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Contention 1 is **Stability**

Sub A is Cred

Non-intervention is eroding AU authority and prevents effective conflict prevention

Félicité **Djilo and** Paul-Simon **Handy**, 3-17-20**22**, Paul-Simon Handy, ISS Regional Director for the Horn of Africa and Representative to the AU and Félicité Djilo, Independent Analyst "Redefining the African Union's utility", ISS Africa, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/redefining-the-african-unions-utility

Redefining the African Union's utility **As it turns 20, hard questions are being asked about the AU's authority to resolve security challenges in Africa.** February's African Union (AU) summit was symbolic in several ways. It was held in person in Addis Ababa after nearly two years of online meetings due to COVID-19, signalling a growing confidence in the management of the pandemic. For Ethiopian authorities, the summit was an **opportunity to show the government's control over the fragile security situation** in the country. **AU Commission** Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat's opening speech was another positive surprise of the summit. He was uncharacteristically confrontational with heads of state, using lucid and courageous words to describe what he called the 'immensity of **African paralysis with regard to neighbouring** homes that are going up in flames.' Faki was referring to the **AU's uneven peace and security record in 2021**, one year after its Commission was reformed and restructured. But he was also raising **fundamental questions around the continental body's authority** to weigh in on **challenges to state stability**. What does the AU need to exert more profound impacts on conflict situations? The time is right to ask this question. **As the body turns 20, protracted and emerging conflicts are testing the coherence of the AU's** African Peace and Security Architecture and its **goal of silencing the guns by 2030**. When facing crises, African governments use various strategies to limit the AU's involvement Based on philosopher Hannah Arendt's definition, authority is generally understood as the ability to obtain consent without coercion. As a continental organisation, **the AU draws its influence from the voluntary adherence of member states to the pan-African project.** But governments often don't back the AU when it tries to enforce its authority, especially on early action and conflict prevention. When facing crises, African governments often resort to various strategies to limit the AU's role. **They politely reject its involvement in their internal affairs** (Cameroon), contest its action when it's already deployed (Somalia), sideline it in favour of regional bodies (Central African Republic and Mozambique), or just prefer working with better-resourced international actors (Libya and Sudan). In inter-state disputes, such as those between Morocco-Algeria, Egypt-Ethiopia, Kenya-Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda, for example, the AU struggles to mediate due to the uneven interest from the states involved. **If we add the AU Peace and Security Council's inconsistent handling of unconstitutional changes** of government in Mali and Chad, it could be argued that the **AU faces a decline of authority**. However the trend could be reversed if several structural and cyclical fragilities were addressed. One systemic fragility is that most African states oppose any interference in their internal affairs. While the AU has normatively shifted from the non-interference position of its predecessor (the Organisation of African Unity) to non-indifference, **the gap between a pro-active AU Commission and reluctant member states is huge.** This causes inconsistencies in how the AU applies its rules and frameworks, which weakens the body. Unlike the EU, joining the AU is not subject to anything other than geography Another serious fragility is the relationship

between member states and the AU. Unlike the European Union (EU), whose members must qualify to be included, **joining the AU is subject only to geography.** Despite strong rhetoric about how integrated the body is, the AU comprises highly heterogeneous types of governments with varied commitments to human rights. Most member states favour a traditional view of sovereignty that prevents any11 interference to boost governance and human rights. The AU's role as an entrepreneur of shared values is complicated because it doesn't encourage the democratic convergence it needs from members, even though it has the power to issue sanctions in situations of unconstitutional government changes. As the AU doesn't provide subsidies or significant funds for economic modernisation, its value-add in the daily functioning of member states is limited. **This means that African governments' dependency on the AU is relatively minimal.** The exception has been its significant role in fighting pandemics and epidemics, although this is more reactive than proactive. The AU is an international organisation with as much authority and influence as its member states want to give it. Beyond fierce rhetoric, it remains unclear how much appetite African leaders have for effective continental integration that goes beyond pan-Africanist slogans. It's unclear how much appetite African leaders have for real continental integration It could be argued that the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA) illustrates a commitment to regional integration. But would the AU be able to settle, for example, trade disputes between Kenya and Somalia if it isn't trusted as an impartial broker for political and security matters? The success of any trade agreement depends on the independence and impartiality of dispute settlement mechanisms and the upholding of their decisions by signatory states. Over the years, African states have been uncomfortable with the decisions of regional legal bodies. Tanzania for example recently denied its people direct access to the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, which is ironically headquartered in Arusha. It remains to be seen how AU member states respond to the AfCFTA dispute mechanism's decisions. As the AU marks its 20th anniversary, it is coming to the end of a cycle where member states intuitively respected its authority without needing to call on its binding instruments. **To remain relevant, key AU member states must find a way to bridge the expectations-capabilities gap.** Should African states see integration and a limited degree of supranationalism as going against their interests, the focus will need to shift to greater regional cooperation that provides better added value. **This would already be an impressive step on Africa's road to integration.**

And foreign actors cant fill the AU's shoes.

Velasco 13, Juliana **Velasco**. "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace." University of Central Florida. 20**13**//DY
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd

The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, **regional organizations are 6**.728 **times more likely to craft** an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.95 The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in general. Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of the remaining variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, regional organizations are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement that last five years96 and when controlling for outstanding issues, almost 3.5 times more likely.9 Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with 3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations, ranging from peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of peace agreements in keeping the peace. Ranging for two to five times more likely to achieve the desired measure (peace for five years), regional organizations outperform the United Nations, individual states, and non-regional ad-hoc groups. From the results, it is also clear that incompatibility is important and territorial disputes are generally the most difficult to resolve. The reasons for this result are several. First, mandated in several regional organizations, as well as the UN, is the respect for sovereignty of member states. When faced with a territorial dispute, organizations are by default required to seek out an outcome that keeps the initial borders of the state. As will be presented in Moldova's case, the OSCE was primarily concerned with keeping the Soviet Era borders despite Transdniestria's desire to become an autonomous state. This is not always the primary reason for involvement, however, it adds an aspect to a regional organizations involvement that can be more difficult to solve. Alternatively, the territorial dispute could also be imbued with intractable characteristics. A common example is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it is a territorial conflict, the land is imbued with religious and ethnic values that only add to the already 98 Appendix A: Table 7. 99 Appendix A: Table 8. 35 immense complexity of the conflict. In terms of the fourth hypothesis, the null cannot be rejected, as none of the third parties yielded statistically significant results. Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression Model Summary Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 1 189.722a .302 .405 a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Step Chisquare df Sig. 1 14.902 8 .061 Variables in the Equation N=189 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B) Lower Upper Step 1a party3_type 10.292 4 .036 State -.093 .549 .029 1 .866 .911 .311 2.674 Regional Org 1.906 .746 6.530 1 .011 6.728 1.559 29.028 United Nations -.623 .611 1.041 1 .308 .536 .162 1.775 Other .626 .597 1.099 1 .295 1.870 .580 6.025 Out_iss 19.649 5 .001 Process to finalize 2.396 .617 15.103 1 .000 10.983 3.280 36.778 Spelled out .425 .771 .304 1 .582 1.529 .338 6.929 Delegated to commission .471 .790 .355 1 .551 1.601 .341 7.527 New negotiations 1.231 .716 2.956 1 .086 3.426 .842 13.943 Agenda for future 2.824 .898 9.879 1 .002 16.840 2.895 97.963 Inc 3.418 2 .181 Territory -.732 .716 1.046 1 .307 .481 .118 1.956 Government -.924 .502 3.381 1 .066 .397 .148 1.063 Provisions for cultural freedom -1.559 .986 2.500 1 .114 .210 .030 1.453 Ceasefire provision .234 .495 .224 1 .636 1.264 .479 3.337 Outline to address Inc .357 .484 .543 1 .461 1.429 .553 3.693 Peacekeeping Operation .697 .566 1.517 1 .218 2.008 .662 6.088 Region 4.082 4 .395 Europe - 20.784 11757.037 .000 1 .999 .000 .000 . Middle East 1.638 1.005 2.657 1 .103 5.147 .718 36.918 Asia .227 .794 .082 1 .775 1.255 .265 5.944 Africa -.095 .698 .018 1 .892 .909 .232 3.570 >1000 deaths -.002 .452 .000 1 .996 .998 .412 2.418 Constant -1.422 .852 2.786 1 .095 .241 a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Inc, Cul, cease, Outlin, PKO, Region, batdeathdum. b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000 36 Implications These results suggest several policy prescriptions. First, regional organizations and regional ad-hoc groups, in general, should be involved in solving conflicts within their region, as they are shown to be significant actors in creating **a durable peace agreement.** However, not all regional organizations are currently equipped to properly handle conflict, due to lack of finances or military capability, which will be illustrated in the case studies. These organizations should be assisted in order to have the means to respond to such conflicts when and if they arrive.

Specifically, in Somaliland:

Kahin 12-12 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/ //doa: 12/12/24 sr

The African Union (AU) Charter is often cited as a barrier to recognizing Somaliland's independence, with its emphasis on territorial integrity as a guiding principle. **Yet, Somaliland's historical, political, and legal realities expose contradictions within this principle when applied to its unique case.** Compounding this inconsistency is the **AU's** failure to act on its **own fact-finding mission's 2005 recommendations,** which **concluded that Somaliland meets the criteria for recognition. Somaliland's situation cannot be classified as secession because it was a sovereign entity before its voluntary union with Somalia in 1960.** Gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a separate state with defined borders. **Its decision to merge with Somalia on July 1, 1960, was a political arrangement, not the result of colonial boundary adjustments.** This union was never formalized through a binding treaty and dissolved in 1991 after decades of marginalization and oppression. **By reclaiming its sovereignty, Somaliland reverted to its original borders, adhering to the very principle of territorial integrity the AU claims to uphold.** The AU's stance becomes even more contradictory when considering its own fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005. **The mission concluded that Somaliland satisfied the legal and political requirements for statehood, recommending recognition. However, nearly two decades later, the AU has taken no steps to act on these findings, undermining its credibility as a proponent of African self-determination and stability.** Somalia's claims over Somaliland's Red Sea coastline further distort the historical reality. These claims rest on a narrative that Somaliland is a secessionist region of Somalia, an assertion that disregards Somaliland's separate colonial history and its recognized independence prior to the union. Somalia's insistence on this point is part of a broader effort to create a false narrative of Somali unity and sovereignty—concepts rendered obsolete by decades of fragmentation and conflict. Since the collapse of its central government in 1991, **Somalia has been under United Nations trusteeship, surviving on international aid and the support of African Union forces.** Confined largely to Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity, Somalia's sovereignty is, at best, symbolic. Its accusations of foreign interference, particularly against Ethiopia, contrast sharply with its reliance on Ethiopian troops and other African forces to maintain order. At the same time, **Somalia has entered into defense agreements with nations like Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkiya, which are more interested in curbing Ethiopia's regional influence than promoting stability. These actions have destabilized the region, creating tensions that threaten to engulf the Horn of Africa in further conflict.** In stark contrast**, Somaliland has built a functioning state with all the hallmarks of sovereignty**: its own flag, police, army, currency, and passport. It engages diplomatically, hosting offices from countries like Ethiopia and signing international commercial and military agreements, including partnerships with the UAE and a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to govern, maintain peace, and foster democratic principles. **Somaliland's political maturity is evident in its democratic elections, which have been lauded by international observers for their fairness and transparency.** Opposition victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections have led to peaceful transfers of power, a rarity in a region where despots often cling to power. These achievements align Somaliland more closely with established democracies than many recognized states in Africa. The African Union's contradictions in handling Somaliland's case go beyond ignoring its fact-finding mission. **Precedents such as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in 2011 show that the AU has supported the redefinition of borders when justified by historical and political realities. Somaliland's case, grounded in legal precedent, historical legitimacy, and its proven capacity for governance, is equally compelling.** As in the case of Senegambia, officially the Senegambia Confederation or Confederation of Senegambia, was a loose confederation in the late 20th century between the West African countries of Senegal and its neighbour The Gambia, which is almost completely surrounded by Senegal.

The confederation was founded on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between the two countries signed on 12 December 1981. It was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 after The Gambia refused to move closer toward union. Somaliland's achievements, from maintaining peace and stability to contributing to regional security efforts, make it a model for governance in the Horn of Africa. **Its recognition would align with the AU's principles of promoting peace, human rights, and self-determination. Conversely, Somalia's fixation on a false narrative of Somali unity serves only to distract from its inability to govern or address its internal challenges. The time has come for the AU and the international community to rectify these contradictions, honor Somaliland's accomplishments, and grant it the recognition it rightfully deserves. Doing so would not only reinforce the principles of justice and self-determination but also promote stability and progress in a volatile region.**

Affirming would align AU words and actions, adhering to established precedents.

Kahin 12-12 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/ //doa: 12/12/24 sr

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Sub B is Proxy conflicts

The Horn of Africa is at a crossroads – political and diplomatic instability make conflict inevitable
Michelle **Gavin**, **10-18**-2024, Expert Bio Michelle D. Gavin is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She has over twenty years of experience in international affairs in government and non-profit roles. She was formerly the managing director of The Africa Center, a multidisciplinary institution dedicated to increasing understanding of contemporary Africa. From 2011 to 2014 she was the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and served concurrently as the U.S. representative to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). "Tensions Rising in the Horn of Africa", Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tensions-rising-horn-africa

Tensions Rising in the Horn of Africa **In the Horn of Africa, the time is now for preventative diplomacy**. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud walks near a Turkish Navy Ship after it docked at the Mogadishu Sea Port following the signing of a defense and economic agreement between Somalia and Turkey in Mogadishu, Somalia on April 23, 2024. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud walks near a Turkish Navy Ship after it docked at the Mogadishu Sea Port following the signing of a defense and economic agreement between Somalia and Turkey in Mogadishu, Somalia on April 23, 2024. Feisal Omar/REUTERS Blog Post by Michelle Gavin October 18, 2024 8:27 am (EST) The last time the United States was on the cusp of a presidential election, **conflict was looming in Ethiopia**. **Escalating tensions between the central government** and the Tigray region **exploded the day Americans** went to the polls in November 2020, **and a costly war ensued for the next two years**, threatening the stability of the Ethiopian state. A cessation of hostilities agreement signed in 2022 brought an end to most of the carnage in Tigray, **although a number of outstanding issues remain unaddressed, not least the return of displaced persons.** Meanwhile, the coalition that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed built to subdue Tigray fractured, and civil conflict continues to simmer in Amhara and Oromia. Today, the United States is again distracted by a tight presidential race, and multiple conflicts around the world are competing for our attention. **It could be easy to overlook the dangers of tensions rising again in the Horn of Africa**. **Ethiopian Prime** Minister Abiy Ahmed's fixation **on securing an outlet to the Red Sea,** and his proven willingness to take big risks, **have neighboring states springing into action**. Abiy's attempt to negotiate with Somaliland—a self-governing entity that seeks independence—**for sea access poisoned the already historically fraught relationship** between Ethiopia and Somalia. Egypt, still gravely concerned about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its **impact on Nile waters**, has seized on regional concerns to find new partners in its efforts to pressure Ethiopia, **recently providing arms to Somalia.** Eritrea, always interested in keeping its neighbors weak, also hosted talks with Egypt and Somalia. More on: Ethiopia Somalia Egypt Wars and Conflict Non-African powers with strong interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are not sitting on the sidelines. Turkey has renewed its close relationship with Somalia, while the United Arab Emirates remains close to Abiy. **The complexity of the region and the web of influences** that **crisscross** historically **contested terrain** **makes the risk of miscalculation** tipping into conflict particularly high. If that happens, the price will be paid first in African lives. **It will then affect the global economy** as **commercially critical shipping lanes** become less secure. Refugee flows will tax recipient countries. **What happens in the Horn** will **reverberate globally.** Africa in Transition Michelle Gavin, Ebenezer Obadare, and other experts track political and security developments across sub-Saharan Africa. Most weekdays. Email Address View all newsletters > **The world certainly does not need more conflict.** Already, Sudan's brutally violent civil war is failing to attract attention and resources despite being the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, poised to become even more **devastating as famine sets in**. **Somalia's fragility continues to provide opportunity for al-Shabaab**, which may be growing closer to Yemen's Houthi militants. As difficult as it is when domestic politics loom large, the United States must urgently work to de-escalate tensions, discourage proxy conflicts, and prevent even more disaster.

The AU's failure to recognize Somaliland has given Egypt and Ethiopia an excuse for conflict.

Abdullahi H Daud 10-10, 10-10-2024, "How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War Between Ethiopia And Egypt", SaxafiMedia, https://saxafimedia.com/somaliland-status-looming-proxy-war-ethiopia-egypt/

Recent reports, such as Alec Soltes' (2024) piece in the Geopolitical Monitor, point out that **Somaliland's unclear status is exacerbating tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, raising concerns about a potential proxy war.** The specter of conflict over Somaliland further underscores the need for the international community to act. **The path forward requires the** international community, particularly the **African Union, to address Somaliland's status** urgently. **Delaying this issue further risks destabilizing not just Somaliland and Somalia but the entire Horn of Africa.** As Professor Ali Mazrui (2006) has noted, the troubled union between Somaliland and Somalia is akin to a disastrous marriage, much like the union between East and West Pakistan. This comparison illustrates the deep divisions that have characterized the Somaliland-Somalia relationship. Somaliland's quest for recognition is emblematic of the broader struggles for self-determination and autonomy that have shaped post-colonial African history. The African Union must draw lessons from the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan, both of which successfully navigated the challenges of independence. Somaliland, like these other nations, has a legitimate claim to recognition. The time for inaction has long passed. The international community must engage meaningfully with Somaliland to ensure lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. In conclusion, the issue of Somaliland's recognition presents a critical challenge that, if left unresolved, could have significant implications not only for Somalia but also for the wider Horn of Africa region. Somaliland's progress in terms of peace, stability, and governance, juxtaposed with the chronic instability in Somalia, makes the question of its recognition urgent. The African Union and the broader international community must reassess their approach and take decisive action to recognize the unique history and circumstances of Somaliland. **The ongoing proxy war tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia underscore the importance of addressing Somaliland's status to prevent further destabilization in the region. Somaliland's quest for international recognition is not just a local or regional issue but one that, if ignored, could trigger wider geopolitical conflicts**, as seen in recent developments. The international community must not remain passive but instead engage in proactive diplomacy to ensure that peace and stability are maintained across the Horn of Africa.

This week's agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia changes nothing.

The Economist yesterday, 12-19-2024, "Ethiopia and Somalia claim to have settled a dangerous feud", The Economist, https://archive.ph/XZerO#selection-1033.0-1131.1

For months a spat between Somalia and Ethiopia had been creeping towards a crisis. In June Somalia threatened to expel all of Ethiopia's troops from its territory, where they have long spearheaded the regional fight against al-Shabab, a jihadist group. By October Somalia had formed a military alliance with Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia's bitterest foes, as Ethiopia's army chief mused openly about arming groups hostile to the Somali government. Many feared the tensions could set off proxy wars and draw in other powers in the vicinity or create a security vacuum in Somalia that al-Shabab might exploit. Perhaps they need not have worried. In a surprise announcement on December 11th Ethiopia and Somalia appeared to make up. **After negotiations in Ankara, brokered by Turkey, a joint declaration was signed** by Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia's prime minister, and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia's president, agreeing to "leave behind differences and contentious issues". Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's president, called it a "historic reconciliation". **But there are reasons to be skeptical. At the heart of the crisis is a memorandum of understanding (MOU)** signed on January 1st between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-governing statelet in northern Somalia. **Under that agreement Ethiopia had offered to become the first country to recognise the breakaway republic, in return for a long-term lease of a strip of its coastline**. This enraged Somalia, which considers Somaliland a renegade province and thus regarded the MOU as a violation of its sovereignty. The Economist **According to the joint declaration, Ethiopia will now seek "access to and from the sea, under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia". It has also agreed to respect Somalia's "territorial integrity". Somalia argues that this implies the end of the MOU**. It will provide Ethiopia with an outlet to the sea for trade; in return, Ethiopia has rescinded its offer to recognise Somaliland. **"The MOU is retracted," says an official in Somalia. Not everyone agrees. The vaguely worded declaration does not mention the MOU and Ethiopia has not confirmed it has cancelled it. Somaliland**, the other party to the MOU, **has greeted**

the news from Ankara with a shrug. Senior **Somaliland officials say they have heard nothing from Ethiopia to suggest that the deal is off the table.** Some **experts suspect that Mr Abiy is still committed to the MOU and is simply playing for time**. **Under** President Joe **Biden both Ethiopia and Somaliland have been under heavy pressure from America to kill the deal**. **But both expect Donald Trump's administration to be more accommodating.** "From what I understand, **Abiy is not deterred by international pressure, and is determined to pursue the MOU by any means necessary**," says Abel Abate Demissie, an Ethiopia-based analyst for Chatham House, a British think-tank. **There is a darker possibility.** Mr **Abiy may not be satisfied with sea access for commerce,** as promised by the deal with Somalia. **What he may really want is a naval base. The MOU would have allowed him to build one on Somaliland's coast.** Another option would be somehow to take back Assab or Massawa, Eritrea's Red Sea ports, over which Ethiopia lost control when Eritrea seceded in 1993. His language was subsequently toned down. But recently the idea of reclaiming Assab has resurfaced on Ethiopia's tightly controlled state media. Last week it was suggested that ceding the port to Eritrea had been unconstitutional and that Ethiopia was being "suffocated" as a result. Add other ominous signs that the two countries are preparing for a conflict, and the outlook looks bleak. "The MOU was just an appetiser," says an observer. "Assab is the main meal."

AU involvement in the issue allows for prevention of inter-state conflict

Abdullahi H Daud, 10-10-2024, "How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War Between Ethiopia And Egypt", SaxafiMedia, https://saxafimedia.com/somaliland-status-looming-proxy-war-ethiopia-egypt/

The brewing proxy war between Egypt and Ethiopia over Somalia is a direct consequence of the international community's failure, especially the African Union, to address the issue of Somaliland's status. The conflict reflects a broader failure to recognize the complex political landscape of the Horn of Africa and the evolving dynamics within Somalia and Somaliland. Somaliland and Somalia originally merged in 1960 after gaining independence from Britain and Italy, respectively, to form the Somali Republic. However, the union fractured soon after, leading to a bloody civil war and Somaliland's subsequent declaration of independence in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has enjoyed relative peace and stability compared to Somalia. Despite lacking formal international recognition, Somaliland has built political institutions and a governance system that starkly contrasts with the absence of a fully functional government in Somalia. This distinction underscores the broader implications of Somaliland's unrecognized status, not just for the now-defunct Somali Republic but for the peace and security of the entire Horn of Africa region. The failure of the international community, particularly the African Union, to confront Somaliland's status has, therefore, only deepened the complexities surrounding the issue. This question resurfaced with renewed urgency following the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The agreement granted Ethiopia access to Somaliland's sea and brought Ethiopia closer to recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign entity. Ethiopia, which has long sought access to the sea, entered into this agreement with Somaliland, which in turn hopes to gain formal recognition. However, the so-called Somali government in Mogadishu claims sovereignty over Somaliland, creating confusion over the legitimacy of the agreement. While Somaliland has de facto control over the territories that Ethiopia is interested in, Somalia claims de jure legitimacy over the same areas. This complex situation demands the attention of the international community. **The international community**, however, **has** been reluctant to address the Somaliland issue**, preferring instead to focus on resolving the chaos in Somalia**. Many **scholars have warned of the dangers of this neglect**. For example, at the Mbagathi peace talks, Somaliland's status was deliberately left unresolved to protect the region's relative stability. However, Somaliland has made it clear that it will not remain indefinitely in limbo, waiting for the international community to act. As Bradbury (2005) noted, Somaliland has long since "steered its own course" and hopes that the international community will follow. In 2005, the African Union sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland, which concluded that Somaliland had been made a "pariah region" by default due to the unratified and dysfunctional union between Somaliland and Somalia. The report emphasized that Somaliland's case was historically unique and self-justified, urging the African Union to find a special solution to this long-standing issue. **The fear that recognizing Somaliland would violate the African Union's stance on the sanctity of colonial borders is unfounded**. Legal scholars like Garth Abraham have pointed out that Somaliland's boundaries conform to the colonial borders of British Somaliland, just as Eritrea's and South Sudan's did when they gained independence (Abraham 2006). The International Crisis Group (ICG) reached similar conclusions in its 2006 report, stating that Somaliland's status needs to be addressed through decisive leadership and open debate. The ICG warned that the African Union could no longer afford to ignore the issue. **Somaliland's** application for **recognition offers the African Union an opportunity for preventive diplomacy and a chance to engage as a neutral third party. The African Union must rise to the occasion and address this issue before it escalates further.** Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay (2006) highlights that **Eritrea and South Sudan have set precedents for the African Union to adopt more flexible approaches to resolving post-colonial intra-state conflicts. Somaliland's struggle for recognition, much like those of**

Eritrea and South Sudan, is deeply rooted in the legacy of post-colonial African liberation movements seeking self-determination from oppressive centralized governments. Somaliland's independence is, as Jhazbhay argues, **irreversible by military means, just as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia could not be reversed militarily.** Another prominent scholar, Ken Menkhaus (2006), noted that Somaliland's progress in democratization, stability, and economic recovery is one of the few positive developments in the troubled Horn of Africa. This makes the question of Somaliland's status even more critical, as ignoring its bid for recognition could undermine these gains. The International Crisis Group (2024) recently echoed this sentiment in its report on the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, noting that the agreement highlights Ethiopia's desire for sea access and Somaliland's unresolved status.

AU mediation works – empirics prove.

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Much of **mediation** efforts' **success** depends on the **relationship** between the **third party** and the **conflict parties**. The social structure in which the third party and the conflict parties operate, in turn, greatly determines the nature of this relationship. Within the African society of states, African leaders generally perceive that they are **bound by norms** related to sovereignty, **respect for the colonial borders**, anti-neocolonialism, nonalignment, **and peaceful conflict resolution**. The collective commitment to this cluster of norms provides African third parties with a social status that, in turn, provides them with a high degree of legitimacy when mediating armed conflict in Africa. I have argued that this **high degree of legitimacy** makes African third parties **more effective** than non-African ones. My statistical analyses support the argument that African mediation outperforms non-African mediation. **Despite** a higher degree of **economic** and **military resources**, non-African third parties are less effective in mediating civil wars in Africa than African ones. Indeed, something other than third-party capacity must explain the effectiveness of African third parties. The statistical analyses thus draw on what Hurd describes as the logical necessity of legitimacy to show that African mediation efforts are likely to be regarded as more legitimate than non-African mediation efforts.116 African third parties' effectiveness is conditional on the government side's commitment to the African solutions norm. This suggests that rather than just a low degree of third-party capacity, African third parties are effective because **African governments perceive them as legitimate**. Hence, I go beyond considering the effectiveness of mediators that are considered weak mediators or lacking "muscle."117 The effectiveness of African third parties is not a result of either the presence or the absence of third-party capacity, it is about the presence of legitimacy. In this article I thus explain why third parties from Africa that have comparable resources to "weak" non-African third parties like Norway or less resources than a nonAfrican third party like the US are still more effective. For example, Beardsley notes about Kofi Annan's mediation effort in **Kenya's post-2007 electoral crisis** that "Annan possessed **no authority** to **promise aid** or **threaten sanctions** against the intransigent parties, nor did he have better access to information about the capabilities and resolve of the respective parties than they had themselves."118 For this reason, Beardsley identifies Kofi Annan's mediation effort as a **good example** of a **third-party effort by a weak mediator**. This is a valid observation, but what Kofi Anan did have was a degree of **third-party legitimacy**. When the AU mediation team led by Anan arrived in Nairobi to mediate, they told the conflict parties that they had discussed the conflict with Nelson Mandela and that he sent his best wishes and sought to remind them that all of Africa was watching the process.119 Almost one month later the **conflict parties signed an agreement**. **This agreement would lay the basis for a grand coalition government that successfully mitigated the conflict.** One major question for future research is whether regional mediators in other regions can also draw on their third-party legitimacy. This question requires further research, but a preliminary analysis included in the appendix suggests that mediation efforts by regional third parties in the Middle East and Latin America— which are both regions where regional third parties with a high degree of

thirdparty capacity are largely absent—are significantly less effective than nonregional mediation efforts. This could mean that the African solution norm bestows legitimacy onto African third parties that neither non-African third parties nor regional mediators in other regions benefit from. The level of compliance with the African solutions norm in Africa contradicts the prevailing view in the literature that only third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources are effective in mediating civil wars. Clearly, security dynamics in Africa can be partly explained in realist terms, but international norms affect the 116. See Hurd 1999, 391. 117. Beardsley 2009; Svensson 2007b. 118. Beardsley 2009, 273. 119. Roger Cohen, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya," New York Review of Books, August 2008, 5. 32 International Organization Downloaded from https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000041 https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 193.203.10.81, on 25 Apr 2020 at 13:02:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. behavior of African actors to a great extent. African conflict parties' understandings of the international environment in Africa constitute an international structure that is highly influential in shaping the outcomes of mediation processes. From this perspective, it is striking that the role of third-party legitimacy has largely been ignored in the literature on international mediation. In essence, solely focusing on third-party capacity entails missing a relevant alternative source of mediation success, namely third-party legitimacy.

Overall, instability causes a great power draw-in.

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A Red Sea Geopolitics Primer by Nathan Heath '20, Fares Center Senior Research Associate and Political Risk Analyst* One of the world's oldest waterways is becoming increasingly relevant in geopolitics. **The Red Sea is positioned between two continents,** bordering six countries in **Africa and four in the Middle East**, and approximately 10% of all global trade passes through its waters**. It also serves as a strategic zone for both regional and Great Powers projecting their military might or openly engaging in conflict**. There is the potential for either reward or disaster in the Red Sea, as increasing economic and military competition in its waters raises the possibility of intense economic growth while simultaneously foreshadowing potential conflicts between rival powers. High levels of trade, energy production, and **innovation forecast significant economic opportunity** in the Red Sea, but this prosperity is threatened by regional rivalries and the ongoing Great Power **competition between the U.S. and China.** The Red Sea's global importance is rooted largely in its role as a key waterway for trade. By 2050, Red Sea GDP is projected to more than triple, increasing from $1.8 trillion to $6.1 trillion, and trade is expected to grow more than five times, from $881 billion to $4.7 trillion. This **enormous wealth will be driven by trade agreements encouraging countries** with substantial Red Sea interests to increase exports, particularly in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology. **Moreover, the construction of new ports and military bases to protect trade and investment interests will lead to even higher levels of trade throughout the Red Sea**. The geographical positioning of the Red Sea, proximate to numerous top energy producers, both explains the area's current wealth and forecasts continuing economic growth. On the African side, Egypt and Sudan alone produce a combined 500,000+ barrels per day (bpd) of oil. On the Middle East side, Saudi Arabia and Oman produce more than 12 million bpd of oil. In total, more than 50 million bpd of oil from producers as diverse as the U.S., Russia, China, Libya, and Iran pass through the Red Sea on a daily basis, along with approximately 3.5 billion cubic feet per day in liquid natural gas. In the future, renewable energy will add even more value to this waterway, given the current interest in hydro, wind, and solar initiatives in numerous bordering states. **In addition to serving as a leading trade route and home to multiple leading energy producers, the Red Sea is also becoming relevant as a hub of innovation.** Saudi Arabia's megacity projects such as Neom, The Red Sea Project, and the Amalaa Project present an opportunity for the region to participate in sustainable urbanization through massive, renewables-focused initiatives integrating robotics and smart services into new economies designed to thrive on innovation and tourism alike. Saudi Arabia's megacities are projected to bring in hundreds of billions of dollars by 2050, but more importantly, Neom and its sister cities highlight the tremendous opportunity for innovation and economic diversification in a region where many countries have historically been dependent on homogenous or semi-homogenous revenue streams such as fossil fuels. The UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, all of which heavily traffic their goods in the Red Sea, have unveiled similar visions for sustainable innovation to be completed in the next decade. In short, this crucial waterway may soon be home to innovation driving regional prosperity forward even faster. These **terrific opportunities for prosperity rooted in trade, energy, and innovation face** risks **posed by complex economic and military competition among both regional** and global owners. For one, African rivalries stretching from Egypt to

Djibouti are adding to the Red Sea region's volatility. Egyptian and Ethiopian relations, although somewhat improved since the transitions to the al-Sisi and Abiy regimes, respectively, remain tense over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia views the dam as a strategic necessity, while Egypt fears the dam will deplete its water resources. **Although Ethiopia's relations with Somalia and Eritrea have improved from Addis's historically hostile positions towards Asmara and Mogadishu**, Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea ports remains a point of negotiation between the three countries. **Sudan has also become increasingly problematic for its neighbors, as its resources, access to the sea**, and ongoing political violence have attracted the **attention of Turkey** and the Gulf Nations, frustrating Egypt given Cairo and Khartoum's historically close relationship. **And Djibouti remains caught in a tug of war between an ever-growing number of regional and global powers.** The Middle East is home to its own set of conflicts fueling military and economic competition in the Red Sea. The primary regional rivalry continues to be between Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are each vying for regional supremacy via either direct or proxy engagement in conflicts. Iran's allies are Syria, Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen (and also Qatar to a limited extent). Saudi Arabi is allied with the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, and the Qataris have historically been Saudi allies but have in recent years struck a more independent foreign policy that resulted in their blockade by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE. The conflict between Riyadh and Tehran presents the most probable risk of a regional conflagration that could threaten the political and economic stability of the Red Sea region. At the moment, the risk of a tanker war or all-out military conflict between the U.S. and Iran is quite high, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or even the disruption of trade through the Gulf of Oman is a troubling and possible outcome of such an event. The formation of Middle East-African alliances has added a further risk of conflict to the region. In addition to its relationship with Sudan (where Saudi Arabia and Iran have competed with Eritrea), **Turkey has poured significant aid and investment into Somalia, and Istanbul now owns all of the country's major ports**. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sparred with Ethiopia over influence in Eritrea. Additionally, Qatar's alignment with the Turks, Saudis, and Emiratis at different times has increased Doha's influence in nations along the Horn of Africa. It is in **Djibouti, however, that the greatest risk** to the Red Sea itself lies, as the city-state has drawn the attention of the great powers. In **addition to a slew of Middle Eastern and African powers including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey**, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, a number of global powers have set their sights on Djibouti as a strategic asset. **The U.S., China, Russia, Japan, France, and Italy have all secured or pursued military bases in Djibouti, which is situated close to the critical Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb**. China's first overseas military base, positioned in Djibouti, is situated just miles from Camp Lemonnier, the only significant U.S. military base in Africa. Russia failed to secure a base in Djibouti and has looked further inland for African military partnerships; France, Italy, and Japan maintain smaller operations. **The U.S.-China base rivalry in Djibouti (if it could be thought of as such), is symptomatic of the larger continental rivalry between two Great Powers**, as both Washington and Beijing continue to vie for influence in Africa wit3h rival political ideologies and systems of economic development. **Djibouti is thus a true powder keg, not merely for regional rivalries but also for the larger Great Power game between the U.S. and China**. An economic and military conflict between Washington and Beijing would impact Djibouti, threatening to disrupt trade routes passing through the Red Sea. In the near future we can expect to see increasing economic competition in the Red Sea as both traditional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources bolster already-significant levels of trade and innovative projects such as Neom and the GERD. The struggle for economic power will fuel increased investment by developed or middle-income regional powers such as Egypt, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE into developing countries such as Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. **Furthermore, global powers such as the U.S., China, EU, and Japan will be increasingly drawn to key Djibouti and other key ports to protect access to key trade routes**. **With shifting alliances and economic competition**, however, comes increased risk of conflict in a region already home to numerous zones of instability. To minimize risk to the global supply chain, powers with military, economic, or political interests in the Red Sea region will have to work together to **ensure that conflicts are contained or prevented altogether in the interest of stabilizing both regional and global markets.**

Great power draw-in leads to extinction.

Stephen **Clare 21**, Research Fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research Fellow, 11/2021, "Great Power Conflict," https://dkqj4hmn5mktp.cloudfront.net/Great_Power_Conflict_report_Founders_Pledge_e4124df2ac.pdf, Accessed 12-11-2024, ARC

This report explores issues at the intersection of international relations, conflict studies, and longtermism.l In it, we draw extensively on the mainstream international relations literature but focus specifically on understanding the potential effects of war on the long-term future. Taking a **long-term view** focuses our attention on the risk a Great Power war poses to **humanity's future potential**. **Extinction**, an **unrecoverable collapse** of civilization, or a **permanent end** to humanity's growth and progress would all **destroy** the long-term potential of our species. We call events that could lead to one of these scenarios **existential risks** .2 Such an event, if it occurred, would be unprecedented in human history. It would cause **unimaginable suffering** for everyone alive today and **extinguish** any possibility for **trillions** of our would-be descendants to live happy lives. **Some** of these global catastrophic risks, like an asteroid impact, are **direct** risks. By **contrast**, Great Power conflict is a **risk factor**: it is **connected** to multiple other risks, and **raising** or **lowering** the amount of conflict affects the seriousness of the threats we face in these **other areas**. In section 4 of this report we consider several concrete pathways through which Great Power conflict poses a **global catastrophic risk**. We will sort these pathways into three broad categories. First, we consider ways in which Great Power conflict poses a risk even **without** a full-blown war breaking out. For example, a new Cold War could **hasten** the development of **dangerous tech**nologies or cause a **breakdown** in cooperation that **precludes** international agreements to mitigate **other** existential risks. Second, a Great Power war could **itself** be a global catastrophic risk. In an all-out war between Great Power nations, weapons with the potential to **kill everyone on earth** or **irreparably damage civilization** could be used. Or, in the **aftermath** of a major war, the victorious side could emerge as a global hegemon that is able to use advanced technologies to **lock in** its **sub-optimal values**. 3 Third, a Great Power war could **weaken** humanity and leave us **more vulnerable** to subsequent disasters, like a serious pandemic.

Contention 2 is Russia

Russia looking to set up bases in Somaliland

Knox 24 [Patrick Knox, "Russia 'To Set Up Naval Base For Warships And Hunter-Killer Submarines In Somaliland' As Putin Looks To Expand Military Reach", 12/24/2024, https://www.facebook, https://saxafimedia.com/russia-to-set-up-naval-base-for-warships-and-hunter-killer-submarines-in-somaliland-as-putin-looks-to-expand-military-reach/] //S.S.

RUSSIA is plotting a game-changing naval base in a breakaway east African state in bid **to** dramatically **expand** his **military might in the Middle East,** according to reports. Talks are reportedly underway between Moscow and leaders **in Somaliland** for a 1,500 man base to support its warships and hunter-killer submarines to operate in the volatile region and busy shipping lanes carrying most of Europe's goods. **If realized, this would be Russia's first base in Africa since the Cold War and be a major step forward for Vladimir Putin's ambitious modernization programme to revive his country's once proud navy.** The rumored location of the base is outside of Zeila city, in the self-declared republic of Somaliland. It is also on the border with Djibouti – nearby the location of China's first overseas base in modern times which opened last year. The United Arab Emirates is also building a military base in Berbera in what is – and always has been – a key position to project power in the unstable region.

incentive to engage soon

News 24 [Qaran News, "Russia Should Seek A Naval Base In Somaliland Since Sudan Continues Giving It The Runaround", 03/08/2024, No Publication, https://qarannews.com/russia-should-seek-a-naval-base-in-somaliland-since-sudan-continues-giving-it-the-runaround/]//S.S.

It was suggested as far back as summer 2021 that "Somaliland Can Be An Alternative For Russia's Troubled Sudanese Naval Base Plans", the insight of which is more relevant than ever after the US ominously threatened Sudan with vague "consequences" in 2022 should it go through with this. Shortly afterwards, its "deep state" war broke out in early 2023 and evolved into a full-blown civil war that continues to this day, further impeding the chances of implementing their 2020 deal. Although Chief General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan refused to bite the American media's bait that Russia allegedly arms his "Rapid Support Forces" rivals via now-defunct Wagner, his Foreign Minister's roundabout response about the future of this base suggests that he remains reluctant to defy the US. This state of affairs isn't expected to change considering that he wants to remain on that Western leader's good side so it's about time that Russia begins looking elsewhere to meet this military need. **The Memorandum of Understanding that Ethiopia and Somaliland signed on the first of the year, whereby Addis will recognize Hargeisa's 1991 redeclaration of independence and give it stakes in national companies in exchange for commercial-military port rights, could form the basis of such talks. Something similar could be discussed between Russia and Somaliland,** which would meet the first's military needs while also pioneering a new connectivity corridor with fellow BRICS member Ethiopia. **Russia** had hitherto **not wanted to upset Somalia,** which continues to claim Somaliland despite not exerting any writ over it for the past one-third of a century, **but recent developments** in their ties **might cause Moscow to reconsider its calculations**. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud slammed Russia twice while speaking at a think tank event in Italy in late January, after which a member of Somalia's Defense Committee put an anti-Russian spin on their country's security deal with Turkiye in late February. These unfriendly actions occurred despite Russia sending Somalia two free shipments of wheat thus far so Moscow shouldn't expect that continuing to abstain from establishing ties with Somaliland will lead to an improvement in Mogadishu's behavior. Quite clearly, the American-Somalian base deal from the middle of last month whereby Washington will construct five such facilities in that country has political strings attached, namely taking the US' side against Russia in the New Cold War. It's therefore time for Russia to recalibrate its regional policy in light of the changes that have recently taken place in Sudan and Somalia. Clinging to hopes that its naval base deal with the first will be implemented in the coming future and that the second's newly unfriendly attitude towards Russia will soon improve risks wasting precious time at the expense of tapping into more promising opportunities. **Somaliland could replace Russia's planned base in Sudan** and the Kremlin should explore this possibility.

But Somaliland wants U.S. recognition and will allow bases in exchange for it

Hasan 24 (Yusuf M Hasan, "Somaliland Offers to Host US Military Base for Recognition", Somaliland Sun, 12-31-2024, https://somalilandsun.com/somaliland-offers-to-host-us-military-base-for-recognition/ // DOA 12-31-2024 // [sai]

Somaliland is mulling a barter deal with the United States. Somaliland, which has been on a long quest to seek independence **is ready to offer the United States a military base**.

In return, it seeks recognition. Somaliland's representative to the US Bashir Goth recently **said** in an interview that **the region is ready to host a US military base** at its Berbera port. In 1991, Somaliland declared unilateral independence for Somalia which firmly opposes the move. The territory is strategically located along the Gulf of Aden. Experts say Donald Trump could show interest in this barter deal. **Granting recognition to Somaliland will give the US A military edge in the critical Red Sea region.** Watch Somaliland Offers US its Port to Build Military Base in Exchange for Recognition

Aff solves - U.S. recognizes when A.U. does

Rubin 23 [Michael Rubin, "On Somaliland, the African Union and UN Betrays Their Own Precedents", 04/03/2023, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/on-somaliland-the-african-union-and-un-betrays-their-own-precedents/]//S.S

Fighting continues between the Somaliland army on one hand, and local clan militias on the other. At stake is the status of Somaliland's Sool region. Somaliland was briefly independent in 1960, but voluntarily joined a union with Italian Somaliland to form Somalia. As Somalia failed

under the dictatorship of Siad Barre, Somaliland left the union and in 1991 reasserted its independence. It held multiple elections and established a vibrant if imperfect democracy. For three decades, it has embraced the West and established moderate policies while Somalia descended into clan warfare, became a morass of corruption, and pivoted toward China. The State Department remains disinterested if not dismissive, despite Congressional calls to augment ties to Somaliland. **U.S. diplomats** resist relations and explain that they **will not** formally re-**recognize Somaliland until the African Union does so.**

Absent U.S. recognition, Somaliland turns to Russia

By 23 [Written By, "Russia's Growing Footprint in Africa", 12/28/2023, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-growing-footprint-africa] //S.S.
Russian influence has been gaining ground across Africa in recent years, placing the continent at the crux of the growing geopolitical contest between the Kremlin and the White House. U.S. officials say **Russia's efforts** to develop a "multipolar" world order, its deployment of disinformation, and its use of mercenaries **have undermined democratic stability and driven conflict on the continent.** Russian economic and military involvement in Africa still pales in comparison to that of both China and the West. Yet, amid the upheaval of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some **African governments**, such as South Africa, **are moving closer to Moscow. Analysts say this shift can be attributed to long-standing frustration with the failures of Western intervention** and to many African countries' simmering resentment over a lack of representation in international institutions. It also stems from a growing desire to avoid choosing sides between major powers, a mindset many Africans see as a relic of the Cold War–era. **Experts argue that to effectively stem Russia's growing influence**, **the U**nited **S**tates and Europe **need to build on previous diplomatic efforts and seek more** equal **partnerships** with African nations, pointing to the renewed efforts of the Joe Biden administration to prioritize African agency in global frameworks.

https://www.aei.org/articles/the-us-needs-to-recognize-somaliland-before-russia-does/

The Horn of Africa is crucial

Admin 20 [Admin, "Russia Plans to Open Naval Base in the Unrecognized Somaliland", 02/01/2020, Somaliland Sun, https://somalilandsun.com/russia-plans-to-open-naval-base-in-the-unrecognized-somaliland/]//S.S.

The Horn of Africa is strategically important for a number of reasons, amongst others **because it allows both power projection into the Middle East and influences over the Suez Canal** through the Gulf of Aden. An aerial starboard bow view of a Russian Navy Northern Fleet DELTA IV class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine underway on the surface. If realized, this would be Russia's first base in Africa since the Cold War and be a **major step forward for** (Vladimir) **Putin's** programme to revive Russia's once proud **navy**. Experts believe a new "Scramble for Africa" is unfolding. The main players are China, the EU and the US. India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, South Korea and the Gulf countries are also interested in increasing cooperation with Africa. Russia's volume of trade and economic interaction with Africa is inferior to almost all of the abovementioned players. Currently, Russia's trade with Africa accounts for less than $12billion.

Ukraine won't be an issue

By 23 [Report By, "Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What's the Limit?", 08/15/2023, No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit] //S.S.

Russia's Continued Progress in Africa, despite the War in Ukraine and Domestic Fissure Despite Russia's military shortcomings in Ukraine—including incurring significant personnel and equipment losses, struggling to produce advanced weapons systems, and increasing reliance on Soviet-era defense equipment—there have not yet been any tangible signs of African countries actively seeking to replace Moscow as a chief arms supplier or military partner. In fact, throughout 2022, a number of countries on the continent initiated new or continued existing military cooperation agreements with the Kremlin. Cameroon, for instance, signed a new defense deal with the Russian MOD entailing joint military trainings, and Mali received military equipment from Moscow. In 2023, the Russia-Africa summit participants agreed to establish a new permanent Russo-African security mechanism, aimed at combating terrorism and extremism on the continent. However, some negative trends have also been observed. For example, Algeria and Egypt, which have long been listed among Russia's top five arms purchasers globally, slowly started to lessen defense ties with the Kremlin in 2022. Yet, considering the large reliance of both countries on Russian-origin arms, they will most likely maintain defense cooperation with Moscow in the near term. Similar to the Russian armed forces, Wagner has sustained significant losses in Ukraine. In May 2023, Prigozhin openly accused the Russian MOD for not supplying his PMC with enough ammunition during the fight for the city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. A month later, this disagreement led to the Prigozhin-orchestrated "march for justice" against Moscow, which, even if brief, has given rise to a number of questions connected with the stability of the Putin regime, as well as the future of Wagner in Africa.

Russia Escalates through Proxies

Borshchevskaya 24 [Anna Borshchevskaya, "Countering Russia's Strategy of Arming Anti-American Proxies", 08/02/2024, The Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/countering-russias-strategy-arming-anti-american-proxies]//S.S.

According to a recent Wall Street Journal report **citing U.S. intelligence sources,** Moscow is poised to provide the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen with advanced antiship missiles. If the report is accurate, it would mark yet another **Russian escalation** in tensions **with the West** and further fuel an assault on longstanding international norms. **Arming or** otherwise **empowering proxies is consistent with the Kremlin playbook.** Since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Vladimir Putin has predictably aligned even more closely with destabilizing anti-American forces in the Middle East. He has chosen low-intensity conflict with the West because Russia has fewer resources. For Moscow, **distracting the U**nited **S**tates at a low cost **and forcing** it **to expend** its **resources against empowered proxies** has proven to be **an effective tactic** in its larger battle to reshape the international system. Too often, **Washington's responses to Russian provocations have been siloed** in specific regional theaters **rather than** tied to **a holistic strategy. As a result,** they have not appreciably changed **Putin's strategy of** undermining U.S. interests via **proxy warfare.** Syria as a Template Russia's increased reliance on proxies stretches back to 2014-15, when it illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine and then intervened militarily in Syria. Since then, Russia has been pursuing what then-chief of staff Valery Gerasimov, speaking about Syria at the annual defense conference of the Russian Academy of Sciences in early 2019, described as a strategy of "limited action." Future warfare was a key theme of that conference, and according to expert accounts, Gerasimov appeared to imply that Syria would serve as an example for future Russian operations. Over the years, Moscow has armed Iran's top proxy, Hezbollah, on the Syrian battlefield. In the process, Hezbollah apparently learned quite a bit from the Russian military, including the ability to conduct offensive maneuver warfare. Supported by Russian air and artillery cover, the group subsequently helped regime forces destroy key rebel strongholds and turn the tide of the war in Bashar al-Assad's favor. **The Kremlin relied on other actors to do the heavy lifting, especially** Iran and its **proxies**. Indeed, the Russia-Iran relationship reached unprecedented heights as a result of Moscow's intervention in Syria, even before the invasion of Ukraine. In the absence of a consistent Western approach to countering Russia in Syria, Putin achieved both his short-term goal of keeping Assad in power and his long-term goal of establishing a permanent military position on the East Mediterranean. Moscow has since leveraged its position in Syria in multiple ways. This includes enabling other proxies in the region, thereby boosting its ability to periodically escalate with the United States. Recent Escalation Beginning in March 2023, Russia significantly escalated in Syria through increased military harassment of U.S. aircraft. This took place in the broader context of unanswered escalation across the Black Sea, where Russia repeatedly intercepted U.S. MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, culminating in a midair collision with a Su-30 fighter jet. In response, Washington publicly denounced the behavior of Russian forces as unsafe and unprofessional, then launched cross-theater exercises to confuse them and drain their readiness. Afterward, the harassment stopped. Then came the October 7 attack on Israel and subsequent Iranian escalation across the region, during which Russia increased its support for Israel's enemies. In response, the United States sent F-35 fighter jets and a Navy destroyer to the Middle East in a show of strength. This quieted things down. But such moves have a limited shelf life when they are temporary, reactive, and not part of a holistic strategy for countering Moscow. By November, reports were surfacing that Russian Wagner Group paramilitary forces in Syria might transfer the Pantsir S-1 (SA-22 Greyhound) antiaircraft system to Hezbollah in Lebanon, reportedly with Assad's assent. The Kremlin denied the report, but such a transfer is certainly conceivable, along with further Russian (and Iranian) escalation as the United States considers withdrawing from northeast Syria.

The reason is simple,

Dolbiala 23 (Report By Mathieu Droin and Tina Dolbaia, "Russia Is Still Progressing in Africa. What's the Limit?", No Publication, 8-15-2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit // DOA 1-1-2025 // [sai]
Therefore, no matter how the war in Ukraine plays out or how the fate of Prigozhin is ultimately decided, the **Kremlin** will likely **have strong incentives** to maintain its use of PMCs—including a restructured Wagner Group or its subsidiaries—in Africa to ensure uninterrupted access to the continent's gold reserves, among other benefits, and **to destabilize Western strategic partnerships with different African states**. Importantly, as the invasion of Ukraine will inevitably produce more veterans seeking adequate remuneration amid Russia's wartime economy, it can be expected that Russian PMCs might expand the size and scale of their current operations in Africa.

Russia and the US could get directly involved

Hornung 24 (Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Ukraine Is Now a Proxy War for Asian Powers", No Publication, 11-21-2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/ukraine-is-now-a-proxy-war-for-asian-powers.html // DOA 1-1-2025 // [sai]
Not all proxy wars look alike or follow the standard pattern. Sometimes, **an outside power's support** for one side **leads that power to intervene directly**. **Think** of **the United States' gradual involvement in** the **Vietnam** War **or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan** to prop up the embattled government there. Even **as** the military **efforts of their proxies waned**, **the United States and Soviet Union maintained** their **participation** in an attempt **to prevent a victory by the other superpower**'s proxy.

Independently, any conflict goes nuclear

ICAN 19 (One Low-Yield, "New Study on US-Russia nuclear war: 91.5 million casualties in first few hours", ICAN, 9-18-2019, https://www.icanw.org/new_study_on_us_russia_nuclear_war // DOA 1-1-2025 // [sai]

34.1 million people could die, and another 57.4 million could be injured, within the first few hours of the start of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States triggered by one low-yield nuclear weapon, **according to** a new simulation by **researcher's at Princeton's Science** and **Global Security programme**.
But that's not all. The overall death toll would be even higher due to long-term consequences of a nuclear war, including radioactive fallout and global cooling of the Earth's atmosphere, researchers add. Even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could put one billion people at risk of starvation and another 1.3 billion at risk of severe food insecurity due to global cooling, according to a 2013 study by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.The Princeton simulation, ironically entitled "Plan A," comes as the United States works to develop brand new low-yield nuclear weapons, despite the opposition of leading Democratic members of Congress, and demonstrates that even lower-yield nuclear weapons can have devastating consequences.The researchers used independent assessments of current U.S. and Russian nuclear force postures, including the number of warheads deployed and their yields, war plans and targets to create the simulation.Equally alarming as the casualty toll of this nuclear war simulation is the growing probability that it becomes a reality. "**The risk of nuclear war has increased dramatically** in the past two years **as the United States and Russia have abandoned long-standing nuclear arms control treaties**, **started** to **develop new** kinds of **nuclear weapons and expanded the circumstances in which they might use nuclear weapons**," wrote the Princeton researchers on the project website.
"'Plan A' shows that there is no sane plan once a nuclear weapon is launched," said Alicia Sanders-Zakre, Policy and Research Coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. "A better plan is to reject nightmare nuclear scenarios and support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons."

Extinction, nuclear winter!

Starr 15, 2/28/2015, Steven is an Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Starr is also an expert on the environmental consequences of nuclear war, Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting to Happen, Symposium: The Dynamics of Possible Nuclear Extinction, https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html)// SN

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and "an unprecedented disaster," or even "the end of civilization," because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world's leading climatologists now tell us that **nuclear war** threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, **would create a** post-war **environment** in which for many years it would be **too cold and dark to** even **grow food**. Their findings make it clear that not only **humans**, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life **would** likely **vanish forever** in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth's protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth's surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

Proxy wars happen. They escalate

America [New America, "Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare: Confronting Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World", Invalid date, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/rethinking-proxy-warfare/]

Great power competition is on the rise, and rivalries among regional powers in the Greater Middle East and its periphery are intensifying. In this new era of proxy warfare, the diffusion of technology, information, and weapons has loosened the state's monopoly on the use of force. This is occurring against a backdrop of a faltering Euro-Atlantic alliance and deadlock in the United Nations Security Council that has undercut attempts to mitigate the adverse effects of conflict in the region. The use of third-party armed forces that lie outside the constitutional order of states directly or indirectly engaged in hostilities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, in particular, has upended

established international norms in the realm of international law and raised serious questions about the efficacy of current U.S. policies. As successive White House administrations have shown in grappling with decisions ranging from whether to support Libyan militias in their fight against ISIS, to a possible withdrawal of support to rebel forces in northern Syria, or assistance in the Saudi air campaign in Yemen, there are few easy solutions. Little has been written about the changes wrought by strategic innovations in proxy force deployment and the use of weapons, communications, and information—all of which have transformed the nature of strategic surprise, made proxy forces more numerous, and in some case made proxies more lethal. The potential peril of these strategic choices is exceedingly high, but all too often policy claims about proxy warfare are made with limited data and insight about what is actually occurring on the ground. **Proxy wars** often **escalate** into brutal conflicts that spill across borders. Rival sponsors commonly employ strategies that support the use of ever more questionable and lethal tactics by their own proxies. In each instance, murky sponsor motivations and covert proxy connections raise barriers to attributing actions to actors. Intelligence sharing, air campaigns, battlefield detentions, joint strikes, and targeted kill/capture operations supported by principals and executed by agents blur lines of command responsibility. Reliance on proxies has simultaneously precipitated and reinforced a feedback loop of ever more expansive state secrecy, predatory corruption, and lack of transparency in the realm of global finance, arms, and energy trading. As a result, when **drones strike, ballistic missiles** cross boundaries, **chemical weapons** explode, and bots attack, "command and control" takes on a whole new meaning. The tangle of relationships between irregular proxy forces and their sponsors often obscures how orders are issued and who sets the rules of engagement. When a proxy combatant operating outside the constitutional order of a state involved in conflict provides targeting coordinates for air strikes, supplies intelligence that leads to chemical weapons attacks, or mobilizes bots to amplify disinformation campaigns, "red lines" are often crossed without consequence. Under these circumstances, the potential for misattribution, escalation, and blowback raises the stakes for sponsors considerably. With the five permanent members of the UN Security Council frequently deadlocked in a 3–2 split when something goes wrong on the battlefield, the procedures for redress are uncertain and sanctions increasingly unenforceable. All these factors add up to a profound change in the global order, one that will test the United States, its allies, and the international community in new ways.

Extinction!

Clare 23 [Stephen Clare, "Great power war", Invalid date, https://www.facebook, https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/great-power-conflict/]

At some point in the 21st century, an unwinnable war may be fought. **A** modern **great power war** could see nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, and other destructive new technologies deployed on an unprecedented scale. It would probably be the most destructive event in history, shattering our world. It could even threaten us with extinction. We've come perilously close to just this kind of catastrophe before. On October 27, 1962 — near the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis — an American U-2 reconnaissance plane set out on a routine mission to the Arctic to collect data on Soviet nuclear tests. But, while flying near the North Pole, with the stars obscured by the northern lights, the pilot made a navigation error and strayed into Soviet airspace.1 Soviet commanders sent fighter jets to intercept the American plane. The jets were picked up by American radar operators and nuclear-armed F-102 fighters took off to protect the U-2. Fortunately, the reconnaissance pilot realised his error with enough time to correct course before the Soviet and American fighters met. But the intrusion enraged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was already on high alert amidst the crisis in Cuba. "What is this, a provocation?" Khrushchev wrote to US President John F. Kennedy. "One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time when everything has been put into combat readiness." If the U-2's path had strayed further west, or the Soviet fighters had been fast enough to intercept it, this incident could have played out quite differently. Both the United States and the USSR had thousands of nuclear missiles ready to fire. Instead of a nearly-forgotten anecdote, the U-2 incident could have been a trigger for war, like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Competition among the world's most powerful countries shapes our world today. And whether it's through future incidents like the lost U-2, or something else entirely, it's plausible that it could escalate and lead to a major, devastating war. Is there anything you can do to help avoid such a terrible outcome? It is, of course, difficult to imagine how any one individual can hope to influence such world-historical events. Even the most powerful world leaders often fail to predict the global consequences of their decisions. But I think the likelihood and severity of great power war makes this among the most pressing problems of our time — and that some solutions could be impactful enough that working on them may be one of the highest-impact things to do with your career. By taking action, I think we can create a future where the threat of great power war is a distant memory rather than an ever-present danger. Summary Economic growth and technological progress have bolstered the arsenals of the world's most powerful countries. That means the next war between them could be far worse than World War II, the deadliest conflict humanity has yet experienced. Could such a war actually occur? We can't rule out the possibility. Technical **accidents or** diplomatic **misunderstandings could** spark a conflict that quickly **escalates**. Or international **tension** could **cause leaders to** decide they're better off **fight**ing **than negotiating**. It seems hard to make progress on this problem. It's also less neglected than some of the problems that we think are most pressing. There are certain issues, like making nuclear weapons or military artificial intelligence systems safer, which seem promising — although it may be more impactful to work on reducing risks from AI, bioweapons or nuclear weapons directly. You might also be able to reduce the chances of misunderstandings and miscalculations by developing expertise in one of the most important bilateral relationships (such as that between the United States and China). Finally, by making conflict less likely, reducing competitive pressures on the development of dangerous technology, and improving international cooperation, you might be helping to reduce other risks, like the chance of future pandemics. Our overall view Recommended Working on this issue seems to be among the best ways of improving the long-term future we know of, but all else equal, we think it's less pressing than our highest priority areas (primarily because it seems less neglected and harder to solve). Scale There's a significant chance that a new great power war occurs this century. Although the world's most powerful countries haven't fought directly since World War II, war has been a constant throughout human history. There have been numerous close calls, and several issues could cause diplomatic disputes in the years to come. These considerations, along with forecasts and statistical models, lead me to think there's about a one-in-three chance that a new great power war breaks out in roughly the next 30 years. Few wars cause more than a million casualties and the next great power war would probably be smaller than that. However, there's some chance it could escalate massively. Today the great powers

have much larger economies, more powerful weapons, and bigger military budgets than they did in the past. An all-out war could kill far more people than even World War II, the worst war we've yet experienced. Could it become an existentially threatening war — one that could cause human extinction or significantly damage the prospects of the long-term future? It's very difficult to say. But my best current guess is that the chance of an existential catastrophe due to war in the next century is somewhere between 0.05% and 2%. Neglectedness War is a lot less neglected than some of our other top problems. There are thousands of people in governments, think tanks, and universities already working on this problem. But some solutions or approaches remain neglected. One particularly promising approach is to develop expertise at the intersection of international conflict and another of our top problems. Experts who understand both geopolitical dynamics and risks from advanced artificial intelligence, for example, are sorely needed. Solvability Reducing the risk of great power war seems very difficult. But there are specific technical problems that can be solved to make weapons systems safer or less likely to trigger catastrophic outcomes. And in the best case, working on this problem can have a leverage effect, making the development of several dangerous technologies safer by improving international cooperation and making them less likely to be deployed in war. At the end of this profile, I suggest five issues which I'd be particularly excited to see people work on. These are: Developing expertise in the riskiest bilateral relationships Learning how to manage international crises quickly and effectively and ensuring the systems to do so are properly maintained Doing research to improve particularly important foreign policies, like strategies for sanctions and deterrence Improving how nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are governed at the international level Improving how such weapons are controlled at the national level Profile depth In-depth This is one of many profiles we've written to help people find the most pressing problems they can solve with their careers. Learn more about how we compare different problems, see how we try to score them numerically, and see how this problem compares to the others we've considered so far. Why might preventing great power war be an especially pressing problem? A modern great power war — an all-out conflict between the world's most powerful countries — could be the worst thing to ever happen to humanity. Historically, such wars have been exceptionally destructive. Sixty-six million people died in World War II, likely the deadliest catastrophe humanity has experienced so far. Since World War II, the global population and world economy have continued to grow, nuclear weapons have proliferated, and military technology has continued to advance. This means the next world war could be even worse, just as World War II was much deadlier than World War I. It's not guaranteed that such a war will break out. And if it does, it may not escalate to such a terrible extent. But the chance can't be ignored. In fact, there are reasons to think that the odds of World War III breaking out this century are worryingly high. A modern great power war would be devastating for people alive today. But its effects could also persist long into the future. That's because there is a substantial chance that this century proves to be particularly important. Technologies with the potential to cause a global catastrophe or radically reshape society are likely to be invented. How we choose to develop and deploy them could impact huge numbers of our descendants. And these choices would be affected by the outcomes of a major war. To be more specific, there are three main ways great power conflict could affect the long-term future: High international tension could increase other risks. Great power tensions could make the world more dangerous even if they don't lead to war. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the USSR never came into direct conflict but invested in bioweapons research and built up nuclear arsenals. This dynamic could return, with tension between great powers fueling races to develop and build new weapons, raising the risk of a disaster even before shots are fired. War could cause an existential catastrophe. If war does break out, it could escalate dramatically, with modern weapons (nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, or other future technologies) deployed at unprecedented scale. The resulting destruction could irreparably damage humanity's prospects. War could reshape international institutions and power balances. While such a catastrophic war is possible, it seems extremely unlikely. But even a less deadly war, such as another conflict on the scale of World War II, could have very long-lasting effects. For example, it could reshape international institutions and the global balance of power. In a pivotal century, different institutional arrangements and geopolitical balances could cause humanity to follow different long-term trajectories. The rest of this profile explores exactly how pressing a problem great power conflict is. In summary: Great power relations have become more tense. (More.) Partly as a result, a war is more likely than you might think. It's reasonable to put the probability of such a conflict in the coming decades somewhere between 10% and 50%. (More.) If war breaks out, it would probably be hard to control escalation. The chance that it would become large enough to be an existential risk cannot be dismissed. (More.) This makes great power war one of the biggest threats our species currently faces. (More.) It seems hard to make progress on solving such a difficult problem (more) — but there are many things you can try if you want to help (more). International tension has risen and makes other problems worse Imagine we had a thermometer-like device which, instead of measuring temperature, measured the level of international tension.2 This 'tension metre' would max out during periods of all-out global war, like World War II. And it would be relatively low when the great powers3 were peaceful and cooperative. For much of the post-Napoleonic 1800s, for example, the powerful European nations instituted the Concert of Europe and mostly upheld a continental peace. The years following the fall of the USSR also seem like a time of relative calm, when the tension metre would have been quite low.4 How much more worried would you be about the coming decades if you knew the tension metre would be very high than if you knew it would be low? Probably quite a lot. In the worst case, of course, the great powers could come into direct conflict. But even if it doesn't lead to war, a high level of tension between great powers could accelerate the development of new strategic technologies, make it harder to solve global problems like climate change, and undermine international institutions. During the Cold War, for instance, the United States and USSR avoided coming into direct conflict. But the tension metre would still have been pretty high. This led to some dangerous events: A nuclear arms race. The number of nuclear warheads in the world grew from just 300 in 1950 to over 64,000 in 1986. The development of new bioweapons. Despite signing the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the search for military advantages motivated Soviet decision makers to continue investing in bioweapon development for decades. Although never used in combat, biological agents were accidentally released from research facilities, resulting in dozens of deaths and threatening to cause a pandemic.5 Nuclear close calls. Military accidents and false alarms happened regularly, and top decision makers were more likely to interpret these events hostilely when tensions were high. On several occasions it seems the decision about whether or not to start a nuclear war came down to individuals acting under stress and with limited time. This makes international tension an existential risk factor. It's connected to a number of other problems, which means reducing the level of international tension would lower the total amount of existential risk we face. The level of tension today Recently, international tension seems to have once again been rising. To highlight some of the most salient examples: China-United States relations have deteriorated, leading to harsh diplomatic rhetoric and protectionist trade policies that aim to reduce the countries' economic interdependence. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has killed about a hundred thousand people so far, raised the risk of nuclear war, and sent United States-Russia relations to their lowest point since the Cold War. Chinese and Indian soldiers fought deadly skirmishes along their countries' disputed border in 2020–21. These dynamics raise an important question: how much more dangerous is the world given this higher tension than it would be in a world of low tension? I think the answer is quite a bit more dangerous — for several reasons. First, international tension seems likely to make technological progress more dangerous. There's a good

chance that, in the coming decades, humanity will make some major technological breakthroughs. We've discussed, for example, why one might worry about the effects of advanced artificial intelligence systems or biotechnology. The level of tension could strongly affect how these technologies are developed and governed. Tense relations could, for example, cause countries to neglect safety concerns in order to develop technology faster.6 Second, great power relations will strongly influence how nations do, or do not, cooperate to solve other global collective action problems. For example, in 2022, China withdrew from bilateral negotiations with the United States over climate action in protest of what it perceived as American diplomatic aggression in Taiwan. That same year, efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention were reportedly hampered by the Russian delegation after their country's invasion of Ukraine raised tensions with the United States and other western countries. And third, if relations deteriorate severely, the great powers could fight a war. How likely is a war? Wars are destructive and risky for all countries involved. Modern weapons, especially nuclear warheads, make starting a great power war today seem like a suicidal undertaking. But factors like the prevalence of war throughout history, the chance that leaders make mistakes, conflicting ideologies, and commitment problems, make me think that conflict could break out anyway. On balance, I think such an event is somewhat unlikely but hardly unthinkable. To quantify this: I put the chance we experience some kind of war between great powers before 2050 at about one-in-three.7 War has occurred regularly in the past One reason to think a war is quite likely is that such conflicts have been so common in the past. Over the past 500 years, about two great power wars have occurred per century.8 Naively, this would mean that every year there's a 2% chance such a war occurs, implying the chance of experiencing at least one great power war over the next 80 years — roughly until the end of the century — is about 80%.9 This is a very simple model. In reality, the risk is not constant over time and independent across years. But it shows that if past trends simply continue, the outcome is likely to be very bad. Has great power war become less likely? One of the most important criticisms of this model is that it assumes the risk is constant over time. Some researchers have argued instead that, especially since the end of World War II, major conflicts have become much less likely due to: Nuclear deterrence: Nuclear weapons are so powerful and destructive that it's just too costly for nuclear-armed countries to start wars against each other.10 Democratisation: Democracies have almost never gone to war against each other, perhaps because democracies are more interconnected and their leaders are under more public pressure to peacefully resolve disputes with each other.11 The proportion of countries that are democratic has increased from under 10% in 1945 to about 50% today. Strong economic growth and global trade: Global economic growth accelerated following World War II and the value of global exports grew by a factor of almost 30 between 1950 and 2014. Since war disrupts economies and international trade, strong growth raises the costs of fighting.12 The spread of international institutions: Multilateral bodies like the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council promote diplomatic dialogue and facilitate coordination to punish transgressors.13 It is true that we are living through an unusually long period of great power peace. It's been about 80 years since World War II. We just saw that a simple model using the historical frequency of great power wars suggests there was only a 20% chance of going that long without at least one more war breaking out. This is some evidence in favour of the idea that wars have become significantly less common. At the same time, we shouldn't feel too optimistic. The numerous close calls during the Cold War suggest we were somewhat lucky to avoid a major war in that time. And a 20% chance of observing 80 years of peace is not that low.14 Structural changes might have dramatically reduced the likelihood of war. Or perhaps we've just been lucky. It could even be that technological advances have made war less likely to break out, but more deadly when it occurs, leaving the overall effect on the level of risk ambiguous. It just hasn't been long enough to support a decisive view.15 So while the recent historical trend is somewhat encouraging, we don't have nearly enough data to be confident that great power war is a thing of the past. To better predict the likelihood of future conflict, we should also consider distinctive features of our modern world.16 One might think that a modern great power war would simply be so destructive that no state leader would ever choose to start one. And some researchers do think that the destruction such a war would wreak globally makes it less likely to occur. But it would be hard to find anyone who claims this dynamic has driven the risk to zero. First, a war could be started by accident. Second, sometimes even prudent leaders may struggle to avoid a slide towards war. We could blunder into war An accidental war can occur if one side mistakes some event as an aggressive action by an adversary. This happened several times during the Cold War. The earlier example of the wayward American reconnaissance plane shows how routine military exercises carry some escalation risk. Similarly, throughout history, nervous pilots and captains have caused serious incidents by attacking civilian planes and ships.17 Nuclear weapons allow for massive retaliatory strikes to be launched quickly — potentially too quickly to allow for such situations to be explained and de-escalated. It is perhaps more likely, though, that an accidental war could be triggered by a technological malfunction. Faulty computers and satellites have previously triggered nuclear close calls. As monitoring systems have become more reliable, the rate at which such accidents have occurred has been going down. But it would be overconfident to think that technological malfunctions have become impossible. Future technological changes will likely raise new challenges for nuclear weapon control. There may be pressure to integrate artificial intelligence systems into nuclear command and control to allow for faster data processing and decision making. And AI systems are known to behave unexpectedly when deployed in new environments.18 New technologies will also create new accident risks of their own, even if they're not connected to nuclear weapon systems. Although these risks are hard to predict, they seem significant. I'll say more about how such technologies — including AI, nuclear, biological, and autonomous weapons — are likely to increase war risks later. Leaders could choose war All that said, most wars have not started by accident. If another great power war does break out in the coming decades, it is more likely to be an intentional decision made by a national leader. Explaining why someone might make such a costly, destructive, unpredictable, and risky decision has been called "the central puzzle about war." It has motivated researchers to search for "rationalist" explanations for war. In his 2022 book Why We Fight, for example, economist Chris Blattman proposes five basic explanations: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions.19 Blattman's Five (Rationalist) Explanations for War This section discusses how great power tensions may escalate to war in the next few decades. It focuses on three potential conflicts in particular: war between the US and China, between the US and Russia, and between China and India. These are discussed because each of these countries are among the world's largest economies and military spenders, and seem particularly likely to fight. At the end, I briefly touch on other potential large conflicts. Source: Author's figure using data from: Kevin Daly and Tadas Gedminas, "Global Economics Paper The Path to 2075 — Slower Global Growth, But Convergence Remains Intact," Global Economics Paper (Goldman Sachs, December 6, 2022), https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/gs-research/the-path-to-2075-slower-global-growth-but-convergence-remains-intact/report.pdf. United States-China The most worrying possibility is war between the United States and China. They are easily the world's largest economies. They spend by far the most on their militaries. Their diplomatic relations are tense and have recently worsened. And their relationship has several of the characteristics that Blattman identifies as causes of war. At the core of the United States-China relationship is a commitment problem. China's economy is growing faster than the United States'. By some metrics, it is already larger.20 If its differential growth continues, the gap will continue to widen between it and the United States. While economic power is not the sole determinant of military

power, it is a key factor.21 The United States and China may be able to strike a fair deal today. But as China continues to grow faster, that deal may come to seem unbalanced. Historically, such commitment problems seem to have made these kinds of transition periods particularly dangerous.22 In practice, the United States and China may find it hard to agree on rules to guide their interactions, such as how to run international institutions or govern areas of the world where their interests overlap. The most obvious issue which could tip the United States-China relationship from tension into war is a conflict over Taiwan. Taiwan's location and technology industries are valuable for both great powers. This issue is further complicated by intangible incentives. For the United States, it is also a conflict over democratic ideals and the United States' reputation for defending its allies. For China, it is also a conflict about territorial integrity and addressing what are seen as past injustices. Still, forecasts suggest that while a conflict is certainly possible, it is far from inevitable. As of 8 June 2023, one aggregated forecast23 gives a 17% chance of a United States-China war breaking out before 2035.24 A related aggregated forecast of the chance that at least 100 deaths occur in conflict between China and Taiwan by 2050 gives it, as of 8 June 2023, a much higher 68% chance of occurring.25 United States-Russia Russia is the United States' other major geopolitical rival. Unlike China, Russia is not a rival in economic terms: even after adjusting for purchasing power, its economy is only about one-fifth the size of the United States'. However, Russia devotes a substantial fraction of its economy to its military. Crucially, it has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. And Russian leadership has shown a willingness to project power beyond their country's borders. Country Military spending in 2021 (2020 USD, PPP adjusted) United States 801 billion China 293 billion India 76.6 billion United Kingdom 68.4 billion Russia 65.9 billion Top five countries by estimated military spending, 2021. Source: SIPRI Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the dangers of renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States-led West. The war has already been hugely destructive: the largest war in Europe since World War II, with hundreds of thousands of casualties already and no end to the conflict in sight. And it could get much worse. Most notably, Russian officials have repeatedly refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Unchecked interests and intangible incentives are again at play here. Vladimir Putin leads a highly-centralised government. He has spoken about how his desire to rebuild Russia's reputation played in his decision to invade Ukraine. Given their ideological differences and history of rivalry, it is reasonable to expect that the United States and Russia will continue to experience dangerous disagreements in the future. As of 8 June 2023, an aggregated forecast gives a 20% chance that the United States and Russia will fight a war involving at least 1,000 battle deaths before 2050. China-India India is already the world's third-largest economy. If national growth rates remain roughly constant, the size of the Indian economy will surpass that of the United States' sometime this century. India also has nuclear weapons and is already the world's third-largest military spender (albeit at a much lower level than China or the United States). One reason to worry that China and India could fight a war is that they already dispute territory along their border. Countries that share a border, especially when it is disputed, are more likely to go to war than countries that do not. By one count, 88% of the wars that occurred between 1816 and 1980 began as wars between neighbours.26 In fact, China and India already fought a brief but violent border war in 1962. Deadly skirmishes have continued since, resulting in deaths as recently as 2020. Forecasters agree that a China-India conflict seems relatively (though not absolutely) likely. An aggregated forecast gives a 19% chance of war before 2035. Other dangerous conflicts These three conflicts — United States-China, United States-Russia, and China-India — are not the only possible great power wars that could occur. Other potential conflicts could also pose existential risk, either because they drive dangerous arms races or see widespread deployment of dangerous weapons. We should keep in mind India-Pakistan as a particularly likely conflict between nuclear-armed states and China-Russia as a potential, though unlikely, conflict between great powers with a disputed border and history of war. Plus, new great powers may emerge or current great powers may fade in the years to come. While I think we should prioritise the three potential conflicts I've highlighted above, the future is highly uncertain. We should monitor geopolitical changes and be open to changing our priorities in the future. Overall predictions Below is a table listing relevant predictions from the forecasting platform Metaculus, including the number of predictions made, as of 10 March 2023. Note the different timescales and resolution criteria for each question; they may not be intuitively comparable. Prediction Resolution criteria Number of predictions Metaculus prediction World war by 2151 Either: A war killing >0.5% of global population, involving >50% of countries totalling >50% of global population from at least 4 continents. Or: A war killing at least >1% of global population, involving >10% of countries totalling >25% of global population 561 52% World War III before 2050 Involving countries >30% of world GDP OR >50% of world population AND >10M deaths 1640 20% Global thermonuclear war by 2070 EITHER: 3 countries each detonate at least 10 nuclear warheads of at least 10 kt yield outside of their territory OR 2 countries each detonate at least 50 nuclear warheads of at least 10 kt outside of their territory 337 11% When will be the next great power war? Any two of the top 10 nations by military spending are at war "At war" definition: EITHER Formal declaration OR Territory occupied AND at least 250 casualties OR Media sources describe them as "at war" 25th percentile: 2031 Median: 2048 75th percentile: 2088 Never (not before 2200): 8% No non-test nuclear detonations before 2035 No nuclear detonation other than controlled test [Note the negation in the question. It resolves negatively if a warhead is detonated] 321 69% At least 1 nuclear detonation in war by 2050 Resolves according to credible media reports 476 31% I have previously independently estimated the likelihood of seeing a World War III-like conflict this century. My calculation first adjusts historical base rates to allow for the possibility that major wars have become somewhat less likely, and uses the adjusted base rate to calculate the probability of seeing a war between now and 2100. This method gives a 45% chance of seeing a major great power war in the next 77 years. If the probability is constant over time then the cumulative probability between now and 2050 would be 22%. This is aligned with the Metaculus predictions above. We can also ask experts what they think. Unfortunately, there are surprisingly few expert predictions about the likelihood of major conflict. One survey was conducted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. The numbers were relatively aligned with the Metaculus forecasts, though slightly more pessimistic. However, it seems a mistake to put too much stock in this survey (see footnote).27 We now have at least a rough sense of a great power war's probability. But how bad could it get if it occurred? A new great power war could be devastating At the time, the mechanised slaughter of World War I was a shocking step-change in the potential severity of warfare. But its severity was surpassed just 20 years later by the outbreak of World War II, which killed more than twice as many people. A modern great power war could be even worse. How bad have wars been in the past? The graph below shows how common wars of various sizes are, according to the Correlates of War's Interstate War dataset.28 The x-axis here represents war size in terms of the logarithm of the number of battle deaths. The y-axis represents the logarithm of the proportion of wars in the dataset that are at least that large. Using logarithms means that each step to the right in the graph represents a war not one unit larger, but 10 times larger. And each step up represents a war that is not one unit more likely, but 10 times more likely. Source: Author's figure. See the data here. Data source: Correlates of War Interwar dataset, v4.029 What the graph shows is that wars have a heavy tail. Most wars remain relatively small. But a few escalate greatly and become much worse than average. Of the 95 wars in the latest version of the database, the median battle death count is 8,000. But the heavy tail means the average is 334,000 battle deaths. And the worst war, World War II, had almost 17 million battle deaths.30 The number of battle deaths is only one way to measure the badness of wars. We could also consider

the proportion of the population of the countries involved who were killed in battle. By this measure, the worst war since 1816 was not World War II. Instead, it's the Paraguayan War of 1864–70. In that war, 30 soldiers died for every 1,000 citizens of the countries involved. It's even worse if we also consider civilian deaths; while estimates are very uncertain, it's plausible that about half of the men in Paraguay, or around a quarter of the entire population, was killed.31 What if instead we compared wars by the proportion of the global population killed? World War II is again the worst conflict since 1816 on this measure, having killed about 3% of the global population. Going further back in time, though, we can find worse wars. Ghengis Khan's conquests likely killed about 9.5% of people in the world at the time. The heavy tail means that some wars will be shockingly large.32 The scale of World War I and World War II took people by surprise, including the leaders who initiated it. It's also hard to know exactly how big wars could get. We haven't seen many really large wars. So while we know there's a heavy tail of potential outcomes, we don't know what that tail looks like. That said, there are a few reasons to think that wars much worse than World War II are possible: We're statistically unlikely to have brushed up against the end of the tail, even if the tail has an upper bound. Other wars have been deadlier on a per-capita basis. So unless wars involving countries with larger populations are systematically less intense, we should expect to see more intense wars involving as many people as World War II. Economic growth and technological progress are continually increasing humanity's war-making capacity. This means that, once a war has started, we're at greater risk of extremely bad outcomes than we were in the past. So how bad could it get? How bad could a modern great power war be? Over time, two related factors have greatly increased humanity's capacity to make war. 33 First, scientific progress has led to the invention of more powerful weapons and improved military efficiency. Second, economic growth has allowed states to build larger armies and arsenals. Since World War II, the world economy has grown by a factor of more than 10 in real terms; the number of nuclear weapons in the world has grown from basically none to more than 9,000, and we've invented drones, missiles, satellites, and advanced planes, ships, and submarines. Ghengis Khan's conquests killed about 10% of the world, but this took place over the course of two decades. Today that proportion may be killed in a matter of hours. First, **nuclear weapons could be used.** Today there are around 10,000 nuclear warheads globally.34 At the peak of nuclear competition between the United States and the USSR, though, there were 64,000. If arms control agreements break down and competition resurges among two or even three great powers, nuclear arsenals could expand. In fact, China's arsenal is very likely to grow — though by how much remains uncertain. Many of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the great powers today are at least 10 times more powerful than the atomic bombs used in World War II.35 Should these weapons be used, the consequences would be catastrophic. Source: AI Impacts, Effect of nuclear weapons on historic trends in explosives By any measure, such a war would be by far the most destructive, dangerous event in human history, **with** the potential to cause billions of deaths. The probability that it would, on its own, lead to humanity's extinction or unrecoverable collapse, is contested. But there seems to be some possibility — whether through **a famine caused by nuclear winter**, **or** by **reducing** humanity's **resilience** enough that something else, like a catastrophic pandemic, would be far more likely **to reach extinction**-levels (read more in our problem profile on nuclear war). Nuclear weapons are **complemented** and amplified **by** a variety of other modern military technologies, including improved missiles, planes, submarines, and satellites. They are also not the only military technology with the potential to cause a global catastrophe — **bioweapons**, too, have the potential to cause massive harm through accidents or unexpected effects. What's more, humanity's war-making capacity seems poised to further increase in the coming years due to technological advances and economic growth. Technological progress could make it cheaper and easier for more states to develop weapons of mass destruction. In some cases, political and economic barriers will remain significant. Nuclear weapons are very expensive to develop and there exists a strong international taboo against their proliferation. In other cases, though, the hurdles to developing extremely powerful weapons may prove lower. Improvements in biotechnology will probably make it cheaper to develop bioweapons. Such weapons may provide the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons at a much lower price. They also seem harder to monitor from abroad, making it more difficult to limit their proliferation. And **they could spark a** global biological catastrophe, like a major — possibly **existential**ly catastrophic — **pandemic.** Artificial intelligence systems are also likely to become cheaper as well as more powerful. It is not hard to imagine important military implications of this technology. For example, AI systems could control large groups of lethal autonomous weapons (though the timeline on which such applications will be developed is unclear). They may increase the pace at which war is waged, enabling rapid escalation outside human control. And AI systems could speed up the development of other dangerous new technologies. Finally, we may have to deal with the invention of other weapons which we can't currently predict. The feasibility and danger of nuclear weapons was unclear to many military strategists and scientists until they were first tested. We could similarly experience the invention of destabilising new weapons in our lifetime. What these technologies have in common is the potential to quickly kill huge numbers of people: A nuclear war could kill tens of millions within hours, and many more in the following days and months. A runaway bioweapon could prove very difficult to stop. Future autonomous systems could act with lightning speed, even taking humans out of the decision-making loop entirely. Faster wars leave less time for humans to intervene, negotiate, and find a resolution that limits the damage. How likely is war to damage the long-run future? When a war begins, leaders often promise a quick, limited conflict. But escalation proves hard to predict ahead of time (perhaps because people are scope-insensitive, or because escalation depends on idiosyncratic decisions). This raises the possibility of enormous wars that threaten all of humanity.

2AC

On C1

Cross apps of C1

On C2

1. NL. Somalia's "army" needs help

Sperber '18 [Amanda; Journalist @ Foreign Policy; 8-7-2018; Foreign Policy; "Somalia Is a Country Without an Army,"
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/07/somalia-is-a-country-without-an-army-al-shabab-terrorism-horn-africa-amisom/; accessible at: https://archive.ph/vS9z1#selection-1151.0-1185.625; accessed: 12-18-2024] tristan

"Somalia is like **cleaning** a **pig**," one Ugandan AMISOM colonel told Foreign Policy. "You **clean** it, and it gets **dirty**." He compared Somalia to Afghanistan. If the coalition in Afghanistan left, he argued, the Taliban would easily take the country back. The same was true for Somalia. Whether or not the colonel's assessment is accurate, the extension of AMISOM's mandate, now with more ambiguous language about an exit date, underscores the SNA's grim situation.

Somalia, which Transparency International has rated the world's **most corrupt country** for **11 years running**, represents the worst of modern war and the international state-building economy. But Somalia wasn't always a war zone. In the first decade after the British Somaliland protectorate and the U.N.-administered former Italian Somaliland colony gained independence and unified in 1960, the Somali Republic was a stable, relatively prosperous democracy. As politicians stoked nationalist sentiment in the name of a Greater Somalia, the country sought to build a formidable army, known locally as "The Lions of Africa," with Soviet assistance. At the time, military academies in the country were so well resourced they had tanks to spare for practical training.

These days, after decades of military dictatorship, failed foreign escapades, civil war, and armed insurgency, there's not even adequate funding for **essentials** like **radios** and **protective gear**. Many SNA **soldiers operate** in **flip-flops**.

<<TEXT CONDENSED, NONE OMMITED>>

Meanwhile, a conglomeration of countries are paying each other, and each other's companies, ostensibly in support of Somalia as it rebuilds a national army. Each has its own military models that differ in ways big and small, from the way that soldiers salute to the chain of command. More significantly, each has different funding streams, various internal alliances, and broader strategic agendas. Turkey has its own military academy. Qatar has one as well. The United Arab Emirates' training facility shut down in April, a proxy in the Persian Gulf dispute. The Egyptians and the Sudanese are training officers. The British are conducting training in their own center, south of Mogadishu, in Baidoa. And the United States, as well as private U.S.-based security firms, are working with the Danab special operations forces on Baledogle air base. The United States used to provide funding for fuel and food for the SNA proper, but suspended that support in December because of fraud. The SNA "could be highly effective," said a foreign advisor to the Defense Ministry, who has worked in more than 20 countries and wishes to stay anonymous. "Turning the SNA into an army here, while difficult, is doable," he added. But, he argued, "the way we're doing it is impossible." After so many attempts at state-building and training national armies—not least of all in Iraq and Afghanistan—it seems as if the international community is following a failed blueprint. "The West has trained the three most abysmal armies in the world: the Iraqi Army, the Afghan Army, and Somali Army," said Stig Jarle Hansen, an associate professor of international relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. None of this bodes well for the Somali people, and suggests that, even if AMISOM eventually follows through on its announced intent to leave, there will be private security firms, peacekeeping missions, and mercenaries in the country for the foreseeable future. The dire straits of the SNA and the reason for AMISOM's extension became immediately obvious during a trip through the men's surgical ward at Mogadishu's Madina hospital, which is filled with wounded soldiers. There I met 48-year-old Abdullahi Awayle Ali, who joined the army after he was arrested by al-Shabab. His relatives negotiated his freedom, but Ali was worried that he'd get stopped again. He decided he needed to get out of his village. He joined the SNA and, after training, was made an officer. Ali was stationed in rural Buurdhuubo district, southwest of Mogadishu, close to the Ethiopian border, where, early one morning in 2016, al-Shabab attacked his compound. The troops managed to hold off the advance, but not before the SNA guard at the front gate was killed. Amid the ongoing battle, Ali ran to retrieve the corpse. A bullet pierced his leg in the process. Ali made it safely back to the compound but he was badly injured. He was also stuck. Buurdhuubo is a remote base, and al-Shabab controlled the surrounding area. The soldiers could defend its main gates, but to beat a path through the opening to the nearest town would mean almost certain death. For nearly a year, the soldiers focused on their own survival, not on routing al-Shabab. Ali, along with his fellow troops, was marooned, his thigh festering. "The SNA didn't have the ability to do anything," he said. Everyone, it appeared, was doing what they could. His early anger dissipated over the 300-plus days it took before they were able to leave the base; a nearby Ethiopian convoy with enough armored vehicles to spare organized an evacuation.

<<PARAGRAPH BREAKS RESUME>>

Ali and his fellow soldiers were **ill-equipped** and **disorganized**. Many **SNA soldiers** who've completed training often **lack** the **skills** to **correctly hold** their **weapons**, if they've managed to get their hands on **one**.

1. **[T] Recognition resolves tensions over regional deals. Amel Elleily, an analyst of Sub-Saharan Africa from Cambridge, writes in 2024 that** (Amel Elleily is a desk analyst for Sub-Saharan Africa at Global Weekly. She is a recent History & Politics graduate from the University of Cambridge. She is set to continue her studies by starting a MSc in International Relations at the LSE. Mar 18 24 "Beyond Recognition: Why is Somaliland not Sovereign?"Global Weekly, https://www.global-weekly.com/post/beyond-recognition-why-is-somaliland-no-sovereign, DOA:12/9/24) LLO

The new Red Sea port deal, signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland at the start of this year, has reignited tensions in the Horn of Africa over regional power dynamics, territorial disputes and, most importantly, concerns of sovereignty. The question of Somaliland's sovereignty and statehood has taken centre stage once

again, and is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, seeking recognition as a sovereign state. Despite applying to the African Union (AU) in 2005, it has yet to gain formal

international recognition after two decades. Rather, the AU seems reluctant to grant Somaliland's sovereignty even though it is becoming a recurring cause

of insecurity and instability in East Africa. This article aims to suggest that Somaliland's statehood remains unrecognised by the AU because it is a case

which defies Eurocentric frameworks of statehood. Rather, Somaliland's struggle for sovereignty testifies to the necessity for more diverse theories of the state which take into account Africa's colonial history. The tensions that have arisen because of the new Red Sea port deal demonstrate this. International recognition for Somaliland is crucial to stabilising domestic and regional politics but, more pertinently, for reshaping understandings of statehood universally. Without international recognition access to multilateral aid and investment opportunities is limited, hindering the development of the state. Additionally, **without recognition, Somaliland struggles to resolve** intra-state and **inter-state disputes; the Red Sea port deal would not have exacerbated** existing **tensions and provoked** intervention by **Somalia if Somaliland's sovereignty was recognised.** This requires redefining statehood beyond the current normative criteria.

2. [DL] Somalia doesn't have the capability for war. Caleb Barnett, a research fellow at the Hudson Institute, explains just last month that

[Caleb; Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute, Research Fellow @ the Centre for Democracy and Development, Fullbright Research Fellow @ the University of Lagos, former analyst @ the American Enterprise Institute, BA from the University of Texas, MA from King's College London; 1-1-2024; War on the Rocks; "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink," https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/; accessed: 12-18-2024] tristan

Neither **Somalia's** nor Somaliland has much in the way of conventional militaries with which to fight a protracted conflict. The broad **failure of** internationally assisted state-**building** and **military capacity**-building in Somalia **is well documented:** The vast majority of what could be construed as "security forces" in Somalia are clan militias or warlord armies of questionable loyalty to the central government (which is itself perennially divided). Within the nominal Somali National Army, the only consistently effective units are small special forces groups trained by the United States and Turkey to combat al-Shabaab. **No Somali government** since 1991 **has had the conventional military capacity to challenge the authority of** the **Somaliland** administration in the latter's territory, **and no degree of bellicose rhetoric from Mogadishu** will change that.

Somalia's inability to wage a conventional war with Somaliland applies as well to the case of Ethiopia, which has traditionally had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa and presently maintains several thousand troops in Somalia as contingents in the African Union peace enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, Cairo has struggled to effectively support its principal ally within Sudan's ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country. It is therefore unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia.

3. **[DL] Even if they develop some conventional capabilities, political fragmentation destroys that. Kristina Hummel, from west point, just a week ago explains that [**Kristina Hummel, 12-31-2024, "The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/ | //niko

The SNA (Somali National Army) remains a fragmented force for two principal reasons. **First,** Somalia's **bickering political leaders have failed to implement a coherent national security architecture** that clarifies force structures and the relationship between the FGS and the country's federal member states. **Second, it is an army built by multiple security partners who have used different doctrine, techniques, and equipment. In sum, no amount of professionalism by individual SNA soldiers could overcome such top-down political fragmentation.** In practice, Danab forces remain the key to ensuring greater cohesion among the wider SNA, but there is consequently a danger of them being overused, including for tasks other than their intended purpose. In comparison, al-Shabaab's fighting force is more cohesive, despite some clan-related tensions.

On C3

1. [DL] Other independence claims prove secessionist groups aren't emboldened empirically in Africa. Joshua Meservey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, in 2021 explains how [Joshua Meservey, "Missing Opportunities in Somaliland", 2021, Heritage, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/missing-opportunities-somaliland]

A frequent concern expressed by those opposed to Somaliland's independence is that it would encourage other secessionist movements on the continent. That hypothesis has already been tested. **Eritrea gained independence in 1991, as did South Sudan in 2011. There was no subsequent explosion of independence claims in either case.** In fact, establishing a standard for independence based on the Somaliland model would raise the bar for achieving recognition, since **there is no other African secessionist movement with** nearly **the same autonomy and success that Somaliland has**. Its borders are also today the same as they were upon independence in 1960, aligning them with the African Union member states' pledge that countries should abide within the boundaries "existing on their achievement of national independence."

And McCann 22 confirms,

McCann, 22 former Junior Foreign Policy Fellow with the Center for the National Interest through the Koch Associate Program with the Charles Koch Institute [Scott McCann, "It's Time for the U.S. to Recognize Somaliland's Independence," The National Interest, 11-19-2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/it%E2%80%99s-time-us-recognize-somaliland%E2%80%99s-independence-205913, accessed 12-10-2024; AD]

As **there was not a wave of secessions after South Sudan became independent, there is little reason to believe that recognizing Somaliland's independence would now trigger such a wave in Africa.** More significantly, Somaliland's situation provides the appropriate rebuttal to these concerns. Somaliland's unique historical existence and behavior not only set it apart from spontaneous independence desires but also create a prece-dent. Somaliland has proven that a functional, durable democracy can be built from the ground up with little to no international support.

2. [DL] Plus, Somaliland Independence is unique anyways, no other movements have its characteristics. T.G. 15 [T.G., "Why Somaliland is not a recognised state", 2015, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/11/01/why-somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state]
Throughout the post-independence era, geopolitics in Africa has tended to respect "colonial borders", ie the borders laid down by European colonial powers in the 19th century. Across the continent, there have been only two significant alterations to the colonial map since the 1960s: the division of Eritrea from Ethiopia, in 1993; and South Sudan from Sudan, in 2011. On the question of Somaliland, the African Union (AU), to whom the international community tends to defer on boundary issues, has stuck to its traditional line: to recognise Somiliand would be to open a Pandora's box of separatist claims in the region. Only with the consent of greater Somalia should Somaliland be granted independence, so the argument goes. But this, Somilalanders point out, is inconsistent: **Somaliland**, unlike Somalia, **sticks to old colonial borders**. **It even has previous experience of statehood** (prior to independence, the territory was administered as a separate British colony, and briefly enjoyed a five-day spell as a sovereign state). Formerly British Somaliland's union with Italian Somaliland to its south, which brought about modern Somalia in 1960, was voluntary, they argue. **Its independence should require merely divorce, not reinvention.**

3. [DL] Regardless, movements don't escalate to secession or become violent, and it's empirically proven. Damien Kingsbury, an emeritus professor from Deakin University, in 2017 explains that [Damien; Emeritus Professor @ Deakin University, Supervises PhD candidates; 10-4-2017; Conversation; "Passion and pain: why secessionist movements rarely succeed," https://theconversation.com/passion-and-pain-why-secessionist-movements-rarely-succeed-85097; accessed: 12-15-2024]
There are currently well over 100 secessionist movements, including four in the Philippines, dozens in India, around eight in Myanmar, and several dozen in Africa. Many of these have produced bloodshed and trauma well in excess of possible practical gains. Yet, **despite their numbers, very few secessionist movements are ultimately successful**, while the costs for governments imposing a nominal unity can be high for all involved. **With** high risks and **limited chances of success**, secessionist movements are rarely about pragmatism and more about fervour. Even with popular support, **these movements rarely have the political or military capacity to impose their will on the state from which they intend to secede.**