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1NC -- SetCol Acknowledgement

The AFF is built on a structure of settler colonialism- with that in mind

1NC -- Port Race

Djibouti is beating out Somaliland in ports.

Caslin 24 Olivier Caslin, 6-6-2024, "Djibouti vs Berbera, a deep-sea duel," Africa Report,

<https://www.theafricareport.com/350793/djibouti-vs-berbera-a-deep-sea-duel/>, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

By signing a memorandum with the president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland Muse Bihi Abdi on 1 January, he put the issue squarely at the top of the heap of major diplomatic challenges facing the sub-region. **He has stirred up the region's rivalries over the only two existing**

deep-water ports on the African coast of the Gulf of Aden – Djibouti and Berbera. Djibouti: Nearly 10 times more traffic. Only a few hundred kilometres apart, the two neighbours have never really been competitors. The docks of Djibouti only came into being at the very end of the 19th century, to meet the needs of French colonialists, while the old quays of Berbera had already been serving Somali shepherds. The British protectorate only strengthened the commercial role of the former capital of Somaliland, its port serving as a hub between the Ethiopian hinterland and the distant India route, before the Somali civil war simultaneously destroyed its port facilities and dreams of grandeur. READ MORE Mahamoud Ali Yousseuf: 'The generation I represent must carry the torch' at AU Three decades later, **Berbera is still one of Africa's busiest ports for exporting livestock to the**

Arabian Peninsula, handling several million animals each year, while at the same time **Djibouti** and its **terminals**

have established themselves as an essential stopover on the maritime highway **between Asia and Europe.** At first

glance, the two rivals are "not in the same league", according to one Djiboutian shipping operator we spoke to. This is particularly true **when it comes to**

container traffic, with **Djibouti handling** annual **volumes** almost **10 times greater than Berbera,** reflecting its use by

Ethiopia, which has relied upon the tiny republic's terminals for more than 90% of its traffic ever since Eritrea's official independence in 1993. All of which should give Somaliland's authorities some ideas. At the start of the 20th century, the British had proposed building a railway line from Berbera to double the

But it's close

Schupani 21 Andres Schipani, 9-2-2021, "Somaliland gears up for 'healthy' battle of ports," Financial Times <https://archive.ph/s8694#selection-2143.0-2146.0>, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

A 2021 global container port performance index by the World Bank and IHS Markit **rated Djibouti as the most efficient port in Africa,** measured by minutes per container move. **The former French colony has capitalised on its infrastructure and**

privileged location on the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, with nearly 1m TEU passing through its ports each

year. **But** the **competition has intensified,** with DP World now in **Somaliland** and **going head to head with**

Djibouti. "Ethiopia destined cargo does predominantly move through Djibouti port, however there are future alternatives within the area," said Carl Lorenz, managing director for eastern Africa at container shipping group Maersk. Those options include Berbera and the much-delayed new port in the Kenyan town of Lamu, close to Somalia, which partly opened in May. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, DP World's chair, said Berbera would be a viable and efficient option for trade in the region, especially for Ethiopian transit cargo. "We believe that developing the Berbera corridor into one of the major trade and logistics corridors will unlock huge economic benefits for Ethiopia," he said. Those ambitions have not been welcomed by neighbours, according to Berbera's mayor, Hassan. "Djibouti is 100 per cent not happy with the investment DP World made in our port," he said. Three years ago, Djibouti seized the container port of Doraleh from DP World. Djibouti argues the company's goal was to take control of the country's coastline and that the port was not operated to its full potential. DP World counters Djibouti acted illegally and won several international arbitration cases. Djiboutian officials have played down any rivalry. Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, Djibouti's finance minister, said Berbera would compete "in a way". Another senior Djiboutian official said their country was in "pole position" as it was closer to the Suez Canal, adding that Djibouti was already a linchpin of global commerce. A general view of Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port in Djibouti Djibouti has been rated as the most efficient port in Africa measured by minutes per container move © Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP/Getty Images Although a road corridor from Berbera to Wajaale, on the Somaliland-Ethiopia border, is due to

be completed by 2022, **Somaliland requires infrastructure development for which it could not** directly **receive**

multilateral financing because it is not an internationally recognised country. And unlike Djibouti, where China has invested heavily, it has relations with Taiwan.

Somaliland can't build infra without recognition

Idaan 24 Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, 12-1-2024, "Understanding The Security And Political Landscape Of Somaliland: An In-Depth Interview With Interior Minister Mohamed Kahin Ahmed," SaxafiMedia, <https://saxafimedia.com/somaliland-in-depth-interview-interior-minister/>, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

Somaliland's success in combating piracy is largely due to its well-trained Coast Guard, which has conducted numerous operations to deter pirate activity. Minister Kahin highlighted that, despite a lack of international recognition and limited resources, Somaliland has effectively safeguarded these vital maritime routes, which are crucial to global trade. International Relations and the Quest for Recognition Efforts to Gain International Recognition Somaliland's lack of international recognition is a recurring theme throughout the interview. Minister Kahin expressed optimism that Somaliland's achievements in terms of governance, security, and democratic development will eventually lead to formal recognition by the international community. He noted that Somaliland has built strong relationships with several African nations, as well as with the European Union and the United States. **Despite these diplomatic efforts, the international**

community's reluctance to recognize Somaliland stems largely from the African Union's adherence to the principle of respecting existing colonial borders. Minister Kahin articulated his frustration with this policy, pointing out that Somaliland's case is unique, given its distinct colonial history and its demonstrated ability to govern itself independently. Economic and Security Consequences of Non-recognition **The absence of international recognition has** profound **implications for** Somaliland's economic

development. Minister Kahin explained that **the region is unable to access international financial markets** or secure development aid from global institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. **This** economic isolation has **made it difficult for**

Somaliland to build the **infrastructure** necessary for long-term development, including in the critical area of security. Nonetheless, Somaliland has managed to allocate approximately 50% of its national budget to security, a figure that underscores the government's commitment to maintaining peace and stability despite the financial constraints imposed by its unrecognized status. Minister Kahin emphasized that this dedication to security has enabled Somaliland to maintain peace and order in a volatile region, ensuring the safety of its citizens and attracting some level of foreign investment, particularly in the telecommunications and port sectors.

Affirming revitalizes Berbera and kills Djibouti.

Brady 11 [Bethany Brady, 09-05-2011, "Somaliland: a modern state minus international recognition?," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/15/somaliland-a-modern-state-minus-international-recognition/>, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

nd has so far been unable to regulate the activities of the private sector' (Ibid:46). Moreover, due to the 'lack of capabilities and capacity combined with lack of legal framework to protect industries' (Ibid:55) those that are easily accessible, and Somalilanders are skilled in, are 'quick to [be] exploited – so quick, in fact, that they are often undermine their own interests by dumping on the market' (Ibid:49). Without either support for this core market or the capacity to explore other market options Somaliland will fail economically and will struggle to alleviate the poverty that is rife across communities, and will never realise its full potential. The singular focus on livestock, while being the 'bulk of Somaliland's export earnings and a significant percentage of government revenues' means that its 'reliance upon a single export market (Saudi Arabia) renders the Somaliland economy extremely vulnerable to external forces' (Ibid:44). The 40 percent drop in Somaliland income during the 1998-1999 Saudi Arabia ban on Somaliland livestock should have provoked economic diversification from the government but 'business people have found it difficult, and in many places impossible, to bring new ideas such as franchised businesses due to the absence of an adequate regulatory framework' (United Nations, 2009). While the livestock industry feels prosecuted from 'the heavy taxation and multiple layers of duties and surcharges they encounter at all levels of government' (Bulhan, 1999:49) there is little opportunity to diversify or change livelihoods completely as much of the countries

'infrastructure is non-functioning or in a state of disrepair' (Ibid:45). The country is in fact resource rich and strategically located to take advantage of international trade into and out of East Africa but the lack of capacity is stifling the potential. 'The growing air traffic between Somaliland and neighbouring countries has tested the limits of [Somaliland's] few, rudimentary airports

(Ibid:59). The same is true for the sea-ports of Somaliland's rich northern coastline. **The rehabilitation of the port of Berbera would encourage**

significant business from Djibouti' congested facilities **but 'Berbera remains uncompetitive i**n comparison' (Ibid:55). Financial contributions from the Diaspora combined with the entrepreneurial spirit of local Somalis are coming together and show signs of rehabilitating the desperate economic situation. However, the severe lack of guidance and regulation from the government is a major hindrance of development within Somaliland. Social suffering The lack of legislation and support provided by the government to communities who have the knowledge, willingness and finance to initiate community development projects stretches beyond the economic and into the social; affecting the very people who are most vulnerable in post-conflict societies. 'The absence of any real capacity in the government forces early important development through the private sector and community-initiated organisations' (Work together p4). Affiliations drafted between Diaspora, International NGOs and specialist institutions counter the government's inability to provide these desperately needed services. A collaboration between Kings College Hospital, UK and Borama University Hospital is providing medical training, hospital management and even start-up and research funds but: 'Incentives for all staff in Somaliland in the form of regular and realistic salaries are desperately needed. Programmes of training and support will ultimately fail unless these issues are addressed and staff will seek private incomes or introduce informal charges [in exchange for treatment], with the long-term effect of such practices marginalising the poor people' (Leather et al, 2006:4) While some may argue that a movement from the locally supported, non-private health care system to private medical treatment is the only viable option for a society such as Somaliland, the 'inability of the government to set standards or verify qualifications, and the absence of a professional medical association' (Bulhan, 1999:71) makes the health arena unregulated and potentially dangerous. The system becomes inaccessible to a vast majority of Somalilanders who are unable to travel to the hospitals or do not have the required funds for treatment. The situation is known to be dire but lack of statistical data means that the health of the population is poorly monitored. In fact Somalia, which includes Somaliland – due to the lack of recognition of the independent state by the international community – barely registers on the Human Development Report;

Sudden reduction in port rents stresses government revenue, triggering Djibouti collapse.

Borowicz 22 [Jessica Borowicz (serves as the deputy division chief for the US Africa Command, J22 regional political/ military analysis. She holds a master of international relations from the University of Oklahoma and a master of African and African-American studies from the University of Kansas.), Aug 26, 2022, "Port in the Desert" Air University, *ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER*, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Volume-1_Issue-3/Borowicz.pdf, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

All these programs bolster pro-US sentiment in the face of influence resulting from Chinese financial investment in the country. While the United States should be concerned about Chinese actions and intentions in Djibouti, it still has the largest military base and, supported by like-minded partners, it has considerable leverage through the rents it pays Djibouti to retain significant global power in the region. Economic Shifts and Political Unrest Along with concern over China's presence in Djibouti, internal pressures and **political instability** likely **from economic shifts** are large potential challenges for continued US presence and

long-term interests in the country. Djibouti has experienced recent economic downturns due to regional wars and the pandemic, although **the country is soon likely to recover and the authoritarian government remains in power. But a significant economic crisis could unseat this control.**

The prospects of **stiff competition in i**ts largest revenue-generating area—its **port industries—mean Djibouti could face a deep economic decline with limited recourse to shift its fortunes. To date, Djibouti is the sole capable supplier of port activity in the region, and these ports remain the top employer in the country.** consequently, the government benefits substantially from the resulting rents and revenue. **This reality could change as neighboring nations consider** their own **port development.** Constricted by its reliance on Djibouti, Ethiopia has been looking to lessen its dependence on the country, which handles about 90 percent of inbound and outbound trade from Ethiopia and collects

about \$1–1.5 billion in port fees annually.⁴⁹ Until 1998, Ethiopia predominantly used the Assab port in Eritrea, but after the two countries fell out, **Ethiopia's only option was Djibouti.** As Ethiopia's economy expands, so has the concern about ever-increasing import fees and the number of foreign forces influencing Djibouti. Soon, land-locked Ethiopia may have more port options. In 2018, DP World entered a joint venture with Ethiopia and the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland to expand the Port of Berbera with a new container terminal. The new terminal was officially inaugurated on June 24, 2021.⁵⁰ While **the port is only one of the logistical hurdles in Ethiopia's use of Berbera's port,** others, such as overland transportation infrastructure, will likely be addressed in the future. This would end Djibouti's monopoly on the shipment of Ethiopia's goods. The magnitude of this shift will certainly have repercussions for Djibouti's economy. Constricted by its reliance on Djibouti, Ethiopia has been looking to lessen its dependence on the country, which handles about 90 percent of inbound and outbound trade from Ethiopia and collects about \$1–1.5 billion in port fees annually.⁴⁹ Until 1998, Ethiopia predominantly used the Assab port in Eritrea, but after the two countries fell out, Ethiopia's only option was Djibouti. As Ethiopia's economy expands, so has the concern about ever-increasing import fees and the number of foreign forces influencing

Djibouti. Soon, land-locked Ethiopia may have more port options. Other potential future competitors are existing Eritrean ports to the north. **Ethiopia and Eritrea have had a long history of conflict that ultimately led to cold relations between the two countries.** The Eritrea/Ethiopia border war that began in 1998 eliminated water access for Ethiopia, access that was crucial for their Navy and commercial ships.⁵¹ But in 2019, a peace deal brokered by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed led to a renewal of collaborations, including reestablishing telecommunications and air transport links, opening land borders, and lifting UN sanctions on Eritrea.⁵² But, as in the Somaliland example, **a substantial infrastructure investment would be required to refurbish these old ports and transport linkages.**⁵³ The idea of opening a Somaliland or Eritrean port is appealing to neighboring countries for several reasons. Somaliland has a developing government and an emerging, stable economy. Although it is an autonomous region that is not globally recognized, the region currently has limited problems and is English-speaking.⁵⁴ **Additionally, Somaliland's Berbera port has the potential to secure 30 percent of Ethiopia's cargo volume.**⁵⁵ With its recently ended conflict, Eritrea is focused on looking for opportunities in economic development and regional stability. As indicated above, one of Eritrea's priorities is

to recover its relationship with Ethiopia and reestablish trade, transportation, and communications links.⁵⁶ **If Djibouti's port customers were to find services elsewhere, in the near or midterm, such as the Berbera Port in Somaliland or the Assab and Massawa Ports in Eritrea, Djibouti's stable income flows could be challenged, placing its political stability at risk.**

These ports could mean competition for Djibouti in the near term, resulting in an economic decline as seen in 2020 when the port output growth slowed to one percent due to the pandemic. While Djibouti is quickly regaining those losses, **another decline could decrease the current rents or threaten the country's political stability if required rents are no longer funded adequately to ensure the support of minority political elites.**⁵⁷ Such a situation could put the United States in the position of operating in a country in the midst of economic decline and looking to potentially recoup its losses by increasing basing rents. Moreover, if Djibouti cannot replace this lost income, **the United States could be open to the whims of a changing political climate and a partner**

government unable to maintain stability through its current patronage network. These new ports could also encourage other competitor nations to open military bases in the region. In the end, Djibouti's port monopoly is unlikely to last forever.⁵⁸ This is one reason it acted so deliberately in updating its port infrastructure to remain competitive. It has also continued to work on its investment climate to increase its attractiveness to global investors, seeking economic diversification to insulate itself from a largely port-based economy.⁵⁹ Other ports may slow Djibouti's economic growth and potentially threaten its hard-won stability, but this result is not guaranteed. And while access to the strait, and ports themselves, is a key requirement for basing considerations, it is not the only requirement. The political willingness of a partner to allow US operations is key and one which Djibouti has already displayed over the decades of US presence on its soil.⁶⁰ Indeed, US and Djiboutian interests overlap in Somalia, where Djibouti deploys a contingent of peacekeepers in the African Union Mission to Somalia. And even if Somaliland develops a better port infrastructure, a base there would require the United States to rethink its current Somalia policy. The United States recognizes Somaliland as a territory of Somalia and therefore would be required to negotiate and deal with the Federal Government of Somalia for any basing agreements. This also means any base of considerable size in Somaliland would require a renegotiation of a troop cap for Somalia, which currently stands at under 500.⁶¹ Even if political winds shifted, only a fraction of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa personnel could base in Somaliland given those troop numbers. Eritrea as a new basing location is also problematic, at least unless a new and more pro-Western government takes over after the current regime, which currently leans heavily toward China and Russia.⁶² Despite a potential economic downturn related to Djibouti's ports, and even with potential political instability, Djibouti remains the safest long-term bet in the region. Conclusion The almost perfect location of Djibouti on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, alongside the country's current political stability in a historically volatile region, is a strong combination that continues to support and promote US interests in the region. Starting as an expeditionary camp for the United States, Camp Lemonnier has become a more semipermanent structure allowing almost unfettered US military access to key parts of Africa and the **West Asia**. While the United States could use other locations within the strait for its activities, Djibouti is the obvious choice for the near and medium term, at the very least. While Djibouti's political stability is predicated on a rentier, neopatrimonial government, it has used deliberate strategy to ensure external rents are collected, largely through ports and military base leasing. It is the most stable of its neighbors and has infrastructure in place, such as the ports, that support US basing. The introduction of a Chinese base in Djibouti may not be ideal. Still, the welcoming attitude of Djibouti to the establishment of other military bases and operations allows the United States to work with several of its partner nations side-by-side every day and build closer relationships with key allies like France and Japan. The costs of leaving Djibouti are, at least in the current environment, higher than the risks. Loss of expended and committed revenue, detrimental messaging of US weakness

to adversaries and allies alike, and loss of access to key sea lines of communication in a volatile region all argue against an ill-thought-out severing of long-standing connections with Djibouti. The threat of political instability is always possible, particularly if economic shifts created by competitor ports are severe. But there are still infrastructure issues that must be overcome to make the ports in **Berbera**, Assab, **or**

Massawa truly **competitive**. Additionally, Djibouti has other ways to obtain rents, such as military bases and continued attempts at economic diversification. The ongoing investment in the country indicates the United States anticipates a continued stable Djibouti, based on the rentier system, in an otherwise historically unstable region. Despite the risks, the optimal choice for the United States is to stay in Djibouti. That does not mean the United States should not look for alternate locations or ways to diversify within the Horn because keeping options open preserves needed flexibility. Yet, the United States must embrace its relationship with this small country and look at the US presence as a long-term project and partnership. Even if other options present themselves, Djibouti will remain a large piece of any US basing puzzle in the Horn of Africa.

This triggers international draw-in– Djibouti is a TINY area where foreign powers are in close proximity.

Donelli 22 [Dr. Federico Donelli (Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste, Italy) , 7-1-2022, "Risks to regional stability and Djibouti's domestic squabbles," Trends Research Advisory, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/risks-to-regional-stability-and-djiboutis-domestic-squabbles/?srsltid=AfmBOoovIjp33EQPsytwgCKL_7d0akxpG2okZ7RisPSB6f28gX6XZ-Cz, accessed 12-1-2024, //ZD

Djibouti enjoys a geostrategic significance that transcends its small size and population. This Horn of Africa country lies astride critical sea lanes of communication and just offshore the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Djibouti's geostrategic significance is further enhanced on account of the numerous military bases it hosts, to include French, Chinese and American installations. The country is entering a turbulent period, however, as President Ismail Omar Guelleh's previously unquestioned authority is increasingly challenged after more than two decades in power. Internal power struggles within the ethnic Somali-led regime have been compounded by an uptick in tensions between the two main ethnic groups, the Somali and the Afar, which, in turn, have been exacerbated due to the spillover effect of the Ethiopian civil war. The resulting

violence between Somali and Afar and the internecine struggles for power playing out in the capital threaten to upend the stability and relative prosperity of this city state that has been prized by foreign militaries. **this article analyzes both the internal and external dynamics that affect Djibouti's political stability and, relatedly, highlights the implications they may have on regional stability and international security**

Djibouti's geostrategic relevance The Red Sea constitutes one of the leading maritime routes of global trade bridging the West and the East. It has been described as the world's Interstate-95 (I-95) – a reference to America's busy Boston-Miami highway corridor – due to its volume of shipping transit annually. More than 20,000 ships are reported to transit through Bab al-Mandeb each year, accounting for about 30 per cent of the world's maritime trade, with a turnover of more than 700 billion US dollars. Barely 10 percent of the size of the United Kingdom, the small African city-state of Djibouti sits at the southern end of this corridor astride the Bab

el-Mandeb Strait which gives it a geostrategic significance that belies its small size.[1] **The Strait, which is only 18 miles wide, connects the Red Sea to the Gulf**

of Aden and thence to the Indian Ocean. Djibouti's geostrategic weight is enhanced by the military presence of extra-regional states on its soil. American, Chinese, Japanese, French and other soldiers are based at various locations scattered throughout the small state.

Others have initiated talks with Djibouti or with some of its neighbors (Somaliland, Eritrea, Sudan)

about hosting their military facilities on their territory.[2] **The involvement of so many extra-regional states – and two great powers – in such close proximity has resulted in turning Djibouti and the Red Sea into something of a proving ground for global competitors.**[3] In turn, piracy, terrorism, and human smuggling on both sides of the Red Sea have further elevated Djibouti's relevance.[4] The number of weak or failing states in the region coupled with a high rate of internal conflicts has affected human and political security negatively.[5] Djibouti, given its relative political stability, has become the headquarters for multiple monitoring and stabilization operations. The increase in anti-piracy patrolling activities in the Red Sea after the hijacking of

multiple vessels by Somali pirates, led states such as China and Japan to establish a somewhat permanent military presence in Djibouti. Japan's military footprint has remained small. In contrast, **China, now has both terrestrial and maritime military bases in Djibouti and Chinese companies have built and run much of the country's port infrastructure.**

China and Japan's decisions to establish military outposts in Djibouti marked a change in the People's Republic's foreign policy strategy.[6] Further, China's move had implications for global politics by

heightening the importance of the Red Sea and Djibouti. In other words, **the Chinese military base, opened in 2017, has increased the geostrategic relevance of the area, transforming the African country into an arena of global competition.**[7] Of note, the military footprints in

Djibouti of adversarial states such as the US and China have become instrumental in their ability to monitor each other's activities and engage in limited brinkmanship. **One of the Chinese military bases, for example, is located just a few kilometers away from Camp Lemonnier, the sprawling American military base which happens to also be the US's only long-term military presence in Africa**

Djibouti's leaders have greatly benefited from their country's strategic location and the financial resources accrued by charging rent for each military facility. These have, for a time, seemingly generated a win-win dynamic for a small Horn of Africa state that wishes to become the Singapore of Africa, despite the ruling party's strong grip on power.[8] However, recent political tussles within Djibouti's ruling Somali Issa elite, tensions with the minority Afar within Djibouti, and civil war in Djibouti's giant neighbor, Ethiopia, have all conspired to threaten the peace and stability that have come to be taken for granted in this small, Horn of Africa city-state. First, a primer on the country's politics is in order. Djibouti's domestic politics Financial and diplomatic benefits have contributed to the gradual consolidation of the ruling Somali Issa-led regime, which is generally classed as softly authoritarian. Djibouti has a particular ethnic composition, with two main groups, the majority Issa (60%), who are ethnic Somalis, and the Afar (35%), plus Arab components coming from Yemen. Since its independence in 1977, the country has been ruled by the Issa, represented politically by the People's Rally for Progress (RPP) party.[9] At the top of the PRP stands the family of the current President, Ismail Omar Guelleh. Guelleh, who has been in power since 1999, was only to have ruled until 2010, or for two five-year terms. However, thanks to constitutional reforms approved by his own party in 2010, Guelleh successfully removed his term limits. Indeed, Guelleh began his fifth term in office in April 2021, becoming one of Africa's longest-serving rulers. Djiboutian politics has, over the years of Guelleh's rule, become highly personalized, based on his prestige and the patronage network built around him. As his power has grown, his regime has systematically weakened opposition forces within the country. Guelleh's strategy has mainly aimed to fragment opposition blocs and personalities via two political mechanisms: co-optation and coercion. In the first case, Guelleh has distributed economic benefits or political positions to those who have decided to support his and the PRP's policies, even if they do not belong to the ruling party. On the other hand, the Djiboutian regime has been accused of fomenting periodic and violent campaigns of repression of certain forms of dissent.[10] Nevertheless, and despite the unfavorable political environment, there are six active opposition parties still in existence in the country, which are grouped in the Union of National Salvation (UNS). In addition, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) is active in the northwest of the country and mainly represents the ethnic Afar. In his efforts to suppress the opposition and consolidate his familial rule, Guelleh has been able to rely, for the most part, on the unstinting support he gets from the substantial foreign military presence in Djibouti. This has occurred in several ways. First, western external state actors, such as France and the US, have largely tolerated Guelleh's presidency and the PRP's less-than-democratic practices. Instead, in order to preserve their military presence in Djibouti, they have continued to pay the regime rent and turned a blind eye to the excesses of the PRP against its own citizens in favor of what they see as the continuity and stability offered by Guelleh and his ruling cadre.[11] Secondly, Guelleh has been able to exploit the economic resources derived from the military bases in order to consolidate his reign and lubricate his patronage network. Finally, Guelleh has also capitalized on the growing rivalry between the various external states operating from their military facilities in the small city-state. In particular, Djibouti's relevance to the world's foremost strategic competitors and great powers, the US and China, has allowed Guelleh to secure continued concessions from both. Clouds on the horizon Despite Guelleh's strong grip on power – assisted by his extended family members who control key government posts – he is now 75 years old. Changes in the regime's balance of power over the past few years coupled with economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, are beginning to threaten Djibouti's cherished stability. Although Guelleh was re-elected only one year ago, rumors are rife about his potential successor. Many believe that even now, Guelleh is not the most suitable figure to maintain the delicate balance of relations between Djibouti's various clans and ethnic groups. Accordingly, over the last few months, palace intrigues have reportedly increased, including reports of a failed coup.[12] Guelleh, who is reportedly obsessed with conspiracies against him, is increasingly uncomfortable and unpredictable in this environment. To counter perceived threats, the President's entourage, within which the First Lady, Kadra Mahamoud Haid, enjoys great leverage, has launched a series of arrests.[13] Abdoulkarim Aden Cher, the former budget minister, for example, was arrested by the judiciary in charge of corruption. The former budget minister Bodeh Ahmed Robleh and former police chief Colonel Abdillahi Abd Farah have been given jail terms for having "obtained telephone conversations in exchange for money, outside cases which are provided for by the law." [14] The phone conversations, part of the so-called "TX Affair," reportedly had President Guelleh threatening the opposition leader, Abdourahman Mohamed Guelleh, aka TX.[15] Finally, the National Assembly speaker, Mohamed Ali Houmed, was also placed under arrest. Houmed has strong international connections and, above all, has a significant social media following.[16] For these reasons, the President's entourage, and Abdi Khaireh, the PRP's leader in

parliament and confidante of Guelleh, reportedly see him as a possible political threat. It is not just internecine political struggles that are negatively affecting Djibouti's peaceful reputation. Armed conflict has also made a comeback within and without the small, but incredibly important country. A resurgence in fighting between the Somali-Issa and Afar communities, in February 2022, soon threatened the Mille-Awash section of the country's major road, one that connects Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, with Djibouti and Djibouti's major ports.^[17] The fighting risks affecting the lucrative transit of goods along the Ethiopia-Djibouti transport corridor.^[18] This has existential implications for both countries given Djibouti's reliance on the movement of Ethiopian imports and exports through its ports and Ethiopia's reliance on those same ports for nearly 95% of its imports/exports.^[19] **But the fighting in Djibouti pales in comparison to that ongoing in its giant neighbor** Ethiopia, as well as conflicts and instability in Eritrea, Somali and Somaliland. At the regional level, Djibouti is in a region characterized by a high level of instability, hence Djibouti's importance to global trade, security, and the grand strategies of great powers like China and the US; the small city-state has been an oasis of calm in a conflict-prone neighborhood. The instability that has characterized Somalia for decades and, more recently, Ethiopia, is exacerbated by the existence of clan social structures and ethnic composition.^[20] **These are characteristics that Djibouti also shares with its neighbors and, thus, it also risks being subjected to the pressures and threats that emanate outside its borders.** Over the last year, for instance, Djibouti has anxiously monitored the internal conflict in Ethiopia. Indeed, Guelleh and the ruling PRP were extremely worried, in late 2021, that the advance of Tigrayan troops towards Addis Ababa would trigger new riots inside Djibouti. This is because Djiboutian politics and society are inextricably intertwined with two large Ethiopian regional states, the Afar Region and Somali Region, also known as Somali West (Somali: Soomaali Galbeed). These two states and their competing ethnic groups have suffered from several unsettled territorial disputes. The conflict in Ethiopia that pits the ethnic Tigray against the government has exacerbated tensions between Afar and Somali.^[21] Indeed, the Ethiopian civil conflict reignited the dormant struggles between the Revolutionary Democratic United Front of Afar (ARDUF) and the paramilitary force (Lyu or special police) of the Somali Region. The former, for example, signed a cooperation agreement with the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) that are fighting against Ethiopia's federal government.^[22] The Lyu, on the other hand, is a paramilitary group at the service of the president of the Somali Region, Mustafa Mohammed Omar. He is a strong ally of Ethiopia's prime minister, Abiy Ahmed.^[23] In short, the Ethiopian civil war has further exacerbated ethno-tribal tensions between the paramilitary groups: the ARDUF and the Lyu. Their localized rivalry has now acquired a national and, in the case of Djibouti, a transnational dimension. In turn, their expressions of loyalty (or not) to Addis Ababa and Prime Minister Abiy have created a new fissure between the peoples. Why is this important for Djibouti? It is important because the Ethiopian rivalry between Afar and Somali directly precisely overlaps with the political and ethnic fault lines in Djibouti. Guelleh's very understandable fear is that fighting in Ethiopia between Somali and Afar could bring the clashes to Djibouti. For this reason, Djiboutian authorities placed all national forces on red alert in late 2021.^[24] Ethnic tensions are not the only storm clouds on the horizon though. The Ethiopian war has had negative economic implications in Djibouti. The widespread warfare has decreased the transit of Ethiopian cargo to and from Djibouti's ports, leading to reported heavy revenue losses.^[25] In December 2021, the worsening of Djibouti's economy rang alarms at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF, accordingly, urged the Djiboutian government to introduce structural reforms as soon as possible.^[26] Otherwise, the country will be unlikely to recover from the dual catastrophes of the pandemic and the Ethiopian civil war. This will result, according to reports, in the decline in living conditions of more than a fifth of the population – a country that is already classed as living in extreme poverty.^[27] Djibouti has recently granted free use of its ports to Ethiopian companies to cope with the deterioration of the situation and boost trade between the two countries. However, Addis Ababa has now asked Djibouti to provide credit for using the ports.^[28] Djibouti can hardly refuse its huge neighbor, and the move is expected to hurt Djibouti's increasingly fragile economy and shrinking budget. The decrease in revenue has, in turn, loosened the ties binding the regime's patronage network to the President, and fed the rumor mill about his successor. All of this has conspired to make Guelleh, and his family feel increasingly insecure. While the ruling clique may be entering a period of relative instability, the conflicts within Djibouti's polity may actually help Guelleh consolidate his rule for a few years to come. First, should Afar and Somali clash within Djibouti, there is little doubt that the ruling Somali-Issa's clan will band together and thus provide a boost to Guelleh's rule and legitimacy – at least within the majority.

foreign military bases in Djibouti have acted as a deterrent in the past to internal inter-ethnic violence. This will negatively affect the minority Afar population but may prove the trump card Guelleh requires to remain in power. In addition, the **may not** put the brake on internal Somali-Issa clan-based political chaos. Indeed, the outbreak of feuds within the PRP regime could be exacerbated depending on the actions of states such as China. As has already happened in Ethiopia, **foreign states that have basing in Djibouti may find themselves supporting different sides, s raising tensions and the stakes** Djibouti's bright future as the "Singapore of Africa" may be increasingly in doubt.

Great power war goes nuclear, Talmadge 18

Caitlin Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Beijing's Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control",

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, //RR

As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, u has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—**no longer seems as implausible as it once did.** And the **odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.** Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, **U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict.** Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." **This assurance is misguided.** If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the

Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a "no first use" pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other's territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China's nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China's nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China's nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself.

The draw-in causes extinction.

Clare 23 [Stephen Clare, former research fellow @ the Forethought Foundation, 6-xx-2023, Great power war, 80,000 Hours, <https://80000hours.org/problem-profilesgreat-power-conflict/>] //RR

A modern great power war could see nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, and other destructive new technologies deployed on an unprecedented scale. It would probably be the most destructive event in history, shattering our world. It could even threaten us with extinction. We've come

perilously close to just this kind of catastrophe before.¶ On October 27, 1962 — near the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis — an American U-2 reconnaissance plane set out on a routine mission to the Arctic to collect data on Soviet nuclear tests. But, while flying near the North Pole, with the stars obscured by the northern lights, the pilot made a navigation error and strayed into Soviet airspace.1¶ Soviet commanders sent fighter jets to intercept the American plane. The jets were picked up by American radar operators and nuclear-armed F-102 fighters took off to protect the U-2.¶ Fortunately, the reconnaissance pilot realised his error with enough time to correct course before the Soviet and American fighters met. But the intrusion enraged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was already on high alert amidst the crisis in Cuba.¶ "What is this, a provocation?" Khrushchev wrote to US President John F. Kennedy. "One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time when everything has been put into combat readiness."¶ If the U-2's path had strayed further west, or the Soviet fighters had been fast enough to intercept it, this incident could have played out quite differently. Both the United States and the USSR had thousands of nuclear missiles ready to fire. Instead of a nearly-forgotten anecdote, the U-2 incident could have been a trigger for war, like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.¶

[illegible]

For example, AI systems could control large groups of lethal autonomous weapons (though the timeline on which such applications will be developed is unclear). They may increase the pace at which war is waged, enabling rapid escalation outside human control. And AI systems could speed up the development of other dangerous new technologies. Finally, we may have to deal with the invention of other weapons which we can't currently predict. The feasibility and danger of nuclear weapons was unclear to many military strategists and scientists until they were first tested. We could similarly experience the invention of destabilising new weapons in our lifetime. What these technologies have in common is the potential to quickly kill huge numbers of people: A nuclear war could kill tens of millions within hours, and many more in the following days and months. A runaway bioweapon could prove very difficult to stop. Future autonomous systems could act with lightning speed, even taking humans out of the decision-making loop entirely. Faster wars leave less time for humans to intervene, negotiate, and find a resolution that limits the damage. How likely is war to damage the long-run future? When a war begins, leaders often promise a quick, limited conflict. But escalation proves hard to predict ahead of time (perhaps because people are scope-insensitive, or because escalation depends on idiosyncratic decisions). This raises the possibility of enormous wars that threaten all of humanity.

1NC -- Terrorism

Somali National Intelligence is expediting the new offensive against Al-Shabaab. HIIRAAN from today.

HIIRAAN, 1-24-2025, "Somalia's intelligence chief starts anti-al-Shabaab meetings in Hiiraan region," No Publication, https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2025/Jan/199942/somalia_s_intelligence_chief_starts_anti_al_shabaab_meetings_in_hiiraan_region.aspx, accessed 1-24-2025 //MA

Beledweyne (HOL) — **Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbaloolshe has started high-level meetings in Buula Burte district, Hiiraan region, to expedite the second phase of military operations against the Al-Shabaab militant group.** Sanbaloolshe, who has been in the region for several days, engaged in **discussions with local intellectuals and community leaders in Buula Burte to secure their participation in the ongoing operations, strengthen local forces' coordination, and support the Somali National Army (SNA).** Community leaders in Buula Burte expressed their commitment to the federal government's efforts to combat Al-Shabaab, pledging full cooperation in the second phase of the military campaign. Earlier this month, a federal government delegation led by Sanbaloolshe and the Minister of Petroleum and Minerals, Dahir Shire, visited Beledweyne to address pressing local security concerns. **The delegation prioritized dismantling illegal checkpoints and resolving internal conflicts that have hindered regional stability. Federal officials are currently focused on reorganizing local forces to provide robust support for the Somali National Army's renewed push against Al-Shabaab.**

And Shabelle 25 finds

Shabelle, 01/21/25, Somalia: Finish Interior Minister Visits Somalia to Deepen Ties", <https://allafrica.com/stories/202501220119.html//EEdoa01/24/25>

Mogadishu, Somalia — **Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre hosted Finland's Interior Minister Mari Rantanen in Mogadishu on Tuesday, aiming to fortify the bilateral relationship between the two nations with a special focus on security cooperation.** The discussions took place in the Prime Minister's office, where Barre praised the **significant strides Somalia has made in its battle against Al-Shabaab, pointing to recent successes that have weakened the extremist group.** He also underscored Somalia's newly elevated status in international security, having been elected to the United Nations Security Council earlier this month. The meeting emphasized the importance of continued collaboration to tackle common security issues, reflecting a mutual commitment to not only address immediate threats but also to enhance support across multiple sectors. **This partnership comes at a time when Somalia is actively working to stabilize and rebuild** after years of conflict, with Finland offering support in these efforts. Finland is among several Western countries that have embassies in Mogadishu and provide gigantic support to Somalia in the security, humanitarian, and state-building process.

However, Independence is a dividing issue in Somaliland that could fuel al-Shabaab recruitment

Geldenhuys 09 [Deon Geldenhuys (Professor of Politics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa), xx-xx-2009, "Contested States in World Politics," PALGRAVE MACMILLAN (publisher), <https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234185,geldenhuys2009.pdf> accessed 12-10-2024, //ZD

This was coupled with an almost pathological fear of setting precedents that would encourage disaffected ethnic minorities to break away from existing states. Africa remained determined to treat the Eritrean case as sui generis and hence not applicable to Somaliland or any other unit within an established state on the continent.¹⁰² It is worth noting, though, that the AU's 2005 mission to Somaliland maintained that its case 'should not be linked to the notion of "opening a Pandora's box" – in terms of spawning imitators – but was instead an exceptional instance requiring special treatment.¹⁰³ Another African concern may have been that **two Somali states** (or even three, if Djibouti was added) **could be fierce rivals and draw surrounding countries into their contest** – thus **jeopardizing regional peace** and stability.¹⁰⁴ A related worry was that **an independent Somaliland increased** the danger of a **renewed North-South conflagration because** a new government in **Mogadishu** in effective control of its territory **could be expected to claim jurisdiction over Somaliland and even press its demands by forcible means.**¹⁰⁵ Questions have also been raised about the level of popular support for Somaliland's independence, despite the referendum of 2001. **The proindependence constituency was concentrated in the dominant Isaaq clan; other clans appeared more divided** on the issue, **with some still favouring a united Somalia.** The creation of **Puntland, discussed earlier, has added to the doubts about political loyalties in the region. Not only was Puntland committed to a federal Somalia, but clans from Somaliland had been prominent in establishing the entity.**¹⁰⁶ A further common argument against Somaliland's statehood was that it lacked economic viability. Poor, underdeveloped and one of the most resource-scarce countries in the world, Somaliland cannot stand on its own feet, it was said.

Horton 24 furthers

[Michael Horton, 2-21-2024, "Will Al-Shabaab Respond to Somaliland's Red Sea Agreement with Ethiopia?," Jamestown, <https://jamestown.org/program/will-al-shabaab-respond-to-somalilands-red-sea-agreement-with-ethiopia/>, accessed 12-10-2024, //ZD

Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) granting Ethiopia access to build a naval base on Somaliland's coast. This was offered in exchange for Ethiopia recognizing Somaliland as an independent state, drawing condemnation from al-Shabaab. **Al-Shabaab has failed to establish itself in most of Somaliland due to effective community-based counterterrorism efforts, but the MoU may exacerbate internal Somaliland tensions that al-Shabaab could exploit,** especially in the contested Sool and Sanaag border regions. Protests against the MoU have taken place outside the border region and Somaliland's defense minister resigned over it, indicating some political opposition, but most Somalilanders likely oppose al-Shabaab and closer Ethiopia-Somaliland military cooperation could counterbalance risks. In early January, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that grants Ethiopia secure access to the Red Sea as well as the right to build a naval base. In exchange, Ethiopia is expected to recognize Somaliland as an independent state (Addis Standard, January 1). Somaliland has been autonomous but unrecognized since its secession from Somalia in 1991. The text of the MoU has yet to be released in full. However, it has the potential to further complicate the Horn of Africa's already volatile political and militant landscape. Closer relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland may also provide al-Shabaab with new operational opportunities. Condemning the MoU Following the initial announcement of the MoU, **al-Shabaab condemned the deal for violating "Somali sovereignty" and called on both followers and the Somali public to violently oppose the MoU's** imposition (The Horn Observer, January 4). Ethiopia has long been an opponent of al-Shabaab and a victim of its attacks. Despite having a large Somali and Muslim population, Ethiopia is often portrayed as a "Christian" invader of Somali lands. Ethiopia has carried out military operations in Somalia to combat militant Salafists in 1996 and again from 2006 to 2009. Since 2009, Ethiopia has remained an important ally for the Somali government in its efforts to combat al-Shabaab. As such, Ethiopia has become one of the group's main enemies. Similarly, Somaliland has long been a determined and effective opponent of al-Shabaab. The group last carried out a large-scale attack in Somaliland's capital of Hargeisa in 2008 (BBC, October 29, 2008). Since then, al-Shabaab has for the most part failed to expand its operational footprint in Somaliland. However, **the organization maintains operatives tasked with gathering intelligence in Somaliland.** Al-Shabaab operatives have also successfully infiltrated into Somaliland's volatile border areas in the states of Sool and Sanaag. [1] Since December 2022, the government of Somaliland has been battling clan-based militias in Sool and Sanaag, who oppose the administration of these areas by Somaliland. Members of the Dhulbahante sub-clan, whose traditional territory encompasses much of Sool and Sanaag, want to form an autonomous region allied to Somalia rather than Somaliland (Al Jazeera, February 20, 2023). Much of the fighting has been concentrated around Las Anod, the regional capital of the state of Sool. In August 2023, the clan militias that control Las Anod launched a successful offensive against Somaliland government troops. This allowed the militias to secure territory around the city (The Horn Observer, August 25, 2023). Exploiting Clan Divisions **Given al-Shabaab's expertise in exploiting divisions within Somalia's clans** and sub-clans, the group almost certainly has inserted both political and military operatives into Sool and Sanaag. Al-Shabaab has long been focused on establishing itself in Somaliland's Cal Madaw Mountains and the Gorof Hills which are located in Sanaag. These areas sit astride important smuggling routes that connect the Gulf of Aden with the interior. The rough terrain also offers excellent cover for permanent bases. [2] Due to a shortage of resources and now clan tensions, **Somaliland has struggled to police these more remote areas.** In contrast,

Somaliland's well-established counter-terrorism initiatives have excelled at policing and interdicting al-Shabaab in the majority of the territory that Somaliland controls. **Somaliland's counter-terrorism efforts rely heavily on community-sourced intelligence**. For years, this approach has proven successful, as evidenced by al-Shabaab's inability to establish itself in most of Somaliland or carry out attacks. **The signing of the MoU** and the resulting cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland **may give al-Shabaab more opportunities to exploit clan divisions** in the latter. While the MoU and the Somaliland government of President Bihi have considerable support for the agreement among Somalilanders broadly, **there are indications that some clans and sub-clans are questioning the deal** (The Horn Observer, January 8). Notably, **Somaliland's defense minister resigned in response to the MoU** (Africa News, January 8). There are also concerns about what the agreement may mean for Somaliland's sovereignty. The MoU purportedly grants Ethiopia the right to build a naval base on Somaliland's west coast. Some Somalilanders view this as the government giving up territory to a neighbor that is, relative to Somaliland, an economic and military superpower. Since the **MoU was announced, protests have taken place in a number of areas well outside of the contested border region** (Garowe Online, January 10). Conclusion Given that most of Somaliland's population remains resolutely opposed to al-Shabaab and its ideology, it is doubtful that the group will be able to establish itself in Somaliland in the short or even medium-term. **However, if the political and clan fractures within Somaliland grow, there is a risk that al-Shabaab will find ways to exploit them, just as it has in Somalia** and Puntland. Further, if the MoU is implemented, al-Shabaab will also have an abundance of new targets as Ethiopia begins to build the proposed facilities. Al-Shabaab is framing and will continue to frame the building of military facilities in Somaliland by Ethiopia as an "invasion" of sovereign Somali territory.

And Independently, CLAN WARS fuel terrorism

Horton 23 [Michael Horton; fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and a co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI).; Clan fighting threatens Somaliland's independent, hard-fought security, 3-2-2023; Responsible Statecraft, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/02/clan-fighting-threatens-somalilands-independent-hard-fought-security/>; accessed, 12-18-2024] //rachelthegoat recut //clairec

For much of the last 20 years, the autonomous, but unrecognized, Republic of Somaliland has been a bastion of stability in the perennially unstable Horn of Africa. However, **fighting between the government of Somaliland and clan based militias** in the eastern region of Sool **threatens to upend the security and stability Somaliland has long enjoyed**. **Somaliland's strategic position in the Horn of Africa combined with the recent confirmation of viable oil reserves, all mean that the stakes are high not only for Somaliland but for the broader region**. The **fighting may also allow al-Shabaab to capitalize on the instability** and finally establish a foothold in Somaliland which has, for years, successfully **fought off the terrorist group**. Since February 6, Las Anod — the regional capital of Sool — has witnessed escalating violence as militias broadly aligned with the Dhulbahante clan battle the army of Somaliland for control of the town and its outskirts. **More than a hundred people have died as a result of the fighting and thousands have been displaced**. The fighting in Las Anod is partly driven, as is often the case in Somalia, by **clan-centric politics**. The Dhulbahante clan claims Las Anod as its capital and is the predominant clan in much of the region of Sool. Somaliland, which bases its borders on those that demarcated British Somaliland, regards Sool as part of its territory. Since 2007 when Somaliland seized Las Anod from militias aligned with the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, the government of Somaliland has lightly administered Sool and its capital of Las Anod. On December 26 of last year, a politician from Somaliland's opposition political party, Wadaani, who was also a member of the Dhulbahante clan, was assassinated by unknown assailants in Las Anod. Protesters subsequently took to the streets of the town and were engaged by Somaliland's security forces. Local media claims that 20 protesters were killed during altercations with security forces. On February 6, some elders from the Dhulbahante clan announced that they intended to form a semi-autonomous state administered by Somalia rather than Somaliland. Since the February announcement, fighting between Somaliland's military and clan aligned militias has intensified despite the government's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and an attempted intervention by clan elders from across Somaliland. The **fighting may also be drawing in forces from neighboring Puntland which the government of Somaliland charges with supporting the uprising** in Las Anod. While there are legitimate local grievances driving the fighting in Las Anod, **the conflict will almost certainly be exploited by al-Shabaab**. The government of Somaliland has already warned that al-Shabaab **operatives have infiltrated some of the militias fighting to control Las Anod**. While there is no firm open source evidence of this, it is likely that al-Shabaab will, if it already hasn't, **take full advantage of the instability in and around Las Anod to establish itself in Somaliland's eastern regions**. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) are both well-established in Puntland. Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing, the Amniyat, has, for years, expertly assessed and exploited clan rivalries for its benefit. At the same time, al-Shabaab, like most terrorist and insurgent organizations, is first and foremost a business. Al-Shabaab, like any organization, must be able to fund itself and enrich its own elites. Thus al-Shabaab is deeply enmeshed in Somalia's political and economic ecosystems. Al-Shabaab operatives and fighters are often knowingly and unknowingly used as political and economic tools by Somali elites to achieve particular agendas. For years, **Somaliland's security and intelligence services have**

effectively countered al-Shabaab, and the terror group has not carried out a major attack in Somaliland since a suicide bombing in the capital city of Hargeisa in 2008. Somaliland's intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism efforts have long been community-centric, both because this approach has proven effective, and out of need.

Somaliland's budget for its military and security and intelligence services is a rounding error when compared with that of Somalia, which has received and continues to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from foreign governments, including the US. Notably, the government of Somalia, which has launched yet another campaign to combat al-Shabaab, has now adopted some of Somaliland's community-centric approaches to counter-terrorism. Somaliland has charted an independent course since its declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades, Somaliland has, with little outside assistance, steadily built-out its state institutions and held multiple internationally monitored elections. Despite receiving miniscule amounts of international aid, Somaliland's cities, particularly Hargeisa and Berbera, have

undergone rapid development. UAE based DP World has funded the expansion of the regionally vital port of Berbera. Most significantly, in light of the current conflict, **multiple companies, including Taiwan based CPC Corp, are investing in the exploration and development of Somaliland's potentially substantial oil reserves.**

On the other hand, Somaliland is one of the few countries in Africa that has spurned both Russian and Chinese offers of aid and investment. Rather than accept these offers, Somaliland, which values its relationship with the UK and the US, has instead developed its relations with Taiwan and other nations that support its autonomy.

Global and regional powers are engaged in a new battle for access to the Horn's resources. The Horn is viewed by China and the Gulf States as well as [redacted] [Türkiye] as the eastern door to Africa's vast and still largely untapped natural resources. Somaliland's

geo-strategic position and the likelihood that it has commercially viable oil as well as other resources, place it at the center of a combustible mix of competing interests and agendas.

The current **conflict** in Las Anod **will almost certainly be exploited by not only al-Shabaab, but also those local, regional, and global**

powers that have an interest in moving their own particular agendas forward. If the fighting in Las Anod is not brought to a quick end through meaningful negotiations by all sides, the conflict will intensify and continue to spread to neighboring regions. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia will be the chief beneficiaries of such spread and intensification. Somaliland has a history of solving problems and abating conflict through customary dispute resolution mechanisms.

All parties to the current conflict must step back from the brink and allow these mechanisms to function before groups like al-Shabaab and outside actors are able to fully subvert de-confliction efforts. **Prolonged fighting will compromise not only Somaliland's hard-earned security and stability, but further erode security and stability in the broader region.**

Moreover, Türkiye's mediation ensures Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia but its contingent on not recognizing Somaliland.

Soylu 24[Ragip Soylu, 12-12-2024, Inside the [redacted] [Türkiye]-backed Somalia-Ethiopia deal, [redacted] [West Asia] Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/inside-turkey-backed-somalia-ethiopia-deal>

When **Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met in Ankara on Wednesday**, expectations from their Turkish hosts were high.¶ **The Turkish government had been attempting to mediate the sea port crisis** between the two countries for almost a year through two rounds of negotiations, but no tangible progress had been made beyond vague statements of goodwill.¶ **Mogadishu has been demanding that Ethiopia cancel a memorandum of understanding (MoU) it signed with Somalia's** breakaway northern region of Somaliland in January. This

agreement aimed to grant Ethiopia port access through Somaliland's coastline for the next 50 years.¶ **Somalia viewed the MoU as a potential recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state and threatened war to protect its territorial**

integrity. Ethiopia, in contrast, argued that as a landlocked country, it had a right to sea access under international law.¶ **"You won't leave this room until you reach a deal," Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during the**

negotiations. according to a person familiar with the issue speaking to [redacted] [West Asia] Eye.¶ Erdogan, who has known both leaders for years, has invested heavily in Somalia since 2011. [redacted] [Türkiye] has established a military base in the country, trained thousands of Somali soldiers, managed Mogadishu's airport and port, and provided extensive humanitarian and military aid.¶ In 2021, Erdogan's decision to sell Turkish armed drones to Abiy tipped the balance of Ethiopia's civil war against the Tigray forces in Abiy's favour.¶ Sticking point¶ A Turkish official stated that the negotiations between the two leaders and their respective teams lasted nearly seven uninterrupted hours, with Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan actively participating.¶ According to a source familiar with the talks, **one of the key sticking**

points was Ethiopia's recognition of Somalia's territorial unity. This recognition would effectively require Ethiopia to cancel its MoU with Somaliland. The source added that while Abiy was willing to sign a statement committing to Somalia's independence and sovereignty, he resisted any mention of "territorial integrity" or "unity". The Somali delegation countered by referencing the 1933 Montevideo Convention, which codifies international legal norms and principles regarding statehood. One of its key criteria for statehood is the possession of a "defined territory". "You cannot say you recognise a country but deny that it has a defined territory," the source explained. Turkish officials found this argument persuasive, concluding that Ethiopia must either recognise Somalia in its entirety under international law or not at all. Hours of negotiations later, **Somalia and Ethiopia finally reached a final agreement, known as the Ankara Declaration, that addressed the core demands of both. Somalia secured Ethiopia's recognition of its territorial unity, while Ethiopia was granted commercial access to the Somali coastline.** The declaration also stipulated that technical delegations from both nations, facilitated by [REDACTED] (Türkiye), would begin negotiations no later than February 2025, with a deadline to complete the talks within four months. Turkish officials hailed the deal as a victory for both sides. "Win-win agreement" Ebuzer Demirci, a regional expert, noted that Somalia has emerged as achieving several deals. "Somalia, earlier this year, signed a comprehensive naval and energy deal with [REDACTED] (Türkiye) to guard its waters and establish a naval force with Ankara's help," Demirci said. "Mogadishu leveraged the Somaliland MoU to its advantage." The reasoning behind Abiy's concessions may be twofold. Tom Gardner, an Africa correspondent for The Economist, suggested that Abiy was under significant diplomatic pressure from the United States to resolve the crisis. "This deal still provides Abiy Ahmed with access to the sea, and it makes sense for the Ethiopian market to be connected to the Somali coast" - Omar Mahmood, analyst. **The US is concerned about the implications for security and peacekeeping in Somalia,** particularly in the fight against al-Shabab [an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group]," Gardner explained, noting that **Ethiopia is a key contributor to African peacekeeping forces. Under the new deal, Somalia confirmed that Ethiopian troops would remain in the country.** The situation was further complicated by Somaliland's recent presidential elections, which shifted the political landscape. Somaliland's new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is reportedly less amenable to Abiy than his predecessor.

Empirically, the now dead port deal that recognized somaliland spiked recruitment and tanked cooperation.

Karr 24 [Liam Karr, 2-1-2024, "Institute for the Study of War," Institute for the Study of War, <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024>, accessed 12-19-2024,

President Mohamud was crucial in leading efforts to rally local support for the offensive against al Shabaab in 2023 but is now preoccupied with lobbying against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. He worked out of the Galgudud regional capital in central Somalia between September and October — the last time the SFG attempted to renew the offensive against al Shabaab in 2023 — and repeatedly traveled to the Bay regional capital in southern Somalia to broker reconciliation deals and attempt to build an anti-al Shabaab coalition in the winter and fall of 2023.[34] Mohamud has spent only one day in central Somalia to generate support for the new offensive and has not announced any plans to visit southern Somalia in advance of the supposedly impending offensive.[35] He instead gave priority to meetings in Egypt, Eritrea, Italy, and Uganda in January to rally support against the port deal in bilateral discussions and multilateral forums.[36] **The port deal has also amplified anti-Ethiopian sentiment in Somalia, energizing al Shabaab and allowing them to recruit more militants.** Somalia's international partners warned on January 18 that the port deal was strengthening al Shabaab and that there are "troubling indicators" that **al Shabaab is using the agreement to recruit new fighters.**[37] Al Shabaab's spokesperson spoke out against the agreement as "invalid" on January 2 and threatened to retaliate.[38] CTP previously assessed that al Shabaab would capitalize on the increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment to boost its support, as the group has regularly done throughout its history.[39] **The port deal has also fractured and degraded the effectiveness of Ethiopian-Somali counterterrorism cooperation.** The SFG had planned to use at least 1,000 troops from each neighboring country as part of the offensive in southern Somalia in 2023 to compensate for the lack of local support in some areas, although this support never materialized.[40] **The SFG has since refused to hold any discussions with Ethiopian officials until Ethiopia withdraws from the port deal.**[41] Ethiopian forces have remained in most of their positions in Somalia, but **the diplomatic standoff prevents military coordination.** The increase in anti-Ethiopian sentiment also makes the use of Ethiopian African Union forces politically unpopular and potentially counterproductive, as it would undermine the government's legitimacy and further boost local support for al Shabaab.

The impact is Instability

Nunez Chaim 22 finds

Gonzalo Nunez-Chaim Utz Johann Pape , September 2022, "The Immediate Impact of Terrorist Attacks against Civilians in Somalia " World Bank Group, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099415109082281442/pdf/IDU03861d1b0002f304b090b8c80ea73003b5ba6.pdf>, accessed 12-17-2024, //ZD

ions After more than two decades of civil war and conflict, Somalia remains a fragile state subject to conflict and violence. The Federal Government of Somalia aims to provide the political and security conditions for improving the development trajectory of the country and increasing the welfare conditions of its population.

The challenge of improving security conditions will be larger in the coming years as countries participating in The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are considering whether to withdraw from Somalia.³² Terrorist groups and their attacks are one of the threats to the government and its stability, representing a risk for the well-being of the population and limiting the capacity of the government and international partners to design and implement effective development policies. This paper documents the immediate (within a week) impact of terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab against civilians in Somalia. We combine micro-data from two waves of the Somali High Frequency Survey and employ a difference-in-difference approach comparing outcomes of households exposed to terrorist attacks against households who were not exposed to the incidents, before and after the events. Our estimates are robust to the use of clustered and HAC standard errors, different samples and control groups considered, besides that a similar composition of repeated-cross sections and a falsification test – measuring the impact before the events occurred– support the validity of our empirical strategy. We further confirm the results through an instrumental variables approach, for which we obtain a valid shift-share type of instrument that exploits the spatial variation of incidents and changes in the number of US air/drone attacks against Al-Shabaab.

And

Michael 18 (Kobi Michael is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University, and the author of sixteen books and monographs and more than fifty scholarly articles. Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at INSS, having formerly served on the National Security Council in the Prime Minister's Office. The article draws on their book *The Arab World on the Road to State Failure* (INSS, 2017). "The Dangers of Failing [Redacted] [West Asia] States," [Redacted] [West Asia] Quarterly, Spring 2018, <https://www.meforum.org/7222/failing-middle-east-states>) dwc 20 //recut the chlo dot com

The last two decades show that most of today's active conflicts, including international terrorism, emanate from failed states, which either cannot control the spillover of domestic turmoil beyond their borders or deliberately seek to export it in an attempt to reduce the threat at home. In other words, crises that develop in failed states also harm their surroundings: They are the biggest generators of humanitarian crises, displaced people, and refugees; they endanger regime stability in neighboring states; they enable access to sophisticated weapons stolen from collapsing military facilities, and they constitute fertile soil for the advent of extremist and terror groups. In the context of the [Redacted] [West Asia], they encourage subversive activities among Muslim communities in Western countries in a way that might destabilize those countries' social order. These effects are having a global impact, not least since the international community has a limited ability to intervene in failed states, to suppress the violent rebel forces that operate in them, or to support the stabilization of nation-states and the regional system. These limits are the product of a lack of political will needed to intervene in areas of conflict; the inherent conceptual and operational weakness of peacekeeping and state-building missions; and the understanding that there is a limited lifespan for intervention in these areas, based on the mostly negative experience with such past missions. To these should be added the problems resulting from competition among aid organizations and difficulty in coordinating among missions operating simultaneously in regions of conflict. These obstacles reduce even further the chances of success and might even exacerbate the situation.^[5] Small wonder that successive U.S. administrations have identified

Instability from state collapse causes great power involvement.

Elmi 24 [Afyare A. Elmi, professor @ City University of Mogadishu, 8-26-2024, The Coming War Nobody Is Talking About, The New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/26/opinion/ethiopia-somalia-conflict.html>] //RR

War would be devastating. Involving rival and well-armed nations, ethnic communities, religious groups and international backers, conflict would bring bloodshed and disaster to both countries. Somalia, slowly recovering from a devastating three-decade civil war, would scarcely be able to bear it. Ethiopia is already mired in multiple conflicts within its borders — in its Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions — and is facing conflict on its Eritrean and Sudanese borders. Another front, stretching thousands of miles, could bring the country to collapse.¶ The region, already racked by the war in Sudan, would become even more unstable. **Conflict could draw in Red Sea states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea**, all of **which consider the** body of **water essential for their national security**. **The United States, China and some European nations already have a military presence in the Red Sea; countries like** [redacted] **[Türkiye], Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Russia have lately entered the fray. The region could quickly become a dangerous battlefield for global and regional powers.**¶ For all its precariousness, **East Africa is vital for international commerce and security**. The Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea connect Asia to Europe and the Americas, while the Horn serves as Asia's gateway to the whole African continent. **By disrupting key maritime routes, war in the area would endanger global trade.** Equally worrying, **it would also revive Islamic extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab, which has already claimed to have recruited thousands of young Somalis to fight the Ethiopians. An unstable East Africa poses a risk to the entire world.**

Cross x Tamalge and Clare from c1 on why it goes nuclear and causes extinction

1NC -- Instability

The African Union is facilitating unprecedented growth and giving the continent a global diplomatic voice.

Hannah **Ryder et al. 24**, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program, 3-26-2024, "Is the African Union Evolving in the Right Direction?", CSIS,

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/african-union-evolving-right-direction>, Accessed 12-12-2024, //RR

In his 1996 bestseller, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington foresaw the establishment of a multipolar world order following the end of the Cold War. The Harvard professor predicted a division of political and economic influence according to civilizational lines. As such, he advocated for a radical change to multilateral diplomacy and called, three decades ago, for each of the nine principal civilizations, including Africa, to play a central role in international affairs. As the current global geopolitical architecture transforms in front of our eyes, an increasing number of major players are now competing for resources and influence, including through high-intensity conflicts. As a result, world geopolitics is heading toward its most unstable point since the end of the 1980s. To reflect these changing global power dynamics and retain legitimacy, the United Nations must modify its institutions to hand greater responsibility to emerging powers. The dramatic demographic, economic, and diplomatic changes in Africa highlight the practical and moral necessity of providing the continent with a greater voice in multilateral diplomacy. The African Union, which enjoys both domestic and international legitimacy, should, therefore, receive a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. The vast majority of African countries still have a very dynamic demographic growth. According to the African Bank of Development, in 2050, the continent will be home to 25 percent of the world's population. In parallel, large swaths of Africa are experiencing rapid economic development. The continent's GDP could (assuming consistently high rates of growth) triple by 2050. As a result, regional and world powers are increasingly courting African states and competing for influence. However, the most significant changes reshaping Africa's reality are in the diplomatic arena. In the past five years, several events have proven the ability of African countries to influence world affairs according to their interests effectively. The first example is the grain crisis triggered by the war between Russia and Ukraine. The continent, which heavily depends on wheat imports from the two belligerents, dispatched Macky Sall, Senegal's President and then head of the African Union, to negotiate reopening grain imports with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Second, almost three months ago, South Africa led a highly publicized legal suit against Israel at the International Court of Justice. While Pretoria's assertion of genocide was politically motivated, lacking factual basis, and ultimately rejected by the court, the diplomatic initiative showed the ability of an African country to exercise leadership on a topic of global importance. Third, and maybe most importantly, the last decade has seen numerous African countries slowly disengage themselves from the influence of former colonial powers, Cold War patrons, and powerful petro-states. For the first time since independence, many of the continent's nations are developing genuinely independent foreign policies based on their national interests. As such, several Sahel countries have severed ties with France, which had heavily dominated the region's politics for decades, and established entirely new alliances. Many African nations refuse to bow to Western pressure and condemn Russia in United Nations resolutions as they see continued relations with Moscow as in line with their strategic interests. Similarly, during the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada, numerous African countries were forced by the Arab League to suspend their diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. However, not a single of the continent's nations has done so following the October 7 attacks and the Israeli offensive in Gaza. Finally, Africa is slowly increasing its presence and influence in multilateral organizations. In 2023, the African Union became part of the G20, cementing its status as an increasingly influential player on the global scene. The same year, two additional African countries, Ethiopia and Egypt, joined the BRICS organization, sitting on an equal footing with major players such as China, India, and Brazil. Such developments seemed unthinkable only several years ago. They demonstrate the ability of large parts of the continent to develop influential and independent policies in the international arena.

They also justify the African Union's need to finally access the select group of powers that determine the rules of global cooperation. Of course, numerous obstacles still stand on the road to the Security Council. Africa's fifty-four states have different cultures, interests, and sets of alliances, making consensus difficult to achieve. Smaller nations may also be sensitive to pressure from global powers seeking to influence the Union's position. Additionally, conflicts between African countries could further escalate tensions within the regional organization. Constant diplomacy and significant compromise will thus be essential, particularly given the high levels of instability persisting in parts of the continent. However, the arguments for AU representation appear more cogent today, and **Africa is slowly gaining the international status it deserves.** Its economies are growing, its diplomatic influence is spreading, and the prospects of its demographic growth are immense. Its main multilateral organization, the African Union, has also proven to be an effective source of legitimacy on the continent.

As multipolarity beckons, the time has come to grant the African Union a robust voice in the concert of nations.

As a result of AU leadership, African nations enjoy unprecedented long-term stability, Usman 23

Abubakar Abubakar Usman, Research fellow with International Islamic University Malaysia Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIIBF) and affiliated with the Asia West Asia Centre for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), 5-31-2023, "West African countries show how working together over decades builds peace and stops wars breaking out", Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/west-african-countries-show-how-working-together-over-decades-builds-peace-and-stops-wars-breaking-out-205498>, Accessed 12-30-2024, recut//RR

Africa is often portrayed as a continent ravaged by war, terrorism, poverty and political instability. But **over the past five decades few violent conflicts have occurred** between states. In Europe, for comparison, there have been more than 25 inter-state conflicts since 1945. It's true that Africa has seen 214 coups, the most of any region; 106 have been successful. Out of 54 countries on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. West Africa, a region of 16 independent states, has experienced 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950. There are also cross-border security challenges such as terrorism, banditry, piracy and the wide presence of arms. But, **since independence in the late 1950s, the region's countries have not gone to war with one another** – except for a minor armed confrontation between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985. In a recent paper we explored the possible reasons for this. As scholars studying the political dynamics of west Africa, we arrived at our insights by analysing historical data, diplomatic interactions and scholarly research. We found evidence that **the principles of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes defined the relationships between west African countries**. The 15 states under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) positively identify with the fate of others in the bloc. The regional body was formed in 1975 by west African countries seeking to promote economic development. **We found a strong correlation between decades of regional cooperation and the rarity of conflicts between states** in west Africa. We conclude that **systemic cooperation between states in the region has led to a collective identity forming over time. A sense of community has developed. The community has developed conflict management mechanisms.** This has prevented members from going into war. This finding highlights the importance of collaboration and diplomacy in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. Making sense of the ECOWAS peace Regional dynamics and historical factors shape conflict, as can be seen in the Horn of Africa. That region has witnessed conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example. In the west African region, we found that the **security arrangements agreed under ECOWAS** have **helped to foster peace between states**. The ECOWAS agreement was updated in 1993. It includes principles that were absent in the earlier pact. Among them are: solidarity and collective self-reliance non-aggression between member states promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness to maintain regional peace, stability and security peaceful settlement of disputes among member states active cooperation between neighbouring countries promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development. **This has led to west African countries choosing peaceful dispute resolution over sovereignty. For example, a border dispute between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 through an international tribunal.** This approach has prevented violent conflicts. A key factor is that member states have mechanisms for settling disputes peacefully. **In both Liberia's and Sierra Leone's wars**, which threatened to engulf other countries in the region, **ECOWAS used these settlement mechanisms**. It deployed military troops to supervise ceasefires brokered by the then Ghanaian president, Jerry Rawlings. Another factor is what in our study we call pan-West Africanism. We describe this as a regional version of **pan-Africanism** that **emphasises unity and collaboration among countries**. In practice **it has facilitated trade, cultural exchanges**

and diplomatic collaborations. It has also created a sense of shared identity and solidarity among member countries. We argue that the idea of pan-West Africanism has promoted regional solidarity and reduced the possibility of violence in inter-state relations. It is not just a philosophy, but a practical approach to regional integration and cooperation. Conclusion Our paper supports the argument that systemic cooperation among states can lead to a collective identity forming over time. This has happened with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their collective identities are based on norms that reflect the history and political cultures of their member states. The importance of shared identity and peaceful coexistence is often overlooked in explaining complex international relations. But it's essential in understanding the relations of west African states.

However, Aff causes the spread of secessionist movements across Africa, Gebereamlak 24

Hagos Gebereamlak, Journalist at The Reporter Ethiopia from Addis Ababa University, 10-2-2024, "Ethiopia's Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders", Reporter Magazine, <https://thereportermagazines.com/3214/>, Accessed 12-11-2024, //RR

Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland's independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If Ethiopia

proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape. Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland's recognition could embolden these movements. In Ethiopia, for example, various regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region, have elements advocating for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa further complicates these dynamics. For instance, Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland, while Afars inhabit Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Similarly, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries, creating fertile ground for secessionist and irredentist movements. The recognition of Somaliland might also inspire regions such as Puntland and Jubaland to seek independence from Somalia. These regions already enjoy a degree of autonomy, and Somaliland's formal recognition could lead them to pursue a similar path. Historically, Somalia has laid irredentist claims to Ethiopia's Somali region (Ogaden), aiming to incorporate it into a "Greater Somalia." If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could provoke retaliation from Somalia, possibly leading to renewed claims over the Somali region of Ethiopia. Somalia could also support secessionist movements within Ethiopia as a form of retaliation. In fact, Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi recently stated that if Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, Somalia would consider backing Ethiopian rebels, essentially threatening to fuel internal conflicts in Ethiopia. Historical Context of Tit-for-Tat Secessionist Support In the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan engaged in a vicious cycle of supporting secessionist movements to destabilize each other. Somalia backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which sought to secede the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Somalia also allowed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to establish offices and use Somali passports to further their causes. Ethiopia, in turn, supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in its fight against the Siad Barre regime, which later led to Somaliland's declaration of independence. Ethiopia also aided the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which established the autonomous region of Puntland. Meanwhile, Sudan supported various Ethiopian rebel groups, including the ELF, TPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In retaliation, Ethiopia provided heavy support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan. This cycle of support for rebel groups contributed to the downfall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the Siad Barre regime in Somalia. It also led to the fragmentation of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, and

other entities. Ethiopia's involvement in Sudan similarly contributed to the eventual secession of Eritrea and South Sudan from Sudan. There is a **strong likelihood** that this historical pattern of reciprocal support for secessionist movements will **reemerge**. Somalia may escalate its support for rebel groups in Ethiopia, particularly in regions like the Somali region, Oromia, and Tigray, where there are already existing tensions. This could fuel further instability in Ethiopia. In response, **Ethiopia might encourage independence movements in Puntland and Jubaland, supporting dissatisfied clans and [REDACTED] in Somalia to rebel or seek autonomy. This would perpetuate a cycle of proxy conflicts, destabilizing the Horn of Africa further and leading to widespread insecurity.** This reciprocal destabilization between Ethiopia and Somalia could easily spread, **drawing in other regional actors and intensifying conflicts** across the Horn of Africa. The region could find itself once again entangled in **proxy wars**, with various factions fighting for independence or control, supported by external powers. The already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa could be further complicated by the spillover effects of [REDACTED] [West Asian] geopolitics and the encroachment of regional powers. The intensifying rivalry between the US and China is leading to a diminishing presence and influence of both superpowers in the region. As they compete for global dominance, their potential withdrawal could create a **vacuum** that may be filled by middle-sized powers from the [REDACTED] [West Asia], including the UAE, [REDACTED] [Türkiye], Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.

Independently aff forces a somalia invasion,

Hassan 24 [Abdillahi Hassan, Somali Journalist and Social Activist, 1-21-2024, Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia, Somaliland,

<https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/>] //RR

Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums. **However, it is crucial to understand that Somalia's reaction is rooted in its perception of recent successes to "bring Somaliland back to the fold".** What infuriated Somalia the most is in not the prospect of Ethiopia getting an access to the sea as President Mohamud himself hinted at his openness to that possibility. **Rather it is the sense of an opportunity to submit Somaliland to its will slipping away from their hands with the possibilities that this deal opens for Somaliland.** This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi's administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu's steps to capitalize on them. The president's extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland's army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the Somali government abruptly capitalized on **by recognizing** the administration of Las Anod which claims three regions in **Somaliland** either wholly or partially. And finally, the neglect of economic development has finally caught up with the country and put considerable strain on its strength. In contrast to Muse's setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year, securing debt relief, East Africa Community membership, and the lifting of a long-standing weapons import ban. These factors have emboldened Mogadishu's administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland's quest for independence on the negotiation table. Bitter Confrontation in Djibouti Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. Confronting Bihi on his "lack of legitimacy" and control over all of Somaliland's territory, Somalia further issued a clear threat of destabilization in Somaliland's western regions by exploiting clan cleavages. Insult was added to injury when Mohamud demanded that president Bihi represent only his personal interests and those of his immediate kin group as "there were no thing as Somaliland to speak off". Later statements from Somalia's Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi's faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by "surrender to" Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. **In fact, the Somali side was so smug about their advantage in Djibouti that Minister Fiqi announced that it was a "historic milestone for the unification of the country".** Indeed, **the over-reaction from Mogadishu was nothing more than frustration over the loss of**

perceived opportunity. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. **And for that, they are willing to go to war, not against Ethiopia as Somali officials have repeatedly stated, but against Somaliland.** Somalia is too weak to maintain confrontation with Ethiopia for prolonged time. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. **There is great difference in the resources and capacities of the two nations at this juncture.** Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, **there is hardly any country that would pick Somalia over Ethiopia.** Subterfuge and Subversion In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it's Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia's attack on multiple fronts. Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing "pro-union" politicians serving in Somalia's parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland's claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. However, **Somalia's fury over Somaliland's self-determination as manifested in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding does not end there. What follows the legalese arguments is concerted efforts to challenge Somaliland's de facto sovereignty over the land. This takes the form of subversion, destabilization and attempts to break the consensus of Somaliland's majority on the independence project.** The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu's approach to the Somaliland question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the "members of Awdal community" to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. **As tensions escalate, the long-deferred confrontation between Somaliland and Somalia over self-determination becomes inevitable, risking wider regional involvement.** In this confrontation, **Somaliland suffers from the obvious disadvantage of being led by a divisive and quite incompetent administration.** However, as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland's narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia.

Also, The AFF opens the floodgates for inequality driven conflict.

Kadidja Said 23, 3-xx-2023, legal professional @ AQN International Law Firm based in Somaliland with a masters degree in international law from Aix-Marseille University, FDI in Somaliland: A Vehicle for Peacebuilding or a Source of Social Inequality?, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, <https://instituteforpeace.org/publications/ipcs-briefing/FDI-in-Somaliland-A-Vehicle-for-Peacebuilding-or-a-Source-of-Social-Inequality-1.pdf>] BZ

Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland has dealt with international companies and foreign governments for economic and political purposes. **But, getting recognition will not solve and answer the social and economic problems faced by Somaliland.**

However, this needs rethinking and reformulating the state policies and strategies, for example, create legal and political framework necessary to qualify for foreign direct investments and design forms of cooperation with the international actors. Not only the international actors, but also creating positive public posture within the state citizens and distribution of the state resources among the citizens can strengthen the social contract and cohesion. Also, inclusive political institutions are necessary for states to develop. Such institutions provide confidence for people (both within the state and without) to invest in themselves and in businesses. Such investments hire people and create the tax revenues necessary to build state infrastructure. Therefore, making Somaliland effective, inclusive and transparent state, and developing clear and coherent investment policies and strategies might place Somaliland more prominently in the frontline to qualify for investment, and may attract more attention from foreign investors who interested to come and invest this country. Therefore, there are a number of issues that need particular attention from the Government and expected to work on it and make this journey fruitful: The Government of Somaliland should work on making state institutions more effective, efficient, transparent and reliable. The Government of Somaliland should open the market space to all citizens, and also advocate the issue of fair and free market economy, where the rights of poor weak and minorities are respected. Creating legal frameworks and effective institutions to govern businesses both local and international and accept a high number of FDI without threatening the fragile peace and the existing balance of the country is necessary. Developing or implementing inclusive policies that could seem important and necessary for the development of the state are also important. Those policies will make the state inclusive, transparent, stable, and representative of the citizens' interests. Introduction Economic growth is important for every country, but it is especially crucial for

post-conflict countries needing peacebuilding, recovery, and reconstruction. Since the declaration of independence in 1991 from Somalia, the Republic of Somaliland has been peaceful and has undergone a significant political and economic transformation. In 2002, Somaliland transitioned from a [REDACTED]-based system to multi-party democracy after a referendum. Still, the country kept some of its traditions by formalising the Guurti as an Upper House of Elders, which ensures the support of traditional [REDACTED]-based power structures¹. Thus, the country secured a stable peace and democratic system of politics by merging modern and traditional elements². According to Freedom House's political rights and civil liberty rankings, Somaliland has a score of 42/100 and is the only one ranked as "partly free" in the Horn of Africa³. Despite not having international recognition, Somaliland is making notable progress in promoting peace and democracy compared to its neighbouring countries. However, the country is still facing challenges, and peace remains fragile. One challenge is that the country has no major economic development with serious unemployment rates and education issues. Many people consider that economic development will be a solution to these challenges and lead to sustainable peace. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be an important tool to rebuild infrastructures and industries and be a cure for unemployment by generating more economic growth. FDI is defined as international investment by an entity resident in one economy, in the business of an enterprise resident in another economy that is made to obtain a lasting interest⁴. FDI is an international movement of capital carried out by foreign investors in a country to create or develop a subsidiary. FDI also allows foreign investors to acquire a local company. More research needs to be conducted on the role that FDI plays in promoting and consolidating peace in a

post-conflict country, with fewer insights on whether or not FDI can lead to sustainable peace or if it will fuel further conflicts. **While FDI may**

remediate unemployment by creating new jobs and increasing standards of living, it can also create other problems and destabilise the fragile peace in place. FDI: A FACTOR OF PEACEBUILDING The attraction of FDI can lead to the economic development of a country, through the improvement of economic conditions, favouring the establishment The Current Economic State of Somaliland After

a conflict, the reconstruction and development of institutional infrastructure are crucial goals. Thereby, foreign aid and FDI are the main development sources for most post-conflict countries⁵. **However, in the case of Somaliland, the country has limited access to international**

financial aid due to the lack of international recognition. Instead, it has heavily relied on a locally mobilised budget that fluctuated around 20 and 40 million dollars between 1999 and 2007⁶. In 2010, this budget⁷ was at 61 million dollars and rose significantly in 2020 to 331.5 million dollars⁸. The country received and still receives little aid from international NGOs and aid agencies with minimal and inconsequential impacts. Thus, the private sector played a vital role in the recovery of the country's economy after the conflict ended, with the government being unable to carry out its basic functions⁹. According to a report by the World Bank, the government's contribution to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) is only around 10%¹⁰. Somaliland's major industries are privately owned businesses, where key industries are telecommunication, livestock and remittances. As a result, the country's economy is private-sector-led and faces little to no regulations¹¹. Somali-owned multinational corporations (MNCs) and large and medium businesses have a huge influence on the Somaliland economy and state formation. Those businesses are [REDACTED]-based and play an essential role in supporting the stability of the country¹². They are usually involved in resolving disputes and disagreements in political and investment related issues¹³, also participating in building infrastructure in the country and supplying relief during droughts¹⁴. However, this situation created a status quo that only benefits a handful of powerful local businesses and closes the market for foreign investors. These businesses do not want powerful state institutions that could control their profits, leading to a stagnation in economic growth. Somaliland's economy lacks diversification. Most products in the country are imported and not produced in place. The stagnation of the economy and the de facto protectionism created by the lack of regulations in turn is fuelling unemployment. Somaliland has one of the highest rates of unemployment and a high level of illiteracy. Another contributing factor to the high level of unemployment can be attributed to the phenomenon known as "brain drain"; when most of qualified professionals go abroad to live and work¹⁵. In 2012, Somaliland had the fourth-lowest GDP per capita in the world after the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, and Burundi¹⁶. There is also a high income gap between the rich wealthy and the poor weak, creating a fragile environment for peace in a region already at risk. For developing countries and emerging economies, FDI has become an increasingly important source of economic development, modernization, and income growth and can also reduce unemployment¹⁷. In the case of Somaliland, attracting more FDI could be beneficial in the long term by solving some of the challenges that weaken the fragile peace, and thus create a favourable environment for sustainable peace. Benefits of FDI in Somaliland FDI is very scarce in Somaliland due to its location in a high-risk environment and need for international recognition. There are only a few multinational corporations operating in the country such as Mott MacDonald, Western Union, and Coca-Cola. These MNCs (Multinational Corporations) are present under special arrangements with the State or local entrepreneurs¹⁸. This type of investment allows the host country to expand its market and develop new marketing channels, and cheaper production facilities but also to gain an access to new technologies and necessary skills to attract further investment¹⁹. Thus, FDI can provide stimulation for economic development. In the short term, opening the market for foreign investment will create a disadvantage for local companies since they will be out-competed. However, when MNCs invest in developing countries they bring new technologies, working practices, and know-hows such as international marketing that local companies can copy and adapt themselves to the increased competition. Moreover, the MNCs usually train and hire local employees who can then establish their own companies with the skills they have learnt²⁰. This will lead to an improvement of local companies' standards, product quality and labour standards²¹. In addition to improving the labour standards and allowing local employees to obtain new skills, foreign companies can also help reduce the unemployment rate of the host country. For instance, local employees can move from foreign to domestic firms and increase their productivity²². Besides improving product quality, labour standards and local companies, FDI plays a huge role in the restoration and construction of infrastructure that did not exist before due to insufficient funds or a lack of security to provide for maintenance²³. Somaliland's infrastructure was already subpar prior to the civil war and withdrawal of the 1960 union with Somalia. Therefore, FDI can provide a critical boost to the existing infrastructure. For instance, Mozambique has been rebuilt itself since welcoming foreign investors and FDI, leading to substantial infrastructure restoration and expansion projects²⁴. International partners and foreign investors are a significant source of infrastructure financing. They can contribute to local transport and communications infrastructure as part of their operation; for example, by building roads to better service their businesses. Sometimes, these foreign investors can contribute to the construction of infrastructure beneficial to all after signing an agreement with the government. Instances of these can be found in many African countries that have signed with Chinese companies, resulting in developed transport communication and roads²⁵. Though the intentions of foreign investors participating in the improvement of infrastructure are in their own favour, businesses in the host countries can prosper from the updated systems which will foster opportunities for the local populace. Another benefit of FDI and the presence of MNCs is the positive imagery that will showcase a readiness for international cooperation, attracting other investors and members of the diaspora that can contribute positively to the country's growth. In the long term, Somaliland would be seen as a country "open for business" and where everyone could benefit by investing in this territory. This openness for foreign investment will contribute to consolidate peace and stability in the region. In fact, FDI plays a major role in strengthening peace in a country when the benefits are distributed equally in the country and to every citizen. FDI and its Role in Peacebuilding Various studies have shown that FDI can help promote peace. According to proponents, investment is a vital component of globalization and economic interdependence and by bringing economic development it promotes democracy and reduces conflict²⁶. Another main argument that supports this theory is that increasing the price of foreign capital is related to the reduced likelihood of civil conflict; where scarcity of capital can lead to conflicts and political unrest. The introduction of foreign capital in the country can decrease these types of problems. Overall, the presence of FDI decreases the probability of instability and increases the stability and development of the country²⁷. Moreover, studies and history have showcased that war and conflicts are unlikely between close economic partners. However, there is an equally important, and for some, a far greater series of questions to consider, for example, what is Somaliland's benefits and dilemmas associated with if Somaliland attracts FDI from neighbouring countries? Could this erase the possibility of a future conflict and strengthen their diplomatic ties? Answering these questions requires a commitment and further studies from economic, political, security and social perspectives.

Not all studies agree that FDI has an important role to play in peacebuilding with minimal thorough investigations into this exact topic. Some studies

argue that there is no significant correlation between FDI and peacebuilding since foreign investors rarely invest or participate in the businesses of a war-torn country unless they are investing in the extractive sector²⁸. The World Investment Report of 2010 found that despite the high levels of conflicts and fragility, the sectors of extraction and

telecommunication were able to draw a high amount of FDI²⁹. FDI can take two forms, Greenfield Investment, and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). A Greenfield investment is a type of market entry that involves the establishment of a new company, facility, or factory in the host country. It is commonly used when a company seeks to gain complete control over its activities in foreign markets. On the other hand, M&A can result in the acquisition of a local company by a foreign investor, or a merger that combines the two companies with ownership shared between the foreign investors and the local company³⁰. The term Greenfield investment originates from the concept that a MNC creates a new venture from the ground up by preparing a green field. Greenfield investment involves building everything from scratch and giving foreign investors the highest control over the facilities and the business in the host country. This type of investment is a strategy commonly used to expand businesses abroad and it has a direct effect on the host country's employment rate. Greenfield investment requires the employment of local workers and adaptation to the host country's institutional environment³¹. Compared to Greenfield Investment, Mergers and Acquisitions do not contribute to expanding the host country's capital stock as they either take over or go into partnership with a company that is already existing³². It can therefore be concluded that Greenfield investment will have a stronger impact on the economic growth of the host country, directly increasing the employment rate and benefiting the local workforce³³. This impact on employment rates will further contribute to peace, and more people will have decent work and pay, whether they are employed or self-employed contributing to the overall stability of society. Providing opportunities for people from all sectors of society helps minimize social immobility and exclusion, and maximises social mobility. Through foreign investment, people have the opportunity to accumulate economic assets which they can in turn invest back into the economy. A higher rate of employment and social mobility within a society will result in an unwillingness and contradiction to participate in violence incited by politicians and others. When people can earn enough to live with dignity and can enjoy fair treatment, they avoid conflict and work hard to keep the stability of their country. In the case of Somaliland, the population is very young. According to a 2020 report from the Somaliland Health and Demographic survey, 61% of the population is aged less than 20 years and 74% is aged less than 30 years³⁴. To avoid violence and instability, it is important to focus on creating economic opportunities for young people³⁵. FDI can create viable jobs for young people because employment opportunities are a key component to achieve sustainable peace and development in all countries, but especially in countries that have experienced violent conflicts. It has been suggested that a high rate of youth unemployment leads to higher rates of instability in countries in general, and thus creates a favourable ground for armed conflicts³⁶. High unemployment rates are not the only contributing factor to instability but are usually cited heavily as causation when it is paired with socioeconomic inequalities and corruption. Inequalities are known to have a positive effect on political violence by increasing tensions among the youth. Economically, countries with good outcomes are less prone to experiencing armed conflict while democracy does not always imply stability³⁷. Thus, flourishing economies are more likely to have favourable outcomes compared to countries focusing on democracy instead of economic development. FDI can have a positive impact on economic conditions especially if the main objective of the laws of the host country is to improve their economy. At the same time, economic conditions can have a significant influence on instability and conflict recurrence. Postconflict countries face harsh economic conditions that should be addressed in order to build a more sustainable peace. Even after the conflict ended a long time ago, these economies still experience various shocks such as capital flight and brain drain³⁸. FDIs are a way to tackle these problems since it has a positive impact on the employment rate but also is a good method to fight against capital flight. Moreover, attracting FDI allows to have a strong currency and increases the population of the host country purchasing power. Study shows that the link between peace and economic development is intuitive, it is certain that peace favours economic development but the latter strengthens peace. According to the World Development Report 2011, the average cost of a civil war is equivalent to around 30 years of economic growth. It is believed that mutual trust and functional relationships grew from and were nourished historically by trade and economic development. That was the main reason that led to the settlement of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the creation of the European Iron and Steel Community which was established to promote peace between Germany and France³⁹. This community was also designed to establish peace through economic linkages. FDI can also be a means to establish peace and contribute to peacebuilding not just in the host country but also with other countries. However, FDI can also have the opposite effect and create instability in a country. Certainly, foreign investments create new jobs and increase the living standards of the host country but they can also lead to the exploitation of the benefits from investment through corrupted networks⁴⁰. This issue is one of the most significant factors that can affect the development of post-conflict countries. Some suggest that investors in post-conflict countries should implement policies contributing to income equality and improving the living standards of the

local population⁴¹. **However, most investors in postconflict countries are not concerned about corporate**

social responsibility and their main goal is to make profits. This suggests that the expectations of foreign investors to solve economic problems and contribute to the equal distribution of the benefits from the investment may not hold. In some host countries, FDI can be a source of destabilisation and disturb the existing balance, especially in the case of Somaliland. FDI Destabilizing Factor FDI presents some challenges and risks that could destabilise a country by increasing inequalities. In the case of Somaliland, FDI can disturb the existing balance of the country and lead to more tension but these challenges can be surmounted. Challenges and Risks of FDI While the attraction of FDI allows a country to improve its economic conditions,

some studies show that FDI inflows can increase social inequality and trigger domestic conflicts⁴². Such disturbance may happen if FDI is going to benefit only a small number of people.

The benefits of foreign investment can be captured easily by the government with a minimal spill-over to the region these investments are made. For example, foreign investment in natural resources does not need support from the locals by way of human capital, and the infrastructure they bring can be easily transferred out of the region. Moreover the workers in these types of industries are usually low-skilled and poorly paid but also poorly treated. This is one of the reasons why investments in non-resource sectors should be encouraged. As mentioned before, foreign investment in sectors other than resources draws a lot of support from the region these investments are made. For instance, manufacturing, infrastructure, and services are some of the sectors that boost the region by investing in human resources and training potential workers⁴³. **Another risk associated with FDI is that it always creates winners and losers, and conflicts**

may emerge through this situation. Indeed, new conflicts arise due to the increasing inequality between the poor population and the elites that are supporting and participating in foreign

investment. This can lead to the decrease of the legitimacy of the political elites since they are not working to find a way to resolve the inequalities created by

these investments nor put in place social justice policies⁴⁴ Another problem connected with FDI is inequalities between regions in the same country. **Foreign**

investment may alleviate the inequalities in the local economy but it is important to note that the

majority of investment is concentrated in industrial and urban areas mainly in big cities. Usually, because these places have the necessary infrastructure and skills to support the development of the businesses⁴⁵. This can lead to strong inequalities between regions, feed conflicts and create insurgencies. Some regions may even ask for more autonomy or independence through armed conflict. In addition, developing countries experience large regional inequalities. Since peripheral regions are less populated than urban cities, they do not usually benefit from the improvement of living standards and incomes. Therefore, insurgencies tend to occur in these areas and mobilisation takes place within local networks. Regional inequalities are more likely to be related to violent conflict than general social inequalities that affect disconnected individuals. These regional inequalities affect the same people, from the same place, so it is easier for them to unite and fight back. Usually, they are from the same ethnic background too which can make them feel like these inequalities are based on discrimination⁴⁶. Some states t''

end to favour regions that are populated by their supporters or kin which can result in marked geographical differences. Regional income **and** economic inequalities are more likely to foster conflict than absolute poverty. According to various theories of relative deprivation, comparisons with those who have more wealth may inspire violent political mobilisation and radical action, especially in cases of discrimination and exploitation⁴⁷. This kind of situation can be exploited by certain group leaders and conflicts entrepreneurs who can exaggerate and exploit these inequalities to achieve their own economic or political goals⁴⁸ Foreign investment can also cause a political reaction from the local business community as it can put local entrepreneurs in a disadvantaged position. For a long time, local businesses did not have to share the market with foreign companies and investors, opening the country for foreign investment will make them lose profit in the short term and that could lead to some tensions. For example, this could be the case for Somaliland because most local businesses are not in favour of welcoming foreign companies.

And, affirming also sparks Somaliland civil war --- clan dynamics ensure conflict.

Batten 24 [Dr. Karl Von Batten, senior government advisor and founder of the Von Batten-Montague-York, L.C. policy advocacy group, 12-9-2024, Growing concern that the push for U.S. recognition of Somaliland will lead to civil war in Somaliland, <https://foreignpolicynews.org/2022/05/13/growing-concern-that-the-push-for-u-s-recognition-of-somaliland-will-lead-to-civil-war-in-somaliland/>] //RR

Unfortunately, history shows that well-intentioned U.S. foreign policies based on a simplistic understanding of internal dynamics in each country in Africa have resulted in more problems. The upheavals in Libya and South Sudan are recent examples of American and European good intentions turning into disasters. We Americans tend to look at things through the lens of good guys versus bad guys and freedom versus perceived oppression, enacting policies or government actions based on these conceptual viewpoints. In this way, the self-declared state of Somaliland appears to be the latest potential victim of U.S. good intentions. There is a push by a group of highly respected individuals in Washington, D.C. for the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent country separate from Somalia. Joshua Meserve, a senior policy analyst for Africa and the [redacted] [West Asia] at the Heritage Foundation, is one of the finest minds when it comes to U.S. policies focused on Africa, and he is a strong advocate for U.S. recognition of Somaliland as an independent country. On May 06, 2020, Joshua published a piece on the Heritage Foundation's Daily Signal website titled "Somalilanders' Quest for Independence Isn't 'Neocolonial' Plot. It's Self-Determination." In it, he said, "It is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019"[4]. Eritrean and South Sudanese independence movements both led to wars that, in part, are still being waged today[5][6]. Therefore, I do not think those are good examples to argue for Somaliland's independence. Joshua is correct in that Somaliland did declare independence from Somalia in 1991. Nevertheless, what is missing from Joshua's comment is that not all Somalis/Somalilanders in Somaliland are pro-secession from Somalia—many are against it. This dissent is why there is strong opposition by many Somalis/Somalilanders and Somaliland-Americans against U.S. recognition of Somaliland. The opposition to U.S. recognition of Somaliland has little to do with independence from Somalia and everything to do with a power struggle between the clans. As with most African states with multiple [redacted] and clans, Somaliland is not unified. Somaliland is made up of five clans, namely the Isaak, the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadaabursi. The Isaak is the

clan in power and pushing for independence. **The four opposing clans—the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi—oppose the U.S. recognition of Somaliland because they know that will translate to financial and military aid to the Somaliland government, which is controlled by the Isaak clan. The fear among the other clans is that U.S. aid to the Somaliland government, and therefore the Isaak clan, will allow the Isaak clan to dominate the other clans and take control of their land.**

Currently, the Somaliland government only has complete control over Isaak territory, where the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, is also located.

However, the recently introduced House and Senate Bills proposing the U.S. recognition of Somaliland and the expansion of the U.S.

military relationship with Somaliland **have increased political anxieties in Somaliland. The opposing clans are now openly discussing the eventuality of a civil war against the Isaak clan. All it takes to start a war in Africa is a few people with Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) 47s.**

I urge caution when it comes to Somaliland. This is why I support the current U.S. policy that calls for the African Union, Somalia, and Somaliland to resolve the Somaliland issue amongst themselves—this is the right approach. It is up to Africans to decide their fate. The days of Americans and Europeans dictating or influencing the borders of sovereign African countries should be left in the last century. I am opposed TO H.R. 7170, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act, and Section 5 of S.3861, the Somaliland Partnership Act. Two pieces of legislation that directly and indirectly violate Somalia's sovereignty. U.S. foreign policy must be color blind; we as Americans cannot oppose Russia's violation of Ukraine's borders and sovereignty and then turn around and put

forward legislation that violates the borders and sovereignty of an African state. The one rule for Europe and a different rule for Africa has not gone unnoticed by Africans. **Instead of pushing**

legislation and policies that will further divide the region and lead to civil war, the U.S. can play a constructive

role in the Somaliland issue; we can **help the African Union facilitate a national dialogue between the opposing clans, the Somali government, and the government of Somaliland.** The U.S. can also help by assisting in developing a

road map for peace that will ensure peace and prosperity for all Somalis. This is a logical way forward. **Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and South Sudan, when it comes to Somaliland, we cannot pretend that the deadly outcome of possible U.S. policy missteps is unknown.**

Moreover, The autonomous region of Somalia, Puntland, will start war over territorial disputes

Mahmood 19 ([Omar S Mahmood](#), Senior Analyst for Eastern Africa at Crisis Group and was Senior Researcher at ISS Addis Ababa 09 December 2019 “The various layers to the Somaliland-Puntland discord” Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

<https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-various-layers-to-the-somaliland-puntland-discord> DOA: 12/18/24)
ESM

The long-standing territorial disagreement between Somaliland and Puntland is a legacy of both

European colonialism and Somali state collapse. The conflict plays out on many different levels, with an intersection of local, regional and national political dynamics. The failure to make progress at each layer is stopping overall resolution. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted [research](#) in Somaliland and Puntland to explore the dynamics around the Sool-Sanaag dispute. It interviewed government officials and Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clan representatives, given that the problem primarily involves their home areas. At a local level, the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans have been divided by the dispute. Some political leaders have moved back and forth between Somaliland and Puntland, based on where they can most gain. This ‘borderland [entrepreneurism](#)’, in the words of prominent academic Markus Hoehne, seems to have affected the Dhulbahante more than the Warsengeli, given the latter’s greater focus on working with both sides. But interviewees said as long as the competitive policies of Somaliland and Puntland remained, this dynamic would c, hindering efforts at resolution.

At a regional level, **Somaliland and Puntland clash over the legitimacy of their respective formations.**

Somaliland claims territorial control that adheres to its colonial boundaries, which would include Sool and Sanaag (and the contested Cayn area). Puntland however offers a political administration for the Darod/Harti clan, which would include the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli, both present in Sool and Sanaag (and Cayn). Most Dhulbahante and Warsengeli representatives interviewed by the ISS expressed a strong desire to remain united

with Somalia. **In this sense, Somaliland’s pursuit of independence was considered a red line that many didn’t want to cross.** Yet neither have they always wanted to associate with Puntland, and both clans have experimented with setting up their own political administrations in the past. This shows a level of discontent with all current options.

The conflict would escalate

Mesfin 9 (Berouk Mesfin, senior researcher in charge of the Horn of Africa region with the Conflict Prevention Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. He has worked as a defence analyst at the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence and as political adviser to the US Embassy in Ethiopia. He has also held several positions at the Addis Ababa University: assistant dean of the College of Social Sciences; lecturer in political science and international relations; and as a research associate at the Institute of Development Research and the Institute of Federal Studies. September 2009 “The political development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland” Institute for Security Studies <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111689/p200.pdf> DOA: 12/18/24) ESM

Second, **Somaliland’s conflict with Puntland poses a serious threat to the hard-won peace in Somaliland.**

It could, at least, have very negative implications for Somaliland’s quest for recognition. **Worse, the simmering conflict might escalate into actual war** as long as the situation on the ground continues to be volatile. Thus, the international community should do its best to find rapidly an innovative way of accommodating Somaliland in the international system and ending the uncertainty over its status, short of **outright recognition which is an extremely delicate issue of African international law and may indeed set a dangerous precedent.** Pertaining to the Somaliland–Puntland conflict, the international community should apply their tested local conflict management methods to encourage the two protagonists to establish a forum to openly discuss common issues and resolve their territorial dispute. Thus, the Somaliland–Puntland conflict may actually provide a favourable backdrop for constructive involvement in northern Somalia by the international community. Finally, Somaliland’s electoral landscape is characterised by a lack of resources, low rates of comprehension of electoral processes, propensities towards political violence, and weak institutions including the central and local administration, the National Election Commission, political parties and civil society. More importantly, however, the Somaliland electorate will only accept the results of the upcoming elections if it has confidence in the institution which manages the electoral process. Thus, the National Election Commission should go beyond its previously disjointed and piecemeal efforts to adhere to standard rules and practices, thus producing a calming effect on all stakeholders. In a similar vein, all political parties should temper their unreasonable political discourse, especially before the repeatedly delayed elections which have disappointed many and already seem marked by extreme polarisation. Whether their allegations and counter-allegations have any substance or not, they could uncontrollably deepen the already dangerous mistrust among political parties further eroding the legitimacy of the whole electoral system and maybe leading to violence. Overall, all political parties must accordingly act with a sense of responsibility, keeping in mind that Somaliland has made enormous strides in the establishment of a viable and democratic system of government. The continuation of that process will have a far-reaching effect on the meaningful progress and promise of Somaliland.

For all the scenarios

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