Constructive

See R2 UKSO OS.

Rebuttal

Steven **Hyland**, 09-20**11**, "The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking", Origins, https://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking // RB

But it is the long history of drug production and distribution in Latin America—and the enduringly strong demand for narcotics in the United States—that best helps to explain why the "war on drugs" has resulted in so few battles won and has come at such a great cost both in money and human lives. The trafficking of illicit drugs is a signature Latin American contribution to our globalized world, and today Colombia and Mexico play the paramount roles in terms of production and distribution. While cocaine, heroin, and marijuana have long figured as primary trafficked products, in the recent past drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have increased shipments of methamphetamines. Yet, this contemporary arrangement was not always the case. The production, trafficking, and distribution of drugs to consumers have moved geographically many times across Latin America. Like all successful businesses, organizations for narco-production and narco-distribution have responded rapidly and extensively to changing tastes and strong market demands in the consumer countries especially the United States. At the same time, the often drastic shifts in the political fates of Latin American countries, geopolitics (most notably the Cold War), supra-state institutions (such as the United Nations with its anti-drug policies), and the increased militarization of efforts to eradicate drugs production (spearheaded by the United States) have also shaped the development of the Latin American drugs industry can be broken into four periods. From the late nineteenth century to 1945, Mexico controlled the illegal trade in opium and marijuana, and Peru dominated the mostly legal trade in cocaine products. A second period, from the end of World War II to the 1960s, saw the professionalization and greater organization of trafficking as networks of traffickers emerged. The third era, from the 1960s to 1984, witnessed the rise of Colombia as the predominant producer and trafficker after Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba fell by the wayside and the Mexican government attempted to curb marijuana and opium production. This period also witnessed a sharp spike in the violence associated with the drug trade. Finally, Mexico has returned to a leading role since 1984 (as a result of connections made with Colombian traffickers in Panama), and drug-trade violence continues to escalate. The history of Latin American narcotics production and distribution thus reveals the ways in which efforts to suppress the drug trade in one state have tended only to shift its location to another country in the region. Entrepreneurs throughout Latin America worked to take advantage of any opportunity to increase their share of this highly lucrative business and to take advantage of consistently strong demand.

Empirics

Alexander $\underline{\textbf{Mendez}}$, 20 $\underline{\textbf{18}}$, "The Adaptive Nature of Drug Organizations," California State University, Maritime Academy $\underline{\textbf{https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/2z10wr09m}} \text{// RB, **parentheses in original**}$

Corrupting border agents allowed cartel organizations the reins to controlling the flow of illicit goods. Soon cartels were using paramilitary tactics, which became a huge problem for Mexican military forces. The increase in violence was also attributed to the increase of force from President Calderon.

His campaign against cartel organizations gained U.S support and funding, which amounted to \$300 million a year. This in turn backfired on

Mexican and U.S policy. Oddly enough every time a cartel kingpin was eliminated, more violence occurred over

the once occupied territory. This led to the rise of many small cartel groups, such as the Zetas and the Mexican Gulf

<u>Cartel</u> (Grillo, 2013). This was observed during 2009 with the death of kingpin Beltran Leyva led to an increase of violence. The number of homicides

(doubled) increased from 249 in 2009 to 487 by the end of 2010.

Fragmentation

Somers-Cox 14 -- [Tamara Joy Somers-Cox, "Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry in Emerging Markets: A comparative study of Nigeria and Mexico," Stellenbosch University, April 2014, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37421347.pdf] Accessed on 6-26-2024 //DW

Drug-related violence is seen by Red24 to be Mexico's biggest political risk for 2013. It is a US\$13bn per year business and It will take a great deal to disrupt the cartels activities in Mexico. The situation presents a grave challenge for the Mexican government. <u>Drug-related</u> <u>crime</u> and <u>violence</u> <u>affect</u> <u>Mexico</u> <u>on</u> a <u>macroscale</u> and this has repercussions for the oil and gas industry as well as the TNOCs that operate in the country. In Mexico the greatest drug related violence occurs not only between the cartels themselves but also due to infighting between the cartels and law enforcement (Red24, 2013b:7). The biggest battle is the conflict between the two largest cartels, the Sinaloa and the Los Zetas Cartels. They are continuously on the offensive and fighting for greater influence and power. Their attacks on one another are bold and violent. Los Zetas lost their leader, Heriberto Lazcano in October 2012 when he was killed by the Mexican Navy but they have remained a force in Mexico. Drug cartels also launch attacks on government officials. These attacks include ambushes, assaults, kidnappings, home invasions, and assassinations (Harary Security Consulting International, 2013:2). The cartels intimidate law enforcement officers in an attempt to stop them from conducting their jobs. Furthermore, if an official joins a cartel, this official is then at risk of being assaulted by a rival cartel (Harary Security Consulting International, 2013:2). Many law enforcement officials have been corrupted by the cartels and drawn into their criminal undertakings (Stratfor, 2013c). For example, local police in Tamaulipas were found to have ties with local cartels, leading to the already over-extended military having to step in (Harary Security Consulting International, 2013:1). These <u>Cartel activities decrease the overall effectiveness of law enforcement and</u> make the actions of law enforcement officials unreliable. Violence has so far been contained to certain areas within Mexico. The violence may, however, disperse. to more localised areas with smaller groups committing the same violence that is evident within the larger cartels. Smaller groups in more areas are far harder to police which creates further instability (Schtulmann, 2013:3). Cartels vie for influence and control (see Figure 10) over the most valuable trafficking routes in the inland parts of the country which could affect states which have, up until now been exempt from violence such as Michoacán, Colima, Guanajuato, and Morelos (Red24, 2013b;7). The main cartels growing in stature and operating inland are Cartel de Jalisco and Knights Templar. According to Schtulmann (Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), —dynamics among Mexico's largest criminal organizations are at a crucial juncture that could generate more violence and criminal activity. With the presidency not as focused on eradicating drug trafficking, this could lead to big cartels like Los Zetas regaining influence in areas where previously it had lost its power.

Visas are rarely used, which is why our ev. from case still indicates that undocumented immigrants are filling in current shortfalls

David J. <u>**Bier**</u>, March 10, 20<u>**20**</u>, "H-2A Visas for Agriculture: The Complex Process for Farmers to Hire Agricultural Guest Workers", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/h-2a-visas-agriculture-complex-process-farmers-hire

Congress created the H-2A program in 1986 to allow legal foreign workers to temporarily work for U.S. farmers who were unable to hire qualified Americans. However, illegal immigrant workers came to dominate the industry in the 1990s, and the H-2A program was rarely used. While it still supplies only about 10 percent of farm labor. H-2A employment has increased fivefold since 2005.

Rest were analytics.