

Nocember Aff Case

First, an Overview

The US is overstaying its welcome in East Asia, trying to fill a role that no longer exists.

Freeman 22 [Chas Freeman, 11-16-2022, "Why Taiwan's dependence on the US is not a safe bet,"

Responsible Statecraft,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/27/why-taiwans-dependence-on-the-u-s-is-not-a-safe-bet/>]

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The regional vacuum the United States filled after World War II has long since ceased to exist. This is a sea change that demands a change in U.S. policy and the regional security architecture. **Most East Asian states are now both prosperous and rapidly developing the robust self-defense capabilities that U.S. military dominance of their region long seemed to make redundant.** But despite all the evidence – for example, the failure of the U.S. humiliation in Indochina to do anything other than mark a transition to a more peaceful and prosperous regional order – **U.S. policy continues to presume that a large U.S. military presence is essential to sustain stability in Asia. Meanwhile, the nations of the region increasingly seek to ensure their independence by reaching out to each other and rearming as well as courting U.S. support.** Only Taiwan continues to delegate its defense to Americans.

Thus, US military support is excessively harmful, drawing unnecessary boundaries between otherwise peaceful states.

Freeman 22 [Chas Freeman, 11-16-2022, "Why Taiwan's dependence on the US is not a safe bet,"

Responsible Statecraft,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/27/why-taiwans-dependence-on-the-u-s-is-not-a-safe-bet/>]

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Washington's current approach ignores both the current and potential capabilities of the region's independent states as well as their need to find a basis for coexistence with a reinvigorated China. The United States seeks to perpetuate a commanding U.S. role in the region's security while disinvesting in its economy and asking next to nothing of the countries it has volunteered to protect. This places a hugely disproportionate defense burden on Americans. **The U.S. approach aims to hold onto a degree of American strategic management of the region's interactions with a continually strengthening China that is both increasingly unrealistic and concerning to China's neighbors. This is a uniquely costly and inherently unsustainable approach to the management of Asian security. It increases rather than reduces the danger of war.**

Contention One is Deescalation

Subpoint A is Diplomacy

US military support of Taiwan hurts the US's relationship with China. Larison 23:

Daniel Larison, 2-28-2023, "Why sending more US military troops to Taiwan is so risky",

Responsible Statecraft,

<https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/28/more-overt-us-support-for-taiwan-is-fraught-with-risk/>

As the United States intensifies its efforts to support Taiwan, it risks further damaging the relationship with China and hamstringing its ability to advance U.S. interests on a wide range of other issues from arms control to climate change. There is also the danger that an increased **U.S. military presence in Taiwan could trigger Chinese responses in the form of increased economic warfare and military exercises that would create additional headaches and costs for Taiwan.** Combined with Speaker McCarthy's expected visit to Taiwan in the spring, these moves may lead to another unnecessary confrontation. Insofar as they are perceived as further eroding U.S. commitments to a One China policy, these actions could make the overall situation less stable rather than more.

All of this is happening against a backdrop of generally heightened tensions and a U.S.-led military buildup in the region, including the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Despite brief hopes of a thaw in the relationship after the breakdown resulting from then-Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taipei last summer, every attempt to repair ties has stalled before it could even begin. As we saw with the overreaction to the incident with the Chinese surveillance balloon and the decision to cancel Secretary Blinken's visit to Beijing, accidents and mistakes that will sometimes happen with other major powers have become occasions for panic and alarmism rather than the manageable problems that they are.

Under these circumstances, **there is a danger that previously routine activities that did not disrupt the bilateral relationship in the past will now be perceived as provocations and lead to strong responses from the other government.** To the extent that every incident is treated as a "test" of resolve rather than an irritant to be smoothed over, it becomes practically impossible to stabilize, much less repair, what many would consider to be the most significant bilateral relationship in the world. The balloon incident showed how inadequate our governments' preparations for crisis management are, and the instinct to cancel diplomatic meetings in response to an incident does not inspire confidence that a more serious clash could be safely navigated.

Jihoon Yu, 1-16-2024, "Korean Denuclearization and the US-China Strategic Rivalry," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2024.2364422#abstract>, accessed 11-11-2024, //ZD, shoutout //NMM

Of the two states, however, the United States cares most about the denuclearization issue while China is primarily concerned with maintaining the DPRK as a buffer state. As such, China is more likely than the United States to use cooperation on Korean denuclearization as a coercive tool.

While neither the US nor China has taken this approach to Korean denuclearization so far, **China has repeatedly shown it is willing to withhold cooperation for coercive purposes.** Most notably, in August 2022, China suspended a slew of cooperative initiatives with the United States in an attempt to punish the United States for the former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. This included cooperation on military affairs (The Theater Commanders and Defense Policy Coordination talks), homeland security (repatriation of illegal immigration, legal assistance on criminal matters, cooperation on transnational crime, and counternarcotics cooperation), and talks on climate change (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Citation2022). While China has resumed talks with the United States on climate change, the other suspensions remain in place (Kine and Lau Citation2023). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi summarized China's rationale for this approach to cooperation with the United States succinctly: "For cooperation to be win-win, there needs to be necessary conditions and atmosphere. It won't do if the US undermines China's core interests ... on the one hand, and on the other, expects China to cooperate unconditionally" (Wang et al. Citation2022). In other words, **China will only engage** in cooperation with the United States **if the United States is willing to comply with Chinese demands on** issues that China views as **its "core interests", including** Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. China has engaged in this approach in the past as well. In 2018, China temporarily suspended the US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in an attempt to ramp up pressure on the United States over disputes over trade and the East China Sea (Tiezzi Citation2018). It also has a long track-record of suspending military-to-military contacts and confidence-building measures in order to coerce the United States into ending **arms sales to Taiwan** and reconnaissance collection in the West Pacific (Kan Citation2014). The United States has made use of this strategy to a more limited extent outside the Korean peninsula. The Trump administration suspended its extradition agreement with Hong Kong and its Fulbright program in mainland China and Hong Kong in 2020 to punish China for its rising repression in Hong Kong (Zheng Citation2020). The United States also

disinvited China from the Rim of the Pacific multilateral naval exercise in 2018 in retaliation for China's growing militarization of the South China Sea (Eckstein Citation2018).

Glaser 21:

Charles L. Glaser, 4-28-2021, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China", Foreign Affairs,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china>

That leaves a less attractive option: the unilateral shedding of U.S. commitments. One form that choice could take is appeasement—concessions that were granted with no expectation of reciprocity and designed to satisfy China's interest in expansion. Appeasement, however, would now be a bad bet, given that a total U.S. withdrawal from East Asia might be required to satisfy Beijing. A better bet would be retrenchment. **The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and scale back its opposition to China's assertive policies simply to avoid conflict.** Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or tertiary interests. Retrenchment's **[this plan's] success would not depend on whether China's goals are limited or on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.**

Impact 1: Invasion

London 24:

Brad Lendon, 6-22-2024, "How China could take Taiwan without even needing to invade", CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/21/china/china-taiwan-quarantine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>

But a Washington think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), warns there is a third way, one that will make it far harder for the United States and other like-minded democracies to counter: Quarantine. **Using "gray zone" tactics – actions just below what might be considered acts of war – the China Coast Guard, its so-called maritime militia and various police and maritime safety agencies could** initiate a full or partial quarantine of Taiwan, possibly **cutting off access to its ports and stopping vital supplies like energy from reaching the island's** 23 million people, a newly released report from CSIS says.

The naval, air and ground components of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the world's largest military force, might play only auxiliary and support roles, authors Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew Funaiole, Samantha Lu and Truly Tinsley write. "China has significantly increased pressure on Taiwan in recent years, stoking fears that tensions could erupt into outright conflict. Much attention has been paid to the threat of an invasion, but **Beijing has options besides invading to coerce, punish, or annex Taiwan,**" the report says.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue defense summit in Singapore earlier this month, Chinese Defense Minister Adm. Dong Jun warned those who support any moves for Taiwan independence will "end up in self-destruction." "We will take resolute actions to curb Taiwan independence and make sure such a plot never succeeds," said Dong, speaking through a translator, while slamming "external interfering forces" for selling arms and having "illegal official contacts" with Taiwan. China's escalating gray zone tactics were on stark display this week as China Coast Guard vessels clashed with Philippine Navy boats in the South China Sea. Videos showed Beijing's troops threatening Filipinos with an axe and other bladed weapons, and Manila said one of its soldiers lost a thumb in a Chinese-instigated collision. The level of violence was a major step up from previous clashes near Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines maintains an outpost on a beached warship in waters claimed by both Beijing and Manila. Similarly, **Beijing's military and economic intimidation of Taiwan**, a highly developed free-market economy, **has**

grown much more pronounced under Xi. China's ruling Communist Party claims the island as its own, despite never having controlled it, and has vowed to "reunify" with it, by force if necessary.

But the CSIS report says **Beijing** has strong options that could not only keep the PLA out of the fight but **could actually put** the island democracy or its supporters like **the United States in the role of initiator of** military **conflict** to preserve Taiwan's autonomy.

But if US military ships or aircraft intervened in what China says is a law enforcement operation, the US could be seen as initiating military hostilities. The report puts the China Coast Guard numbers at 150 ocean-going vessels and 400 smaller ones, like the PLA Navy, the world's largest force in terms of fleet size. Beijing has hundreds of more vessels in its Maritime Safety Agency and maritime militia, fishing boats integrated into China's military and law enforcement services.

O'Hanlon 22:

Michael E. O'Hanlon, 6-1-2022, "But CAN the United States defend Taiwan?", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/>

The United States should respond to any Chinese attack, yes — in that sense, there should not be strategic ambiguity — but rather than promise to respond militarily, we should seek to develop a wider range of response options that include the use of economic, diplomatic, and other tools. This approach has the benefit of being consistent with the Defense Department's concept of "integrated deterrence," and of **not promis[e]ing that we would effectively defend Taiwan when in fact it may be beyond our power to do so.**

CFR 23:

Council on Foreign Relations, 06-xx-2023, "Recommendations", <https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/us-taiwan-relations-in-a-new-era/recommendations>
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Politics and Diplomacy **U.S. diplomacy should focus on deterring Chinese aggression**, signaling to China and Taiwan that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, and ensuring that any future arrangement between China and Taiwan be arrived at peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. To achieve these goals, the United States should work to increase Taiwan's resilience and ability to counter Chinese coercion. Washington's approach to Beijing should focus both on making clear the risks and costs of using force against Taiwan and on reassuring it that Washington does not seek to permanently separate Taiwan from China. In support of these objectives, the United States should: Maintain its One China policy while emphasizing that such a policy is predicated on China pursuing a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. The U.S. One China policy is the foundation of modern U.S.-China relations, and its flexibility has also allowed Washington to build a robust unofficial relationship with Taipei. Despite the decades-long success of the One China policy, calls to abandon it and recognize Taiwan as an independent country have recently grown louder.¹⁷⁶ On one level, this position is understandable given that the CCP has never governed Taiwan and the desire to recognize Taiwan's achievements. As the history of negotiations between the United States and the PRC over normalization reveal, however, Beijing will not accept such a course and would sever its relations with Washington if the latter were to recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Animosity between the United States and China would heighten immeasurably, and any attempts to build guardrails between the countries or manage competition would founder. Any prospect of U.S.-China cooperation on global issues from climate change to nonproliferation, however remote, would disappear. U.S. allies and partners, for their part, would view the U.S. abandonment of its One China policy as irresponsible and destabilizing, placing stress on U.S. efforts to enlist their support in balancing China. A U.S. decision to walk away from its One China policy could also trigger a conflict. China's 2005 Anti-Secession Law threatens, "In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."¹⁷⁷ While Beijing purposely leaves these conditions vague, U.S. recognition of Taiwan as an independent country could trigger a PRC use of force against Taiwan. The current political framework has allowed the United States to pursue its interests with both Taiwan and China,

and cross-strait stability it has afforded has enabled Taiwan to prosper and remain secure. Still, while the U.S. One China policy remains the best approach for managing cross-strait relations, the policy leaves enough room for adjustment and should be tweaked. The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is U.S. policy "to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."¹⁷⁸ Senior U.S. officials should publicly and emphatically articulate this linkage between continued U.S. adherence to its One China policy and the PRC refraining from using force against Taiwan—in other words, that the U.S. One China policy is conditional on the PRC's approach to Taiwan. Publicly and consistently making this point would serve as a warning to leaders in Beijing that they should not expect Washington to maintain the status quo if they increase their coercion of Taiwan. The United States should also seek to establish high-level, regular diplomatic interactions with China with the aim of communicating both the extent and limits of its Taiwan policy and its concerns with the PRC's coercive behavior. In recent years, U.S.-China diplomacy has become too infrequent and too conditional, increasing the risk of misjudgment and miscalculation. Even in an increasingly contentious bilateral relationship, such diplomacy should not be viewed as a favor one side bestows on the other but instead be pursued regardless of the state of relations to further U.S. interests and bring greater transparency to the most sensitive issues, in particular Taiwan. Finally, although decades-long efforts to establish crisis communications mechanisms have faltered, the United States should continue to attempt to establish hotlines to prevent incidents from escalating into full-fledged crises. Whatever their success, **good-faith attempts at diplomacy can demonstrate to China**, as well as to U.S. allies and partners, **that the United States** seeks to responsibly manage U.S.-China relations and **is not looking to provoke a conflict.**

An invasion would be devastating, even on a small scale, Bowman 14 finds

Bowman, G.; Caccioli, F.; Coburn, A.W.; Kelly, S.; Ralph, D.; Ruffle, S.J.; Foulser-Piggott, R, June 2014, "CHINA-JAPAN GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICT SCENARIO" Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies , <https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/141031-ccrs-geopolitical-conflict-scenario-report.pdf>, accessed: 4-24-2022 //ZD

Nearly half of the world's shipping traffic passes through the South China Sea and this is significantly reduced while the conflict continues. Direct impacts Human cost The human cost is high, with 100,000 to **500,000 civilian deaths as a result of** the **strategic bombing campaigns against key cities** in both countries. Many of these deaths are employees in commercial facilities. Millions more people are injured. Property damage costs Bombing results in extensive damage to physical facilities. Reconstruction costs are estimated at \$120 to \$500 billion. The insurance industry mainly excludes claims from war damage in its policies, so is not expected to have large property losses. It is however likely to pay claims from indirect consequences, for example in liability lines, life and health insurance, contingent business interruption, and in other lines where there are ambiguities around exclusion. Insurers need to ensure that their war exclusion terms are robust to avoid major losses. Consequence analysis The world's economy suffers from the shock waves of the conflict. Exports from China and Japan to other countries are severely reduced, along with their imports. We shock exports and other variables in the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics to estimate global macroeconomic impact in terms of losses to global GDP output over 5 years. There are many other side effects and systemic consequences – counterparty risk increases, and more severe variants of the scenario trigger a financial crisis that causes a cascading failure of financial institutions and a liquidity crisis. **Lost global output of more than \$17 trillion. The conflict triggers a global recession**, which persists over several years. The overall effect is measured in lost GDP output over 5 years ('GPD@Risk') ranging from \$17 trillion to \$34 trillion in the more extreme variant, the latter dwarfing the \$20 million estimated loss of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2012. GDP losses in the US and EU are substantial, in total \$5 billion, which is just shy of the \$6 billion damage that is jointly experienced by China and Japan.

US-China relations are an impact filter---only cooperation can solve cascading existential risks.

Davis 23 [Steve Davis, Lecturer and Global Health Faculty Fellow, Stanford University Graduate School of Business; Member, Council on Foreign Relations, 8-23-2023, "Finding Safe Harbors for Development Impact: Navigating U.S.-China Stormy Waters for the Global Public Good" CSIS,

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/finding-safe-harbors-development-impact-navigating-us-china-story-waters-global-public>, accessed: 10-26-2024] OA

In West Africa, a new breed of rice that can withstand flooding and drought has allowed farmers to triple their productivity, improving local economies and feeding thousands of people. In regions from South America to Scotland, new green tech technologies are generating an abundance of clean energy. And in Southeast Asia, hundreds of millions of children have been protected from deadly Japanese encephalitis through life-saving vaccines. Each of these projects is contributing significantly to the collective future of humans and the planet. And all of them hinge on partnerships in health, technology, and business between the United States and its greatest strategic rival: China.

Take the Green Super Rice feeding thousands in West Africa, for example. It leverages 40 years of Chinese research on rice seeds accelerated with the financial muscle of U.S. philanthropy. Meanwhile, China's ability to develop and produce low-cost vaccines—for safeguarding the health of its own enormous population as well as supporting millions in the Global South—has been bolstered by know-how and support from the West, particularly through global health research collaborations, assistance with regulatory reforms, and the navigation of global qualification and distribution channels. These examples, but a tiny sample of social impact collaborations underway around the world, remind us that endeavors advancing human health and development often fall beyond the purview of any single country; multinational and multisectoral partnerships are increasingly required. Specifically, they underscore the importance of continued engagement by two of the world's greatest economic and technological powers, as well as the need to find ways to continue such collaborations in smart, informed, geopolitically sensitive, and mutually beneficial models. Truly game-changing innovations and opportunities with great social impact are within reach; and yet, many will depend on initiating, continuing, or expanding collaborations between partners in the United States and China to augment the global public good. However, this reality sits alongside stark and uncontestable truths: that the relationship between the United States and China over the past 10 years has worsened to one of its lowest historical ebbs, that policy and national sentiment have negatively reshaped the countries' perceptions of—and working exchanges with—each other, and that we are in an era of aggressive competition that threatens progress in some of this work. As the trajectory of this new great power competition continues to play out, what will happen to the substantial historical legacy of partnership between these two nations on issues of critical social impact? Will it be possible for would-be collaborators on either side of the Pacific to navigate these rocky waters without being immobilized by political risk, thwarted by sanctions, or hamstrung by the potential for reputational damage? The stakes are high. Between global climate change, food insecurity, and the very real threat of future pandemics, humanity is facing truly existential challenges. Against that backdrop, it is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives—safe harbors—where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good. This essay explores the reasons such a dialogue is needed, the risks at play, and some options for moving forward. Its aim is not to wish away deeply competitive features of the U.S.-China relationship, but rather to accept that these dynamics will persist and then generate understanding of and support for actively reimagining U.S.-China transnational collaborations in key areas of development. It seeks to advance thinking around ways to identify and pursue opportunities that support U.S. interests for multilateral social impact projects with China.[1] It is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives—safe harbors—where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good. It does not take an expert to appreciate that the relationship between China and the United States is among the most complex, fraught, and critical on earth. Nor does this paper suggest that U.S. policies toward China—or vice versa—are misguided. Quite the contrary. Albeit without access to much of the intelligence behind the current stances, this is written with full awareness of the many potential threats that each nation perceives in the other. Acknowledging the realities—and the fact that aggressive competition between these two powers is

only likely to increase—this essay proposes that we need a new set of principles and mechanisms to guide continued collaboration among scientists and activists in health, climate, food security, and humanitarian relief. The well-being of the world depends on it.

China's Journey toward Global Development Impact Among confrontational policies, rhetoric, and media coverage, it is easy to lose sight of or underappreciate China's historical and current role in global development. In part, China's work in countries across much of the Global South, with deep roots in the "South-South" brotherhood of developing economies starting back in the 1950s, is hard to track or understand. China's historical role in global aid and development has often been opaque—deeply tied to its political interests in specific countries, often delivered as part of infrastructure or other economic packages, and generally done through bilateral (state-to-state) mechanisms or as part of larger investment deals. Without delving into a discourse on China's philosophy and approach to global development, of which there are many, suffice it to say that China has taken a very different route from the West.[2] Most notably, China has been slow to embrace multilateral initiatives (through large multicountry organizations) or to actively participate in large globally coordinated development or humanitarian initiatives. And yet, the many strands of China's international collaboration have knitted together a clear commitment and broad narrative that are increasingly notable in terms of their scale and political importance. A range of bilateral scientific projects in health, agriculture, water and sanitation, and climate greatly expanded in the 1990s through the 2010s.[3] Looking at global health as an example,

U.S.-China collaboration quickly expanded after the two countries' relations were normalized in 1979,



particularly through exchanges and knowledge sharing with experts from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), who worked with partner organizations to lay the health infrastructure groundwork that led to the establishment of China's own CDC in 2001.[4] With support from U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and coordination from regulatory authorities like the World Health Organization (WHO), China has become an essential linchpin in helping to eradicate polio through vaccine production and monitoring systems.[5] China has also played a major role in combating tuberculosis (TB) and malaria—two of the world's top infectious killers—by working with the World Bank, the British Department for International Development, Japan, the Netherlands, the WHO, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and other international NGOs to dramatically cut infection rates through improved detection, technology, and treatment. Altogether, China's work on TB has benefited some 668 million people, prompting the World Bank's lead economist studying health in East Asia to call it "one of the most successful TB projects ever seen." [6] China also brought lessons learned in the fight against malaria to Africa. Its research program to find new treatments for malaria led to the discovery of artemisinin, now the basis of the world's most effective antimalarial drugs. Overall, in the words of Pedro Alonso, director of the WHO Global Malaria Programme, China's healthcare advancements have had a global "ripple effect." [7] This success was not solely the result of international aid. China's spending on research and development in 2017—at \$200 billion—was nearly seven times its investment just a decade earlier, much of it in healthcare. [8] However, these collaborations have taken on a different tone and approach in the past decade. President Xi Jinping has embarked on an aggressive campaign to build China's geopolitical influence, especially with the Global South, and has placed global health and development as a critical piece of that work. [9] Such initiatives include a broad set of mechanisms, and approaches include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for infrastructure development involving 70 countries across South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral cooperative making social-improvement loans available to 91 member nations; and, more recently, a Global Development Initiative to aid nations' continued recovery from the economic devastations of Covid-19. [10] In his 2021 speech at the United Nations General Assembly, Xi explicitly stated that China would use its growing global influence to further the public good in science, food security, and other areas, calling on the world community to join in renewing a shared commitment to balanced, inclusive growth. [11] To date, the impact of these ambitious-sounding initiatives has been unclear and comparatively modest, depending on whether you are measuring political influence or actual social development impact. Some argue that these have been poorly executed approaches driven by China's agenda to expand its economic and strategic interests across the world; others see them as glimmers of potential for the possibility of using the enormous resources, manpower, and research capacity of the world's second-largest economy to focus on critical global issues. For the latter to be realized, China needs to dispel anxiety by clearly demonstrating that these initiatives work for their intended beneficiaries, not just China's interests.

Regardless, they certainly represent notable change in a country long criticized for failing to address global poverty. China and the United States Working Together Within this context, many of China's international collaborations have focused on global social impact by partnering with various U.S. organizations. In some cases, these partnerships have lasted more than a century. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, has maintained significant programs in China since 1913, funding—and shaping—the education of generations of doctors at Peking Union Medical College, as well as supporting humanitarian causes during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Since opening its Beijing office in

2007, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has managed a portfolio of philanthropic grants and initiatives that includes programs to help China improve the quality of its medical products toward normative international standards, as well as contribute efforts to the fight against TB, HIV, and other diseases in China. The Gates Foundation has also provided technical assistance and support to Chinese efforts directed at low resource needs elsewhere in the world, including safe Chinese vaccines, innovations in agriculture and sanitation, and improved scientific research opportunities between Chinese and global scientists. In conjunction with the Beijing Municipal Government, the foundation launched and co-funded the Global Health Drug Discovery Institute (GHDDI), based at Tsinghua University, to help orient and leverage research and innovation toward critical diseases across the globe for which cures and treatments are needed.[12] But the Gates Foundation is actually a latecomer. The Asia Foundation has been active in China since the late 1970s. The World Wildlife Fund has been working to promote conservation efforts in China—from forest management to wetlands conservation and species protection—since 1980. Johns Hopkins University and Nanjing University opened the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in 1986. The Ford Foundation began working on U.S.-China issues in the 1960s through funding China studies centers in the United States, before establishing a Beijing office in 1988.[13] Greenpeace has been working there since 1997. And the list goes on. On the U.S. side, this long association attests to the fact that for decades, the United States valued international exchanges as a form of “soft diplomacy.” The first Fulbright agreement signed by the United States was with China in 1947. And even during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, U.S.-funded exchange programs supported some 20,000 international students for study in the United States each year. An increasingly large proportion of them have come from China. By 2019, 370,000 students from China were enrolled in U.S. schools, accounting for about 34 percent of foreign students in the United States.[14] Most Chinese students in the United States have indicated a strong desire to stay in the United States, which underscores the importance of the programs but increasingly raises concerns in both Beijing and Washington. China welcomed these partnerships as well for many years—in part as a recipient of aid as a developing country with health and development programs focused on China, and in part as a component of its expanding global footprint across Africa and other regions of the globe, where it also has a strategic interest in “soft power” politics. The technical assistance provided to Chinese government agencies, academic institutions, and even companies through these programs significantly elevated China’s know-how and engagement on critical social issues, and even today it continues to be welcomed by Chinese and U.S. authorities on specific issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention and cancer research. Changing Geopolitical Winds Many international observers hoped that mounting tensions between China and the United States would be a passing phase, provoked by Donald Trump’s anti-China rhetoric and vanishing with his exit from office. Others suggested that as Xi Jinping consolidated power with a third term as leader of the Chinese Communist Party, his antipathy toward the United States might ease. But the divide has only become more entrenched, with the Biden administration solidifying a framing of China as the primary U.S. strategic competitor with numerous policies, sanctions, and commitments, and the Xi administration expanding its anti-U.S. policies and rhetoric. With schisms playing out militarily, technologically, economically, and ideologically, more observers are speaking in cold war terms—and expressing concerns about the potential for some event, such as a confrontation over Taiwan, to trigger a “hot war.

Subpoint B is Provoking China

China is a defensive realist — they are cooperative until threatened.

Beckley 23 [Michael Beckley, 8-13-2023, "How War With China Begins," archive.ph, <https://archive.ph/SDmvM>] //   s

Numerous scholars have analyzed when and why Beijing uses force. Most reach a similar conclusion:

China attacks not when it feels confident about the future but **when it worries its enemies are closing in.** As Thomas

Christensen, the director of the China and the World Program at Columbia University, writes, **the Chinese Communist Party wages**

war when it perceives an opening window of vulnerability regarding its territory and immediate periphery, or a closing window of opportunity to consolidate control over disputed areas. This pattern holds regardless of the strength of China's opponent. In fact, **Beijing often has attacked far superior foes—including the U.S.—to cut them down to size and beat them back from Chinese-claimed or otherwise sensitive territory.**

Drills

To signal its displeasure with the U.S.,

Emily Feng (Npr), 1-8-2024, "China is subtly increasing military pressure on Taiwan. Here's how," opb, <https://www.opb.org/article/2024/01/08/china-is-subtly-increasing-military-pressure-on-taiwan-here-s-how/>, accessed 10-14-2024, //ZD

There is an ominous new normal in the Taiwan Strait, the narrow strip of water between Taiwan and

China. Beijing has long considered self-governed Taiwan as part of China and has threatened to force it to "unify" with the mainland. But over the past year, Beijing has been stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, while stopping short of an outright invasion. China has been sending ships and planes to encircle Taiwan and mounting more sophisticated military drills simulating a blockade of the island. In September, **Taiwan's defense ministry counted a record number of Chinese fighter planes** — 103 warplanes to be exact — flying in airspace around Taiwan in just one day. Security experts call this "gray zone" tactics, a strategy of intimidation and daily harassment designed to gradually wear Taiwan down, without drawing the United States and its Asian allies, like Japan and South Korea, into a wider conflict. Here's what you need to know about China's gray zone tactics. Daily **military incursions are increasing around Taiwan** Taiwan's Constitution, enacted in 1947 by its former Chinese Nationalist rulers who fought a civil war with China's Communist forces, still officially recognizes the authorities in Taipei as the legitimate government representing not just Taiwan, but also mainland China and some nearby territories. And now, decades after its transition to democracy in the 1990s, Taiwan still maintains an "air defense identification zone," or ADIZ, that's monitored by its military and reaches far into China's borders. The ADIZ is an informal area Taiwan's defense ministry monitors but is not an official, internationally recognized boundary and is far larger than Taiwan's territorial air space as defined by international law. Loading... **Since last year, China has been sending near-daily military sorties that dart in and out of that air defense zone.** Robin Hsu is among a group of Taiwanese military enthusiasts who obsessively track this signal communication Chinese pilots leave as their planes or ships enter the air defense zone each day. This summer, NPR met with Hsu outside a Taiwanese air base, where he already intercepted Chinese pilot chatter from six separate incursions. Loading... **Hsu worries there will be miscommunication, a misfire even, between militaries that could spiral into conflict.** "Gray zone" tactics **chinese military activity around Taiwan has been increasing since the summer of 2022 when former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei.** It was a trip that infuriated leaders in Beijing, who claims Taiwan as its own and opposes other countries sending high-level official visits there. Pelosi's trip also prompted China to look for ways to up the ante over Taiwan. "The PRC has been committed to push the envelope in terms of what is [an] acceptable level of the use of force underneath open war," says Alessio Patalano, a professor of war and strategy at King's College London, using an acronym for China. Patalano says China prefers to use gray zone tactics like military and economic coercion to intimidate Taiwan and attempt to influence upcoming January presidential elections there. These tactics include sending planes or banning Taiwanese goods to punish its farmers. Loading... **In other words, no hot war, no invasion, but there is a constant reminder that China has its sights on Taiwan.** Some fear China's gray zone tactics are practice for a real invasion. "[Chinese forces] can practice their military requirement as they need, and even they can test the response capability from the Taiwanese military," says Lee Hsi-ming, a retired Taiwanese admiral and a former defense chief. Meanwhile, Taiwan is limited in how it can respond to Chinese pressure. For example, Lee says, every time a Chinese military plane or ship gets too close, Taiwan has to scramble its own jets or ships, and China just has way more of everything. Plus, Lee says, Taiwan doesn't want to make things worse: "Because we don't want [to] escalate the tension, and in order to maintain our morale, then we have to passively respond to this kind of gray-zone aggression."

Luckily, affirming ends the key motivation for military drills.

Brian Hioe, 06-25-2024, "China Responds to US Arms Sales to Taiwan with Military Drills," New Bloom Magazine, <https://newbloommag.net/2024/06/25/china-drills-us-sales/>, accessed 10-14-2024, //ZD

TAIWAN HAS SEEN increased Chinese military activity around it in the preceding days. This appears to be **in reaction to a US arms sale** to Taiwan. The 360.2 million USD arms sale was approved by the Biden administration on June 18th. In particular, **the arms deal will provide**

Taiwan with more than one thousand of two kinds of suicide drones. These are 720 Switchblade 300 Loitering Missile System and 291 Altius 600M-V UAVs. The drone sales are to boost Taiwan's asymmetric defense capacity, at a time when American experts have called on Taiwan to increase asymmetric defense rather than staking Taiwan's defense on traditional weapons platforms. This has become an object of contention between Taiwan and the US at times, with the US seeking to pressure Taiwan into reliance on

asymmetric weapons systems in the view that this would be more effective for Taiwan in warding off Chinese threats. Namely, asymmetric defense has been seen as having been employed to great success in Ukraine. Specifically, asymmetric defense is seen as having allowed Ukraine to ward off an enemy that is many times larger, in employing aerial and maritime drones, loitering munitions, and other means of outmaneuvering Russia's much larger, but more traditional army that is, on the other hand, reliant on such platforms. Among the champions of asymmetric defense in Taiwan is Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, the former Chief of the General Staff of the ROC, who wrote a book arguing for the utility of asymmetric defense. There has been some pushback in Taiwan, however. Namely, it is hard to justify scaling back traditional weapons platforms to the branches of the military that are built around them. Likewise, politicians often have their eye on traditional weapons platforms that are flashy and can be touted as policy wins, inclusive of Taiwan's much-vaunted domestic submarine program. That is, even though much discussion was previously that submarines could significantly change the calculus for naval operations in the event of a Chinese invasion, they would still be considered an expensive and resource-intensive traditional weapons platform. At the same time, part of the concern about transitioning to asymmetric defense is that this would leave Taiwan dependent on the US for munitions, even as there are questions about the potential flip-flops the US could see in its Taiwan policy—particularly if Donald Trump were to win a second political term. To this extent, traditional weapons platforms are still necessary for countering grey-zone activity. Either way, China stepped up its naval incursions and air incursions as a response to the arms sale. Up until 6 AM of June 18th, 20 aircraft and 7 navy vessels were detected. The next day there were 18 aircraft and 6 navy vessels. On the 20th, this was 11 aircraft and 8 vessels, while on the 21st this was 36 aircraft and 7 vessels, and on the 22nd this was 41 aircraft and 7 navy vessels. On the 22nd, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense also reported detecting a satellite launch that passed over Taiwan, though stressed that it was monitoring and had a grasp of the situation and that the satellite launch posed no harm to Taiwan. China has increased its military activity around Taiwan in past years. This began after the visit to Taiwan in August 2022 by then-US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, as the first Speaker of the House to visit Taiwan in 25 years. Since then, China has held a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan annually. Such exercises are meant to intimidate and send a message—not only to Taiwan, but also the US. Furthermore, sometimes China launches exercises in response to what are fundamentally American actions, rather than Taiwanese ones, even if China does escalate military activity after major Taiwanese political events such as the presidential inauguration. As China has ramped up military activity, this serves as not only a means of intimidating Taiwan, but also a means of probing Taiwan's defense and giving its troops an opportunity to rehearse future military action. Yet the way in which China expands what repertoire of events it claims are provocations on the scale of necessitating further military exercises too, is worth noting. This evidently also includes arms sales from the US at present.


Indeed, Jash 24 -- Amrita Jash, 10-2-2024, "China's Military Exercises Around Taiwan: Trends and Patterns," <https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/chinas-military-exercises-around-taiwan-trends-and-patterns/>  ***this is text directly copied from a chart, left to right

Table 1: China's Military Exercises around Taiwan (2018-2024)	Time	Drill Name (if applicable)	Type of Exercise	Key Features	Context	Strategic Purpose
<u>March 2018 Live-fire drills</u>			Naval and air force; live ammunition	Simulated amphibious landings and blockades	Following the signing of the US Taiwan Travel Act that allowed official visits	Signaled opposition to US-Taiwan relations
<u>August 2020 Live-fire exercises</u>			Naval and air force; live ammunition	Simulated attack on Taiwan; missile tests	Heightened US-Taiwan relations during the Trump administration	April 2021 Joint landing exercises
<u>Days after the US Navy's transit of the Taiwan Strait</u>			Amphibious assault training	Practiced beach landings, and assault operations	Warning to Taiwan and the United States	August 2022 Largest-ever drills
<u>Response to US Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan</u>			cyber warfare	Comprehensive readiness for Taiwan invasion scenario	October 2022 Military training flights	Ongoing post-Pelosi tensions and US military presence
<u>April 2023 "United Sharp Sword"/ "Allied Sword" drills</u>			test Taiwan's air defense	Multi-branch exercises	Simulated encirclement of Taiwan, missile tests,	In response to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's meeting with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy
<u>July 2023 Night time Drills</u>			Air and Naval Drills	Conducted night time combat drills	Increased US military support for Taiwan	August 2023 Drills
<u>Vice President Lai Ching-te's visit to the United States</u>					Response to	

Sword-2024A drills Full-scale military exercise Focus on joint precision strikes, missile tests, and drone operations. First time Chinese Coast Guard joined the drills Response to the inauguration Speech of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te Joint sea-air combat readiness, precision strikes, and integrated operations to test real combat capabilities Noteworthy Trends in PLA Exercises Around Taiwan Given the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP, 民進黨) traditional pro-independence outlook, its political control over Taiwan goes against Beijing's goal of "reunification." In this regard, since the DPP took power in 2016, there have been significant developments in China's military drills around Taiwan. These key trends and patterns are noted below. The Frequency and Scale of Military Exercises The first key trend is an increase in the frequency and scale of military exercises, as noted (Table 1, above). This dramatic increase in the PLA's military exercises has been evident especially since the DPP came to power under Tsai Ing-wen. Beginning in 2018, China conducted military drills around Taiwan with increasing frequency in order to exert pressure on Taiwan's DPP-led government, which China views as being pro-independence. These exercises have served to test the PLA's joint real combat capabilities in the potential operating areas of a future Taiwan crisis. The Sophistication of Military Operations Second, the depth and sophistication of the PLA's military exercises have increased, combining both military drills and joint exercises. This has involved live fire exercises; the involvement of all branches of the military, as well as a wide variety of military assets for greater jointness, coordination and operational preparedness; and simulating more realistic combat scenarios such as blockade and amphibious assault. For instance, in the Joint Sword-2024A exercise, the China Coast Guard (CCG) practiced joint operations for the first time with the PLA. In the 2022 exercises, even Chinese aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, were involved—along with a Type 75 amphibious assault ship, at least one Type 55 cruiser, and several Type 54 frigates and others. As part of the May 2024 exercise, China deployed 111 aircraft and 46 naval vessels to areas around Taiwan, and 82 Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait—with some approaching close to the 24 nautical mile line that Taiwan uses to define its contiguous zone. Platforms such as the J-20 and J-16 fighter jets, Type 052D destroyers, and Dong Feng ballistic missiles were also prominently featured. The Increasing Use of High Technology Third, the PLA's exercises have increasingly showcased advancements in military technology—including the use of drones, cyber warfare capabilities, and missile systems—indicating a shift towards modern warfare tactics. For instance, in

early August 2024, Taiwan's Ministry of Defense reported that a total of 31 Chinese military aircraft—including several drones—and 12 Chinese warships were detected operating in and near the Taiwan Strait over a 24 hour period. Achieving PLA Narrative Objectives Fourth, the military drills and exercises are aimed towards fulfilling key narrative objectives: both as a psychological tactic to intimidate Taiwan, as well as to signal its capabilities to the international

community—particularly to **the United States** and Japan—regarding a potential Taiwan crisis. **The PLA’s military exercises increasingly coincide with significant political events related to Taiwan, such as** visits by foreign dignitaries to Taiwan or statements from Taiwan’s government that Beijing views as

provocative—to include then-Speaker of the House **Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022** or President Lai’s inauguration in May 2024. For instance, in his inauguration speech Lai called on Beijing to end its “political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and emphasized that Beijing needs to recognize “the reality of the Republic of China’s existence”—statements that were met with Beijing’s military response.

Independently, backing Taiwan makes them take more aggressive actions, which further provokes China’s drills.

Thrall 20 [A. Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, 11-2-2020, "Time to Rethink Arms Sales to Taiwan," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/time-rethink-arms-sales-taiwan?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZWQCMTEAAR1sOwegXRMOWrRwRunQHGP19OVNLvviPEquY50sxLtkLg-9HI30NHZJSE_aem_RZ1hHT9QEKO5esEJA4JrA, accessed 10-5-2024, //ZD

Zhao added that China will make a “legitimate and necessary response” because of the sales. Beijing’s reasons for being concerned should not be a surprise. Taiwan’s leaders are not really buying missiles or planes or tanks; they are buying signals of American commitment to Taiwan’s independence. For China, **this means another great power has influence with a nearby, rival neighbor. Both Beijing and Taipei know that anti-tank missiles will not change the regional balance of power.** Instead, **these sales signal that the U.S. wants to maintain its own influence in the region** and to deny China regional primacy. **Selling arms to Taiwan also creates a moral hazard that could make things even worse. By giving Taiwan’s leaders greater confidence in American support, arms sales may encourage them to engage in provocative behavior** that aggravates China **and** in turn, **encourages Beijing to act** more **aggressively**. The greater the chances for conflict between Taiwan and China, the greater the prospects that the United States winds up in a shooting war with a nuclear-armed adversary. Nor do arms sales to Taiwan promise much in the way of economic gain, advocates’ claims to the contrary.

Luckily, reducing support and arms sales would encourage de-escalation and reduce drills.

Eric Gomez, September 28, 2016, "A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship#>, accessed 10-8-2024, //ZD

Stopping the sale of new equipment would not significantly reduce the Taiwanese military’s ability to defend itself for three reasons. First, most equipment sold to Taiwan by the United States does not represent the latest in U.S. military technology and is not necessarily superior to new capabilities fielded by the PLA.⁹⁸ Second, **Taiwan’s domestic defense industry is capable of producing new equipment that is well-suited to asymmetric defense**, although it will take time for Taiwan’s relatively small and underdeveloped defense industry to reach its full potential.⁹⁹ **Finally, stopping the sale of new weapons still gives the United States the latitude to sell spare parts and ammunition for weapons systems that have already been sold.** Halting the sale of new types of weapons systems will signal a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security that would not be overly disruptive to Taiwan’s self-defense. **One of several ways that Beijing might respond to this U.S. concession on arms sales would be to reduce the number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) within firing range** of Taiwan. **Currently there are more than 1,000 conventionally armed SRBMs (with a maximum range of approximately 500 miles) in the PLA arsenal that could strike Taiwan.**¹⁰⁰ **Improvements in guidance technology have transformed these missiles from inaccurate “terror weapons” that would likely target cities to precision munitions better suited for strikes against military airfields and ports.**¹⁰¹ **Stationing the SRBMs out of range** of Taiwan **would be** a low-cost, but **symbolically important** action. The missiles are fired from mobile launchers that could be moved back into range of Taiwan. However, the act of moving the missiles out of range would, according to Lyle J. Goldstein, “show goodwill and **increasing confidence across the Strait and** also **between Washington and Beijing**.”¹⁰² **If China agrees to America’s demand to relocate its ballistic missiles, then additional steps could be taken to further reduce the threat China poses to Taiwan.** If China proved unwilling to make any concessions, either in other

territorial disputes or in cross-strait relations, the United States could still unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior. American policymakers are unlikely to accept such a course of action given recent shows of Chinese assertiveness. Charles Glaser explains, “China appears too likely to misinterpret [unilaterally ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan], which could fuel Chinese overconfidence and intensify challenges to U.S. interests.”¹⁰³ Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict, but the dearth of other benefits would make the policy difficult for policymakers to implement. Extracting some kind of concession from China, either in cross-strait relations or in other territorial disputes, should be a priority. **Finally, stepping down from the commitment to defend Taiwan with military force does not remove America’s interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait free of armed conflict. The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan. Diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions may not inflict the same kinds of costs on Beijing as military force, but they are additional costs that would have to be absorbed.**¹⁰⁴ Additionally, U.S. arms sales are separate from the implicit commitment to defend Taiwan and could continue, albeit in some reduced or modified form.¹⁰⁵ Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment to use military force to defend the island allows the United States to demonstrate support for Taiwan’s defense without taking on the risks associated with direct intervention.¹⁰⁶

Drills are a game of roulette— lack of communication, nationalism, and high tensions means an accident could lead to war.

Bonny Lin, 10-12-2021, "How to Prevent an Accidental War Over Taiwan," Foreign Affairs,

<https://archive.ph/IHmMr>, accessed 10-14-2024, //ZD

China is demonstrating its ability to conduct military operations against Taiwan at all hours, 365 days of the year. It may also be expanding and routinizing these flights to desensitize Taiwan and the United States to Chinese military operations near the island, allowing Beijing to more easily disguise preparations for an actual attack on Taiwan as part of “normal” activities. **China’s**

increasingly aggressive behavior makes a cross-strait emergency more likely. But the risk of a crisis stems

less from the possibility of an immediate Chinese invasion than **from an accident or a miscalculation that turns deadly—a midair**

collision between Chinese and Taiwanese jets, for instance, **or a Chinese decision** to violate Taiwan’s sovereign airspace **that prompts Taiwan to**

shoot down the plane. Beijing will probably continue to escalate its coercive efforts, sending aircraft closer to Taiwan and possibly even over the island itself. At a certain point, Taipei will be forced to respond—whether with enhanced surveillance and warnings or with military force. The United States must therefore work with Taiwan to preempt and respond to

China’s military activities without triggering a crisis. **Preparing for a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan is no longer a sufficient**

U.S. strategy. Washington must also prepare for a blunder or a miscue that has the potential to explode

into open conflict. TIT FOR TAT As China has ratcheted up its coercive behavior, Taiwan has refined its responses. Initially, Taipei scrambled fighter jets to intercept each

approaching Chinese aircraft. By early 2021, however, the daily strain of doing so had prompted Taiwan to rely more on ground-based air defense systems to monitor Chinese intrusions. And the island’s leaders know that even these measures will be insufficient if China continues to escalate: Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review, for instance, states that Taipei will adopt a tougher response as the enemy draws closer. According to multiple media reports, officials from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, air force, and coast guard have openly discussed a range of responses to Chinese military operations, based on their nature and their distance to the island. Some reports suggest that Taiwan may have already established three separate zones: a “surveillance” zone for Chinese activities within 30 nautical miles of Taiwan, a “warning” zone for activities within 24 nautical miles, and a “destruction” zone for activities within 12 nautical miles. Within the destruction zone, Taiwan’s air force has reportedly formulated some standard operating procedures—for instance, by preparing to intercept intruding aircraft or to force them

to land. If such aircraft are perceived to have hostile intent, **Taiwan’s air force could lock its radar on the aircraft, fire warning**

shots, or even strike first to shoot them down. To prevent escalation, individual Taiwanese pilots are not allowed to shoot first unless the air force

headquarters orders them to do so. In a crisis, **s, the air force may be able to authorize such strikes without further approval**

from Taiwan’s most senior military and political officials. These potential responses are comparable to those one might expect from countries facing similar threats. South Korea, for instance, fired hundreds of warning shots in 2019, when Russian aircraft intruded into the airspace over the disputed Dokdo Islands, known in Japan as the Takeshima Islands. Indeed, it would be politically untenable for any Taiwanese leader not to defend Taiwan from Chinese incursions. Although U.S. officials might prefer that Taiwan’s leaders not expend their limited military resources responding to Chinese military flights, domestic political imperatives will likely force them to do so. So far, Chinese military aircraft have yet to fly within 12 nautical miles of the main island of Taiwan, at least according to public reports. But China has flown progressively closer to southwest Taiwan and to Pratas Island, which Taiwan administers and which sits roughly 275 miles from Taiwan in the South China Sea. If tensions continue to rise, China’s past flight paths and training exercises suggest that Beijing could readily escalate air operations in at least one of three ways: by flying closer to Taiwan, including to the east side of the island or near the center or north of the Taiwan Strait; by undermining Taiwan’s

control of Pratas or other offshore islands that Taiwan administers, likely with regular overflights; and, most provocatively, by flying directly over Taiwan. **Taipei could feel**

compelled to shoot down a Chinese aircraft. The first option would expand the geographic scope of Chinese military activities beyond the southwest corner

of the ADIZ and bring Chinese aircraft closer to more sensitive and less fortified regions of Taiwan. The second and third options are more dangerous, however. To challenge Taiwan’s administration of Pratas, China could routinize flights over it, forcing Taiwan to either defend its airspace or acquiesce to regular Chinese incursions. Such flights could also serve as a test of

Taiwan’s defenses and response before China attempts a flyover of the main island. **China might also attempt to use one of these escalatory**

maneuvers to force Taipei to be the first to use kinetic force, which could then justify a larger Chinese

punitive operation against Taiwan. The Global Times, a nationalist state-run daily, has called the reported division of Taiwan’s airspace into defensive zones

“especially ridiculous,” declaring that the Chinese military is “prepared to send warplanes to fly across the island of Taiwan to declare sovereignty.” While Chinese officials have been less explicit, they have argued that military operations and exercises against Taiwan are legitimate and necessary to safeguard Chinese sovereignty. If Beijing disregards Taiwan’s possible redlines, it risks triggering a crisis—especially if its military aircraft enter the island’s reported “destruction” zone. Aggressive maneuvering by Chinese or Taiwanese pilots could result in an unintended midair fatality akin to the one that occurred in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and forcing the U.S. plane to make an emergency landing in China. Should China attempt to fly military aircraft directly over Taiwan itself, Taipei could feel that it has no option but to shoot down the aircraft. Even an accidental collision in the Taiwan Strait could spiral out of control. Since the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, when China shelled Taiwan’s offshore islands, neither side has suffered a fatality in a cross-strait encounter. If that were to change today, however, both sides would be ill equipped to manage the domestic political fallout—and both could be forced into tougher and more inflexible positions. If a Chinese fighter pilot were to be killed, moreover, Beijing could decide to eschew diplomacy until after it has punished Taiwan. And because cross-strait communication channels have been dormant for over five years, mutual misperceptions could easily result in further escalation. CRISIS MANAGEMENT To be sure, the United States must prepare for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which means ensuring that it has the military capability to prevent China from capturing the island and making clear to Beijing that an unprovoked attack would come with a heavy price. But the United States must also prepare for the more likely near-term cause of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait: an accident or miscommunication that pushes both sides to the brink of war. To that end, Washington should invest in making Taiwan more resilient and better able to withstand Chinese military pressure. It should also help Taiwan deter China’s most threatening activities and work with Taiwan to develop responses to its neighbor’s provocations. For instance, U.S. and Taiwanese officials could conduct tabletop exercises focused on heightened Chinese aggression that falls short of war, helping Taiwan’s national security leaders think through the implications of different responses, including defending potential redlines. Washington should help Taiwan develop responses to China’s provocations. To prepare for the possibility of a military or paramilitary incident in the Taiwan Strait, the United States should prioritize maintaining reliable crisis communication channels with both China and Taiwan. Washington could also privately communicate some of Taipei’s redlines to Beijing and warn Chinese leaders against testing them. At the same time, it could work with allies and partners to impress upon China the destabilizing consequences of its coercive behavior against Taiwan. Where appropriate, the United States may even want to encourage Taipei to publicly reveal some of its thinking on Chinese military activities, signaling when and why it may have to respond with military force. As China escalates its military coercion of Taiwan, the risk of an accidental crisis will only increase. Taiwan and the United States should continue to work together to deter a Chinese invasion of the island, but that agenda is no longer enough to prevent a conflict. Taipei and Washington must also develop responses to Chinese military pressure that reduce the risk of a potentially deadly miscue or blunder. Years ago, U.S. President Joe Biden reportedly told Chinese President Xi Jinping that “the only thing worse than a war is an unintentional war.” Now, as the risk of such a war over Taiwan increases, it is incumbent upon Biden to help stave it off.

Swaine 24 continues that

Michael D. Swaine, 1-11-2024, "Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan," Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, <https://quincyinst.org/research/paths-to-crisis-and-conflict-over-taiwan/>, accessed 10-14-2024, //ZD

There are few reasons for each side to question such worst-case assumptions about the motives of the other, and many reasons to believe they have been confirmed by the other side’s provocative actions. Under current conditions, both Washington and Beijing remain inclined to miscalculate in assessing the threat posed by the other side through specific actions taken regarding Taiwan and the intended effect of its own response to such provocations. There are few reasons for each side to question such worst-case assumptions about the motives of the other, and many reasons to believe they have been confirmed by the other side’s provocative actions. Attempts to counter perceived extreme threats to each side’s vital interest could lead to extreme reactions regarded as necessary and prudent but viewed by the other as excessive and provocative. The propensity for an intense, escalatory spiral of threats and counter-threats to emerge is clear. Drivers of escalation on the Chinese side The likelihood of a dangerous escalation between the United States and China over Taiwan is made worse by certain destabilizing characteristics evident in the public and elite belief system, intelligence-gathering system, domestic political structures and processes, and historical experience of both sides that can increase risk-taking and lower flexibility in a crisis over Taiwan. These features can reinforce tendencies on both sides to worst case any potential crisis and rely heavily on signals of resolve, eventually serving to reduce room for mutual restraint and accommodation necessary for de-escalation in a crisis. Several existing characteristics, conditions, and habits on China’s side could trigger an escalation in a high-tension situation in the Taiwan Strait. First is China’s deep-rooted insecurity toward U.S. intentions, derived from its experiences during the “century of humiliation” in the late 19th and early 20th century, when China suffered from sustained Western subjugation and was forced to cede territories and extraterritorial privileges to Western hegemonic powers. 29 This persistent insecurity about the loss of territorial control and national dignity from foreign intervention can incline Beijing to approach sovereignty-related crises in unyielding, moralistic, zero-sum terms and view Washington’s behavior as fundamentally ill-intentioned. 30 In a crisis over Taiwan, this historical insecurity factor, combined with the Chinese association of unification with Taiwan as a necessary step to national rejuvenation, will almost certainly come into play to intensify nationalist sentiments in China. Perceiving that the party state’s legitimacy is at stake, Beijing will likely find the political cost of

backing down in a serious Taiwan crisis unbearable. As a result, Beijing's flexibility in crisis interactions will be severely limited, increasing the chance of China overreacting to U.S. signals of resolve and making sharp escalation more likely. Perceiving that the party state's legitimacy is at stake, Beijing will likely find the political cost of backing down in a serious Taiwan crisis unbearable. **Second, some operational concepts of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)**

might undermine the need for clear signaling, limited goals, and a restrained use of force in a crisis. These include the cultivation of uncertainty in an opponent through unclear signaling and other means, the use of escalatory leaps (including sudden demonstrations of force) to shake the confidence of the other side in its deterrence power, and reliance on cyberattacks early in a crisis, to signal deterrence and as a force multiplier. 31 While these features are evident in some PLA writings on how to manage crises and armed conflicts, it is unclear to what extent they would influence China's behavior. PLA-connected Chinese scholars have downplayed the importance of such concepts overall while stressing that in some extreme instances of a high-stakes crisis over Taiwan, Chinese leaders could be forced to engage in sudden, rapid, asymmetrical escalations,

ostensibly to force both Taipei and Washington to realize the seriousness of the situation. 32 **Third is the possibility that China will underestimate Washington's commitment to defending its interests in a severe crisis over Taiwan. Many Chinese assume the United States has less stake in the Taiwan issue than China does. 33 This is due not only to the close association of a Taiwan crisis with Chinese nationalism and the legitimacy of the PRC regime, but also China's belief that the United States will prove averse to conducting a prolonged and costly**

conflict far from U.S. territory. Likely without the overwhelming support of the American people. Such perceptions could reinforce Chinese arguments in favor of dangerous shows of resolve, including kinetic actions, designed to force Washington to back down in the face of a supposedly more determined Beijing. 34 Fourth, China's tendency to engage in "tit-for-tat" retaliation moves in a diplomatic or military confrontation, viewed as conveying resolve in defending China's interests while avoiding excessively provocative actions, is a potential source of concern. 35 Although potentially stabilizing in some cases (if used sparingly), an overly rigid adherence to this approach could generate an escalating spiral toward conflict in the absence of diplomatic restraint. 36 Fifth, **Beijing has become more susceptible to domestic pressures and demands in**

China for tougher deterrence signals. In past crises, such as the 1999 accidental U.S. bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy, Chinese leaders could take measured responses in part because public pressure to reciprocate and escalate was relatively small. Today's domestic environment in China, however, looks far different. Mounting economic problems, and associated anxiety about the eroding authority of the party-state, widespread Chinese nationalist sentiments, and Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy stances all combine to create incentives for political and military leaders in Beijing to opt for confrontational responses to perceived U.S. provocations. As one scholar has noted, Xi's assertive rhetoric, his apparent demand for absolute obedience, and nationalist Chinese public audiences have transformed the security apparatus in Beijing into a hawkish "echo chamber" with marginalized moderate voices. 37 Xi's assertive rhetoric, his apparent demand for absolute obedience, and nationalist Chinese public audiences have transformed the security apparatus in Beijing into a hawkish "echo chamber" with marginalized moderate voices. Sixth, China's secretive, top-down yet, in some ways, fragmented decision-making process and stove-piped civilian and military intelligence structure have delayed reaction time and, at times, distorted both the Chinese assessment of information and clear signaling in past Sino-American crises. 38 In addition, as mentioned above, Xi Jinping's dominance of the Chinese decision-making process today could suppress the past tendency of post-Mao leaders to make collective, consensual decisions, thus increasing the likelihood of impulsive, incautious moves. 39 Drivers of escalation on the U.S. side **There are also several existing characteristics, conditions,**

and habits on the American side that could trigger an escalation in a Taiwan crisis. Most saliently,

Washington has become increasingly susceptible to domestic political pressures and demands for decisive action against China. Domestic politics can cause politicians to seek political support, both in general and in a crisis, by manipulating and stoking the fears and insecurities of the American public regarding real and imagined foreign threats. 40 Such political manipulation has become more attractive and arguably more effective as a result of growing domestic insecurity and political polarization in the United States. Tempted to take advantage of the widespread negative public sentiments toward China, U.S. politicians are now vying with one another to show their anti-China credentials by promoting ever greater American support for Taiwan. Tempted to take advantage of the widespread negative public sentiments toward China, U.S. politicians are now vying with one another to show their anti-China credentials by promoting ever greater American support for Taiwan. 41 Bipartisan bills aimed to elevate U.S.-Taiwan military and political ties well beyond the existing level are routinely introduced and passed. 42 An arguably growing number of politicians from both Republican and Democratic

sides call for abrogating strategic ambiguity in favor of a formal U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. 43 **Domestic pressures in both the United States and China for aggressive signals of resolve and government responses** to such pressures in the form of escalatory actions could easily be taken by the other side as deliberate attempts to justify conditions creating the permanent separation of Taiwan from China (from the Chinese perspective) or pave the way for the use of force or massive coercion to resolve the Taiwan issue (from the U.S. perspective). Second, past historical (and some current) examples of U.S. crisis behavior toward China indicate a U.S. tendency to be heavily influenced by ideological mindsets and zero-sum thinking. 44 These have included exaggerated notions about communist aggression, an assumed Chinese lack of concern for human life and, hence, a lower threshold for the use of high levels of force, and the allegedly existential nature of the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. Such extreme ideas could cause U.S. leaders to adopt highly provocative policies and overreact to China's perceived provocations, especially in a high-stakes crisis over Taiwan. In addition, a tendency toward overreaction would be particularly likely if U.S. leaders felt a need to disabuse China of the commonly held belief that the United States is in decline as a great power. Another driver of escalation: **A lack of bilateral crisis management mechanisms Aside from various destabilizing features**

of Chinese and American thinking and behavior, a future bilateral crisis over Taiwan would also likely prove very difficult to manage as a result of certain specific deficiencies involving the crisis management perceptions and systems on both sides. 45 Specifically, although both governments have endorsed the need for crisis management

dialogues, have established some crisis management procedures between the two militaries, and have held Track One military-to-military crisis communication dialogues in the past,

Beijing and Washington currently have no substantive, broad-based crisis communication mechanisms that can serve to overcome or moderate the above negative mindsets and actions of both sides. The two

sides have not agreed at the official level on any specific crisis management guidelines for minimizing the chance of inadvertent escalation and defusing a crisis. 46 Beijing and Washington currently have no substantive, broad-based crisis communication mechanisms that can serve to overcome the negative mindsets and actions of both sides. In Sino-American crises of the post-Mao era, obstacles to effective crisis management were to some extent overcome by the use of interlocutors who had worked together for years and — to some extent — trusted one another, such as former Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo and former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson. 47 Such individuals could provide credible assurances of intent and the meaning of specific signals sent in a crisis. Unfortunately, no such trusted interlocutors exist today at senior levels of the leadership in either government. Historical experience also suggests

that several problems relevant to the presence of a third party in a Sino-U.S. crisis (in this case, Taiwan) would also likely undermine effective crisis management. These include China's belief that Taipei's actions are either directed by Washington or undertaken to force the United States to counter Chinese actions more aggressively. 48

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Commentators dismissed Beijing's response to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting as less intense than the one that had attended then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022. But the dismissal itself highlighted the gravity of the problem. **A certain level of military activity had become normalized.** It was as though the world now took for granted the presence of missiles and aircraft carriers, the shows of force that demanded a response in kind. The week after the meeting in California, the United States and the Philippines launched their largest joint military exercise to date. It was a way of showing China that there were other militaries that could operate in the region. **The new normal meant more ships and planes operating in close proximity to one another, mutual recrimination, and mutual suspicion. Beijing and Washington have become desensitized to the risk these circumstances pose.** But in the militarization of foreign policy **and** the failure to grasp the full significance of that militarization, the pair **are one accident** and a bad decision removed **from a catastrophic war.** **Mathematicians speak of the "edge of chaos":** the final point **separating order from doom. A system operating at this edge has no room for error.** This is where the accumulated weight of the past has brought the United States, China, and Taiwan. **They walked right up to the edge of a war that could go nuclear** several times in the past: in 1954-55, 1958, and 1996. **Now, they seem to be living on that edge permanently.**