

# Constructive

See R1 AV OS.

## Rebuttal

**AFP 24** [The AFP, "Xi Jinping calls to prepare for war as China launches live-fire exercise in Taiwan Strait", **10/22**/2024, The Hindu,

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-jinping-calls-to-prepare-for-war-as-china-launches-live-fire-exercise-in-taiwan-strait/article68781757.ece>] ZG

**China's military began a live-fire exercise near Taiwan on Tuesday** (October 22, 2024), **maintaining pressure on the self-ruled island after staging large-scale drills and President Xi Jinping called for troops to prepare**

**for war.** China's Communist Party has never ruled the island, but it claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has said it will not renounce the use of force to bring it under its control. This

month it sent planes and warships around the island in what Beijing said was a "stern warning to the separatist acts of 'Taiwan Independence' forces". On Monday, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in the eastern island of Pingtan announced that "gun firing" would take place in a limited area close to the Chinese mainland, about 105km (66 miles) from Taiwan. The MSA said they would start at 9:00 a.m. local time (0100 GMT) and take place for four hours in an area encompassing about 150 sqkm (60 square miles).

Charles L. **Glaser**, 04-28-20**21**, Glaser is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China," Foreign Policy, archive.is, <https://archive.is/5m5xT> // MH // re-cut

**A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and** scale back

its opposition to China's assertive policies **simply to avoid conflict.** Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or

tertiary interests. Retrenchment's success would not depend on whether China's goals are limited **or** on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.

What would this policy look like in practice? **The U**<sub>nited</sub> **S**<sub>tates</sub> **would make its revised position public**, thereby laying the foundation **to**

**minimize pressure** from foreign policy elites and the public **to intervene if China attacked Taiwan. It would continue to**

**make clear that China's use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms,** and it could even

continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, **Washington could boost spending**

to preserve and even **enhance its capability to defend Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the commitments it hasn't cut.**

Jared M. **Mckinney & Peter Harris**, 11-22-20**21**, "Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan," USAWC Press,

<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/> // MH

Unlike strategies placing the threat of military reprisal at their core, a **deterrence-by-punishment** strategy **does not rely on** the United States **bolstering** its **military forces** in Northeast Asia. This approach **leaves the U**nited **S**tates some **room to adopt a force posture capable of reassuring allies such as Japan and South Korea** about their collective defense, **while** also **convincing** both **Taiwan and China the U**nited **S**tates **is truly committed to maintaining the status quo across the** Taiwan **Strait. It also frees the US military to divest** itself **from vulnerable bases** in Japan **that** may **on balance make great-power war more**, rather than less, **likely— via a preemptive Chinese attack** in an active-defense situation. Shifting the burden of deterrence from military reprisal to non-military punishment might **also reduce the likelihood of a war caused by miscalculation**, while **also removing** the pretext that China's buildup is a response to **US** and Taiwanese **provocations. Of course, there are dangers associated with reducing the US military footprint around Taiwan. Careful** research and **planning must be conducted in conjunction with regional partners** to ascertain what level and type of US forward deployment would be necessary **to reassure allies** while also lessening the chances of war. **There should be no drawdown** of military forces **until** such a time as **a** credible **deterrence-by-punishment strategy has been put in place**; otherwise Beijing might perceive a window of opportunity to wage a successful attack. Additionally, Taiwan might be less encouraged to stage an independent fight against China if it no longer believes the United States would (or could) intervene on its behalf. **That said**, given reports about low morale in the Taiwanese Armed Forces, as well as low defense spending (around 2 percent of GDP), **a shock**

to the status quo might be just what the situation requires. Regardless, relying less on threats of force is

not the same as ruling out the use of force altogether. Ambiguity will always exist about whether the

United States would use force in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.<sup>37</sup>

Rest were analytics.