Formatting

Constructive

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Todd **Miller**, 04-19-20**21**, "**A lucrative** border-**industrial complex keeps the US border in constant 'crisis'**",

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/apr/19/a-lucrative-border-industrial-complex-keeps-the-us-border-in-constant-crisis // RB

Another way to look at the scope of this money juggernaut are the **105,000 contracts, totaling $55bn**, that **CBP and Ice have given private industry** – including Northrop Grumman, General Atomics, G4S, Deloitte and CoreCivic, among others – **to develop the border** and immigration **enforcement apparatus**. That is worth more than the total cumulative number of border and immigration **budgets** from 1975 to 2003. **That's 28 years combined amounting to $52bn.** The companies can also give campaign **contribut**ions **to** key politicians and lobby during budget debates. And so we have **the formula of a perpetual "border crisis": the bigger the crisis, the more need for border infrastructure, generating more revenue.**

In the affirmative world, migration still runs rampant. Increasing surveillance only forces migrants to take more dangerous routes

Douglas S. **Massey**, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, 20**17**, "Why Border Enforcement Backfired", PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5049707/ // RB

Border enforcement, of course, **does nothing to address the economic drivers of migration—persistent labor demand and high wages in the United States** and an abundant labor supply and low wages in Mexico—**nor does it take into account the existence of well-developed networks able to support and sustain undocumented border crossing and thus circumvent enforcement efforts.** Under these circumstances, we argue that **the militarization of the border cannot be expected to deter undocumented migrants from coming, but will simply induce them to adjust their**

border-crossing strategies while continuing to migrate to readily available jobs in the United States. An important constraint from the U.S. side is that the border is long and enforcement resources necessarily must be targeted to specific sectors. **As a result, the hardening of the border** at one location **will lead migrants to shift to new, less patrolled, likely more remote and riskier crossing sites, and to make more frequent use of coyotes** and to pay them more for higher quality, and more effective services. **As migrants were diverted away from relatively safe** and well-trod **pathways** in urban areas **into more remote, isolated, and environmentally hostile sectors of the border**, crossings grew increasingly difficult and hazardous and the share relying on the services of a paid guide, which had always been high, steadily rose. The solid line in Figure 3 shows the trend in the percentage of undocumented **migrants** who **used a** paid guide, or **coyote**, to cross the border from 1970 to 2010. **Starting from usage levels around 70%** in the early 1970s **the utilization of coyotes increased steadily increased over time to reach 100%** by 2010. As before, to assess the degree to which this trend stemmed from rising border enforcement, we used a logistic model to regress use of a coyote (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) on the Border Patrol budget instrument controlling for other variables in Table 1.

The humanitarian toll is unjustifiable.

Chambers 19 [Samuel Norton Chambers, 1-31-2019, Mortality, **Surveillance** and the Tertiary "Funnel Effect" on the U.S.-Mexico Border: A Geospatial Modeling of the Geography of Deterrence, Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08865655.2019.1570861, accessed 7-1-2024] // BZ **brackets in original**

The "Funnel Effect" in U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement Since 1994 the United States has massively expanded the personnel, resources and infrastructure devoted to policing the U.S.-Mexico border. During this period, annual funding for the U.S. Border Patrol has grown from $400 million to $3.8 billion; while staffing has increased almost five-fold, from 4,200 to more than 19,400 agents (CBP 2017a, 2017b). As described above, this expansion and concentration of policing has been mobilized under a logic of "**prevention through deterrence**" – which rather than directly obstructing unauthorized migration intends to make it '"**so difficult and so costly to enter** this country [the United States] **illegally that fewer individuals even try**"' (GAO 1999). Early evaluations of the deterrence policy questioned its efficacy on multiple grounds. Andreas (1998), for example, found that **rather than** meaningfully **preventing or deterring migration**, the U.S. **strategy** merely **moved it away from traditional urban crossing areas** like El Paso and San Diego and **into rural desert areas** of southern Arizona, where it became **less visible.** Rubio-Goldsmith et al. (2006) theorize this outcome as a "funnel effect" that they identify as "the primary structural cause of death of thousands of North American, Central American, and South American unauthorized men, women, and children who have died while trying to enter the U.S." (2). Compounding this outcome, once migration was successfully shifted to southern Arizona the Border Patrol once again concentrated resources in and around binational staging areas like Nogales and Douglas/Agua Prieta,

which had the effect of pushing migration routes away from these cities and into even more remote desert areas like the Altar Valley and "Devil's Highway" corridor surrounding the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge – an outcome that Martínez et al. (2014) describe as a secondary "funnel effect." As argued by Martinez et al. (2013), the above two **"funneling" processes** have **contributed to a 20-fold increase in the death and disappearance of clandestine migrants** in the Arizona borderlands, alongside a statistically significant increase in the proportion of these deaths caused by exposure to environmental conditions (see also Rubio-Goldsmith et al. 2006; Slack et al. 2016). For example, between 2000 and 2016 the southern Arizonabased Coalición de Derechos Humanos reports 3196 human remains recovered in the U.S. Border Patrol's Tucson Sector alone (Coalición de Derechos Humanos 2017), while the Border Patrol itself reports in excess of 6,000 deaths across the entirety of the U.S.- Mexico border during a similar period (Jones 2016). Meanwhile, Martínez et al. (2014) also find a long-term increase in the rate of death along the border (measured as migrant deaths / 100,000 Border Patrol apprehensions). As observed in Table 1, this rate nearly doubled between the years 2009 and 2011 alone. There is broad scholarly consensus on the relationship between the geography of deterrence and the phenomenon of migrant deaths. Indeed the United States government itself has used an increase in the number of migrant deaths ("as enforcement in urban areas forces aliens to attempt mountain or desert crossings") as an indicator of the success of its overall strategy (GAO 1997, 84). However, there has yet to be any robust modeling of the interaction between the location of surveillance and enforcement infrastructure, the conditions of the desert landscape in and around the locations where this infrastructure is deployed, the routes chosen by unauthorized migrants, and the distribution of migrant deaths. This problem merits greater attention, particularly given that the deployment of additional surveillance technology, enforcement infrastructure and personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border has garnered bipartisan support and serves as a major policy focus under the presidential administration of Donald Trump.

Meanwhile, cartels reap the profits

Gustavo **Solis**, 04-21-20**23**, "Little known 'virtual' border wall creates privacy, safety concerns, advocates say", KPBS Public Media, https://www.kpbs.org/news/border-immigration/2023/04/21/us-mexico-virtual-border-wall-privacy-safety-concerns // TT

Along with the leg up come serious privacy concerns, Maass said. He cited **recent examples of federal border agents gathering information on activists, lawyers, humanitarian workers, and journalists.** Safety concerns Other experts said **the virtual wall** — just like its physical counterpart — **causes more migrant deaths along the border. It also fails to address the most common drug smuggling method**, which is to simply drive illicit drugs **through legal ports of entry**, they said. **There is a direct correlation between militarization along the southern border and migrant deaths,** according to Sam Chamber's research. Sam Chambers is a University of Arizona researcher who focuses on patterns of migrant deaths in relation to border infrastructure. From a migration perspective, the virtual wall has the same impact as the physical wall, he said. "People moving around, out of sight of these towers, means they are taking **longer journeys**," he said. This **puts migrants at risk of kidney damage, dehydration, heat stroke and death**, Chambers said. So far, Chambers' research has primarily been limited to Arizona. But he says the Electronic Frontier Foundation's virtual border map will allow him to expand into California and Texas. "Now that this data exists, I'm looking at researching what's happening in the rest of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands," he said. What's more, **human smugglers aren't deterred by the virtual wall,** according to Victor Alfaro-Clark, a social anthropologist who has studied human and drug smuggling since the late 1980s. Alfaro-Clark teaches a class at San Diego State University where students interview human

smugglers in Tijuana. He knows smugglers in Tijuana, who are also known as "coyotes." "The **coyotes tell me that there has not been any impediment,**" Clark-Alfaro said. **"They continue to cross."** While the towers make **crossing more difficult, it just means the coyotes can charge more money**, he added. When it comes to drugs, the federal government's own statistics show that the majority enter the U.S. through legal border crossings. Putting up surveillance towers in remote parts of the border isn't going to stop that, Clark-Alfaro said.

HRMI 19 [No Author. September 24, 2019. "Cartel Wars: How A Border Wall Will Increase Drug Cartel Violence in Mexico". Human Rights Measurement Initiative. https://humanrightsmeasurement.org/cartel-wars-how-a-border-wall-will-increase-drug-cartel-violence/] doobz

Erecting a stronger continuous border wall along the US-Mexico border may lead to an **escalation in violence** and greater human rights violations. The newer physical barrier might reduce cartel human trafficking and narcotics, but that will likely come at a cost.On 06-19-1019 construction crews continue work on the replacement border wall on the boundary between the United States and Mexico near the Calexico Port of Entry. Photo by Mani Albrecht. A more tightly controlled barrier will **increase fragile tensions** between top Mexican drug syndicates and the Mexican government. Currently, an **uneasy alliance** exists among the major rings in Mexico. According to a DEA report in 2018, Mexico is dominated by the Sinaloa Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Los Zetas, and a string of smaller cartels. Each control territory or 'plazas' that collect revenue for trafficking narcotics, weapons, and humans. **Historically**, when the distribution routes are threatened it results in war between drug syndicates. For example, **in 2012, the** newly elected **Mexican government adopted a** more **militarised strategy targeting** the **cartels; it strangled their** resources and **revenue** streams. The **cartels responded with an increase in violence against the government, civilians**, and other rings. **Mexico saw its worst spike in forced disappearances, crime, and homicides.** As the border wall is constructed, officials in the United States and Mexico can expect another spike in mob violence.

The impact is regional instability.

Amies '11 [Nick Amies, 5-9-2011, "Southern expansion – DW – 05/09/2011," dw, https://www.dw.com/en/mexican-drug-cartels-exploit-central-americas-problems/a-15061349, accessed 8-18-2024] //recut Rae

The Mexicans have been looking for new routes into the US and have found going south into Central America and then out through the Caribbean very appealing," Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, a Latin America expert at Chatham House, told Deutsche Welle. "Central America has always been a transit route for drugs from South America, but the success of the Colombian government against drug trafficking in that country has led to a 'balloon' effect. Part of the trade - coca growing and paste production - has gone south while

cocaine production has gone north to Central America." "Thus, Central America has been caught in a double squeeze and the governments of the region, including Belize, are finding it very difficult to cope," Bulmer-Thomas added. Ted Leggett from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime believes geography, a lack of law enforcement capacity, corruption, and the legacies of the civil wars that ended in the 1990s make **Guatemala, Honduras** and **El Salvador** attractive to the Mexican drug cartels. Leggett said that the Mexican drug gangs make use of local street gangs and high-level connections in the government and military to subvert the rule of law. In Guatemala and Honduras in particular, he said, the risks are grave. "These countries are already in much worse shape than Mexico," he told Deutsche Welle. "Murder rates are at least four times higher in all of these countries than in Mexico. High-level penetration by cartels is equally problematic. And because these countries are much smaller and poorer than Mexico, they are much less capable of fighting back." The likely effect of **cartel** infiltration will be that social and political problems within a number of Central American countries will exacerbate, leading to increased **destabilization** which in turn **could threaten** their **regional neighbors**. The arrival of the Zetas and other Mexican drug cartels may turn out to be disastrous for **Guatemala, Honduras** and **El Salvador** but the **shockwaves won't stop at their** own **southern borders**. Threat to regional stability Central American countries are **ill-equipped** to repel the **cartels** Countries like Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama may start to feel **the** effects should the northern triangle become the next front in the fighting as **Mexico's drug war becomes a Central American conflict**. Relatively stable Central **American countries** which rely on heavily on tourism will soon find their economies suffering should the brutality of the **conflict seen in Mexico start to infect their cities** and resorts. Remove tourism income from the economic equation and the kind of social problems experienced by poorer neighbors may not be far behind - with the drug cartels following soon after. "For a variety of reasons, the countries further south face lesser risks," Leggett said. "However, Costa Rica has been used as a transit country, including for the air trafficking of drugs to Europe, while Panama is a key drug transit country, and regularly makes some of the most spectacular cocaine busts in the world. But the US military presence in Panama makes the country less attractive for those seeking to undermine the state."

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Although fragile, an economic recovery is on the way.

Fortinsky Sarah, 9-19-20**24**, "Yellen on 'soft landing' prediction: 'I believe that's exactly what we're seeing in the economy'," Hill//vivyells, https://thehill.com/business/economy/4888824-yellen-soft-landing-us-economy/

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Thursday she believes **the U.S. economy is making** the **"soft landing"** that she predicted two years ago, when inflation soared after the pandemic. In a live interview during the Atlantic Festival 2024, journalist Ron Brownstein recalled their interview in 2022, when, he said, **"there was a great deal of apprehension about the economy, about the Biden administration's management of the economy."** "Well, here we are now, two years later: unemployment 4.2, inflation under 3 percent, Fed finally, cutting interest rates," he said. "I know Taylor Swift has been in the news

a lot lately, so let me ask you: Are we out of the woods?" **Yellen cautioned against overconfidence, since "there are always risks to the economy**," but she said today's economy is exhibiting key markers of a soft landing, as she outlined them two years ago. "When we spoke two years ago, what I said was, I believe that **there was a path to bring inflation down, in the context of a strong job market, and if the Fed and the administration's policies could succeed in accomplishing that, we'd call that a soft landing,"** Yellen said. "And I believe that's exactly what we're seeing in the economy," she continued. **the Federal Reserve** on Wednesday **cut interest rates by 50 basis points**, in its first rate reduction after a two-and-a-half-year crusade against inflation. The new federal funds rate is 4.75-5 percent. The Fed incrementally increased interest rates from near zero in March 2022 to a range of 5.25-5.5 percent last July as it battled rising inflation, which peaked at 9.1 percent in June 2022. **While rate hikes fueled recession concerns and layoff fears, the unemployment rate maintained its lowest sub-4 percent streak since the 1960s**. Yellen said she wouldn't comment on the decision to cut rates by the Federal Reserve, which she previously chaired, but said the decision is "**a very positive sign for where the U.S. economy is."** Yellen said **the labor market remains "strong," despite having cooled significantly. "It's not as hot as the labor market was a year and a half or two years ago, when firms were utterly struggling to hire back employees that they had laid off during the pandemic, and there had been huge shifts in demand, wages were rising very rapidly."** Yellen said she believes the U.S. economy can **continue down this path**, which **would be "an excellent outcome."**

Greg **Ip**, 09-18-20**24**, "The Fed Has Significantly Improved the Odds of a Soft Landing", WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/economy/jobs/the-fed-has-significantly-improved-the-odds-of-a-soft-landing-3cbf486d // TT

In the past month, something that once seemed impossible suddenly became likely. **After four years of upheaval, the U.S. now seems to have low inflation, low unemployment, and solid economic growth**. The popular term for this is soft landing. A better word is "normal." This is what an economy is supposed to look like. Until Wednesday, one thing still looked abnormal: the Federal Reserve's interest-rate target, which at 5.25% to 5.5%, was much higher than economic conditions called for. **The Fed has begun to rectify that abnormality with its half-point rate cut. This vastly improves the odds of a soft landing**. It might even leave the economy and interest rates looking more normal a year from now than before the pandemic. To be clear, "normal" doesn't mean idyllic. Some people will be unemployed. Some people's wages will not keep up with inflation. Prices will rise gradually but won't go back to where they were before the pandemic. Normal simply means sustainable, without the excesses that lead to either recession or accelerating inflation.

Unfortunately, affirming quashes our soft landing in 2 ways.

First, reducing migrant inflows

Kevin **Appleby**, Center For Migration Studies, 09-02-20**24**, "The Importance of Immigrant Labor to the US Economy", Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS), https://cmsny.org/importance-of-immigrant-labor-to-us-economy/ // RB

Despite **calls to deport** all **undocumented persons** in our nation, such an operation **would cause a severe** strain on US citizens, as **labor shortage**s would accrue **and inflation** would rise. Moreover, federal, state, and local budgets would be reduced, as **taxes paid by undocumented workers would be lost,** including their contributions to the Social Security and Medicare systems. The following offers a profile of immigrant laborers in the US economy and measures their economic and fiscal contributions to the United States. It also argues that legalizing the undocumented workforce, instead of deporting them, and creating legal avenues for immigrant workers would serve the best interest of the United States and the US citizenry. Immigrants in the Labor Force. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2023, foreign-born workers, including the undocumented, accounted for 18.6 percent, or 29.1 million, of the US labor force, up from 18.1 percent in 2022. The labor force participation rate of the foreign-born increased to 66.6 percent, almost five percent higher than the native-born population (61.8 percent). Foreign-born workers were mainly employed in service occupations, construction, transportation, and material moving occupations, with native-born workers employed in management, professional, and sales and office occupations, making their roles in the labor force largely complementary. Almost half (47.6 percent) of the foreign-born workforce was Hispanic, with about a quarter (25.1 percent) being Asian. According to estimates from the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) and other groups, as many as **8.3 million undocumented immigrants work in the US economy**, or 5.2 percent of the workforce. They work in **construction** (1.5 million), restaurants (1 million), agriculture and farms (320,000), landscaping (300,000), and **food processing and manufacturing** (200,000), among other occupations. [1] Unauthorized workers hail from Mexico (30 percent), Central and South America (20 percent), and Central and Eastern Asia (15 percent). Occupations which will continue to demand undocumented workers over the next decade include cooks, home health/personal care aides, delivery and taxi drivers, and medical/therapy assistants. In New York State, CMS estimates a total of 470,100 undocumented workers, with 56 percent coming from six countries: Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, China, and the Dominican Republic. They work as construction workers (29, 500), maids/housekeepers (20,900), cooks (16,800), home and personal care aides (16,800), janitors (13,600), and delivery drivers (13,400), among other occupations. Potential Labor Shortages. In order to grow, the US economy will continue to need immigrant workers in certain industries. A Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas study found that immigrant **laborers have helped grow the post-pandemic economy, spurring job growth while also keeping down inflation.**

But surveillance would scare civilians from crossing—creating massive labor shortages that deck the job market

Stephen **Devadoss**, 06-28-20**11**, "IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE", Wiley Online Library, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x // RB, **blackout for language**

The baseline is run using the actual domestic enforcement expenditure as the gauge for the level of worksite surveillance. The alternate scenario is run with **a 10% increase in the enforcement budget** over the baseline (Table 3). Comparison of the alternate scenario with the baseline offers insight into the impacts of tighter domestic enforcement on the endogenous variables. **Greater spending on domestic enforcement reduces the [redacted] labor employment,** and **causes labor shortages**, **because undocumented workers are concerned about getting** caught and **deported and employers are concerned about government sanctions, including heavy fines and jail time.** The results show that the decline in labor use is more pronounced in the recent years, which is consistent with current events, that is, stricter workplace raids have not only led to curtailing of [redacted] employment but also **undocumented workers are returning to Mexico and fewer [redacted] immigrants are entering the United States.** Specifically, as the demand for [redacted] labor declines, the [redacted] wage rate for farm workers also declines. The simulation results show that a 10% increase in domestic expenditure reduces the [redacted] wage rate on average by 11.49%, but the reduction is more pronounced in the later years. For example, the [redacted] wage rate falls by 36.11% in 2006 and 55.23% in 2007, which is significantly larger than the 0.18% decline in 1994. The lower labor demand and depressed [redacted] wage rate **reduces the [redacted] agricultural labor flow by 9.12% or about 42,000 illegal immigrants in 2007.** The lower labor demand reduces U.S. agricultural production. As U.S. production declines, fewer farm products are exported to Mexico. As shown in Table 3, **the agricultural trade flow is reduced by** 0.04% in 1994 and **22.67% in 2007.**19 This is consistent with the larger decline of illegal labor employment in recent years. The decline in the U.S. supply and lower exports to Mexico **causes the commodity prices to increase in both countries.** Because fewer immigrants are entering the United States and undocumented workers are returning to Mexican agricultural employment, the Mexican farm supply increases. These results confirm the theoretical findings that an increase in the worksite enforcement will deter employers from hiring illegal immigrants. However, **this policy reduces trade between the countries.** Thus, domestic enforcement has a tradeoff between curbing the undocumented workers versus lower agricultural production and exports.

Historically

Stephen **Devadoss**, 06-28-20**11**, "IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE", Wiley Online Library, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x // RB, **blackout for language*

To stop the influx of immigrants, IRCA focused heavily on tightening border control. The IRCA also legislated the H-2A program, which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations (ERS 2007). However, farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of H-2A and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking.3 In spite of IRCA's amnesty provision and strengthened control measures, [redacted] [undocumented] immigration continued to rise—about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2007 (Martin 2007) which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports—leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the [redacted] [undocumented] immigration problem. Several bills were proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements,4 paths to citizenship, and guest-worker programs (Montgomery 2006). These bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest-worker programs.As a result of the failed legislations and the September 11 attack, the government primarily focused on border security. Accordingly, funding for border enforcement has steadily increased,5 and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement. However, Boucher and Taylor (2007) documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority (GAO 2005). For example, from 1999 to 2003, the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480,000 to 18,000.6,7 But, by late 2005, the U.S. government started to intensify domestic surveillance. For example, only 25 criminal arrests relating to [redacted] [undocumented] immigration occurred in 2002, but increased to 716 by 2006 and 1,103 by 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008c). Domestic surveillance has further intensified under the current administration (Meyer and Gorman 2009).According to Passel (2008), a decreasing trend in the unauthorized immigrant population is recently occurring.8 This is largely due to worksite and border enforcements and the recent U.S. economic recession. These enforcements have exacerbated U.S. agricultural labor shortages before the 2008/2009 economic crisis.

According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey, 80% of the newly hired farm labor force is from Mexico, of which 96% are unauthorized (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Therefore, **as border** and domestic **enforcements intensified, entry of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. farm labor force was thwarted, which led to an acute labor scarcity.** For example, the Wall Street Journal (2007) reported that in 2006, **about 20% of agricultural products were not harvested nationwide**. Furthermore, the Rural Migration News (2007) provides a detailed and specific list of these shortages and the adverse effect on crucial cultivational operations which resulted in heavy losses. As a result, farm groups are one of the strongest allies of overhauling the current guest-worker program to bring immigrants to legally work in U.S. agriculture. For the last several decades, **immigrants played a crucial role in the development and competitiveness of U.S. agricultural production** (Torok and Huffman 1986). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead (2008) provide evidence of the importance of immigrant farm workers to vegetable production which is highly labor intensive. The United States has a great land endowment and ideal growing conditions; however, **without immigrant labor who perform the back-breaking labor-intensive operations that U.S. low-skilled workers are unwilling to perform, agricultural productivity and total production would decline. Consequently, costs to U.S. consumers of agricultural products would increase and net exports would also decrease.** In recent years, Mexican immigrant labor contributed significantly to the expansion of U.S. agricultural exports, particularly between the United States and Mexico. For example, between 1994 and 2008,

net U.S. exports to the world and to Mexico increased by 82% and 200%, respectively (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008f). Devoid of these laborers, this dramatic increase would not have been possible.

Second, increasing migrant outflows

Asher 24 reports:

Avi **Asher-Schapiro**, **07**-20-20**24**, "Trump, armed with tech, could supercharge deportations", No Publication, https://www.context.news/ai/trump-armed-with-tech-could-supercharge-deportations. //brask

Surveillance and AI **could** speed Trump's promise to **deport millions of immigrants**. Immigrants brace for crackdown post-election AI and surveillance bolster US borders LOS ANGELES - Maru Mora-Villalpando had been living in the United States for 21 years when a letter arrived at her door with a deportation notice. It was 11 months into Donald Trump's presidency, and Mora-Villalpando thought she had taken all the necessary steps to keep her address hidden from authorities. But she did not realise that immigration officials could track her whereabouts using basic information she had assumed was private, such as her car registration or utility bills. "I didn't know all this data was being packaged up and given to authorities," said Mora-Villalpando, a community organiser who works with immigrant and undocumented communities in Seattle, Washington. "People would see ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) agents outside their homes, and we didn't know how they would find us - well now we know." The Trump campaign and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not respond to requests for comment. High-tech enterprise Immigration enforcement is increasingly a high-tech enterprise. Authorities can track migrants using data brokers that create detailed profiles of immigrants based on thousands of data points, as well as other state-of-the-art **surveillance tools** **including** facial recognition and licence plate readers. Algorithms can help decide an immigrant's fate on a range of issues, from whether they should wear an ankle monitor to whether an asylum case is flagged as suspicious. Authorities are also using ever more artificial intelligence (**AI**), which campaigners worry **could generate target lists for deportation or automatically reject asylum** applicants **en masse**. With Trump leading in the polls, many organizations that work with immigrant communities worry these **tools could be used to speedily** target then **deport** some of the **more than 11 million undocumented people** who are estimated to live in the U.S. "There's a huge tech infrastructure ready to do just that," said Jacinta Gonzalez, field director of Mijente, a grassroots organisation that works on immigration issues. In a memo released in 2023, the DHS, which oversees immigration enforcement, said it would "not use AI technology to enable improper systemic, indiscriminate, or large-scale monitoring, surveillance or tracking of individuals." Undocumented immigrants always have risked deportation - even those who came as children or who are near-lifelong U.S. residents. Despite more than two decades of trying, Congress has never been able to pass a law that would normalise their status.

Furthermore, it causes migrants to fear increased deportations. As a result,

Flores-11 [Edwin Flores and Dennis Romero, 6-28-2011, "Implications of Immigration Policies for the U.S. Farm Sector and Workforce," Wiley Online Library. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x //AB]

The results for these two scenarios show a distinct tradeoff between a reduction in illegal labor flow and commodity trade. **In response to** the **economic downturns, heightened border surveillance**, and **new national- and state-levelworkplace enforcements, undocumented workers** are **returning** to **Mexico and** also **fewer immigrants** are **attempting to enter** the **United States, which reducesthe farm labor supply.** As a result, the U.S. agricultural sector is facing labor shortages in labor-intensive operations such as vegetable production, food processing,

and manufacturing (Gans 2007; Wall Street Journal 2007).20 Despite the economic slowdown, farmers still need labor to carry out crucial farm operations such as planting and harvesting. Producers in several states have been beset with labor scarcity and are experiencing **devastating** effects on farm production and profitability. Consequently, consumers have also incurred higher costs for fruits and vegetables at the grocery stores. **Any reduction of** the **immigrant workforce**, by **deporting undocumented workers** and **scuttling** the**guest-worker program**, **has several adverse implications** for **U.S. agriculture.**

AP 17 (Associated Press, "Mexico weighs grim prospect of deportation wave under Trump," 01-23-17, http://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/15/mexico-deportation-prospect-donald-trump/) //recut brask

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexico is starting to seriously contemplate the possibility that millions of its migrants could be deported, and the picture is not pretty. Under proposals put forward by President-elect Donald Trump, **Mexico could see millions** of people **streaming back with no jobs available**; the country might lose some of the billions of dollars in remittances sent home annually; **and** some **jobless deportees could swell the ranks of drug cartels**, **sparking more violence**. Gov. Hector Astudillo of the southern state of Guerrero considered the possible scenario over the weekend. At least a million Guerrero residents live in the United States, many without proper documents, and the state is already reeling from drug gang violence and poverty. "Of course Guerrero is not in any condition to receive the million or more than one million migrants" in the U.S., Astudillo said. "On the contrary, they have been an important mainstay in supporting the economy of Guerrero." **Migrants sent home almost $25 billion in remittances to Mexico** in 2015, and experts say most of that went to support the most basic needs of the poorest Mexicans. Trump has suggested he might somehow seize the funds of those immigrants who are not deported to pay for a border wall. Mexico already has a shortfall of 800,000 new jobs for youths who join the labor force each year, let alone returning migrants, said Alejandra Barrales, head of the leftist Democratic Revolution Party. "We need to close ranks and create (job) opportunities, not just for people who might be deported, but for the 1.2 million young people who join the labor market each year." The federal government announced an emergency program this week aimed at encouraging business to hire returning migrants, but Mexico City teacher Armando Osorio doubted that would be enough, given the government's poor track record on job creation. "These people have no moral authority to say they will receive their countrymen with open arms," he said. "They are the ones who are mainly responsible for the forced exodus of millions of Mexicans who don't have enough to eat." Even if Trump seems to be walking back the idea of mass deportations, the prospect still remains frightening for people in Mexico. On Sunday, Trump said in an interview on the news program "60 Minutes" that "what we are going to do is get the people that are criminal and have criminal records, gang members, drug dealers, a lot of these people — probably two million, it could be three million — and getting them out of our country." **Central America's violent gangs**, known as "maras," **emerged** in the 1980s **when migrants** who had fled El Salvador's civil war **were deported by the U.S.** after committing crimes as members of street gangs in Los Angeles. The deportees took their criminal knowhow back with them and started new gangs. The U.S. government in 2012 estimated **about 1.9 million immigrants were criminals and could face deportation.** The Migration Policy Institute, a Washington think tank, estimated 820,000 of those are in the United States illegally. Mike Vigil, former chief of international operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, said at least some **deportees** will likely **embrace drug trafficking**, using already established U.S. connections to increase the amount of heroin and other drugs sent across the border. Even deporting only the felons would backfire by causing more violence in Mexico and Central America, he said. "What's going to happen is that these **individuals** are going to **return** back **to Mexico and** they **have no jobs, so they** are going to **feed the ranks of the cartels** there," said Vigil, author of the book "Metal Coffins:

The Blood Alliance Cartel." "**That would lead to more violence**, **kidnappings** in Mexico, **and** these areas (of Central America), which would cause **a tsunami of undocumented immigrants coming into the U**nited **S**tates, probably much more so than what he could actually deport," Vigil said. There are cases of **deported migrants assum**ing **leadership positions in** the region's **gangs**, such as Martin Estrada Luna, a high school dropout from Washington state with a rap sheet of petty crimes such as burglary. Two years after he was sent back to Mexico in 2009, he had transformed himself into a drug baron known as "El Kilo," leader of a ruthless cell of the Zetas gang who masterminded the mass killings of more than 250 people.

The impact is recession.

Immigrants are vital for American industries

Brennan **Hoban**, 08-24-20**17**, "Do immigrants "steal" jobs from American workers?", Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/do-immigrants-steal-jobs-from-american-workers/ // TT

Immigrants often fill the jobs Americans don't want However, some argue that the work of these agents to protect against "job-stealing" immigrants may be in vain. As Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown explains in her new Brookings Essay, "The Wall," immigrants may not actually be "stealing" as many U.S. jobs as Trump thinks. As she put it, "the impact of immigrant labor on the wages of native-born workers is low… However, **undocumented workers often work the unpleasant, back-breaking jobs that native-born workers are not willing to do**." Felbab-Brown explains that many of the jobs occupied by undocumented workers in the United States are physically demanding jobs that Americans do not want, **such as gutting fish or work on farm fields**. She argues, "**fixing immigration is not about mass deportations of people** but about creating a legal visa system for jobs Americans do not want. And it is about providing better education opportunities, skills-development and retooling, and safety nets for American workers. And to date, Trump hasn't offered serious policy proposals on many—if any—of these areas."

Nicole Prchal **Svajlenka**, February 2, 20**21**, "Undocumented Immigrants in Construction", https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/02/EW-Construction-factsheet.pdf // ND

Across the country, **5 million undocumented immigrants are working** alongside their neighbors to keep the country safe amid a global pandemic—including **nearly 1.6 million immigrants who are working in construction**.1 **These workers are building and maintaining critical infrastructure projects, such as those needed to expand Americans'** increased **need for both health care** throughout the pandemic **and reliable internet access. Construction has continued on bridges**

and facilities to generate renewable energy in order to keep our roads accessible and electricity on. **Construction workers have also continued to ensure that Americans have safe and secure housing**.

But affirming would shock the labor market, pushing the economy over the brink—and hampering our current recovery

Austin **Denean**, Fri, September 20th 20**24** , "Fed turns focus toward bolstering economy with obstacles ahead", WLOS, https://wlos.com/news/nation-world/fed-turns-focus-toward-bolstering-economy-with-obstacles-ahead-inflation-unemployment-jobs-interest-rates-consumer-spending-soft-landing-jerome-powell-federal-reserve

The Federal Reserve is moving onto its next mission after the first rate cut since ratcheting them up to tame the rate of price increases earlier this week marked a symbolic end to its fight with inflation and the beginning of a new phase **to steer the economy into a soft landing. Keeping the labor market intact is one of the chief challenges for the Fed to navigate as it eases interest rates to a more neutral level where they do not spur or slow economic activity.** Signals that the employment situation in the U.S. is declining have grown more prominent in recent months. Unemployment rose to 4.2% last month compared to 3.7% in January and the rate at which businesses have added jobs has also declined. Labor data is still strong to solid compared to historical averages but is significantly weaker than it was in the peak of the post-pandemic resurgence of the economy. Policymakers' projections showed they are predicting unemployment to continue to climb modestly through the end of the year to 4.4% and stay there by the end of 2025. That is an increase of 4% this year and 4.2% for 2025. Powell said on Wednesday that the **labor market is no longer causing inflationary pressure through a labor shortage that caused wages to rise rapidly and was passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices.** They are now turning their focus to the maximum employment side of their dual mandate of overseeing the economy. **Economists also noted that Powell was very clear about further weakening in the labor market being an unwelcome development.** The other big challenge facing the central bank is determining what its benchmark interest rate needs to be to have a neutral effect on the economy, meaning that it would neither spur growth nor weaken activity. There is some debate among economists as to exactly what that range is, and Powell signed governors are also unsure but that it is higher than it was prior to the pandemic.

Absent a soft landing,

Boston **U**niversity, 11-01-20**13**, "The Financial Crisis and The Great Recession," Boston University. https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2019/06/MAC_2e_Chapter_15.pdf recut Aaron

The financial crisis that commenced in 2007 and its aftermath have been widely referred to as the "Great Recession"—and with good reason. From its beginning until its nadir in 2009, it was responsible for the destruction of nearly $20 trillion worth of financial assets owned by U.S. households. During this time, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 4.7 percent to 10 percent (not counting the discouraged and marginally attached workers discussed in Chapter 7). By 2010, college graduates fortunate enough to find a job were, on average, earning 17.5 percent less than their counterparts before the crisis—and experts were predicting that such a decline in earnings would persist for more than a decade. The crisis also spread beyond U.S. borders. As consumption and income decline[s]d in the United States, many countries experienced a significant reduction in exports as well as a decline in the investments that they held in the United States. As a result, global GDP declined by 2 percent in 2009. It has been estimated that between 50 million and 100 million people around the world either fell into, or were prevented from escaping, extreme poverty due to the crisis. Why did this happen?

Rebuttal

Steven Hyland, 09-2011, "The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking", Origins, https://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking // RB

But it is the long history of drug production and distribution in Latin America—and the enduringly strong demand for narcotics in the United States—that best helps to explain why the "war on drugs" has resulted in so few battles won and has come at such a great cost both in money and human lives. The trafficking of illicit drugs is a signature Latin American contribution to our globalized world, and today Colombia and Mexico play the paramount roles in terms of production and distribution. While cocaine, heroin, and marijuana have long figured as primary trafficked products, in the recent past drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have increased shipments of methamphetamines. Yet, this contemporary arrangement was not always the case. The production, trafficking, and distribution of drugs to consumers have moved geographically many times across Latin America. Like all successful businesses, organizations for narco-production and narco-distribution have responded rapidly and extensively to changing tastes and strong market demands in the consumer countries especially the United States. At the same time, the often drastic shifts in the political fates of Latin American countries, geopolitics (most notably the Cold War), supra-state institutions (such as the United Nations with its anti-drug policies), and the increased militarization of efforts to eradicate drugs production (spearheaded by the United States) have also shaped the development of the narcotics trade. In broad terms, the development of the Latin American drugs industry can be broken into four periods. From the late nineteenth century to 1945, Mexico controlled the illegal trade in opium and marijuana, and Peru dominated the mostly legal trade in cocaine products. A second period, from the end of World War II to the 1960s, saw the professionalization and greater organization of trafficking as networks of traffickers emerged. The third era, from the 1960s to 1984, witnessed the rise of Colombia as the predominant producer and trafficker after Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba fell by the wayside and the Mexican government attempted to curb marijuana and opium production. This period also witnessed a sharp spike in the violence

associated with the drug trade. Finally, Mexico has returned to a leading role since 1984 (as a result of connections made with Colombian traffickers in Panama), and drug-trade violence continues to escalate. **The history of Latin American narcotics production and distribution thus reveals the ways in which efforts to suppress the drug trade in one state have** tended **only to shift its location to another country in the region.** Entrepreneurs throughout **Latin America** worked to take advantage of any opportunity to increase their share of this highly lucrative business and to take advantage of consistently strong demand.

Empirics

Alexander **Mendez**, 20**18**, "The Adaptive Nature of Drug Organizations," California State University, Maritime Academy https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/2z10wr09m // RB, **parentheses in original**

Corrupting border agents allowed cartel organizations the reins **to controlling the flow of illicit goods.** Soon cartels were using paramilitary tactics, which became a huge problem for Mexican military forces. The increase in violence was also attributed to the increase of force from President Calderon. **His campaign against cartel organizations** gained U.S support and funding, which amounted to $300 million a year. This in turn **backfired on Mexican and U.S policy.** Oddly enough **every time a cartel kingpin was eliminated**, **more violence occurred** over the once occupied territory. **This led to the rise of many small cartel groups, such as the Zetas and the Mexican Gulf Cartel** (Grillo, 2013). This was observed during 2009 with the death of kingpin Beltran Leyva led to an increase of violence. **The number of homicides (doubled) increased from 249 in 2009 to 487 by the end of 2010.**

Rest were analytics.