We negate, The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in domestic nuclear energy.

C1) RWT

RWT will be reinvigorated under Trump

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After more than two decades of prioritizing efforts to combat militant Islamist groups, U.S. counterterrorism programs have slowly shifted their focus in recent years to a domestic threat the FBI has said is deadlier and more active: violent far-right movements. But that pivot is likely to halt when President-elect Donald Trump takes office next month, according to analysts and former national security officials. **Based on campaign promises and Trump's first-term record, analysts foresee a rollback of initiatives aimed at curbing violent extremism, especially among right-wing movements. Among the predictions: a slashing of domestic terrorism resources, White House pressure to investigate what Trump terms "the radical left" and cuts to programs aimed at the prevention of radicalization. Such moves would reverse steps taken by the Biden administration, which issued the nation's first strategy on countering domestic terrorism in 2021, a document that pledged a whole-of-society campaign to fight white supremacist and anti-government violence that had become "the most urgent terrorism threat the United States faces today." The threat picture has somewhat shifted since 2021, with a drop in far-right attacks and an uptick in foreign-inspired plots. Analysts say the lull among the former is due in part to Justice Department prosecutions of violent extremist groups including the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers and neo-Nazi factions. But researchers say the same domestic movements that mobilized under the first Trump administration are poised to make a comeback if given a permissive climate.** An analysis last month by Colin Clarke of the Soufan Center, a security-focused think tank, said "**a second Trump term could reduce, if not altogether eliminate, US government funding available for domestic terrorism or at least right-wing extremism." Trump and several of his picks for senior posts have espoused ideologies the Biden counter-extremism project was designed to combat, including white supremacist "replacement" theory, xenophobia, antisemitism and Islamophobia. The president-elect's promise to pardon some rioters who took part in the storming of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, is another setback to what the Biden administration had touted as progress on the domestic terrorism front**. Taylor Rogers, a spokesperson for the Trump-Vance transition team, did not address specific questions about the next administration's priorities in combating domestic terrorism. "President Trump will deliver on his promise to protect our country from terrorist threats and Make America, and the world, Safe Again!" Rogers said in a statement. Trump surrogates have pushed back on claims that racial animus and anti-immigrant extremism are core to the MAGA movement, noting that a surge in support from voters of color helped Trump win the 2024 election. The White House sets policy priorities that trickle down to the funding and investigative assets of federal agencies charged with monitoring a wide range of threats to the United States. Analysts and former officials say their main concern is a **replay of what they saw in the first Trump presidency — attempts to wield counterterrorism powers as a political cudgel and going after Islamist militants and far-left groups while playing down the far-right threat. Such a turn, extremism researchers say, could embolden movements that assert themselves as a shadow MAGA army. Already, anti-immigrant groups have expressed an eagerness to assist with Trump's promised mass-deportation plan, an offer that raises the specter of militia vigilantism and increased anti-Latino hostility. "This is an exciting prospect for most of them," said Amy Cooter, a militia specialist at the Middlebury Institute's Center on Terrorism, Extremism and Counterterrorism. "Border militias have already been engaged with this and see this as sort of a green light to potentially up their aggressive actions."** Lessons from last time For clues on how Trump might approach violent extremism this time around, analysts **recall the test that came early in his first presidency after a deadly white**

supremacist rally in Charlottesville. Analysts say Trump's muted response to the 2017 hate march indicated a willful blindness to the momentum of the far right. Months earlier, federal authorities issued an intelligence bulletin that said white supremacists were responsible for 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 2000 to 2016, "more than any other domestic movement." But the Trump White House was loath to address the topic and repeatedly intervened to remove or weaken language in reports related to white supremacist threats, according to two former counterterrorism officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss national security matters. Similar accounts emerged in a whistleblower complaint by a then-official who said superiors told him to modify intelligence reports, including about white supremacists, to bring them in line with Trump's public statements. A Homeland Security spokesman denied the claims. Critics point to a 2018 White House strategy report as an object lesson in the Trump approach to counterterrorism. The 25-page document mentions Islamist militants nearly two dozen times, with descriptions such as "vile," "hateful" and "totalitarian." Domestic terrorism gets a brief mention only at the end: "Lastly," the section begins, followed by a couple of paragraphs that lumped together "racially motivated extremism, animal rights extremism, environmental extremism, sovereign citizen extremism, and militia extremism." Days after the White House released the report in October 2018, a gunman killed 11 people at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the deadliest anti-Jewish attack in U.S. history. The following spring brought a second fatal shooting at a synagogue — in Poway, California, by an assailant who previously tried to burn down a mosque. A few months after that came a racist rampage at a Walmart in El Paso and another bloody milestone: the deadliest assault on Latinos in U.S. history. The El Paso attack prompted a rejection of white supremacist violence from Trump, who previously had said he didn't think it was a growing threat. "In one voice, our nation must condemn racism, bigotry and white supremacy," Trump said. "These sinister ideologies must be defeated." That more direct approach was echoed in a 2019 counterterrorism strategy that spelled out the threat of white supremacist movements and pledged aggressive pushback — a departure from the 2018 document. Still, behind the scenes, according to former officials and researchers who worked closely with the administration, there was little political will to grapple with the far-right threat. Federal authorities began using terms such as "RMVE," for "racially motivated violent extremism," which was criticized by activists and researchers as a euphemism for deadly white supremacists. The term was also vague enough that it allowed officials to introduce a subcategory on "black identity violent extremism," drawing outrage from civil rights groups who called it an attempt to equate Black Lives Matter protesters with far-right militants. Alex DiBranco, executive director of the Institute for Research on Male Supremacism, said some anti-fascist and gender-focused nonprofits are concerned again about the Trump administration seeking to discredit or even prosecute them by classifying them as far-left domestic terrorist groups. "When you think about Trump and the way he talks about anti-fascist organizations, it's very easy to think about him delineating lots of organizations as terrorist-supporting," DiBranco said. During Trump's first term, former officials said, frustrated staffers tried to push for more balanced positions but were steamrolled by the hard-line senior Trump aide Stephen Miller, who is returning to the administration with similar powers. Another polarizing returnee is Trump's pick to oversee counterterrorism policy at the National Security Council, Sebastian Gorka, whose open hostility toward Islam and prickly persona contributed to his exit after only a few months in the first Trump administration. For all the dysfunction of the first Trump term, a former official said, counterterrorism leaders aggressively pushed the MAGA agenda while remaining cognizant of legal pitfalls and making sure policies could withstand challenges. "They had an appreciation for the importance of doing it right. 'Move faster, but do it right,'" the former official recalled. Whether that mantra is carried into a second term is an open question. Some are bracing for a constitutional crisis over policies such as mass deportation that are sure to bring legal battles. "You don't have another election and you own both chambers of Congress, so what if you just ignored court enjoinment?" the former official said. "What tools do we have to actually enforce court orders? They're all in the executive branch." A shifting threat picture Extremism researchers say they expect one immediate effect of Trump's return to be a repeal of the culture shift Biden tried to bring about with his 2021 domestic terrorism strategy, which pledged more training and personnel to monitor violent far-right networks. Researchers say Biden ultimately fell short on promises outlined in the strategy but contributed to what analysts have described as an overdue rethinking of policies that hadn't evolved to meet the latest threats. In recent years, Pentagon and homeland security officials have launched efforts to root out extremism within their ranks. Academic researchers and community groups were awarded federal grants to study and prevent radicalization. That work, however, is not in line with the MAGA agenda. Trump-aligned Republicans have portrayed the stepped-up fight against domestic terrorism as a thought-police exercise that could infringe on First Amendment rights.

Affirming would create two risks

First, increasing enriched uranium

Pashby 25 (Tom Pashby: contributor for the New Civil Engineer. 1/10/25, "US Government assessing risk of SMRs being used to make dirty bombs", New Civil Engineer, https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/us-government-assessing-risk-of-smrs-being-used-to-make-dirty-bombs-10-01-2025/ // DOA: 3/13/25)JDE

The risk of small modular reactors (SMRs) being used to provide access to materials for dirty bombs (radioactive explosive devices) is being reviewed by the US Government. The review follows the publication of a paper published in the Science journal looking at the increase in **demand for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) which can be used to fuel advanced modular reactors** (AMRs) **and SMRs.** The paper, titled The weapons potential of high-assay low-enriched uranium posited that "Recent promotion of new reactor technologies appears to disregard decades-old concerns about nuclear proliferation". Scott Kemp , Edwin S. Lyman, Mark R. Deinert, Richard L. Garwin, and Frank N. von Hippel authored the paper, which said: "Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major thrust of international policymaking for more than 70 years. "Now, **an explosion of interest in a nuclear reactor fue**l called high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), **spurred by billions of dollars in US Government funding, threatens to undermine that system of control**. "HALEU contains between 10 and 20% of the isotope uranium-235. At 20% 235U and above, the isotopic mixture is called highly enriched uranium (HEU) and **is internationally recognised as being directly usable in nuclear weapons.** "However, the practical limit for weapons lies below the 20% HALEU-HEU threshold. "**Governments** and others promoting the use of HALEU **have not carefully considered the potential proliferation and terrorism risks** that the wide adoption of this fuel creates." The "terrorism risks" the paper refers to **can be understood to mean the creation of dirty bombs, which are relatively low-tech devices. Conventional explosives are used, rather than fission or fusion reactions, to spread radioactive material.** US Government responds to paper announcing review U.S. Department of Energy under secretary for nuclear security and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administrator Jill Hruby wrote a letter published on 2 January in the peer review 'eLetters' section of the academic paper published on 6 June 2024. Hruby said the paper in Science, and a subsequent debate between the authors the wider nuclear community, promoted the NNSA to respond. "Given concerns about climate change coupled with increased energy demand, nuclear energy is poised for growth," she said. "Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) using HALEU fuel are under active development "NNSA recognises that reactor type, fuel enrichment level, fuel quantity, and fuel form are important factors in evaluating proliferation risks and believes that risk-informed and adaptive approaches to the proliferation challenges inherent in nuclear energy are warranted." She continued: "NNSA has a program to support U.S. A/SMR developers on security- and safeguards-by-design and promotes best practices for nuclear energy deployment by partnering with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "With its national laboratories, NNSA has regularly collected data and evaluated HALEU risks, and is currently finalising plans to commission a National Academies report. Although these reports are largely classified, the information is used to inform programs, develop actions, and make recommendations to stakeholders. "It is important to address proliferation concerns about HALEU and important to responsibly develop A/SMRs. NNSA commits to working with academia, industry, the public, and IAEA to do just that." On 20 January 2025, President Trump will be sworn in for a second term, at which point he will be free to replace public servants with his preferred appointees at organisations including the NNSA. HALEU not being considered in the UK's SMR competition The main focus of SMR developers in the UK is the UK Government's Great British Nuclear (GBN) SMR competition. The competition winner or winners will have the opportunity to build a fleet of SMRs with government support on siting and

funding. A GBN source confirmed to NCE that none of the developers in its SMR competition – name the developers – were proposing to use HALEU. NCE has previously explored the topic of whether waste from SMRs could be used to make nuclear warheads after the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) did not rule out whether it was investigating this possibility. HALEU still popular in wider SMR research Work on SMRs outside of the GBN competition continues to heat up. Last Energy UK and newcleo are both active in the UK and are pushing for micro modular reactors and advanced modular reactors respectively. King's College London research fellow Ross Peel told NCE that **HALEU continues to be popular with SMR developers and the risks faced outside of the USA are similar.** Peel has recently authored papers with King's on Insider Threat Security Considerations for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors and Nuclear Industry Views on the Security of Small Modular Reactors: Results of a pilot survey, both published in October 2024. Peel said he has been "very pro-nuclear" for years but **is working to help the industry to address his security concerns around SMRs, which he believes is "not where it should be".** Peel said: "The article in Science caused a major argument when it came out and since, and is still doing so as more people become aware of it. The American Nuclear Society, for instance, prepared a letter to Science denouncing the article and tearing down the methods used by the authors, who are all highly respected non-proliferation scholars. "**HALEU is central to the plans of many developers of novel nuclear technology because of the various benefits it offers. The potential security and proliferation risks are real**, however, and proper consideration needs to be given to these. "**The technical risks of HALEU in the UK and US are not different**, although we do have a different background level of security risk than they do, which means that those technical risks might be experienced and managed in a different way. "Both countries have well-developed nuclear security infrastructure, however, which will help to manage these risks. **A lot of concern from both countries will likely be around the export of HALEU fuel to reactors abroad, in foreign countries with less mature nuclear security and non-proliferation systems**. "**Normalising the possession and use of uranium of up to 20% U-235 means that many states who might concern the US** and/or the UK **will be able to maintain a justifiable position that is that much closer to possessing nuclear weapons, whilst non-state actors** (terrorists, criminals, and even simple disgruntled employees at nuclear sites and more) **will potentially see their way to accessing a type of nuclear material that they could previously almost never imagine getting hold of.** "Developers should be taking seriously the increased security and proliferation risks associated with HALEU use. I would recommend this be considered from the earliest stages of reactor and fuel design – the decision to use HALEU must be based on a full consideration of all factors, including security risk and proliferation risk. "Technology designers who think about these issues throughout their design process, in an integrated way alongside safety, economics, operability and all the rest, will have the greatest chance of producing well-conceived designs that address risks effectively and produce cost-effective nuclear energy." Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is touted by some developers like newcleo as a way of reducing the burden on society of nuclear waste by using it to fuel its own AMR design. newcleo said: "Through an innovative combination of existing and proven technologies, and by reviving a nuclear industry model based on the manufacture and multi-recycling of Mixed Oxide (Mox) fuel, newcleo aims to close the nuclear fuel cycle while safely producing clean, affordable, and practically inexhaustible energy required for low carbon economies." Peel continued: "MOX is different to HALEU. MOX is about using a mixture of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide to make the fuel (usually – other oxides can creep in too). Almost all nuclear fuel today is uranium oxide. "HALEU is to do specifically with the uranium within the uranium oxide, specifically, how much of it is uranium-235 vs uranium-238. Most reactors today operate with 2-5% uranium-235 within the overall uranium. HALEU is about moving that into a range of up to 19.999% - going to 20% would make it HEU (highly enriched uranium, which is considered to be unacceptable due to weapons-use risks). "So in theory, you could put HALEU into MOX, although no-one has proposed this as the whole point of putting plutonium in there is to replace the need for uranium-235. If you have both plutonium and HALEU in the same fuel you're effectively doing two complicated and costly processes a bit, rather than focussing on doing one process more." Anti-proliferation body says lots of **SMRs increases weapons risk** The Nuclear Information Service (NIS) describes itself as "an independent, not-for-profit research organisation" which investigates the UK's nuclear weapons programme. NIS director David Cullen said: "**This move by the NNSA is a tacit acknowledgement that warnings being raised about the proliferation risks of HALEU are not unfounded**. "I hope that some of the results of their study will be made public so that there is a greater understanding of the dangers, which are just as relevant to the UK as to the US. "We don't know very much about what would be done in the UK to mitigate the risk, as none of the SMR reactor designs have progressed very far in getting regulatory approval. "Only the Rolls-Royce SMR has passed the second stage of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process, which means that the Office for Nuclear Regulation have not identified any foundational problems with that design." GDA allows regulators to assess the safety, security, safeguards and environmental aspects of new reactor designs before site-specific proposals are brought forward. The GDA process assesses new nuclear power plant designs for deployment in the UK, demonstrating they can be built, operated and decommissioned in accordance with the highest standards of safety, security, safeguards and environmental protection. Cullen continued: "The second stage does assess security and safeguards (i.e. measures to prevent clandestine diversion of nuclear material), but only to identify fundamental flaws. "The third stage of the process is much more detailed. I hope the ONR will have an opportunity to draw upon the work the NNSA is undertaking. "Unfortunately, **the industry's vision for SMRs, where a**

much larger number of smaller reactors are deployed, substantially complicates both counter-proliferation monitoring and ensuring the security of nuclear material. "**Design measures** might be able to counter some of the more opportunistic security threats against an individual site, but they **cannot meaningfully guard against the diversion of nuclear material by SMR operators.** "Fundamentally, **a greater number of sites and more material creates more opportunities for bad actors. There is no way to design around this basic fact**."

This is the missing piece for extremists

NAE 19 (The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) is an American nonprofit, non-governmental organization. It is part of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), along with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National Academy of Medicine (NAM), September 16, 2019, National Academy of Engineering , "Prevent Nuclear Terror",https://www.engineeringchallenges.org/challenges/nuclear.aspx, DOA 3/10/25) KC

Long before 2001, defenders of national security worried about the possible immediate death of 300,000 people and the loss of thousands of square miles of land to productive use through an act of terror. From the beginnings of the nuclear age, the materials suitable for making a weapon have been accumulating around the world. Even some actual bombs may not be adequately secure against theft or sale in certain countries. **Nuclear reactors for research or power are scattered about the globe, capable of producing the raw material for nuclear devices. And the instructions for building explosive devices from such materials have been widely published, suggesting that access to the ingredients would make a bomb a realistic possibility.** "It should not be assumed," write physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak, "that terrorists or other groups wishing to make nuclear weapons cannot read." **Consequently, the main obstacle to a terrorist planning a nuclear nightmare would be acquiring fissile material — plutonium or highly enriched uranium capable of rapid nuclear fission.** Nearly 2 million kilograms of each have already been produced and exist in the world today**. It takes less than ten kilograms of plutonium, or a few tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, to build a bomb.** Fission, or the splitting of an atom's nucleus, was discovered originally in uranium. For a bomb, you need a highly enriched mass of uranium typically consisting of 90 percent uranium-235, a form found at levels of less than 1 percent in uranium ore. Fuel for nuclear power reactors is only enriched 3 percent to 5 percent with respect to this trace form of uranium, and so is no good for explosions. **Highly enriched bomb-grade uranium is, however, produced for some reactors (such as those used to power nuclear submarines and for some research reactors) and might be diverted to terrorists.**

Second, plutonium waste

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Besides uranium, another serious concern is the synthetic radioactive element plutonium. Produced by the nuclear "burning" of uranium in reactors, plutonium is a radioactive hazard in itself and also an ideal fuel for nuclear explosives. Worldwide, more than 1,000 reactors operate nowadays, some producing electric power, others mostly used for research. **Plutonium produced in either reactor type could be extracted for use in weapons.** Nuclear security therefore represents one of the most urgent policy issues of the 21st century. In addition to its political and institutional aspects, it poses acute technical issues as well. In short, engineering shares the formidable challenges of finding all the dangerous nuclear material in the world, keeping track of it, securing it, and detecting its diversion or transport for terrorist use. What are the challenges to

preventing nuclear terror attacks? Challenges include: (1) how to secure the materials; (2) how to detect, especially at a distance; (3) how to render a potential device harmless; (4) emergency response, cleanup, and public communication after a nuclear explosion; and (5) determining who did it. All of these have engineering components; some are purely technical and others are systems challenges. Some of the technical issues are informational — it is essential to have a sound system for keeping track of weapons and nuclear materials known to exist, in order to protect against **their theft or purchase on the black market by terrorists. Another possible danger is that sophisticated terrorists could buy the innards of a dismantled bomb, or fuel from a nuclear power plant, and build a homemade explosive device. It is conceivable that such a device would produce considerable damage, with explosive power perhaps a tenth of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. With help from renegade professional designers, terrorists might even build a more powerful device, equaling or exceeding the force of the Hiroshima bomb. Detonated in a large city, such a bomb could kill 100,000 people or more.** Building a full-scale bomb would not be easy, so terrorists might attempt instead to cause other forms of nuclear chaos, possibly using conventional explosives to blast and scatter radioactive material around a city. Such "dirty bombs" might cause relatively few immediate deaths, but they could contaminate large areas of land, cause potential economic havoc to the operation of a city, and increase long-term cancer incidence. There are millions of potential sources of radioactive material, which is widely used in hospitals, research facilities, and industry -- so preventing access is extremely difficult. Responding to a "dirty bomb" attack would also involve engineering challenges ranging from monitoring to cleanup, of both people and places. Concern for nuclear security complicates the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity. Ensuring that a nation using nuclear power for energy does not extract plutonium for bomb building is not easy. **Diversion of plutonium is much more difficult when a country opts for a "once through" fuel cycle that keeps the plutonium with the highly radioactive spent fuel, rather than a "closed" fuel cycle where spent fuel is reprocessed and plutonium separated out.** Simple record keeping could be faked or circumvented. Regulations requiring human inspection and video monitoring are surely not foolproof.

It's likely

Earnhardt et al 21 (Becca Earnhardt is a Research Associate with the Nuclear Security program at the Stimson Center. Brendan Hyatt is a nuclear security intern at the Stimson Center. Nickolas Roth serves as a senior director of Nuclear Materials Security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 14, 2021, "A threat to confront: far-right extremists and nuclear terrorism", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2021/01/a-threat-to-confront-far-right-extremists-and-nuclear-terrorism/, DOA 4/11/23) KC

Last March, neo-Nazi Timothy Wilson was killed during a shootout as he was planning to bomb a hospital treating COVID-19 patients. Like other neo-Nazis, Wilson viewed the pandemic and increased unrest among the American public as an opportunity to popularize Nazi ideas, spark further chaos, and accelerate societal collapse.[1] This past week, Ashli Babbitt was shot and killed while storming the US Capitol as part of a right-wing uprising; several years earlier, she was an employee of the Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant, exhibiting violent behavior during this period.[2] **Acts of violence by far-right extremists are on the rise in the United States. Until now, most of these incidents have lacked sophistication, but a critical question for national security experts is whether US far-right extremist groups that espouse violence can carry out something catastrophic. Every president serving in the last two decades has said that nuclear terrorism is a significant national security threat. Analysis of this threat has been, for good reason, mostly focused on foreign extremist groups, but recent events raise questions of whether there should be greater focus in the United States on far-right, domestic extremist threats. These extremists represent a unique danger because of their prevalence in federal institutions such as the military and the potential that they might infiltrate nuclear facilities, where they could access sensitive information and nuclear materials. The far-right extremist nuclear terrorism threat, which has some history, is amplified today by an ideology focused on accelerating the collapse of society and a documented interest in pursuing nuclear terrorism**. Officials need to act decisively to better understand and mitigate this threat. Far-right narratives of nuclear terror. **The intersection between violent far-right extremist ideology and catastrophic terrorism goes back decades. In The Turner**

Diaries, a 1978 novel labeled the "bible of the racist right," the protagonists use acts of nuclear terror in service of the creation of a "white world." Protagonists bomb nuclear installations, seize nuclear weapons, target missiles at New York City and Tel Aviv, and ultimately destroy the Pentagon in a suicidal nuclear attack.[3] The International Centre for Counterterrorism ties the Diaries to "at least 200 murders and at least 40 terrorist attacks/hate crimes" in the last 40 years.[4] This includes Timothy McVeigh's 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, resulting in the deaths of 168 people.[5] McVeigh, however, is not the only far-right terrorist to be inspired by the Diaries. In 2011, violent far-right extremist Anders Breivik's terror attacks killed 77 people in Norway. **Dozens of pages in his 1,500-page "manifesto" discuss the execution of different acts of nuclear terrorism.[6] An increasingly active generation of violent far-right extremist groups and actors have adopted an especially dangerous ideology that is compatible with an act of nuclear terror: accelerationism.** [7] Violent far-right extremists who adopt accelerationism view societal collapse as inevitable and seek to hasten that collapse in service of "total revolution"—the complete destruction of the existing system of governance.[8] Violent far-right extremists who adopt accelerationism hope to set off a series of violent chain events, with violence begetting more violence, destabilizing society.[9] **Indiscriminate, highly destructive acts of terror—like a nuclear attack—are therefore perfect tools to sow chaos and accelerate this societal collapse.** In Siege, one of the defining theoretical works of violent far-right accelerationism, author and accelerationist leader James Mason writes that, "[White supremacists] will be the single survivor in a war against the System, a TOTAL WAR against the System."[10] In a recent act of violent far-right extremist terrorism, Brenton Tarrant, the Australian perpetrator of the 2019 terrorist attack on Christchurch mosqitoes in New Zealand, wrote about accelerationism in his manifesto.[11] Groups with nuclear interests. Inspired by the ideas of accelerationism, the modern breed of violent far-right extremism is becoming more destructive, and nuclear weapons certainly fit into this profile of catastrophic violence. The intention to bring about a cataclysmic clash of civilizations bears resemblance to better known terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo, both of which have pursued nuclear weapons. As director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the US Department of Energy, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, once observed, "Osama bin Ladin has signaled a specific purpose for using WMD in al Qaeda's quest to destroy the global status quo, and to create conditions more conducive to the overthrow of apostate regimes throughout the Islamic world."[12] Like Al-Qaeda, violent far-right extremists support the creation of a new society that is in line with their own ideology. **One of the most notable and violent far-right extremist groups that have adopted accelerationism and operate in the United States is the Atomwaffen Division (AWD.**[13] **The organization's name translates from German to "the nuclear weapons division," indicating that its members have an explicit interest in nuclear terrorism.** Brandon Russel, a former Florida National Guard member and an AWD co-founder, is one case of an aspiring nuclear terrorist. A heavily armed Russel and a fellow AWD member were recently arrested while in route to the Turkey Point nuclear power plant. During the investigation officials found that Russel lived in an apartment with two AWD co-conspirators; in the apartment was a prominently placed copy of the Turner Diaries and a framed photo of Oklahoma City Bomber Timothy McVeigh. **The trio stockpiled weapons and explosives with the intent to blow up, among other targets, a nuclear power plant. In their apartment, police found pipe bomb components, traces of the explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, and detonators. Police also detected two radioactive materials—thorium and americium—in his bedroom.**[14] **AWD was not the first far-right extremist in America to consider using radioactive or nuclear materials in a terrorist attack. Several previously documented attempts by violent far-right extremists to commit acts of radiological terror indicate a longstanding interest among far-right actors in highly destructive, non-conventional acts of terror.**[15] In 2004, National Socialist Movement member Demetrius Van Crocker attempted to build a dirty bomb to blow up a courthouse.[16] In 2008, James Cummings, a white supremacist, obtained four 1-gallon containers of a mix of depleted uranium and thorium-232. He planned to use these materials to assemble a dirty bomb.[17] In 2012, a member of the Ku Klux Klan who worked at General Electric carried out research on radiation dispersal devices, learning what level of emission was required to kill humans.[18] Could they really pull it off? While some violent far-right extremists are clearly motivated to carry out catastrophic terrorist attacks, a question remains: Do they possess the means and opportunity to conduct an act of nuclear terrorism? There is no public evidence violent far-right extremist groups have obtained the resources or exhibited the requisite operational sophistication to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism. Many of the plots involving far-right extremists and nuclear terrorism have been poorly conceived and were unlikely to succeed. These incidents, however, likely do not provide a complete picture of the threat, because **publicly accessible information on the capability of these groups is limited, creating ambiguity about their general capabilities.** Moreover, predicting the capability of specific terrorist groups has proven to be exceptionally difficult. In January 2014, for example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper did not list the Islamic State as a terrorist threat in his testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Yet, within months, the Islamic State had seized major portions of Syria and Iraq and declared a global caliphate.[19] Intelligence on potential lone-wolf actors is even more difficult to gather. **The most concerning evidence that violent far-right extremists might have access to nuclear weapons or weapons-useable material lies in their presence in the US military and other parts of the federal government. The presence of white supremacists in the military is well-known and well-documented. A 2019 poll revealed that 36 percent of active-duty military troops had witnessed evidence of white supremacist ideology in the military.[20] In 2020 alone, there were several recent examples of active service members being arrested for plotting far-right extremist acts of terrorism. In January 2020, Coast Guard Lt. Christopher Hasson was sentenced to 13 years in prison for planning a "mass casualty attack" in support of white nationalism.**[21] **In February, former Master Sgt. Cory Reeves was discharged from the Air Force because of his ties to white supremacist organizations.[22] And in June 2020, Private Ethan Melzer, a neo-Nazi in the US Army, attempted to provide information about US troops abroad, "including whereabouts, movement and security details," to both white supremacist and jihadist groups. He gave this information with the intention of coordinating a suicidal, mass casualty "jihadi" attack on those troops.**[23] **There is also evidence of violent far-right extremism in other government institutions. For example, in May 2018, Matthew Gebert, a State Department employee working on Pakistani and Indian energy policy, led a double life.** He headed the Washington, D.C. chapter of the white supremacist group The Right Stuff, socialized with major white supremacist figures like Mike Peinovich and Richard Spencer, and secretly hosted a white nationalist podcast titled "The Fatherland."[24] In a May 2018 episode of "The Fatherland," Gebert announced, "We need a country founded for white people with a nuclear deterrent. And you watch how the world trembles." This pattern of insider threats raises key questions: How many violent far-right extremists are in the government? What materials or information do violent far-right extremists in government have access to? Are they sophisticated enough to steal nuclear material or sabotage a nuclear facility, or aid another actor on the outside? **To what extent have violent far-right extremists penetrated organizations like national laboratories or nuclear material production facilities, where they might be able to acquire highly-enriched uranium or plutonium—the building blocks for constructing an improvised nuclear device.**[25] The need to screen for far-right extremists. The US government needs to develop processes that ensure violent far-right extremists do not have access to nuclear weapons, weapons-useable nuclear materials, radiological material, or sensitive information about nuclear weapons or material

Nuclear security efforts fail

NNSA (The National Nuclear Security Administration is a United States federal agency responsible for safeguarding national security through the military application of nuclear science. No date, "REDUCING RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM", NNSA, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/reducing-risk-nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet, DOA 3/3/25) RK

Although efforts by the U.S. and many other countries have dramatically improved nuclear security around the world, significant challenges remain due to global expansion of nuclear power and increased need for nuclear materials in an environment of heightened political instability and terrorist activity. Further, **evolving and disruptive technologies and cyber vulnerabilities threaten nuclear facilities in new ways**. On this stage, nuclear newcomers are working to develop capabilities to protect their facilities and materials. This has led to increasing demands on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist Member States with their nuclear security needs and partner countries seeking U.S. support.

The impact is nuke war

Sarkar 21 (Jayita Sarkar is assistant professor of international relations at Boston University's Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies., Jan 27 2021, "It's time to take domestic nuclear terrorism seriously", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/27/its-time-take-domestic-nuclear-terrorism-seriously/, DOA 4/6/23) RK

How can the new Biden administration address the threat of domestic terrorism, most vividly illustrated by the attempted insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6? Last week, 20,000 members of the National Guard were deployed for the inauguration to protect the new administration from far-right extremist violence, but a more serious threat looms. **Nuclear and radiological terrorism has prominently appeared in "apocalyptically minded" white-supremacist ideology for decades**. The policy community perceives the threat of nuclear terrorism as almost uniquely emanating from outside of U.S. borders, specifically from Islamist terrorism networks such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and their splinter groups. But in fact**, U.S. far-right extremist groups have a history of**

attempted procurement of nuclear weapons and radiological materials to use against the federal government. Members of neo-Nazi groups such as Atomwaffen Division, which literally means "atomic weapons" in German, and the National Socialist Movement have attempted in the past to access nuclear materials with the intent to cause harm. Fears of nuclear terrorism among U.S. policymakers go back at least to the 1970s, when armed insurgencies intensified in the Middle East. The 1972 Munich massacre by the Palestinian group Black September and the 1973 oil price shock that suddenly empowered petroleum-exporting countries fueled concerns of a violent, non-White, Muslim world. India's 1974 nuclear explosion, Pakistan's nuclear weapons acquisition in response and new nuclear energy programs funded by petrodollars in Iran, Libya, Iraq and elsewhere further fanned fears of nuclear materials falling into "rogue" hands. In 1979, as the Iran hostage crisis played out on national television for over a year, the idea of radical Islam as a security threat became entrenched in U.S. political culture. But **nuclear terrorism was also a domestic threat in the 1970s. Nuclear power was expected to grow that decade, and a large amount of plutonium (a radioactive material used in nuclear weapon design) was feared to be widely available. By the end of the decade, white-power activists, many of whom were Vietnam War veterans hardened by military training, had organized for a violent armed struggle of "leaderless resistance" against the federal government. To them, the government was the source of unacceptable societal change that hurt White Christian Americans. In 1978, William Pierce, the founder of the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, published the novel "The Turner Diaries" under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. It sold over 500,000 copies worldwide and remains highly popular among white supremacists. In the novel, right-wing extremists invade the Capitol to overthrow the U.S. government. Its narrator, Earl Turner, gloats that "not one of them is beyond our reach." Dubbed by the FBI as the "bible of the racist right," the novel depicts 18 nuclear explosions in Manhattan alone and the destruction by nuclear weapons of Baltimore, Miami, the California coast and Detroit. It also provides plans to deliberately contaminate with radioactive materials a nuclear power plant in Evanston, Ill. The novel ends with Turner detonating a nuclear bomb over the Pentagon. He justifies the nuclear explosions and sabotage against non-White populations and "race criminals" (liberal Whites) in the name of establishing white supremacy in the United States and worldwide. "The Turner Diaries" has inspired racially motivated armed robberies and more than 200 killings in the United States. It greatly influenced Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, who perpetrated the deadliest domestic terrorist attack on U.S. soil that killed 168 people in April 1995. The book has received renewed attention after the attack on the Capitol.** Amazon has prevented its sale, **and major news outlets have reported on its influence over far-right and white-supremacist groups**. The analogies are chilling. The violent white-supremacist ideology that calls for nuclear and radiological attacks against non-White populations has spread outside the United States. Norwegian far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who killed 77 people in July 2011, had called for the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents against "cultural Marxists," "multiculturalists" and those responsible for the Islamic "colonization" of Europe. In his 1500-page manifesto, he laid out plans for theft or unauthorized access to nuclear weapons and the procurement of nuclear materials through transnational smuggling networks. Breivik recommended the use of radiological agents and nuclear weapons after Jan. 1, 2020 — his deadline for Muslims in Europe to "assimilate." Given the leaderless transnational networks of white supremacists, the call for nuclear and radiological attacks in Breivik's manifesto as well as "The Turner Diaries" poses grave concerns. Policy experts reassure us that if taken seriously as a threat, nuclear terrorism is both preventable and solvable. That violent white supremacists can easily infiltrate the police, the military and nuclear facilities make them an extremely serious and hard-to-detect national security risk. The involvement in the Capitol attack of the Oath Keepers, a far-right anti-government group that recruits former U.S. military and law enforcement personnel, demonstrates the extent of this threat. Screening far-right extremists within government institutions at local, state and federal levels needs to be a priority for the Biden administration. The key to preventing such a catastrophic attack will be moving beyond a one-dimensional understanding of terrorism as the violent threat of radical Islam, and better understanding the different ways in which far-right domestic terrorism has grown in the United States and the specific threats this brings. **Despite ample evidence to support the concern that insider threats pose high security risks in nuclear and radiological environments, little has been done at the policy level. The threat of nuclear terrorism is such that we must act preemptively, not after a devastating attack**. The lessons of the past tell us that action will involve breaking down the artificial border between foreign and domestic policies. National security does not just mean preventing attacks from abroad. **The siege of the Capitol came close to being far worse, and there are indications that some rioters intended to harm lawmakers. But just because we escaped the worst does not mean we can rest easy. We must be proactive to prevent far-right domestic terrorism from going nuclear in this country.**

This triggers retaliation

Hayes 18 (Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney. "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR," *Nautilus Institute*, 1/18/18, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/) dwc 18

Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea's leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons.//// However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. //// This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. //// The possibility that **non-state actors** may **attack without advance warning** as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may

break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, **and** will **use** radically **different organizational procedures** and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state **nuclear terrorist could** violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or **use actual nuclear** materials and even **warheads against** military or civilian **targets**. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities.//// If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could **impel a nuclear** armed **state to escalate** its threat or even military actions **against other states, in the belief** that **this** targeted **state** may have **sponsored the non-state attack**, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. **This**outcome could **trigger** these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent **nuclear war,** especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. //// Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the "metasystem" to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis **when alert levels are** already **high**, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when **decision making is** already **stressed**, when **the potential for miscalc**ulation **is** already **high** due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when **rhetorical threats promising annihilation** on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other **invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies** to gain the upper hand **in the "contest of resolve**," and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, **then a terrorist nuclear attack** may **shift** a coincident combination of some or all of these factors **to a threshold level where they** collectively **lead to** a **first-use decision** by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above. //// The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system?//// Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Figure 6: Impact of a Terrorist Nuclear Threat or Attack on Interstate Nuclear Use Control //// Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that they may not share a common image of the other states' motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation.

Extinction

Starr 14 (Steven Starr: Director, Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the U of Missouri. Senior scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility. 5/30/14, "The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner", Centre for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611 // DOA: 4/1/21)JDE

Paul Craig Roberts held top security clearances. He has repeatedly warned that a US-Russian nuclear war would wipe out the human race, along with all other complex forms of life. As a scientist with expert knowledge, I wish to echo and explain his warning.//// **Nuclear war has no winner**. Beginning in 2006, several of the world's leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline

scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that **the consequences of even a "small" nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate**[i] **and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer**[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that **global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death**. [iii]//// These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that **a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race**.[iv] In other words, a US-**Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life**.//// A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war",[v] begins by stating://// "A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, **an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction**." In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that **nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer** (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer.//// Following a US-Russian nuclear war, **temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations.//// Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices**[viii], including **those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool** (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) **would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway**.////

C2) Oil

The US maintains a strong presence in the ME

Masters and Merrow 25 (Jonathan Masters is a deputy editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, and writes on national security and civil liberties issues, he received his BA in Political Science from Emory University, Will Merrow creates data visualizations for a range of CFR content. He previously worked at Graphicacy designing visualizations for mission-driven clients. He holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from Tufts University and a master's degree in data analytics and visualization from the Pratt Institute, "U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Mapping the Military Presence", March 28, 2025, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/article/us-forces-middle-east-mapping-military-presence, DOA 4/3/25) KC

The United States maintains a considerable military presence in the Middle East, with forces in more than a dozen countries and on ships throughout the region's waters. That presence expanded in 2024 as the United States focused on deterring and defeating threats from Iran and its network of armed affiliates in the region, including Hamas (Gaza Strip), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), and several Iraq- and Syria-based militant groups. In March 2025, U.S. Central Command forces launched an offensive air strike on Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen from war ships stationed in the Red Sea. Since the October 2023 outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel, a U.S. ally and defense partner, U.S. forces in

the Middle East have been increasingly targeted by some of these groups—and have regularly responded with counterstrikes. Meanwhile, U.S. and coalition ships have been protecting merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, defending against near-daily Houthi drone and missile attacks. The Pentagon has also responded as hostilities between Israel and Iran as well as Israel and Hezbollah have flared in recent months. In April 2024, U.S. warplanes and ships successfully intercepted dozens of drones and missiles fired at Israel in an unprecedented direct attack by Iran. In October of the same year, the United States announced it sent dozens of additional aircraft (four squadrons) to the region. The move came as Israel commenced a ground incursion against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran launched another, larger barrage of missile strikes against Israel. U.S. naval forces reportedly shot a dozen interceptors at the Iranian missiles. In March 2025, B-2 stealth bombers were also reportedly being deployed from their home base in Missouri to the joint U.S.-United Kingdom military base in Diego Garcia, an island part of the British Indian Ocean Territory that is within striking range of Houthi territory and Iran. U.S. troop levels in any given region can fluctuate greatly depending on the particular security environment, national defense priorities, and various other considerations. As of October 2024, U.S. defense officials said there were some forty thousand servicemembers in the Middle East, many on ships at sea in the region. **In total, the United States has military facilities across at least nineteen sites—eight of them considered to be permanent by many regional analysts—in countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.** The U.S. military also uses large bases in Djibouti and Turkey, which are part of other regional commands but often contribute significantly to U.S. operations in the Middle East. All host countries have basing agreements with the United States, except Syria, where U.S. forces had been opposed by the government. (Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa has indicated an interest in restoring ties with the United States.) Qatar hosts U.S. Central Command's forward headquarters. Bahrain hosts the most permanently assigned U.S. personnel and is home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. The navy had multiple large warship formations conducting operations in the region, but since the start of the second Donald Trump administration, several warships have been returned to the United States to support domestic border security efforts. **As of March 2025, two carrier strike groups will overlap in the region, with the USS Harry S. Truman extended another month and the USS Carl Vinson set to arrive in the coming weeks at U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility.** The move to deploy the two aircraft carriers follows renewed firing between the United States and Houthi rebels in Yemen and the Red Sea earlier that month.

Affirming reverses this

Sivaram and Saha 18 (Varun Sivaram and Sagatom Saha: Council on Foreign Relations, New York, USA. 1/12/2018, "The Geopolitical Implications of a Clean Energy Future from the Perspective of the United States", The Geopolitics of Renewables, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-67855-9_5 // DOA: 3/27/25) JDE

5.3 The Fading Geopolitics of Fossil Fuels: New Dynamics with Established Powers **America's relationship with the Persian Gulf could drastically change** by 2050 **as it adopts clean energy**. **The United States currently maintains a strong military presence in the region, in large part to prevent disruptions in global oil supplies. But the American economy could be far less exposed to oil shocks in the future if it reduces its oil demand and develops stronger buffers against supply disruption**. The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Gulf during the Cold War provides a template for how America's drawdown might look. **In such a scenario, America might substitute its permanent presence for a lighter footprint and redirect its naval power elsewhere to address more pressing security concerns.** Yet regional insta- bility might deter a full U.S. withdrawal. 5.3.1 Context America has long considered the Persian Gulf central to its national interest. Driven by concerns over global oil supply, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared "the defense of Saudi Arabia as vital to the defense of the United States" in 1943, authorizing U.S. military aid to the Kingdom (Klare 2013). As the region consti- tuted most of the world's non-Soviet oil at the time, a large supply disruption in the Gulf would have been disastrous to the United States (Glaser and Kelanic 2017). Such a disruption came to pass when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) set an embargo on oil in 1973 (DOS n.d.). The price of oil in the United States quadrupled, imposing daunting costs on consumers and the wider economy. Between 1973 and 1975, U.S. GDP plummeted 6% and unemployment doubled to 9% (Hayward 2015). The U.S. economy is still exposed to oil prices today. Though it is difficult to estimate the direct economic cost of oil dependency, economists suggest a 10% increase in oil prices shaves 0.4% from GDP. If prices were to double today, economic output would shrink by 3% or about $550 billion (Glaser and Kelanic 2017). Echoing FDR's doctrine, President Carter, in a State of the Union address, proclaimed that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." (Peters and Woolley n.d.a). He later created the Rapid Deployment Force, which would become U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), America's unified U.S. military command responsible for the Middle East (Cordesman 1991). Today, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf is still motivated by preventing both deliberate and unintended oil supply disruptions. The first mission is to ensure that countries in the region—in particular, Iran—cannot purposefully disrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. An extended closure

would be devas- tating, blocking 20% of the world's oil supply (EIA 2012; Glaser and Kelanic 2017). The second mission is to backstop stability for major supplier-countries to guarantee steady production. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait alone cumulatively wiped 420 million barrels from world supply from 1990 to 1991 (Fattouh 2007). Either scenario—deliberate or unintended disruption to oil supply—would cause a surge in the price of oil, harming the U.S. economy. **To guard against these scenarios, the United States maintains roughly 35,000 troops in the Gulf, one-third of which are stationed in Kuwait (Katzman 2016). The remainder are positioned throughout the region in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar. America's naval presence in the region is anchored by the Fifth Fleet, which patrols the Persian Gulf (Allen 2017).** The fleet consists of several carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and a number of other ships and aircraft (Pike 2011a). The U.S. military also operates rotating Marine Expeditionary Units, brigade-size quick reaction forces for immediate crisis response (Pike 2011b). **It is difficult to attribute exactly how much the United States spends on pro- tecting the flow of Gulf oil, given that many of these military assets also serve other purposes. However, experts estimate the cost at between 12 and 15% of the defense budget—roughly $90 billion dollars (Crane et al. 2009). Another assessment places U.S. defense spending attributable to oil imports at roughly $15 for each imported barrel (Hall 1992).**

Its strategic

Sivaram and Saha 18 (Varun Sivaram and Sagatom Saha: Council on Foreign Relations, New York, USA. 1/12/2018, "The Geopolitical Implications of a Clean Energy Future from the Perspective of the United States", The Geopolitics of Renewables, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-67855-9_5 // DOA: 3/27/25) JDE

5.3.2.3 Scenario Summary Thus, the U.S. would be largely protected from an oil crisis in the Gulf, having satisfied two requirements**; its economy would need less oil to function, and it would have better safeguards to mitigate supply disruptions that come to pass**. And if global oil demand flags and Gulf production lags behind that of other regions, Gulf oil will be even less important to global oil markets and the U.S. economy. **As these trends unfold, U.S. policymakers might finally decide to scale down America's military presence in the Gulf.** 5.3.3 Implications Something as simple as a strong push toward reduced defense spending—a subject of continuing debate in Congress—could force the U.S. to reevaluate the value of its military commitment toward securing oil flows. If limited, what exactly might America's force posture in the region look like in 2050? The British withdrawal from the Middle East provides one prominent example. Until the late 1960s, the United Kingdom maintained a large military presence in the region chiefly to secure access to oil. Indeed, after World War II, Gulf oil supplies accounted for most of the world's non-Soviet oil and were therefore critical to British security and that of its European allies (Luce 2009). Britain maintained garrisons with air and naval support in Sharjah and Bahrain while also financing local police and military forces in Oman and Abu Dhabi (Sato 2009). Despite this, the need to cut defense spending and stimulate the economy forced the United Kingdom to abdicate its special influence. In 1968, the British gov- ernment announced a complete military withdrawal "east of the Suez" (Sato 2009). Most of the military was either redirected to Europe to confront the Soviet Union or cut altogether. Dennis Healey, UK secretary of defense at the time, noted, "Although we have important economic interests in the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, military force is not the most suitable means of protecting them, and they would not alone justify heavy British defense expenditure" (Francis 2000). **With far lower dependence on Gulf supplies, American policymakers could reach a similar conclusion by 2050. A persuasive push to rein in ballooning defense costs—as in the United Kingdom—could compel the United States to withdraw from the Gulf. In fact, it may become strategically sensible for the U.S. to abdicate its role as security guarantor if that role is perceived as a responsibility and burden to secure supply for other countries. Support for maintaining America's military presence could evaporate when it becomes clear that India and China, not the United States, would actually suffer most from an oil supply disruption** (Murtaugh et al. 2016). There may be little support for shouldering security costs that benefit other countries that are more dependent on global oil markets and Gulf production. Yet the United States is unlikely to completely relinquish an active presence in the Gulf because of its commitments to combatting terrorism and checking Iranian aggression. Still, **whatever military assets remain would require more specific justification than the broad fiat exercised today. America's role may mirror its current security posture in Sub-Saharan Africa, where it maintains a relatively small handful of bases and spends comparatively less on**

counterterrorism operations (Taylor 2014). **Concretely, the United States could forego its legacy of permanent military bases and naval assets in favor of a lighter footprint. America could pursue its non-oil- related strategic goals in the Gulf by relying on coalition building with regional and international partners. The president might deactivate the Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet or redirect it to the Asia-Pacific where it originally operated**. In coming decades, China's growing influence in the region may drive the United States to build a stronger presence there.

A lack of US military presence would create chaos

Stroul 25 (Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,"A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian Regime's Malign Activities", April 1, 2025, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/return-maximum-pressure-comprehensively-countering-iranian-regimes-malign, DOA 4/3/25) KC

In my view, the window is open for the United States to work with like-minded partners to advance opportunities in a region no longer held back by Iran's nefarious influence. To emphasize, this is a window of opportunity: **how the United States proceeds in the coming months will determine whether a more stable and secure Middle East emerges from the post-October 7 environment**. To press the advantage, Washington must be prepared to bring more to the table than pressure. Military force and sanctions are critical elements of strategy but insufficient on their own. The United States must lean into diplomacy as well, testing the possibility of a negotiated settlement that can prevent Iran's nuclear program from delivering weapons while also supporting new leaders across the region that oppose Tehran's interest in rebuilding its "axis of resistance." To implement a comprehensive strategy, **the United States will need to empower its diplomats, work with allies and partners, restore assistance and stabilization programs, and maintain a robust military posture and security commitments across the Middle East. Iran's strategy for regime survival has relied on decades-long investments in three key areas: (1) the nuclear weapons program, (2) its threat network of terrorists and proxies, and (3) its conventional missile arsenal. Tehran has used each of these pillars to threaten its neighbors, challenge Israel's existence, and try to push the United States out of the region, all in the pursuit of imposing its will and vision on the Middle East. Regional developments since October 7, 2023, have significantly reshaped the regional threat landscape. In the aftermath of Hamas's attack, Israel, with U.S. support, has systematically dismantled Iran's proxy network in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere, disrupting the regime's ability to project power by funding, arming, and training nonstate groups. In Syria, Tehran lost its one Middle East strategic partner with the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, who had willingly permitted the use of Syrian territory for destabilizing Iranian activities. As a result, Tehran's ability to exert asymmetric pressure through its regional proxies has been greatly reduced. New leaders in Damascus and Beirut alike are working to stabilize their countries and do not want them to be dominated by Tehran.** In Gaza, Palestinians have taken to the streets to protest against Hamas, signaling some resistance to the group's stranglehold on governance. **These new leaders and movements on the ground will need long-term assistance and support. The combination of Israel's offensive strikes inside Iran and U.S.-led defensive action in the region has lowered the fear barrier in confronting Iranian aggression. From the emergence of a U.S.-led regional air defense coalition in April 2024 to Israel's defeat of a large-scale ballistic missile attack in October, allies have demonstrated that Iran's complex conventional attacks and missile threats can be effectively countered.** Israel's strikes inside Iran targeted key missile production facilities, disrupting the regime's ability to replenish critical components of its arsenal and degrading its strategic air defense systems. Tehran's military infrastructure is now exposed to future military action**. These developments not only altered Iran's deterrence posture, but also reinforced the credibility of integrated air and missile defense networks in mitigating threats posed by**

state and nonstate actors in the region. To build on this, the United States will need to prioritize the operational integration of partner air defenses across the region, which includes accelerating foreign military sales, providing security assistance funding, and prioritizing defense diplomacy. **Washington will also need to maintain an increased military posture across the region in the medium term as the operational backbone for integration and deterrence.**

This causes Iran prolif

Stroul 25 (Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,"A Return to Maximum Pressure: Comprehensively Countering the Iranian Regime's Malign Activities", April 1, 2025, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/return-maximum-pressure-comprehensively-countering-iranian-regimes-malign, DOA 4/3/25) KC

Yet sanctions alone cannot stop Iran's nuclear program. In the past, the regime responded to economic pressure by taking provocative nuclear steps or attacking the interests of its neighbors. Today, it is perilously close to crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has expressed significant concern over Iran's uranium enrichment activities, stating that it is "pressing the gas pedal" by dramatically accelerating enrichment to near weapons-grade levels. He highlighted that Iran's production of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity has increased from approximately seven kilograms per month to over thirty, emphasizing that the Islamic Republic is the only non-nuclear-weapons state producing uranium at this high level of enrichment, which he finds "seriously concerning." Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran has significantly advanced its nuclear capabilities. It has expanded its stockpile of high-enriched uranium and is now producing fissile material at enrichment levels and in quantities far beyond the JCPOA's original limits. Additionally, it has installed and operated advanced centrifuges at key facilities such as Natanz and Fordow, increasing the rate of enrichment and shortening its capacity to stage a quick breakout. The regime has also restricted international oversight by limiting cooperation with the IAEA, reducing transparency over its nuclear activities. As my Washington Institute colleague Michael Singh pointed out in a recent paper for the Trump administration, **Iran could have sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a weapon in just days and could produce a usable weapon in six months or less.** Although Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard recently testified that **Iran is not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon at this time, the U.S. intelligence community has warned for the past year that regime nuclear experts are engaging in activities that better position Tehran to develop a nuclear device should the leadership decide to do so. These activities include work on uranium metal production, which has direct weapons applications, and advancements in explosive technologies relevant to nuclear warhead development.** While Iran insists that these measures are for civilian energy and research purposes, **the pattern of activity suggests that it is methodically reducing the time needed to weaponize if it chooses to move in that direction. The intelligence community has long assessed that Tehran's decisionmaking is the only thing precluding a breakout, not any technical inhibition. A crucial question for this hearing, therefore, is whether we can keep Iran from making that decision**. President Trump has indicated that while economic and military pressure will continue, his preferred path for addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions remains diplomacy and negotiation. As the administration considers potential talks, it must address several questions. The first is the scope of any agreement—whether negotiations will focus solely on the nuclear program (as with the 2015 JCPOA) or seek a more comprehensive deal that also addresses support for terrorist organizations, proxy militias, and the missile, space-launch, and drone programs. Second, the administration must decide whether to pursue a unilateral negotiation strategy or engage in a multilateral framework involving key allies such as Israel, European partners, and Gulf states. A multilateral approach could enhance enforcement mechanisms and diplomatic legitimacy, but it would also slow the process. A good deal, as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has emphasized, would be one that permanently blocks Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon rather than just delaying its capability. It must include consistent, regular inspections to ensure full transparency and prevent the regime from exploiting loopholes. The Trump administration should prioritize testing Tehran's willingness to reach a diplomatic deal on the nuclear program while also preparing to set the program back through military means should diplomacy fail. Yet the time window to test Iran's openness to negotiate is short, partly due to the looming October expiration of remaining restrictions on the nuclear program via UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and also because of Iran's current exposure to Israeli military strikes. Policymakers should assume that Russia and China will work with Iran to rebuild its military-industrial capacity and air

defenses, limiting the scope of what can be achieved through military strikes beyond the near term. Moscow and Beijing are already supporting Tehran diplomatically, so Washington will need to prepare for a complex negotiation in which these powers do not contribute to a diplomatic process like they did as part of the P5+1. Also unclear is how Russia and China would respond should Iran decide to weaponize. **To strengthen the U.S. approach toward Iran, the administration needs a hard-nosed diplomatic plan backed by economic and military leverage**: To effectively signal U.S. resolve in pursuit of an agreement, the administration should clearly articulate how sanctions relief would be structured if Iran dismantles its nuclear program and exports key elements out of the country. A well-defined framework for phased economic relief would provide clarity on the benefits of compliance. This is also an area where Congress can contribute. At the same time, **the administration must continue taking steps to keep its military options open. This includes maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in the region, strengthening regional air and missile defense capabilities, and reinforcing America's commitment to deterring Iranian aggression against Israel and Gulf allies. The recent announcements about sending a second aircraft carrier to the region and deploying B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia are important steps in reinforcing U.S. readiness to use military force.**

Otherwise, war occurs in 2 ways

First, cascading prolif

Gowan 18 (Richard Gowan is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research at United Nations University in New York. He also holds fellowships with the European Council on Foreign Relations and New York University Center on International Cooperation, and teaches at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. 2018, "MINIMUM ORDER: The role of the Security Council in an era of major power competition", *United Nations University Center for Policy Research*, https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6677/UNU-Minimum-Order-FINAL.pdf // DOA: 10/22/22) SED

It is less certain that the council could now divest itself of its counter-proliferation duties. **If the P5 give up on cooperative approaches to WMD challenges, a series of dangers could quickly arise.** At the most basic level, **more governments could be tempted to experiment with low-grade WMD attacks – such as chemical weapons use** – against their opponents, **on the assumption that the council will not punish them.** On the nuclear plane, **the failure of council efforts to contain DPRK or Iran's nuclear programmes could open the way to more middle and rising powers developing nuclear weapons**, playing P5 members off one another in the process. Lastly, **a deeply divided P5 is extremely unlikely to be able to respond to crises involving new technologies and weapon systems in an effective manner. If the council loses its non-proliferation role, it could presage a series of arms races and potential uses of WMD that would destabilize the international system.** The P5, unable to control a patchwork of non-conventional threats, would surely struggle to maintain cooperation on other issues including conventional crisis management and counterterrorism issues. This, short of an all-out great power war, is the worst-case scenario for the council.

This causes nuclear war

Kroenig 15 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. January 2015, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?" Journal of Strategic Studies, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future// DOA: 10/29/20)JDE

"The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of

action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran's advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. **Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability**. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, **Israel might not be confident** that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. **In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures.** That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, **nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.**49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. **Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war.** This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. **We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction"**

Second, an Israeli first strike

Farley 19 (Robert Farley, received his Ph.D. for Political Science. "Why Israel Would Start a Nuclear War," 9/12/2019, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-israel-would-start-nuclear-war-80016. DOA: 10/18/2019) DE

If a hostile power (let's say **Iran,** for sake of discussion) **appeared to be on the verge of** mating **nuclear devices** with the systems needed to deliver them, **Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack.** In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which **Israeli planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to** destroy or **delay the Iranian program.** In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian facilities.

Causes extinction

Avery 20 (John Scales Avery is a theoretical chemist at the University of Copenhagen. Since 1990 he has been the Chairman of the Danish National Group of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Between 2004 and 2015 he also served as Chairman of the Danish Peace Academy. He founded the Journal of Bioenergetics and Biomembranes, and was for many years its Managing Editor. He also served as Technical Advisor to the World Health Organization, April 1 2020, "Attacks On Iran, Past And Present", Counter Currents, https://countercurrents.org/2020/01/attacks-on-iran-past-and-present/, DOA 1/1/23) RK

An attack on Iran could escalate We recently passed the 100th anniversary **World War I**, and we should remember that this colossal disaster **escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict.** There is a danger **that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The** unstable **government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran,might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East.** In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that **nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation**. Recent research has shown that besides **making large areas of the world uninhabitable** through long-lasting radioactive contamination**, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus,nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere.** To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included. Recent research has shown that **thick clouds of smoke from firestorms in burning cities would rise to the stratosphere, where they would spread globally and remain for a decade,** blocking the hydrological cycle**, and destroying the ozone layer. A decade of greatly lowered temperatures would also follow. Global agriculture would be destroyed. Human, plant and animal populations would perish.** We must also consider the very long-lasting effects of radioactive contamination. One can gain a small idea of what it would be like by thinking of the radioactive contamation that has made large areas near to Chernobyl and Fukushima permanently uninhabitable, or the testing of hydrogen bombs in the Pacific in the 1950's, which continues to cause leukemia and birth defects in the Marshall Islands more than half a century later. In the event of a thermonuclear war, the contamination would be enormously greater. We have to remember that the total explosive power of the nuclear weapons in the world today is 500,000 times as great as the power of the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. **What is threatened today is the complete breakdown of human civilization and the destruction of much of the biosphere.**

Thus, we negate.

REBUTTAL:

On heg

1. They say decline causes xtinction, thats not at all what their ero ev says, it says there could maybe be some violence but never says war nukes or xtinction so pref our scenarios

2. T: Entanglement

Glaser 17 (John Glaser is associate director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. "Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous ," *CATO Institute*, Policy Analysis No. 816, 7/18/17, doa 7/1/18, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture) dwc 18

Entanglement is another risk exacerbated by the attempt to reassure allies with overseas bases. 75 **If** U.S. **troops are stationed abroad to demonstrate credibility**, and then **the U**nited **S**tates **refuses to intervene in** the event of **conflict**, U.S. **policymakers will suffer political** costs, even if the circumstances do not involve vital U.S. interests. Much academic literature has questioned the need to take military action solely for the sake of credibility. 76 But the presence of military bases in or near a conflict zone can intensify calls to intervene to satisfy credibility concerns, thus making entanglement more likely. **Allies can entrap a security patron into war with their rivals by pursuing high-risk strategies. U.S. military presence can encourage this moral hazard, sometimes called "reckless driving." 77 Current U.S. posture is plagued by plausible scenarios of entrapment in its commitments to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines over territorial and maritime sovereignty disputes with China**. In 2012, the Philippines engaged in an intense and potentially dangerous two-month naval standoff with China, a much more capable military power, over the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Heightened nationalist sentiments certainly played a role in the quarrel, but the unequal power dynamics between the two states raises reasonable questions about whether the relatively weak Philippines was emboldened to challenge a much stronger China because of the United States' security guarantee and nearby military bases. That kind of moral hazard is a liability that could pull the United States into conflicts unconnected to its direct security and economic interests. Fundamentally, moral hazard is a function of the commitment, but it is exacerbated by the physical presence of bases and troops. In the past, the United States stumbled into conflicts because of the entangling influence of credibility, commitments, and the capabilities presented by a forward military presence. Examples include such major wars as Korea and Vietnam. In the case of Korea, the United States established what was supposed to be a temporary military presence there following the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The U.S. military presence reflected prior agreements between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at Yalta to establish a multinational trusteeship that would, in Philip Bennett's words, "guide the Koreans to self-government." 78 By December 1945, U.S. Gen. John R. Hodge recommended full withdrawal. Secretary of War Robert Patterson argued the same in April 1947. In 1948, the National Security Council proposed withdrawing all American troops by the end of the year. The joint chiefs explained that "Korea is of little strategic value to the United States" and warned that the lingering military presence risked entangling the United States in a war following some provocation on the peninsula. That entanglement indeed happened in 1950 when the North invaded the South. 79 Unfortunately, calls to withdraw had been unheeded. Similarly, in Vietnam, despite years of a slow trickle of troop deployments, President Lyndon Johnson was able to get congressional authorization for a massive escalation in military involvement only after a U.S. warship allegedly clashed with Vietnamese naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, 12 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam. The warship, the USS Maddox, was conducting electronic warfare support measures to assist U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam. The notion that American troops deployed to the area were in danger helped entangle the United States in what became one of the most costly quagmires in American history. The presence of forces **abroad can also tempt policymakers to get involved in elective wars** that we could more easily forgo if we lacked in-theater bases. **In NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya's civil war**, for example, **the U**nited **S**tates **bombed Libya from warships in the Mediterranean** and from air bases in Spain, Italy, and Germany, among other nearby locations. The weak **arguments** in favor of U.S. involvement, which included conjectural claims about impending humanitarian disaster and pressure from NATO allies, **might have been harder to sell politically if U.S. forces had not already been deployed** in the area. 80

o/w on probability: miscalculation is most likely method of war – states won't unintentionally jeopardize their economies

o/w on scope: entrapment applies to all allies, they only impact to war b/w two countries

3. T: Prolif

Preble 16 (Christopher Preble is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. William Ruger is vice president for research and policy at the Charles Koch Institute. "NO MORE OF THE SAME: THE PROBLEM WITH PRIMACY." *War on the Rocks*, 8/31/16, doa 7/1/18, https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/no-more-of-the-same-the-problem-with-primacy/, DOA: 7/22/21)ET

Such a move on the part of our allies could prove essential, given that primacy has not stopped our rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, **primacy exacerbates** the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including **nuclear proliferation. U.S. efforts at regime change** and talk of an "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated certainly **provided additional incentives for states to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions (e.g., North Korea**). Meanwhile, **efforts** intended **to smother** security competition or **hostile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined** our **counterterrorism** efforts, **and even harmed those we were** ostensibly **trying to help. After U.S.** forces **deposed** the tyrant Saddam **Hussein** in 2003, **Iraq descended into chaos** and has never recovered. The **civil war in Syria, and** the problem of the **Islamic State** in particular, is **inextricable from the U.S**.-led invasion and **occupation of Iraq.** The **situation in Libya** is **not** much **better** — the United States helped overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which originated in Iraq, has now established a presence in Libya as well, provoking still more U.S. military action there. It is clear that those interventions were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure, yet primacists call for more of the same.

This causes nuclear war per Kroenig from case

Pref:

a) LI: it creates the conflicts that primacy peace is supposed to solve and makes them intractable bc its existential

b) o/w on probability: new nuclear states are most likely to escalate because they lack second—strike capabilities, established nuke powers like China and US have MAD

4. T: Arms Control – heg hurts arms treaties

Zhao 20(Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, February 2020, "IFSH Research Report #002: Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing," No Publication, https://ifsh.de/en/publications/research-report/research-report-002, DOA: 11/19/20)ET

The greatest obstacle for China to deepen participation in arms control is the perception that the other parties, especially **the United States**, may **seek to** use arms control to help **win great power competition** against China. **Within China's security policy circles**, the long-standing majority view has always been that arms control is simply "a tool to maintain [U.S.] hegemony."**20 Such a view gets reinforced by senior U.S. officials emphasizing the intent to use nonproliferation and arms control policies to help achieve America's great power competition strategy.21 Persuading Chinese leaders to join trilateral arms control will require the United States to set a mutually acceptable objective. Using arms control to advance one's military advantage vis-à-vis China is a nonstarter for Beijing, especially as Washington cannot force China into any arms control deal. Cooperative arms control is only achievable if all parties accept the goal of managing rather than winning competition.** From this perspective, any arms control approach to be offered to China must be mutually beneficial **and involve give and take from all parties. An approach that imposes constraints on China alone, will never work. The following are some arms control proposals that China could view as generally balanced and worthy of consideration. None of the proposed options would be easy to negotiate. The level of technical complexity would dramatically increase as countries move from a general political willingness to explore common interests to substantive negotiations on an implementable agreement. The purpose of these options, however, is to identify some general approaches through which trilateral arms control talks could be seriously considered. Thus, these options are meant to be balanced, fair, and equitable, seeking to take into consideration the most important security needs of all parties involved. The aim is to frame an approach that none of the three could immediately reject without exposing itself to the rest of the world as mal-intentioned.**

Manulak 19(Michael W. Manulak, Michael W. Manulak is an assistant professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, and a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Originally Published On Policy Options September 16, 2019, 9-16-2019, "As the nuclear arms race heats up, Canada's got a critical role to play," Policy Options, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/september-2019/as-the-nuclear-arms-race-heats-up-canadas-got-a-critical-role-to-play/, DOA: 11/28/20)ET

The global security environment is in a dynamic state. Renewed competition between great powers threatens stability. Brinksmanship between US President Donald Trump and Iran's

leadership could trigger war in the Middle East. **Complicating matters is an increased willingness to question the international norms and institutions that have helped preserve stability for the past 70 years. The global rules-based order is under direct threat, and international willpower to preserve it is in short supply. Perhaps the most concerning feature of the current security situation is a dangerous increase in the risk of a nuclear arms race. The state of international efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons presents real challenges** and will feature prominently throughout the mandate of Canada's next government. Though the current government has stood against proliferation threats and has advocated nuclear disarmament, leading observers have called on it to do more. No other issue implicates so directly and urgently Canada's global security interests. Nonproliferation and disarmament questions should be front and centre in any substantive debate over Canada's foreign and defence policies during the federal election campaign.A longstanding international consensus in question: Uncertain negotiations over the North Korean nuclear programs between President Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, as well as confrontations with Iran over its enrichment activities, have been dominant international security stories of the past year. **A failure of efforts to counter proliferation in these two instances could lead other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 and an apparent lack of US interest in extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) also threaten the disarmament agenda.** A decision not to extend New START would eliminate verifiable, legally binding limits on the number of deployed American and Russian strategic warheads. **Combined with nuclear modernization programs in both countries, backsliding on disarmament has led to fears of a new nuclear arms race. China, India and Pakistan have also expanded their nuclear arsenals in the last three years. These developments are emerging at a time when the nuclear nonproliferation regime is experiencing deep challenges.** At the heart of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a bargain — which Canada played a leading role in forging in the late 1960s — that non-nuclear-weapons states would not proliferate, in exchange for a commitment to disarmament from nuclear-weapons states. In recent years, there has been considerable frustration among non-nuclear countries over the slow pace of disarmament. Owing in part to these frustrations and a desire to reinvigorate the disarmament agenda, 70 countries have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and 23 have ratified it since it was adopted at the United Nations in July 2017. The TPNW stigmatizes the possession of nuclear weapons, highlighting their dire humanitarian consequences**. The nuclear-weapons states have announced their unwillingness to be bound by the treaty and in some cases have responded disdainfully to the entire enterprise.** US officials, for example, are said to regard the treaty as a "nuisance." **This fractious setting threatens progress at the upcoming spring 2020 review conference of the NPT.** Review conferences are the primary intergovernmental mechanism for meetings of the states that have signed the NPT. These high-level affairs, which occur every five years, are an opportunity for states to report on their progress in implementing the treaty and to take substantive decisions**. Meanwhile, conflicts with Iran and potentially North Korea threaten stability in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. As a means of balancing perceived threats, other states could seek their own nuclear weapons, leading to a proliferation "cascade." The wider the circle of nuclear states, the greater the damage to current norms and institutions that restrain global proliferation.** An increase in the number of nuclear-weapons states also increases the risk of miscalculation and **inadvertent use. When countries with domestic instability have nuclear weapons, the threat of "loose nukes" and** nuclear terrorism increases. These developments raise the chances of cataclysmic nuclear conflict. In the last three years, all nuclear-weapons states have invested in new delivery systems, and some have expanded the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. The development of new tactical nukes and of hypersonic weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads poses new challenges, most notably to the maintenance of strategic stability. What is needed is a progressive ratcheting down of great power tensions, not new avenues for competition. Arms control and disarmament agreements have long been ways in which great powers collaborate to reduce global tensions, furthering détente. From this perspective, a failure to extend New START would be a missed opportunity.

Cross app prob weighing from above

5. T: Multipolarity – balanced system checks expansion

Marchetti 17 (Raffaele Marchetti, *senior assistant professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the School of Government of LUISS, external expert for the

European Commission, "End of the American hegemonic cycle," Feb 14, https://www.opendemocracy.net/raffaele-marchetti/end-of-american-hegemonic-cycle) //ET

Trump's election marks the end of the long phase of **American** world **hegemony**. Despite the electoral slogan "Make America Great Again" and the great expectations this may have generated, his presidency will presumably be characterized by an overall retrenchment. Many different interpretations have been provided on the reasons of Trump's success ranging from populist framing to FBI support. Contrary to the mainstream debate, I see a more fundamental reason underpinning his victory: the changed costs/benefits balance in the US role in the world. **The theory of hegemonic stability holds that at some point the hegemon will start to decline due to the increased costs of the management of the system which outbalance the benefits the hegemon gains out of it. The costs of the management of the system have in fact been accumulating in the last 4 presidencies**. During the Bush administrations, security costs due to the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have, among other damage, impacted negatively on the US government. Equally, during the Obama presidencies costs due to economic stimuli have increased the overall debt of the country. **As predicted by hegemonic theory, we finally come to a point in which the costs became too heavy for the citizens, or rather their perception of this becomes more evident, so that they start to protest and demand a change**. **This was intercepted by Trump much more than by Clinton, with Trump stepping back to decrease the costs of international** projection. So-called "imperial overstretch", formed much earlier, led Trump's electorate to seek less international costs (and possibly, but less likely, more domestic benefits). Hence, the promised withdrawal from a number of Free Trade Agreements, the discussion of the terms of NATO participation, cancellation of the environmental deals etc. From this perspective Trump's election has to do with a much longer trend of international order rather than the specific time-lapse of the electoral campaign, a trend of dis-engagement that had already begun during the Obama administration and will now be more clearly visible with Trump. The system in which we have been living in the last 70 years was created in large part by the US leadership. The UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and WTO are all institutional arrangements that have been strongly promoted by the post WWII hegemon and that have been preserved in life thanks to continuous support by the USA. Now all of this is put into question by the resistance of the newly elected president to engage in and with these multilateral organizations. Trump will most likely have a more unpredictable, possibly turbulent behaviour vis a vis all of these institutions and this will lead to their transformation and perhaps for some, to their marginalization. Other significant elements in this jigsaw puzzle have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. It is because of global transformation in production chains, the relocation of multinational corporation abroad coupled with the possibility of (re-)importing goods, and the subsequent loss of jobs that a component of the middle class has been badly affected by unemployment. But it is also thanks to globalization that China is rising fast and challenging the US leadership in economic, but also increasingly in political and military terms. It is clear by now that the policy choice for globalization taken by the US leadership in the '80s (republican) and '90s (democratic) was beneficial only at the beginning, but later turned out to be detrimental to the power position of the USA in the world economy. It is widely recognised that India and especially China are the real winners in the game of globalization, hence closing the gap with the west. Russia is an additional element in this calculation. This new would-be multipolar system, deprived of the overall western master plan, is left to pure bargaining, pure transactionalism played with ad hoc games, which is very much in line with Trump's overall attitude to socio-economic engagement. And yet, this might have a de-polarizing effect, a de-escalating consequence in terms of the current world tensions that have grown in the last few years. Here I am thinking especially of the west-Russia split. **Without a hegemonic power pushing for a specific world order, a more balanced system might emerge**. We might end up with a Trump presidency that has polarizing effects domestically and depolarizing effects internationally. The line of march is clear: either **new competition based on multipolar rivalry which might possibly escalate into conflicts, or the opening of new channels for dialogue,** might lead to a foundational phase in which innovative rules of the international games are written by western and non-western powers together. It will be up to Trump and the other leaders to steer the way and to take a decision on which way to go.

Pref on probability: unipolarity empirically causes the most violence

Monteiro 14 (Nuno P. Monteiro, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale Nuno, Theory of Unipolar Politics, p. 181-184, DOA: 7/22/21]ET

At the same time, the first two-and-a-half decades of our unipolar system have been anything but peaceful in what concerns U.S, involvement in interstate conflict. U.S. forces have been employed in **four interstate wars** – Kuwait (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2oo3-2011) – **in addition to many smaller interventions** including Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.5 As a result, **the United States has been at war for fifteen of the twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, In fact, the first**

two-and-a-half decades of unipolarity — representing around 1o percent of U.S. history account for more than 30 percent of the nation's total wartime.6 For critics of U.S. interventionism, "the central question [of contemporary international politics] is how to contain and moderate the use of military force by the United States."8 Table 5 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: from 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; from 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and unipolarity since 1990.9 Table 6 then presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. **Unipolarity is by far the most conflict prone of all systems according to two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers.** In multipolarity, 18 percent of great-power years were spent at war versus 16 percent in bipolarity. In unipolarity, in contrast, a remarkable 64 percent of great-power years have been until now spent at war – by far the highest percentage in all systems. Furthermore, during multipolarity and bipolarity the probability that war involving a great power would, break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 16.o percent – or around four times higher. It might be argued that the higher number of years that great powers spent at war under unipolarity are merely the result of the long, grinding, and unforeseen occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq by U.S. forces.11 But even if these two wars had gone according to U.S. plans – if the Afghanistan War had ended in the spring of 2002 and the Iraq War in the summer of 2003 – unipolarity would still be particularly prone to great-power involvement in war. Even if the United States had not occupied either Afghanistan or Iraq, it would still have spent 16.0 percent of the post-Cold War years at war, which is about the same as the respective percentages for bipolar and multipolar systems. In other words, **even if the United States had refrained from any military occupations, the frequency of its use of military force in major operations would still give us no reason to believe that unipolarity is any more peaceful than any other past configuration of the international system**. As things turned out in both Afghanistan and Iraq, **the last two-and-a-half decades saw a sharp increase in both the incidence of conflict and the percentage of great-power years spent at war. This is a particularly puzzling finding given that the current unipole – the United States – is a democracy in a world populated by more democracies than at any time in the past. In light of arguments about how democracies are better able to solve disputes peacefully, choose to engage only in those wars they can win, and tend to fight shorter wars, the United States should have spent fewer years at war than previous nondemocratic great powers.**12 As we can see, post-Cold War history can be used in support of both the widespread claim that the overall level of conflict has declined and of the claim that the United States has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in interstate war. Reality seems to be chafing against the view that unipolarity produces no incentives for conflict; at least in what concerns the unipole's involvement in interstate wars, the past two-and-a-half decades seem to point in the opposite direction.

On grids

1. T: Efficiency

Sovacool 10 (Benjamin Sovacool: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. 6/1/10, “Critically weighing the costs and benefits of a nuclear renaissance”, Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1943815X.2010.485618#d1e227 // DOA: 3/3/25)JDE

A third disadvantage relates to the energy payback ration of the nuclear fuel cycle, or how much energy one gets out of a nuclear power plant after they deduct the energy needed for construction, operation, fueling, decommissioning, and storage. Helen Caldicott has noted, for example, that **a nuclear power plant must operate at full load for 10–18 years before it has paid off its energy debts** (Caldicott Citation1994). A separate study looking at the energy payback ratio of different electricity systems, **the ratio of total energy produced**

compared to the energy needed to build and operate an energy system, found that hydroelectric, wind, and biomass power plants are at least 1.5–20 times more efficient than nuclear reactors (Gagnon Citation2008).

LI: if energy systems are more efficient, there's more available to power the grid

2. T: Uranium shortage

Sovacool 10 (Benjamin Sovacool: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. 6/1/10, "Critically weighing the costs and benefits of a nuclear renaissance", Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1943815X.2010.485618#d1e227 // DOA: 3/3/25)JDE

Nonetheless, while historical reserves of uranium have been plentiful, **security of future supplies is uncertain**. The International Atomic Energy Agency, for instance, estimates in their Red Book that **primary supply of uranium will cover only 4–6% of the industry's need for fuel in 2025**. They warned in 2001 that **low-cost ores are being rapidly expended and countries are being forced to explore harder to reach more expensive sites** (International Atomic Energy Agency Citation2001). Even more worrying is that the Red Book has been accused of historically overestimating uranium mining capacity and availability of reserves, with upward exaggerations of 20–30% common (Dittmar Citation2009). One study from the Institute of Particle Physics of ETH Zurich and CERN **cautioned that extraction from known mines and secondary resources during the coming 5–10 years appears to be much more critical than generally believed, and almost no country that uses nuclear energy is self sufficient in fuel production.** Table 3, for example, shows that virtually every country producing uranium is now past its peak, and that a deficit occurred in 2008 between uranium supply and demand (with demand for natural uranium exceeding supply) (Dittmar Citation2009). As depicts, Germany and France have essentially stopped uranium mining, Japan, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Sweden never had any substantial mining operations of their own, and production in the United States is not even sufficient to satisfy 10% of national demand. For the past 15 years, only about two-thirds of global uranium requirements (between 31,000 and 44,000 tons) have been extracted from actual uranium mines, with the shortfall made up of civilian and military stocks of uranium and plutonium built up over the cold war along with mixed oxide reprocessing. These **secondary sources, however, are becoming rapidly exhausted, convincing the Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA to declare in the press release of their Red Book 2007 that "most secondary resources [of uranium] are now in decline and the gap will increasingly need to be closed by new production.** Given the long lead time typically required to bring new resources into production, uranium supply shortfalls could develop" (Dittmar Citation2009). Such pessimism was confirmed recently by another independent study on available uranium resources at 93 deposits and fields located in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, France, Kazakhstan, Malawi, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, Russia, South Africa, United States, and Zambia (Mudd and Disendorf Citation2008).

LI: shortage means supplies are unreliable which thus means the grid would be too

3. NL: Nuclear reactors still rely on grids to power cooling systems

Kuperman 24 (Alan J. Kuperman is associate professor and coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. 10/7/24, "On Army bases, nuclear energy can't add resilience, just costs and risks", Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/on-army-bases-nuclear-energy-cant-add-resilience-just-costs-and-risks/ // DOA: 3/5/25)JDE

What about resilience, which is the supposed justification for buying these expensive reactors? Well, **even though reactors can produce electricity, they have always required an external source of electricity to keep them running safely — most crucially to cool the fuel to avoid a nuclear meltdown and radioactive release**. The Army's

recent request for proposals seems to acknowledge this reality by saying that in addition to an external electricity source, **the reactor must have an "alternative credited independent power source as a backup."** Therefore, **an Army base reactor would almost surely depend on drawing electricity from the commercial grid**. But **this means the reactor would be no more resilient than the existing power source it is supposed to replace to increase resilience**. In the event of a blackout of the commercial grid, what would the reactor do to get essential electricity? Of course, **it would turn on its backup diesel generators.** However, if the base requires backup generators anyway, it has no need for the super-expensive reactor.

4. T: Nuclear energy is more expensive than alternatives

Jacobson 24 (Mark Z Jacobson, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Stanford University, 17 January 2024, "Seven Reasons Why New Nuclear Energy is an Opportunity Cost That Damages Efforts to Address Climate Change and Air Pollution", Stanford, https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/24-01-MZJ-HRTestimony.pdf, DOA 3/27/2025) ESR

2. Cost **The levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for a new U.S. nuclear reactor** in 2023, based on Lazard (6) **is $181** (1141 to 221)/MWh. This **compares with $49.5** (24 to 75)/MWh **for onshore wind and $60** (24 to 96)/MWh **for utility-scale solar PV from the same source. This** nuclear LCOE range **is an underestimate** for several reasons. First, **Lazard assumes a construction time for nuclear of 5.75 years. However**, the Vogtle 3 and 4 reactors, **the only ones built in the U.S. in the past 20 years, took 9 and 10 years, respectively for construction**. Lazard also assumed a mean capital cost of $11.2/W. However, the Vogtle **reactors cost $15.7/W** ($35 billion for 2.23 GW). These changes alone suggest an LCOE of **nuclear** that is **3 to 14 times** that of **onshore wind.** Next, the **LCOE does not include the cost of** the major nuclear **meltdowns** in history. For example, the estimated **cost to clean up the damage from** three **Fukushima** Dai-ichi nuclear reactor core meltdowns, **was $460 to $640 billion** (7). This is **$1.2 billion, or 10 to 18.5 percent of the capital cost, of every nuclear reactor worldwide**. In addition, the **LCOE does not include the cost of storing nuclear waste for hundreds of thousands of years**. In the U.S. alone, about $**500 million is spent yearly to safeguard nuclear waste** from about 92 civilian nuclear reactors. **This** amount **will only increase as more waste accumulates**. After the nuclear reactors retire, the **spending must continue for hundreds of thousands of years with no revenue stream from electricity sales** to pay for the storage. **There is no reason to think SMRs will be less expensive** than large reactors. Indeed, SMRs were developed before large reactors, but **large**

reactors took over because they were less expensive due to economies of scale. Small reactors generally **require more material per unit energy produced than large reactors.**

o/w tf – their studies ignore longterm costs passed on to future generations

Leslie-Bole 19 (Haley Leslie-Bole, Senior Manager of US Lands and Climate at the World Resources Institute, Masters of Environmental Management from Yale University, 30 July 2019, "The true long-term cost of nuclear power", Yale Environmental Review, https://environment-review.yale.edu/true-long-term-cost-nuclear-power, DOA 3/27/2025) ESR

The impacts of our transition away from fossil fuels will be felt primarily by future generations. How then can we factor future costs and benefits into the energy choices we make today? **Researchers** Robert **Barron** from the Western New England University **and** Mary **Hill** from the University of Kansas are trying to answer this question. They **calculated the cost of nuclear power as a strategy for low-carbon energy production in the future** and are concerned that **the costs are higher than previous research has suggested.** Nuclear energy has always had both appealing benefits and serious drawbacks. The meltdowns of nuclear reactors in Chernobyl and Fukushima created some of the worst environmental disasters in recent history. Yet, some analysts suggest that nuclear power is also a relatively inexpensive, low-carbon way to produce electricity. Its low-carbon emissions are particularly important in the fight against climate change, as the world looks to transition from high-carbon fuels like oil and coal toward lower-carbon methods of producing power. One study cited by Barron and Hill estimates that the transition to low-carbon energy pathways would be 50% more expensive if nuclear power were not an option than if it were included as a transition energy source. Because of these benefits and drawbacks, the decision whether to increase reliance on nuclear energy is complex. **According to Barron and Hill, to get a sense of the true cost of nuclear power, we need to assess not only the cost of power production now, but its effect on future generations – a time scale not typically considered in most engineering projects**. Not only can **power plant meltdowns create long-lasting radioactive contamination, but permanent disposal of the radioactive waste that nuclear power plants produce has not yet been achieved by any country**. Because the cost of waste disposal is difficult to assess, researchers have debated what the best way is to measure the costs and benefits of nuclear power. Barron and Hill have created a model that provides a more accurate way of factoring in the costs borne by future generations. To do this, **the team closely considers** an economic modeling factor called a **discount rate**. A discount rate of about 5% is common, but it emphasizes near-term costs and downplays future costs. Such a high discount rate is consistent with valuing current or soon to be realized benefits or costs more highly than benefits that

we might experience in the future. For example, it is easier to save money for a vacation you know you will be taking this summer, than it is to save for theoretical retirement many years in the future. To account for the impact of nuclear waste on future generations, **Barron and Hill consider two alternative discounting schemes that account for the costs of nuclear power on future generations**. This is important, because **nuclear power plants and nuclear waste will remain dangerously radioactive for hundreds – if not thousands - of years after they are created.** Using their model, Barron and Hill found that **nuclear power is likely to be a far less cost-effective, low-carbon energy source than others had suggested.** In fact, their **models find nuclear waste disposal to be 2.5 to 4 times more expensive** than other models have suggested. These new findings support the argument that nuclear power, despite being a low-carbon energy source, may not be cost effective. With this in mind, more research is needed to determine what role nuclear power is actually capable of playing in a low-carbon future. Many of today's major environmental decisions will affect the people of tomorrow. It may be complex to measure the impacts of nuclear power, but we must continue to do so for the sake of future generations.

LI: trades off w money spent on cyberdefenses

On transition

On climate

1. NU: Emissions down

Gaffney et al 25 (Michael Gaffney: research analyst with Rhodium Group's Energy and Climate practice, attended UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy where he earned a Master of Public Policy specializing in energy and environmental policy. He holds a bachelor's degree in political economy from UC Berkely. Ben King: associate director with Rhodium Group's Energy and Climate practice, focusing on the effects of policy and economic changes to the US energy system. He previously worked for the US Department of Energy in the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. John Larsen: partner at Rhodium group where he leads the firm's US energy system and climate policy research, a non-resident Senior Associate at the Energy and National Security program at CSIS. He has lectured at Johns Hopkins and Amherst College. He holds a master's degree in Environmental Policy and Planning from Tufts University. January 9, 2025, "Preliminary US Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for 2024", Rhodium Group, https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-greenhouse-gas-estimates-for-2024/ . DOA March 17, 2025) CLS

Since peaking in 2004, emissions have trended downward in a bumpy fashion. But after a significant decline in 2023, we estimate that 2024 emissions were down by just 0.2% year-on-year while the economy grew by 2.7%, continuing a decoupling of

emissions and economic activity. Emissions are still below pre-pandemic levels and remain about 20% below 2005 levels, the benchmark for US commitments under the Paris Agreement. Lower manufacturing output drove the overall decrease in 2024 emissions, with industrial sector emissions falling by 1.8%. In the oil and gas sector, continued reductions in methane emissions intensity led to a 3.7% drop in emissions. Increased air and road travel partially offset these reductions, which drove up transportation sector emissions by 0.8%. Demand for electricity—led by the residential sector—also rose by 3% and was met by higher natural gas, wind, and solar generation, while coal generation saw just a slight decline. For the first time, combined solar and wind generation surpassed coal, although overall power sector emissions increased by a slight 0.2%. In the buildings sector, emissions crept up 0.4% due to slightly elevated fuel use. The modest 2024 decline underscores the urgency of accelerating decarbonization in all sectors. To meet its Paris Agreement target of a 50-52% reduction in emissions by 2030, the US must sustain an ambitious 7.6% annual drop in emissions from 2025 to 2030, a level the US has not seen outside of a recession in recent memory. Economic growth and slightly lower emissions in 2024 Economic growth is one of the major determinants of GHG emissions, and in 2024, the US gross domestic product (GDP) expanded at a projected annual rate of 2.7%. This growth was driven by strong consumer spending as well as public and private investment, despite persistent inflation, high interest rates, and elevated labor and materials costs. **Clean technology played a significant role. Record-high investment in the manufacturing and deployment of clean technologies accounted for 5% of total private investment in structures, equipment, and durable consumer goods in Q3, according to the latest data from the Clean Investment Monitor,** a joint effort between Rhodium Group and MIT's Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). While the economy grew, we estimate that US GHG emissions fell slightly in 2024. The US will get its final GHG report card for 2024 when the EPA finalizes its annual GHG inventory in spring 2026. However, using preliminary economic and energy activity data, we project that economy-wide emissions declined by just 0.2% in 2024 (Figure 1). **This puts US emissions at about 20% below 2005 levels, and down by 8% from pre-pandemic levels.**

Pref: they have no emissions up uq

2. T: nuclear power plants increase carbon emissions

Jacobson 24 (Mark Z. Jacobson Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering & Director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program, Stanford University, "7 reasons why nuclear energy is not the answer to solve climate change" https://www.oneearth.org/the-7-reasons-why-nuclear-energy-is-not-the-answer-to-solve-climate-change/, 10/10/24, DOA 3/6/25) AKD

There is no such thing as a zero- or close-to-zero emission nuclear power plant. Even existing plants emit due to the continuous mining and refining of uranium needed for the plant. Emissions from new nuclear are 78 to 178 g-CO2/kWh, not close to 0. Of this, 64 to 102 g-CO2/kWh over 100 years are emissions from the background grid while consumers wait 10 to 19 years for nuclear to come online

or be refurbished, relative to 2 to 5 years for wind or solar. **In addition, all nuclear plants emit 4.4 g-CO2e/kWh from the water vapor and heat they release. This contrasts with solar panels and wind turbines, which reduce heat or water vapor fluxes to the air by about 2.2 g-CO2e/kWh for a net difference from this factor alone of 6.6 g-CO2e/kWh.** In fact, **China's investment in nuclear plants that take so long between planning and operation instead of wind or solar resulted in China's CO2 emissions increasing 1.3 percent from 2016 to 2017 rather than declining by an estimated average of 3 percent. The resulting difference in air pollution emissions may have caused 69,000 additional air pollution deaths in China in 2016 alone, with additional deaths in years prior and since.**

3. T: tradeoff- w/o nuclear better forms of energy are prioritized

Bird et al 25 (Lori
Bird: director of World Resources Institute US Energy Program. Previously principal analyst in the Markets and Policy Group of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, co-authored studies on the costs and benefits of renewable electricity standards, and previously worked for the US Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency. She holds a master's degree in environmental studies from Yale. Andrew Light: program manager for IREC with a Master's in Environmental Policy from the University of Michigan's School of Environment and Sustainability. Ian Goldsmith: research analyst with US energy program, he holds a Master's in Public Policy from the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown University. February 21, 2025, "US clean power development sees record progress, as well as stronger headwinds", World Resources Institute, https://www.wri.org/insights/clean-energy-progress-united-states . DOA March 17, 2025) CLS

Following the record-breaking outcomes of 2023, 2024 was another impressive year for clean energy deployment in the United States. These upward trends signal that clean electricity sources are an increasingly vital part of the U.S. economy and power system, with renewable sources and battery storage making up the vast majority of new additions to the grid. Solar and battery storage continue to set installation records, while wind energy has plateaued. Solar surpassed 2023's record installations in 2024, adding an estimated 39.6 gigawatts (GW) of capacity, compared to 27.4GW in 2023. Installed solar capacity in the U.S. now totals about 220 GW, enough to provide over 7% of the nation's electricity. This continues a decade-long trend of rapid growth in solar power. Battery storage nearly doubled in 2024, with total installed capacity reaching almost 29 GW — and projected to grow another 47% in 2025. This growth in capacity will help support the grid when variable renewable energy technologies, such as solar and wind, are unavailable, making

the U.S. power system more stable and secure. At the same time, onshore wind capacity growth has tapered off, with only 5.3 GW of new generation added in 2024, significantly less than wind installation levels in previous years. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), installed wind capacity totaled 153 GW at the end of 2024. Limited growth of wind power resulted in part from a focus on repowering older facilities as well as continued challenges related to supply chains, financing, interconnection and permitting.

CAP 08 (Center for American Progress. 2008, "10 Reasons Not to Invest in Nuclear Energy", CAP<, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/10-reasons-not-to-invest-in-nuclear-energy/ //. DOA: 3/2/25)JDE

Nuclear reactors require water use amid shortages. Large areas of the United States already face water shortages, and the effects of global warming are expected to exacerbate this problem. "Elec tricity generation accounts for nearly half of all water withdrawals in the nation," and nuclear power stations require more water than fossil fuel use does. The only alternative to the water usage associated with nuclear energy is less efficient (and more expensive) dry cooling systems. 7. Safety concerns still plague nuclear power. After the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, the United States stopped granting licenses for new nuclear plants. The crises demonstrated that the nuclear industry is vulnerable to public concern. While modern reactors are safer than those that failed in the past, another accident anywhere in the world could turn public opinion against nuclear power as a whole. 8. Nuclear is already a mature technology—it will not get cheaper. The American nuclear industry has benefited from $100 billion in direct and indirect subsidies since 1948, and nuclear power provides 20 percent of electricity in the United States. The technology behind nuclear power is fully developed, so nuclear energy is unlikely to get much cheaper. Continued subsidies would be necessary to make nuclear cost-competitive with other energy sources, but will not lower the overall price of nuclear power. 9. Other clean energy technologies are cheaper, cleaner, and faster to build. Solar power, photovoltaics, advanced biofuels, wind power, and other energy technologies promise to revolutionize how electricity is generated in the 21st century. Already, wind energy can produce electricity for less than five cents per kWh, and concentrated solar power can produce energy for 11-12 cents per kWh—even at night—and these costs are decreasing. Alternatives do not produce nuclear waste, and they do not face the same extensive safety, regulatory, and construction costs and delays that nuclear does. 10. Nuclear subsidies take money away from more effective alternative energy subsidies. Subsidies for nuclear reactors wouldn't subsidize nuclear technology—they would subsidize the nuclear industry. Congress should fund research of clean, alternative energy technologies that promise to rival fossil fuels in cost—without subsidies. Congress should also provide tax credits that would make such technologies cheaper by encouraging production and moving them down the experience curve. Such support would encourage a growing American industry and create American jobs. By squandering our limited resources on subsidies for the nuclear power industry, the United States is missing an

extraordinary opportunity.

3. T: water pollution

Wasserman 16 (Harvey Franklin
Wasserman is an American journalist, author, democracy activist, and advocate for renewable energy. He has been a strategist and organizer in the anti-nuclear movement in the United States since 1973, and in the election protection movement since 2004. 9/21/2016, "How Nuclear Power Causes Global Warming", The Progressive Magazine, https://progressive.org/latest/nuclear-power-causes-global-warming/, DOA: 3/7/2025) SMB

Supporters of nuclear power like to argue that nukes are the key to combatting climate change. Here's why they are dead wrong. Every nuclear generating station spews about two-thirds of the energy it burns inside its reactor core into the environment. Only one-third is converted into electricity. Another tenth of that is lost in transmission. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists: Nuclear fission is the most water intensive method of the principal thermoelectric generation options in terms of the amount of water withdrawn from sources. In 2008, nuclear power plants withdrew eight times as much freshwater as natural gas plants per unit of energy produced, and up to 11 percent more than the average coal plant. Every day, large reactors like the two at Diablo Canyon, California, individually dump about 1.25 billion gallons of water into the ocean at temperatures up to 20 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than the natural environment. Diablo's "once-through cooling system" takes water out of the ocean and dumps it back superheated, irradiated and laden with toxic chemicals. Many U.S. reactors use cooling towers which emit huge quantities of steam and water vapor that also directly warm the atmosphere. These emissions are often chemically treated to prevent algae and other growth that could clog the towers. Those **chemicals can** then be **carried downwind, along with radiation** from the reactors. In addition, hundreds of thousands of birds die annually by flying into the reactor domes and towers. The Union of Concerned Scientists states: **The temperature increase in the bodies of water can have serious adverse effects on aquatic life**. Warm water holds less oxygen than cold water, thus discharge from once-through cooling systems can create a "temperature squeeze" that **elevates the metabolic rate for fish.** Additionally, **suction pipes** that are used to intake water can **draw plankton, eggs and larvae into the plant's machinery**, **while**

larger organisms can be trapped against the protective screens of the pipes. Blocked intake screens have led to temporary shut downs and NRC fines at a number of plants.

And that's not all. **All nuclear reactors emit Carbon 14, a radioactive isotope, invalidating the industry's claim that reactors are "carbon free." And the fuel that reactors burn is carbon-intensive. The mining, milling, and enrichment processes needed to produce the pellets that fill the fuel rods inside the reactor cores all involve major energy expenditures, nearly all of it based on coal, oil, or gas. And of course there's the problem of nuclear waste. After more than a half-century of well-funded attempts, we've seen no solution for the management of atomic power's intensely radioactive waste**. There's the "low-level" waste involving enormous quantities of troublesome irradiated liquids and solid trash that must be dealt with outside the standard civilian waste stream. And that handling involves fossil fuels burned in the process of transportation, management, and disposal as well As for the high-level waste, this remains one of humankind's **most persistent and dangerous problems**. Atomic apologists have claimed that the intensely radioactive spent fuel rods can somehow be usable for additional power generation. But after a half-century of efforts, with billions of dollars spent, all attempts to do that have utterly failed. **There are zero successful reactors capable of producing more reactor fuel than they use**, or able to derive more energy from the tens of thousands of tons of spent fuel rods they create. Some reactors, like Fukushima, use "mixed-oxide" fuels that have proven to be extremely dirty and expensive. It's possible some of this "MOX" fuel containing plutonium, actually fissioned at Fukushima Unit Three, raising terrifying questions about the dangers of its use. **The mushroom cloud that appears on video as Fukushima Unit Three exploded stands as an epic warning against further use of these impossible-to-manage fuels**. The MOX facility under construction near Aiken, South Carolina, is now projected to require another ten years to build with another ten possible after that to phase into production. U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz said on September 13, 2016, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the mismanaged project was "impossible" to carry out and that it could cost $30 billion to $50 billion. Even the current pro-nuclear Congress won't fully fund the project and the Department of Energy DOE continues to recommend abandoning it. **There are no credible estimates of the global warming damage done by the intensely hot explosions** at the four Fukushima reactors, or at Chernobyl**, or** at any other past and **future reactor meltdowns or blowups**. Atomic apologists argue that the disposal of high-level reactor wastes should be a relatively simple problem, lacking only the political will to proceed. The industry touts New Mexico's Waste Isolation Pilot Project, or WIPP, which has long been the poster child for military attempts to deal with high-level trash from the nuclear weapons program. Accepting its first shipment of waste in 1999, WIPP was touted as the ultimate high-tech, spare-no-expense model that proved radioactive waste disposal "can be done." But a series of disastrous events in February, 2014, led WIPP to stop accepting wastes—the sole function for which it was designed. Most significant was the explosion of a single barrel of highly radioactive waste materials (it was mistakenly packed with organic rather than clay-based kitty litter). About a dozen WIPP workers

were exposed to potentially harmful radiation. The entire facility remains closed. In a phone interview, facility management told me it may again accept some wastes before the end of this year. But at least part of the cavernous underground labyrinth may never be reopened. The Los Angeles Times estimated the cost of this single accident at $2 billion. Overall, **the idea that atomic power is "clean" or "carbon free" or "emission free" is a very expensive misconception**, especially when compared to renewable energy, efficiency, and conservation. Among conservation, efficiency, solar and wind power technologies, there are no global warming analogs to the heat, carbon, and radioactive waste impacts of nuclear power. No green technology kills anywhere near the number of marine organisms that die through reactor cooling systems. Rooftop solar panels do not lose ten percent of the power they generate to transmission, as happens with virtually all centralized power generators. S. David Freeman, former head of numerous large utilities and author of All Electric America: A Climate Solution and the Hopeful Future, says: "Renewables are cheaper and safer. That argument is winning. Let's stick to it." **No terrorist will ever threaten one of our cities by blowing up a solar panel. But the nuclear industry that falsely claims its dying technology doesn't cause global warming does threaten the future of our planet.**

Ocean health is k2 climate

UN N.D. (United Nations: intergovernmental organization that aims to maintain international peace and security, as well as to achieve international cooperation. N.D., "The ocean – the world's greatest ally against climate change", United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/ocean . DOA March 12, 2025) CLS

The ocean generates 50 percent of the oxygen we need, absorbs 25 percent of all carbon dioxide emissions and captures 90 percent of the excess heat generated by these emissions. It is not just 'the lungs of the planet' but also its largest 'carbon sink' – a vital buffer against the impacts of climate change. The ocean is central to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions and stabilizing the Earth's climate. However, increasing greenhouse gas emissions have affected the health of the ocean – warming and acidifying seawater – causing detrimental changes to life under water and on land, and reducing the ocean's ability to absorb carbon dioxide and safeguard life on the planet. Here are a few reasons we need to safeguard the ocean as our best ally for climate solutions.

On econ

1. T: Nuclear subsidies don't produce jobs – companies empirically cut their workforce

NIRS 21 (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, national information and networking center for citizens and environmental activists, 27 July 2021, "How Nuclear Bailouts Would Cost

over 60,000 Green American Jobs", NIRS, https://www.nirs.org/how-nuclear-bailouts-would-cost-over-60000-green-american-jobs/, DOA 4/3/2025) ESR

Specifically: how many jobs would a nuclear bailout actually create? Spoiler alert! None. Over the last few weeks, we've shown why subsidizing nuclear power is a bad investment for climate, environmental justice, and renewable energy. Earlier this month, we co-released a major report with Friends of the Earth that shows why nuclear bailouts fail on all counts: climate, jobs, and justice. To be sure, this country has needed a major jobs program for at least a generation. As proponents of the Green New Deal note, because the climate crisis requires the transformation of our entire energy economy, we will need to create millions of jobs to take it on. President Biden's American Jobs and Families Plan–and the $4.1 trillion in legislation members of Congress are advancing–are also supposed to create millions of jobs. So this week, it's time to dig into jobs and climate–and how subsidizing nuclear reactors hurts both. **Billions for a Nuclear Bailout = No New Jobs** (at most) That's right. **Investing tens of billions in old, uneconomical nuclear reactors will create, at most, zero actual jobs.** The **subsidies would go to power plants that are currently operating**, ostensibly to prevent any more of them from closing because they are not making enough profits. The reality is, that **the reactors that would be bailed out were built 30-50 years ago and are currently operating with full-time staff.** So the best the subsidy could do is to avoid potential layoffs of nuclear workers, not create any new jobs for people who are currently unemployed or underemployed. In reality, the subsidy could actually result in a loss of jobs. That is because the **subsidies would not require the companies to keep workers employed at current levels**. We know that **nuclear power companies have cut jobs at reactors that are already receiving subsidies.** Earlier this year, **Exelon** revealed that it **cut its nuclear workforce in Illinois by 15% since 2016, despite receiving nearly $1 billion in subsidies over the last four years**. Three of its eleven reactors in Illinois (Clinton and Quad Cities 1&2) have been receiving $235 million/year in ratepayer subsidies under a 2016 law. Yet Exelon cut its nuclear workforce statewide by about 720 jobs, averaging 65 per reactor, including at Clinton and Quad Cities. Given the financial conditions of the nuclear industry, it's possible that thousands of nuclear workers could still lose their jobs even if Congress passes $50 billion in nuclear subsidies.

2. T: Opportunity cost – renewables create more jobs

NIRS 21 (Nuclear Information and Resource Service, national information and networking center for citizens and environmental activists, 27 July 2021, "How Nuclear Bailouts Would Cost over 60,000 Green American Jobs", NIRS, https://www.nirs.org/how-nuclear-bailouts-would-cost-over-60000-green-american-jobs/, DOA 4/3/2025) ESR

Opportunity Costs: **Subsidizing nuclear power could prevent over 60,000 jobs from being created** Budgets are about choices. Senate Democrats have agreed to $3.5 trillion to fund a package of physical and social infrastructure, with funds raised by increasing the minimum income tax rates on corporations and very wealthy people (household incomes more than $400,000/year). So **the budget is set.** The **proposed nuclear subsidy would come out of that budget–diverting funds from other programs, priorities, and investments.** By our calculations, knowing that President Biden's American Jobs Plan proposed $469 billion for renewable energy and other electricity infrastructure, the nuclear subsidy would take up more than 10% of that budget. This would be a massive amount of money to waste on a program that would not create a single job and, at best, would sustain a few thousand jobs at nearly four times the cost of the rest of the energy budget. **If those bilions were spent on other energy programs–renewable energy, energy efficiency, battery storage, and/or grid modernization–it would create over 67,000 new jobs**. That would be **enough to re-employ all of the nuclear workers in other energy industries and create jobs to employ 60,000 more people who are currently unemployed or underemployed.** So here is the choice: are we going to give tens of billions to bail out old reactors and ensure most of those workers keep their jobs for a few more years? Or are we going to create four times as many jobs building the energy industry of the future? And if we go with the bailouts, what about the 60,000 Americans for whom the American Jobs Plan will fail to provide jobs?

3. No reason why political solve