

## Quarry Lane PS affirms

**Resolved: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan.**

### 1AC - Ukraine

#### Contention One is Ukraine

**The US is shifting focus to Taiwan now. Lee '24 writes**

**Lee '9/4** [Yimou Lee, Fabian Hamacher, 09-04-2024, "US is building allies network to counter China's threat, top diplomat to Taiwan says", Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/senior-us-diplomat-says-taiwan-not-only-chinese-target-changing-regional-status-2024-09-04/>] [Yimou Lee is a Senior Correspondent for Reuters covering everything from Taiwan, including sensitive Taiwan-China relations, China's military aggression and Taiwan's key role as a global semiconductor powerhouse. A three-time SOPA award winner, his reporting from Hong Kong, China, Myanmar and Taiwan over the past decade includes Myanmar's crackdown on Rohingya Muslims, Hong Kong protests and Taiwan's battle against China's multifront campaigns to absorb the island.]

TAIPEI, Sept 4 (Reuters) - The United States is building a network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific to counter China's threats there, its top diplomat in Taiwan said on Wednesday, adding that the island was not Beijing's only target in seeking to change the status quo. **The United States is Taiwan's most important supporter and arms supplier, despite its lack of formal ties with the island, and Raymond Greene, the newly appointed director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and de facto U.S. ambassador [said], was speaking to reporters in Taipei. "The United States is building a latticework of alliances in the Indo-Pacific to enhance our deterrence capabilities,"** Greene said, adding Taiwan was not the only target of Chinese efforts to "use intimidation and coercion to change the status quo" and that as a result more and more countries were joining forces to preserve the rules-based international system. He said those efforts, along with Taiwan's investment in defence and "impressive" military reforms, were designed to prevent a war rather than preparing for one.

#### **Current arms sales underlie this trend. Yang from this month explains**

**Yang November 2** [William Yang "Taiwan expects Ukraine-tested weapons from US amid rising Chinese pressure" VOA November 2, 2024] [thiele] [<https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-expects-ukraine-tested-weapons-from-us-amid-rising-chinese-pressure/7848827.html>] [reporter, VOA]

TAIPEI, TAIWAN — **Taiwan is expected to receive several weapons that have been battle tested in Ukraine from the United States over the next few years. Analysts say those weapons can help bolster Taiwan's defense and strike capabilities amid growing military pressure from China. In the latest round of arms sales to Taiwan, worth about \$2 billion, the United States plans to deliver three medium-range National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, also known as NASAMS.** The weapons include advanced AMRAAM Extended Range surface-to-air missiles. The proposed sales will help improve Taiwan's security and "assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, and economic progress in the region," the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in a statement released October 26. NASAMS has been battle-tested in Ukraine and is viewed by experts as **a significant elevation of** Taiwan's air defense **capabilities**. Australia and Indonesia are the other countries in the Indo-Pacific region that have received the system from the U.S. Experts say that NASAMS has a high interoperation capability, and that the medium-range air defense system provides needed coverage in Taiwan's existing air defense capabilities. "Currently, Taiwan relies on Stinger missiles for short-range air defense while using the Patriot missile system or Taiwan's indigenous Tien Kung for long-range air defense, so NASAMS can help fill the gap of Taiwan's medium-range air defense," said Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research. He told VOA by phone that when NASAMS is incorporated into Taiwan's air defense system, it can improve the island's capabilities to deal with the increasingly frequent patrols the Chinese military is conducting around Taiwan. "As Chinese naval vessels and military aircraft increase the frequency of their

combat-readiness patrols near Taiwan, the risk of abrupt missile attacks launched by Chinese vessels is also increasing, so acquiring NASAMS can further enhance Taiwan's capabilities to deal with these potential threats," Su said.

## Taiwan arms sales directly trade off from Ukraine. Velez-Green '23 explains

**Velez-Green '23** [Alex Velez-Green, 08-31-2023 "Managing Trade-offs Between Military Aid for Taiwan and Ukraine", The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/managing-trade-offs-between-military-aid-taiwan-and-ukraine>] Leon + Shah, [Alexander Velez-Green is a Senior Policy Advisor in The Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for National Security. His research focuses on defense, deterrence, and alliance management. He is also lead author of Heritage's special report on U.S. defense strategy titled "The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America's Interests in a More Dangerous World." Velez-Green previously served as National Security Advisor to U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO). In this capacity, he staffed Senator Hawley on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he was responsible for hearing preparations, drafting legislation, and related negotiations. Velez-Green also advised the Senator on matters related to U.S. defense strategy, including U.S. force structure, posture, and modernization, as well as opportunities to strengthen allied and partner burden-sharing. Prior to the Senate, Velez-Green held roles in the U.S. defense industry and at the Center for a New American Security. His work in these roles focused on strengthening nuclear and conventional deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Velez-Green has published in The Washington Post, The National Interest, The American Conservative, Newsweek, National Review, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, War on the Rocks, Lawfare, Defense News, and Defense One, among others. He also speaks regularly at events in the United States, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Velez-Green graduated cum laude from Harvard College]

Finally, Washington must work closely with Taipei to ensure it is doing everything possible to strengthen its defenses, including raising defense spending to a level commensurate to the existential threat it faces, prioritizing acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, and accelerating necessary defense reforms. **Conclusion** The United States has a vested interest in preventing China from seizing control of Taiwan. The best way to do so is by deterring Beijing from invading in the first place. One of the most effective ways to strengthen deterrence in the near term is by doing everything in America's power to arm Taiwan with the weapons it requires to defend itself. Unfortunately, many of [but] those weapons are also needed in Ukraine. When the United States is unable to meet Taiwanese and Ukrainian requirements at the same time, it must prioritize delivering weapons to Taiwan if it is to maximize the U.S. ability to deter China during the next several years. At the same time, the United States should take steps to reduce trade-offs as much as possible through a combination of industrial expansion, FMS reforms, and increased reliance on allies to support Ukraine's defense. Finally, even as Washington sends weapons to Taiwan, it must ensure that Taipei takes other necessary steps to strengthen Taiwan's defenses. This approach is not without risks. Sending weapons to Taiwan that Ukraine also needs means accepting risk in the European theater until the United States and its allies can produce replacement armaments. During this time, Ukraine may find itself less able to sustain offensive operations or prevent Russian forces from making gains. But prioritizing Ukraine at the expense of America's ability to arm Taiwan as quickly as possible also involves risk. Doing SO not only means a higher risk of deterrence failure against China in the Indo-Pacific, it also means greater risk to American servicemembers who may be called to Taiwan's defense. Given limited inventories and production capacity, the United States does not have the luxury of eliminating risks on both fronts. Instead, the United States must choose where to accept risk, consistent with American interests. Today, that means prioritizing delivery of weapons to Taiwan, while taking steps to prevent these kinds of trade-offs in the future, including greater reliance on NATO allies to defend Europe.

## Trade off is empirically proven. Bertrand '24 writes

**Bertrand 9-17** Natasha Bertrand, Oren Liebermann, 9-17-2024, "US military aid packages to Ukraine shrink amid concerns over Pentagon stockpiles", CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/17/politics/us-reducing-military-aid-packages-ukraine/index.html> || DOA 11/1/2024 BRP

US military aid packages for Ukraine have been smaller in recent months, as the stockpiles of weapons and equipment that the Pentagon is willing to send Kyiv from its own inventory have dwindled. The shift comes amid concerns about US military readiness being impacted as US arms manufacturers play catchup to the huge demand created by the war against Russia. The shortage means the Biden administration still has \$6 billion in funds available to arm and equip Ukraine, but the Pentagon lacks the inventory it is willing to deliver more than two years into the war, two US officials told CNN. "It's about the stockpiles we have on our shelves, what [the Ukrainians] are asking for, and whether we can meet those requests with what we currently have" without impacting readiness, one of the officials said. The Pentagon has asked Congress for more time to spend that money before it expires at the end of September, according to Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary. It's a stark reversal from last winter, when the administration was pleading with lawmakers for additional funding to support Ukraine against Russia's invasion. "Replenishment is also an issue," the official said. The US is ramping up production of key items, such as 155 mm ammunition and Patriot missile systems, both to supply Ukraine and to refill US inventories. But it is a yearslong process that won't

quickly meet the surging demand. Before the war in Ukraine, the US produced approximately 15,000 155 mm artillery shells each month. With new factories and production lines opening, the US is now producing 40,000 shells a month. But it will still take more than a year for the Pentagon to hit its goal of 100,000 shells each month. The process of ramping up production is on schedule, but the process will take years, requiring new facilities, expanded factories and Congress willing to allocate the money. **Ukraine is feeling the impact of the inventory shortages, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.** During a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Germany this month, Zelensky told the US and other allies that deliveries of promised air defense systems were moving too slowly and warned of a "significant" shortfall in vital aid. In April, Congress gave the Biden administration an additional \$13.4 billion to use specifically to send Ukraine weapons and equipment drawn from US stockpiles. But the Defense Department hasn't been able to use it all because of a lack of corresponding supply that it is willing to part with without risking the US' own readiness, officials told CNN. **The Pentagon announced in April that it would send up to \$1 billion worth of weapons and equipment directly from US stockpiles to Kyiv after Congress finally passed a supplemental funding package for Ukraine. Since then, however, the value of each military aid package to Ukraine has been significantly smaller, with none exceeding \$400 million and most in the \$125 million to \$250 million range.** In 2022 and 2023, the Pentagon regularly announced packages worth between \$600 million to \$800 million, with the highest being \$2.85 billion in January 2023. Another US official noted the administration was unable to draw supplies from Defense Department stockpiles for the first four months of the year because of Congress' delay in approving supplemental funding. The official also said the US is trying not to send Ukraine too much at once. "There are limits to how quickly we can draw down equipment without impacting military readiness, which is one reason packages get spaced out," the official said. There are also limits, the official added, to how quickly Ukraine can absorb the equipment and distribute it effectively. The US is still trying to announce a new aid package roughly every two weeks, the official added, which Ukraine is "supportive of because they believe getting new packages every two weeks is a morale boost." Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has vowed to continue providing military support to Ukraine and announced a new \$250 million aid package at the meeting in Germany this month. Austin acknowledged at the meeting that the US is working to ramp up production and "speed up deliveries" to Ukraine. "Time is of the essence, especially with winter on its way," Austin said. "And **we must all step up our support — and quickly.**"

## **Lack of Ukraine support ensures defeat. McDonagh '24 explains**

**McDonagh '8/28** [Shannon McDonagh, [No Quals] 08-28-2024, "Ukraine Will Lose War Unless U.S. Steps Up: Former Top General", Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/us-official-warns-ukraine-biden-missile-restrictions-1945509>] leon

A former US General and top NATO commander has warned that **Ukraine faces defeat unless the U.S. significantly ramps up its military support against Russia. Philip Breedlove, who led NATO operations in Europe from 2013 to 2016, argues that Ukraine** is at risk of losing the war unless the United States rethinks its guidance for missile use. "This war is going to end exactly how Western policymakers decide it will end," said the retired four-star U.S. Air Force leader. The message comes amid heightened military activity on the ground in Ukraine and intensified debate over the nation's role in the conflict. **"If we keep doing what we're doing, Ukraine will eventually lose,"** Breedlove said. **"Because right now [...] we are purposely not giving Ukraine what they need to win."**

## **Ukraine defeat causes Russian expansionism and nuclear war. Shalom '22 explains**

**Shalom '22** [Stephen R. Shalom, 08-23-2022 "Ukraine and the Dangers of Nuclear War", New Politics, <https://newpol.org/ukraine-and-the-dangers-of-nuclear-war/>] leon ,[STEPHEN R. SHALOM is on the editorial board of New Politics.]

Imagine what would happen if Washington responded to Putin's nuclear bluster by stopping its weapons supplies to Ukraine or lifting its sanctions. The Kremlin, now with a proven method of getting its way, could then demand surrender from Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet republics where Russian troops currently hold contested territory. And **when the United States and NATO refused to provide arms to these governments (because, after all, one doesn't want to risk nuclear war), the two countries would have little option but to submit. But why stop there? If Russia then demanded (with appropriate rhetoric and missile tests) that NATO troops be removed from the Baltic states, would it be worth risking madman Putin escalating to nuclear war? So best comply. And if it then further demanded that no NATO arms be provided to these former components of the Soviet Union, again, why provoke the Bear? But at some point, either Moscow or Washington will miscalculate – will NATO back down? is Russia bluffing? — and we'll be in the midst of a nuclear war.** And Putin wouldn't be the only one to try to take advantage of this strategy. Would his success encourage other nuclear bullies? Might Israel then make demands of Iran, to which Tehran would have to give in lest it face Armageddon? Might China demand that the United States stop arming and even trading with Taiwan,

facilitating a bloodless conquest? Might North Korea demand that South Korea and Japan subsidize its economy? But giving in to Putin's threats wouldn't only encourage continuing acts of nuclear extortion. It would also provoke the potential victims of this extortion to rush to acquire nuclear arms of their own as a means of self-protection. South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and others would inevitably seek to become nuclear weapons states (if they are not already doing so). Some experts have claimed that widespread nuclear proliferation would be great, because no one would ever go to war again, fearing nuclear retaliation. But as most analysts understand, the risks of accidental, inadvertent, or escalatory war, or terrorism, or sabotage increases exponentially with the number of nuclear weapons states.

## **1AC - Grey Zones**

### **Contention Two is Grey Zones**

**New AI support to Taiwan causes inevitable miscalculation. Machines malfunction and overreact to grey zone tactics---guarantees escalation and legitimizes invasion.**

**Hiebert 24** [Kyle Hiebert (B.A. in Sociology & Political Economy, Kyle Hiebert is a researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor.), 1-15-2024, "The United States Quietly Kick-Starts the Autonomous Weapons Era", Centre for International Governance Innovation, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/the-united-states-quietly-kick-starts-the-autonomous-weapons-era/> (accessed 11-6-2024)] ME

Activists and campaign groups — backed by dozens of countries and Nobel Peace Prize laureates — have long sought a global treaty banning lethal autonomous weapons systems. When the underlying technology was unproven and the world was a less hostile place, this objective seemed possible. That's no longer the case. The policy conversation must now focus on devising mechanisms to manage these systems rather than halt their development. **Huge progress in visual recognition tools, machine learning and robotics is making it far easier for computers to navigate complex environments. The war in Ukraine has delivered a combat data bonanza and investment windfall for defence tech companies. And a surge in conflicts worldwide has revealed a fragmented international community increasingly unable or unwilling to enforce humanitarian laws. Concurrently, the United States has expedited its timeline for deploying intelligent weapons.** In late August 2023, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks delivered a keynote speech at a tech-focused defence industry conference in Washington, DC. Her talk had an anodyne title — "The Urgency to Innovate." But the plans within constitute nothing less than a reinvention of contemporary warfare. **The goal, in Hicks's words: "to field attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within the next 18-to-24 months."** Arguing the US military must adapt **to counter the global ambitions of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), Hicks unveiled "Replicator."** Initiated by the US Department of Defense (DoD), **the program aims to streamline the US military's uptake of emerging technologies** — especially those from the private sector. The intention is for Washington to maintain its ability **to project US hard power abroad** while becoming less reliant on the expensive, lumbering legacy components of today's conventional armed forces. Instead, **the DoD envisions a highly networked, data-driven force powered by artificial intelligence (AI).** Human soldiers would be paired on the battlefield with waves of smaller, complementary, **low-cost intelligent weapons systems that can be quickly replaced after being destroyed.** Speaking a week later, Hicks suggested some forms this might take: **self-piloting naval vessels, uncrewed aircraft** and "pods" of mobile, general-purpose units deployed on **land, at sea, in the air** and in space. The emphasis would be on attritability — a design principle generally defined as prioritizing function and expendability over long-term use and durability. A US Navy task force developing military applications for AI already has an autonomous early-warning drone fleet in the Persian Gulf. Monitoring freedom of navigation around the Strait of Hormuz is strategically vital, given it's a key chokepoint for global energy supplies. Yet **these capabilities are now moving beyond simply aiding domain awareness. On October 23, 2023, after receiving orders from an operator ashore, an unmanned US Navy boat for the first time successfully attacked a fake enemy target using live rockets, without any tactical direction from a human operator.** The Pentagon reportedly has **more than 800 active military AI projects** in the works. Most of these relate to enhancing process efficiency, **threat evaluation and**

**battlefield decision making.** But that summary is **merely** what can be gleaned from public sources and **unclassified records.** Unlike nuclear weapons, **autonomous weapons can be developed and tested in secret.** The war in Ukraine has also provided a clear case for why mass still matters in modern warfare, bolstering the value proposition of attributable smart weapons systems such as drones. Hicks has vowed that Replicator will align with America's stated approach to AI ethics and autonomous systems. These are reflected in the Pentagon's newly updated policies on weapon systems autonomy and the US State Department's political declaration on the responsible military use of AI. As of late November 2023, the latter had been endorsed by 49 countries — essentially all of America's Western allies. But **the initiative's main motive** appears to be in preparation for a possible **confrontation with authoritarian China.** And **Beijing is also actively pursuing** autonomous weapons **technology as part of its explicit doctrine of civil-military fusion.** A chapter within the 2023 annual report of Congress's US-China Economic and Security Review Commission warns that **"investment and procurement patterns suggest the PLA aims to use AI-enabled weapons systems to counter specific U.S. advantages and target U.S. vulnerabilities."** It's here that **lethal autonomous weapons present** arguably their greatest medium-term risk: **A deadly accident** between the PLA and US military, or one of Washington's allies, **involving these weapons around Taiwan** or in the South China Sea, **could trigger a globally destabilizing war** that no one really wants. Australia, for example, is also aggressively trying to develop and acquire unmanned systems. So are India and South Korea. Without a formal de-escalation process in place, **an incident involving lethal robots — due to unit malfunction or operator error — could spiral out of control** quickly. **Military escalation** between China and the United States, two rival **nuclear-armed superpowers, might ensue.** The recent agreement between China's President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden to initiate bilateral talks to assess the risks of AI systems for military use is a small yet important step. But, of greater importance is that the two leaders agreed to have their militaries revive bilateral emergency hotlines. These direct links were abandoned by China in the wake of then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022, which infuriated Beijing. The resumption of their use — while not guaranteed to last — can and should be a foundation from which to jointly create a specific, sequenced de-escalation process. Pre-existing off-ramps for military commanders could mean the difference between diffusing tensions around an isolated accident or mobilizing for war. Because while proponents of lethal **autonomous** weapons say their use will be "less dramatic" and more bound by legality than the dystopian machine-powered death squads envisioned by activists, there is consensus that **these weapons systems will vastly accelerate warfare. Their quick-strike capability will shrink the window to properly weigh** retaliatory actions. **A minor incident thus has a greater chance of morphing into a conflagration.** This dynamic will be compounded if human-in-the-loop models — where an operator must actively approve the use of force — are deprioritized in favour of **human-on-the-loop** ones. Also known as fully autonomous design, a human handler can oversee and intervene in a robot's course of action if desired, but otherwise the **units are granted agency to identify and destroy targets based solely on programming and algorithmic decision making.** The US government could conceivably argue these weapons systems still align with its **definition** of keeping military uses of AI under responsible human **control.** A 2021 UN report claims the world's inaugural test run of a fully autonomous hunter drone, produced by a Turkish weapons manufacturer, took place in Libya in March 2020. However, American defence tech company Palantir — which has been deeply involved in the war in Ukraine — estimates such capabilities are still a few years away from being totally realized. It's these human-on-the-loop models that have stoked fears around autonomous weapons going awry. **Their future use is also central to drawn-out debate at the United Nations around creating international laws for the military use of AI, which has now been extended through to the end of 2025.** A Russian diplomat, speaking during a UN debate on AI arms control in May 2023, said, "We understand that for many delegations the priority is human control. For the Russian Federation, the priorities are somewhat different." This debate may eventually force the United States' hand in embracing fully autonomous weapons models. In an essay published shortly before his death, Henry Kissinger and a co-author, political scientist Graham Allison, wrote, **"Never in history has one great power fearing that a competitor might apply a new technology to threaten its survival and security forgone developing that technology for itself."** **Even human-in-the-loop systems could fuel military escalation due to the prevalence of automation bias.** Research shows that people tend to defer to computer-generated decisions **over their own** evidence and perceptions. An autonomous weapons system is thus **likely to gain a human's approval** for the use of force, most of the time, when signalling an incoming threat. Then there is the issue of the alignment problem whereby an AI program places achieving its objective above mitigating collateral damage. In May 2023, a US Air Force colonel briefly sparked panic by saying that during a recent test simulation, an autonomous drone had killed its operator to dodge an order to abort a requested airstrike. The Air Force quickly denied the incident, and the officer in question, Col. Tucker Hamilton, retracted his comments, calling them a "thought experiment" instead. But the point had been made. "We've never run that experiment, nor



would we need to in order to realise that this is a plausible outcome,” said Hamilton afterward. In recent years, war gamers inside and outside the US government have tried to map out what a US-China clash over Taiwan might look like. A recurring finding is that thwarting an amphibious assault by the PLA — one backed by Chinese airpower and long-range munitions launched from the mainland — would necessitate a large garrison of autonomous anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems. Chinese forces in the region are already deploying so-called grey zone tactics against Taiwan and others, engaging in acts just shy of military provocation. These tactics include sending warplanes into Taiwan’s air defence zone on an almost daily basis. The Philippines, which updated its mutual defence treaty with the United States in May 2023, has also reported numerous cases of Chinese coast guard ships ramming their fishing boats, spraying them with water cannons or pointing military-grade lasers at vessel crew members. Canadian and American warships patrolling international waters have faced maritime intimidation and harassment. It’s impossible to predict whether, in the real world, a weapons system — especially a fully autonomous one — might interpret such ambiguous aggressions as worthy of a violent response. Defence expert and former Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy has highlighted the possibility that an adversary could “spoof” the visual recognition tools of autonomous weapons systems to manipulate them into attacking civilian targets. This type of false-flag operation could conceivably provide cover for Beijing to claim that mobilizing the PLA for an attack on Taiwan or nearby Western forces was defensive. Armed conflicts are inherently unpredictable. Reflecting on the first year of Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, military historian Phillips Payson O’Brien wrote that the biggest lesson for the world was that “war is rarely easy or straightforward — which is why starting one is almost always the wrong decision for any nation.” Before autonomous weapons become a fixture, de-escalation processes must be established to ensure that their growing pains do not drag the planet’s two rival superpowers into a ruinous conflict.

**Taiwan is the only scenario for miscalculation---short time frame and US prioritization causes an arms race and flash wars.**

**Honrada 22** (Gabriel Honrada is a Research Analyst at International Security Program, Politico-Military Dimension, 5-23-2022, "Drone swarms may be key to defending Taiwan," Asia Times, <https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/drone-swarms-may-be-key-to-defending-taiwan/>) //bmiy

The US Air Force has conducted simulations in cooperation with think tanks that reportedly showed the effectiveness of drone swarms in defending Taiwan against a possible Chinese invasion. David Ochmanek, a defense researcher at the RAND Corporation think tank, highlighted in an online discussion last week the short time window in which US and allied forces must respond in event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. “US and allied forces may have as few as a week to 10 days to either defeat this invasion or accept the fait accompli,” he said. Ochmanek mentioned that simulations conducted in 2020 with the Air Force’s Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) office and RAND have shown that drone swarms using a distributed “mesh” laser data-sharing network were essential in securing a US victory. This employs line-of-sight lasers to transmit and receive data between drones that effectively make the swarm autonomous, sharing flight and targeting data instantaneously and constantly between individual drones. This may defeat anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that China may deploy to deter or defeat a US intervention. These include ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, dense integrated air defense networks and capable 5th-generation combat aircraft. Ochmanek described several ways that drone swarms could turn the tide in favor of the US and Taiwan, noting that they could be deployed together with stealthy manned platforms such as the F-35 and F-22 to hit Chinese warships, aircraft and missile batteries. The drones would form a decoy screen for stealthy manned aircraft, extending the onboard sensor capabilities of the latter, and enabling them to observe electronic silence to avoid detection. These networked drones would drastically increase the situational awareness and target acquisition capabilities of manned platforms while simultaneously flooding enemy radar scopes with multiple targets, forcing them to waste limited missiles and ammunition on expendable decoys before manned systems move in for the kill. Ochmanek also mentioned that machine learning and AI give autonomous drone swarms the ability to look at targets from multiple angles, cross-check various targeting data streams and suggest the best way to attack a specific target. Despite these advancements, Ochmanek voiced concerns regarding the maturity of the technology, citing potential vulnerabilities such as Russian and Chinese electronic warfare capabilities, cyberattacks and bandwidth limitations. He also cautioned that the aforementioned 2020 simulation resulted in a Pyrrhic US victory. This contrasts with previous simulations of a Taiwan invasion that have ended badly for the US. In October 2020, the US lost a classified wargame simulating a Chinese invasion. “Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably. An aggressive red team that had been studying the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. They knew exactly what we’re going to do before we did it,” said Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Hyten. The results prompted Hyten to scrap joint warfighting concepts that had guided US military operations for decades. Hyten noted at the time that the first US Joint Warfare Concept (JWC) simply improved on the

long-standing US strategy of gathering and using ubiquitous information to coordinate forces and structure battles. However, the JWC "failed miserably" in the October 2020 simulation, since it presumed information dominance in a simulation wherein US forces had to act without that advantage. In response, Hyten espoused a new concept he termed "expanded maneuver", which entails aggregating capabilities to provide significant effect, and disaggregating to survive any kind of threat. This is enabled by AI, cloud computing and machine learning, and could take place in multiple domains under a single command structure, a concept known as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), which is the US' concept to connect sensors from all branches of the US military into a single network. Former US Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work has stated publicly that in the most realistic Taiwan invasion simulations that the US can come up the US has lost to China with a score of 18-0. These defeats have shown that China's A2/AD capabilities have evolved to the point that the US can no longer expect to quickly achieve air, space or maritime superiority. **China is not far behind in deploying autonomous drone swarms against US, Taiwanese and allied forces.** Following missile strikes to destroy Taiwan's command and control nodes and offensive cyber operations to degrade Taiwan's space-based systems, China may launch its own drone swarms to knock out Taiwan's air defenses, going against the latter's air defense radars and missile batteries. **The potential use of drone swarms may fuel an AI arms race between major military powers.** Russia, China and the US are already seeking to outdo each other in creating new algorithms and gaining access to critical technologies for autonomous AI, such as high-end microchips. **Increasingly capable AI coupled with the proliferation of drone swarms may thus lead to "flash wars," wherein autonomous weapons systems react against each other in an uncontrolled chain reaction of escalation.**

### **Reducing support ends Chinese drills and deescalates the region.**

**Gilley 10** [Bruce Gilley, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ Portland State University's Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, 1-1-2010, "Not So Dire Straits: How The Finlandization Of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security" Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits>, accessed: 10-27-2024] OA

Even from a strictly realist perspective, **there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit,** given that **U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations.** Taiwan's **Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice** to a rising China **but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China.** **Washington should drop its zero-sum view** of the Taipei-Beijing relationship **and embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement** -- in effect "losing China" a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC's sphere of influence. Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his détente would be "beneficial to all parties concerned." He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, **Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China.** **Washington needs to embrace this shift** not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them. The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues. **SIDELINING UNCLE SAM** The United States has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. **U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically.** Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC's intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, **Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.** In 1982, **the United States pledged** to China that **it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan -- a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since.** Today, as then, **there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict.** The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan's economic decline has moderated Taipei's appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, **Washington can reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales** of items such as Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit. **By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills.** Removing Taiwan as a

major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture. The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations -- specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power. Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift.

## And the aff solves draw-in.

**FA ND** [Fiveable, ND, "Military Support", <https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/apush/military-support>]  
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Definition Military support refers to the assistance provided by armed forces to enhance the capabilities of allied nations or groups during conflicts or crises. This can include direct intervention, logistical assistance, training, and intelligence sharing, all aimed at bolstering the effectiveness of military operations and ensuring strategic objectives are met.

## War is existential.

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As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a



conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place..