles, missile defenses, and space and cyber capabilities, to name a few.<sup>18</sup> These moves have been popular with the public, with polling suggesting the South Korean public overwhelmingly supports the country's acquiring its own nuclear deterrent.<sup>19</sup> While South Korea has the most public support for developing a nuclear capability, it is not the only nation under the nuclear umbrella contemplating such a move. The governments of both Japan and Australia, traditionally staunchly against building a nuclear capability of their own, have more openly discussed the merits of, at a minimum, nuclear-sharing agreements. Some in the Japanese government have been more forward leaning. Former Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated in 2017, "Japan should have the technology to build a nuclear weapon if it wants to do so."<sup>20</sup> Moreover, it must be noted that these nations are more than technically capable of developing nuclear weapons and it is political considerations that have served as a restraint. As those political considerations continue to change, they may no longer serve as a restraint but as a catalyst for proliferation. Mitigating the Risk to Assurance Assuring our allies is an imperative, not only for the health of the nonproliferation regime but also for the continued strength of the alliance relationships. The benefits that the United States receives from strong alliances are numerous. These relationships contribute to global stability and prosperity by binding powerful nations together with a shared vision and purpose. Also, by building militaries that are interoperable and exercising in peacetime, these alliance relationships increase the involved nations' overall military strength, thus enhancing deterrence. Failing to mitigate the risk to assurance could introduce stress into the alliances, undermining cooperation and creating the potential for global instability with the increased risk of arms races and growing competition. To address the challenge, the United States must remain committed to the nuclear modernization program. The potential for productive relationships with Russia and China, the focus on the war on terror, and continued conflicts in the Middle East resulted in decisions for nuclear modernization being delayed. While the programs are under way, they are at a point that any delay in funding or technical issues may result in an increase in risk. While it is imperative that the modernization program stays on track, the decisions for the program were made in 2010, in a more benign security environment. Since that time, the increased aggression of Russia, the strategic breakout of China, and the continued advancement of North Korea's nuclear program require the United States and allies to reevaluate their strategy to confront these new security threats. NATO has begun that process with the Vilnius Summit Communiqué, announcing a new generation of strategic plans to increase readiness and improve deterrence of threats.<sup>21</sup> However, any new strategy must address the risk to extended deterrence of the two-peer environment and the risk of opportunistic aggression from one adversary if the United States is engaged with the other. Therefore, any strategy for Europe must consider the risk of opportunistic aggression in the Indo-Pacific region and vice versa. This will place additional demands on both the allies and the United States to ensure an effective deterrent. Although it is tempting to immediately discuss the capabilities needed for extended deterrence and assurance, ensuring that the strategy is sound is a necessary first step. This leads to a more fruitful debate on what capabilities are needed to make the strategy credible. While each leg of the triad is being replaced, a mix of both conventional and nuclear capabilities is necessary to meet both the military and political requirements for extended deterrence. Militarily, the forces must be survivable and prompt while also capable of holding a variety of adversary targets at risk. Strategically, the forces must provide a persistent presence, be visible to the adversary, while also being acceptable to the ally and potentially providing the option for burden-sharing.<sup>22</sup> Through consultations, the United States and allies should develop a suite of capabilities to make the extended deterrence strategies credible. Working directly with allies will also enhance assurance. Consulting with allies is imperative for assurance, and to that end, the United States is modernizing and enhancing the processes for

consultations within the alliances. Today, these processes are quite different between the Indo-Pacific allies and the NATO allies. There may be benefits in creating NATO-like consultative mechanisms and processes for the Indo-Pacific allies. This would increase assurance by ensuring allies feel that they are actively involved in decisions affecting their security. Additionally, building mechanisms to conduct combined deterrence planning across deterrence periods and spectrums of conflict will better allow the alliances to integrate deterrence operations. The Washington Declaration has laid the foundation for building these mechanisms with South Korea, announcing the establishment of a Nuclear Consultative Group charged with increasing nuclear dialogue, information-sharing, and strategic planning.<sup>23</sup> Finally, the security environment necessitates that NATO allies and Indo-Pacific allies work together to address security threats. Strengthening relationships across regions and nations will enhance deterrence throughout an increasingly interconnected security environment. Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky arrives for port visit in Busan, Republic of Korea Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky arrives for port visit in Busan, Republic of Korea, July 18, 2023 (Screenshot/U.S. Navy Video/Adam Craft) Conclusion The grand bargain of extended deterrence is a unique aspect of U.S. alliance relationships. Elaine Bunn, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, testified before Congress on this phenomenon, remarking: I have come to believe that extended deterrence is amazing from both sides. We have our non-nuclear allies, who have forsworn their own nuclear weapons and rely on another country, the U.S., in high-end situations, including nuclear attacks on their own territory and people. And it is amazing that the U.S. takes on the risk and responsibility of putting its own forces, even its population and territory, at risk on behalf of an ally. And that is an amazing fact to the point that some, in the past, have found it incredible.<sup>24</sup> The emerging two-peer environment will increasingly challenge this “amazing” agreement. The credibility of extended deterrence is being directly tested by our potential adversaries as they pursue their goals that increasingly challenge the security of the United States and its allies. The consequences of failing to assure allies could dramatically change the international environment. Failing to address the challenges to assurance increases the risk of nuclear proliferation by allies. General Cotton testified to this risk, stating, “The credibility of our extended deterrence commitments is not only part of the nation’s ironclad commitment to our allies, but it’s also essential in limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons.”<sup>25</sup> Mitigating this risk requires reexamining our strategies, designing an extended deterrence posture with both conventional and nuclear weapons to achieve that strategy while modernizing the alliance structures and consultative mechanisms that increase alliance integration. This requires the United States to be open and increase consultations, especially with our East Asian allies, on nuclear deterrence strategies and their respective employment. Every conflict the United States has fought since World War I has involved allies. They are the greatest asset of the United States, and it is easy to take the U.S. alliance system for granted because of the longevity of the relationships. However, in the next decades, the challenges to extended deterrence and assurance will only increase. The United States needs to take proactive action now to enhance extended deterrence and mitigate the risk to assurance to ensure our allies that the U.S. commitment is “ironclad.” Failing to close the gap might have consequences that could dramatically reshape the security environment. During World War II, Winston Churchill observed, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.”<sup>26</sup> By placing alliances on a solid footing for decades to come, prioritizing extended deterrence and assurance will ensure that the United States does not face Churchill’s worst-case scenario.