

# Disclosure Theory


## **A) Interpretation: [1:28]**

Debaters must, on the NDCA PF 2024-2025 openCaseList with their name and the school they attend, disclose the full citations, cut cards, and apt taglines of any pieces of non-identity evidence that they have read 30 minutes before the round for the March 2025 NSDA topic. For clarity, disclose case positions before the round.

## **B) Violation:**

They didn't disclose their education case for round 6.

Rowdy Rouse Raiders TFA Qualifier	Round 3	Pro	Krupal Yarram & Nevaan Dwivedi	MacFarland	aff- climate co-op and allies ...	^		
TFA State	Round 1	Pro	Flower Mound KK	Kasibhatla	aff- killjoy neg- clash, topicality	^	↓	
TFA State	Round 2	Pro	Strake Jesuit DP	Crivella	aff- fem ir neg- topicality	^	↓	
TFA State	Round 4	Con	Flower Mound SS	Canezo	same as round 1 aff- 2 tier th...	^		
TFA State	Round 5	Con	Seven Lakes AR	Koh	con - fem ir neg - fem impacts	^		
TFA State	Round 6	Pro	Plano West LW	Baker	Aff- education neg- critical th...	^		
TFA State Round 3	Round 3	Pro	BYE					
The 50th Anniversary Churchill Classic TOC and NIETOC Qualifier	Round 1	Con	SevLak Lu & Lin	Tulu	con- fem k aff- kant, discours...	^		



They say they were “norm-set” at TFA but they didn’t disclose round 6 AT STATE. Which means you must reject any “email us” discourse because THEY know it’s a good norm

### **C) Standards:**

1 – Argument quality:

A world without disclosure rewards debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but because their opponents won't know how to respond. Disclosure forces debaters to commit to quality. Argument quality is a voter because debate is a unique space in which we need to have in-depth education about important issues.

2 – Inclusion: Two internal links:

- a) Intel – Schools with big programs who bring more students and judges and are better connected will scout more rounds and have more flows; disclosure equalizes that intel disparity.
- b) Research – Disclosure forces big, wealthy programs to put their prep on the wiki, that means everyone has access to the best, pay walled evidence, and also keeps smaller programs up-to-date on the meta.

### **D) Voters:**

(1) Research/Education - Disclosure allows debaters to pursue more information on an opponent’s case and exposure to more literature. More reading means we get the most holistic education from the preparation process, rather than having the shallow process of reading taglines and hearing only what’s highlighted.

(2) Fairness - disclosure massively reduces the prep burden by streamlining down the amount of arguments that need to be prepped out. If there are 20+ reasonably topical arguments, forcing small programs or individuals to prepare endless waves of blocks is unfair and exclusive

*Drop the debater – two reasons*

- 1) No Difference – It's the same as dropping the argument since the argument is the entire case that wasn't disclosed.
- 2) Norm-setting – Voting for us sets a precedent in favor of a positive model of debate—wins and losses determine the direction of activity.

**Prefer competing interps for 2 reasons.**

1. Reasonability collapses to Competing interps since the brightline to what is reasonable is the counter interpretation.
2. Race to the bottom - Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where debaters are encouraged to exploit a judges tolerance for questionable arguments.

*No RVIs – two reasons.*

A) Illogical – you shouldn't win for being fair – it's a litmus test for engaging in substance

B) Chilling Effect: abusive debaters will get really good at the rvi debate and bait theory meaning we can never check back abuse

Theory > K because procedural fairness comes before the discourse on the K and we can't prove the truthity of their discourse if the game is flawed. They concede procedural fairness comes first in their UNDERVIEW AND REPS because they 1. follow speech times and conventions to ensure fairness and 2. they ran the underview to curb "time skews" which means they believe themselves it comes before the significance of their discourse. Also, if the round is uneducational, they can't learn to spread the discourse effectively.

"Any argument that seeks to 'win' within the norms of debate replicates the very structures that erase queer and feminist voices, making our refusal to conform a prerequisite to meaningful resistance." makes no sense because we need norms to dictate the discourse, otherwise what stops you from doing 5 stuff

(1:28)

CROB is to vote for the debaters who is winning offense and weighing on the pre-fiat level; basically winning on the flow

Prefer 2 reasons

[1] Accessibility: any team can win under our framework, aff can make the same arguments and just weigh them against the pre-fiat consequences of the neg disclosure

[2] Jurisdiction: any other ROB invites arbitrary judge intervention, we restrict judge intervention by weighing the consequences in round for the judge. Anything else creates a race to the top where the debate itself becomes arbitrary and there is no incentive to participate which kills all possible education, advocacy, and discourse.

Their ROTB:

1. No internal warrant for why this should be preferred, entirely arbitrary. Prefer ours because it's a comprehensive ROTB that's applicable to debate as a whole AND has net benefits. Proves our jurisdiction warrant.
2. Oppression Olympics IVI - their model of debate devolves down to who can garner offense off of the most oppressed group in debate, forcing us to debate between the suffering of different marginalized groups a. this independently causes psychological violence, and forces people to leave the activity – this is an independent reason to down them and should be the first thing you look at when you sign your ballot because the discourse doesn't matter if people can't interact due to unsafety

Anti Normativity K has been run a large number of times before their uq, which proves the theory of power overwhelms. Opposition in debate cannot solve sexism, and since their uq is still bad it proves that Fem K's effects are nonexistent at best.

Drop rage, rage is purely oppositional and cannot transform the reason for its existence---turns their K

**Zembylas 10** Robert, School of Education, University of South Australia, and Michalinos, School of Education, Open University of Cyprus, What's anger got to do with it? Towards a post-indignation pedagogy for communities in conflict, Social Identities Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2010, 2340

These ideas do not settle the ambivalence of indignation in any comfortable way, and do not seek the settlement of all tensions around an all encompassing perspective. But through a consideration of these ideas, we attempt to revisit some of the affective implications of indignation in conflict-ridden communities. Dominant anger discourses perpetuate the cycle of indignation; however, some of the classical and contemporary political thought that we have revisited reframes anger and creates alternative affective landscapes that might be truly transformative. In this paper we have aimed to unsettle the too-easy acceptance of anger as the political emotion, especially in communities in conflict that are saturated with indignation. Our reading of our own contexts indicates

that anger is historically constituted and naturalized which often means that communities are quite literally stuck in anger through a fusion of reification with re-iteration. As educators committed to social justice then, the challenge is working out how we might think past anger in ways that do not fall into the two extremes suggested by Thurman: a resignation to anger or a resignation from anger. We think that contemporary theories of critical pedagogy have also been stuck in anger and actually might contribute to the perpetuation of a cycle of indignation: anger with no end. There are examples of discourses that provide a middle way and in this paper we could only provide sketches of such perspectives. For us, these discourses provide an imaginary for an alternative framing for critical pedagogy, one that focuses on the problem of how we might learn to live together in societies of ever increasing cultural complexity and trauma. Taking this problem seriously requires enacting pedagogies of conviviality.

**Process turn – using debate as medium ensures the failure of their activism – competition means debaters ally themselves with individuals who vote for them and alienate those who are positioned with the burden of rejoinder and forced to negate.**

**Ritter '13** [Michael; September; JD, University of Texas Law School, BA, Trinity University; The National Journal of Speech & Debate, “Overcoming the Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What's to Learn from 2PAC's Changes,” vol. 2]

The Fiction

The idea or proposition that competitive interscholastic debate can result in social change is properly characterized as a fiction because it is false and has not been proven true. The proposition that debate rounds can create social change is a fiction because it is false on a theoretical level. Those who attempt to apply theories about academic debate (i.e. arguments published in books and journals by PhDs who argue about concepts within their respective fields of study), social movements, rhetorical acts, and performances are not discussing competitive interscholastic debate. Philosophers and rhetorical theorists have never written an article or book using competitive interscholastic debate as an example of the effectiveness of a communication strategy (at least not successes outside of a debate round). Their theories draw upon historical (i.e. anecdotal) examples to demonstrate their theories. None of them have ever cited a debate round or “debate movement” as an example of their theories.<sup>26</sup> Those who attempt to apply academic theories to competitive interscholastic debate (primarily communications academics, who also frequently happen to be participants in the debate community), decontextualize the broader theories to apply them to competitive interscholastic debate without adequately accounting for the competitive and interscholastic structures of competitive interscholastic debate.<sup>27</sup>

Although some “competition” is part of any debate, this part is more accurately described as the presence of seemingly conflicting positions, which is discussed above and exemplified by the Tarantino hypothetical. In social movements or public debate, there are two (or more) apparently conflicting positions. Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different because there is not a possibility for compromise on the ultimate question of who did the better debating; most tournaments prohibit double wins, and no debaters would agree to a double loss. The competition is absolute; one side must win and one side must lose. This is radically different from the ability of individuals to be persuaded by the other side of a social movement. The switching of sides outside of the debate context comes from a person's willingness to be persuaded by a particular position; it is not forced by tournament rules. Thus, the competitive structures of competitive interscholastic debate render the applicability of philosophical or rhetorical theory inapplicable to the extent that it does not account for particular competitive interscholastic debate context.

The unique structures of debate rounds rob all arguments or positions therein (or in a series of rounds) of any persuasive value beyond the very narrow issue of “which side did the better debating.” The competitive element and tournament structure of competitive interscholastic debate taint all positions proffered in a debate round to create social change with a stench of “I am actually lying about my goals; I am clearly just using this argument to win the ballot.” Even debates about how debates should proceed (i.e. theory arguments or arguments about the practices in debate, or “meta-debate” (debates about debate)) are not proffered for the truth of the proposition, but to win the debate. The audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the ultimate question: “Which side did the better debating?” Competitive interscholastic debate is certainly a venue in which students can become aware of societal issues and topics of concern. But the persuasive value of arguments presented in a debate round to convince debaters of the truth of either side on a topic is virtually nil.<sup>28</sup>

Students will generally form opinions about issues they learn about in a debate round outside of their debate rounds. The issues debaters become aware of include issues external to debate (e.g. affirmative action, foreign policy) and issues internal to debate (e.g. theory, community issues). When debaters choose to bring those issues into a debate round, they necessarily use those issues as a competitive means to the ultimate end of convincing the judge that they did the better debating. This requires the opposing team to adopt a competitive counterstrategy to that position; it forecloses the option of the opposing team being fully persuaded by the other team’s position. Even an attempt to “compromise” via a permutation (as a competitive strategy rather than a persuasive position) will meet vigorous, usually pre-scripted opposition. As a result, any in-round action (whether a speech act or the judge voting for one team or the other) will have no out-of-round effect consistent with or contemplated by any cited authors or postulated by the high school or college student making the assertion.

**Prefer this over their evidence, their evidence is super nonspecific and doesn’t talk about solvency WITHIN DEBATE AS A MEDIUM, WHICH IS CRUCIAL IF THEY WANNA RUN THIS IN DEBATE**

**A2: alt**

**Alt is entirely not competitive, it doesn’t require voting for aff OR neg. Perm do both, we reject sexism/queerphobia in debate too because we’re not topical either**

**Voting for us causes the net benefit is fairness in debate -> the judge can both advocate for the killjoy and for the procedural fairness of the theory WHICH IS A PREREQ TO EFFECTIVE DISCOURSE BECAUSE WE CANT ENGAGE IN IT IF THE ROUND IS SKEWED**

**Means they have no pre fiat offense, their only offense IS the alt.**

# Rebuttal

You talk about how the norms in debate are what enforce bad things

**The Aff's rejection of political engagement is not radical—it continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eliminates our ability to construct alternatives to political domination**

**Burgum '15** (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, "The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism," *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being "distracted". In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand's critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself. For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, "a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence" (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)<sup>3</sup> instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, "a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered ... everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy" (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism. Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as "enlightened false consciousness", which he describes as a "modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain ... it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice" (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically "duped" by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they "know" that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose "not to know" and don't act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such, cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it, (Žižek, 1989, p. 23) The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on "knowing" that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet

they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action. As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399) The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism. The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge ... but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146). This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness. It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his *New Statesman* piece that the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors ... this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum ... for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive. Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic. As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.