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For over 30 years, Somaliland has been focused on ensuring stability for its people, and finally it has done so. Mohamed Guudle, a phd expert in politics, economics and international relations says that: **O. Osman Guudle 24** [Mohamed O. Osman Guudle, "Opinion: Peace and Progress: How Somaliland's peaceful path differentiates from Somalia's Turbulent Journey", 09/22/2024, <https://www.facebook.com/2024/09/22/opinion-peace-and-progress-how-somalilands-peaceful-path-differentiates-from-somalias-turbulent-journey/>] [shivank]

This paper explores the distinct developmental trajectories of Somaliland and Somalia through a comparative lens. **Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland has achieved remarkable progress in establishing peace, democracy, and economic development** after it ousted the troops of neighboring 'Somali Democratic Republic' in 1991, and immediately reclaimed the sovereignty it had gained from Great Britain at the time of its independence in 1960. **The visible economic successes in Somaliland are entirely funded by Somaliland's internal resources** that rely solely on citizen taxes and local industries, to fund government administration, defense, education, health, development, and infrastructure. **Key areas of progress include four successful local, and parliamentary elections as well as five peaceful presidential elections** where three candidates were elected by almost seven hundred thousand electorates that were issued voting cards with their identity verified by Iris biometric identification. **Somaliland also has seen a vibrant and substantial trade and tourism growth, and the development of its trade with Ethiopia through the Berbera port and road corridor. Additionally, Somaliland's commitment to combating terrorism and piracy, coupled with robust law enforcement, has significantly contributed to its stability. While the waters of Somalia have become known for piracy, there has never been a single incident of piracy** in the 850 kilometers of Somaliland's coastline. The private sector has thrived under consistent governance encouragement and has bolstered by industries such as livestock export. Notably, Somaliland has achieved significant development in education and health, particularly, in the reduction of maternal mortality, all with minimal international aid. In stark contrast, **Somalia faces ongoing violent conflicts, political instability, and economic challenges.** Terrorist groups control vast swathes of southern and central Somalia, taxing and extorting local populations. Somalia's weak government relies heavily on foreign aid and assistance, even to manage the capital, Mogadishu, and to administer the small Benadir region under its control. The rest of the country falls under the control of the militant group Al-Shabaab and partly by the Federal member states. Additionally, Somalia has never held democratic one-person-one-vote elections in over 64 years, further highlighting the contrast with Somaliland's democratic processes, which have already been referred to, holds the record of peacefully, and successfully holding a Referendum in 2001, five Presidential elections, and several Parliamentary and Local Government elections during that time. By comparing these experiences this study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how internal governance, resource management, and external challenges influence the development trajectories of these neighboring countries, namely Somalia and the Republic of Somaliland. The analysis reveals that effective governance, community resilience, and strategic development initiatives are crucial for fostering peace and progress. Somaliland's experience underscores the significant impact of democratic processes, economic self-reliance, and effective security measures in achieving stability, offering valuable insights for other regions facing similar challenges.

Hassan 21 [Osman Hassan, reporter @ Hiiraan Online and former UN official as well as BBC reporter, 12-25-2021, Why the USA Should Not Recognize Somaliland, Hiiraan Online, https://store.hiiraan.com/op4/2021/dec/184920/why_the_usa_should_not_recognize_somali_and.aspx] BZ A: The Voice of Northern unionists counts While it is clear what Meservy wants for the USA, he shows otherwise scant knowledge about the people in northern Somalia (former British Somaliland) and comes up with uniformed justifications for its recognition. The

salient flawed assumption inherent in his discourse about the people in northern Somalia (aka Somaliland) is that they are monolithic and almost all support the secession. Nothing could be further from the truth. The following critical facts about the people in this region are indispensable for forming an objective judgement about the secession: · **That there are five clans in the former British territory and only one of them, and not all of its members at that, are supportive of the secession from Somalia. It occupies less than 20 percent of the territory.** · That **the other four clans, occupying more than 80 percent of the territory,** and who **do not call themselves “Somalilanders” but citizens of Somalia,** are unionists **and oppose** the **secession**. · That any claim as to who is the majority and who is the minority in the area

To keep the peace of the status quo, Sai and I are proud to negate the Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state.

With that, our first argument is preserving prosperity. Affirming inhibits this prosperity in 2 key ways.

The first is through Secession,

Recognizing Somaliland would encourage a domino effect of more secession movements.

Seifu 24 [Batseba Seifu, "Somalia and Somaliland: A Complex Relationship in the Horn of Africa", 06/27/2024, <https://facebook.com/moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/06/27/somalia-and-somaliland-a-complex-relationship-in-the-horn-of-africa/>]

Establishment of Somaliland's Government and Institutions Since declaring independence, Somaliland has developed its own political system, distinct from Somalia's. It has held regular democratic elections, established a constitution, and maintained its own security forces. Despite its self-governance and relative stability, Somaliland's quest for international recognition has been unsuccessful. **No country or international organization officially recognizes Somaliland as a sovereign state, largely due to concerns over setting a precedent for secessionist movements and the preference for maintaining the territorial integrity of African states as endorsed by the African Union.** **Somalia's Position and International Dynamics** On the other hand, the Federal Government of Somalia considers Somaliland an integral part of its territory. Successive Somali governments have sought to reintegrate Somaliland, arguing for the preservation of Somalia's territorial integrity. Internationally, most countries and organizations, including the United Nations and the African Union, support Somalia's stance, advocating for dialogue and reconciliation to address the issue. Continued Tensions and Sporadic Dialogue The relationship between Somalia and Somaliland remains tense, characterized by sporadic, often inconclusive dialogues. Several attempts at negotiations have taken place over the years. However, these talks have not led to any significant breakthroughs, leaving the **status of Somaliland unresolved**. Political Landscape of Somalia and Somaliland Independent Political Systems Somaliland: Democracy Since its self-declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has established a relatively stable and functional political system, distinguishing itself from the turmoil in southern Somalia. Somaliland operates as a de facto state with its own government, institutions, and constitution. It has conducted multiple democratic elections for the presidency, parliament, and local councils, often praised by international observers for their fairness and transparency. This democratic governance, combined with efforts to build a stable, inclusive political environment, has helped maintain peace and stability in the region. The political structure of Somaliland includes an executive branch headed by the President, a bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Elders (Guurti), and an independent judiciary. The House of Elders, composed of traditional leaders, plays a significant role in conflict resolution and maintaining social order, reflecting the integration of modern governance with traditional practices. Somalia: Struggles with Instability In contrast, Somalia faces considerable political challenges. Since the collapse of Siad Barre's regime, Somalia has experienced prolonged periods of instability, characterized by civil war, clan-based conflicts, and the rise of

militant groups like Al-Shabaab. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), established in 2012, operates under a federal system intended to decentralize power and promote local governance. However, its authority is often limited to Mogadishu and a few other regions, with varying degrees of control and influence over the rest of the country. Political infighting, corruption, and the ongoing insurgency have hindered Somalia's progress towards stability. Efforts to build a cohesive national government are frequently disrupted by power struggles among political elites and regional leaders, further complicating the situation. International support, including peacekeeping forces from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and subsequently, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) has been important in maintaining a semblance of order, but lasting peace and effective governance remain elusive. Lack of Formal Dialogue and Ongoing Tensions **The political relationship between Somalia and Somaliland is characterized by a lack of formal dialogue and persistent tensions. Despite periodic attempts at negotiations, there has been no sustained or successful dialogue process.** Several factors contribute to this impasse: 1. Somalia's Political Instability: The internal conflicts and political instability within Somalia make it difficult for the federal government to engage constructively with Somaliland. The ongoing insurgency and political divisions divert attention and resources away from addressing the Somaliland issue. 2. Somaliland's Quest for Recognition: Somaliland remains steadfast in its pursuit of international recognition as an independent state, a position that Somalia vehemently opposes. Somaliland's government is wary of engaging in talks that might undermine its claims to sovereignty. 3. Clan Dynamics and Regional Interests: Clan affiliations and regional politics play a significant role in the relationship between Somalia and Somaliland. Clan dynamics influence political decisions and negotiations, often complicating efforts to reach a consensus. Additionally, regional actors like Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya have their own strategic interests in the stability and political alignment of Somalia and Somaliland. 4. International Stance: The international community, including the United Nations, the African Union, and major powers, generally supports Somalia's territorial integrity. This stance discourages Somaliland's push for recognition and complicates international mediation efforts. Efforts at Mediation and Prospects for the Future Despite the challenges, there have been intermittent efforts to mediate between Somalia and Somaliland. Various international actors and regional organizations have facilitated dialogues, albeit with limited success. The most notable of these efforts include talks in Djibouti in 2012, facilitated by Turkey. The prospects for a resolution remain uncertain. Achieving a lasting agreement requires addressing the core issues of sovereignty, resource sharing, and political representation. Confidence-building measures, such as fostering economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, might help create a conducive environment for dialogue. Additionally, a more stable and unified Somali government could potentially engage more effectively with Somaliland. Challenges and Obstacles Entrenched Positions One of the primary obstacles in resolving the diplomatic standoff is the deeply entrenched positions of both Somalia and Somaliland. Somaliland remains unwavering in its quest for recognition, viewing it as essential for its political and economic development. Somalia, on the other hand, perceives any concession towards **Somaliland's independence as a threat to national unity and stability.**

However, affirming shatters this stability and reinvigorates a host of dangerous secessionist movements.

Gebreamlak 24 [Hagos Gebreamlak, reporter @ The Reporter, 12-17-2024, Ethiopia's Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders, Reporter Magazine, <https://thereportermagazines.com/3214/>] leon + BZ

After gaining independence, **African states** largely adopted a policy of **respecting the borders drawn during colonial times**. This principle, known as 'Uti Possidetis', is **enshrined in** Article 4 of **the African Union Constitutive Act**, which calls for the preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. **The goal of this policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents.** Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, **recognizing Somaliland's independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries.** Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland's independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape. **Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region.** There are already existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and

Somaliland's recognition could embolden these movements. In Ethiopia, for example, various regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region, have elements advocating for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa further complicates these dynamics. For instance, Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland, while Afars inhabit Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Similarly, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries, creating fertile ground for secessionist and irredentist movements. The recognition of Somaliland might also inspire regions such as Puntland and Jubaland to seek independence from Somalia. These regions already enjoy a degree of autonomy, and Somaliland's formal recognition could lead them to pursue a similar path. Historically, Somalia has laid irredentist claims to Ethiopia's Somali region (Ogaden), aiming to incorporate it into a "Greater Somalia." If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could provoke retaliation from Somalia, possibly leading to renewed claims over the Somali region of Ethiopia. Somalia could also support secessionist movements within Ethiopia as a form of retaliation. In fact, Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi recently stated that if Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, Somalia would consider backing Ethiopian rebels, essentially threatening to fuel internal conflicts in Ethiopia.

Historical Context of Tit-for-Tat Secessionist Support In the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan engaged in a vicious cycle of supporting secessionist movements to destabilize each other. Somalia backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which sought to secede the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Somalia also allowed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to establish offices and use Somali passports to further their causes. Ethiopia, in turn, supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in its fight against the Siad Barre regime, which later led to Somaliland's declaration of independence. Ethiopia also aided the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which established the autonomous region of Puntland. Meanwhile, Sudan supported various Ethiopian rebel groups, including the ELF, TPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In retaliation, Ethiopia provided heavy support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan. This cycle of support for rebel groups contributed to the downfall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the Siad Barre regime in Somalia. It also led to the fragmentation of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, and other entities. Ethiopia's involvement in Sudan similarly contributed to the eventual secession of Eritrea and South Sudan from Sudan. There is a strong likelihood that this historical pattern of reciprocal support for secessionist movements will reemerge. Somalia may escalate its support for rebel groups in Ethiopia, particularly in regions like the Somali region, Oromia, and Tigray, where there are already existing tensions. This could fuel further instability in Ethiopia. In response, Ethiopia might encourage independence movements in Puntland and Jubaland, supporting dissatisfied clans and tribes in Somalia to rebel or seek autonomy. This would perpetuate a cycle of proxy conflicts, destabilizing the Horn of Africa further and leading to widespread insecurity. This reciprocal destabilization between Ethiopia and Somalia could easily spread, drawing in other regional actors and intensifying conflicts across the Horn of Africa. The region could find itself once again entangled in proxy wars, with various factions fighting for independence or control, supported by external powers. The already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa could be further complicated by the spillover effects of Middle Eastern geopolitics and the encroachment of regional powers. The intensifying rivalry between the US and China is leading to a diminishing presence and influence of both superpowers in the region. As they compete for global dominance, their potential withdrawal could create a vacuum that may be filled by middle-sized powers from the Middle East, including the UAE, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.

Not only will it increase instability, but also significantly harm the already fragile tensions between African countries

Atcha Boukari 18 [MousBaou Atcha Boukari, "The Rise of secession movements in Africa and its impact on security in the region", 6/1/2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1084114.pdf>]

THE RISE OF SECESSION MOVEMENTS IN WEST AFRICA AND ITS **SECURITY IMPACT ON THE REGION**, by Mousbaou Atcha Boukari, 114 pages. West **African countries have experienced the rise of secession movements** given their independence **with significant impact upon their stability**. Some scholars have targeted ethnic marginalization, bad governance and poverty as being key factors to be addressed if the desire of the people to secede is to be reduced. However, the **recent escalation of the separatist movements** in Mali and associated terrorist activities has **destabilized the country**, and the West African region, **and calls for long term solutions**. This paper analyzes factors that have been addressed by Niger and Senegal in order to avoid the Tuareg 2012 uprising in Mali and the escalation of the secession movements in the southern Casamance region in Senegal. Factors such as grievance mitigation, successful decentralized policy, sound insurgency mitigation strategy and good diplomacy need to be addressed in order to mitigate this rise in secessionist sentiments

History affirms this

Woodward 16 [Peter Robert Woodward, professor @ the University of Reading with a PhD from there as well, 9-8-2016, Somaliland wants to secede – here’s why caution is necessary, Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/somaliland-wants-to-secede-heres-why-caution-is-necessary-63919>] tristan

The general approach to calls for **secession** in Africa, as set out by the African Union (AU) and its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity, is that they **should be opposed**. The most frequently heard argument against secession is that **granting the right to one country invites others to take the same step**. This, the argument goes, **would put at risk the internationally recognised system** of post-colonial states in Africa. The issue of secession first arose in the 1960s with the wave of decolonisation and questions over the viability of the newly independent states across the continent. Two cases stood out: the Congo, where Katanga’s self-proclaimed breakaway was defeated by United Nations forces; and Nigeria, where the Biafran secession was ended by the Nigerian federal forces. Africa’s new states The issue has come up again in recent times. In northeast Africa two states have experienced separation. In 1993 **Eritrea** was recognised as a separate state from Ethiopia, and the world’s newest state, **South Sudan**, was recognised in 2011. The **circumstances** in each of these cases **was different**. But the purpose here is not to revisit how and why these took place, but to consider what happened next. **In both cases separation was intended to deal with historical problems and provide an acceptable alternative** in the form of a new internationally recognised state. But have they achieved these objectives? Both the Ethiopian and Sudanese examples suggest that separation isn’t always the straightforward option. The **division** has **led to violent border disputes, economic complications, and poor relations with the wider international community**. There is also a case to be made that **granting secession** has merely **served to fuel the claims of other separatist movements**. Somaliland’s calls to be recognised as independent, rather than being included in the efforts to rebuild Somalia, **is an example**. **When South Sudan became independent** in 2011 **a Somaliland delegation arrived** in Juba, the capital, wearing t-shirts **saying “Somaliland Next”**. Border disputes, military costs **Any separation involves the recognition of an accepted border** between the two states involved. **In** the case of both **Eritrea and South Sudan** this has proved contentious. In 1998 there was an issue over Badme, a small town near the Ethiopian border which Eritrea claimed was theirs. This **ignited** one of **the two largest interstate conflicts in Africa since the second world war**. The other interstate conflict was Somalia’s attack in 1977 to back up its claim to Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, an area mainly populated by clans of Somali origin. South Sudan’s border with Sudan also proved contentious, and there were clashes over the disputed area of Abyei. Neither the Badme or Abyei issues have been resolved to the satisfaction of the two states involved. Instead they continue to fester. **The continuing border disputes have resulted in both sides continuing to invest heavily in their armies and in equipment. Eritrea and Ethiopia both maintain large and costly forces facing each other across their disputed border.** And while South Sudan and Sudan agreed to an integrated joint force on their **common border**, it **never came into existence. Mutual suspicion and accusations of incursions by both armies persist.**

That’s awful, as secession is notorious for the death tolls it brings.

Haile 24 [Daniel Haile, "Somaliland: The Nation the World Won't Recognize but Can't Ignore", 12/08/2024, <https://facebook.com/moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/08/somaliland-the-nation-the-world-wont-recognize-but-cant-ignore/>]

African nations have cemented the notion that recognizing secessionist movements threatens the fragile political fabric of the continent. They fear that **granting autonomy to breakaway regions could lead to the unraveling of African states**, whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by European colonizers. **This fear serves as a Pandora's box for the continent, discouraging the recognition of regions fighting for self-determination.** If the people of Somaliland have overwhelmingly chosen independence through a referendum, why should their aspirations be denied? The case of Somaliland raises pressing questions about the balance between preserving outdated borders and acknowledging the democratic will of a people striving for sovereignty. The Case for Peaceful Secession: Redrawing Borders Without Bloodshed. The international community cannot ignore that Somaliland has functioned as a de facto independent and self-governing state for over 30 years. Astonishingly, the African Union and the broader international community have remained silent on recognizing Somaliland's independence. After all, Somaliland stands as one of the only regions within the Horn of Africa that has maintained political stability, functioning institutions, and a democratic system of governance underpinned by the consent of its people. This silence is even more perplexing when contrasted with the human cost of independence **struggles in Namibia, where 20,000 to 25,000 lives were lost; Eritrea, which saw over 65,000 deaths; and South Sudan, where over 2 million perished in their quest for sovereignty.** Not all secessionist movements in Africa have succeeded. The Nigerian Civil War, or Biafra War, remains a poignant example. During the conflict, the Igbo people, under the leadership of Odumegwu Ojukwu, a Nigerian military officer of Igbo origin, unilaterally declared the Republic of Biafra in 1967. Their attempt at independence failed after the war concluded in 1970, dashing hopes for an independent Igbo state, and **3 million Nigerians perished during the Biafra war.** Yet, the aspiration for the Republic of Biafra endures, and only time will reveal whether Nigeria will follow Ethiopia on the "Yugoslavia train" of disintegration. Against this backdrop, one might ask: could a political union, akin to the structure binding England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, offer Somalia a framework to prevent future bloodshed? By accommodating regional autonomy within a broader national framework,

The second way is through instability

Recent groundbreaking negotiations have deescalated previously high tensions

Zane 25 [Damian Zane, "Ethiopia-Somalia tension: Dispute resolved according to Somali foreign minister", 01/03/2025, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3vr4pqn2ego>] [Shivank]

The diplomatic dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia that had led to tense regional relations has been resolved. Somalia's foreign minister says. Ahmed Moalim Fiqi's statement, carried by state TV, said Somalia had made no concessions. Ethiopia has not commented on the Somali claim, but said **the two countries had agreed to "strengthen bilateral relations".** **The two neighbours had been at loggerheads since last January when landlocked Ethiopia signed a maritime deal with the breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia considers as part of its territory.** Friday's statement follows a visit to Somalia by an Ethiopian delegation in the latest sign of détente after a **Turkey-brokered deal** announced last month. Led by Ethiopian Defence Minister Aisha Mohammed, the visit focused on the future of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Ethiopia has thousands of troops stationed in Somalia which are not part of the AU force and it has not been clear what role they will play in the future. In its statement, Ethiopia said the two countries had agreed to collaborate on the mission. A statement from Somalia's foreign ministry was a little more equivocal saying the country had "expressed its willingness to consider Ethiopia's request to contribute forces" to the mission. Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift be healed? Ethiopia warns against invasion amid regional tensions Why Ethiopia is so alarmed by an Egypt-Somalia alliance Somalia had previously said it could expel Ethiopian troops over the Somaliland deal. Throughout last year, tension was high after Ethiopia announced plans to build a naval base in Somaliland. The breakaway republic said the deal included a commitment for Ethiopia to officially recognise it as an independent country, but Addis Ababa never confirmed this. At the time Somalia said it saw the deal as an act of "aggression" and an affront to its sovereignty. Somaliland, which broke away from Somalia more than 30 years ago, has long been pushing for recognition. Just weeks ago it would have been unthinkable for officials from Ethiopia's defence ministry to be holding talks in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Relations between the neighbours were so bad, there were

fears a wider regional feud was brewing - with Ethiopia on one side and Egypt backing the Mogadishu government. **But as a result of Turkey's mediation, things have improved, with both countries** agreeing to recognise each other's sovereignty. According to the Ankara joint declaration of 12 December 2024, the Horn of Africa neighbours are to reconvene in February to hold "technical talks". Until then, they are to **strive to reach "mutually beneficial commercial arrangements"** to ensure Ethiopia gains access to the sea "under Somalia's sovereignty". It is not clear if Ethiopia has discarded the deal it signed with Somaliland. Somali state TV quoted Fiqi as saying "that file... was closed after Somalia's demands were tabled and accepted but not due to concession or setting aside the principles we used to defend our course".

However, affirming would upset this balance and force Somalia to reclaim Somaliland by force.

Hassan 24 [Abdillahi Hassan, Somali Journalist and Social Activist, 1-21-2024, Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia, Somaliland,

<https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/>] Leon + Aaron

Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like **Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums**. However, it is crucial to understand that **Somalia's reaction is rooted in its perception of recent successes** to "bring Somaliland back to the fold". What infuriated Somalia the most is in not the prospect of Ethiopia getting an access to the sea as President Mohamud himself hinted at his openness to that possibility. Rather it is the sense of an opportunity to submit Somaliland to its will slipping away from their hands with the possibilities that this deal opens for Somaliland. This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi's administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu's steps to capitalize on them. The president's extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland's army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the Somali government abruptly capitalized on by recognizing the administration of Las Anod which claims three regions in Somaliland either wholly or partially. And finally, the neglect of economic development has finally caught up with the country and put considerable strain on its strength. In contrast to Muse's setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year, securing debt relief, East Africa Community membership, and the lifting of a long-standing weapons import ban. **These factors have emboldened**

Mogadishu's administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland's quest for independence on the negotiation table. Bitter Confrontation in Djibouti Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. Confronting Bihi on his "lack of legitimacy" and control over all of Somaliland's territory, **Somalia further issued a clear threat of destabilization in Somaliland's western regions by exploiting clan cleavages.**

Insult was added to injury when Mohamud demanded that president Bihi represent only his personal interests and those of his immediate kin group as "there were no thing as Somaliland to speak off". Later statements from Somalia's Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi's faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by "surrender to" Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. In fact, the Somali side was so smug about their advantage in Djibouti that Minister Fiqi announced that it was a "historic milestone for the unification of the country". Indeed, the over-reaction from Mogadishu was nothing more than frustration over the loss of perceived opportunity. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. And for that, **they are willing**

to go to war, not against Ethiopia as Somali officials have repeatedly stated, but **against Somaliland.** Somalia is too weak to maintain confrontation with Ethiopia for prolonged time. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. There is great difference in the resources and capacities of the two nations at this juncture. Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, there is hardly any country that would pick Somalia over Ethiopia. Subterfuge and Subversion In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it's Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia's attack on multiple fronts. Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing "pro-union" politicians serving in Somalia's parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland's claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. However, Somalia's fury over Somaliland's self-determination as manifested in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding does not end there. What follows the legalese arguments is concerted efforts to challenge Somaliland's de facto sovereignty over the land. This takes the form of subversion, destabilization and attempts to break the consensus of Somaliland's majority on the independence project. The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu's approach to the Somaliland

question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the “members of Awdal community” to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. As **tensions** escalate, the long-deferred confrontation **between Somaliland and Somalia** over self-determination becomes inevitable, **risking wider regional involvement**. In this confrontation, Somaliland suffers from the obvious disadvantage of being led by a divisive and quite incompetent administration. However, as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland’s narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia

Somalia would see protecting its legitimacy as far more important than counterterror aid

Fraser 24 [Suzan Fraser, "Turkey says Ethiopia and Somalia have made 'notable progress' in talks to settle dispute", 08/13/2024, AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/turkey-ethiopia-somalia-mediation-talks-2e45e19fe688297bfeec6121b2fd2834>]/SS

Under the disputed deal, Somaliland would lease a 20-kilometer (12-mile) stretch of land along its coastline to Ethiopia to establish a marine force base. With a population estimated at over 120 million, Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world. RELATED STORIES Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold 'technical talks' over breakaway Somaliland region Turkey's Erdogan offers to mediate between Sudan and the UAE Somaliland's new president is sworn in after elections that boosted region's drive for recognition In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland's independence. Somalia has said it's prepared to go to war over it as it considers Somaliland part of its territory. Fidan, who has held meetings with his Ethiopian counterpart, Taye Atske Selassie, and Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi since Monday, did not provide details on the discussions. However, last week he told reporters that he had proposed an arrangement that would ensure Ethiopia's sea access via Somalia. In return, Ethiopia would acknowledge Somalia's territorial integrity and political sovereignty,

he said. In the video, Selassie thanked Turkey for its mediation and reaffirmed Ethiopia's wish to “secure dependable access to and from the sea.” “We look forward to having continued engagement that will ultimately help us resolve current differences and restore normal relations,” he said. Fiqi said progress was made in the latest round of talks, and expressed hope that the momentum will result in a solution. **“Somalia remains committed to protecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity,”** he said. A first round of talks was also held in the Turkish capital in July. Turkey has forged close ties with Somalia, and recently signed deals toward cooperation in defense and oil and gas exploration. It also has economic and trade ties with Ethiopia. by Taboola Suggested For You

History confirms Somalia's retaliatory measures. Prior to mediated talks with Ethiopia, Somalia expressed its readiness for war.

Yibeltal In Addis Ababa & Damian Zane In London 24 [Kalkidan Yibeltal In Addis Ababa & Damian Zane In London, "Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift be healed?", 07/03/2024, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67911057>]

Why is this so controversial? **For Somalia, Somaliland is an integral part of its territory.** Any suggestion that it could make a deal with another country or that bits of it could be leased without the approval of Mogadishu is highly problematic. **The day after the MoU was signed, Somalia described the deal as an act of "aggression"** that was **an "impediment to... peace and stability"**. **It also recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa. Ethiopia's ambassador to**

Somalia subsequently left Mogadishu. In the immediate aftermath of the deal, Somalia's president also stepped up the rhetoric saying: "**We will defend our country**, we will defend it **by all means necessary** and seek the support of any ally willing to help us." He also called on youths "**to prepare for the defence of our country**" and described Ethiopia as his country's "enemy". Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of rivalry. In 1977 and 1978, Ethiopia and Somalia fought a devastating war for control of what is now called the Somali region of Ethiopia. There have also been protests in Mogadishu against the deal, with tens of thousands turning up to express their opposition.

Recent Chinese aid has provided Somalia with the capabilities for war

Mohamed 25 [Goth Mohamed, "With an eye on Taiwan, China arms Somalia against Somaliland", 09/24/2020, <https://www.facebook.com/with-an-eye-on-taiwan-china-arms-somalia-against-somaliland/>]

According to reports dated September 19, almost a week after Somaliland opened its representative office in Taiwan, China delivered 'large-scale' military aid to Somalia. The gesture came with a message impelling Somalia to retaliate against Somaliland, which refused to kneel to China's command and established commercial ties with Taiwan. As per a Somali-language news report, the addition of Chinese muscle to Somalia has rung major warning bells for Somaliland, with its diplomats fearing possible conflicts between the two nations on the behest of imperialist China.

War would be devastating

University [Norwich University, "Five Major African Wars and Conflicts of the Twentieth Century", No Publication, <https://online.norwich.edu/online/about/resource-library/five-major-african-wars-and-conflicts-twentieth-century/>]

Armed conflicts in Africa during the twentieth century caused an enormous loss of human life, the collapse of socio-economic systems, and the degradation of health and education services across the continent. From the Nigerian Civil War to the Somali Civil War, these 20th Century conflicts submitted civilians to intense physical and psychological trauma that negatively impacted development throughout many African nations. To understand the magnitude and scope of inflicted trauma, and in order to prevent its recurrence, military historians and students should consider the following five significant African wars and conflicts of the 20th Century. In 1991, a coup ousted dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, President of the Somali Democratic Republic. This shift in the balance of power sparked a twenty-plus-year civil war that killed as many as one million Somalis via violence, famine or disease. Following Barre's removal from power, the Somali Democratic Republic divided into two opposing parties, the Somali National Movement in the North and the United Somali Congress of the South. This separation made it difficult to achieve control of the conflicting factions because no one ruling entity was recognized by all Somalis; those living in the north would not recognize authority from the southern faction, and those in the south opposed leadership from the Somalis in the north. The lack of a central government forced the U.S. to close its embassy that same year. The United Nations and the United States became heavily involved in the conflict from 1992 to 1995, sending military forces and humanitarian aid to the country. The United States officially ended its involvement in Somalia in 1994 due to the lack of a foreseeable resolution and financial costs in excess of \$1.7 billion. The Somali Civil War's large death toll and protracted conflict could possibly have been avoided with earlier humanitarian action, according to a 1999 report commissioned by then-United Nations' Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, the heavy fighting between the warlords obstructed timely U.S. relief efforts in Somalia.

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On democracy:

Eubank '11 [Nicholas; PhD student @ Stanford University; 3-1-2011; Taylor & Francis; "Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland,"
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessible at:
<https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessed: 12-15-2024] tristan
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In addition to forcing the development of these institutions, revenue bargaining also provided Somaliland citizens with an ongoing mechanism for enforcing these arrangements. While deviations from constitutional constraints are common in sub-Saharan Africa, in Somaliland the persistent dependency of the central government on local tax revenues helps keep occasional attempts to exceed constitutional limits by the executive in check. Indeed, as a 2009 Human Rights Watch report points out: Somaliland's government remains fundamentally a product of political compromise, negotiation, and consensus and the presidency is often not strong enough to defy the diverse coalition of clan and other interests that support it. This reality imposes informal limits on presidential power which have worked well enough to partially offset the dysfunction of legal and constitutional constraints. [...] The result, as another analyst put it, is that 'Some in the government don't believe in our democratic process, but no one has enough power to destroy it.' (Human Rights Watch 2009: 22)

Affirming increases aid which decks democracy---empirics prove. Independently, that decks economic investment---it's perceptual.

Eubank '11 [Nicholas; PhD student @ Stanford University; 3-1-2011; Taylor & Francis; "Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland,"
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessible at:
<https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessed: 12-15-2024] tristan
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Using this median level of assistance and a very conservative discount factor of 25 per cent to account for the fact some aid does not go to the government sector, this suggests that an eligible Somaliland government would have received approximately US\$70.5 million in foreign assistance in 2001. To put this in context, that amount is approximately double annual Somaliland government revenues, which have ranged between US\$20 to US\$40 million between 1999 and 2007, and which were even lower in preceding years. Even this represents a conservative estimate, however, as it does not take into account the fact that donors tend to provide higher Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid 475 levels of assistance per capita to smaller countries. Taking this tendency into account results in even higher estimates, as presented in Table 1.

Possible effect on development of national institutions. How then might Somaliland have been affected had it been eligible for these volumes of foreign assistance?

In the case of the SNM transitional government, these levels of aid would have diminished the need of the government to take control the port of Berbera -- the \$7-15 million USD in revenue the port generates would have been inconsequential in comparison to foreign aid flows. Moreover, foreign aid would also have provided the government with more independent resources which may have improved its ability to overwhelm opposition groups by military force had it still decided to take control of the port.

In both of these ways, foreign assistance would have dramatically diminished the bargaining power of those outside the government in control of the port, and thus reduced the need of the government to extend political franchise to them and create a more representative national government.

In the case of the conflict between the Habar Yonis and the Habar Jelo which began in the fight over the Hargeysa airport, this assistance may have either (a) provided the government with sufficient resources to defeat the Habar Yonis militarily, or if it had not, (b) reduced the financial pressures on the government and the influence of civil society which steered the

government towards a peaceful compromise. In either case, the eventual outcome of a political compromise which satisfied both parties and left them willing to participate in the democratic process seems less likely.

Avoiding Somalia's Pitfalls

Up to this point, this analysis has shown that revenue bargaining ensured the development of more inclusive, representative, and accountable government than would otherwise have likely emerged. It is also worth noting the possibility, however, that by facilitating this process of revenue bargaining, **Somaliland's ineligibility for foreign assistance** may also have **helped the country avoid one of the problems that has contributed to southern Somalia's inability to form any government at all** -- the emergence of those who would rather see no government at all than one which might be predatory in nature.

The presence of 'spoilers' in southern Somalia is well documented. Traditionally, analyses of 'spoilers' in southern Somalia have focused on warlords and criminal elements that seek material gain from instability. More recently, however, Menkhaus (2006/2007: 75–76) has argued that **'many businesspeople who need a predictable, safe, and peaceful environment in which to conduct commercial activities' have also become spoilers out of 'fear that a revived central government will become repressive and predatory at their expense'**. While these same businessmen 'support peace building and the reduction of crime, [they] block efforts to revive an effective central government'.

On Food

1. [DL] Somaliland's economy is growing. Shaban Yusuf, from Saxafi Media, in 2024

[Shab'an H. Yusuf, May 28, 2024 , Saxafi Media, "The Economic Implications Of Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: A Comprehensive Analysis"<https://saxafimedia.com/economic-implications-somaliland-ethiopia-mou/>]

Furthermore, **the economic performance of Somaliland is highlighted, showcasing its development** despite being an unrecognized territory within Somalia. The private sector, including telecommunications, remittances, and livestock exports, has played a significant role in driving economic growth and job creation. **The expansion of infrastructure, such as ports and road networks, has improved connectivity and facilitated trade in the region.**

In recent years, Somaliland's economy has experienced growth, with increased investment in infrastructure, trade activities, and recovery from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic **contributing to a boost in real GDP. Inflation and exchange rate stability have been maintained, creating a favorable economic environment for investors in Somaliland.**

Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the economic landscape in Somaliland, the implications of the memorandum with Ethiopia, and the key factors driving economic growth in the region.

1. [DL] Al-Shabaab blocks aid and strict counterterror laws means agencies can't send regardless. Jason Burke, an africa correspondent at the Guardian, in 2017 writes that

[Jason Burke, Africa Correspondent @ The Guardian, 7-27-2017, Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/al-shabaab-militants-ban-starving-somalis-from-accessing-aid>] AZ

Islamist militants in Somalia have **imposed a ban on humanitarian assistance** in areas they control, **forcing** hundreds of thousands of **people to choose between** death from **starvation and** disease or brutal **punishment**. In some towns, hungry and weak people have been ordered by extremist leaders to remain where they are to act as human shields against US airstrikes. Somalia is suffering its worst drought in 40 years, with the effects of climatic catastrophe compounded by war and poor governance. Interviews with villagers in the swaths of land controlled by al-Qaida-affiliate al-Shabaab, in the centre and south of the east African state, reveal a population on the brink of catastrophe, with children and older people already dying in significant numbers. **Al-Shabaab** has **told people they will be** punished – possibly **executed** – **if they have any contact with humanitarian agencies. Strict** British and US **counter-terrorism laws are also discouraging humanitarian organisations from delivering vital emergency assistance, aid** agencies have said. Although aid officials

say a huge international effort and donations by Somalia's vast diaspora have so far averted a repeat of the 2011 famine, when 250,000 people died, conditions in much of the country have continued to deteriorate in recent months. An additional 500,000 people now need humanitarian assistance, bringing the total to 6.7 million. Almost half of these people face starvation if they do not receive help. One **reason for the high death toll** six years ago **was** a **blockade imposed by al-Shabaab on humanitarian assistance by international and local NGOs** that did not meet its strict criteria.

On colonialism

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