

OFF - OS Disclosure

A is the Interpretation

All Teams competing in the varsity or open division of Tabroom indicated 2024-2025 national circuit tournaments or TOC bid tournaments, must open-source disclose each round: non-identity based, previously broken case positions and rebuttal docs, including with all tags, underlining, and highlights read, on the Opencaselist 2024-2025 NDCA HS PF Wiki under their team name and team code at least 30 minutes before the published start time of the current round permanently and correctly. In other words, open source disclose.

I'll clarify any questions in CX

B is the Violation

The screenshot displays the openCaselist website interface. The top navigation bar includes the 'openCaselist' logo, a search bar, and a 'Logout' button. The left sidebar contains a 'Schools' section with a '+ Create' button and a list of schools. Below this is a 'Recently Modified' section with a 'Bulk Downloads' button and a 'State' dropdown menu. The main content area shows the team page for 'Newton South BrTe (Brown-Telio)', with a 'Claim Page' button and a note 'Last updated by Sofia Tello on 11/3/2024'. The 'Team Notes' section is visible, along with a '+ Add Round' button. The 'Tournament' tab is active, showing a table with columns for Round, Side, Opponent, Judge, Round Report, and Open Source. The table is currently empty, with a message 'No rounds yet, add one!'.

They don't, screenshots in the doc

C are the Standards

1. **Evidence ethics:** disclosure allows teams to verify evidence isn't miscut. Otherwise, people could read 4 minutes of fake evidence with no way to check back. We can't read every PDF in 3 minutes of prep. Controls fairness, can't have a fair debate with falsified evidence. Key to education, more peer review means debaters will cut higher quality evidence and research more.
2. **Cross-pollination:** Debaters can use and modify the best ideas from each other's wikis, ultimately leading to development of the best version of the argument and increasing depth of clash. disclosure forces big, wealthy programs to put their prep on the wiki – that means everyone has access to the best, paywalled evidence, and also keeps smaller programs up-to-date on the meta.
3. **Intel:** Otherwise schools with big programs who bring more students and judges and are better connected will scout more rounds and have more flows; disclosure equalizes that intel disparity.
4. **Quality engagement:** disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively write blocks. Also allows for reciprocal engagement where each side has an equal opportunity to prepare as opposed to rewarding debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but because they're tricky or their opponents won't know how to respond, and incentivizes in-depth debates, actually educational debates which is key to clash and topic education

D are the Voters

1. **Education is a voter:** Education is a voter because it is the only reason that schools fund debate and the only thing we take away post - debate
2. **Fairness is a voter:** Them disclosing is key to fairness because we are providing them with our prep and evidence for them to use, skews us in many ways. Fairness is a voter because Debaters would quit if they kept losing unfairly and will not be able to access the education so fairness prereqs education too

Drop the Debater

If we win that disclosure is a good practice you should drop them to encourage the practice –
2 warrants

1. **Norms** Sets norms through negative reinforcement as people can avoid violating while gaining access to run the shell
2. No matter what we do in this debate, we are at a structural disadvantage from an educational and fairness standpoint. Time spent on theory can't be made up- I was forced to run theory and undercover substance

Default Competing interps

1. Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.
2. **Hacking**—intervention encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge's tolerance for questionable argumentation.

They shouldn't get offense off of defense/offense to this shell - 4 warrants.

1. **Fairness:** You shouldn't win for proving you are fair and adhering to the rules of the round. Their shell-based-offense also justify us winning because we were also fair
2. **Abuse Check:** People wouldn't run theory for fear of it, so there is no abuse check
3. **Baiting:** They incentivize debaters to go all in on theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows.

They must line by line the standards of the shell in the next speech to maximize clash. Not doing so forces the debate backwards and means the debate is undercovered. Doing so allows us to talk about all the issues of the shell sooner leading to more in depth clashes.

Theory First

You must know the rules of the game before you play

Theory is a prerequisite to how we debate substance, you can't evaluate the substantive part of the flow before theory. Fiat is illusory, whether you vote aff or vote neg doesn't actually do anything, but voting on theory actually changes the direction of the activity

Respond in Next Speech Warrants (1C) :

the other team should respond to theory in the next speech or its conceded - 3 warrants:

1. **Time Skew:** Not responding in the next speech means that we have to wait until summary to frontline. This puts us at a 4:3 disadvantage on time skew.
2. **Clash:** if they respond to theory early then it centers the debate around theory leading to better clash and more effective norm setting
3. **Logic:** theory determines how the debate functions - without settings norms, the rest of the debate can't play out - if they don't respond to theory in the next speech we can't properly function and debate

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Contention 1 is Stability

Non-intervention is eroding AU authority and prevents effective conflict prevention

Félicité **Djilo and Paul-Simon Handy**, 3-17-2022, Paul-Simon Handy, ISS Regional Director for the Horn of Africa and Representative to the AU and Félicité Djilo, Independent Analyst "Redefining the African Union's utility", ISS Africa, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/redefining-the-african-unions-utility>

Redefining the African Union's utility **As it turns 20, hard questions are being asked about the AU's authority to resolve security challenges in Africa.** February's African Union (AU) summit was symbolic in several ways. It was held in person in Addis Ababa after nearly two years of online meetings due to COVID-19, signalling a growing confidence in the management of the pandemic. **For Ethiopian authorities, the summit was an opportunity to show the government's control over the fragile security situation in the country. AU Commission** Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat's opening speech was another positive surprise of the summit. He was uncharacteristically confrontational with heads of state, **using lucid and courageous words to describe what he called the 'immensity of African paralysis with regard to neighbouring homes** that are going up in flames.' Faki was referring to the **AU's uneven peace and security record in 2021**, one year after its Commission was reformed and restructured. But he was **also raising fundamental questions around the continental body's authority** to weigh in on **challenges to state stability**. What does the AU need to exert more profound impacts on conflict situations? The time is right to ask this question. **As the body turns 20, protracted and emerging conflicts are testing the coherence of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture and its goal of silencing the guns by 2030.** When facing crises, **African governments use various strategies to limit the AU's involvement** Based on philosopher Hannah Arendt's definition, authority is generally understood as the **ability to obtain consent without coercion**. As a continental organisation, **the AU draws its influence from the voluntary adherence of member states to the pan-African project.** But **governments often don't back the AU when it tries to enforce its authority, especially on early action and conflict prevention**. When facing crises, African governments often resort to various strategies to limit the AU's role. **They politely reject its involvement in their internal affairs** (Cameroon), **contest its action when it's already deployed** (Somalia), **sideline it in favour of regional bodies** (Central African Republic and Mozambique), or just **prefer working with better-resourced international actors** (Libya and Sudan). **In inter-state disputes, such as those between Morocco-Algeria, Egypt-Ethiopia, Kenya-Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda, for example, the AU struggles to mediate due to the uneven interest from the states involved.** **If we add the AU Peace and Security Council's inconsistent handling of unconstitutional changes of government in Mali and Chad, it could be argued that the AU faces a decline of authority.** However **the trend could be reversed if several structural and cyclical fragilities were addressed.** One systemic fragility is that most African states oppose any **interference in their internal affairs**. While the AU has normatively shifted from the non-interference position of its predecessor (the Organisation of African Unity) to non-indifference, **the gap between a pro-active AU Commission and reluctant member states is huge.** This causes inconsistencies in how the AU applies its rules and frameworks, which weakens the body. Unlike the EU, joining the AU is not subject to anything other than geography Another serious fragility is the relationship between member states and the AU. Unlike the European Union (EU), whose members must qualify to be included, **joining the AU is subject only to geography.** Despite strong rhetoric about how integrated the body is, **the AU comprises highly heterogeneous types of governments with varied commitments to human rights.** **Most member states favour a traditional view of sovereignty that prevents any11 interference** to boost governance and human rights. The AU's role as an entrepreneur of shared values is complicated because it doesn't encourage the democratic convergence it needs from members, even though it has the power to issue sanctions in situations of unconstitutional government changes. As the AU doesn't provide subsidies or significant funds for economic modernisation, its value-add in the daily functioning of member states is limited. **This means that African governments' dependency on the AU is relatively minimal.** The exception has been its significant role in

fighting pandemics and epidemics, although this is more reactive than proactive. The AU is an international organisation with as much authority and influence as its member states want to give it. Beyond fierce rhetoric, it remains unclear how much appetite African leaders have for effective continental integration that goes beyond pan-Africanist slogans. It's unclear how much appetite African leaders have for real continental integration. It could be argued that the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA) illustrates a commitment to regional integration. But would the AU be able to settle, for example, trade disputes between Kenya and Somalia if it isn't trusted as an impartial broker for political and security matters? The success of any trade agreement depends on the independence and impartiality of dispute settlement mechanisms and the upholding of their decisions by signatory states. Over the years, African states have been uncomfortable with the decisions of regional legal bodies. Tanzania for example recently denied its people direct access to the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, which is ironically headquartered in Arusha. It remains to be seen how AU member states respond to the AfCFTA dispute mechanism's decisions. As the AU marks its 20th anniversary, it is coming to the end of a cycle where member states intuitively respected its authority without needing to call on its binding instruments. To remain relevant, key AU member states must find a way to bridge the expectations-capabilities gap. Should African states see integration and a limited degree of supranationalism as going against their interests, the focus will need to shift to greater regional cooperation that provides better added value. This would already be an impressive step on Africa's road to integration.

And foreign actors cant fill the AU's shoes.

Velasco 13, Juliana **Velasco**. "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace." University of Central Florida. 2013//DY
<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd>

The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, **regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft** an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.⁹⁵ The return of

significance on regional organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in general. Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of the remaining variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, regional organizations are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement that last five years⁹⁶ and when controlling for outstanding issues, almost 3.5 times more likely.⁹ Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with 3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations, ranging from peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of peace agreements in keeping the peace. Ranging from two to five times more likely to achieve the desired measure (peace for five years), regional organizations outperform the United Nations, individual states, and non-regional ad-hoc groups. From the results, it is also clear that incompatibility is important and territorial disputes are generally the most difficult to resolve. The reasons for this result are several. First, mandated in several regional organizations, as well as the UN, is the respect for sovereignty of member states. When faced with a territorial dispute, organizations are by default required to seek out an outcome that keeps the initial borders of the state. As will be presented in Moldova's case, the OSCE was primarily concerned with keeping the Soviet Era borders despite Transnistria's desire to become an autonomous state. This is not always the primary reason for involvement, however, it adds an aspect to a regional organizations involvement that can be more difficult to solve. Alternatively, the territorial dispute could also be imbued with intractable characteristics. A common example is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it is a territorial conflict, the land is imbued with religious and ethnic values that only add to the already 98 Appendix A: Table 7. 99 Appendix A: Table 8. 35 immense complexity of the conflict. In terms of the fourth hypothesis, the null cannot be rejected, as none of the third parties yielded statistically significant results. Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression Model Summary Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 1 189.722a .302 .405 a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Step Chisquare df Sig. 1 14.902 8 .061 Variables in the Equation N=189 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for EXP(B) Lower Upper Step 1a party3_type 10.292 4 .036 State -.093 .549 .029 1 .866 .911 .311 2.674 Regional Org 1.906 .746 6.530 1 .011 6.728 1.559 29.028 United Nations -.623 .611 1.041 1 .308 .536 .162 1.775 Other .626 .597 1.099 1 .295 1.870 .580 6.025 Out_iss 19.649 5 .001 Process to finalize 2.396 .617 15.103 1 .000 10.983 3.280 36.778 Spelled out .425 .771 .304 1 .582 1.529 .338 6.929 Delegated to commission .471 .790 .355 1 .551 1.601 .341 7.527 New negotiations 1.231 .716 2.956 1 .086 3.426 .842 13.943 Agenda for future 2.824 .898 9.879 1 .002 16.840 2.895 97.963 Inc 3.418 2 .181 Territory -.732 .716 1.046 1 .307 .481 .118 1.956 Government -.924 .502 3.381 1 .066 .397 .148 1.063 Provisions for cultural freedom -1.559 .986 2.500 1 .114 .210 .030 1.453 Ceasefire provision .234 .495 .224 1 .636 1.264 .479 3.337 Outline to address Inc .357 .484 .543 1 .461 1.429 .553 3.693 Peacekeeping Operation .697 .566 1.517 1 .218 2.008 .662 6.088 Region 4.082 4 .395 Europe -.20784 11757.037 .000 1 .999 .000 .000 . Middle East 1.638 1.005 2.657 1 .103 5.147 .718 36.918 Asia .227 .794 .082 1 .775 1.255 .265 5.944 Africa -.095 .698 .018 1 .892 .909 .232 3.570 >1000 deaths -.002 .452 .000 1 .996 .998 .412 2.418 Constant -1.422 .852 2.786 1 .095 .241 a. Variable(s) entered on step 1:

party3_type, Out_iss, Inc, Cul, cease, Outlin, PKO, Region, batdeathdum. b. p = * ≤.05; ** ≤.01; *** ≤.000 36 Implications These results suggest several policy prescriptions. First, regional organizations and regional ad-hoc groups, in general, should be involved in solving conflicts within their region, as they are shown to be significant actors in creating **a durable peace agreement.** However, not all regional organizations are currently equipped to properly handle conflict, due to lack of finances or military capability, which will be illustrated in the case studies. These organizations should be assisted in order to have the means to respond to such conflicts when and if they arrive.

Specifically, in Somaliland:

Kahin 12-12 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, <https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/> //doa: 12/12/24 sr

The African Union (AU) Charter is often cited as a barrier to recognizing Somaliland's independence, with its emphasis on territorial integrity as a guiding principle. **Yet, Somaliland's historical, political, and legal realities expose contradictions within this principle when applied to its unique case.** Compounding this inconsistency is the **AU's failure to act on its own fact-finding mission's 2005 recommendations, which concluded that Somaliland meets the criteria for recognition. Somaliland's situation cannot be classified as secession because it was a sovereign entity before its voluntary union with Somalia in 1960.** Gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a separate state with defined borders. **Its decision to merge with Somalia on July 1, 1960, was a political arrangement, not the result of colonial boundary adjustments.** This union was never formalized through a binding treaty and dissolved in 1991 after decades of marginalization and oppression. **By reclaiming its sovereignty, Somaliland reverted to its original borders, adhering to the very principle of territorial integrity the AU claims to uphold.** The AU's stance becomes even more contradictory when considering its own fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005. **The mission concluded that Somaliland satisfied the legal and political requirements for statehood, recommending recognition. However, nearly two decades later, the AU has taken no steps to act on these findings, undermining its credibility as a proponent of African self-determination and stability.** Somalia's claims over Somaliland's Red Sea coastline further distort the historical reality. These claims rest on a narrative that Somaliland is a secessionist region of Somalia, an assertion that disregards Somaliland's separate colonial history and its recognized independence prior to the union. Somalia's insistence on this point is part of a broader effort to create a false narrative of Somali unity and sovereignty—concepts rendered obsolete by decades of fragmentation and conflict. **Since the collapse of its central government in 1991, Somalia has been under United Nations trusteeship, surviving on international aid and the support of African Union forces.** Confined largely to Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity, Somalia's sovereignty is, at best, symbolic. Its accusations of foreign interference, particularly against Ethiopia, contrast sharply with its reliance on Ethiopian troops and other African forces to maintain order. At the same time, **Somalia has entered into defense agreements with nations like Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkiya, which are more interested in curbing Ethiopia's regional influence than promoting stability. These actions have destabilized the region, creating tensions that threaten to engulf the Horn of Africa in further conflict.** In stark contrast, **Somaliland has built a functioning state with all the hallmarks of sovereignty:** its own flag, police, army, currency, and passport. It engages diplomatically, hosting offices from countries like Ethiopia and signing international commercial and military agreements, including partnerships with the UAE and a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to govern, maintain peace, and foster democratic principles. **Somaliland's political maturity is evident in its democratic elections, which have been lauded by international observers for their fairness and transparency.** Opposition victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections have led to peaceful transfers of power, a rarity in a region where despots often cling to power. These achievements align Somaliland more closely with established democracies than many recognized states in Africa. The African Union's contradictions in handling Somaliland's case go beyond ignoring its fact-finding mission. **Precedents such as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in 2011 show that the AU has supported the redefinition of borders when justified by historical and political realities. Somaliland's case, grounded in legal precedent, historical legitimacy, and its proven capacity for governance, is equally compelling.** As in the case of Senegambia, officially the Senegambia Confederation or Confederation of Senegambia, was a loose confederation in the late 20th century between the West African countries of Senegal and its neighbour The Gambia, which is almost completely surrounded by Senegal. The confederation was founded on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between the two countries signed on 12 December 1981. It was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 after The Gambia refused to move closer toward union. Somaliland's achievements, from maintaining peace and stability to contributing to regional security efforts, make it a model for governance in the Horn of Africa. **Its recognition would align with the AU's principles of promoting peace, human rights, and self-determination. Conversely, Somalia's fixation on a false narrative of Somali unity serves only to distract from its inability to govern or address its internal challenges. The time has come for the AU and the international community to rectify these contradictions, honor Somaliland's accomplishments, and grant it the recognition it rightfully deserves. Doing so would not only reinforce the principles of justice and self-determination but also promote stability and progress in a volatile region.**

Affirming would align AU words and actions, adhering to established precedents.

Kahin 12-12 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, <https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/> //doa: 12/12/24 sr

The African Union (AU) Charter is often cited as a barrier to recognizing Somaliland's independence, with its emphasis on territorial integrity as a guiding principle. **Yet, Somaliland's historical, political, and legal realities expose contradictions within this principle when applied to its unique case.** Compounding this inconsistency is the **AU's failure to act on its own fact-finding mission's 2005 recommendations, which concluded that Somaliland meets the criteria for recognition. Somaliland's situation cannot be classified as secession because it was a sovereign entity before its voluntary union with Somalia in 1960.** Gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a separate state with defined borders. **Its decision to merge with Somalia on July 1, 1960, was a political arrangement, not the result of colonial boundary adjustments.** This union was never formalized through a binding treaty and dissolved in 1991 after decades of marginalization and oppression. **By reclaiming its sovereignty, Somaliland reverted to its original borders, adhering to the very principle of territorial integrity the AU claims to uphold.** The AU's stance becomes even more contradictory when considering its own fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005. **The mission concluded that Somaliland satisfied the legal and political requirements for statehood, recommending recognition. However, nearly two decades later, the AU has taken no steps to act on these findings, undermining its credibility as a proponent of African self-determination and stability.** Somalia's claims over Somaliland's Red Sea coastline further distort the historical reality. These claims rest on a narrative that Somaliland is a secessionist region of Somalia, an assertion that disregards Somaliland's separate colonial history and its recognized independence prior to the union. Somalia's insistence on this point is part of a broader effort to create a false narrative of Somali unity and sovereignty—concepts rendered obsolete by decades of fragmentation and conflict. **Since the collapse of its central government in 1991, Somalia has been under United Nations trusteeship, surviving on international aid and the support of African Union forces.** Confined largely to Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity, Somalia's sovereignty is, at best, symbolic. Its accusations of foreign interference, particularly against Ethiopia, contrast sharply with its reliance on Ethiopian troops and other African forces to maintain order. At the same time, **Somalia has entered into defense agreements with nations like Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkiya, which are more interested in curbing Ethiopia's regional influence than promoting stability. These actions have destabilized the region, creating tensions that threaten to engulf the Horn of Africa in further conflict.** In stark contrast, **Somaliland has built a functioning state with all the hallmarks of sovereignty:** its own flag, police, army, currency, and passport. It engages diplomatically, hosting offices from countries like Ethiopia and signing international commercial and military agreements, including partnerships with the UAE and a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to govern, maintain peace, and foster democratic principles. **Somaliland's political maturity is evident in its democratic elections, which have been lauded by international observers for their fairness and transparency.** Opposition victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections have led to peaceful transfers of power, a rarity in a region where despots often cling to power. These achievements align Somaliland more closely with established democracies than many recognized states in Africa. The African Union's contradictions in handling Somaliland's case go beyond ignoring its fact-finding mission. **Precedents such as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in 2011 show that the AU has supported the**

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AU mediation works – empirics prove.

Allard **Duursma 20**, Assistant Professor in Conflict Management and International Relations at ETH Zurich. My research focuses on how mediation and peacekeeping can help to prevent and end armed conflict. I also study the links between patronage politics and political order, 2020, "African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa," Cambridge University Press, <https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000041>, Accessed 12-13-2024, ARC

Much of **mediation efforts' success depends on the relationship between the third party and the conflict parties.** The social structure in which the third party and the conflict parties operate, in turn, greatly determines the nature of this relationship. Within the African society of states, **African leaders generally perceive that they are bound by norms related to sovereignty, respect for the colonial borders, anti-neocolonialism, nonalignment, and peaceful conflict resolution.** The collective commitment to this cluster of norms **provides African third parties with a social status that, in turn, provides them with a high degree of legitimacy when mediating armed conflict in Africa.** I have argued that this **high degree of legitimacy makes African third parties more effective than non-African ones.** My statistical analyses support the argument that African mediation outperforms non-African mediation. **Despite a higher degree of economic and military resources, non-African third parties are less effective in mediating civil wars in Africa than African ones. Indeed, something other than third-party capacity must explain the effectiveness of African third parties.** The statistical analyses thus draw on what Hurd describes as the logical necessity of legitimacy to show that African mediation efforts are likely to be regarded as more legitimate than non-African mediation efforts.¹¹⁶ African third parties' effectiveness is conditional on the government side's commitment to **the African solutions norm.** **This suggests that rather than just a low degree of third-party capacity, African third parties are effective because African governments perceive them as legitimate.** Hence, I go beyond considering the effectiveness of mediators that are considered weak mediators or lacking "muscle."¹¹⁷ The effectiveness of African third parties is not a result of either the presence or the absence of third-party capacity, it is about the presence of legitimacy. In this article I thus explain why third parties from Africa that have comparable resources to "weak" non-African third parties like Norway or less resources than a non-African third party like **the US** are still more effective. For example, Beardsley notes about Kofi Annan's **mediation effort in Kenya's post-2007 electoral crisis that "Annan possessed no authority to promise aid or threaten sanctions against the intransigent parties, nor did he have better access to information about the capabilities and resolve of the respective parties than they had themselves."**¹¹⁸ For this reason, Beardsley identifies **Kofi Annan's mediation effort as a good example of a third-party effort by a weak mediator.** This is a valid observation, but what Kofi Annan did have was a **degree of third-party legitimacy. When the AU mediation team led by Annan arrived in Nairobi to mediate,** they told the conflict parties that they had discussed the conflict with Nelson Mandela and that he sent his best wishes and sought

to remind them that all of Africa was watching the process.¹¹⁹ **Almost one month later the conflict parties signed an agreement. This agreement would lay the basis for a grand coalition government that successfully mitigated the conflict.** One major question for future research is whether regional mediators in other regions can also draw on their third-party legitimacy. This question requires further research, but a preliminary analysis included in the appendix suggests that mediation efforts by regional third parties in the Middle East and Latin America—which are both regions where regional third parties with a high degree of third-party capacity are largely absent—are significantly less effective than nonregional mediation efforts. This could mean that the African solution norm bestows legitimacy onto African third parties that neither non-African third parties nor regional mediators in other regions benefit from. The level of compliance with the African solutions norm in Africa contradicts the prevailing view in the literature that only third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources are effective in mediating civil wars. Clearly, security dynamics in Africa can be partly explained in realist terms, but international norms affect the 116. See Hurd 1999, 391. 117. Beardsley 2009; Svensson 2007b. 118. Beardsley 2009, 273. 119. Roger Cohen, “How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya,” New York Review of Books, August 2008, 5. 32 International Organization Downloaded from <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000041> <https://www.cambridge.org/core>. IP address: 193.203.10.81, on 25 Apr 2020 at 13:02:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms>. behavior of African actors to a great extent. African conflict parties’ understandings of the international environment in Africa constitute an international structure that is highly influential in shaping the outcomes of mediation processes. From this perspective, it is striking that the role of third-party legitimacy has largely been ignored in the literature on international mediation. In essence, solely focusing on third-party capacity entails missing a relevant alternative source of mediation success, namely third-party legitimacy.

Overall, instability causes a great power draw-in.

Nathanael C. **Heath 20**, 2nd year MALD Candidate at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He focuses primarily on political risk and negotiations in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, 2020, “A Red Sea Geopolitics Primer,” The Fares Center, <https://sites.tufts.edu/farescenter/a-red-sea-geopolitics-primer/>,

A Red Sea Geopolitics Primer by Nathan Heath ’20, Fares Center Senior Research Associate and Political Risk Analyst* One of the world’s oldest waterways is becoming increasingly relevant in geopolitics. **The Red Sea is positioned between two continents, bordering six countries in Africa and four in the Middle East, and approximately 10% of all global trade passes through its waters. It also serves as a strategic zone for both regional and Great Powers projecting their military might or openly engaging in conflict. There is the potential for either reward or disaster in the Red Sea, as increasing economic and military competition in its waters raises the possibility of intense economic growth while simultaneously foreshadowing potential conflicts between rival powers. High levels of trade, energy production, and innovation forecast significant economic opportunity in the Red Sea, but this prosperity is threatened by regional rivalries and the ongoing Great Power competition between the U.S. and China.** The Red Sea’s global importance is rooted largely in its role as a key waterway for trade. **By 2050, Red Sea GDP is projected to more than triple, increasing from \$1.8 trillion to \$6.1 trillion, and trade is expected to grow more than five times, from \$881 billion to \$4.7 trillion. This enormous wealth will be driven by trade agreements encouraging countries with substantial Red Sea interests to increase exports, particularly in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and technology. Moreover, the construction of new ports and military bases to protect trade and investment interests will lead to even higher levels of trade throughout the Red Sea.** The geographical positioning of the Red Sea, proximate to numerous top energy producers, both explains the area’s current wealth and forecasts continuing economic growth. On the African side, Egypt and Sudan alone produce a combined 500,000+ barrels per day (bpd) of oil. On the Middle East side, Saudi Arabia and Oman produce more than 12 million bpd of oil. **In total, more than 50 million bpd of oil from producers as diverse as the U.S., Russia, China, Libya, and Iran pass through the Red Sea on a daily basis, along with approximately 3.5 billion cubic feet per day in liquid natural gas. In the future, renewable energy will add even more value to this waterway, given the current interest in hydro, wind, and solar initiatives in numerous bordering states. In addition to serving as a leading trade route and home to multiple leading energy producers, the Red Sea is also becoming relevant as a hub of innovation.** Saudi Arabia’s megacity projects such as Neom, **The Red Sea Project, and the Amalaa Project present an opportunity for the region to participate in sustainable urbanization through massive, renewables-focused initiatives integrating robotics and smart services into new economies designed to thrive on innovation and tourism alike. Saudi Arabia’s megacities are projected to bring in hundreds of billions of dollars by 2050, but more importantly, Neom and its sister cities highlight the tremendous opportunity for innovation and economic diversification in a region where many countries have historically been dependent on homogenous or semi-homogenous revenue streams such as fossil fuels. The UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, all of which heavily traffic their goods in the Red Sea, have**

unveiled similar visions for sustainable innovation to be completed in the next decade. In short, this crucial waterway may soon be home to innovation driving regional prosperity forward even faster. These terrific opportunities for prosperity rooted in trade, energy, and innovation face risks posed by complex economic and military competition among both regional and global owners. For one, African rivalries stretching from Egypt to Djibouti are adding to the Red Sea region's volatility. Egyptian and Ethiopian relations, although somewhat improved since the transitions to the al-Sisi and Abiy regimes, respectively, remain tense over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia views the dam as a strategic necessity, while Egypt fears the dam will deplete its water resources. Although Ethiopia's relations with Somalia and Eritrea have improved from Addis's historically hostile positions towards Asmara and Mogadishu, Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea ports remains a point of negotiation between the three countries. Sudan has also become increasingly problematic for its neighbors, as its resources, access to the sea, and ongoing political violence have attracted the attention of Turkey and the Gulf Nations, frustrating Egypt given Cairo and Khartoum's historically close relationship. And Djibouti remains caught in a tug of war between an ever-growing number of regional and global powers. The Middle East is home to its own set of conflicts fueling military and economic competition in the Red Sea. The primary regional rivalry continues to be between Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are each vying for regional supremacy via either direct or proxy engagement in conflicts. Iran's allies are Syria, Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen (and also Qatar to a limited extent). Saudi Arabia is allied with the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, and the Qataris have historically been Saudi allies but have in recent years struck a more independent foreign policy that resulted in their blockade by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE. The conflict between Riyadh and Tehran presents the most probable risk of a regional conflagration that could threaten the political and economic stability of the Red Sea region. At the moment, the risk of a tanker war or all-out military conflict between the U.S. and Iran is quite high, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or even the disruption of trade through the Gulf of Oman is a troubling and possible outcome of such an event. The formation of Middle East-African alliances has added a further risk of conflict to the region. In addition to its relationship with Sudan (where Saudi Arabia and Iran have competed with Eritrea), Turkey has poured significant aid and investment into Somalia, and Istanbul now owns all of the country's major ports. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sparred with Ethiopia over influence in Eritrea. Additionally, Qatar's alignment with the Turks, Saudis, and Emiratis at different times has increased Doha's influence in nations along the Horn of Africa. It is in Djibouti, however, that the greatest risk to the Red Sea itself lies, as the city-state has drawn the attention of the great powers. In addition to a slew of Middle Eastern and African powers including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt, a number of global powers have set their sights on Djibouti as a strategic asset. The U.S., China, Russia, Japan, France, and Italy have all secured or pursued military bases in Djibouti, which is situated close to the critical Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. China's first overseas military base, positioned in Djibouti, is situated just miles from Camp Lemonnier, the only significant U.S. military base in Africa. Russia failed to secure a base in Djibouti and has looked further inland for African military partnerships; France, Italy, and Japan maintain smaller operations. The U.S.-China base rivalry in Djibouti (if it could be thought of as such), is symptomatic of the larger continental rivalry between two Great Powers, as both Washington and Beijing continue to vie for influence in Africa with rival political ideologies and systems of economic development. Djibouti is thus a true powder keg, not merely for regional rivalries but also for the larger Great Power game between the U.S. and China. An economic and military conflict between Washington and Beijing would impact Djibouti, threatening to disrupt trade routes passing through the Red Sea. In the near future we can expect to see increasing economic competition in the Red Sea as both traditional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources bolster already-significant levels of trade and innovative projects such as Neom and the GERD. The struggle for economic power will fuel increased investment by developed or middle-income regional powers such as Egypt, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE into developing countries such as Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. Furthermore, global powers such as the U.S., China, EU, and Japan will be increasingly drawn to key Djibouti and other key ports to protect access to key trade routes. With shifting alliances and economic competition, however, comes increased risk of conflict in a region already home to numerous zones of instability. To minimize risk to the global supply chain, powers with military, economic, or political interests in the Red Sea region will have to

work together to ensure that conflicts are contained or prevented altogether in the interest of stabilizing both regional and global markets.

Great power draw-in leads to extinction.

Stephen **Clare 21**, Research Fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research Fellow, 11/2021, "Great Power Conflict,"

https://dkqj4hmn5mkt.cloudfront.net/Great_Power_Conflict_report_Founders_Pledge_e4124df2ac.pdf, Accessed 12-11-2024, ARC

This report explores issues at the intersection of international relations, conflict studies, and longtermism. In it, we draw extensively on the mainstream international relations literature but focus specifically on understanding the potential effects of war on the long-term future. Taking a long-term view focuses our attention on the risk a Great Power war poses to humanity's future potential. Extinction, an unrecoverable collapse of civilization, or a permanent end to humanity's growth and progress would all destroy the long-term potential of our species. We call events that could lead to one of these scenarios existential risks.² Such an event, if it occurred, would be unprecedented in human history. It would cause unimaginable suffering for everyone alive today and extinguish any possibility for trillions of our would-be descendants to live happy lives. Some of these global catastrophic risks, like an asteroid impact, are direct risks. By contrast, Great Power conflict is a risk factor: it is connected to multiple other risks, and raising or lowering the amount of conflict affects the seriousness of the threats we face in these other areas. In section 4 of this report we consider several concrete pathways through which Great Power conflict poses a global catastrophic risk. We will sort these pathways into three broad categories. First, we consider ways in which Great Power conflict poses a risk even without a full-blown war breaking out. For example, a new Cold War could hasten the development of dangerous technologies or cause a breakdown in cooperation that precludes international agreements to mitigate other existential risks. Second, a Great Power war could itself be a global catastrophic risk. In an all-out war between Great Power nations, weapons with the potential to kill everyone on earth or irreparably damage civilization could be used. Or, in the aftermath of a major war, the victorious side could emerge as a global hegemon that is able to use advanced technologies to lock in its sub-optimal values.³ Third, a Great Power war could weaken humanity and leave us more vulnerable to subsequent disasters, like a serious pandemic.

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On contacting them

They say we should have contacted them:

1. teams shouldn't be told to be fair, it should be expected.
2. dropping them incentivizes them to disclose and meet these norms.

On first ci

1. **Lose and Learn:** If you lose to disclosure, there's a greater chance your coach will see that disclosure is actually a good norm that people are winning off of which
 - a) Incentivizes them to let you disclose so you gain access to run the shell

On 2nd ci

1. **[T]** If anything research will be always more in depth because
 - a) You can use the wiki as a baseline to understand arguments then go for a wider scope
 - b) If you see a lot of common arguments on the wiki, you're more likely to look for nonstock arguments which widens the literature you read as opposed to finding the same arguments that everyone else would meaning everybody would research less