

# Constructive

See Octos Peach OS.

## Rebuttal

Tradeoff from Saudi Arabia, not Ukraine.

Jennifer **Kavanagh** and Jordan **Cohen**, 05-11-20**23**, "Taiwan Is Competing for Arms with the Middle East, Not Ukraine," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/taiwan-competing-arms-middle-east-not-ukraine> // MH

While the war in Ukraine has received much of the blame for slow deliveries of systems such as Javelin and Stinger missiles to Taiwan, **Taiwan's weapons backlog predates the war**. Furthermore, to this point, **Taiwan and Ukraine** have **received arms through two different channels**. **Most of the aid** that **Ukraine has received** has **come from U.S. stockpiles through presidential drawdown** authority—which Taiwan only became eligible for under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act—**rather than** foreign **military sales, on which Taiwan has** traditionally **relied**. **Taiwan** therefore has been **shopping for new weapons, while Ukraine has been receiving old ones**. Rather than Ukraine, **Taiwan has competed most directly with** other countries purchasing new systems. Among its biggest competitors are large buyers in the Middle East, including **Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates**. **These countries** not only **buy** many of **the systems Taiwan needs most**, but they also buy these weapons **in large quantities**—often **exceeding** what has been allocated to **Ukraine**, from stocks or otherwise. Based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between the start of former U.S. President Barack Obama's Asia pivot in 2012 and 2022, the United States has delivered thousands of weapons to these five Middle Eastern countries, including 25,658 TOW missiles, 8,512 Hellfire missiles, 46 Patriot air defense systems, 2,526 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 1,241 Javelins, 645 Harpoon missiles, 459 Stingers, 24 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 250 Abrams tanks, 21 F-16s, and other missiles, ammunition, and military vehicles. These are all systems that Taiwan could use for its defense, and many are included in the \$19 billion backlog. Diverting even some of the production capacity devoted to these five countries over the past 11 years would have increased Taiwan's defense stocks substantially. **While Ukraine has received a large number of Javelin, Stinger, and TOW missiles, compared with these Middle Eastern buyers it has received substantially less of** most of the **other systems Taiwan needs**. For example, Ukraine has been promised just two Harpoon coastal defense systems and received one Patriot battery but zero Hellfire or longer-range missiles, and its HIMARS were modified to limit their targeting range. Moreover, while **Ukraine and Taiwan** do need some of the same systems, they **face vastly different battlefield demands that limit** the extent of any **overlap**. **Ukraine** is fighting a ground war of attrition, in close proximity to its adversary, and **needs short-range artillery and air defense** most of all. **Taiwan** will instead face air and maritime warfare and **needs longer-range missiles and air defense and anti-ship capabilities**. Taiwan and Ukraine may compete more directly for newly built weapons as excess U.S. stocks are consumed. But **a review of new production** promised to Ukraine through the Defense Department's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative **finds limited overlap** between capabilities Ukraine will receive and those Taiwan needs. There are some systems slated to go to Ukraine that could benefit Taiwan, including National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, HIMARS, and a range of different types of drones. But **quantities are** relatively **low and are unlikely to delay key arms transfers to Taiwan**. While **there are** and will continue to be **trade-offs between** resources committed to **Taiwan and Ukraine, the same can be said for resources committed to arming other allies** and partners, many of which have less severe security concerns and far more problematic human rights records. For the weapons systems Taiwan needs most, it is large buyers in **the Middle East**—and not Ukraine—that **have been** and likely will continue to be **the biggest drain**. **The fastest** and most efficient **way to get needed weapons** in **to Taiwan** these hands **would be to** pause or **reduce deliveries to** large

**arms buyers in the Middle East**—specifically Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, at least temporarily. Though these Arab states do have some legitimate security concerns, particularly coming from Iran and its proxies, **substantial** and largely **condition-free arms transfers to these countries have** frequently **fueled regional conflicts**, produced security outcomes that are antithetical to U.S. interests, **and contributed to human rights violations**.

Otherwise, war in West Asia escalates – draws in the U.S., China, Russia, and Iran.

**Farley** 12/22/**18** (Robert, Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College, "5 Places Where World War III Could Start in 2019," )

Persian Gulf: The perpetual political and military **crisis in the Middle East** has settled into an uneasy **tedium**. **Economic pressure on Iran continues to increase**, as the United States take ever more aggressive steps to curtail trade. **The Saudi war on Yemen** shows no signs of abating, and while the Syrian Civil War has dialed down to a low, slow burn, both the United States and Russia remain committed to their partners and proxies. But like any slow burn, the conflict could reignite. **Political turmoil** in Iran **could** destabilize the region, either **pushing Iran into aggressive behavior** or making the Islamic Republic a tempting target for its enemies. The tensions between Kurds, Turks, Syrians and Iraqis could break into open conflict at any time. Finally, **the mercurial leader of Saudi Arabia has demonstrated time and again a proclivity for risk acceptance**, even as whispers about the stability of the Kingdom grow louder. **Given the strategic importance of the region, any instability could lead to conflict between the United States, Russia or even China.**

Cast doubt on their UQ.

Thomas **Novelly**, 03-07-20**23**, "Some Air Force Leaders 'Disappointed' in General's Prediction of 2025 War with China," Military, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/03/16/some-air-force-leaders-disappointed-generals-prediction-of-2025-war-china.html> // MH

"I hope I am wrong," Minihan wrote. "My gut tells me we will fight in 2025." That **prediction** and advice were **received very differently** than his earlier speech. **Minihan's memo** was shared widely on the internet, **drawing immediate criticism from** some of **his own airmen and the Pentagon, which decried the rhetoric as "not representative of the department's views** on China." Other politicians and defense experts praised Minihan's comments, saying they underscored the need to be prepared and were spoken like a true warfighter. If the general received a rock star-like reception from airmen at the Air and Space Force Association's 2022 conference, 2023's held last week in Aurora, Colorado -- less than two months after his memo made headlines -- was very different. **Reporters** and attendees **didn't see much of Minihan. Minihan didn't have a keynote speech** like the previous conference, though Air and Space Force Association spokeswoman Amy Hudson said that decision had been made long before the memo was released. Minihan was featured only on a 30-minute panel to discuss the importance of logistics as it related to future conflicts. He received an enthusiastic round of applause when he was introduced and some scattered cheers throughout, but **constrained his remarks** to similar themes as his September speech. Unlike other commanders and top brass, **Minihan didn't host a round table** with reporters. Department of the **Air Force leadership** largely **spoke out against** some of the messages in **his memo** during the symposium. Without naming Minihan directly, **Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told attendees** during his keynote speech at the conference, known by its initials of AFA, **that there shouldn't be attempts to predict when war with China will occur**. "The possibility of aggression in the western Pacific is real, particularly against Taiwan, but **war is not inevitable and there is no reason to believe it is imminent**," Kendall said in his remarks. "In fact, **there is no specific timeframe in which conflict can be predicted** to occur." Kendall later told Military.com during a media roundtable that he believed "Gen. Minihan was trying to motivate his people to be ready at all times" but underscored that **"nobody knows" when a conflict could occur with China. "My own view is that we will be able to successfully deter**; it's not in anybody's interest to start a war over Taiwan or anything else between the U.S. and China," Kendall said. "War is certainly not inevitable. But it could come at any time. We need to be

ready all the time." Likewise, **Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.** Charles "C.Q." **Brown** told Military.com during a media roundtable that **there were aspects of Minihan's memo he was "disappointed in"** and said perhaps **the biggest mistake** was that parts of it were a distraction from the overall message-- one he agrees with. "I think it **detracted from the key message** of the sense of urgency that is required," Brown told Military.com. "The sense of urgency is the most important part out of his memo."

Rest were analytics.