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2AC:

(Lots of analytical stuff contact for more info)

Zimmerman 91 Michael Zimmerman, Heideggerian Scholar, Tulane University. "Deep Ecology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution." *ReVision*, 13.3, p. 123-127, Winter 1991

Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess affirm the uniqueness of humankind and its potential for contributing to the Self-realization of all beings. Naess (1984) discusses **humanity's potentialities for evolving into a species whose unique capacity involves appreciating the wonder of creation**. It may sound paradoxical, but with a more lofty image of maturity in humans, the appeal to serve deep, specifically human interests **is in full harmony with the norms of deep ecology**. But this is evident only if we are careful to make our terminology clear. This terminology is today far from common, but it may have an illuminating impact. It proclaims that essentially there is at present a sorry underestimation of the potentialities of the human species. Our species is not destined to be the scourge [or cancer—M.E.Z.] of the earth. If it is bound to be anything, perhaps it is to be the conscious joyful appreciator of this planet as an even greater whole of its immense richness. This may be its "evolutionary potential" or an ineradicable part of it. (p. 8) Insofar as Naess speaks of the "evolutionary potential" of humanity to become appreciators of the planet, he has something in common with the evolutionary views of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin (1990) argues even more emphatically (than Naess) that **humanity's evolutionary potential includes the capacity for intervening in natural processes, even to the point of shaping aspects of evolution on Earth. Clearly, there is room for negotiation and compromise in the hitherto somewhat unsavory debate between deep ecologists and social ecologists in that both hold to some version of a "progressive" and "evolutionary" view of humankind**. Deep ecologists cannot reasonably hope for a move toward nondualistic, nonanthropocentric attitudes without simultaneously affirming the notion that humankind has the capacity for evolution to a more mature stage of consciousness. Social ecologists are quite right in pointing out the dangers involved in rejecting out of hand the whole of modernity, especially its emancipatory political dimensions.

Brown 95 Brown, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, 1995 (Charles S, "Anthropocentrism and Ecocentrism: the quest for a new worldview," *The Midwest Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Winter)

There is a concern among ecologically minded thinkers that **ecocentrism may be used as an ideology of domination**. It is widely believed that **the current level of human interference** with the ecosphere cannot be justified and needs to be reduced. It has been argued that some **forms of ecocentrism lead to the rejection of individual rights and interests for the good of the whole ecosphere**. It is not an unreasonable concern to suspect that **such a worldview could possibly sanction efforts to quickly reduce**

human population to ecologically manageable levels In spite of these totalitarian dangers the ecocentric model is useful as a foil in the critique of the anthropocentric model. I can only suggest without argument that the development of truly benign forms of anthropocentrism will be consistent with benign forms of ecocentrism. Ecological thinking will remain with us and like all other forms of thinking it is human thinking. If such thinking is to be guided by the sense of justice it can only be the human sense of justice which serves as its beacon. All three forms of ecological thinking previously mentioned share the vision of a wholistic worldview which is explicitly contrary to the atomism of the mechanistic and organic worldviews. The ecocentric worldview, like the organic, however, sees value in non-human entities. The task that a viable form of ecocentrism faces is to conceive of the value inherent in non-human entities without falling into the nihilism of radical egalitarianism. This is a task yet to be completed.

Backlash DA

Hayward 97 PhD, Department of Politics at Edinburgh University, "Anthropocentrism: a Misunderstood Problem", Environmental Values

The aim of overcoming anthropocentrism is intelligible if it is understood in terms of improving knowledge about the place of humans in the world; and this includes improving our knowledge about what constitutes the good of nonhuman beings. This kind of knowledge is significantly added to by objectivating science. There may also be a role for other kinds of knowledge – for instance, kinds characterised by empathetic imagining of how it might be like to be a member of another species (Cassano, 1989); but here one must always be cautious about

unwittingly projecting human perceptions on to beings whose actual perceptions may be radically different, since this **would** be to **reintroduce** just the sort of **error that characterises ontological anthropocentrism**. The need for caution is all the clearer when it comes to attempting to gain a non-anthropocentric perspective in ethics. Indeed, it may be that **anthropocentrism in ethics, when properly understood, is actually less harmful than harbouring the aim of overcoming it**. At any rate, a number of the considerations advanced in this article would tend to suggest this view. I have noted: that the ethical impulse which is expressed as the aim of overcoming anthropocentrism is very imperfectly expressed in such terms; that **there are some things about 'anthropocentrism' which are unavoidable, and others even to be applauded**; furthermore, the **things which are to be condemned are not appropriately called 'anthropocentrism' at all**; that the mistaken rejection of anthropocentrism misrepresents the fact that harms to nonhumans, as well as harm to some groups of humans, are caused not by humanity in general but by specific humans with their own vested interests. For these reasons, I suggest that **discussions of environmental values would be better conducted without reference to the equivocal notion of anthropocentrism**.

Lewis 92 George Washington University geography and regional science professor, 1992 [Martin, "Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism" <http://books.google.com/books?id=cMTEEHW2JYC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>, p.18, accessed 7-10-12]

In marked contrast, **the decoupling perspective** endorsed here **seeks to separate human activities from nature**, both in order to protect nature from humanity (for nature's sake) and to allow continued technological progress (for humanity's sake). This entails acknowledging a profound division between humankind and the rest of nature, **a distinction that** many greens allege **is** itself **at the root of the ecological crisis. Yet the** radical **environmentalists who condemn this example** of dualistic thinking **merely substitute for it their own** parallel gulf, **one separating modern** (or technologically oriented) **human beings from nature. This** in turn **entails** positing a radical discontinuity in human development, **a dualism of human nature** separating moderns **from primals** (or primitives). As I shall argue at length in this work's conclusion, **such a division** of humankind **is**, in the end, both **bigoted and** empirically **unsupportable**. We would be better of admitting that while humankind is indeed of nature, intrinsically creative human nature is a phenomenon not found in nature's other creations. In a Promethean environmental future, humans would accentuate the gulf that sets us apart from the rest of the natural world – precisely in order to preserve and enjoy nature at a somewhat distant remove. **Our alternative is to continue to struggle within nature**, and in so doing to distort its forms by our inescapably unnatural presence.