

C1: Cyber

The DHS trades off with the Coast Guard.

Lamothe 17; Dan Lamothe, 3-8-2017, "To fund border wall, Trump administration weighs cuts to Coast Guard,...", <https://archive.is/PDh15>

The Trump administration, **searching for money to** build **the** president's planned multibillion-dollar **border** wall and crack down on illegal immigration, **is weighing significant cuts to the Coast Guard**, the Transportation Security Administration and other agencies focused on national security threats, according to a draft plan. The proposal, drawn up by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), also would slash the budget of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which provides disaster relief after hurricanes, tornadoes and other natural disasters. **The Coast Guard's \$9.1 billion budget in 2017 would be cut 14 percent to about \$7.8 billion**, while the TSA and FEMA budgets would be reduced about 11 percent each to \$4.5 billion and \$3.6 billion, respectively. **The cuts are proposed even as the planned budget for the Department of Homeland Security**, which oversees all of them, **grows** 6.4 percent to \$43.8 billion, according to the plan, which was obtained by The Washington Post. Some \$2.9 billion of that would go to building the wall on the U.S.-Mexico border, with \$1.9 billion funding "immigration detention beds" and other Immigration and Customs Enforcement expenses and \$285 million set aside to hire 500 more Border Patrol agents and 1,000 more ICE agents and support staffers.

However, the Coast Guard is key to maritime cybersecurity.

Ribeiro 24; Anna Ribeiro 24, 7-15-2024, "New DHS report highlights gaps in cybersecurity efforts of Coast Guard for **marine transportation systems**", Industrial Cyber, <https://industrialcyber.co/transport/new-dhs-report-highlights-gaps-in-cybersecurity-efforts-ofcoast-guard-for-marine-transportation-systems/>

The U.S. Coast Guard has made progress in enhancing the cyber posture of the Marine Transportation System (MTS) by establishing maritime cybersecurity teams over the past two years, in line with statutory requirements, according to a final report published by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG). Based on its findings, the **report proposes four recommendations to improve the Coast Guard's cyber readiness and precautions to secure the U.S. supply chain.** The DHS has concurred with four recommendations.

Coast Guard budget cuts risk cyber weaknesses.

Ribeiro; Anna Ribeiro, 7-15-2024, "New DHS report highlights gaps in cybersecurity efforts of Coast Guard for marine transportation systems", Industrial Cyber, <https://industrialcyber.co/transport/new-dhs-report-highlights-gaps-in-cybersecurity-efforts-of-coast-guard-for-marine-transportation-systems/>

The report also touched upon the fact that Coast Guard inspectors were not conducting cybersecurity checks despite requirements to do so, mainly due to lack of standardized cyber training. Inspectors across three sectors mentioned receiving minimal cybersecurity training only during annual DHS-wide sessions. While some expressed interest in more training based on enforceable regulations, others highlighted the disadvantages faced by inspectors without proper guidance. It added that the Coast Guard partners with an educational institution for specialized maritime cybersecurity courses, but **funding limitations restrict** the number of attendees. Without **a formal training program**, inspectors rely on written guidance and job aids. However, the provided guidance may be challenging to implement effectively, **leaving gaps in critical areas like vetting third-party vendors and updating access control systems.** The Coast Guard's Office of Port and Facility Compliance emphasized the need for cybersecurity regulations to establish proper training for inspectors.

MTS cyber security is key.

Cuffari; Cuffari July-9th, 24, Joseph V. "Coast Guard Should Take Additional Steps to ... - Dhs Oig." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 9 July 2024, www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-07/OIG-24-37-Jul24.pdf

protect the MTS, which remains vulnerable to the exploitation, misuse, or failure of cyber systems. This continued cyber vulnerability may lead to injury or death, harm the marine environment, or disrupt vital trade activity. **The Marine Transportation System (MTS) is the backbone of the U.S. economy, as about 90 percent of U.S. imports and exports travel by ship.** The **waterways and ports** that **make up the MTS** include 25,000 miles of coastal and inland waterways with 361 ports, 124 shipyards, and more than 3,500 maritime facilities. These critical assets connect U.S. highways, railways, airports, and pipelines to facilitate nearly \$5.4 trillion in commerce — representing about 25 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. **The MTS is a prime target for malicious actors who seek to disrupt our supply chain.** The use of new technologies, such as those for navigation, communication, and security, benefit the supply chain. However, these **technologies are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation**, misuse, or simple failure, which could cause injury or death, harm the marine environment, or disrupt vital trade activity. For example, according to the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), vessels rely almost exclusively on networked Global Positioning System-based systems for navigation, while facilities often use the same technologies for cargo tracking and control. **Threats to maritime infrastructure and the supply chain continue to increase.** For example, as of August 2021, **Coast Guard estimated that hackers attacked the MTS every 39 seconds**, for an average of 2,244 cyberattacks per day.¹ As discussed

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Without Coast Guard cyber security, a successful attack is devastating.

Well 24; Foxs-well, 3-15-2024, "Foreign states, ransomware threaten U.S. ports, says maritime security analyst", StateScoop, <https://statescoop.com/us-ports-maritime-cybersecurity-threats-2024/>

The nation's critical maritime industry — which includes waterways, ports and land-side connections, moving people and goods to and from the water — is under an increasing threat of cyberattacks, one expert told StateScoop. **A successful cyberattack** against a complex maritime ecosystem in the United States **could be devastating** — more than **75% of the nation's trade relies on the maritime sector, totaling \$5.4 trillion in economic activity, \$1.5 trillion in imports and more than 30 million jobs**, according to a 2023 report by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.

C2: Modeling

Democracy is rebounding

Serhan 23: Yasmeen Serhan, 3-9-2023, Time,
<https://time.com/6261065/freedom-house-report-democratic-backsliding/>

or more than a decade, Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report, which has been published by the Washington-based pro-democracy watchdog since 1973, has made for pretty grim reading. Since 2006, the report has chronicled a global "democratic recession," in which the number of countries with diminishing political rights and civil liberties has outpaced those moving in the opposite direction. But there may now be cause for cautious optimism. Of the 195 countries and 15 territories evaluated, 34 countries saw improvements in political rights and civil liberties, whereas 35 countries lost ground. That represents the narrowest margin recorded between countries that declined and improved since the downward trend began 17 years ago. The report concludes that it signals that **"the world's long freedom recession may be bottoming out."** The second, perhaps more noteworthy, reason is to do with the fact that **autocracies are no longer seen as** quite as **"infallible."** Throughout 2022, **authoritarian regimes and illiberal leaders suffered a series of blows.** That includes Vladimir Putin's failure to achieve outright victory in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Jair Bolsonaro's failure to win reelection in Brazil even after an attempted coup. Meanwhile, in China, rare demonstrations forced the government into a stunning reversal on its stringent zero-COVID policy; in Iran, women have emerged at the forefront of nationwide anti-regime protests. And in countries such as Venezuela and Afghanistan, governments have presided over humanitarian crises.

Modeling ethical surveillance now is key to preventing encroaching digital authoritarianism.

Shahbaz 18; Adrian Shahbaz, xx-xx-2018, "The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism",
Freedom House,

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism>

The internet is growing less free around the world, and democracy itself is withering under its influence. Disinformation and propaganda disseminated online have poisoned the public sphere. **The unbridled collection of personal data has broken down traditional notions of privacy.** And a cohort of countries is moving toward digital authoritarianism by embracing the Chinese model of extensive censorship and automated surveillance systems. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom declined for the eighth consecutive year in 2018. Democracies have a number of options for slowing China's techno-dystopian expansionism, from tightening import and export controls to imposing sanctions on tech companies that enable human rights abuses. They can also help defend their own companies from demands to participate in China's Social Credit System or otherwise comply with antidemocratic standards and practices. Citizens can also hold companies accountable for compromising their commitments to democratic values for the sake of access to China's lucrative market. In an internal company letter from August, some 1,400 Google employees called for greater transparency after media reports revealed plans to launch a censored search and mobile news service in China, in which users' activity would be linked to their telephone numbers. Similar internal pressure in June led the company to reevaluate its work with the US Defense Department in the field of artificial intelligence; chief executive Sundar Pichai publicly pledged not to pursue AI applications, including surveillance tools, that are likely to cause harm or contravene "widely accepted principles of international law and human rights." As China strives to become an AI powerhouse by 2030, the moral and ethical concerns surrounding the technology deserve greater attention. Like nuclear science, AI will inevitably fall into the hands of governments that seek to use it for authoritarian ends. **Democracies will face temptations as well, given the appeal of AI applications for everything from e-commerce to national security. Ensuring that government agencies and private companies abide by ethical codes will** require constant vigilance by civil society, investigative journalists, and official oversight bodies, the last of which may **play a key role in preventing the transfer of advanced technology that can**

be used for both benign and malign purposes to countries like China. But the best way for democracies to stem the rise of digital authoritarianism is to prove that there is a better model for managing the internet. This entails tackling social media manipulation and misuse of data in a manner that respects human rights, while preserving an internet that is global, free, and secure. Democratic governments will have to devote much greater diplomatic and other resources to countering China's charm offensive on the international stage. More governments are turning to China for guidance and support at a time when the United States' global leadership is on the decline, and the acquiescence of foreign companies to Beijing's demands only emboldens the regime in its effort to rewrite international rules in its favor. **If democracies fail to advance their own principles and interests with equal determination, digital authoritarianism will become an inescapable reality almost by default.**

Affirming leads to authoritarian modeling.

Hellerstein-21 (Erica Hellerstein, 7-14-2021, "Between the US and Mexico, a corridor of surveillance becomes lethal," Coda Story.<https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/us-border-surveillance/#:~:text=Humanitarian%20and%20migrant%20rights%20groups,privacy%20and%20civil%20liberty%20concerns//vy>)

A glance at the map shows Arivaca and its surrounding areas awash with red dots, each representing the location where a body was found. 2020 was the deadliest year on record for border crossers in Arizona, according to Humane Borders, which recorded 226 migrant deaths statewide, and 182 in Pima County. Lately, Lewis says it is typical for at least one person a day to stumble into Arivaca, often dazed from days-long treks through the desert. "You feel so powerless that people keep dying and nobody is doing anything. It's a nightmare," she told me. **The impacts of the surveillance dragnet extend to Arivaca residents** like Lewis. The town's surveillance infrastructure regularly inserts itself into the routine aspects of her life, from tripping sensors while hiking, "and all of a sudden you have a border patrol helicopter overhead," to driving through technology-equipped border patrol checkpoints whenever she needs to leave town. "I think I've become a lot more paranoid since living in the border zone," she told me. "A lot more paranoid about government surveillance and feeling like I never have privacy or can never have full trust in privacy." In addition to endangering the lives of migrants, privacy advocates and civil liberties groups argue that **the kinds of surveillance that have enveloped life in the borderlands can violate the civil liberties of millions of U.S. citizens living along the border.** "Even if it's a camera near the international boundary, that camera can turn and surveil streets that cover hundreds and hundreds of households, read license plates and use facial recognition technology," said Shaw Drake of the American Civil Liberties Union's Border Rights Center. **"What has happened is a massive surveillance infrastructure throughout the entire region."** They also warn that the **surveillance technologies deployed in the region threaten the rights of people living far outside the borderlands.** Last summer, CBP dispatched drones to more than 15 U.S. cities — from Philadelphia to New York City — during protests held in response to the police killing of George Floyd. The drones logged more than 270 hours of video footage in a digital network managed by the Department of Homeland Security and accessible to local police departments. The news prompted a Congressional inquiry by House Democrats, who called on the Trump administration to "explain its use of Customs and Border Patrol resources to conduct surveillance on Americans engaging in peaceful protests." The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General has cast doubts on the **CBP's drone program, referring to the devices as "dubious achievers"** that cost \$12,255 an hour to operate, while delivering fewer than 2% of all border apprehensions. "We see no evidence that the drones contribute to a more secure border," the report concluded. Julie Mao, deputy director of the immigrant rights legal firm Just Futures Law, which specializes in the intersection of technology and immigration, **predicted a future where immigrants and U.S. citizens alike are subjected to "constant, real-time surveillance"** by the Department of Homeland Security.

Border Technology spills over onto a global stage.

Bady 19; Aaron Bady, 8-20-2019, "How the US Exported Its Border Around the World", Nation,
<https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/todd-miller-new-book-empire-of-borders-interview/>

Journalist Todd Miller's Empire of Borders is about how dramatically and completely this easy simplicity can mislead us about what the border really is, where it is, and where it is going. Borders aren't just there. Not only were they made (often arbitrarily and with great cruelty and violence), but the US border, in particular, extends far beyond the frontier line that separates one country from another, even far beyond the 100-mile range that Homeland Security considers the border zone. **The US border is a massive global apparatus,** an interconnected network of partnerships, funding, multinational industries, and international agreements, stretching across every continent and saturating the world. Most important, it's still growing. With a climate-changed future on the horizon—and the prospect of climate refugees from around the globe growing exponentially—walls and fences and towers are proliferating, as the global border security industrial complex accelerates its efforts. From his home in Arizona, Miller tracks the border from Guatemala and Honduras to the Caribbean, Israel, the Philippines, and Kenya, interviewing subjects on every side of that multidimensional line. And that is exactly what is happening. The Palestine example is a good one to demonstrate how this works. "Smart wall" technology gets tested out in the occupied Palestinian territories first, like the West Bank wall. "Smart wall" means walls that are either equipped with or reinforced by sensor systems, cameras, radar systems, drones, and linked to command and control centers. These are technologies of segregation, of apartheid. But **if a company** can show that their technology is effective, like the Haifa-based company Elbit Systems claims in the West Bank, they can then sell it to other countries for their own border and homeland security enforcement systems. It's field-tested. If it works in the occupation of Palestine, the argument goes, then it can work everywhere else. In 2014, Elbit got a contract from US Customs and Border Protection to **build 52 surveillance towers in** southern Arizona, for **the border** with Mexico. But now that those towers are being deployed, **they get showcased to other countries as a model of what US border enforcement is.** This also leads to another big part of the US pushing out the borders—sending officials to the other borders around **the** world so they can diagnose the problems with that border and give recommendations that **result** in trainings and resource transfers and suggestions for technology deployments. They can suggest, for example, that other countries adopt smart walls that were first developed in occupied Palestine, modeled in Arizona, but coming to a country near you. So this **is** a way that the global border system propagates and standardizes itself, **a globalization of** essentially **oppressive technologies** of exclusion and division for profit.

The Rise of Authoritarianism has catastrophic ramifications

Kasparov 17; Garry Kasparov, 02-2017, The Washington Post, "Why the rise of authoritarianism is a global catastrophe"

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/02/13/why-the-rise-of-authoritarianism-is-a-global-catastrophe/>

If injustice and oppression aren't bad enough, **authoritarian governments** bear an enormous social cost. Dictator-led countries **have higher rates of mental illness, lower levels of health and life expectancy, and** as Amartya Sen famously argued, **higher susceptibility to famine.** Their **citizens are less educated and file fewer patents.** In 2016, more patents were filed in France than in the entire Arab world — not because Arabs are less entrepreneurial than the French, but because nearly all of them live under stifling authoritarianism. Clearly, the suppression of free expression and creativity has harmful effects on innovation and economic growth. Citizens of free and open societies such as Germany, South Korea and Chile witness advances in business, science and technology that Belarusians, Burmese and Cubans can only dream of. And consider that free nations do not go to war with each other. History has shown this to be the only ironclad law of political theory. Meanwhile, **dictators are always at war, often with a foreign power and always with their own people. If you are worried about public health, poverty or peace, your mandate is clear: Oppose tyranny.** Tragically, world institutions and organizations have failed to properly address authoritarianism. Western governments sometimes protest human rights violations in countries such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea — but routinely ignore them in places such as China and Saudi Arabia, in favor of upholding trade deals and security agreements. The United Nations, established to bring peace and justice to the world, includes Cuba, Egypt and Rwanda on its Human Rights Council. Here, a representative from a democracy carries the same legitimacy as a representative from a dictatorship. One acts on behalf of its citizens, while the other acts to silence them. Between June 2006 and August 2015 the Human Rights Council issued zero condemnations of repressive regimes in China, Cuba, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Despite the fact that **dictatorship is at the root of** many **global ills — poor health, failing**

education systems and global poverty among them — authoritarianism is hardly ever addressed at major conferences worldwide. And no wonder: Many, including the World Economic Forum and the now-defunct Clinton Global Initiative, receive ample funding from authoritarians. Few human rights groups focus exclusively on authoritarianism, and most establishment ones spend significant chunks of their budgets on criticizing democratic governments and their policies. Dictators are rarely in the spotlight.

Reversing progress is existential.

Belfield-23 [Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (Haydn, "Collapse, Recovery, and Existential Risk," in *How Worlds Collapse: What History, Systems, and Complexity Can Teach Us About Our Modern World and Fragile Future*, p. 74-76) //

A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, **more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress** than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world would be worse. **It would increase the risk of** another collapse and **extinction and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories** (Beckstead, 2013). **Totalitarian states are** incompetent. They are **bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters** (Caplan, 2008).¹⁶ This can be seen most clearly in the great famines of Communist China and the USSR, in which millions died (Applebaum, 2017; Becker, 1996; Dikotter, 2010; Snyder, 2010). In comparison, functioning multiparty democracies rarely, if ever, experience famines (Sen, 2010). "Established autocracies" (or "personal"/"sultanist") are particularly bad, as there are few checks or restraints on arbitrary rule and the whims and ideology of the single individual, even from other elites (Svolik, 2012). From the inside, the "inner circle" around Mao, Stalin, and Hitler seems incredibly chaotic, with elites strongly incentivized to conceal information and encouraged by the autocrat to squabble and feud—so they are divided (Conquest, 1992; Kershaw, 2008; Zhang & Halliday, 2006). **If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems**, then **a world dominated by them would likely be worse at responding to risks of** collapse and **extinction. A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have major wars.** States with near-universal adult suffrage rarely (if ever) go to war with one another (Barnhart et al., 2020), so a world dominated by democracies has fewer wars. **Miscalculation might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate information**, leading to well-known strategic disasters such as Hitler and Stalin's blunders in World War II (Bialer, 1970; Noakes & Pridham, 2001), or at a smaller level, Saddam Hussein's rejection of diplomacy (Atkinson, 1993). **War makes collapse and extinction more likely, by raising the chance of weapons of mass destruction being used.** Linked to this, **totalitarian states are less cooperative** than democratic states. While cooperation is possible (Ginsburg, 2020), their internal norms are characterized by paranoia and treachery, **and their lack of** transparency limits their **ability to** credibly **commit to agreements. This is bad for** all risks that require cooperation such as **pandemics or climate change** (Tomasik, 2015). Finally, **continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of** collapse and **extinction.** Social progress could **reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could help address natural risks and climate change** (Sandberg, 2018), **differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power** (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019), **and solve safety challenges in AI or biotechnology** (Russell, 2019). However, as we will now discuss **totalitarian states would likely inhibit social progress.** A central question from a longtermist perspective is: Which values should shape the future? I would argue that we should prefer it to be shaped by liberal democratic values. This is not to say that the current democracy-dominated world is perfect—far from it. The fate of billions of factory-farmed animals or hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty makes that abundantly clear. However, democracies have two advantages. First, democracies have space for cosmopolitan values such as human rights, plurality, freedom, and equality. These are better than those that characterize life under totalitarianism: Fear, terror, subjection, and secrecy. Second, they have within themselves the mechanism to allow progress. In the last 100 (or even 50) years, the lives of women, LGBT people, religious minorities, and non-white people have dramatically improved. Our "moral circle" has expanded, and could continue to expand (Singer, 1981). The arc of the moral universe is long, but given the right conditions, it might just bend toward justice (King, 1968). A global society dominated by these values, and with the possibility of improving more, has a better longterm potential. A totalitarian-dominated world, on the other hand, would reduce the space for resistance and progress—distorting the human trajectory. **We should be particularly concerned about "bottlenecks" at which values are particularly important—where there is a risk of "locking-in"** some particular set of (possibly far from optimal) **values.** While they are currently far-off, **future technologies such as artificial general intelligence, space settlement, life extension (of autocrats), or much better surveillance could enable lock-in** (Caplan, 2008).¹⁷ Conditional on them avoiding new catastrophes, world orders dominated by totalitarians could be quite long-lasting (Caplan, 2008). Democracies can undermine authoritarian and totalitarian regimes through the following ways: Control, including conquest; contagion through proximity; and consent, promoting receptivity

toward democratization (Whitehead, 2001). Democracies can actively undermine these regimes through war, sanctions, hosting rebellious exiles, or sponsoring internal movements. Passively, through contagion, they offer a demonstration that a better, more prosperous life is possible. For example, in the final years of the USSR, ordinary Soviet citizens were able to see that the West had a higher standard of living—more innovation, more choice, and more consumer goods. The elites were able to read books from the outside, and travel—Gorbachev's contacts and friendships with European politicians may have made him more favorable to social democracy (Brown, 1996). Democracies can undermine the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2004). However, in a world not dominated by democracies, all these pressures would be far less. A world in which, say, totalitarian regimes emerged as dominant after World War II (for example if the USA was defeated) could be self-reinforcing and long-lasting, like the self-reinforcing relationship of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia (Orwell, 1949). Orwell's fictional world is characterized by constant low-grade warfare to justify emergency powers and secure elites, and with shifting alliances of convenience as states bandwagon and balance, thereby preventing any resolution. A totalitarian-dominated world order could be rather robust, perhaps for decades or even centuries. **A long-lasting totalitarian-dominated world would extend the period of time humanity would spend with a heightened risk of collapse or extinction, as well as increased potential for** distortion of the human trajectory and the possibility that a "**lock-in**" event may occur. This example illustrates the possibility of a "negative recovery," resulting in a trajectory with less or no scientific and social progress and a less favorable geopolitical situation, which would threaten the destruction of humanity's longterm potential

C3: Water Pollution

Border populations have resisted infrastructure.

Blanchfield 19 (Caitlin Blanchfield and Nina Valerie Kolowratnik, Caitlin Blanchfield is a doctoral candidate in architectural history at Columbia University's Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation and an editor of the Avery Review. Her research explores questions of landscape and sovereignty in the Americas. Nina Valerie Kolowratnik is an architect and researcher developing notational systems in the context of forced migration and cultural claims to territory, "'Persistent Surveillance': Militarized Infrastructure on the Tohono O'odham Nation," Avery Review, May 2019, <https://averyreview.com/issues/40/persistent-surveillance>, DOA: 8-19-2024) //Bellaire MC

A rigorous reading of terrain here allows us to see how it is deployed materially and conceptually by the US government and thus more deeply understand impact. Terrain is not simply the physical contours and geological composition of a landscape but also the built structures on it, the communities that use it, and the political regimes that govern it. In the words of Stuart Elden, "Terrain makes possible, or constrains, political, military and strategic projects, even as it is shaped by them. It is where the geopolitical and the geophysical meet."²⁴ Federal policing strategies originally used to contain and monitor O'odham people have been incorporated into Homeland Security tactics like Operation Gatekeeper, where terrain is not only used as a migration deterrent but also as a mechanism of territorial control. This has direct implications for O'odham lands, imposing one ontological system onto another. Sacred sites, the landmarks of origin stories, bedrocks of temporal and spatial knowledge, ceremonial grounds and hunting trails, ancestral burial sites and living habitats become armatures in the militarized reach of the state. The repudiation of the tower project forces us to reassess not only how we, as people who work with and think about the built environment, talk about impact—it also pushes us to question on what basis potential sites for large-scale built projects are assessed and if the voices of affected communities can be heard in this process. **In the case of the Environmental Assessment on the Integrated Fixed Tower project on the Tohono O'odham Nation, the numerous objections sent to the processing agency by tribal individuals and districts neither changed nor even found entry into the final document; however, the Tribal Council still has not approved the project, leaving it in a bureaucratic limbo.**²⁵ As of correspondence with Rivas in February 2018, CBP has apparently reduced the number of proposed towers to two, attesting to the effects of resistance. This is, of course, complicated by the proposed border wall, which the tribe opposes. What **the tribe's repudiation of the IFT project clearly does is question the distinction between action and inaction**, between preservation and resistance, **thereby undermining these binaries in a political act of refusal.**²⁶

Affirming creates infrastructure that pollutes water.

Tulane 18 — Garbus, Marshal. "Environmental Impact of Border Security Infrastructure: How Department of Homeland Security's Waiver of Environmental Regulations Threatens Environmental Interests Along the U.S.-Mexico Border." Tulane Environmental Law Journal, vol. 31, no. 2, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 2018, pp. 327–44, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/90021700>. WMK

II. ECOSYSTEMS AT RISK ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER The body of land that encompasses the U.S.-Mexico border is roughly 1954 miles long⁶ and is home to the highest rate of species endangerment in the United States.⁷ The borderlands are home to more than 700 migratory species of birds, mammals, and insects.⁸ Along the border are many protected national parks, including Big Bend National Park in Texas and Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona. Significant state and local parks also exist along the border, including the World Birding Center in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and the National Butterfly Center in Mission, Texas. The fragile ecosystems of the borderlands form part of transboundary ecosystems whose integrity is essential to the hundreds of vulnerable species that inhabit it.⁹ The migration of species across the international border is vital to their health. In the case of large animal species, a large geographic area is necessary to promote migration and genetic diversity, two important aspects of species survival.¹⁰ The impact of a contiguous border wall will increase the number of species at risk by preventing species migration and genetic dispersal.¹¹ Currently existing border security infrastructure is significantly impacting the environment of the borderlands. To date, 654 miles of pedestrian and vehicular border fence contribute to ecological damage in the region. The existing security infrastructure includes fences, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) vehicle roads, vehicle road blocks, sensor networks, communication networks, and lighting and video installations.¹² The consequences of border infrastructure contribute to a variety of harmful ecological phenomena that lead to habitat fragmentation, flooding, sedimentation, and damage to cultural and natural resources.¹³ Soil erosion Substantially disrupts the local ecology with the construction of border fences that reach up to fifty meters deep in the ground.¹⁴ The construction of border security infrastructure in densely populated areas has pushed the avenues for unauthorized entry into more rural regions.¹⁵ The movement of unauthorized immigration and illegal activity on the border has shifted the environmental impact onto the fragile ecosystems of the rural borderlands.¹⁶ With increased enforcement efforts following new routes of unauthorized immigration, "habitat fragmentation, water pollution, soil damage and compaction, destruction of vegetation, and wildlife disturbance" parallel the movement of border crossing activity.¹⁷

Infrastructure development at the border is unregulated.

Boggs 21 — Boggs, Jennifer, "WAIVER AUTHORITY VS. FEDERAL PRESERVATION LAWS: A CASE STUDY ON THE U.S.- MEXICAN BORDER WALL" (2021). Theses (Historic Preservation). 709. https://repository.upenn.edu/hp_theses/709 WMK

Because of federal law waivers, former President Donald J. Trump Administration's (Trump Administration) border wall and border infrastructure project threatened the existence of the American Southwests' natural, archaeological, and historical resources—including Native American cultural patrimony (e.g., sites and artifacts). Legislation such as the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)⁴ and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)⁵ require lead federal agencies to consider the potential adverse impacts their project may have on cultural and environmental resources prior to project commencement. This consideration often leads to mitigating, minimizing, or avoiding significant damage to the project region's most important resources. When waiver authority is declared by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS Secretary), federal agencies are no longer obligated to comply with existing federal laws like NHPA and NEPA. Waiver authority gives the DHS Secretary sole discretion through Section 102(a) of the Real ID Act of 2005⁶ "to waive all legal requirements...[the DHS Secretary] determines

necessary to ensure expeditious construction of certain barriers and roads at the U.S. border.”⁷ The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (Border Patrol)—the federal law enforcement agency tasked with overseeing the border walls—voluntarily performs environmental reviews called Environmental Stewardship Plans (ESPs) and Environmental Stewardship Summary Reports (ESSRs) when waiver authority is declared. Yet, these reviews are not as comprehensive as the existing federal environmental procedures. ⁸ Furthermore, the Real ID Act⁹ precludes judicial review of the DHS Secretary’s decision to use waiver authority. The lack of judicial review makes it nearly impossible to challenge the necessity of waiving all federal laws. Because of the waiver authority, as outlined in the Real ID Act, the history of the American Southwest fate is in the hands of a single person. Through this thesis, I analyze the implications waiver authority has on cultural landscapes (including cultural and environmental resources) using the U.S.-Mexican border wall construction (including infrastructure) during the Trump Administration as a case study. This study is not a critique on whether or not a border wall between the United States and Mexico (Map 1) is needed. This thesis does, however, question the necessity of circumventing federal environmental review processes to expedite the construction of a new border wall. The primary resources for this assessment are NEPA and NHPA legislation, existing surveys of the area, and interviews with federal and state preservation professionals. In the end, I make general recommendations to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse impacts to cultural landscapes when emergencies justifying waiver authority are declared. These recommendations may be turned over to preservation, environmental, and conservation advocacy groups for promotion and used to challenge the exemption of the border wall from future federal environmental review processes.

The border population is not small.

Bianchi 20 [Joseph Bianchi (), The Water Problem Along the U.S-Mexico Border, 12-15-2020, Immigration Coalition, <https://theimmigrationcoalition.com/the-water-problem/>] accessed 8-23-2024 // bellaire FL

The U.S.-Mexico Border is comprised of hundreds of colonias, which often have inadequate housing, roads, sewage systems, drainage, and lack clean water supply. Colonias have both rural and urban characteristics, depending on their history, size, population density, location, community development trajectories cities, and are collectively home to well near a million residents (Barton, Ryder Perimeter, Sobel Blum, & Marquez, 2015; Lusk, Staudt, & Moya, 2012).

Water Insecurity is Devastating.

Patwoary 21 (Nargish Sultana Patwoary, “The Health Impacts of Water Insecurity in U.S. Colonias”, December 2021, Arizona State University, DOA: 8-23-2024) //Bellaire MC

Introduction: Often it is presumed that in high-income countries, like the United States, water insecurity is not an issue. Yet, more than 2 million individuals in the United States are affected by water insecurity. Experiencing the effects of water insecurity are informal settlements and impoverished communities termed as “colonias”, characterized by the lack of possessing basic infrastructures and services, including water systems and wastewater disposal amongst many. Purpose: To critically analyze how water insecurity manifests in the colonias and the impacts it has on the health and well-being of the community members. Methods: An extensive systematic literature review was conducted in the effort to bring a meaningful framework of existing challenges and potential resolutions and theorize water insecurity in colonias. Results: The effects of water insecurity due to water scarcity and water contamination in the colonias led to health complications, unsanitary living conditions and mental distress for residents. The causes of water insecurity in the colonias were because of political exclusion, municipal underbonding and the failure to monitor water quality. Conclusion: The dire consequences of household water insecurity to an individual, no less an entire population, are detrimental to health and well-being. Despite this acknowledgement of a critical and basic human necessity, literature reveals a robust water governance infrastructure is much needed for the people in colonias. For meaningful progress and developments to be made in addressing water insecurity for the ii people of colonias, this review was approached through a transdisciplinary lens - one that achieves convergence.

C4: Agriculture

Undocumented immigrants are crucial to US agriculture.

Jordan 20, 4-2-2020, Farmworkers, Mostly Undocumented, Become 'Essential' During Pandemic ..., Miriam Jordan, archive.ph <https://archive.ph/4YMF4>

About half of all crop hands in the United States, more than one million, are undocumented immigrants, according to the Agriculture Department. Growers and labor contractors estimate that the share is closer to 75 percent.

A constant supply of workers is necessary.

Lai 21; Deepali Lal, 3-28-2021, "American Agriculture's Dependence on Immigrant Workers", Arkansas Journal of Social Change and Public Service,

<https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2021/03/28/american-agricultures-dependence-on-immigrant-workers/>

Labor needs are concentrated in California, Texas, Michigan, Washington and North Carolina where the local demand for labor far outweighs the labor supply, pushing farmers to bring in immigrant workers. 80% of immigrant workers fall into the "settled" farmworker category, meaning they work at a single farm location within 75 miles of their home. Those in opposition of immigrant labor are quick to argue the unemployment rates in the U.S., but the truth is Americans would rather be jobless than work in agriculture. A 2010 national survey conducted by the National Council of Agricultural Employers of H-2A employers showed that 68% of the 36,000 domestic workers state agencies referred to H-2A employers did not accept jobs offered to them. The job requires long, laborious work for minimal pay. Farm labor is the third highest expense for a farmer, making it virtually impossible for business owners to increase wages and keep product prices low. Increasing labor costs to incentivize domestic workers is not a solution since American consumers are sensitive to increased price on fruits, vegetables and other horticultural goods. But Mexican and Central American immigrants can make double their local minimum wages by working in the U.S. Another issue facing immigrant labor is holding onto immigrant workers long term. The turnover rate for immigrant workers is extremely

high. Agriculture acts as a stepping stone to the "American dream" and immigrants don't plan to work in farm labor any longer than necessary.

While most federal and state labor laws, including those regarding wages and safety training, protect all workers equally, regardless of immigration status, many undocumented workers either do not know these rights or are afraid to assert them. As an undocumented worker, immigrants run significant risks if they choose to file a claim against their employer. Although retaliation is illegal, if the employer goes so far as to notify ICE of the workers status, the worker could be investigated or, worst case, deported and excluded from the U.S. workforce permanently. There is a delicate dependency between immigration and American agriculture. Farmers need cheap labor to keep consumers satisfied, but workers also need fair wages and working conditions. The H-2A Program is far from perfect and underinclusive in meeting the needs of both farmers and workers. Just this month, the House passed an immigration bill to give undocumented agricultural workers a chance at citizenship. The Farm Workforce Modernization Act, would establish a system where immigrants working under temporary status would have the chance to eventually become permanent residents, amending the current H-2A Program. It seems reform for immigrant farm labor could be just around the corner.

Unfortunately, more surveillance stops immigrants.

Higgins 24, 7-9-2024, "Chairmen Higgins, Bishop Open Joint Hearing: Border Security Technologies "Play a Critical Role" In Countering Threats, Mass Illegal Immigration – Committee on Homeland Security", No Publication,

<https://homeland.house.gov/2024/07/09/chairmen-higgins-bishop-open-joint-hearing-border-security-technologies-play-a-critical-role-in-countering-threats-mass-illegal-immigration/>

For example, the deployment of autonomous surveillance towers, unmanned aerial systems, and other **surveillance** technology along the border **facilitates** real-time **monitoring** for potential threats, especially **in remote areas that are** more **difficult for Border Patrol** agents **to cover**. In a 2021 report, however, the DHS Inspector General found that CBP lacked sufficient personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology advances. Using **artificial intelligence** can help alleviate the manpower issue. Enabling **surveillance** and processing tools to operate **with greater autonomy** can reserve time for agents to review the most imminent threats. Automating previously labor-intensive tasks also **helps free Border Patrol agents to be back out in the field** to safeguard the homeland.

Empirically,

DHS 20 [U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 10-29-2020, The Border Wall System is Deployed, Effective, and Disrupting Criminals and Smugglers,

<https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/10/29/border-wall-system-deployed-effective-and-disrupting-criminal-s-and-smugglers>, accessed 7-5-2024] //

Effective physical infrastructure works to secure our Southwest Border. Since the U.S. Border Patrol began constructing border barriers nearly 30 years ago, these barriers have proved to be a critical component in gaining operational control of the border. Deploying the wall system in high priority areas—particularly urban areas where illegal border crossers can quickly vanish into the surrounding community—allows the USBP to decide where border crossings take place, not smugglers, and the USBP can deploy personnel and technology in complement to the border barrier. In 2006, the U.S. Senate voted in a bipartisan 80 to 19 majority to pass the Secure Fence Act, which authorized construction of physical infrastructure to secure the border. Securing our Southwest Border was once a bipartisan issue. Neglected, easily compromised, and sparsely constructed, the border fence concept needed a reinvestment in 2017. From day one, President Trump prudently recognized that America must have an effective border wall system that delivers first-of-its kind capabilities to the men and women of the USBP. Today, **CBP is constructing a border wall system which includes a combination of various types of infrastructure including:** Internally hardened steel-bollard barriers from 18' to 30' high New and improved all-weather access roads Perimeter lighting **Enforcement cameras** Other related technology The border wall system deploys the right mix of **personnel, technology, and infrastructure** to meet the challenges of a dynamic border threat environment and **ultimately achieve operational control of the border.** DEPLOYED: As of October 23, 2020, construction of the wall system breaks down as follows: FUNDED: 738 miles COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION: 386 miles UNDER CONSTRUCTION: 195 miles PRE-CONSTRUCTION PHASE: 157 miles Bottom line: The Trump administration is well on its way to meet the goal of having 450 miles of new border wall system deployed by December 31, 2020. EFFECTIVE – DISRUPTING CRIMINALS AND SMUGGLERS The results speak for themselves: **illegal** drug, **border crossings**, and human smuggling activities **have decreased in areas where barriers are deployed.** For example: San Diego Sector: In one short 12 mile section in the San Diego Sector, the wall reduced CBP manpower requirements by 150 agents every 24 hours. That is approximately a \$28 million return on investment per year in salaries and benefits. These agents were redeployed to fill resource gaps in other areas of the border -- further improving our security. CBP's San Diego Field Office continues to be a significant source of narcotics seizures. From FY 19 to FY 20, seizures of fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine all increased, with meth seizures jumping at alarming rates in the past several years – demonstrating that the border wall is forcing drug smugglers to where we are best prepared to catch them – our ports of entry. Yuma Sector: **Illegal entries in areas with new border wall system plummeted over 87% in FY 20 compared to FY 19.** In FY 19, CBP deployed a temporary barrier, which it has replaced with a permanent system, at the Sanchez Canal, which resulted in illegal entries decreasing in this area by more than 1,000 per month. In FY 19, in areas of older existing border fencing or barriers, Yuma Sector

apprehended 12 large groups (over a 100 persons) compared to zero large groups in FY 20 with new border wall system. Family Unit entries have decreased over 95% FY 19: 51,961 vs. FY 20: 2,940 RGV Sector: In a section of RGV (Zone 1) apprehensions have decreased since the construction of the border wall system. This is a location that has never had any border infrastructure. CBP has seen 79% decrease in apprehensions in this area (Zone 1) since the completion of border wall system. CBP has seen a 26% decrease in narcotics seizures since the completion of border wall system in this area. In another section of RGV, prior to construction of the border wall system it was common to see illegal aliens running across a heavily traveled road, putting themselves and members of the community at risk. Smugglers are now forced to take their groups further west into areas that are less dense with brush and easier for CBP **surveillance cameras to detect illicit**

activity. El Paso Sector: El Paso Sector has experienced a significant reduction in drug and smuggling activities in areas where the new border wall system was built. Most notably, in Zones 14 and 15 of the Santa Teresa (STN) AOR where apprehensions have decreased by 60% and 81% respectively when comparing the last half of fiscal year FY 20 to the first half of FY 20. El Paso Station has experienced similar results from the new border wall in Zones 20 – 23, with a reduction in apprehensions of 70% during the same timeframe.

Devastatingly,

Devadoss 11 (Stephen Devadoss, 6-28-2011, "IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE", Wiley Online Library, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x> , DOA 7-15-2024, \\SL)

Because illegal immigration was not a serious problem in the 1960s and 1970s, legislation addressed only the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the United States. But in the 1980s, illegal immigration began to emerge as a national problem, and extensive debates entrenched around issues such as preventing the entry of unauthorized workers, providing public services to illegal immigrants, and even legalizing these workers. Consequently, the U.S. Congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The goals of IRCA were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty² and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of illegal immigrants by increasing the border surveillance. Amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of illegal immigrants because only about half of the illegal immigrants filed for citizenship, and it created future expectation of amnesty and more illegal unauthorized entry. Furthermore, domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantily enforced. To stop the influx of immigrants, IRCA focused heavily on tightening border control. The IRCA also legislated the H-2A program, which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations (ERS 2007). However, farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of H-2A and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking.³ In spite of IRCA's amnesty provision and strengthened control measures, illegal immigration continued to rise—about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2007 (Martin 2007) which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports—leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the illegal immigration problem. Several bills were proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements,⁴ paths to citizenship, and guest-worker programs (Montgomery 2006). These bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest-worker programs. As a result of the failed legislations and the September 11 attack, the government primarily focused on border security. Accordingly, funding for border enforcement has steadily increased,⁵ and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement. However, Boucher and Taylor (2007) documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority (GAO 2005). For example, from 1999 to 2003, the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480,000 to 18,000.^{6,7} But, by late 2005, the U.S. government started to intensify domestic surveillance. For example, only 25 criminal arrests relating to illegal immigration occurred in 2002, but increased to 716 by 2006 and 1,103 by 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008c). Domestic surveillance has further intensified under the current administration (Meyer and Gorman 2009). According to Passel (2008), a decreasing trend in the unauthorized immigrant population is recently occurring.⁸ This is largely due to worksite and border enforcements and the recent U.S. economic recession. These enforcements have exacerbated U.S. agricultural labor shortages before the 2008/2009 economic crisis. **According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey, 80% of the newly hired farm labor force is from Mexico, of which 96% are unauthorized** (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Therefore, **as border and domestic enforcements intensified, entry of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. farm labor force was thwarted, which led to an acute labor scarcity**. For example, the Wall Street Journal (2007) reported that **in 2006, about 20% of agricultural products were not harvested nationwide**. Furthermore, the Rural Migration News (2007) provides a detailed and specific list of these shortages and the adverse effect on crucial cultivational operations which resulted in heavy losses. As a result, farm groups are one of the strongest allies of overhauling the current guest-worker program to bring immigrants to legally work in U.S. agriculture. For the last several

decades, **immigrants played a crucial role in the development and competitiveness of U.S. agricultural production** (Torok and Huffman 1986). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead (2008) provide evidence of the importance of immigrant farm workers to vegetable production which is highly labor intensive. The United States has a great land endowment and ideal growing conditions; however, **without immigrant labor who perform the back-breaking labor-intensive operations that U.S. low-skilled workers are unwilling to perform, agricultural productivity and total production would decline. Consequently, costs to U.S. consumers of agricultural products would increase and net exports would also decrease.** In recent years, Mexican immigrant labor contributed significantly to the expansion of U.S. agricultural exports, particularly between the United States and Mexico. For example, between 1994 and 2008, net U.S. exports to the world and to Mexico increased by 82% and 200%, respectively (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008f). Devoid of these laborers, this dramatic increase would not have been possible. Because of the failure of the 1986 IRCA legislation to eliminate the stock and reduce the inflow of illegal immigrants and the heightened national security concern after the September 11 attack, the U.S. government stepped up the border enforcement beginning in 2002. Because of the legislative impasse to pass immigration reform, the U.S. government also tightened the domestic enforcement starting in 2005.

US food export shocks go global.

Puma 17 [Michael Puma, research scientist at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies & Dean of science at Columbia University, 3/2/2017, Trump's Unifying Opportunity: Food Security,"

<https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2017/03/02/trumps-unifying-opportunity-food-security/>, Willie T.]

The reality is that Trump's coming transformation of U.S. trade policies will inevitably lead to changes in food security that dwarf even the most substantial of outcomes from the bipartisan Global Food Security Act. Why? First, **the U.S. is a world superpower when it comes to global food production**, so any shift in U.S. agriculture policy can have significant consequences both at home and abroad. But there is more to the story than just U.S. trade policy changes. It turns out that our global food system is highly sensitive — even to small changes. **A minor disruption in the U.S. food supply could potentially produce cascading effects that spread rapidly and cause a major shock to the system.** The **world** experienced this type of sensitivity firsthand when, much like a flu epidemic, food riots spread from country to country in Africa and other developing countries during the global food crisis of 2007/2008. Wheat and corn prices doubled over about two years prior to the crisis, and rice prices tripled over just a few months in late 2007 and early 2008. Economists continue to debate what caused these price spikes, offering explanations that include long-run drivers like greater biofuel demand and changes in Asian diets together with short-run factors such as trade restrictions, speculation, and depreciation of the U.S. dollar, hoarding, and panic purchases. Unfortunately, it turns out that "tipping points" leading to such crises (a term popularized by the author Malcolm Gladwell) are generally unpredictable. Yet the **severe effects of the food-price spike**, which **included increases in poverty and malnourishment as well as violent protests in multiple countries**, are clear. Importantly, the 2007/2008 crisis was not isolated to the developing world. Even in the U.S., food prices spiked, leading to hardship for many everyday Americans.

Overall,

GEP 19; GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, 1-xx-2019, "Poverty Impact of Food Price Shocks and Policies",
<chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/607201542819678017/Global-Economic-Prospects-Jan-2019-Topical-Issue-food-prices.pdf>

In August 2011, nominal international food prices hit an all-time high.¹ This followed shortly after **the 2007-08 food price spike**, which **pushed** an estimated **105 million people into extreme poverty** (Ivanic and Martin 2008). This event also prompted widespread concerns about the food security of the poorest and fears over a potential world food crisis. Although food prices have declined

considerably since then, in real terms, they are still significantly above their lows in 2000 (Figure 4.2.1). Food price spikes such as in 2010-11 may materialize again as the growing frequency of extreme weather events increases the risk of disruption to food production, setbacks in food availability and access to food. World hunger and **severe food insecurity rose** during 2014-17, reversing the decline of the previous decade. In 2017, the number of undernourished people reached 821 million, up by 5 percent since 2014 and a setback in achieving the Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating hunger by 2030 (FAO et al. 2018). G20 policy makers have recently reiterated the urgency of tackling the challenges to achieving food security (G20 2018)