

# January Neg Case

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**Hassan 21** [Osman Hassan, reporter @ Hiiraan Online and former UN official as well as BBC reporter, 12-25-2021, Why the USA Should Not Recognize Somaliland, Hiiraan Online, [https://store.hiiraan.com/op4/2021/dec/184920/why\\_the\\_usa\\_should\\_not\\_recognize\\_somaliland.aspx](https://store.hiiraan.com/op4/2021/dec/184920/why_the_usa_should_not_recognize_somaliland.aspx)]

BZ A: The Voice of Northern unionists counts While it is clear what Meservey wants for the USA, he shows otherwise scant knowledge about the people in northern Somalia (former British Somaliland) and comes up with unfounded justifications for its recognition. **The** salient

**flawed assumption inherent in his discourse about the people in northern Somalia (aka Somaliland) is that they are monolithic and almost all support the secession. Nothing could be further from the truth.**

The following critical facts about the people in this region are indispensable for forming an objective judgement about the secession: · That

**there are five clans in the former British territory and only one of them** and not all of its members at that, **are**

**supportive of the secession from Somalia.** It occupies less than 20 percent of the territory. · That **the other four**

**clans, occupying more than 80 percent of the territory, and who do not call themselves**

**“Somalilanders” but citizens of Somalia, are unionists and oppose the secession.** · That any claim as

to who is the majority and who is the minority in the area, as Meservey has indulged in, is presumptuous since no official census of the clans have ever been made, · That the five clans that fell under British conquest are not exclusive to that area but are part of their fellow clans in southern Somalia (former Italian Somaliland), Ogaden region and Djibouti. · That each of the five clans, exercising its inalienable right, freely chose to join the union with Italian Somaliland. As such, no clan was forced to be part of the union just as none can be forced to be part of the secession as the one clan enclave calling itself Somalilanders is, forcing the secession on the other four unionist clans. · Even the ruling clan is not monolithic about the secession. An inter-clan civil war erupted in the heart of the enclave in 1993/94 when one of the clans supported the former Somaliland president Abdirahman Ahmed Ali who was an avowed unionist. The impact of USA recognition of Somaliland would, far from ending their resistance, do the opposite and motivate them all the more to free themselves. B. One Clan Rule and Denial of Human Rights Commitment to democracy is the key justification Meservey gives for rewarding the enclave with recognition. Admittedly, elections of some sorts have taken place albeit at long intervals and often at the behest of foreign donors. After 16 years, elections took place recently for the Peoples Chamber and only after persistent prodding from donors, No election took place for the Upper House for the same period. If members were to have their way, they would want to remain. Like a lot of façades put-up in the enclave, elections are not held as a prerequisite of democracy but as a show to win favourable international impression to win recognition. And on the whole they have been successful. A good convert is Mr. Meservey. Once the facades are out of the way, the reality is something completely different. A more fitting analogy to the enclave would be the white minority-ruled former Rhodesia. Just as all power was monopolized by the whites, so all power is exclusive to the clan. The three political parties permitted in Somaliland are in the hands of the ruling clan. No other party is allowed to compete with them which closes the doors on other clans and regions. The clan's control permeates also both houses of Parliament, the civil service, the police and the armed forces. If one-clan power monopoly is unacceptable, what makes it intolerable is what it does with its power. Its militia, the SNM, have committed massacres against innocent civilians in unionist regions, the first taking place in Borama in the Awdal region when hundreds were brutally massacred as reprisal for allegedly being supporters of the ousted military regime. A similar massacre was committed at Kalshaale in the Buuhoodle district in 2012, also for resisting the secession. Both amount to crimes against humanity. These massacres remind many observers the Sharpeville massacre of Africans in March 1960 who were resisting Apartheid and white minority rule. No less shocking are the wider appalling rule of law and human rights situation under the one-clan authoritarian rule. Daily human rights abuses are pervasive wherever the writ of the authority reaches but worse in the parts of the unionists regions it occupies. Freedom of speech, thought, assembly and movement (to Mogadishu) are proscribed. Arbitrary detentions, long periods in jail without trial, and languishing in jail long after sentences have expired are widespread. Extra-judicial killings are common in occupied Lascanod, the capital of Sool region, and used as a tool to suppress the rising opposition to the occupation and secession. Access to justice and non-discriminatory application of the law underpin the rule of law. Yet those who do not have the means to defend themselves, or not connected to those who wield power, or belong to minority clans, are likely to be the victims of the abuse of power.. Extra-judicial killings, common in occupied Lascanod, the capital of Sool region, are used as a tool to suppress the rising opposition to the occupation and secession. Th United Nations Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Somalia

has been following some of these cases which speaks for itself. What recently shocked the rest of Somalia and the international community was the deportation of thousands of Somali citizens lawfully resident in Lascanod and carted back like cattle to southern Somalia. Many Children were in the process separated from their parents. It all amounts to crimes against humanity. And yet, Mr. Meservey calls their ways as devotion to democracy, an Orwellian doublespeak if there was one. C. The Inevitable Pandora box In the end, Mr. Meservey dispenses with seeking justifications for the barter deal with Somaliland and simply urges the USA government to proceed and get the deal. To forestall anti-USA imperialistic unilateralist stigma that might arise, he urges the government to co-opt some African countries to join the action. This is to project some semblance of a united action in order to encourage many others in the continent and beyond to follow suit. As he puts, the Africans' role is to: " follow an American lead on recognizing Somaliland. The USA, he adds, "should coordinate the timing of its recognition of Somaliland with these countries so they can prepare to follow in quick succession. Their doing so would create momentum for even more states to recognize Somaliland by signaling that it is safe and beneficial to have relations with Hargeisa" The USA would have no difficulty in finding some African leaders ready to do its bidding. This is the easiest part but what about the consequences? Mr. Meservey downplays any Pandora box arising from their recognition of Somaliland. As an example, he cites the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan whose separation from Ethiopia and Sudan led to no outcry or secessions in Africa. But their separation from their mother countries came through mutual agreement and the rest of Africa and the world went happily along with that outcome. What America is cooking up Somalia is something different – more a throwback to its worst practices in Latin America in the last century. No matter how one looks at it, **the consequences could be dire.** For a star, if African governments collude with the USA in the dismemberment of a fellow African country, this could have serious consequences for the Charter of the African Union and for its member States. But even without this unholy alliance against an African country, a unilateral USA action is sufficient to open a Pandora Box and **[for example, it could] further destabilize fragile African countries already reeling from tribal separatists or jihadist insurrection.** America's own allies in the continent would be the first victims. Africa would not be the only loser. America's wider interest in the continent would also be seriously jeopardized. One has to ask whether a base in Berbera just to level with China in Djibouti is worth this possible incalculable damage to Africa and indeed to America's own interests?

## Secession

The African Union is facilitating unprecedented growth and giving the continent a global diplomatic voice.

### Ryder et al. 24:

Hannah Ryder et al. 24, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program, 3-26-2024, "Is the African Union Evolving in the Right Direction?", CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/african-union-evolving-right-direction>, Accessed 12-12-2024, ARC

In his 1996 bestseller, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington foresaw the establishment of a multipolar world order following the end of the Cold War. The Harvard professor predicted a division of political and economic influence according to civilizational lines. As such, he advocated for a radical change to multilateral diplomacy and called, three decades ago, for each of the nine principal civilizations, including Africa, to play a central role in international affairs. As the current global geopolitical architecture transforms in front of our eyes, an increasing number of major players are now competing for resources and influence, including through high-intensity conflicts. As a result, world geopolitics is heading toward its most unstable point since the end of the 1980s. To reflect these changing global power dynamics and retain legitimacy, the United Nations must modify its institutions to hand greater responsibility to emerging powers. The dramatic demographic, economic, and diplomatic changes in Africa highlight the practical and moral necessity of providing the continent with a greater voice in multilateral diplomacy.

**The African Union**, which **enjoys** both **domestic and international legitimacy**, should, therefore, receive a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. The vast majority of African countries still have a very dynamic demographic growth. According to the African Bank of Development, in 2050, the continent will be home to 25 percent of the world's population. In parallel, large swaths of Africa are experiencing rapid economic development. The continent's GDP could (assuming consistently high rates of growth) triple by 2050. As a result, regional and world powers are increasingly courting African states and competing for influence. However, the most significant changes reshaping Africa's reality are in the diplomatic arena. **In the past five years, several events have proven the ability of** African countries to influence world affairs according to their interests effectively. The first example is the grain crisis triggered by

the war between Russia and Ukraine. The continent, which heavily depends on wheat imports from the two belligerents, dispatched Macky Sall, Senegal's President and then head of **the African Union, to negotiate** reopening grain imports with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Second, almost three months ago, South Africa led a highly publicized legal suit against Israel at the International Court of Justice. While Pretoria's assertion of genocide was politically motivated, lacking factual basis, and ultimately rejected by the court, **the diplomatic initiative showed** the ability of an African country to exercise **leadership of** a topic of **global importance**. Third, and maybe most importantly, the last decade has seen numerous African countries slowly disengage themselves from the influence of former colonial powers, Cold War patrons, and powerful petro-states. For the first time since independence, many of the continent's nations are developing genuinely independent foreign policies based on their national interests. As such, several Sahel countries have severed ties with France, which had heavily dominated the region's politics for decades, and established entirely new alliances. Many African nations refuse to bow to Western pressure and condemn Russia in United Nations resolutions as they see continued relations with Moscow as in line with their strategic interests. Similarly, during the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada, numerous African countries were forced by the Arab League to suspend their diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. However, not a single of the continent's nations has done so following the October 7 attacks and the Israeli offensive in Gaza. Finally, Africa is slowly increasing its presence and influence in multilateral organizations. In 2023, the African Union became part of the G20, cementing its status as an increasingly influential player on the global scene. The same year, two additional African countries, Ethiopia and Egypt, joined the BRICS organization, sitting on an equal footing with major players such as China, India, and Brazil. Such developments seemed unthinkable only several years ago. They demonstrate the ability of large parts of the continent to develop influential and independent policies in the international arena. They also justify the African Union's need to finally access the select group of powers that determine the rules of global cooperation. Of course, numerous obstacles still stand on the road to the Security Council. Africa's fifty-four states have different cultures, interests, and sets of alliances, making consensus difficult to achieve. Smaller nations may also be sensitive to pressure from global powers seeking to influence the Union's position. Additionally, conflicts between African countries could further escalate tensions within the regional organization. Constant diplomacy and significant compromise will thus be essential, particularly given the high levels of instability persisting in parts of the continent. However, the arguments for AU representation appear more cogent today, and Africa is slowly gaining the international status it deserves. Its economies are growing, its diplomatic influence is spreading, and the prospects of its demographic growth are immense. Its main multilateral organization, **the African Union, has also proven to be an effective source of legitimacy on the continent.** As multipolarity beckons, the time has come to grant the African Union a robust voice in the concert of nations.

As a result of AU leadership, African nations enjoy unprecedented long-term stability. Their evidence about conflict is rooted in bias and not supported by empirics.

### **Usman 23:**

Abubakar Abubakar Usman 23, Research fellow with International Islamic University Malaysia Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IiBF) and affiliated with the Asia Middle East Centre for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), 5-31-2023, "West African countries show how working together over decades builds peace and stops wars breaking out", Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/west-african-countries-show-how-working-together-over-decades-builds-peace-and-stops-wars-breaking-out-205498>, Accessed 12-15-2024, ARC

**Africa is often portrayed as a continent ravaged by war, terrorism, poverty and political instability. But over the past five decades few violent conflicts have occurred between states.**

In Europe, for comparison, there have been more than 25 inter-state conflicts since 1945. It's true that Africa has seen 214 coups, the most of any region; 106 have been successful. Out of 54 countries on the African continent, 45 have had at least one coup attempt since 1950. West Africa, a region of 16 independent states, has experienced 53 successful and 40 failed coups since 1950. There are also cross-border security challenges such as terrorism, banditry, piracy and the wide presence of arms. But, since independence in the late 1950s, the region's countries have not gone to war with one another – except for a minor armed confrontation between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1985. In a recent paper we explored the possible reasons for this. As scholars studying the political dynamics of west Africa, we arrived at our insights by analysing historical data, diplomatic interactions and scholarly research. We found evidence that **the principles of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes defined the relationships between west African countries.** The 15

states under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) positively identify with the fate of others in the bloc. The regional body was formed in 1975 by west African countries seeking to promote economic development. We found a strong correlation between decades of regional cooperation and the rarity of conflicts between states in west Africa. We conclude that systemic cooperation between states in the region has led to a collective identity forming over time. A sense of community has developed. **The community**

**has developed conflict management mechanisms.** This has **prevent[ing]**ed members from going into **war.**

This finding highlights the importance of collaboration and diplomacy in maintaining peace and resolving conflicts. Making sense of the ECOWAS peace Regional dynamics and historical factors shape conflict, as can be seen in the Horn of Africa. That region has witnessed conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between Ethiopia and Somalia, for example. In the west African region, we found that the security arrangements agreed under ECOWAS have helped to foster peace between states. The ECOWAS agreement was updated in 1993. It includes principles that were absent in the earlier pact. Among them are: solidarity and collective self-reliance non-aggression between member states promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness to maintain regional peace, stability and security peaceful settlement of disputes among member states active cooperation between neighbouring countries promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development. This has led to west African countries choosing peaceful dispute resolution over sovereignty. For example, a border dispute between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 through an international tribunal. This approach has prevented violent conflicts. A key factor is that member states have mechanisms for settling disputes peacefully. In both Liberia's and Sierra Leone's wars, which threatened to engulf other countries in the region, ECOWAS used these settlement mechanisms. It deployed military troops to supervise ceasefires brokered by the then Ghanaian president, Jerry Rawlings. Another factor is what in our study we call pan-West Africanism. We describe this as a regional version of pan-Africanism that emphasises unity and collaboration among countries. In practice it has facilitated trade, cultural exchanges and diplomatic collaborations. It has also created a sense of shared identity and solidarity among member countries. We argue that the idea of pan-West Africanism has promoted regional solidarity and reduced the possibility of violence in inter-state relations. It is not just a philosophy, but a practical approach to regional integration and cooperation. Conclusion Our paper supports the argument that systemic cooperation among states can lead to a collective identity forming over time. This has happened with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Their collective identities are based on norms that reflect the history and political cultures of their member states. The importance of shared identity and peaceful coexistence is often overlooked in explaining complex international relations. But it's essential in understanding the relations of west African states.

Runaway independence movements---Somaliland's recent election put us on the brink. An independence domino spreads secessionist movements across Africa.

#### **Zahran 24:**

Motaz Zahran 12-10, Current Ambassador of Egypt to the United States. He formerly served as the Assistant Foreign Minister and Chief of Cabinet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt, 12-10-2024, "Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade", Newsweek,

<https://www.newsweek.com/stability-horn-africa-vital-global-trade-security-opinion-1998578>,

Accessed 12-12-2024, ARC

The eyes of the world are fixed on the rising tensions in the Middle East as Israel's war continues in Gaza and Syria falls back into chaos, dominating global news coverage. Yet the world cannot afford to overlook the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa posing a serious threat to both regional and international peace and security. For the past year, the Houthis have disrupted global commerce in one of the world's most crucial waterways, the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Instability in the Horn of Africa was exacerbated following Ethiopia's decision to undermine the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia by signing an agreement with the region of Somaliland. This enables the terrorist group Al-Shabab to recruit militants, spread their destructive ideology, and expand operations beyond Somalia's borders under the guise of preventing Somalia's disintegration. Coordination between Al-Shabab and the Houthis will only add fuel to fire to engulf the Bab Al Mandeb Strait. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is of critical importance to global economic security due to the integrated nature of global supply chains. 12 percent of world trade flows through the Red Sea, and disruptions to this flow affect the global economy. **The recent elections in Somaliland** are an important development, as they **create an opportunity**, if seized correctly, **to** considerably **reduce tensions in the region.** Ethiopia should revoke its agreement with Somaliland, and the U.S. should put in use its political clout to mediate between Mogadishu and Hargeisa to settle, once and for all, the nature

of their relationship within a unified Somalia. Under this arrangement, it would still be possible for all international and regional stakeholders to enhance ties with Somaliland while preserving the region's stability and combatting terrorism. The present agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland directly defies the realization of these goals. **Any recognition of Somaliland** as an independent state will result in dangerous repercussions, including exacerbating internal divisions between the various clans of Somaliland that support independence and others that seek to remain within the Somali federal state. This is a staggering reminder of the danger of further fragmenting the country through reckless recognition agreements. Beyond Somalia, this recognition **is a slippery slope entailing a domino effect of separatist movements** across the region igniting conflicts in pursuit of independence, leading to unimaginable chaos.

An independence domino spreads secessionist movements across Africa.

#### **Gebereamlak 24:**

Hagos Gebereamlak 10-2, Journalist at The Reporter Ethiopia from Addis Ababa University, 10-2-2024, "Ethiopia's Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders", Reporter Magazine, <https://thereportermagazines.com/3214/>, Accessed 12-11-2024, ARC

Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, **recognizing Somaliland's independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries.** If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial borders. **This move might encourage other secessionist movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability.** The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape. **Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region.** There are already existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland's recognition could embolden these movements. In Ethiopia, for example, various regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region, have elements advocating for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa further complicates these dynamics. For instance, Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland, while Afars inhabit Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Similarly, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries, creating fertile ground for secessionist and irredentist movements. The recognition of Somaliland might also inspire regions such as Puntland and Jubaland to seek independence from Somalia. These regions already enjoy a degree of autonomy, and Somaliland's formal recognition could lead them to pursue a similar path. Historically, Somalia has laid irredentist claims to Ethiopia's Somali region (Ogaden), aiming to incorporate it into a "Greater Somalia." If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could provoke retaliation from Somalia, possibly leading to renewed claims over the Somali region of Ethiopia. Somalia could also support secessionist movements within Ethiopia as a form of retaliation. In fact, Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi recently stated that if Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland, Somalia would consider backing Ethiopian rebels, essentially threatening to fuel internal conflicts in Ethiopia. Historical Context of Tit-for-Tat Secessionist Support In the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan engaged in a vicious cycle of supporting secessionist movements to destabilize each other. Somalia backed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which sought to secede the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF). Somalia also allowed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to establish offices and use Somali passports to further their causes. Ethiopia, in turn, supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in its fight against the Siad Barre regime, which later led to Somaliland's declaration of independence. Ethiopia also aided the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which established the autonomous region of Puntland. Meanwhile, Sudan supported various Ethiopian rebel groups, including the ELF, TPLF, and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In retaliation, Ethiopia provided heavy support to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which eventually led to the secession of South Sudan. This cycle of support for rebel groups contributed to the downfall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia and the Siad Barre regime in Somalia. It also led to the fragmentation of Somalia into Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, and other entities. Ethiopia's involvement in Sudan similarly contributed to the eventual secession of Eritrea and South Sudan from Sudan. **There is a strong likelihood that this historical pattern of reciprocal support for secessionist movements will reemerge. Somalia may escalate its support for rebel groups in Ethiopia,** particularly in regions like

the Somali region, Oromia, and Tigray, where there are already existing tensions. This could fuel further instability in Ethiopia. **In response, Ethiopia might encourage independence movements** in Puntland and Jubaland, supporting dissatisfied clans and tribes in Somalia to rebel or seek autonomy. **This would perpetuate a cycle of proxy conflicts, destabilizing the Horn of Africa further and leading to widespread insecurity.** This reciprocal destabilization between Ethiopia and Somalia could easily spread, **drawing in other regional actors and intensifying conflicts across the Horn of Africa.** The region could find itself once again entangled in proxy wars, with various factions fighting for independence or control, supported by external powers. The already volatile situation in the Horn of Africa could be further complicated by the spillover effects of Middle Eastern geopolitics and the encroachment of regional powers. The intensifying rivalry between the US and China is leading to a diminishing presence and influence of both superpowers in the region. As they compete for global dominance, their potential withdrawal could create a vacuum that may be filled by middle-sized powers from the Middle East, including the UAE, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

“United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa (2016-04). Human and economic cost of conflict in the horn of Africa : implications for a transformative and inclusive post-conflict development. Addis Ababa:. © UN. ECA,. <https://hdl.handle.net/10855/23726>”

Since their independence from colonial masters, **the Horn of Africa States have experienced endemic intra and interstate conflict. These conflicts have imposed considerable human and economic costs and [hindered] retarded the development of the Horn by transferring scarce resources from development to support war.** The focus of this study is to analyze how conflict impacts stability and undermines efforts towards achieving inclusive and sustainable development. The identification of how conflict impacts on development and elucidation of the economic cost will inform the development of post-conflict policy frameworks and strategies for sustainable recovery. Capturing the negative effects of violence on development is critical for trans-formative policies and for formulation of accountable, transparent and effective polices and public institutions for inclusive and sustainable development. Moreover, as the continent is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the new global economic openings, seizing this opportunity for generating and maintaining growth to improve the socioeconomic aspirations of its people is critical.

## Conflict

**Somalia would respond to recognition with violence, sparking conflict. The status quo keeps the peace.**

**Idaan 24** Gulaid Yusuf Idaan: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a distinguished senior lecturer at universities in Somaliland, specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. His independent scholarly work and extensive publications have established him as a leading expert in regional dynamics and diplomatic relations. In addition to his significant professional contributions, Gulaid is an aspiring university lecturer, holding multiple Master's Degrees in International Law and Diplomacy, and International Relations., 7-4-2024, "A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland's Quest for International Recognition", Modern Diplomacy, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/04/a-legal-and-diplomatic-analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/> //doi: 12/10/24 sr

Geopolitical Dynamics. How Regional and International Politics Impacts Somaliland's Pursuit of Recognition Somaliland's success in its pursuit of recognition is mainly defined and determined by the geopolitical environment of the Horn of Africa. The discussion in this section addresses the



main regional and international stakeholders surrounding the African Union, United Nations, and neighboring states, and the impact these actors' activism will have on the pursuit of the recognition of Somaliland. Regional Players: Juggling Interests and Stability Ethiopia Strategic Partnerships Political Caution It means that Ethiopia relies on Somaliland because of strategic interests; it is about security cooperation and strong economic ties. In this way, the argument runs that 'developing the port of Berbera and trade corridors that link a landlocked Ethiopia to the Red Sea makes Somaliland crucial for economic-strategic plans'. This port provides an important alternative route for the landlocked Ethiopian State, decreasing its dependence on Djibouti and increasing access to global markets. However, Ethiopia refrains from the provision of formal recognition because it presents a risk of conflict with Somalia and the Muslim influence in the region. **Formal recognition of Somaliland would most likely anger Somalia. That act would encircle an already unstable region** besides upsetting Ethiopia's wider exotic strategy across the region. It, therefore, shows how **a delicately balanced approach is maintained by regional powers while negotiating the tricky politics of state recognition. It keeps them economically and politically engaged without showing signs of all the way recognition for stabilizing the region** and its strategic alliance. Djibouti: Economic Ties and Regional Stability Djibouti, despite its strong economic relations with Somaliland, upholds the African Union's principle of territorial integrity. A strategically located country, with vital port facilities of its own, Djibouti is a regional commercial crossroads and enjoys very good economic and political relationships with both Somaliland and Somalia. But more broadly, Djibouti's prudence is indicative of the greater regional aversion to legitimizing breakaway territories out of concern that it could further destabilize what is already a region mired by numerous conflicts and that a precedent could imbue and embolden other secessionist movements. In addition, Djibouti is close to Somaliland, with which it shares a border. More importantly, most of the imported goods and services that sustain the Kenyan economy and other peripheral countries in the region flow through Somaliland. By recognizing Somaliland, Djibouti could easily defend its close ally in the region. In a nutshell, the intricate nature of the interaction between economic interest and political stability in the region reveals Djibouti's pragmatic approach, basically encouraged by the strategic establishment of the country in global politics.

## Egypt would also be drawn in.

**Idaan 24** Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, 10-24-2024, Gulaid Yusuf Idaan: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a distinguished senior lecturer at universities in Somaliland, specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. His independent scholarly work and extensive publications have established him as a leading expert in regional dynamics and diplomatic relations. In addition to his significant professional contributions, Gulaid is an aspiring university lecturer, holding multiple Master's Degrees in International Law and Diplomacy, and International Relations., "Egypt's Blockade Threat and Hostility Toward Somaliland: Strategic Implications and Regional Consequences", Modern Diplomacy, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/10/24/egypts-blockade-threat-and-hostility-toward-somaliland-s-trategic-implications-and-regional-consequences/> AA

Egypt's Concerns: The Somaliland-Ethiopia Alliance **Egypt's threat to impose a blockade on Somaliland stems from** deeply rooted concerns regarding **the** evolving **partnership between Somaliland and Ethiopia**, particularly in the context of regional geopolitics. The formalization of their relationship through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signals a significant shift in the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. **Egypt** perceives this alliance as a direct challenge to its interests and **fears that** it could accelerate **Somaliland's** push for international **recognition**. Such recognition **would** not only **jeopardize Egypt's regional influence but also contravene what it refers to as the international consensus on maintaining Somalia's territorial integrity, a principle strongly supported by Egypt and the African Union. At the heart of Egypt's strategic anxiety lies the Berbera port, a critical maritime hub for Ethiopia.** As a landlocked nation, Ethiopia depends heavily on external ports to access global markets, with Berbera offering an alternative to its reliance on

Djibouti. **The port**, which operates with backing from international actors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), **provides Ethiopia with direct access to the Red Sea**, expanding its economic reach. **Egypt, which has long held control over vital maritime trade routes** like the Suez Canal, **views Ethiopia's** increasing **access** to the Red Sea **as a direct threat to its own economic and geopolitical leverage. As Ethiopia fortifies its position** in the region, **Egypt's influence** correspondingly **diminishes**, particularly in an area of strategic importance for both its security and trade networks. Beyond the economic ramifications, the political symbolism of the Somaliland-Ethiopia alliance poses an even greater concern for Egypt. The partnership between these two entities is seen as a potential stepping stone toward Somaliland's full independence, a prospect that Cairo regards with trepidation. Somaliland's growing diplomatic assertiveness, coupled with Ethiopia's backing, could set a precedent for other separatist movements across Africa, emboldening regions with latent secessionist tendencies. This fear is not unfounded, as Africa is home to numerous regions grappling with separatist sentiments, including Ethiopia's Tigray conflict and similar movements in Cameroon and Nigeria. Egypt, along with other members of the African Union, strongly advocates for the preservation of colonial-era borders as a means to prevent the instability that often accompanies the redrawing of national boundaries. If Somaliland's diplomatic endeavors lead to widespread recognition, it could unravel decades of efforts to maintain political stability across the African continent. This, in turn, would disrupt Egypt's long-standing strategic interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa. **The fragmentation of Somalia**, which has traditionally served as a key ally in balancing Ethiopia's rising influence, **would weaken Egypt's ability to exert control over the** region's **political landscape**. A divided Somalia, devoid of its territorial cohesion, would not only destabilize the Horn of Africa but would also strip Egypt of a critical ally in its ongoing rivalry with Ethiopia. Egypt's fears are thus multifaceted—centered not only on the geopolitical and economic shifts but also on the broader implications for regional stability and its ability to navigate the evolving dynamics of power in the Horn of Africa.

**Strategic Importance of Berbera Port and Ethiopian Leverage** The Berbera port holds immense strategic value, not only as an economic hub for Somaliland but also as a crucial geopolitical asset for Ethiopia. As Ethiopia's regional influence continues to grow, its reliance on stable and diversified trade routes becomes imperative for consolidating its dominance in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland plays a pivotal role in this dynamic by providing Ethiopia with critical infrastructure that allows it to bypass Djibouti, which currently manages nearly 95% of Ethiopia's trade. The development of Berbera port enables Ethiopia to reduce its dependency on Djibouti, thus expanding its trade options and increasing its autonomy in regional economic affairs. Egypt's apprehensions about the Berbera port are rooted in the far-reaching implications it poses for the broader regional trade networks. Historically, Egypt has maintained significant control over global maritime trade through its strategic hold on the Suez Canal, one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. However, the growing Ethiopia-Somaliland alliance undermines Egypt's traditional dominance by creating alternative trade pathways that bypass the Suez Canal and reduce reliance on Egypt-controlled routes. Through its collaboration with Somaliland, Ethiopia gains direct access to the Red Sea via Berbera, reshaping the economic landscape of East Africa and weakening Egypt's influence in regional maritime affairs. This strategic shift significantly challenges Egypt's ability to exert power over the Red Sea and the wider region. As Ethiopia continues to cement its economic and geopolitical position, Egypt's leverage—both politically and economically—faces erosion. Egypt's opposition to Somaliland's independence is thus deeply intertwined with its broader efforts to counter Ethiopia's rise. For Egypt, maintaining influence in the Horn of Africa is critical to ensuring that Ethiopia remains constrained by internal challenges, including its dependence on limited and contested trade routes. The strengthening of Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea through Somaliland presents a direct threat to Egypt's ambitions to maintain hegemony in the region, further complicating an already tense regional power struggle.

## **A return to chaos would kill hundreds of thousands. During the beginning of the Somali Civil War:**

**Norris and Bruton 11** John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, September 2011, "Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia", John Norris is the Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at the Center for American Progress. He has served in a number of senior roles in government, international institutions, and nonprofits. John previously served as the Executive Director of the Enough Project, an advocacy organization committed to preventing war crimes around the globe. John was the chief of political affairs for the United Nations Mission in Nepal as that country tried to emerge from a decade-long war. Previously, John served as the Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans. Earlier in his career, John served as the director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. He also worked as a speechwriter and field disaster expert at the U.S. Agency for International Development. John is the author of several books, including the Disaster Gypsies, a memoir of his work in the field of emergency relief, and Collision Course: NATO, Russia and Kosovo. Bronwyn Bruton is a fellow at One Earth Future Foundation. She is the author of numerous reports and



articles on the Horn of Africa, including the November 2009 Foreign Affairs essay, “In the Quicksands of Somalia,” the March 2010 Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, “Somalia: A New Approach,” and the July 25, 2010 New York Times op-ed, “In Somalia, Talk to the Enemy.” Ms. Bruton is a democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa, and was a 2008-2009 international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations. She was born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana. Prior to her fellowship appointment, Bronwyn spent three years at the National Endowment for Democracy, where she managed a \$7 million portfolio of grants to local and international nongovernmental organizations in east and southern Africa (priority countries included Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Sudan). Bruton has also served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives, and as a policy analyst on the international affairs and trade About the Authors | [www.americanprogress.org](http://www.americanprogress.org) 45 team of the Government Accountability Office. Bronwyn is currently conducting research on failed states at the One Earth Future Foundation, or OEF. She holds an MPP, with honors, from the University of California at Los Angeles. <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf> || DOA 12/20/2024 BRP

First and foremost, Somalia continues to be a human disaster of immense proportions. This was true even before it was again battered with famine. The country’s ongoing conflicts and profound dysfunction have exacted a very steep cost on Somalis for years. Parts of Somalia remain in such dire conditions that it is challenging to arrive at clear figures regarding its population. The U.N. Development Program usually does not even rank Somalia on its Human Development Index—its annual barometer of country-by-country development levels—simply because basic data on the country are lacking. Making matters worse, increasingly large parts of Somalia are now suffering a major famine aggravated by the inability of international relief agencies to deliver aid in territory controlled by Al Shabbab—an inability that stems both from Al Shabbab’s threats and from restrictive U.S. government counterterror laws that seek to prevent aid from falling into Al Shabbab’s hands. The data that are available make clear the impact of Somalia’s conflict upon its own citizens. Between 450,000 and 1.5 million people have died in Somalia’s conflict or directly due to hunger since 1991.<sup>21</sup> This total reflects excess mortality, or the difference between the actual deaths in Somalia and the number of deaths that we would expect for a peaceful, decently governed country with the same demographics. The huge variation in the mortality numbers only underscores the general weakness of the Somali state and its institutions. The number of fatalities, however, is likely on the high side of this range given that **the United Nations estimated 300,000 deaths in 1991 and 1992 alone** and the recent sharp spike in mortality due to hunger and disease, particularly among children.<sup>22</sup> The U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Somalia noted in July 2011: “In the last few months, tens of thousands of Somalis have died as a result of causes related to malnutrition, the majority of whom were children.”<sup>23</sup> In addition, more than 25 percent of the country’s entire population is currently a refugee or internally displaced person, or IDP (someone driven from his or her home who has not crossed an international border). The United Nations estimates that more than 800,000 Somali refugees are in neighboring states, and more than 1.5 million Somalis are currently displaced. (see chart) An April 2011 statement from the United Nations also notes: “The number of Somali refugees arriving to neighboring countries during the first quarter of this year has more than doubled in comparison to the same period in 2010.”<sup>24</sup> As of July 2011 some 3,500 people per day were pouring out of Somalia into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia, with 80 percent of those people being women and children.<sup>25</sup>