1NC

Contention 1 is TERROR.

Right-wing terror is on the rise.

McCabe 24 [Riley McCabe, associate fellow for the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10-21-2024, "The Rising Threat of Anti-Government Domestic Terrorism: What the Data Tells Us", CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/rising-threat-anti-government-domestic-terrorism-what-data-tells-us, accessed 3-3-2025] RNM

First, **there is an increased terrorist threat against government targets today.** Specifically, since 2016 **there has been a dramatic rise in attacks and plots motivated by partisan political beliefs**. This includes attacks and plots against elected officials, political candidates, political party officials, political staff and workers, and their offices from terrorists with opposing political views. From January 1, 2016, to April 30, 2024, there were a total of 21 such terrorist attacks and plots, compared to a total of just two such incidents in the more than two preceding decades tracked in the CSIS dataset. This elevated threat is in large part **due to the increased spread of conspiracy theories that motivate extremists to take violent action.** Second, there has been a significant shift in the ideologies and organization of anti-government terrorists. From 1994 to 2004, 71 percent of attacks and plots against government targets were inspired by general opposition to federal authority, spearheaded by the broader American militia movement. Today, **terrorists attacking government targets are more likely to be motivated by partisan political beliefs and rarely have material ties to any group**. From 2016 to 2023, only 29 percent of attacks and plots against government targets were inspired by general opposition to federal authority, while a remarkable 49 percent were inspired by partisan political views.

Generative AI exacerbates educational divides.

Bozkurt et al. 24 [Aras Bozkurt, researcher and faculty member at Anadolu University, Türkiye, et al. "The manifesto for teaching and learning in a time of generative AI: A critical collective stance to better navigate the future." Open Praxis 16.4 (2024): 487-513. https://openpraxis.org/articles/10.55982/openpraxis.16.4.777] SDA

1. Digital Divide and Educational Inequality

GenAI may exacerbate existing inequalities within education:

Unequal Access: High **costs** of advanced GenAI tools along with **infrastructure** requirements limit accessibility for underprivileged students and institutions.

Widening the Gap: Those with access to premium GenAI services may gain advantages that increase the disparity between wealthy and disadvantaged learners.

Global Inequities: Developing countries may lack the infrastructure to support GenAI, hindering educational progress.

Critical Insight: While GenAI has the potential to transform education, it risks deepening the digital divide and exacerbating inequalities. Unequal access to AI-powered tools is a major concern, as advanced GenAI technologies are often costly and inaccessible to underprivileged students, particularly in low-income or rural areas. This economic barrier leaves many without access to GenAI's personalized learning and academic support, further disadvantaging them. As well-resourced institutions adopt **premium**, rather than freemium, GenAI services, their students gain a **competitive edge**, deepening social and educational **hierarchies.** In contrast, underfunded schools rely on **outdated** resources, widening the **gap between wealthy and disadvantaged** learners. This disparity undermines education's role in promoting equal opportunity. Global inequities in AI accessibility are also pressing, as many developing nations lack the infrastructure to support GenAI integration. In resource-constrained settings, where access to GenAI tools often comes at the cost of increased surveillance, marginalized

communities may face difficult trade-offs, such as sacrificing privacy for technological access. This cost-benefit balance varies widely across institutions and regions, impacting the extent to which GenAI can be integrated in an equitable and autonomous manner. Without addressing these access and ethical concerns, GenAI risks reinforcing, rather than bridging, existing educational disparities.

Education inequality breeds right wing groups.

Bovens 21 [Mark; School of Governance, Utrecht University; 4-26-2021, "Education, Inequality, and Political Behavior", Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637e1772?p=emailAU3ISYC.vI3Fo&d=/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1772 DOA: 3-1-2025] sumzom

Distrust

It should come as no surprise then that the well-educated citizens are politically confident. They express **trust** in the national and European political institutions, and they feel included in the political process. They take for granted that they are listened to and that their interests are taken care of. Less well-educated citizens, on the other hand, show high levels of social distrust and political **cynicism**.

Figure 6 shows how, across Europe, the lesser-educated have low confidence in their ability to influence politics and in the responsiveness of the political system to their interests and views. They think MPs and parties are uninterested in their opinions. They feel they are not being listened to by politicians and that politics ignores the opinions of the common person. Given the composition of present-day political parliaments, these feelings of distrust and alienation should not come as a surprise.

<<FIGURE 6 OMITTED>>

Sociological studies (Noordzij et al., 2019; Spruyt et al., 2020) indicate that the **education gap** in trust in politicians is not only related to the differences in political efficacy but must be understood as a broader status-based cultural conflict. The less-educated "feel **symbolically** excluded from politics because the culturally elitist standard, i.e., the 'superiority signaling' or 'status signaling' of establishment politicians, denotes their opposing lifestyle and attitudes as inferior" (Noordzij et al., 2019, p. 2). The high-status signals of establishment politicians spur opposition among low-status groups who feel that their lifestyle and opinions are not really respected and are regarded with contempt.

In the United States, cultural factors and white racial resentment and ethnonationalism also divide the educational groups. The more education Americans have, and the greater their household income, the greater the likelihood they are high on the personal trust spectrum. Those with less income and education are markedly more likely to be low trusters (Pew, 2019).

Education as a Cleavage

Education as a Basis for New Social Divisions

Educational expansion, together with secularization, increased social mobility, and affluence, have weakened the distinctiveness of class and the salience of religious identities. Class and religion are no longer the only sources of identity but are cross-cut by other sources of political attitudes and preferences (Evans & De Graaf, 2013, pp. 4–5). In knowledge economies, levels of formal education not only determine to a large extent socioeconomic positions, they also affect attitudes and political preference formation. This is particularly salient in light of the fact that, since the "educational revolution" of the 1970s, the number of tertiary-educated citizens has risen enormously and in many Western European countries now equals the number of citizens with primary education. In Western Europe, well-educated and less well-educated individuals exhibit significant differences in attitudes and preferences regarding cultural issues such as immigration, racial and ethnic diversity, and European unification. Some even argue that educational differences constitute the basis for a new type of social and political cleavage in European societies (Bovens & Wille, 2017; Stubager, 2010). Educational groups exhibit collective identities and to some degree also perceive an **antagonism** with each other in terms of interests and attitudes (Spruyt & Kuppens, 2015). The higher-educated, despite their supposed tolerance, hold more negative attitudes toward less educated people than toward highly educated people (Kuppens et al., 2015).

In the United States, the educational expansion has resulted in a similar social and cultural divide between college-educated professionals and workers without a college degree (Murray, 2012). The former are defined by educational attainment, professional productivity, and shared cultural norms, and the latter by insecure jobs, a breakdown of traditional values such as marriage, and widespread political and social disengagement. This new educational divide provides large advantages to the children of the professional class and makes it ever harder for working-class kids to work their way up (Putnam, 2016). It is also visible in a growing resentment toward universities and higher education among blue-collar workers (Kramer, 2016).

Education as a Basis for New Political Divisions

Education level is also an important variable regarding the rise of a new cultural conflict dimension in Western politics. Traditionally, most voters in Western European democracies could be positioned along a social-economic, left–right dimension and along a religious– secular dimension. In addition to these traditional conflict dimensions, which reach back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a new cultural conflict dimension has manifested itself in the 21st century. The crucial themes along this cultural dimension are immigration, globalization, and European integration. This new division between what could be called "cosmopolitans" and "nationalists" has emerged gradually, fueled by the waves of nonWestern immigration and in Europe by the process of European unification. Located on one side of this new line of conflict are the citizens who accept social and cultural heterogeneity and who favor, or at least condone, multiculturalism. These tend to be the more highly educated. On the other side are citizens who are highly critical of multiculturalism and who prefer a more homogeneous national culture. These are predominantly citizens with primary or secondary education levels.

This educational divide also manifests itself in **structural** changes in the political landscape in Western democracies. While party systems continue to bear the footprint of class and religious cleavages, a restructuring of political space occurred as a consequence of the mobilization of the new social movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s in Western democracies (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). New actors with new types of preferences entered the political stage.

On one side of the new cultural dimension of conflict we have seen the emergence of green and social-liberal parties in the late 20th century, such as Groen! and Ecolo in Belgium, Les Verts in France, the Greens in Germany, D66 and GroenLinks in the Netherlands, and the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom, to name but a few. In all countries, the green and social-liberal parties predominantly attract voters from the high end of the education spectrum.

On the other side of this cultural conflict, a remarkable change in the political landscape has been visible with the emergence of right-wing **nationalist parties** such as the FPÖ in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Danish People's Party, the True Finns party, France's Front National, AfD and Pegida in Germany, Lega Nord in Italy, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, and UKIP in the United Kingdom. These nationalist parties tend to draw large proportions of the primary- and secondary-educated voters, and relatively few tertiary-educated voters. This is particularly the case in Western and Northern European countries, such as Denmark, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. It is not the case in in Eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland (Bornschier, 2010).

A New Diploma Divide in the Political Landscape

Thus, in Europe, the expansion of higher education has broadened the political base for the New Left, and the rising salience of cultural issues has **triggered the emergence of nationalist parties**. As a result, the well-educated tend to vote for the New Left, whereas those with lower education levels provide disproportionate support for the radical right.

In the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, for example, the Leave vote was much higher in those regions of England populated by citizens with low education qualifications, and much lower in those regions with a larger number of university graduates: "fifteen of the 20 'least educated' areas voted to leave the EU while every single one of the 20 'most educated' areas voted to remain" (Goodwin & Heath, 2016, pp. 1–2). Likewise, in the 2017 French presidential elections education level was a very strong predictor of the Emmanuel Macron vote. In the top 10% of the most-educated regions, Macron won no less than 84% of the vote, as opposed to only 53% in the least-educated regions (Financial Times, 2017). The Yellow Vests movement, which initially started as a protest against a government plan to raise the gas tax but turned into a broad and violent antigovernment movement, fits this pattern. It consisted largely of working-class and lower middle-class citizens, often from more peripheral areas, who opposed the Parisian, professional political elites.

A similar trend has reshaped American politics since the early 1970s. "Class inversion" has muddled the Republican and Democratic parties' core coalitions of support (Stonecash, 2017, pp. 30–31). Those with high

school diplomas or less have moved to the Republican Party, and college graduates have become more Democratic. Data from the Pew Research Center (2018) indicate that this educational division resulted in a shift in the political landscape in which a record share of college graduates align with Democrats and voters with no college experience have been moving toward the Republican Party.

The U.S. presidential election of 2016 between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump was marked by an educational divide that was far wider than in previous presidential elections (Pew, 2016). Registered voters with at least a college degree favored Clinton over Trump by 23 percentage points (52% for Clinton vs. 29% for Trump). Trump's campaign exploited divisions that have been growing within the electorate for decades: "The most dramatic shift in voting patterns in the election involved the growing alignment of partisanship with education among white voters. White voters with college degrees shifted toward the Democratic Party while white voters without college degrees shifted toward the Republican Party" (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019, p. 149). Large differences in voting preferences between people with more and less educational attainment were also evident in the 2018 congressional elections. As The Atlantic wrote on November 7, 2018: "It's an **unprecedented** divide, and is in fact a **complete departure** from the diploma divide of the past. Non-college-educated white voters used to solidly belong to Democrats, and college-educated white voters to Republicans. Several events over the past six decades have caused these allegiances to switch, the most recent being the candidacy, election, and presidency of Donald Trump."

Issues of immigration and trade, and even climate change, have been repackaged into a cultural-resentment frame (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019). It should be noted that this is not a "class inversion" in traditional socioeconomic terms, but rather in educational terms. The education gap grew in 2016 primarily among middle- and high-income households. Educational attainment has become more important than income to explain political preferences in presidential elections: "College attainment is becoming more and more of a dividing line in presidential elections—but simply conflating not having a college degree with being 'working class' obscures the important reality that many people without college degrees are quite well off, and those affluent people are increasingly important to the Republican electoral coalition" (Carnes & Lupu, 2020, p. 44).

They'll use bioweapons.

Ackerman et al 22 [Gary A Ackerman, Associate Professor with the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at SUNY Albany, Zachary Kallenborn, Philipp C Bleek, May 2022, "Going Viral: Implications of COVID-19 for Bioterrorism", Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/going-viral-implications-of-covid-19-for-bioterrorism/, accessed 3-3-2025] RNM

Groups with maximalist ideologies aiming for drastic, global, or even cosmic change such as apocalyptic cults, some extreme environmental groups,[26] or accelerationist **extreme right-wing groups**[27] **necessarily require extreme means to achieve their goals.** While a handful of attacks aimed at garnering public attention and perhaps support may help, **drastic ends require drastic means**, especially for more misanthropic ideologies. **Biological weapons are one of the few avenues available to cause globally catastrophic, and especially existential, harm.** For example, the green anarchist group RISE in 1970s Chicago sought biological weapons as a way to kill off most of humanity to repopulate the Earth with enlightened environmentalists.[28] COVID-19's impacts on the motivations of such groups might also not manifest in the short-term. After all, groups with such apocalyptic ideologies are relatively rare, and even rarer still are those with meaningful capabilities. Decades from now, however, some future apocalyptic extremist group may look back at the **COVID-19** pandemic as **evidence of the potential utility of biological weapons.**

Additionally, spoilers scared of technological development will target advances.

Hambling 23 [David Hambling, technology journalist and author based in South London. He writes for The Economist magazine, New Scientist, WIRED, Aviation Week, Popular Mechanics and Popular Science

among others, 6-23-2023, “New Report Warns Terrorists Could Cause Human Extinction With ‘Spoiler Attacks’”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/06/23/new-report-warns-terrorists-could-cause-human-extinction-with-spoiler-attacks/, accessed 3-3-2025] RNM

For example, **terrorists could leverage the potential risks in advanced AI research**, an area **which some warn carries “risk of extinction,” and leading to calls for strict safeguards on research**. Rather than building their own super-intelligent AI, **terrorists might carry out a spoiler attack to break through the safeguards preventing an AI from being developed beyond a certain stage or released**. This might be carried out remotely via hacking, on the spot by recruiting or subverting researchers, or by an armed intrusion into a research facility.

Spoiler **attacks might** also **target biological research** or nanotechnology projects, both areas where high levels of safeguarding are required. The authors note that new tools such as CRISPR, rapid DNA sequencing and DNA/RNA synthesis mean that there are now far more groups working on potentially hazardous biological projects. The unproven lab leak theory that COVID-19 escaped from a Chinese research facility could be a blueprint for a spoiler attack.

Generative AI hands terrorists the means.

Sandbrink 23 [Jonas Sandbrink, biosecurity researcher at the University of Oxford, 8-7-2023, “ChatGPT could make bioterrorism horrifyingly easy”, Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23820331/chatgpt-bioterrorism-bioweapons-artificial-inteligence-openai-terrorism, accessed 3-3-2025] RNM

Advances in artificial intelligence have tremendous potential to have positive impacts on science and health. Tools like ChatGPT are revolutionizing how society works and learns, and artificial intelligence applied to biology has led to solving the decade-old protein folding problem and is transforming drug discovery. However, as **artificial intelligence** raises the ceiling of biological engineering and helps distribute these powers to a tremendous number of individuals, there is a serious risk that it **will enable ill-intentioned actors** like Aum Shinrikyo, to potentially devastating effect. As I have discussed in a recent preprint paper, large language models (LLMs) like **ChatGPT**, as well as novel AI-powered biological design tools, may significantly **increase** the risks from biological weapons and **bioterrorism.** How AI language models are a threat multiplier for bioweapons **Large language models — which are very good at answering questions and teaching about dual-use knowledge** — may in particular **increase the accessibility of biological weapons**. In a recent exercise at MIT, **it took just one hour for ChatGPT to instruct non-scientist students about four potential pandemic pathogens, including options for how they could be acquired by anyone lacking the skills to create them in the lab, and how to avoid detection by obtaining genetic material from providers who do not screen orders.** At the same time, the story of Aum Shinrikyo’s lack of knowledge about the difference between Clostridium botulinum and botulinum toxin is not an isolated example. **Past** biological weapons **programs have** frequently **been bottlenecked by not having the right staff, with the required knowledge and expertise, to create an effective bioweapon**. Al-Qaeda’s exploration of bioterrorism was led by Rauf Ahmed, who had originally studied microbes related to food production, and thus tried to quickly learn about anthrax and other pathogens. Over the course of 2001, Rauf used his scientific credentials to make headway toward acquiring anthrax. It is not publicly known how far he got; he was arrested that December. Despite having access to the relevant equipment, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq never turned its anthrax weapon from a less potent liquid form into a more dangerous powder form, which can be stored and released at much higher and more predictable concentration. That’s likely because its scientists lacked the knowledge of the relevant process for drying and milling anthrax. As chatbots become more sophisticated, however, they may inadvertently help individuals with malicious intent to upskill on topics that empower them to do harm. But how much can you learn from an AI-powered lab assistant alone? After all, to make a pathogen or a bioweapon, you don’t just need instructional knowledge of the sort that can be dished out by an LLM, you need hands-on, tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge describes all knowledge that cannot be verbalized and can only be acquired through direct experience. Think of how to ride a bike, or for that matter, how to perform molecular biology procedures, which might require knowing how to hold a pipette, shake a flask, or treat your cells. It is difficult to define the extent of this tacit knowledge barrier and how much impact LLMs like ChatGPT may have on lowering it. However, one fact seems clear: **If chatbots and AI-powered lab assistants make the creation and modification of biological agents seem more accessible, then it is likely that**

more individuals will try their hand. And the more who try, the more who will eventually succeed. Additionally, **ChatGPT is just the beginning of language models and related forms of artificial intelligence.** Already now, language models are revolutionizing the way scientists can instruct lab robots on what work to perform. Soon, **artificial intelligence systems will be able to perform ideation and design of experimental strategies**. Thus, **artificial intelligence will enable and accelerate the increasing automation of science, reducing the number of scientists required to advance large-scale projects**. This will make it easier to develop biological weapons covertly. Biological design tools could simplify bioweapons While large language models may eventually push the ceiling of biological design capabilities, more specialized AI tools are already doing this now. Such biological design tools (BDTs) include protein folding models like AlphaFold2 and protein design tools like RFdiffusion. These artificial intelligence tools are usually trained on biological data, such as genetic sequences. They are developed by many different companies and academics to help with important biological design challenges, such as developing therapeutic antibodies. **As biological design tools become more powerful, they will enable many beneficial advances like the creation of new medications based on novel proteins or designer viruses.** But such powerful **design capabilities may also exacerbate biological risks.** At the extreme, biological design tools could **allow the design of biological agents with unprecedented properties**. It has been hypothesized that **natural pathogens feature a trade-off between how transmissible and how deadly they are; designed pathogens might not feature such evolutionary constraints.** A group like Aum Shinrikyo could potentially create a pandemic virus much worse than anything nature could produce and thus, biological design tools could turn pandemics from the catastrophic risks they are now into true existential threats. Biological design tools could also enable the creation of biological agents targeted at specific geographies or populations.

Extinction.

Walsh 21 [Bryan Walsh, the Future Correspondent for Axios, Editor of the Science and Technology Publication OneZero, Former Senior and International Editor at Time Magazine, BA from Princeton University, "BIOTECHNOLOGY: Engineering a Killer," End Times: A Brief Guide to the End of the World, Chapter 6, pp. 204-206, ISBN: 978-0275948023] //WP + IB + SJID + EHSRJ <3

I've lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But **a deliberate outbreak** caused **by an engineered pathogen** would be **far worse**. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that **would spread** once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We're scared of disease outbreaks and we're scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for **chaos**. As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could **spread faster and kill quicker than anything** that would emerge out of nature. **It can** be designed to **evade medical countermeasures**, frustrating doctors' attempts to diagnose cases **and** treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could **be reintroduced** into the public **again and again. It could,** with the right mix of genetic traits, **even wipe us off the planet**, making engineered viruses a **genuine existential threat**. And such an attack may **not even be that difficult** to carry out. Thanks to advances in **biotech**nology that have **rapidly reduced** the **skill level** and **funding** needed to perform **gene editi**ng and **engineer**ing, what might have once required the work of an army of virologists employed by a nation-state could soon be done by a handful of talented and trained individuals. Or maybe just one.

Contention 2 is the EU.

The EU is clamping down on US GenAI technology. That threatens to derail US-EU current cooperation.

Pouget '23 [Hadrien Pouget; May 1st; Associate Fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Research Assistant at the computer science department at the University of Oxford, Ph.M. in Technology Policy from the University of Cambridge, M.S. in Computer Science from the University of Oxford; "Europe's AI Act Nears Finishing Line — Worrying Washington"; Center for European Policy Analysis; https://cepa.org/article/europes-ai-act-nears-finishing-line-worrying-washington/] cameron

European parliamentarians are considering **additions** to the initial **A**rtificial **I**ntelligence (AI) **Act's** draft lists of either **prohibited** or high-risk **applications**.

The AI Act's main thrust is to require programmers working on high-risk applications to document, test and take other safety measures. Parliament is poised to **rope in** more **applications** than initially proposed, including broad categories such as systems "likely to influence democratic processes like elections," or "General Purpose AIs" which can be integrated into different applications, such as OpenAI's **ChatGPT**.

Big Tech is predictably resistant. The US government has voiced concern. An **increase** in scope could **raise** overall **transatlantic tensions** surrounding **tech regulation**. So far, **Washington** has remained relatively **silent** as **Europe clamps down** on tech. Through the Trade and Technology Council, **Washington** and **Brussels** have focused on **collaboration** and expressed a **desire** to **harmonize** their **regulatory approaches** to **AI**.

A **broadening** of the **AI Act** could test this **cooperative spirit**. US **companies** and **regulators** were already **worried** about the AI Act, **fearing** it was trying to tackle too many applications and would become **ineffective** and **burdensome**. US actors are sensitive as the EU's recent Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act were perceived as unjustly targeting US companies. In this environment, an increase in the AI Act's scope could risk losing the neutral appeal it enjoyed until now.

A **looming collision** must and can be **avoided**. US critics should recognize that the AI Act is not the "one-size-fits-all" solution it is often imagined to be. While the Act attaches a single set of generic requirements to high-risk AI systems, the requirements could — and should — be adapted to different applications. "Appropriate levels" of accuracy or robustness will be customized to different high-risk contexts. This would allow flexibility in enforcement and potential alignment with international standards — and the US and EU have already identified standards as an area for cooperation. Recent AI Act proposals also offer opt-out mechanisms for companies who do not think their AI systems pose any risks.

US **attitudes** are **shifting** in favor of **regulation**. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has announced an ambition to put together an AI policy framework as ChatGPT's popularity has supercharged the discussion. While details remain scarce, Schumer's statement suggests some unification of requirements for AI systems according to four guardrails: "who," "where," "how," and "protect." At the same time, the Department of Commerce has launched a request for comments on the development of AI audits and assessments, and the FTC has begun issuing pointed warnings about AI systems.

In this light, **Washington** and **Brussels** enjoy an **opportunity** to **work together**. The US and EU can partner on **elaborating** the technical **standards** and other concrete implementation details that will **underpin** both of their **regulatory approaches**. The EU, which is ahead of the US in some of these discussions, should **invite** and encourage this **collaboration**. Conversely, US lawmakers and federal agencies should take note of the EU's approach as they implement their own requirements.

The European Parliament still must approve a text, and negotiations are stretching out. EU lawmakers reached a political agreement on April 27, and a key committee vote is scheduled for May 11. A full parliamentary vote will be in mid-June. Even then, the Parliament's position will need

to be reconciled with the Council of the European Union's (formed of member states' relevant ministers). Substantial changes remain on the table.

It is understandable that the EU's **broadening** of the AI Act's **scope** (or the threat of broadening) makes Americans **nervous**. The US should come to the EU with targeted suggestions, as its domestic conversation around AI risks matures. A productive **dialogue** over **AI regulation** remains **possible** – and **necessary**.

State regulations are slowly bringing the US in line, easing tensions.

Kibel '24 [Gary Kibel; May 16th; Parter and Privacy, Technology, and Data Security specialist at Davis and Gilbert LLP, J.D. from Brooklyn Law School; "Utah, Colorado and Other States Lead Groundbreaking AI Legislation in U.S."; Davis and Gilbert LLP; https://www.dglaw.com/utah-colorado-and-other-states-lead-groundbreaking-ai-legislation-in-u-s/] cameron

Over the last year, nearly **200** new **laws** were proposed across **dozens** of **states** to **regulate AI** technology.

Utah's new **AI transparency law** requires companies to **disclose** when their AI systems are used to interact with consumers.

A new law pending in Colorado will be the first to **regulate** the use of **AI** when making **consequential decisions** about **individuals**.

Other states may **regulate** AI through existing **consumer privacy** legislation, and **numerous states** have enacted laws **regulating deepfakes**, including for political advertising.

With the rapid introduction of increasingly powerful **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence (AI) technologies, **regulators**, **consumers** and even **industry participants** are seeking to establish a **clear regulatory framework**.

While the **E**uropean **U**nion recently enacted the **AI Act**, which will both **regulate** AI and **prohibit** the use of **AI** in certain instances, the United States **Congress** has **not adopted** any new **federal laws addressing AI** technologies. In the **absence** of any such **federal legislation**, many U.S. **states** are taking matters into their **own hands**. Since the beginning of 2023, nearly 200 AI-related bills have been introduced across dozens of states.

But education is a key sticking point.

Zhang et al '25 [Dr. Shuang Zhang; February 10th; Associate Professor with the School of Artificial Intelligence at Neijiang Normal University, Postdoctoral Researcher with the School of Life Science and Technology, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Ph.D. in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from the University of Macau, M.S. in Control Engineering from the Institute of Optics and Electronics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences; et al; "Understanding the practices, perceptions, and (dis)trust of generative AI among instructors: A mixed-methods study in the U.S. higher education"; Computers and Education: Artificial Intelligence; https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666920X25000232] cameron

Generative **AI** (GenAI) is **rapidly transforming** teaching and learning in higher **education**, introducing **significant changes** and **uncertainties** (Michel-Villarreal et al., 2023). Faculty, students, and institutions all face uncertainty and anxiety surrounding the role of GenAI in teaching and learning, as it is uncertain to what extent they should embrace or restrict the use of GenAI in educational contexts (Adeshola & Adepoju, 2023). **Policymakers** also face **challenges** in **devising** appropriate **regulatory frameworks** and **guidelines** to **manage** the integration of **GenAI** into higher education, balancing **innovation** with **ethic**al considerations

and academic **integrity** (Luo, 2024). Meanwhile, **attitudes** and **practices** among different stakeholders regarding GenAI **vary significantly** across educational communities. For example, according to a survey conducted in 2023 by Tyton Partners, most students are increasingly curious about GenAI, with nearly half of the college students using these tools regularly (Fox & Shaw, 2023). In contrast, only 22% of faculty members have adopted GenAI (Coffey, 2023). Even among instructors, the integration of GenAI into educational practices has sparked **polarized reactions** (Mishra et al., 2024; D'Agostino, 2023a, D'Agostino, 2023b). Such a split often manifests as a division between those who view traditional educational methods as outdated—labeling skeptics and distrust as "you're a dinosaur (D'Agostino, 2023a)"—and those who caution against an unrestrained embrace of AI, fearing it could undermine fundamental educational values, such as critical thinking and academic integrity (van den Berg & du Plessis, 2023; Sullivan et al., 2023). These varying practices and attitudes shed light on a broader discourse on educators' perceptions, attitudes, and trust towards GenAI, as these perspectives could help explain their practices and approaches to GenAI use and integration in teaching and learning.

Differing standards will tank transatlantic relations.

Franke '21 [Dr. Ulrike Franke; January 20th; Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, policy affiliate at the Governance of AI project at Oxford University, Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford; "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI"; European Council on Foreign Relations; https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/] cameron

Obstacles to cooperation

Both sides of the Atlantic are already **motivated** to **cooperate** with each other on **AI**. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit.

Transatlantic estrangement

The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration's criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president's threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, **technology** in particular has become an area that **creates conflict** in the **transatlantic relationship** rather than **fostering cooperation**.

Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump's predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense "should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam". Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and **AI more specifically**, they have also begun to reach out to **other democratic allies**.

European digital autonomy

The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, **Europeans** have become much more comfortable talking about **European strategic autonomy** or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the **technological realm**, this led to the idea of **European digital sovereignty**, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe **US tech**

giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are **forces to protect against**. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to **build up digital sovereignty** may **impede transatlantic cooperation**.

The EU's effort to strengthen **ethical AI**, and to make 'trustworthy AI' a unique selling point for **Europe**, might also end up **creating problems** for **transatlantic cooperation**. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU's insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI 'made in Europe' rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that **AI is developed** and **used** in an **ethical way**. Partnering with a **powerful player** such as the **US** on this matter should be an **obvious way** to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe's uniqueness.

Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are **indeed aligned** on **ethical AI principles**. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: "Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy." Many Europeans feel that the US "has no idea how to regulate" cyberspace and **continues to show little enthusiasm** for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 "right to be forgotten" or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

Trump is priced in.

Vinjamuri '2-28 [Dr. Leslie Vinjamuri; February 28th; Professor of International Relations at University of London, Director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House, Ph.D. from Columbia University; "Europe's leaders are finding a way to deal with Trump – but clarity on Ukraine remains elusive"; Chatham House; https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/europes-leaders-are-finding-way-deal-trump-clarity-ukraine-remains-elusive] cameron

The **statements** of US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance around the time of Munich had **seemed** like a **death knell** for Europe's relationship with the US, but that may yet prove to have been **more noise than signal**.

After all, Trump's **willingness** to entertain four European leaders shows that he could be **uncomfortable walking away** from Europe. The **US** has been signposting a **rebalancing** in its global **commitments** for more than **two decades**. But that **shift** is still more likely to be **gradual** than **abrupt**, even under **Trump** – since all partners including the **US** have a **great deal** at **stake**.

The urgent moment

President **Trump** is clearly willing to **force Europe's hand** and treat US commitments as part of a **bargain**, subject to **conditions** rather than one bound by **principles**.

US-EU relations solve a litany of existential threats.

Eizenstat '23 [Stuart E. Eizenstat; former United States Ambassador to the European Union, senior strategist at APCO Worldwide, B.A. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School; "Wanted: a new framework for US-EU relations";

Financial Times; 7-30-2023; https://www.ft.com/content/f94a4b1d-72af-4f93-ad6e-efc30a78c535] cameron

A **new transatlantic framework** between the **US** and **EU**, comparable to NATO, is needed in order to **address** the **challenges** of the **21st century**. NATO is currently performing indispensable service in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, as it did in the 1990s in ending the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the alliance is consuming all the attention of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic at a time when we face issues that go beyond its mandate. Military security, economic security and prosperity are intertwined and must be co-ordinated, not kept in separate silos.

Consider the challenges we face: the rise of **China**; the **existential threat** of **climate change**; securing **fragile supply chains** and **critical minerals**; transformational technologies like artificial intelligence; looming **nuclear threats** from **Iran** and **North Korea**; and the task of rebuilding Ukraine. All of these **demand greater US-EU co-operation than ever before.**

Precedents for building this new **relationship** are **plentiful**: the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration under President George HW Bush; the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda under Bill Clinton (which I helped negotiate); and the 2021 announcement of a "renewed Transatlantic partnership" that created the joint Trade and Technology Council, which is doing important work in a number of areas. More recently, the US and EU have worked closely together to impose on Russia the stiffest economic sanctions ever. Vladimir Putin's efforts to break the transatlantic relationship have failed.

The US is the EU's largest bilateral trade and investment partner. A third of transatlantic trade consists of intra-company transfers. And the percentage of **investment** in each other's markets accounts for more than **30 per cent** of total **global investment**. American companies invest more than three times as much in Ireland as they do in China.

But more is needed. While attendance by American presidents and European heads of state at Nato summits is automatic, summit meetings between US and EU leaders are sporadic at best. There is **no common vision** for the future and we each **go our own ways on important initiatives** without advance **consultation** with **governments** and **businesses** on the other side of the **Atlantic.**

In the past few weeks, with no US input, the European parliament adopted a sweeping law **regulating AI**, while the White House focused on a voluntary approach, with **Congress yet** to **formally address the issue**. Last year, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act to provide over $360bn in subsidies and tax incentives to US-based companies to encourage clean technologies, in effect excluding European ones.

With the COP28 summit approaching, the **US** and **EU** have starkly **different approaches** to climate change. Europe recently approved a carbon border adjustment mechanism to tax carbon intensive imports from the **US and elsewhere**, and has a cap and trade system, which **America has rejected**.

Nuclear non-proliferation solves global arms racing and war. An effective EU relationship is key.

Federica **Mogherini 18.** High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "The EU as a Global Non-Proliferation Actor". http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eunpd_e-newsletter_1.pdf

"In times of global uncertainty, the European Union has become a **global point of reference** for all those who believe in non-proliferation and multilateralism.

Our partners know where we stand. They know we are an honest broker, and we will always seek **win-win solutions to preserve peace and security**. And they know we have **world-class expertise on non-proliferation** – also thanks to the work of the European Network of Independent NonProliferation and Disarmament think-tanks. Independent analyses and recommendations are an

essential contribution to our policy-making, so I am glad that the Council decided to extend our support to the network, also as a contribution to the implementation of the EU Strategy against **proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**.

This is a **delicate moment** for the global non-proliferation regime. The United States have decided to unilaterally re-impose sanctions on Iran, after their withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – a multilateral agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council. Our European strategic and security interest is clearly to save the nuclear deal. So we have reacted decisively to protect both our security interests and our economic sovereignty.

This is also an incentive for Iran to continue comply with its nuclear restrictions. Any alternative could have tragic consequences – and it would make all of us **less secure**, both **in Europe**, in **the United States and** in **the Middle East**. Let us not forget: the nuclear deal with Iran has **prevented a nuclear arms race** in one of the most fragile regions in the world; it has ensured that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon; it has brought economic benefits to the people of Iran; and it has opened new channels for diplomacy and dialogue. Preserving the deal is in everyone's interest.

Preserving the deal is also essential to the credibility of multilateral diplomacy and the global nonproliferation regime. This is even more important as talks on the **North Korean nuclear programme** are ongoing. We have always believed that sustainable peace requires a complete, verifiable and irreversible **de-nuclearisation** of the Korean peninsula. The path will not be easy and negotiations could take time. But this is the only way to achieve an agreement that can stand the test of time. So our policy of "critical engagement" is more valid than ever. The European Union keeps standing for maximum pressure on North Korea, as we support the diplomatic track with all possible means.

Only diplomacy and dialogue can advance the cause of non-proliferation. We will continue to put our unparalleled expertise to the service of **peace**. From the **Middle East to Asia**-Pacific, from conventional to nuclear weapons, the European Union is playing its part. We owe it to our citizens and we owe it to the **world**."

Global proliferation ensures extinction.

Anna **Bartoux 22**. Research Intern for Nuclear Knowledges @ Center for International Studies, Sciences Po Paris, staff writer @ CPR, "The Bomb and Us: Why Gen Z Should Care About Nuclear Disarmament", https://www.cpreview.org/blog/2022/2/the-bomb-and-us-why-gen-z-should-care-about-nuclear-disarmament

But our generation is gravely mistaken in its risk assessment. American and Russian **nuclear arsenals** remain **alive and well** today, and worse, they have been joined by nations such as India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan. Many of us remain **stubbornly attached** to the theory of **Mutually Assured Destruction**, which argues the threat of nuclear retaliation against an attack provides an adequate safeguard against conflict escalation. **Some scholars**, including Kenneth **Waltz**, have gone so far as arguing that we should allow **nuclear weapons proliferation** as a method of promoting peace. However, this deterrence-based approach does not take into account the possibility of **accidental** and **unauthorized nuclear explosions**, or of **nuclear terrorism**, two **very real menaces**. **Spreading nuclear weapons** to **less developed countries** that may not have the means to safekeep them would **drastically increase** the chances of an **unwanted detonation**, potentially setting off a **chain of catastrophes** from which there will be **no return**.

eate new and **contested** abundance, like in the Arctic. If we continue on the current path, climate change will become e a particularly **important role** to play in this regard.

Contention 3 is FINANCES.

Universities are in peril

Wadhwani-25 [Emily Wadhwani, 1-15-2025, (Senior Director @ Fitch, MBA @ Iowa, B.A. @ Creighton), "U.S. Higher Education Navigating Numerous Changes in 2025," Fitch Ratings. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/us-public-finance/us-higher-education-navigating-numerous-changes-in-2025-15-01-2025 DOA: 2/25/2025] //vy

Fitch Ratings-Chicago/New York-15 January 2025: While the universe of Fitch-rated U.S. colleges remain fundamentally stable in performance, cracks will continue to surface this year, as discussed in a webinar hosted by Fitch Ratings yesterday.

Fitch maintains a **deteriorating sector outlook** for **higher education** in **2025**, **driven** in part **by** a **softer operating environment, reduced financial flexibility**, a **fragile** international **enrollment pipeline**, and an **expectation** for **increased consolidation** and **college closures**. Though much of the sector's unrest comes from unrated colleges, even rated **institutions** at both ends of the rating spectrum are **now** also **facing reduced** an **increasingly challenging fundraising environment**, **shrinking class sizes** and **more intense cost control pressures**.

The perceived value of higher education versus its cost is a long-term behavioral shift that colleges will have to navigate, with the incoming administration being an important barometer for how the sector may fare, according to Fitch Senior Director Emily Wadhwani.

"With **tuition growth** still **moderating**, **flattening enrollment prospects**, and a **great deal** of **policy uncertainty** at both state and federal levels, **margins** will **likely remain very modest** at **best** in **fiscal 2025**," said Wadhwani. "Further, **endowments** have **benefitted** from **recent market gains**, but **access to ready liquidity** will **continue to be critical** as **colleges navigate** operating and environmental **uncertainty**."

State funding should **help keep financial risk at bay** in the **near term**, a bright spot of sorts tempered by more intangible risks the sector faces. Key person risk is a particular area of concern, with Wadhwani pointing to more 'turnover at the top' as average tenure of university presidents continues to decline. "There is also an elevated percentage of university staff that are very likely looking for new employment over the next 12 months," said Wadhwani.

Even for large ones

Azziz-24 [Ricardo Azziz, 8-19-2024, (Exec. Director "Why is the higher education sector so fragile in the US?" Higher Ed Drive. https://www.highereddive.com/news/merger-watch-us-fragile-higher-education/724471/ DOA: 3/7/2025] //vy

Declining enrollment has **increased** the **financial challenges** of **most types of colleges**. **All sectors** of **institutions**, when **viewed by size**, have **recently experienced enrollment decreases** — with the **exception** of the **colleges that enroll over 30,000 students**.

Institutions with fewer than 1,000 students have seen the most significant decrease in enrollment, which has declined 36% between fall 2012 and fall 2021. **Paradoxically**, **larger colleges** and **universities** that **enroll between 20,000** and **29,999 students** — which are often regional institutions — also **lost 30% of their enrollment** over that same period.

Indeed,

Dickler-24 [Jessica Dickler, 12-22-2024, (Financial Journalist @ CNBC, B.A. in Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, M.A. @ Columbia SIPA), "College closures expected to spike amid 'unprecedented fiscal challenges,' Fed research finds," CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/12/11/college-closures-could-jump-amid-financial-challenges-fed-research.html DOA: 2/25/2025] //vy

But now, the **number of colleges set to close** in the **next five years** is **expected** to **spike**, a new study found.

Higher education, as a whole, is "**facing serious financial headwinds**, both due to long-term trends and to the post-pandemic recovery," according to a working paper by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

"**Colleges** and **universities** are **facing unprecedented fiscal challenges** in **today's economic climate**," the **Fed researchers wrote**.

More from Personal Finance:
The 2025-26 FAFSA is open ahead of schedule
These are the top 10 highest-paying college majors
More of the nation's top colleges roll out no-loan policies

At least 20 colleges closed in **2024**, and **another nine schools announced** they **will close** in **2025**, according to the latest tally by Implan, an economic software and analysis company.

In the worst-case scenario, as many as **80 additional colleges** would **shut** from **2025** to **2029**, the **Fed** analysis **found**.

It'll accelerate now

Kingson-24 [Jennifer A. Kingson, 7-3-2024, (Chief Correspondent @ Axios), "Schools are bracing for the looming "enrollment cliff"" Axios. https://www.axios.com/2024/07/03/education-enrollment-cliff-schools DOA: 3/7/2025] //vy

The **number of U.S. high school graduates is expected to peak in 2025 or 2026 and then decline for years to come — posing severe challenges to schools** at all levels.

Why it matters: Schools and **colleges are closing**, faculty members are being laid off, and districts are facing financial dilemmas — **all as education is under political fire from every side**.

Driving the news: **Due to a birthrate drop after the 2008 recession, schools are planning for a decades long dry spell that's being referred to as the "enrollment cliff"** or "demographic cliff."

AI expenditures ensure full collapse

Burke-25 [Lilah Burke, 1-2-2025, (Fmr. Reporter @ Inside Higher Ed, News Intern @ Bloomberg Law, B.S. in Foreign Service @ Georgetown, M.A. in Journalism @ CUNY), "Why more colleges are embracing AI offerings," Higher Ed Drive. https://www.highereddive.com/news/colleges-artificial-intelligence-programs-investments/736196/ DOA: 2/25/2025] //vy

Despite the growing interest in the emerging technology, **investing** in **AI**-related programming **is often difficult**. For one, depending on the level and focus, it **can be expensive**. **AI curricula** can **require colleges** to **hire qualified faculty** and **staff** and **pay** for **significant computing power**. That's why many of the **institutions** that are investing in AI, such as Carnegie Mellon University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are well-resourced with large endowments, Koslosky said. Other institutions are pursuing partnerships with industry to make their goals possible. University of Florida, for instance, has a partnership with chipmaker Nvidia, which includes a $50 million gift from the company and one of its cofounders. Arizona State University is **partnering with OpenAI, to provide enterprise subscriptions** to ChatGPT for approved faculty and staff. Stony Brook University, part of the State University of New York system, recently expanded an AI institute into a universitywide initiative, which will focus on research and applications in healthcare, infrastructure, education and finance. The university is investing about $15 million, which includes support from Empire AI, a college research consortium focused on AI and heavily funded by the state. Stony Brook Provost Carl Lejuez said that "$15 million is nothing and a lot of money all at the same time." "We're seeing companies **struggle** with this **immensely** **because** they're **having to make decisions** about – are they **going to fall behind so far** that they're **not going to be able to compete**?" Lejuez added. "But in the **meantime** they're **spending millions** and in **some cases billions** in cases where they're not generating real revenue yet." Whether an **investment** in **AI programming** is right for an institution will likely depend on its circumstances, including its resources, faculty, mission and connections to industry. "If you're a major research university, you're going to be really far behind if you are not investing in this," Lejuez said. "For research **universities**, it's an absolute necessity." For other institutions though, a **big AI investment** might be **riskier**. "If your school doesn't have a huge computer science department and doesn't have a lot of industry connections to companies using AI or building AI, then you shouldn't drop everything to stand up a brand new AI program right now," Koslosky said. **Additionally, investments** in **AI** are **so far untested**. Although many business leaders believe AI is going to change the American workforce, that transformation hasn't fully come to pass. Although current research predicts the number of AI jobs trending upwards, what those jobs look like might change. That means that trying to integrate AI into other disciplines is the financially safer approach, Koslosky said. "**Schools** are **struggling** with **lots of things** and **balancing competing priorities**," he said. "AI is important and will continue to be, but it's not the only important thing."

It's unpredictable

Tobenkin-24 [David Tobenkin, May/June 2024, (Senior Industry Analyst @ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, B.A. @ Berkeley), "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Higher Education, Part 2," AGB https://agb.org/trusteeship-article/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-higher-education-part-2/ DOA: 3/3/2025] //vy *brackets are og

Institutions that **intend** to **drive AI change through major initiatives** will **have to be aware** of the need to provide adequate **resources** to **support ambitious AI** and other data analytics **efforts**, Hilbelink says. "As an example, at **one** well-known **institution**, a [chief information officer] said he was told that they were going to **hire 100 new faculty** next

year, which is a lot of new faculty, yet were **not going to give** a **penny** to **increasing technology services, showing** that they're **not necessarily taking into consideration** the **IT needs that would grow** with that number of new faculty. So that's a perfect example of a school not thinking **towards the future**."
But many institutions are not, and will never be, on the leading edge of AI change by design, says Andrew Lounder, associate vice president of programs at AGB and a board member of Wheaton College in Massachusetts. **Major initiatives** to **drive** and **steer AI** on **campus** can **represent enormous financial** and **reputational gambles** that **many universities** and colleges simply **cannot afford**, he notes. For such institutions, it may be a perfectly legitimate approach to allow better-funded peers to be pioneers and to learn from their experiences. "Tech revolutions don't always happen in sweeping fashion, the way that futurists predict," Lounder says.

Collapse is rapid

Troller-23 [Mark Troller, 12-27-2023, (CIO @ Tangoe), "Beware of Ai's Hidden Costs Before They Bankrupt Innovation," Tangoe. https://www.tangoe.com/blog/ais-hidden-costs-can-bankrupt-innovation/ DOA: 3/7/2025] //vy
Unpacking this issue requires understanding AI's addiction to the cloud. **AI relies heavily on cloud storage and computing powers. Separate they are nothing, but together AI has velocity**. Cloud infrastructure and applications give advanced analytics, hyper-automation, and large language models the fast, scalable delivery channels they need to be effective. But **this addiction** also **quietly triggers** cloud **expenditures that can go unforeseen and undetected**. The Wall Street Journal recently published an article on how **AI is impacting the ability to control** cloud **costs**. **Hidden infrastructure and application costs pile expenses on an already difficult cloud dynamic**:
Prices are rising for infrastructure and applications
Cloud **services dominate IT budgets** and IaaS **invoices can spin out of control**
Most companies **are already spending more** on cloud **than they budgeted**
When you factor in AI's costly yet indispensable ally with the high demands for new GenAI tools, it's easy to see why investment strategies can quickly become financially unsustainable. GenAI is driving another layer of technical debt for many businesses.**Under the pressures of constant innovation, we could see AI-cloud growth at new record-breaking speeds. As these factors come together in 2024, we may even see cloud hangovers of the past three years grow into full-fledged AI-cloud bankruptcies. Hidden costs have the potential to bankrupt** AI innovation, because they **limit the ability for CIOs and CFOs to create new budget**, finding funding from within as a means to sustain the economic cycles of digital transformation.

For enrollment,

Tobenkin-24 [David Tobenkin, January/February 2024, (Senior Industry Analyst @ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, B.A. @ Berkeley) "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Higher Education, Part 1," AGB. https://agb.org/trusteeship-article/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-higher-education-part-1/ DOA: 3/3/2025] //vy
Perhaps most significant, a substantial number of educators and consultants interviewed think that as **AI's functionality expands**, it **could eventually pose** an **existential threat** to **many HEI** functions by **rendering them obsolete**. "If you **keep leveraging AI** and other digital trends to **provide highly competitive, lower-cost alternatives** to **traditional [HEI]** and research, you **start to see the economic model** of **traditional institutions** really **gets messed up**—their **primacy starts to crumble**," says Scott Pulsipher, president of the online, nonprofit Western Governors University (WGU).

Unfortunately,

Letiner-24 [Georg Letiner, May 2024, (Strategy Analyst @ Raiffeisen Bank international, Lecturer of Macroeconomics @ Vienna University, Financial Stability Analyst @ ECB, Researcher @ Institute for Advanced Studies, MS.c. + BS.c. @ Vienna University) "The rise of artificial intelligence: benefits and risks for financial stability," European Central Bank.

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart202405_02~58c3ce5246.en.html DOA: 3/3/2025] //vy

Overreliance and a **limited number of AI suppliers** may **make the operational backbone** of the financial system **more fragile**. To leverage potential efficiency gains, **financial institutions** may **increasingly substitute AI resources** for **human resources**, potentially **inducing** an **overreliance on AI** in **core functions** that could render the financial system more **vulnerable** to **inherent operational flaws** and **failures or cyberattacks**. Both would be amplified if the number of AI suppliers is limited, as this would **additionally increase** the financial system's dependency on third-party providers and introduce **single-point-of-failure risks**. This **constitutes** a **potential threat** to **financial stability from** the **perspective** of **operational risk** and **cyber risk** (Box A).

The **widespread adoption of AI** may **increase market concentration** in the **financial services industry**. The integration of AI into business structures may **require large initial fixed investments** and **entail economic risks**. It may be easier for larger firms with well-established data infrastructure and third-party networks to obtain the requisite technological knowledge and levels of data availability. Accordingly, some financial institutions may miss the transition or be unable to make the necessary investments, ending up permanently behind and dropping out of the market. Like other information technology, AI may prove to be a winner-takes-all market. AI may thus contribute to a further shift in market power amid an increasingly digitalised environment, leading to a higher concentration in the financial system, among either existing players or new players (e.g. from the technology industry). **Ultimately**, this could **result in fewer institutions remaining on the market**, **accelerate too-big-to-fail externalities**[25] and **transfer economic rents** from **consumers** to **financial institutions**.

AI may distort the **information processing function** of **markets**, **increasing financial markets' endogenous crisis potential**. Conceptually, **AI** can be **thought of as a filter through which information** is **gathered, analysed** and **assessed**. The **interpretation of information** may **become more uniform if increasingly similar models** with the **same embedded challenges** and **biases** are **widely used to understand financial market dynamics**. As a result, **AI may make market participants' conclusions systematically biased**, **leading** to **distorted asset prices**, **increased correlation**, **herding behaviour** or **bubbles**. Should many institutions use AI for asset allocation and rely only on a few AI providers, for example, then **supply** and **demand** for **financial assets** may be **distorted systematically**, **triggering costly adjustments** in **markets** that **harm their resilience**. Similarly, extensive use of AI by retail investors **may result in large** and **similar shifts** in **retail trading patterns,** which **would increase volatility** in **market sentiment**, trading volumes and prices.

Universities are key post-Trump

Riles-20 [Annelise Riles, 12-15-2020, (Professor of Law & Associate Provost @ Northwestern Pritzker, Founder @ Meridian 180, Fmr. Professor @ LSE, Yale, and Cornell, B.A. @ Princeton SPIA, M.S.C @ LSE, J.D. @ HLS, PhD @ Cambridge), "Universities can help the U.S. retake its seat at the global table," Northwestern University https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2020/12/us-international-community/ DOA: 3/4/2025] //vy

On his first day in office, President-elect Biden vows to take swift action to ensure that the U.S. re-joins the World Health Organization and Paris Climate Accord. But while the U.S. might be about to re-join the international community, it should not return to its old role as "leader of the free world."

That archetype no longer serves the interests of the **U.S.** — which is **no longer willing** to **bear the costs** — or the **international community** — which has got used to a more consensus-based international order. Accordingly, the new administration will **need to learn** to **lead laterally** — as a **collaborator** and **coordinator**. This is **where American universities can help**.

'Track-two diplomacy'

Working through global networks such as the U7+ Alliance of World Universities, **higher education institutions** are n**ow positioned to serve** as **crucial sources** of **policy innovation** and **social impact**. During this year's second annual U7+ summit, hosted at Northwestern University, nearly 100 university leaders from 17 countries gathered virtually to discuss how **higher education** can **play** a **key role** in a "**track-two diplomacy**" that has **so often bolstered fragile** "**track-one**" **diplomatic relations**.

During the summit, held at the end of November, university presidents unanimously voted to **create new opportunities** for **mutual understanding** and **equitable resource sharing across generations** through **direct engagement** with the G7 group of nations. This builds on previous U7+ Alliance commitments and work to set targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, identify best practices for less carbon-intensive globalization, and establish guidelines for the ethical use of AI and digital technology.

Many academics already collaborate to **conduct** and **publish research** on **global challenges**, but **universities historically haven't coordinated across national borders** to push a common agenda. They **haven't operated** as **global actors** in their **own right**, alongside formal G7 engagement groups such as the Business7, Science7 and Women7. Yet, unlike other sectors of society beholden to short-term election or sales cycles, **universities** are **uniquely poised** to **take** the "**long view**" on **policy issues** and advocate for intergenerational justice — **ensuring** that **solutions** to **global challenges** are **developed in a way** that **takes the interests** and **rights** of **future generations into account**.

Rebuilding American credibility

Robust global networks of **universities** with **U.S. institutions** at their heart can be **activated** to **rebuild American credibility** and **pursue coordinated global agendas** on **issues** such as **health, climate change, inequality,** and **digital innovation**. As a formal G7 engagement group, the U7+ Alliance can take coordinated action to bring scientific evidence to the fore of policy debates on these issues. Consisting of top-tier universities from across the globe, the alliance can also mount credible, international information campaigns to cut through the cacophony of fake news and encourage the millions of young people they collectively serve to elevate and amplify science.

Related Q&A: Why **universities** are in a **prime position** to **lead during** a **global crisis**

The U7+ is already building relationships with G7 leaders, including with the organisers of the 2021 G7 meeting in the UK. Alliance members from the US and dozens of other countries have also **already self-organized into working groups dedicated** to **taking concrete actions** that contribute to attaining the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals, which 193 countries have adopted.

New geopolitical order

If the past four years have proved anything, it's that, despite the attempts to kill it, multilateralism isn't dead. It just looks and feels more inclusive than it used to — and how could it not as a new generation of citizens and political leaders less beholden to the legacy of the Second World War takes charge? The new UN treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, championed by NGOs and acceded to primarily by countries in the Global South, despite strong lobbying against it by the US — is an example of the new diplomacy at work, within which American leadership is not accepted as a given.

The **new American leadership** will be as **one among a number of nations within** a **new geopolitical order** — one in which **networked power supplants super power** and **distributed leadership trumps hegemony**. A **punishing dose** of **humility** for **American diplomatic gaffes** and **betrayal of our allies** over the past four years may serve as the perfect antidote to a previous overabundance of US pride and exceptionalism.

Big global problems **require coordinated solutions**, but the Biden administration must employ new diplomatic resources to address them. **Higher education institutions** with the **scientific knowledge**, the **moral obligation** and, **now**, the **structure** for **coordination** can **play a pivotal role** in **developing** and **promoting those solutions**.

Crucially,

Sasnal-20 [Patrycja Sasnal, 2020, (Professor @ UCLA, Advisor @ UN Human Rights Council, Member @ European CFR, Fmr. Fulbright Scholar @ JHU SAIS), "Mistaking Panacea for Pathogens: The Case for Existential Multilateralism," Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Mistaking%20Panacea%20for%20Pathogens%2C%20The%20Case%20for%20Existential%20Multilateralism.pdf DOA: 3/4/2025] //vy

These **first-tier global challenges**—**climate change**, **terrorism, mass migration**, **infectious diseases**, **nuclear weapons, economic hardship,** and **cyberattacks**—are not only substantively but also **qualitatively different**. That **quality rests** neither on the number of victims nor on the kind of perpetrator (state, individual, or natural) hut instead **on** the **potential** to **threaten** the **existence of humanity**. **Three threats** have this **potential**: **climate change**, highly **infectious diseases**, and **nuclear weapons**. Of course, abstract **scenarios** are **easily imagined** in which **human existence is endangered** because of a massive **cyberattack**, **mass migration**, or **vicious artificial intelligence** that **leads** to a **conflict** in **which nuclear weapons** are **used** and **humanity kills itself**. Such potential futures, though, require a chain of events, whereas the three existential menaces are present and direct. Unlike other threats, they are all global and equal. No community is immune from them or their aftermath. **All three** can **reach** a **tipping point**, after which the **danger spirals out of control**.

This set of existential threats is not conventionally recognized. The term existential threat has proliferated in political debates to mean anything across a spectrum of minor and major challenges: the opiate crisis to the policies of the Donald J. Trump administration. In twentieth-century politics, the expression was barely used despite the omnipresent danger of the nuclear bomb. For the past two decades, it has been mostly associated with terrorism. Terrorism, however, is not a threat to human existence—not even to Middle Easterners, where 95 percent of deaths from terrorist attacks occur. Classing mass migration as an existential threat is even more preposterous given how little insecurity migrants have brought to already stable host countries. Similarly, little suggests that inequality or economic hardship are existential threats, though their complex forms and far-reaching consequences render them categories of their own.

The **distinction between existential** and **other international threats matters** for **multilateralism** and **global governance** in light of the functional difference in the roles of the state in fighting them. The **former can be taken on only by international efforts**. **Other concerns** can be **fought in other ways**: a **unilateral** national **decision** to act internally or on another state; or a national bottom-up societal effort to reduce terrorism, disrupt cyber capabilities, or influence local migration patterns. **Climate change**, **nuclear weapons**, and **infectious diseases**, however, **require global multilateral efforts** to **prevent** their **destructive potential** from **manifesting** itself.

REVIVING TRUST IN INFORMATION AND SCIENCE

National responses to the **pandemic** have often **been provisional**—decisions of utmost importance to civil liberties are **taken without proper argumentation** or **scientific judgment**, because **none is available**. Not in living memory have **governments** watched each other as closely as now on decisions such as when and how to lock down and open societies and economies—at least in Europe. **Since** the **pandemic**, **hunger** for **information** and **knowledge** seems to have **increased exponentially** in **international relations** and the **global public sphere** because **specific epidemiological expertise** was **needed**—such that was available to only a few. Perhaps for the first time on such a scale, information is seen as directly correlated with human well-being. What scientists know about the virus—the way it is transmitted, how it mutates, how strong the antibodies are—is no longer seen as abstractly affecting our individual lives but directly affecting them.

The **shortening** of this **perception chain** is an **opportunity** for the scientific and analytical community to **revive trust in experts** by learning from the experience of life scientists. Medicine advanced as a result of interdisciplinary and international teams, and innovative fast publishing procedures (short communications and case reports). Given the importance of information to physical, political, and social life, further plans are being enacted to make scientific publications available for free, something social scientists should ponder as well. The pandemic also exposes the weight of information in politics. First, information has been critical to assessing how effectively governments are responding to COVID-19. Without reliable statistical information from the health sector, it is impossible to analyze the scale of the pandemic, and therefore say anything about the measures authorities have taken. The Open Data Inventory 2018/19, which assesses the coverage and openness of official statistics, including health data, finds them open and covered only in Europe, North America, and a handful of other countries. Second, states have used the pandemic to spread propaganda and misinformation. China and Russia have a lot to answer for here by vilifying the European Union and the United States, as do Iran (which blamed the virus on the United States) and several Gulf states (which blamed Iran).

EXISTENTIAL MULTILATERALISM

The Indian novelist Arundhati Roy sees the pandemic as a portal between the old and new world. In international politics, this may translate into a passage from the post-1989 preoccupation with terrorism and economic growth based on consumption and exploitation to new existential politics. **Little** can be **said about** the **future** with **certainty except** that it will **face global existential threats**: **climate change, infectious diseases, nuclear war**. Because of the **nature of these menaces**, they **cannot be mitigated** save by **multinational**, **informed**, and **expert governance**.

REBUTTAWL

2NC---AT: OFF

THEY NEVER GIVE U AN EXAMPLE FORCE THEM TO NAME ONE
They say that we dont link in last speech

Reject the team – regardless of Xi's foreign policy, Westwood KX's framing and fear of China's rise relies on racist tropes that greenlight anti-Asian aggression. Prefer - Beckley '25 literally says that China would invade Taiwan with no warrant as to why – even if tensions exist with the U.S, no internal link why they invade taiwan – dont let

them make new warrants because it shouldve been in the card for them to prove theyre not securitizing

Siu 20 [Lok Siu, Associate Professor in Asian Diaspora Studies, PhD student @ the University of California, Berkeley in the Department of Ethnic Studies, 10-xx-2023, "Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare", https://muse.jhu.edu/article/772573/pdf] arjun

The term **yellow peril emerged** in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan's arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer's series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of "yellow peril" along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the **iconic supervillain archetype** of the **Asian "evil criminal genius**," and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu's characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the **notion** of the **non-differentiable "yellow" masses continues** to **function** as a **homogenizing** and **dehumanizing device** of **Asian racialization**, which **makes possible** the **transference** of **Sinophobia** to **Asian xenophobia**.

In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, "**yellow peril**" is more a projection of **Western fear** than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a **repository** of **racial affect** that can **animate** a **myriad** of **representational figures**, **images**, and **discourses**, depending on context. Indeed, the images and **discourses** of **yellow peril** have **surfaced** multiple times throughout the twentieth century, **capturing** a **multitude** of **ever-shifting perceived threats** that **range** from the **danger** of **military intrusion** (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), **Asian moral** and **cultural depravity** (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to **biological inferiority** (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, "the incipient 'yellow peril' refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and **Chinese** numerical mass **confronts Western civilization** with a **potentially unbeatable force.**"11 **Arguably**, the **yellow peril** of **today represents heightened Western anxieties** around **China's combined forces** of **population size**, **global economic growth**, and **rapid technological-scientific innovation**—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The **current context**, we suggest, is **best understood through** the lens of **techno-Orientalism**.

When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins's analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan's ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan's technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its "others." They **claimed** that the **shifting balance** in **global power**—the **West's loss** of **technological preeminence**—has **induced** an **identity crisis** in the West. In **response**, **techno-Orientalism**, in which "[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism," is **produced** in **large part** to **discipline** Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The **U**nited **S**tates, **for instance**, **externalized** its **anxiety** into **xenophobic projections** of Japan as a "culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like" **in which** its **people** are "**sub-human**" and "**unfeeling aliens.**"13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the "Japan Panic," was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian.

Extending Edward Said's concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the **West no longer** has **control over** the **terms** that **define** the East—the "**Orient**"—as **weak**, **inferior**, and **subordinate** to the **West**. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. **Techno-Orientalism**, then, is the **expressive vehicle** (cultural productions and visual representations) **by which** Western and Eastern **nations articulate** their **fears**,

desires, and **anxieties** that are **produced** in their **competitive struggle** to **gain technological hegemony** through economic trade and scientific innovation.15

Analogous to Japan's position in the late 1980s, **China currently figures** into the **techno-Orientalist imaginary** as a **powerful competitor** in **mass production**, a **global financial giant**, and an **aggressive investor** in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of **China provokes American fear** of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this **duality**—the **domination** of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global **economy**—that **undergirds American anxieties** of a **sinicized future**.16

Further **amplifying** these **anxieties** around Chinese techno-economic domination is our **imagination** of **China**/the Chinese as the **ultimate yellow peril**, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic **expansion** and technological advancements may **actually pose** a **real challenge** to **U.S. global hegemony**. We turn now to examine how the ideology of **yellow peril** is **manifesting** in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the **racial trope** of "**Chinese** as **contagion**" and its connection to **anti-Asian aggression**.

PERFCON IVI

1. THEY KNEW SECURITIZING WAS BAD so it makes them infinitely worse morally, cross apply their drop the debater on rhetoric stuff

Independently a reason to vote us for all the offense on sec and dont let them rebut it bc they support it last speech so u should coop any new offense they read in summary bc it flows our way – they ran the ivi too

C1:

1.Ai can be taught in schools without using ai, teachers can teach ai literacy

2.Ai has been implemented in schools since 2020 we should have seen their impacts trigger

3.Bozkurt 24 just says that there is a model to help with literacy not that teachers or students even use the model

4.NU - A.I. literacy is doomed

Arianna **Prothero** [Arianna Prothero is a Texas-based reporter for Education Week covering technology and student health and well-being. She has also extensively reported on school choice policy for the paper. Previously, she was a reporter and anchor at WLRN, the NPR-affiliate station in Miami. She got her start in journalism at WFIU, the public radio station in Bloomington, Ind. She has a degree in political science from Indiana University.], 2-13-20**25,** "Teens Need More AI Literacy as Fake Content Becomes Harder to Detect," https://www.edweek.org/technology/teens-need-more-ai-literacy-as-fake-content-becomes-harder-to-detect/2025/02, accessed 3-7-2025, //ZM

Robbie Torney, the senior director for AI programs at Common Sense Media, a group that researches and advocates for healthy tech and media use among youth, makes the case for why schools should play a bigger role in helping students understand AI's strengths and weaknesses and how to use it responsibly. The Common Sense Media report "underscores the need for more AI literacy," said Torney, a former teacher and principal. "If only about 4 in 10 teens can determine that they have been exposed to inaccurate content, that number feels a lot lower than it should be in terms of issues we know about with [generative] AI." In an interview with Education Week, Torney talked about the lessons learned from the Common Sense Media findings and what they mean for how schools should help students navigate a world that is increasingly driven by AI technologies. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. The number of kids who reported seeing images that were misleading actually seemed pretty low to us. As somebody who has used a gen AI chatbot for work or for other purposes almost every day for a while now, every single time I use a chatbot, there's something in there that's slightly inaccurate or that's wrong. You have to have the ability to discern and detect that.

5.Bozkurt '24 is talking about a proposed framework to implement ai literacy
-there are no classes for ai literacy→ this is an on balance topic

8.We didnt see GPW in any past econ declines - literally happened during covid

9.No brightline to how many jobs need to be lost to see econ decline happen

10. No brightline to when states will go to war

C2:

1. **here is no terminalized impact on civics, they give no numerics or warranting on how civics lead to their impacts**
2. **They give you no uq that civic is DOWN RN!!! THIS SHOULD BE IN CASE**
3. **SOOOOOO nuq, mock trial, model un, a litany of other activities that people involve themselves in and learn from**
4. **Their own impact card contradicts them, civic engagement cant solve extinction level threats**

Dan **Jasper 22**, 2/05/2022, founder and primary author of Street Civics. He has a masters in public policy, Why Civic Engagement Will Determine the Fate of the World, Street Civics, https://streetcivics.com/why-civic-engagement-will-determine-the-fate-of-the-world/] dollinger

Some commentators have pointed out that above-ground electrical grids are as vulnerable to solar storms today as they were in 1859. While moving to underground infrastructures could help protect against solar storms, the issue is unlikely to be a priority in current political environments. Importance of Civic Engagement The examples above may seem like overwhelming scenarios for civic engagement and, indeed, these examples are the most extreme areas of public concern. In some circumstances, it may not necessarily be clear what civic engagement could achieve to help determine the fate of the world. Events such as asteroids and supervolcanoes seem out of the average citizen's scope of attention and it sounds more like a matter of good government contingency planning. These aren't the types of issues that can get massive grassroots support after all.

C3:

BRONW 24

THIS IS HYPOTHETICAL IT SAYS IT COULD HELP RESEARCH LOOK AT BROWN BUT INSOFAR AS IT IS HYPO AND GAI EXIST FOR 3-5 YEARS THEY HAVE NO VERIFIABILITY

. No internal --- their CRU evidence is from 2012 and says that universities were already solving x risks --- AI didn't exist in 2012.

3. Universities and their research are cooked – newest ev. Universities perceive the cuts as harmful which means they pause hiring and cut research initiatives to brace for impact.

Saul '3/6 [Stephanie Saul; education reporter at The New York Times

"As Trump Goes After Universities, Students Are Now on the Chopping Block"; The New York Times; 3-6-2025; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/politics/trump-university-funding-grad-student-cuts.html accessed 3-6-2025 via archive.ph] kai

In the early weeks of the Trump administration's push to slash funding that colleges and universities rely on, grants and contracts had been cut and, in a few cases, researchers had been laid off.

In recent days, the fiscal pain has come to students.

At the University of Pennsylvania, administrators have asked departments in the School of Arts & Sciences, the university's largest school, to cut incoming Ph.D. students. In some cases, that meant reneging on informal offers, according to Wendy Roth, a professor of sociology.

Her department had to decide which of the students would be "unaccepted." Dr. Roth, chair of graduate education, was chosen to explain those decisions to them.

"Two of them, I would say, were extremely upset. One person was in tears," she said. "It's just the most terrible thing to get that kind of news when your plans are made."

Since taking office, the Trump administration has issued orders that threaten to broadly undercut the financial foundation of university based research, including deep reductions in overhead cost reimbursements through the National Institutes of Health. Court challenges have paused some of the cuts, but universities are bracing for uncertainty. The University of Pennsylvania could face a $250 million hit in N.I.H. funding alone.

Members of the administration have cast the cuts as a way to reduce wasteful government spending, sometimes in political terms. Last month, Katie Miller, who is working with Elon Musk's team to trim federal spending, said the cuts would end "liberal D.E.I. deans' slush fund."

In some cases, schools are pre-emptively cutting their expenses as a precautionary measure.

North Carolina State University announced on Feb. 14 that it was freezing most hiring. Stanford University announced on Feb. 26 that it was freezing staff hiring, citing "very significant risks" to the community. At the University of Louisville in Kentucky, President Kim Schatzel announced an "immediate pause" on faculty and staff hiring until July. She cited the potential loss of $20 to $23 million in N.I.H. research funding. Dozens of other schools have announced hiring freezes or "chills."

Many of the cuts are now hitting graduate education, too, which is highly dependent on research grants, leaving students who had dreams of pursuing Ph.D.s with nowhere to go.

A graduate program in biological sciences at the University of California, San Diego, usually enrolls 25 new graduate students a year. This year, the number will be 17.

The reduction may seem small, but Kimberly Cooper, a biology professor, said the Trump cuts would ricochet through the university.

"I hate to sound fatalistic," said Dr. Cooper, who specializes in the study of limb development. "But at this point I think they're trying to break the academic enterprise. And cutting academic science has impacts on the educational mission of the entire university."

At Penn, cuts to graduate programs were made across the board in the school's 32 programs, professors said. The history department, for example, was asked to offer Ph.D. slots to only seven students, not the usual 17. In English, the normal cohort of 9 to 12 incoming students will be reduced to a maximum of six.

A letter signed by professors in 22 departments at Penn warned that the school's decision would cause reputational damage.

Asked to comment, the university pointed to a statement signed by J. Larry Jameson, Penn's interim president, posted on the school's website, which noted that the cuts "represent an existential threat across our university and American higher education."

Dr. Jameson said the school was pursuing "cost containment measures and new sources of revenue." He added: "We will remain judicious, measured, deliberate and focused on sustaining our mission when determining any action."

As the Trump administration vows to target schools over antisemitism and diversity initiatives, other programs that directly touch undergraduates, such as scholarships, could be affected, too, if the administration clears legal hurdles.

David Kazanjian, graduate chair of comparative literature at Penn, said the cuts to graduate students would reduce opportunities for undergraduates. With fewer graduate student teachers, class sizes may increase, for example.

The cost-cutting measures are taking effect across a variety of schools, from the Ivy League and large public research universities to smaller public schools. The administration's decision to cap overhead reimbursements on National Institutes of Health grants to 15 percent could cut millions that schools have come to rely on to cover facilities and staff. The overhead rates normally vary depending on the grant recipients, but in some cases provide up to 60 percent of the grant in additional reimbursements.

Columbia University, which receives about $1.3 billion a year in N.I.H. funding, could lose up to $200 million a year from the formula change, according to one analysis by a group of university faculty and staff members and alumni called the Stand Columbia Society.

A graduate-student union at Columbia reported in a news release last month that university officials had proposed even more draconian cuts than Penn: eliminating up to 65 percent of incoming Ph.D. students in the School of Arts & Sciences. Following criticism, the cuts at Columbia were ultimately scaled back, and no firm numbers have been released.

The graduate workers at Columbia argued that there was no need for funding cuts, citing the university's endowment, which grew to $14.9 billion at the close of 2024 from $13.6 billion in 2023. Yale, for example, one of the largest recipients of N.I.H. dollars, has announced that it would provide temporary funding from its own coffers for scholars.

But this week, the Education Department said it would review all of Columbia's federal contracts and grants, accusing the school of not doing enough to curb antisemitism on campus. The administration identified $51.4 million in contracts between Columbia and the federal government that could be subject to stop-work orders.

5. GenAI in the U.S. doesn't solve global impacts. 1AC Cernev inserted

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Generally it is the Outcome/Foundational and Human input SDGs that are most directly related. **For example as the movement of refugees increases pandemic risk, poverty levels in low and middle income countries increase reducing the health of the population, and so restricting access to education which further enhances poverty and birth rates rise as family sizes increases generating unsustainable population growth which furthers the migration of refugees** (Figure 5). Figure 3 shows that leverage points to reduce refugees lies in SDG 16 (Peace Justice and Strong Institutions), **reducing malnutrition through alleviating** SDG 2 **(Zero Hunger) and taking SDG 13 (Climate Action) to avoid the mass movement of people to avoid the impacts of global warming.**

C4:

Literally no uniqueness bc it says officers can do it anyway so not unique benefit of ai

Turn it, Goudarzi 23—using AI in war games is extrapolates biases, leads to overconfidence, and endorses paranoia–leads to escalation and kills diplomacy

Sara Goudarzi, 12-4-2023, "Wargames and AI: A dangerous mix that needs ethical oversight", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2023/12/wargames-and-ai-a-dangerous-mix-that-needs-ethical-oversight/

Compromising ethical principles. Wargames can carry risks that, without ethical guardrails, could damage players and society. In realistic games, participants can experience high stress levels, sometimes leading to aggressive behavior similar to the dynamics seen in competitive sports. Also, if player identities can be linked to their game actions and discussions, this could damage people's professional reputations and even jeopardize their safety. Ethical games—like proper research studies—avoid such pitfalls through careful protocols, such as informed consent and data anonymization. More broadly, strategic wargames can have both indirect and direct influences on real-world decisions. Players who are or will become real-world decision-makers could be primed by their gaming experiences, possibly affecting future decisions in subtle ways. This is like having a medical trial participant, who had an adverse reaction to a drug, decide on the drug's approval. To illustrate potential issues, consider a recent university-based wargame that involved NATO staff and uniformed military exploring a Russian invasion of Finland, as reported in The Guardian. If this game were sponsored by an entity like NATO for strategic insights, its outcomes could guide immediate policy or military choices. For instance, **if the Russian leadership is unintentionally portrayed as overly aggressive due to hidden biases in the game design or scenario, this could lead to misallocation of defense resources or inadvertent conflict escalation.** Of course, such consequential decisions are unlikely to be made based on the results of a one-off game, but many games with large numbers of players can exacerbate risks. Scale matters. **Now consider a digital AI-powered version of an analytical game deployed at a massive scale. AI risks amplifying existing biases by producing volumes of skewed data that could falsely validate a hypothesis. AI could also craft remarkably persuasive but deceptive narratives that further blur the line between simulation and reality.** Ironically, **in the eyes of decision-makers, these data-driven insights could add undue credibility to** otherwise **questionable results.** If wargaming continues to be pivotal in defense decisions, as stated by former UK Defence Secretary Wallace, **leaders might view wars as more necessary and winnable than they are in reality. Biased or unexplainable AI-powered games can exaggerate chances of victory or misrepresent adversaries' intent, priming decision-makers to believe war is essential when diplomatic options remain.** This could compromise the ethical principles of just war theory, such as just cause and last resort.

1. T - AI integration into war games causes miscalc.

Ivanka **Barzashka**, 12-4-20**23**, "Wargames and AI: A dangerous mix that needs ethical oversight", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2023/12/wargames-and-ai-a-dangerous-mix-that-needs-ethical-oversight/ [Barzashka founded and directed the first research organization at a civilian university dedicated to establishing wargaming as an academic discipline. After completing her PhD on missile defense strategy at King's College London, she has led projects for the Secretary of State's Office for Net Assessment and Challenge in the UK Ministry of Defence, advised the Cabinet Office, and provided testimony to UK Parliament. Thanks to her experience at Stanford University and Silicon Valley, she co-founded a multi-national defense technology startup, where she currently serves as CEO and board chair.] DOA: 2/27/2025

Missing from the summit's agenda was AI's use by state actors for national security applications, which could soon transform geopolitics and warfare. Killer robots aren't necessarily the biggest risk. Instead, AI systems could sift through data to identify competitive advantages, generate new adversary strategies, and evaluate the conditions under which wars can be won or lost. This can be achieved via the fusion of AI with wargames—defined by NATO as "representations of conflict or competition in a safe-to-fail environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions." A centuries-old art, wargaming is only now emerging as a science and an academic discipline. **AI's integration into wargames can subtly influence leadership decisions on war and peace—and possibly lead to existential risks.** The current landscape of human-centric wargaming, combined with AI algorithms, faces a notable "black box" challenge, where the reasoning behind certain outcomes remains unclear. This obscurity, alongside potential biases in AI training data and wargame design, highlights the urgent need for ethical governance and accountability in this evolving domain. Exploring these issues can shed light on the imperative for responsible oversight in the merging of AI with wargaming, a fusion that could decide future conflicts. Influence without oversight. Wargaming has exploded in popularity: NATO member states, think tanks, and universities are using these tools to examine a range of security issues—from nuclear crises to great power competition. Some wargames seek to educate participants, while others collect data for analysis to inform scholarly theory or government policy. The revival began in 2015 when the Pentagon called for more wargaming to out-compete major rivals like Russia and China. Now, NATO is developing an "audacious" wargaming capability—a culture shift that encourages critical thinking, experimentation, and cross-pollination of ideas in military strategy and planning to gain strategic advantage. Leading institutions like King's College London and Stanford University have also established new research centers in this field. **As a result of the revival, wargames have a growing influence on Western leaders. As the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace highlighted in July 2023, "Wargame outputs have been central to [the Ministry of Defence's] decision-making.**" For example, the Secretary of State's Office of Net Assessment and Challenge has been conducting extensive wargaming, informed by defense intelligence and independent expertise, to ensure current and emerging strategies are thoroughly tested before they are implemented. In the United States, wargaming is even more prevalent, as the Pentagon habitually uses such simulations to "prepare for actual warfare." For instance, Hedgemony, developed by the RAND Corporation, was a strategic wargame that played a key role in shaping the Pentagon's 2018 National Defense Strategy. The game simulated the trade-offs in resource and force management guiding US defense professionals in aligning military capabilities with evolving national strategies and objectives in a dynamic global security environment. RAND, a federally funded research and development center, has been working on wargaming since the late 1940s. Yet, oversight hasn't kept pace. In a 2023 King's College London survey I led, we polled more than 140 wargame designers from 19 countries. The results were concerning: 80 percent of the analytical wargames skipped ethics reviews, ignoring the standard process for research studies that involve human participants. This trend is also reflected in data from the UK Ministry of Defence: According to information obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request, only one study was submitted for research ethics committee review between 2018 and 2023. Why has wargaming lacked ethics oversight? First, influential guidance, like NATO's wargaming handbook released this year, fail to outline ethics requirements, even though these games inform real-world decisions. Government sponsors also seldom mandate formal compliance with research ethics standards. Moreover, securing ethical approval can be arduous and time-consuming, conflicting with pressing policy timetables. The next frontier: Fusing AI and wargaming. Ethical challenges multiply as wargaming embraces AI. Companies and government agencies like the United States' Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the United Kingdom's Defence Science and Technology Laboratory are spearheading experimental projects on AI-wargaming integration. Notably, the RAND Corporation has toyed with such fusion since the 1980s. The promises are compelling. A 2023 study from the Alan Turing Institute, United Kingdom's top AI hub, found this merger could increase speed and efficiency and improve analysis. AI could rapidly uncover insights from vast data. Players could experience more immersive games with AI-generated scenarios and adversarial strategies. The expected result? A transformative leap in foresight and strategic advantage over competitors. **However, both wargames and AI models share two challenges—lack of explainability** (difficulties in comprehending how knowledge is produced) and bias, which raise ethical concerns. Wargames are "not reproducible," according to NATO and UK's Ministry of Defence wargaming guidance. **When combined with black-box deep learning models—systems where the decision-making process is opaque and not readily interpretable—trust in outcomes**

diminishes further. Biases in both can arise from limited data or flawed design, potentially leading to erroneous conclusions. Additionally, wargame methods and insights are often classified. Turbocharging them with AI can propagate errors with significant real-world consequences free from public scrutiny. Compromising ethical principles. Wargames can carry risks that, without ethical guardrails, could damage players and society. In realistic games, participants can experience high stress levels, sometimes leading to aggressive behavior similar to the dynamics seen in competitive sports. Also, if player identities can be linked to their game actions and discussions, this could damage people's professional reputations and even jeopardize their safety. Ethical games—like proper research studies—avoid such pitfalls through careful protocols, such as informed consent and data anonymization.