

# Constructive

See R3 OS.

## Rebuttal

### Migrants circumvent surveillance

Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, 2017, "Why Border Enforcement Backfired", PubMed Central (PMC),

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5049707/> // RB

Border enforcement, of course, does nothing to address the economic drivers of migration—persistent labor demand and high wages in the United States and an abundant labor supply and low wages in Mexico—nor does it take into account the existence of well-developed networks able to support and sustain undocumented border crossing and thus circumvent enforcement efforts. Under these circumstances, we argue that the militarization of the border cannot be expected to deter undocumented migrants from coming, but will simply induce them to adjust their border-crossing strategies while continuing to migrate to readily available jobs in the United States. An important constraint from the U.S. side is that the border is long and enforcement resources necessarily must be targeted to specific sectors. As a result, the hardening of the border at one location will lead migrants to shift to new, less patrolled, likely more remote and riskier crossing sites As migrants were diverted away from relatively safe and well-trod pathways in urban areas into more remote, isolated, and environmentally hostile sectors of the border, crossings grew increasingly difficult and hazardous and the share relying on the services of a paid guide, which had always been high, steadily rose. The solid line in Figure 3 shows the trend in the percentage of undocumented migrants who used a paid guide, or coyote, to cross the border from 1970 to 2010. Starting from usage levels around 70% in the early 1970s the utilization of coyotes increased steadily increased over time to reach 100%

by 2010. As before, to assess the degree to which this trend stemmed from rising border enforcement, we used a logistic model to regress use of a coyote (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) on the Border Patrol budget instrument controlling for other variables in [Table 1](#).

## **Consequently, smuggling empirically increased**

**Solis 21** [Gustavo Solis, xx-xx-2021, Drug smuggling, and the endless battle to stop it, USAToday, <https://www.usatoday.com/border-wall/story/drug-trafficking-smuggling-cartels-tunnels/559814001/>, accessed 7-18-2024] // BZ \*\*edited for offensive language\*\*

Fences went up, but drugs kept moving. After the government built fences in San Diego, drug smugglers turned to the ocean, underground tunnels and, most commonly, the ports of entry. Last year more than 90 percent of the drug seizures happened in the port of entry, where millions of cars drive into San Diego from Mexico every year. David Shaw is Unzueta's successor at Homeland Security Investigations. The unit investigates cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, money laundering and drug smuggling. Cartels "operate like a business," Shaw says. "If you put up one wall, they find a way to get around it." The USA TODAY NETWORK spoke with current and retired law-enforcement experts who have patrolled the border on a daily basis. Asked about President Donald Trump's proposed border wall, they seem to agree: San Diego, at least, would benefit more from additional personnel, training and investment in investigative tools like wiretaps and paid informants. Drug smuggling along the border is like a balloon, experts say. If you squeeze one part, the air simply shifts to another. The San Ysidro Port of Entry, which connects Tijuana, Mexico, to San Diego, is the busiest land crossing in the world. Every year, more than 14 million vehicles and 23 million passengers cross through one of 26 inspection lanes to get into the United States. "We probably lead the nation as far as smuggling attempts from [redacted] [undocumented immigrants] and narcotics, so we are very dynamic and very busy," says Acting Port Director Robert Hood. "It's a fun place to be if you're an officer. Something is always going on." During the 2016 fiscal year, Border Patrol agents in San Diego confiscated nearly 83,000 kilograms of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin from the three ports of entry in the area. The next closest border sector in terms of drug seizures was Laredo, Texas, which covers twice as much land and where agents confiscated 10,000 fewer kilograms of drugs, according to Customs and Border Protection data. The San Ysidro port is a giant bottleneck that funnels a seemingly endless flood of traffic to inspection booths. There, Border Patrol agents have about 40 seconds to find signs of smuggling. Agents look for anything that could point to drug smuggling, such as custom-made compartments, uneven tires, a nervous driver or a weighted down trunk. Inspectors do this while

knowing that drivers have been in line for hours and that those drivers contribute millions to the U.S. economy. "When I worked the primary lanes, my goal was to look at the folks as they are coming at me and to determine which one of all this traffic is not like everybody else," Hood says. "It's kind of like when the Secret Service identified counterfeit currency. They know what legitimate currency is like so well that when the bad one comes, you go, 'That's it.' " When drug smuggling moved to the ports of entry, it was by design. The idea was that fences would divert drug trafficking to one area: the ports. Here, the agents have the advantage of lights, drug-sniffing canine patrols, X-ray machines and other high-tech equipment. Diverting drugs to the ports was a safer option than sending agents to rural areas of the country, two hours away from their nearest backup. In this sense, the fencing has been a success. But there have also been unintended consequences. Since 2001, the San Diego Sector's Tunnel Task Force has found more than 60 smuggling tunnels in the county. "With the advent of the infrastructure between the ports of entry, one of the unintended consequences were the huge narcotics tunnels that were created that went over 100 feet deep and ran seven or eight football fields in length," says Unzueta. Most of those tunnels are in Otay Mesa, a massive warehouse district just north of a commercial truck port of entry. The warehouses are the perfect spot to dig exits from Mexican tunnels. The constant truck traffic keeps the noise levels up so that much construction goes unnoticed. Subleasing of warehouses makes it difficult for law-enforcement officers to keep tabs on who is renting them out. The Tunnel Task Force finds and seals tunnels. Its members call themselves the "tunnel rats," in homage to the tunnel rats of the Vietnam War who cleared the tunnels the Viet Cong used to run their guerrilla warfare operations. San Diego's soil, at least along certain stretches of the county, makes the area ideal for building tunnels. The soil is strong enough to support the weight of a tunnel but soft enough to dig through. Other parts of the border are too sandy, and sophisticated tunnels require infrastructure to support the weight. "We just happen to be in the right place at the right time where most of the tunneling activity takes place," says Lance LeNoir, captain of the tunnel rats. "We've developed a niche. We didn't have a script to go off in here so we borrowed from the fire department, from geologists, from everything. It's just been a collaboration." While the majority of smuggling attempts happen in the ports of entry, the biggest loads of drugs enter San Diego through tunnels. The ones equipped with rails can carry packages as big as 35 tons. It can take more than a million dollars to build one of these tunnels, but the drug-smuggling organization can get a return on its investment after two successful shipments. "Even if you put every single resource you have on something, I'm not sure you stop it because the other side has a lot more resources to actually move it along," Shaw says. "It goes back to the demand side in the U.S. If the demand wasn't so high, then you wouldn't have the supply problem." Smuggling in the ocean has evolved from Jets Skis dropping off packages on deserted beaches near San Diego to multiday expeditions taking ships 150 miles west into the ocean and as far north as San Francisco. A group of about 50 border patrol agents, mostly former military, patrol an area that's larger than the state of Connecticut but has no roads and only a handful of visual landmarks. "They are going so far out of our area of operations that we can't even cover that area," says Kurt Nagel, a marine interceptor for Customs and Border Protection's air and sea patrol. "We are trying to set up task forces in San Francisco to give us a hand. ... Right now

with how far they are going, we can't keep up." After the border fences in San Diego were built, law enforcement noticed

more pangas — small, open fishing boats that run on outboard motors — abandoned on the city's beaches. "We were completely

overwhelmed," says Unzueta, the retired ICE investigator. When agents focused on pangas, the smugglers began using

expensive recreational vessels that blend in with the boats San Diegans use for weekend fishing

or scenic cruises. Border Patrol agents have to figure out which ones are coming from Mexico. "A lot of it is just knowing the people,

knowing the seasons, knowing what fish is in season, what kind of tackle you use to go sea fishing as opposed to lake fishing," Nagel says.

"Smugglers sometimes mix that up." If a wall is built, don't expect it — or the Border Patrol — to stop the flow of drugs. Border Patrol agents in

San Diego agree that they need more people and funding for investigative work. "It's old-school police work," Shaw says. "That's where I think

our best money is spent." Wiretaps and paid informants are among the unit's most effective tools for uncovering the inner workings of

drug-smuggling organizations, he adds. "You can have all the technology you want and all the infrastructure you want, but if you have nobody

to make an arrest when someone comes across illegally, it really doesn't do you any good because they are going to get right past that

technology eventually," Hernandez says. "And if you have all the agents you want but no technology to help you find them, people are going to

get away anyway. We want to try to find the right balance." And any wall that is built can't wall off the bustling border ports. Sealing San Ysidro

would decimate a multimillion dollar, trans-border economy. "Some of our better tools are the officers' skill and the canines' ability," says Hood,

the ports chief. Beyond that, their work is done with intelligence, paying informants in Mexico and building cases so that they know what is

approaching the border before it gets there. "I think what we are likely to see with the border wall is probably

increased levels of smuggling going on within the ports of entry, potentially increased levels in narcotics tunnels,"

Unzueta says.

## **Nowratesh 17, information for border security produces overload**

(Alex Nowratesh: VP of econ policy at CATO. 6 December 2017, "More Information Won't Resolve

Management Problems at Border Patrol Checkpoints", CATO,

<https://www.cato.org/blog/more-information-wont-resolve-management-problems-border-patrol-checkpoints>

[k points](#) .//. DOA: 7/8/24) TZL

The call for more information and better metrics for measuring border security is well intentioned but

it can also backfire. Some information is required to make accurate decisions but, beyond a certain point, too much information can produce information overload, whereby decisions become less accurate as the decision maker

learns more (Figure 1). Information beyond the overload point will confuse a decision maker, affect his or

her ability to set priorities, and worsen recall of prior information. A fundamental concept in

economics is scarcity, which occurs when there is not enough supply of a good to satisfy all demand at

a price of zero. Information overload is a reminder that human attention span, information processing

capacity, and accurate decision-making ability are also scarce resources. Information overload can take several

forms. Some [scholars](#) emphasize how much time it takes to absorb new information, which can diminish the

accuracy of decisions that require timely action. That case is most similar to the timeliness of

intelligence reports in guiding Border Patrol agent deployment. The value of most intelligence

depreciates rapidly and, if it is accurate, must be quickly acted upon to have an effect. Other [scholars](#) focus

on the quality of information, as it is difficult to measure that without first absorbing it and comparing it to other information. Estimates of the

size of black markets, a crucial metric for Border Patrol, are fraught with errors and it is nearly impossible to tell which one is correct. Tasks that

are [reoccurring routines](#) produce less information overload than more complex and varied tasks. As mentioned above, the [organizational](#)

design of a [firm](#) is another important factor that influences information overload. Smugglers and illegal immigrants compound the problem of

information overload as they change their behavior in response to Border Patrol policies. Smugglers and illegal immigrants rarely want to be

apprehended so they shift away from patrols or areas where there is more enforcement. In the mid-2000s, illegal Mexican border crossers

moved [east](#) from California and west from Texas into Arizona because of border security. More enforcement in Arizona after 2010 then shifted

illegal immigrant entry attempts back east toward Texas. Their constant movement and reaction to Border Patrol and immigration enforcement

generally creates more complexity and information that the agency must process. [The symptoms of information overload are a lack of](#)

[perspective, cognitive strain and stress, a greater tolerance for error, low morale, and the inability to use information to make a decision](#).

Those symptoms are all common at Border Patrol and its parent organization, the Department of Homeland Security. In terms of a lack of

perspective, the chaos below the border is a supposed "[existential threat](#)." Meanwhile, the [tolerance for performance and](#)

[discipline problems in Border Patrol personnel has festered for over a decade, producing numerous](#)

[errors of all kinds](#). [Morale has historically been low](#) in Border Patrol and has only risen recently due to the election of President Trump.

One common reaction to information overload is that decision makers become highly selective, ignore

vast amounts of information, and cherry pick that information which confirms their biases. Information

never speaks for itself and it must always be interpreted and applied. By increasing the quantity of information available to managers and supervisors at Border Patrol, their actions could become more erratic and less efficient because they will be able to pull from a vaster array of justifications for their decisions. Like any other self-interested actors, Border Patrol will always select and interpret information to justify the actions they want to undertake while discounting information that supports another course of action. The principal-agent problem means that this rarely gets corrected.

## Empirics prove

**Medium** @ Una-Nca, 03-16-20**21**, "Op-Ed: The Dangers of Emerging Surveillance Technology in Immigration and Beyond", Medium,

<https://medium.com/una-nca-snapshots/op-ed-the-dangers-of-emerging-surveillance-technology-in-immigration-and-beyond-726133826f18> //

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Surveillance encompasses measures like drones providing aerial views, facial recognition technologies, and monitoring social media activity.

**Emerging surveillance technologies** spanning from **facial recognition in airports** to **drone surveillance** by CBP **showcase the systems already in place that aim to increase surveillance across the United States.**

Surveillance has previously helped identify **individuals that pose a threat** to the public, **but has also led to the**

**monitoring of everyone's communications — not only suspects' — causing investigators to miss critical**

**information due to an excess of data.** Historically, this has caused problems, like when the FBI

**collected and catalogued 100 million fingerprints by 1946** — overwhelming staff and decreasing efficiency when trying to

match prints. **Even now with 21st century technology, too much information collected by U.S. government**

**agencies still presents challenges with inefficiency and data overload.**

## Young voters increasingly prioritize the economy

Anezka **Pichrtova**, 07-23-20**24**, "Kamala Harris Losing to Trump on Key Economic Issue: Poll", Newsweek,

<https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-losing-trump-economy-inflation-poll-1928909> // RB

Kamala **Harris is facing skepticism from voters** regarding her ability to tackle a key economic issue: **inflation**.

Recent polling by YouGov found that **only 29 percent of respondents thought that Harris would do a better job**

**than Donald Trump when it comes to inflation, while 43 percent had more confidence in the former**

**president**. While Kamala Harris' nomination has not been made official yet, she has secured enough delegate support to win her place in

the 2024 election race, and is expected to become the Democratic nominee. Wroe believes that **inflation will be a factor in the**

**upcoming presidential election**. A Harvard Youth Poll found that for **young voters in particular inflation is a**

**priority when it comes to electing a president**. Confidence in Harris' abilities to tackle inflation was higher among Democrats,

with 63 percent saying they thought she'd do a better job than Trump, although the proportion of Republicans backing the former president on

the issue was higher, at 86 percent.

## Alt reasons why Harris is losing

**Mitchell 21** Lincoln Mitchell. 10-20-2021, PhD @ Colombia, teaches in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia

University. "Opinion: Doing right isn't the secret to Democrats' success next year." CNN, October 20, 2021.

<https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/20/opinions/joe-biden-democrats-midterm-elections-2022-legislation-mitchell/index.html> Accessed on

December 29, 2023. //AT

**The idea that delivering on policy promises is the key to victory** in the midterms also happens to be wrong – or at least

**not supported by any evidence from the last half century** or so. **As a motivator for Democrats to act, the**

**idea that delivering major policy accomplishments will pave the road to electoral success** may be a good

approach, but as political analysis it **runs counter to history**. Recent decades are filled with examples of a new administration passing major legislation only to lose seats in the midterm election. After being elected in 1964 in a landslide with huge Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, President Lyndon B. Johnson passed a battery of policies in 1965 that included the Voting Rights Act, the creation of Medicare and Medicaid and a number of other Great Society programs. The reward for the Democrats was the loss of 47 seats in the House of Representatives and three seats in the Senate in the 1966 midterm elections. For good measure, Johnson's Vice President Hubert Humphrey was defeated in the 1968 presidential election. A few years later, in 1981 President Ronald Reagan delivered on a campaign promise and passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which was the core of his economic agenda and his campaign platform from his 1980 election. Reagan's Republican Party then went on to pick up one Senate seat but lost 26 House seats in the 1982 midterms. In more recent years President Donald Trump passed major tax cuts, significant deregulation and two Supreme Court justices while President Barack Obama delivered the Affordable Care Act early in his first term. Both Trump and Obama saw their party drubbed in their first midterm election. The pattern of the president's party losing seats in the midterm is well-known and vexing for almost all presidents. Simply delivering on campaign promises has, at least since the New Deal era, not been enough to stop that trend. **It is extremely unlikely that will change now in an era of a**

**deeply polarized electorate, highly partisan media and a relative paucity of undecided voters.**

**The aff's militarized crackdown against drug trafficking only makes cartels harder to catch.**

Steven **Hyland**, 09-20**11**, "The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking", Origins, <https://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking> // RB

But it is **the long history of drug production and distribution in Latin America**—and **the enduringly strong demand for narcotics in the United States**—that best helps to **explain** why the "**war on drugs**" has **resulted in so few battles won and has come at such a great cost both in money and human lives**. The trafficking of illicit drugs is a signature Latin American contribution to our globalized world, and today Colombia and Mexico play the paramount roles in terms of production and distribution. While cocaine, heroin, and marijuana have long figured as primary trafficked products, in the recent past drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have increased shipments of methamphetamines. Yet, this contemporary arrangement was not always the case. The production, **trafficking**, and distribution of drugs to consumers have **moved geographically** many times **across Latin America**. **Like all successful businesses, organizations for narco-production and narco-distribution have responded rapidly and extensively to changing tastes and strong market demands in the consumer countries especially the United States**. At the same time, the often **drastic shifts in the political fates of Latin American countries**, geopolitics (most notably the Cold War), supra-state institutions (such as the United Nations with its anti-drug policies), and the **increased militarization** of efforts to eradicate drugs production (spearheaded by the United States) **have also shaped the development** of the narcotics trade. In broad terms, the development of the Latin American drugs industry can be broken into four periods. From the late nineteenth century to 1945, Mexico controlled the illegal trade in opium and marijuana, and Peru dominated the mostly legal trade in cocaine products. A second period, from the end of World War II to the 1960s, saw the professionalization and greater organization of trafficking as networks of traffickers emerged. The third era, from the 1960s to 1984, witnessed the rise of Colombia as the predominant producer and trafficker after Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba fell by the wayside and the Mexican government attempted to curb marijuana and opium production. This period also witnessed a sharp spike in the violence associated with the drug trade. Finally, Mexico has returned to a leading role since 1984 (as a result of connections made with Colombian traffickers in Panama), and drug-trade violence continues to escalate. **The history of Latin American narcotics production and distribution thus reveals the ways in**



which efforts to suppress the drug trade in one state have tended only to shift its location to another  
country in the region. Entrepreneurs throughout Latin America worked to take advantage of any opportunity to increase their share of this highly lucrative business and to take advantage of consistently strong demand.