

Septober Neg Case

Contention One is Immigrant Lives

Cartels are finally losing power, as Pandit 24 finds

Pandit 24 [Puja Pandit, 5-14-2024, "4th consecutive year of improvement in peacefulness in Mexico," Vision of Humanity, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/fourth-consecutive-year-of-improvement-amid-persistent-organized-crime-challenges/>, accessed 9-6-2024, KMM]

Mexico recorded a slight improvement in peacefulness of 1.4%. This is the fourth straight year of progress; however, this follows steep decline in peacefulness between 2015 and 2019.

Produced annually by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the Mexico Peace Index provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, including trends, analysis and estimates of the economic impact of violence in the country. The MPI is based on the Global Peace Index, the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. **Mexico's peacefulness improved by 1.4 percent in 2023, with all five indicators of the MPI registering modest improvements. The homicide rate decreased by 5.3% in 2023, marking the fourth straight year of improvement.** However, homicides continue to be a significant concern, with more than 30,500 victims last year. Despite recent improvements, peace in Mexico has deteriorated by 14.4% since 2015, with organized crime and homicide rates notably higher than nine years ago. Yucatán remained the most peaceful state in Mexico, while Colima was the least peaceful. Colima recorded the highest homicide rate on record in 2023, with 111 homicides per 100,000 people.

American operations have also begun bearing fruit, as DHS 24 finds that

DHS 24 [DHS, 7-31-2024, "Fact Sheet: DHS Shows Results in the Fight to Dismantle Cartels and Stop Fentanyl from Entering the U.S.", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/07/31/fact-sheet-dhs-shows-results-fight-dismantle-cartels-and-stop-fentanyl-entering-us>]

Over **the** past three years, **DHS** has focused not just on illicit fentanyl, but the tools and materials TCOs use to make it. We are interdicting and seizing precursor chemicals, pill press machines, die molds, and pill press parts used in the manufacturing process. We are targeting pill press supply chains, pill press brokers, TCOs and U.S. recipients who are producing and moving fentanyl, and the money launderers who help facilitate this illicit trade. In April 2024, CBP **launched Operation Plaza Spike to target plaza bosses and cartels** that facilitate the flow of deadly fentanyl, as well as its analogs, precursors, and tools to make dangerous drugs. Plaza bosses are Cartel operatives who supervise **and** control the flow of illicit products in their specific geographic corridors. On July 18, 2024, CBP expanded the operation to El Paso and Juarez. In June 2024, HSI **indicted 47** alleged **members of a** n Imperial Valley-based, Sinaloa

Cartel-linked fentanyl distribution network; and in July, HSI helped execute the arrest on U.S. soil of the de facto head of the Sinaloa Cartel.

Valle 22:

[Gaby de Valle, policy reporter @ The Verge focused on immigration, 8-3-2022, The Most Surveilled Place in America, Verge,

<https://www.theverge.com/c/23203881/border-patrol-wall-surveillance-tech>] BZ **edited for offensive language**

President Joe Biden promised that “not another foot of wall” would be built if he was elected president. Instead, his administration would use “high-tech capacity” to secure the border. Drones, cameras, and sensors would be more effective and more humane than a physical barrier, he claimed. What Biden’s promises ignored, however, is that the federal government has spent billions on border surveillance technology for the past three decades — and that despite these efforts and aside from a brief lull in crossings early in the pandemic, the number of unauthorized border crossings has gone up year after year. Since the ’90s, the question hasn’t been whether to fund border technology but how to get more of it. The fact that some migrants still make it across the border undetected — or that they attempt the journey at all — isn’t seen as a failure of technology or policy. Instead, it is used to justify more surveillance, more spending, and more [redacted] [workforce].

Miller 19:

Todd Miller, 09/19, “MORE THAN A WALL”, INC,

<https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/more-than-a-wall-report.pdf//EEdoa09/17/24>

The[re is] report begins by tracing the history of border control and militarization. It shows how US budgets for border and immigration control massively increased from the mid-1980s, a trend that has been accelerating ever since. These budgets rose from \$350m in 1980 (then run by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)) to \$1.2 billion in 1990; \$10.2 billion in 2005 and \$23.7 billion in 2018 (under two agencies, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)). In other words, budgets have more than doubled in the last 13 years and increased by more than 6000% since 1980. This growth was matched by a similar growth in border patrol from 4,000 agents in 1994 to 21,000 today. Under its parent CBP agency (which includes an Office of Air and Marine, investigative units, and the Office of Field Operations) there are 60,000 agents, the largest federal law-enforcement agency in the United States. Importantly, it shows that modern US border control involves much more than a wall. The physical barriers on which Trump focuses for campaign purposes are but one feature of an extensive technological border-control infrastructure that penetrates deep into the US interior and into the border regions of Mexico as well as countries in Central America and the Caribbean and beyond. Since 1997, the US government has been steadily expanding the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies, including cameras, aircraft, motion sensors, drones, video surveillance and biometrics at the US–Mexico border. Border Patrol agent Felix Chavez, speaking at the Border Management Conference and Technology Expo in El Paso in 2012, acknowledged this border arsenal, saying that ‘in terms of technology, the capability we have acquired since 2004 is phenomenal’. In line with the 1946 revisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act – and a 1957 decision by the Justice Department – border-control measures extend 100 miles inland, thus expanding the market for the border industry to an area where more than 200 million people, two-thirds of the US population, reside. This is reinforced by US Border Patrol strategies that emphasize a ‘multi-layered’ approach to patrolling the border. What is more, an active policy to externalize US border enforcement to prevent migrants getting anywhere near US borders – particularly since 9/11 – means there are both funding and active programs to train foreign border guards and transfer resources and infrastructure to other countries for border policing. Elaine Duke, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has called these international programs ‘the away game of national security’. This has created a seemingly limitless market for border-security corporations. For example, VisionGain argued in 2014 that the global border-security market was in an ‘unprecedented boom period’ due to three interlocking developments: ‘illegal immigration and terrorist infiltration’, more money for border policing in ‘developing countries’, and the ‘maturation’ of

new technologies. MarketAndMarkets projects that this will be a \$52.95 billion market by 2022. While this is a process taking place in many regions – see TNI’s Border Wars reports on border policies in the European Union (EU) – the US provides the single largest market for border-security corporations, which have reaped handsome rewards under Democrat and Republican administrations alike. The report unveils the scale of the revenues this border-security bonanza has provided, mainly to US corporations: ICE, CBP and Coast Guard together issued more than 344,000 contracts for border and immigration control services worth \$80.5 billion between 2006 and 2018. ICE issued more than 35,000 contracts (costing \$18.2 billion), CBP more than 64,000 (\$27 billion), and the Coast Guard more than 245,000 (\$35.3 billion). CBP contracts alone between 2006 and 2018 exceed the accumulated INS budgets from between 1975 and 1998 of approximately \$26.1 billion. They are also certainly less than the true figures, as reports by the US Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports have consistently criticized these departments for their poor data transparency. Focusing in on CBP contracts – the largest government contractor in border and immigration control – the report identifies 14 companies that are giants in the border security business. These are Accenture, Boeing, Elbit, Flir Systems, G4S, General Atomics, General Dynamics, IBM, L3 Technologies, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, PAE, Raytheon, UNISYS, among several other top firms we list in the report that are receiving contracts. They include technology and security firms, but are clearly dominated by the same global arms firms that reap rewards from high levels of US military spending. In addition, it also profiles, private prison companies CoreCivic and Geo Group who along with G4S are major players in providing immigration detention services. The volume and value of CBP contracts has grown to the point that in 2009, Lockheed Martin landed a contract potentially worth more than \$945 million for maintenance and upkeep of 16 P-3 surveillance planes equipped with airborne and surface-to-radar systems. This one contract was equal to the total entire border and immigration enforcement budgets from 1975 to 1978 (around \$923 million). Similarly, the contract to the San Diego-based General Atomics, worth \$276 million in 2016 for the operational maintenance of the Predator B drone systems, almost exceeds any of the INS annual budgets in the 1970s. The money paid out to corporations dwarfs that given to humanitarian groups supporting refugees. For example, in 2016 the Office for Refugee Resettlement designated \$14.9 million to nine non-profit agencies to help people resettle, a tiny fraction of the total contracts given to corporations to stop, monitor, arrest, incarcerate and deport people. Ethical scandals involving some of the big ten border-security corporations have done little to slow down the revenue stream. UNISYS was found guilty in 2005 of over-billing taxpayers for almost 171,000 employee hours; Flir Systems was found guilty of bribery in 2015; G4S has faced charges for mistreatment and even the death of detainees in the US and UK. Tracking US government contracts for border-security operations overseas is harder to calculate as they are disbursed by multiple agencies through more than 100 programs. The report shows, however, that Raytheon is one of the most significant players – receiving over \$1 billion between 2004 and 2019 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – which has included significant border-building operations in Jordan and the Philippines. According to Raytheon’s own sources, it has deployed border ‘solutions’ in more than 24 countries across Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Americas, covering more than 10,000 kilometers of land and maritime borders. This included deploying more than 500 mobile surveillance systems, training more than 9,000 members of security forces, and building 15 ‘sustainment centers’. Corporations have not been the only ones to benefit. Universities and research institutes have also cashed in through nine Centers of Excellence (COEs) on Borders, Trade, & Immigration that in 2017 received \$10 million directly, with another \$90 million dedicated to research and development (R&D). The University of Houston, University of Arizona, the University of Texas El Paso, University of Virginia, West Virginia University, University of North Carolina, University of Minnesota, Texas A&M, Rutgers University, American University, the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, and the Migration Policy Institute all receive DHS funding. According to the DHS, these COEs have developed more than 100 targeted tools, technologies, and knowledge products for use ‘across the homeland security enterprise’. The COEs have received \$330 million of additional investment from ‘external sources’, presumably the private sector, for homeland security research, development, and education. Other research corporations working with the COEs include MITRE, SAS and Voir Dire International, LLC. The report shows that [thus,] corporations’ success in winning ever bigger contracts is not an unexpected bonanza, but has been engineered by the same corporations’ growing involvement in US politics.

The main beneficiaries of border contracts are also the same companies making the most campaign contributions, doing the most lobbying, meeting most often with government officials, and entering government as advisors and staff in strategic positions of influence. In

this way, **they have shaped the border-militarization policies from which they have profited.** With data from the [opensecrets.org](https://www.opensecrets.org) database – run by the Center for Responsive Politics – the report reveals that: The border-security corporate giants are also the biggest campaign contributors to members of the House Appropriations Committee, the congressional body that regulates expenditures of the federal government, or earmarks the money for potential contracts. Between 2006 and 2018, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing contributed a total of \$27.6 million to members of the committee. During the 115th Congress (2017–2018), Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin were the top two contributors with \$866,194 and \$691,401 respectively offered to members of the Appropriations Committee, along with Raytheon, Boeing, Deloitte, and General Dynamics, all making donations of over \$500,000. While these were all companies winning military contracts and were also lobbying on military issues, they also received substantial contracts from CBP. The top seven contributors to the House Appropriations Committee members (2017–2018) are all CBP contractors: Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Honeywell International, General Dynamics, Deloitte LLP, Boeing, and Raytheon. The border-security corporations also make the biggest campaign contributions to members of the strategic House Homeland Security Committee, which handles legislation on border and immigration control. Between 2006 and 2018, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing contributed a total of \$6.5 million to members of the committee. In the 115th Congress (2017–2018), Northrop Grumman donated \$293,324, General Dynamics \$150,000 and Lockheed Martin \$224,614.

Ultimately, the aff is another step in a vicious, ineffective cycle. With that,

Subpoint A is Alternative Routes.

Despite surveillance, people will still try to come to the U.S., but will use more dangerous methods to do so.

Douglas S. **Massey**, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, 03-xx-2016, Why Border Enforcement Backfired, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5049707/>,
//wenzhuo

From 1986 to 2008 the undocumented population of the United States **grew from three million to 12 million** persons, **despite a five-fold increase in Border Patrol officers**, a four-fold increase in hours spent patrolling the border, **and a 20-fold increase in nominal funding**. Whether measured in terms personnel, patrol hours, or budget, **studies indicate that the surge in border enforcement had little effect in reducing unauthorized migration to the United States** (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999; Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo 2002; Davila, Pagan, and Soydemir 2002; Hanson and McIntosh 2009, 2010; Massey and Riosmena 2010; Angelucci 2012; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2014). The strategy of enhanced border enforcement was not without consequences, however, for research also suggests that it reduced the rate of return migration and redirected migrant flows to new sectors along the border with Arizona and then toward new destinations throughout the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Massey and Capoferro 2004; Carrión-Flores and Sorensen 2006; Gathmann 2008; Kaufman 2008; Bohn and Pubatch 2013; Rocha et al. 2014; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2014). **Border enforcement**, of course, **does nothing to address the economic drivers of migration—persistent labor demand and high wages in the United States** and an abundant labor supply and low wages in Mexico—**nor does it take into account the existence of well-developed networks** able **to support and sustain undocumented border crossing** and thus circumvent enforcement efforts. Under these circumstances, we argue that the **militarization of the border** cannot be expected to deter undocumented migrants from coming, **but will simply induce** them to adjust their border-crossing strategies while continuing to migrate to readily available jobs in the United States. An important constraint from the U.S. side is that the border is long and enforcement resources necessarily must be targeted to specific sectors. As a result, **the hardening of the border at one location will lead migrants to shift to new, less patrolled, likely more remote and riskier crossing sites**, and to **make** more frequent use of coyotes and to pay them more for higher quality, and more effective services. We hypothesize that these costs will not be sufficient to offset expected gains of unauthorized labor in the United States.

Migrants in this position have two options.

The first is smugglers, which ultimately results in the kidnapping, extortion, and death of migrants.

Miriam **Jordan 22**, 7/24/2022, National Immigration Correspondent, Smuggling Migrants at the Border Now a Billion-Dollar Business, New York Times,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/us/migrant-smuggling-evolution.html>

“What transpired there is the subject of science fiction, of a horror movie — and something we simply don’t see in the United States,” the prosecutor, Matthew Watters, told a jury when the accused smugglers went on trial. Organized crime cartels, he said, had “brought this terror across the border.”

But if it was one of the first such cases, it was not the last. Migrant smuggling on the U.S. southern border has evolved over the past 10 years from a scattered network of freelance “coyotes” into a multi-billion-dollar international business controlled by organized crime, including some of Mexico’s most violent drug cartels.

The deaths of 53 migrants in San Antonio last month who were packed in the back of a suffocating tractor-trailer without air conditioning — the deadliest smuggling incident in the country to date — came as **tightened U.S. border restrictions**, exacerbated by a pandemic-related public health rule, have **encourage**d more **migrants to turn to smugglers.**

While migrants have long faced kidnappings and extortion in Mexican border cities, such incidents have been on the rise on the U.S. side, according to federal authorities.

More than 5,046 people were arrested and charged with human smuggling last year, up from 2,762 in 2014.

Over the past year, federal agents have raided stash houses holding dozens of migrants on nearly a daily basis.

Title 42, the public health order introduced by the Trump administration at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, has authorized the immediate expulsion of those caught crossing the border illegally, allowing migrants to cross repeatedly in the hope of eventually succeeding. This has **led to** a substantial **escalation in** the **number of migrant encounters** on the border — 1.7 million in fiscal 2021 — **and** brisk **business for smugglers.**

In March, agents near El Paso rescued 34 migrants from two cargo containers without ventilation on a single day. The following month, 24 people being held against their will were found in a stash house.

Law enforcement agents have engaged in so many high-speed chases of smugglers lately in Uvalde, Texas — there were **nearly 50 such “bailouts” in the town between February and May** — that some school employees said they failed to take a lockdown order seriously during a mass shooting in May because so many previous lockdowns had been ordered when smugglers raced through the streets.

Teófilo Valencia, whose 17- and 19-year-old sons perished in the San Antonio tragedy, said he had taken out a loan against the family home to pay the smugglers \$10,000 for each son’s transport.

Fees typically range from \$4,000, for migrants coming from Latin America, to \$20,000, if they must be moved from Africa, Eastern Europe or Asia, according to Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, an expert on smuggling at George Mason University.

For years, independent coyotes paid cartels a tax to move migrants through territory they controlled along the border, and the criminal syndicates stuck to their traditional line of business, drug smuggling, which was far more profitable.

That began to change around 2019, Patrick Lechleitner, the acting deputy director at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, told Congress last year. The sheer number of people seeking to cross made migrant smuggling an irresistible moneymaker for some cartels, he said.

The enterprises have teams specializing in logistics, transportation, surveillance, stash houses and accounting — all supporting an industry whose revenues have soared to an estimated \$13 billion today from **\$500 million in 2018**, according to Homeland Security Investigations, the federal agency that investigates such cases.

Migrants are moved by plane, bus and private vehicles. In some border regions, such as the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, smugglers affix color-coded bands to the wrists of migrants to designate that they belong to them and what services they are receiving.

“They are organizing the merchandise in ways you could never imagine five or 10 years ago,” said Ms. Correa-Cabrera.

Groups of Central American families who crossed the Rio Grande recently into La Joya, Texas, wore blue bracelets with the logo of the Gulf Cartel, a dolphin, and the word “entregas,” or “deliveries” — meaning they intended to surrender to U.S. authorities and seek asylum. Once they had crossed the river, they were no longer the cartel’s business.

Previously, **migrants** entering Laredo, Texas, waded across the river on their own and faded into the dense, urban landscape. Now, according to interviews with migrants and law enforcement officials, it is impossible to cross without paying a coyote connected to the Cartel del Noreste,

a splinter of the Los Zetas syndicate.

Smugglers often enlist teenagers to transport arrivals to stash houses in working-class neighborhoods. After they gather several dozen people, they load the migrants onto trucks parked in Laredo's vast warehouse district around Killam Industrial Boulevard.

"Drivers are recruited at bars, strip joints, truck stops," said Timothy Tubbs, who was deputy special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations for Laredo until he retired in January.

Rigs hauling migrants blend with the 20,000 trucks that travel daily on the I-35 freeway to and from Laredo, the country's busiest land port. Border Patrol agents posted at checkpoints inspect only a fraction of all the vehicles to ensure traffic keeps flowing.

The tractor-trailer discovered on June 27 with its tragic cargo had passed through a checkpoint about 30 miles north of Laredo without arousing suspicions. By the time it stopped three hours later on a remote road in San Antonio, most of the 64 people inside had already **died**.

The driver, Homero Zamorano Jr., one of two men **indicted on Thursday** in connection with the tragedy, said that he was unaware that the air-conditioning system had failed.

The 2014 incident at the stash house in Texas resulted in the arrest of the perpetrators and a subsequent trial, providing an unusually vivid look at the brutal tactics of smuggling operations. Though **kidnapping and extortion happen with** some **frequency**, such trials with cooperating witnesses are relatively rare, federal law enforcement officials say. Fearing deportation, undocumented relatives of kidnapped migrants seldom call the authorities.

That case began in the thick brush country eight miles from the Rio Grande, in Carrizo Springs, a popular transit point for people trying to elude detection. "You could hide a million elephants here, this brush is so thick," said Jerry Martinez, a captain in the Dimmit County Sheriff's Office.

The second is riskier routes. Harris 20 writes

Erin Harris, 4-3-2020, "The US – Mexico Border: A testing ground for digital warfare," No Publication, [//RC">https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/article/the-us-mexico-border-a-testing-ground-for-digital-warfare //RC](https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/article/the-us-mexico-border-a-testing-ground-for-digital-warfare)

While CBP uses other **technology capabilities for prolonged surveillance, the drones are specifically used for targeted investigations. In the attempt to try and avoid detection**, many **migrants** are **opting for much riskier paths into higher mountains and vast deserts**. Despite the artificial intelligence algorithms and drones used by CBP, which **could be used to help migrants** in dangerous situations, practices under such circumstances only seem to be linked to the increased number of migrant deaths along these riskier paths. While CBP uses other **technology capabilities** for prolonged surveillance, the drones are specifically used for targeted investigations. In the attempt to try and avoid detection, many migrants are opting for much riskier paths into higher mountains and vast deserts. Despite the artificial intelligence algorithms and drones used by CBP, **which could be used to help migrants** in dangerous situations, practices under such circumstances **only seem to be linked to** the **increased** number of migrant **deaths** along these riskier paths.

Either way, on top of the human impact, these alternative routes empower cartels.

Gilman 24 states that

Denise **Gilman**, 1-16-20**24**, "Claims of an Open Border Are False and Harmful," UT News, [https://news.utexas.edu/2024/01/16/claims-of-an-open-border-are-false-and-harmful/ //SM](https://news.utexas.edu/2024/01/16/claims-of-an-open-border-are-false-and-harmful//SM)

These **harsh policies** do not stop arrivals at the border, but they do have serious negative consequences, since asylum seekers are returned to their home country. The policies also do not make the United States safer. Instead, they **force asylum seekers into the hands of smuggling rings, which incentives and profits organized crime, making both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border more violent.**

Freeman 24 corroborates, finding that

Will Freeman, Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, "Tough New Immigration Rules Risk Empowering the Cartels", JANUARY 9, 2024, <https://time.com/6553516/new-immigration-rules-empowering-cartels/>, accessed 7-16-2024] /mesm

Not many lawmakers like to admit it, but migration surges correspond much more to crises roiling Latin America and the Caribbean than they do to new immigration policies ironed out in D.C. Economic collapse and authoritarian repression have pushed seven million Venezuelans and over one million Cubans to leave their countries. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians, Ecuadoreans, and Central Americans have fled poverty and gang violence. For years, more politically stable Latin American countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Chile absorbed the bulk of these flows, becoming home to over 80 percent of these fleeing Venezuelans and millions of Haitians. The pandemic's steep toll on the region's economies, global price hikes, and a decade of slow economic growth have driven many migrants to uproot once again and head for the U.S., where nearly 9 million job vacancies and safer conditions offer hope. As former top White House Latin America advisor Dan Restrepo has argued, Washington can do more to help stabilize the region's economies and host communities—for instance, by leveraging development finance tools—without hopelessly trying to “fix” crises in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, or Haiti. But debate in Congress is focused on the border—and not an inch beyond it. If Democrats and Republicans arrive at a “deal” that gives border hawks everything they want, not everyone will lose out—Latin America’s human smugglers and criminal groups, especially those active in northern Mexico, will find themselves suddenly in an even more advantageous situation. Over the past decade, as more and more people have set their sights on heading north, supply has met demand: a physical and digital infrastructure has sprung up, stretching from Venezuela and Ecuador to northern Mexico, that facilitates the grueling overland journey from South America to North—squeezing migrants for every penny and racking up huge profits for guides, human smugglers, and corrupt state officials along the way. The Darién Gap—a once all-but impassible stretch of mountainous jungle between Panama and Colombia which 500,000 migrants are believed to have crossed in 2023—is now crisscrossed by rough-hewn dirt roads, “security checkpoints” run by armed groups, and stores selling provisions. What’sApp groups and TikTok accounts—the digital side of the hemisphere’s new migration infrastructure—advertise information about routes and services, giving more people in the Americas more information about how to migrate than ever before. These channels of communication give no accurate estimates of the odds of successfully making it to the U.S. or remaining there. But they suggest making it is possible. Often, that’s enough to inspire desperate people to begin their journeys. Organized crime is not the only actor benefiting from the new migration economy. Small informal businesses and loosely connected individuals often sell migrants services. But criminal groups just as frequently de facto control the border zones—from Ecuador to Mexico—in which these businesses operate, extorting their proprietors and migrants, alike. InsightCrime, an organization that researches cartels in Latin America, has shown that Mexican drug cartels have taken over operations along the U.S.-Mexico border—in part as a result of **U.S. policies** such as the now defunct “remain in Mexico” which **created pools of desperate migrants these criminal groups could extort and exploit. If new hardline measures are enacted**, expect these **Mexican cartels**—some of the same ones that traffic deadly fentanyl into the U.S.—to **[will] turn eye-popping profits**.

Council on Foreign Relations 07/05/24 Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels. [Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels | Council on Foreign Relations \(cfr.org\)](#)

Mexican authorities have been waging a deadly battle against drug cartels for nearly two decades, but with limited success. **Thousands of Mexicans—including politicians, students, and journalists—die in the conflict every year. The country has seen more than 431,000 homicides since 2006, when the government declared war on the cartels.**

Subpoint B is Detention Deaths.

Surveillance inevitably leads to further detention of migrants, as Morley 24 finds:

Morley, 2024. [Priya, 06-28 "AI at the Border: Racialized Impacts and Implications," Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/97172/ai-at-the-border/>], Date Accessed: 2024-07-08T17:19:52.324Z //MA

The United States has increasingly relied on digital technology to enforce its border externalization policies. The Biden administration has allocated substantial funds toward **border security technology**. "Smart borders" include "remote **video surveillance**, drones, automated license plate readers, motion sensors, [and] integrated fixed towers [IFTs]." At the U.S.-Mexico border IFTs are tall long-range

structures that use cameras and radar to detect moving people and **collect data** about them **for immigration**

enforcement. The United States also employs small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), a form of remote-operated drone originally designed for military operations, to identify and surveil migrants, facilitating their apprehension at the border. Such border surveillance technologies impinge on migrants' privacy rights and can **lead to increased violence and detention**, and are a tool to externalize borders **and impede migrants from entering the United States**. Upon arrival to the U.S.-Mexico border, some migrants are required to use CBP One, a mobile AI application implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to submit their personal and biometric information to apply for asylum (or, previously, exceptions to Title 42). This app has come under scrutiny, including because it is less able to recognize the photos of Black and dark-skinned people, creating a barrier for them to access this portal to move their asylum applications forward. While the algorithms CBP One relies on are not publicly available, such facial recognition technology has been rejected as racially discriminatory in other contexts such as policing. For example, these algorithms have been found to inaccurately identify Black faces at a rate 10 to 100 times more than white faces.

Deportations are slow, leaving tens of thousands stuck in detention, AIC 24 writes

American Immigration Council, 8-14-2024, "The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security",

<https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/the-cost-of-immigration-enforcement-and-border-security/> //MX

The federal government has already met the border security benchmarks laid down in earlier Senate immigration reform bills. As the American Immigration Lawyers Association pointed out in a January 2013 analysis, the "benchmarks" for border security specified in the bipartisan 2006, 2007, and 2010 immigration-reform legislative packages in the Senate have been largely met. Yet each time a benchmark was met,

Congress continued to **fund** ever-greater levels of **enforcement without significant increases in adjudication** or passage of broader reforms to the immigration system. The requirements in those Senate bills for more border

enforcement personnel, border fencing, surveillance technology, unmanned aerial vehicles, and detention beds have also been fulfilled and in many ways surpassed. ICE detention bed funding reached a record level in FY 2024, funding 41,500 beds, the third highest level in Congressional history. And when Congress authorizes ICE to increase detention beds, **the agency** often **detains more than funded**. For example, despite Congress appropriating enough money for 40,520 beds throughout the year, ICE's use of budgetary mechanisms in FY 2019 to shift money from other locations to their detention account led to ICE breaking records by detaining more than 55,000 people.

Overall, these conditions dehumanize migrants

Hansen 19 (Brianna Hansen, xx-xx-2019, "Living Conditions in United States Immigration Detention Centers," Ballard Brief, <https://ballardbrief.byu.edu/issue-briefs/living-conditions-in-us-immigration-detention-centers>, accessed 7-7-2024 //RR

Detainees' physical **health often suffers as a result of** poor conditions. There are many reported **incidences of food and water deprivation as well as inadequate health care and overcrowding**. There have also

been reports of unsanitary food which can cause food poisoning and other negative health effects.⁶⁷ There is limited exposure to the outdoors, some centers limiting time to one hour per week. Many detainees are often not exposed to much sunlight.⁶⁸ This neglect of basic health necessities can result in weight loss, malnutrition, dehydration, muscle deterioration, and many other negative health consequences.⁶⁹ Medical care specifically can be a big issue in detention centers. Legal advocacy groups report that as many as 80% of detainees were dissatisfied or experienced problems with medical care.⁷⁰ A 2009 study reported that “among inmates in federal prisons, state prisons, and local jails, 38.5%, 42.8%, and 38.7%, respectively, suffered a chronic medical condition. The study concluded that many inmates failed to receive care while detained.”⁷¹ From 2003 to 2016, there were 155 reported deaths in immigration detention, many of which appear to be a result of poor living conditions.⁷² This number does not include the unreported deaths or the deaths which occurred after release resulting from neglect within the centers. Many deaths in detention centers suggest a failure to complete initial screenings, continue care, and seek expert referrals.⁷³ **Even when death is avoided, there can be permanent**

consequences for the detainee’s physical health. Updated graphic 2.png Mental Health In addition to poor physical health, detention is also associated with negative mental health consequences. These consequences include higher rates of psychological distress and suicidality.⁷⁴ In a study on asylum seekers, a small subset of detainees, the researchers found that mental health “was extremely poor and worsened the longer that individuals were in detention[. . .]. Significant **symptoms of depression were present in 86% of** the ⁷⁰ **detained asylum seekers**, anxiety was present in 77% and PTSD in 50%.”⁷⁵ Many of the detainees also reported verbal abuse by officials and solitary confinement as a form of punishment.⁷⁶ These reports suggest that the poor treatment of detainees affects their mental health. It is important to note that many detainees, particularly asylum seekers who are fleeing dangerous circumstances, are likely to experience negative mental health before detention. However, even if conditions are preexisting, detention centers often fail to appropriately address them. There are reports of “segregation⁷⁷ [being] used as a punitive intervention for detainees with mental health problems. Combined with a system-wide lack of mental health counseling, the punitive use of segregation creates a disincentive for detainees to seek mental health care. Several groups have documented the use of segregation in response to detainees asking for mental health services.”⁷⁸ Many of these detainees likely develop worse symptoms as a result of the lack of treatment. These mental health consequences will likely have social impacts as well, affecting detainees’ relationships with family and friends and their ability to work and manage their household effectively. Evidence suggests that inadequate living conditions contribute to poor mental health in detainees which can affect society more broadly.

Contention Two is Agriculture

Payan and Sanchez ‘24 finds

Tony Payan, Jose Ivan Rodriguez-Sanchez, 4-10-2024, "Migrant Workers’ Vital Role in Agriculture: A Conversation with Alejandro Gutiérrez-Li", <https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/migrant-workers-vital-role-agriculture-conversation-alejandro-gutierrez-li/EEdoa08/29/24>

In recent years, we have seen labor shortages in all sectors throughout the U.S. economy. The **shortages in agriculture**, however, were not caused by the COVID-19 pandemic — they **have existed for many decades** and are likely to persist and might possibly worsen in the future. While mechanization in the agricultural sector can help in the future, it is not a short-term option. **This is why the sector relies heavily on undocumented workers** and there has been a sharp increase in the number of H-2A visa workers, who come mainly from Mexico. The need for reform grows increasingly pressing as the likelihood of more extreme weather events in the future will make it harder to recruit workers. To alleviate and address labor shortages. in this key sector of the U.S. economy, we recommend: Increasing legal immigration paths. Legalizing the existing undocumented agricultural workers. Bringing more foreign-born workers into agriculture. Improving working conditions. On this last point, to ensure just and fair conditions for the workers it is important to have: Bilingual support groups that can interact with the farmworkers and be their voice — as they did during the pandemic, when it became known that workers did not have access to personal protective equipment (PPE). Certification of good

labor practices for employers and the products they put on the market — for example, confirming that the certified product was brought to the market by a farmer paying adequate wages, under healthy and fair working conditions. Acting now to support these essential workers is vital to sustaining the nation's food supply chain into the future. Everyone wins when workers are well and their needs are met.

Thus, Accounting for inflation, Lane '24 warrants

Sylvan Lane, 5-15-2024, "Grocery prices fall for first time in a year", Hill,
<https://thehill.com/business/4666050-grocery-prices-fall-for-first-time-in-a-year///EEdoa09/03/24>

Grocery prices fell on the whole in April **for the first time in 12 months**, according to data released Wednesday by the Labor Department. Prices for food at home fell 0.2 percent in April, according to the Labor Department's consumer price index, the closely watched inflation gauge. It was the first time food-at-home prices fell since April 2023 and followed several months of plateauing. After rising quickly for most of the past three years due to supply chain constraints and the impact of the Ukraine war, grocery prices are up just 1.1 percent over the past 12 months.

Kille '12 reports

Leighton Walter Kille, 6-25-2012, Implications of immigration policies for U.S. farm sector and workforce, Journalist's Resource,
<https://journalistsresource.org/environment/implications-immigration-policies-u-s-farm-sector-labor/>, accessed 7-10-2024] // BZ+Willie T.//RecutEEdoa08/29/24

A 2011 study published in Economic Inquiry, "Implications of Immigration Policies for U.S. Farm Sector and Workforce," examined the effect of U.S. immigration policy on the flow of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico and the subsequent impact on the nation's economy. The researchers, based at Washington State University and the University of Idaho, modeled the relationship between restrictive policies and the productivity of the U.S. agricultural sector. The findings include: There is a strong relationship between spending on border security and rates of illegal immigration from Mexico. "As the probability of apprehension of illegal immigrants at the border increases, the flow of undocumented workers into the United States lessens." A 10% increase in domestic enforcement spending, primarily worksite surveillance, reduces the wage rate for illegal workers more than 11%; curbs illegal labor use by approximately 9,000 workers to U.S. agriculture; and decreases U.S.-Mexico commodity trade by an average of \$180 million. **"Heightened border enforcements reduce the employment of undocumented workers and commodity production, which** causes U.S. agricultural exports to

Mexico to decline by an average of 5%.” Reductions in the immigrant labor force has caused labor shortages in several states and has had “devastat[es]ing effects on farm production and profitability.” These are being felt by consumers through higher costs for fruits and vegetables. “The results of the study show the distinct tradeoffs between reducing illegal immigration into the United States, and the productivity of the agricultural sector, and subsequently the U.S. economy,” the researchers state. “U.S. government policies aimed at deporting unauthorized workers — without taking adequate measures to supply farm laborers through guest-worker programs — will adversely affect the supply of farm laborers to crop production.”

Indeed, DHS ‘20 confirms

DHS, 10-29-2020, "The Border Wall System is Deployed, Effective, and Disrupting Criminals and Smugglers",

<https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2020/10/29/border-wall-system-deployed-effective-and-disrupting-criminals-and-smugglers/> /EEdoa09/03/24

Illegal entries in areas with new border wall system plummeted over 87% in FY 20 compared to FY 19. In FY 19, CBP deployed a temporary barrier, which it has replaced with a permanent system, at the Sanchez Canal, which resulted in illegal entries decreasing in this area by more than 1,000 per month. In FY 19, in areas of older existing border fencing or barriers, Yuma Sector apprehended 12 large groups (over a 100 persons) compared to zero large groups in FY 20 with new border wall system. Family Unit entries have decreased over 95%

Empirically, Devadoss ‘11 finds

Stephen Devadoss, 6-28-2011, "IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE", Wiley Online Library,

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x>, DOA 7-15-2024, \\SL//RecutEEdoa09/4/24)

Because illegal immigration was not a serious problem in the 1960s and 1970s, legislation addressed only the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the United States. But in the 1980s, illegal immigration began to emerge as a national problem, and extensive debates entrenched around issues such as preventing the entry of unauthorized workers, providing public services to illegal immigrants, and even legalizing these workers. Consequently, the U.S. Congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The goals of IRCA were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty² and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of illegal immigrants by increasing the border surveillance. Amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of illegal immigrants because only about half of the illegal immigrants filed for

citizenship, and it created future expectation of amnesty and more illegal unauthorized entry. Furthermore, domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantily enforced. To stop the influx of immigrants, IRCA focused heavily on tightening border control. The IRCA also legislated the H-2A program, which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations (ERS 2007). However, farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of H-2A and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking.³ In spite of IRCA's amnesty provision and strengthened control measures, illegal immigration continued to rise—about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2007 (Martin 2007) which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports—leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the illegal immigration problem. Several bills were proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements,⁴ paths to citizenship, and guest-worker programs (Montgomery 2006). These bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest-worker programs. As a result of the failed legislations and the September 11 attack, the government primarily focused on border security. Accordingly, funding for border enforcement has steadily increased,⁵ and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement. However, Boucher and Taylor (2007) documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority (GAO 2005). For example, from 1999 to 2003, the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480,000 to 18,000.^{6,7} But, by late 2005, the U.S. government started to intensify domestic surveillance. For example, only 25 criminal arrests relating to illegal immigration occurred in 2002, but increased to 716 by 2006 and 1,103 by 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008c). Domestic surveillance has further intensified under the current administration (Meyer and Gorman 2009). According to Passel (2008), a decreasing trend in the unauthorized immigrant population is recently occurring.⁸ This is largely due to worksite and border enforcements and the recent U.S. economic recession. These enforcements have exacerbated U.S. agricultural labor shortages before the 2008/2009 economic crisis. According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey, 80% of the newly hired farm labor force is from Mexico, of which 96% are unauthorized (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Therefore, **as border and domestic enforcements intensified, entry of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. farm labor force was thwarted, which led to** an acute labor scarcity. For example, the Wall Street Journal (2007) reported that in 2006, about **20% of agricultural products** were **not [being]**

harvested nationwide. Furthermore, the Rural Migration News (2007) provides a detailed and specific list of these shortages and the adverse effect on crucial cultivational operations which resulted in heavy losses. As a result, farm groups are one of the strongest allies of overhauling the current guest-worker program to bring immigrants to legally work in U.S. agriculture. For the last several decades, immigrants played a crucial role in the development and competitiveness of U.S. agricultural production (Torok and Huffman 1986). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead (2008) provide evidence of the importance of immigrant farm workers to vegetable production which is highly labor intensive. The United States has a great land endowment and ideal growing conditions; however, without immigrant labor who perform the back-breaking labor-intensive operations that U.S. low-skilled workers are unwilling to perform, agricultural productivity and total production would decline. Consequently, costs to U.S. consumers of agricultural products would increase and net exports would also decrease. In recent years, Mexican immigrant labor contributed significantly to the expansion of U.S. agricultural exports, particularly between the United States and Mexico. For example, between 1994 and 2008, net U.S. exports to the world and to Mexico increased by 82% and 200%, respectively (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008f). Devoid of these laborers, this dramatic increase would not have been possible.

The impact is Food Prices

Canales '22 explains

Arturo Castellanos-Canales, 11-4-2022, "America's Worker Shortages in the Agriculture and Food Industries: Direct Impact on Food Waste and Inflation", National Immigration Forum, <https://immigrationforum.org/article/americas-worker-shortages-in-the-agriculture-and-food-industries-direct-impact-on-food-waste-and-inflation/> //EEdoa09/03/24

Product shortages, rising input costs, and expectations of future inflation all contribute to increases in inflation. In the case of the United States, **labor shortages in the agricultural sector reduce output – both in terms of growing less and the generation of more food waste**. On the latter point, approximately one-third of edible produce remains unharvested in the United States due to several factors, including labor unavailability, causing severe impacts on the economy. This wasteful process not only increases food prices but also exacerbates global food insecurity. This is one of the reasons why a recent report conducted by Texas A&M revealed that **higher admissions of immigrant workers are directly related to lower prices** of meat, poultry, eggs, dairy, fruits, and vegetables. Given today's globalized agricultural commodities market, it is difficult for individual countries to reduce food prices on a worldwide basis. That said, **the United States – the world's largest exporter of food** and the second-largest importer of food in the world – **is uniquely positioned to help alleviate high food prices**, with

agricultural immigration reforms playing a significant – although not determinative – role.

Specifically, Caldwell '08 quantifies that

Jake Caldwell, 5-1-2008, "Food Price Crisis 101," Center for American Progress,

<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/food-price-crisis-101/>, accessed: 3-13-2022 //ZD

The timing could not be worse for many of the world's hot spots and the United States' long-term national security. Rising prices and low stockpiles have fueled civil strife and political instability in urban areas of vitally strategic countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, Pakistan, and India. At the precise moment when the United States has a narrow window of opportunity to contribute toward progress on the security, political, and economic fronts in key countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, the streets have erupted in food riots. Dramatic increases in food prices disproportionately affect the poor both in the United States and abroad. The purchasing power of families, food banks, and aid agencies erodes as prices rise, and they cannot keep pace with rising costs. Food banks and soup kitchens in the United States are reporting dwindling stocks and a 20 percent increase in visitors since April of last year. And **in developing countries**, where 60 to 80 percent of a family's income is spent on food, **every 20 percent increase in food prices will push 100 million more people into the ranks of the poorest of the poor** living on less than one dollar a day. Food inflation in the United States is at its highest levels in 17 years. Enrollment in the nation's food stamp and nutrition programs has grown by 1.3 million to its highest levels ever. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that the price of household food purchases will rise by 4 to 5 percent this year. Poor Americans spent almost 6 percent more of their income on food in 2006 than households with incomes above \$70,000. Congress must use the Farm Bill and other legislation to provide additional funding to increase the budgets of the food stamp and nutrition programs so that they can serve more Americans in need.