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Stephen Rademaker [Stephen Rademaker practices law at the Washington DC firm of Covington & Burling. During a 20-plus year career in government, he served, among other things, as Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, General Counsel of the Peace Corps, Chief Counsel to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and Assistant Secretary of State responsible for arms control and nonproliferation matters.], "The ICC's Fundamental Design Flaws Have Only Become More Evident", May 24, 2021, International Criminal Justice Today, <https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/the-iccs-fundamental-design-flaws-have-only-become-more-evident/> //MVSG recut RH

In 2014, I argued in this publication that the ICC suffers from fundamental structural defects that have rendered it an obstacle to peace in most of the conflicts in which it has inserted itself, and that until those defects are corrected, the Court cannot expect and does not deserve US support. Since then, there has been a growing recognition that the ICC is a broken institution in desperate need of repair. "Reform" has become a watchword at the Court and among its supporters. But the reforms under consideration are all akin to recommendations for improving the propulsion system of the Hindenburg: if adopted, it's possible they will improve day-to-day operations, but they do not begin to address the fundamental design flaws that are conducting the institution toward spectacular failure. I will not repeat the criticisms spelled out in my previous article, except to say that nothing has happened since 2014 to refute them, and even if all the reforms to the ICC now under consideration are adopted, the criticisms I expressed will remain valid. What has happened since 2014 is that many other criticisms of the Court that I did not reach in my previous article have been vindicated, and arguments previously put forward by the Court's supporters in defense of the institution have been refuted. In particular, the long-running debate over whether the ICC is a threat to countries like the United States and Israel—nations that have not consented to the Court's jurisdiction by ratifying the Rome Statute—has been decisively answered by the Court itself. For more than two decades, critics of the Court warned that it inevitably would target the United States and Israel. These warnings were ridiculed by the Court's proponents as the paranoid delusions of nativists, of a piece with claims that the UN was secretly flying black helicopters over America. ICC supporters insisted that the principle of complementarity embedded within the Rome Statute guaranteed that no American would ever be prosecuted by the Court. They used terms like "inconceivable" to describe this risk, "automatic" to describe how complementarity would operate, and "powerless" to describe the Court's ability to target Americans. Accordingly, they dismissed measures like the American Servicemembers' Protection Act as hysterical over-reactions to an imaginary threat. It has now emerged, of course, that it was not the ICC's critics who were deluded about the threat, but rather its supporters. No serious observer today would use adjectives like those above to describe the protection afforded Americans by the principle of complementarity. Why the ICC Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber would have chosen to prove the Court's detractors right and its supporters wrong by authorizing an investigation into war crimes allegedly committed in Afghanistan by Americans and others is something of a mystery. It's not as if the ICC doesn't already have a full plate, or has demonstrated the capacity to successfully manage the investigations it already has before it. And, as has become characteristic of the ICC in conflict situations, the Court is pursuing its investigation over the objections of the government—Afghanistan—whose consent it ostensibly is relying on to conduct the investigation. Certainly the ICC knows it is provoking a confrontation with the United States by initiating this investigation. Indeed, it is widely assessed that the Appeals Chamber voted to authorize the investigation precisely in order to dispel perceptions that the Court was unwilling to confront the United States. The most plausible explanation of the ICC's action is that it is part of the Court's response to the indisputable criticism that it has spent most of its existence meting out European-style justice to African defendants. This critique been devastating to the ICC's reputation in Africa. So much so that the Court's Western supporters had to mount a diplomatic campaign to head off a Kenyan-led effort to instigate a mass-defection from the Rome Statute by African governments. The only long-term solution to the Court's reputational problem in Africa is for it to identify some non-African defendants to bring to justice. The ICC's options for doing this are limited, however, as it currently has only four investigations underway outside of Africa. Notably, all of them were commenced after African unhappiness with the Court began to manifest itself. In addition to the Afghanistan investigation (requested by the Prosecutor in 2017 and authorized in 2020), the pending ICC investigations outside of Africa are: Georgia: In 2016, an investigation was authorized into crimes committed during the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia. This investigation is fraught with risk for the ICC, however. It will look feckless if it only brings charges against Georgians, who after all were the victims of Russian aggression in that conflict. But should it seek to prosecute Russian government or military officials, it will face an entirely different set of risks. Russia has never ratified the Rome Statute, and has made clear its hostility to the ICC. Vladimir Putin probably does not need the encouragement of a Hague Invasion Act in order to defend Russia's interests should he deem them seriously threatened by the ICC. Bangladesh/Myanmar: In 2019, an investigation was authorized into Myanmar's treatment of its Rohingya ethnic minority. The Court's jurisdictional hook is tenuous, however, given that Myanmar has not ratified the Rome Statute, and the government's actions are taking place on Myanmar's territory. The Prosecutor argues that the fact that Rohingya individuals are being deported to Bangladesh—which is party to the Rome Statute—is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court, but this claim is sure to be contested should charges ever be brought. State of Palestine: In 2015, the "State of Palestine" declared that it had ratified the Rome Statute, and in reliance on this, as well as a Pre-Trial Chamber ruling, the Prosecutor in March 2021 announced the opening of an investigation into the "situation in Palestine." For purposes of this investigation, "Palestine" is defined as the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Although the Prosecutor found in preliminary examination a reasonable basis to believe crimes had been committed by both Israeli and Palestinian actors, the clear object of this investigation is to bring charges against Israelis—notwithstanding that Israel has not

ratified the Rome Statute—in connection with Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and its episodic military engagements with Palestinian forces in Gaza. The ICC’s jurisdiction in this case is on even shakier ground than in Myanmar, given that Palestine is not a member of the United Nations and is not recognized as a state by most Western governments, but these concerns were brushed aside by the ICC. To be sure, the opening of an ICC investigation does not equate to the bringing of criminal charges, and therefore it remains possible that the Court ultimately will decide not to exercise the criminal jurisdiction it claims to have over potential defendants in these cases. But political considerations suggest that it will be extremely difficult for the Court not to bring charges in at least some of these cases. Should the ICC bring charges against Americans over US actions in Afghanistan, political confrontation with the United States will be assured. There has been no indication that the Biden administration will depart from the policy of all previous US presidents to reject the ICC’s jurisdiction over Americans on grounds that the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute. Further, implicit in any charges brought against Americans will be a finding by the Court that the investigations of US actions in Afghanistan undertaken during the Obama administration were essentially cover-ups—investigations that the United States was “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out,” in ICC parlance. That would be a most unfriendly accusation to level against an administration whose alumni populate the new Biden administration. Should the ICC bring charges against Israelis—who, like Americans, hail from a country that has not ratified the Rome Statute—the political fallout in America will be almost as great. Last year a bipartisan group of 69 Senators sent a letter castigating the ICC for taking up the Palestine case and affirming that “the United States should stand in full force against any biased investigation of Israel.” In addition to asserting that the ICC has no standing to decide whether Palestine is a state and what its boundaries are, the letter complained that the ICC’s actions “would further hinder the path to peace.” This final criticism tracks the principal argument of my previous article, which described the many cases in which the ICC’s intervention in ongoing conflicts has served primarily to impede prospects for peaceful settlement. The last thing the world needs is more obstacles to peace in the Middle East. Of course, achieving peace is completely beside the point to true believers in the ICC. As one prominent NGO was unashamed to declare, “the prosecutor may not . . . decide not to go from investigation to trial . . . because of concerns regarding an ongoing peace process, because that would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.” Where we are left, therefore, is that the ICC’s need to re-legitimize itself is driving what was supposed to be an apolitical instrument of justice to bring cases that will be detrimental not just to the United States, allies like Israel, and the Court itself, but also to world peace. These can only be seen as manifestations of the kinds of fundamental design flaws discussed in my previous article, not unlike those that led the Hindenburg to its unhappy end.

Journalist Mecklin 22 [John Mecklin, a journalist, novelist and editor, who specializes in narrative journalism. He was the editor-in-chief of Miller-McCune, a national public policy magazine. Mecklin is currently the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists "The United States has supported successful mediation in 11 vicious conflicts since 1990: Could Ukraine make it an even dozen?", 04/27/2022, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/04/the-united-states-has-supported-successful-mediation-in-11-vicious-conflicts-since-1990-could-ukraine-make-it-an-even-dozen/>] / MS DEMON RAY HE

Up to now, the United States, along with its Western partners, has been rightly preoccupied with furnishing Ukraine the weapons needed to defend itself against massive Russian aggression, ramping up crushing economic sanctions against Russia, and decrying the latter’s war crimes. However, they also need to use their considerable leverage with both sides to promote neutral third-party mediation to deescalate this particularly dangerous war. US and Western policy makers should remember that their predecessors’ support for such mediations has helped settle 11 vicious civil wars and interstate conflicts since 1990.

If neither side can fully impose its will, they and the world could be looking at a brutal conflict that kills up to hundreds of thousands of people. By some estimates, tens of thousands, military and civilian, have already died. And the longer the Ukraine war continues, the greater the damage the international community will suffer due to disruption of the global economy that affects food security in many countries and to diversion of attention from urgent issues like climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. This is not to mention the potential for military, even nuclear, confrontation between Russia and NATO. So, the consequences of continued war in Ukraine could exceed those incurred in any conflict since Vietnam.

There is a plausible alternative to this bleak scenario. It is third-party mediation rooted in recognition of on-the-ground power relations, leavened by as much justice as a neutral intermediary can elicit. From 1990-2005 the United States supported mediations that produced agreements ending 11 conflicts that had killed anywhere from tens of thousands to nearly 4 million people in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland and Sudan. Although all but one of these settlements concerned civil wars, half also involved interstate conflicts and relations—including some with great powers. For example, the principal signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia were the states of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, and NATO was strongly involved in the conflict. The Cambodia accord became possible when China and Vietnam made a secret deal. And the US Congress's withholding of military aid to the Government of El Salvador was instrumental in its UN-mediated peace settlement. In five of the 11 conflicts, war crimes trials were held, but only after the peace accords were well-established.

While many of these peace agreements were flawed, fell under significant strain, and were later revised, not one has dissolved into renewed war.

A rich literature, including many first-person accounts, describes how the mediators nurtured agreements in conflicts that were either "ripe" for resolution (i.e. where the parties appeared to perceive they could not win and the costs of continuing were higher than the costs or prospects of a settlement) or needed further "ripening."

Contention 1 is Human Rights Interventions

Inge 22 from University of Mary Washington [Alexia Inge (Political Science), University of Mary Washington, 29 April 2022, "Humanitarian Intervention and American Public Opinion: An Analysis to Intervene", https://scholar.umw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1501&context=student_research] / MS DEMON RAY HE

The United States is a known active and influential state in the international community and historically has participated in humanitarian interventions around the world through humanitarian aid, diplomacy, threats of sanctions, threats of the use of force, and military assistance. The definition of humanitarian intervention that will be used for the context of the paper comes from scholar Johnathan Moore. He defined humanitarian intervention as, "...action by international actors across national boundaries including the use of military force taken with the objective of relieving severe and widespread human suffering and violation of human rights within states where local authorities are unwilling or unable to do so" (Moore, 2007, pg. 169). Humanitarian crises that create the need for intervention include disasters that are man-made and natural, along with outbreaks of diseases. Man-made disasters include armed conflict, forced displacement, and mass refugee flows (Kohrt, et.al. 2019). Natural disasters include unpredictable events such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and droughts (Kohrt, et.al. 2019). Unfortunately, most severe humanitarian crises have multiple of these events occurring simultaneously. Yet, as seen in the Ukraine case, the United States does not always intervene militarily when large scale human rights atrocities and human suffering occur. The American government deemed genocide in Darfur continued to be an international crisis in 2008, as new peacekeeping forces had to be implemented. The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1769 in July, which authorized the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and added support to the small African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) (U.S. Response to the Situation in Darfur 2008). The United States continued to support the peacekeeping mission and provided humanitarian assistance to those in the Darfur region. From 2005 to 2008, the United States provided \$4 billion in humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping assistance, along with \$100 million to equip and train those a part of UNAMID, constructed 34 base camps for peacekeepers in Darfur, and provided 40,000 metric tons of food monthly to Sudan (U.S. Response to the Situation in Darfur 2008). This was the full extent of the United States' aid to Sudan, which ultimately did not include military intervention. As it was presented, the United States provided large amounts of humanitarian aid and was dedicated to strengthening peacekeeping forces in Sudan, but in the end, the United States government did not respond in the way that the American public wanted. There was a change in 27 public opinion regarding the United States being a part of a multilateral force in Sudan to end the ethnic genocide, as in 2004, 61% of Americans favored it and in 2007, 45% favored it.

Professor Choi and James of UChicago 16 [Seung-Whan Choi (PhD, is professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His research interests include

terrorism, human rights, conflict studies, and research methods) and Patrick James (Dornsife Dean's Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California (PhD, University of Maryland, College Park). James specializes in comparative and international politics), Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 60(5), Science Society (International), pages 899-926, SAGE, 12 July 2016 "Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and Terrorism", <https://whanchoi.people.uic.edu/Why-Does-The-US-Intervene-Abroad.pdf>] / MS DEMON RAY HE

Abstract Democracy, human rights, and terrorism are major foreign policy issues. However, among these issues, what do the US leaders care about the most? This study assesses the degree to which Washington responds militarily to threats to democratic institutions, human rights abuses, and terrorist activity in other countries. **Based on a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 164 countries for the years 1981 to 2005, this study presents empirical models** that evaluate the relative importance of these issues for contemporary American foreign and security policy. **It turns out that, all other things being equal, the United States is likely to engage in military campaigns for humanitarian reasons that focus on human rights protection rather than for its own security interests such as democracy promotion or terrorism reduction. This finding is extremely robust** and reinforced by case illustrations that support a causal explanation for US intervention with a basic and sustained place for human rights protection. Quasi-hegemony is the story of US foreign policy for some time. In spite of economic downturn in the present decade, observations regarding preeminent US capability and activity abroad are legion. Several years ago, for example, the Economist (2007, 10) observed that **the United States** "still spends roughly as much on defence as the rest of the world put together ... and **remains the only country able to project military power globally.**" The Economist's assessment puts the United States in **the unequivocally number one place in the world for defense spending and military power.** This unique **position has facilitated frequent military actions to promote peace, prosperity, and democratic governments overseas.** On the contrary, **Russia and China**, the most likely pretenders to the throne, **possess limited political resources and do not necessarily share Washington's self-identified ideas about democracy, freedom, and human rights.** Thus, **Moscow and Beijing have appeared to be less keen to engage in international military intervention** with any degree of regularity. For example, the Chinese are more **concerned with regional hegemony**, particularly keeping the United States at bay in any future conflict **over Taiwan, Korea, and/or Japan.** And **recent Russian activity vis-a-vis Ukraine** would **not** appear **even remotely connected to the concerns attributed to the United States.** Thus, the United States emerges as the natural priority for assessment of intervention on a worldwide basis. However, the question of how Washington's unique military capabilities are related to promoting freedom and democracy and protecting human rights around the world could use more scrutiny. Existing intervention literature searches for general patterns of military action by all countries and mainly in the context of the role of democratic political systems. This is somewhat limiting because US military actions constitute the centerpiece of foreign military interventions that seem "to have become a sine qua non of modern statecraft" (Pickering and Kisangani 2006, 363). This activity also is associated with the rise of "contingent sovereignty"—the new and still evolving challenge to the norm of nonintervention in the internal affairs of countries (Ramos 2013, 78, 143). In particular, the United States appears to see military intervention as an effective foreign policy tool; it has quite often wielded military muscle worldwide since World War II (Fordham 2008; Prins 2010).

Professor Yoo and Stradner of UC Berkeley in 20 explains [John Yoo, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ the UC Berkeley School of Law and Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford & Ivana Stradner, Research Fellow @the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 3-17-2020, "The U.S. Must Reject the International Criminal Court's Attack on Its National Sovereignty", National Review, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/03/united-states-must-reject-international-criminal-court-attack-on-national-sovereignty/>] /Kanksee recut RH + wrong

To end this charade, **the U.S. should continue to challenge the Court's jurisdiction and protect the rights of nations** that are bound only by rules to which they consent. The Trump administration should continue to deny ICC officials and any government officials (such as any military or law enforcement officers) that assist them from entering the United States or using its financial

system. Most important, the United States should strike at the ICC through its supporters. Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Mexico, and Australia are all major Court funders. The Trump administration should warn countries who are ICC top funders yet depend utterly on the U.S. for their defense (such as Japan) that they cannot expect American troops to protect any nation seeking to prosecute and imprison them. It should weaken defense ties with ICC member countries, and cut foreign aid to any nation that cooperates with the Court.

With these actions, the Trump administration will defend the rights, not just of the United States, but of all sovereign nations. America did not join the Rome Statute. It remains unfettered by its requirements. To protect international law, it should refuse to recognize any ICC probe. International rules should only bind nations that consent to them. Allowing the ICC to claim power over the U.S., which does not consent to its jurisdiction will erode any incentive to obey any international rules at all. The ICC's actions threaten the only true mechanism for deterring human rights abuses. Subjecting U.S. forces to an after-the-fact and idealistic human-rights barometer will only discourage Washington from intervening to end massive human-rights abuses in difficult world hotspots. If the global elite want the U.S. to lead efforts to end killings in places such as Syria, Yemen, or Sudan, the last thing it should do is prosecute American troops when they take on the difficult jobs that no other nation can or will do.

Professor Goldsmith 03 of Harvard Law [Jack Goldsmith (the Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard University, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute), The University of Chicago Law Review, 2003, "The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court", <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5158&context=uclrev>] / MS
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I now turn to consider how the ICC might actually diminish human rights protections. This perverse result could occur because the ICC's actions may have a chilling effect on U.S. human rights-related activities. The main reason why the United States opposes the ICC is the fear that its unique international policing responsibilities will expose it to politically motivated prosecutions before an unaccountable court. To be sure, the ICC's safeguards to prevent rogue prosecutions are all ultimately subject to ICC interpretation. The most notable safeguard is complementarity. Complementarity requires that the ICC dismiss a case under investigation "unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution".⁹ But the ICC has the **final word** on what counts as a "genuine" investigation based on its judgment whether the domestic proceedings are "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice."¹⁰ The perceived efficacy of complementarity and other ICC safeguards turns on the level of trust a nation has toward the ICC. The United States has little. This lack of trust is magnified by the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction over non-signatory nations and the more favorable immunities the ICC provides to signatory nations (most notably, the option for a seven-year immunity from war crimes prosecution). There are two plausible answers. First, U.S. troops do not hide behind U.S. borders. Hundreds of thousands of them are spread across the globe and can much more readily be nabbed and whisked away to The Hague. The possibility of capture is thus much more salient for U.S. troops or officials. Even a remote chance that one of them may be prosecuted will understandably concern U.S. leaders. Second, even if no U.S. official ends up in The Hague, the ICC can affect the United States by merely investigating alleged crimes and engaging in official public criticism and judgment of U.S. military actions. We can now finally begin to see the perverse effects of the ICC. The first component of the central ICC compromise leaves in place international human rights' dependence on United States political support, funding, and military might. The second component of the fatal compromise exposes the United States, a non-signatory nation, to liability for crimes committed in signatory nations or in non-signatory nations that temporarily invoke Article 12(3). But this latter part of the compromise will lead the United States to limit its human rights enforcement activities. And the first enforcement activities to go will be ones involving human rights crises that lack a powerful U.S. welfare-enhancing justification. We have already seen these perverse effects in the United States' threat to pull out of UN peacekeeping

missions unless U.S. troops receive immunity before the ICC. However this is resolved, peacekeeping will suffer at least at the margin. To the extent that ad hoc international tribunals have been important in protecting human rights, they too have suffered, and will continue to suffer, from a general U.S. withdrawal for reasons already canvassed. But perhaps the greatest effect will be on U.S. humanitarian and quasi-humanitarian interventions, such as in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia. Human rights advocates increasingly view such **interventions** as legitimate and necessary to **protect human rights.** It is hard enough to generate domestic support in the United States for these interventions when there is no threat of liability. U.S. **intervention will now be much harder.** Such interventions invariably involve **combat against irregular forces interspersed in civilian populations and thus invariably run the risk of war crime accusations.** The fatal compromise appears to expose the **only nation** practically able to **intervene** to protect human rights to the greatest potential liability for human rights violations. So in the end **the ICC will** likely have two ironic consequences. It will affect the generally human-rights-protecting, but globally active, United States more than rogue human rights abusers who hide behind national walls and care little about world opinion or international legitimacy. And it will have the **greatest chill on U.S. military action not** when important U.S. strategic interests are at stake (as they are now in Afghanistan), but rather **in quasi-humanitarian situations** (such as in Kosovo) where the strategic benefits of military action are lower and thus a remote possibility of prosecution weighs more heavily.

Dowd 15, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose (Alan, "Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence",

<https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/>) | recut et

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, **the only thing that keeps the peace** defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization **is** the willingness to **use** our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of **military deterrence**, and too many people of faith forget that **the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them.** Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ's message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren't expected to do—and arguably shouldn't do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that **we live in** such **a violent world**, but that's precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn't admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.^[i] "Even in the Gospels," soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, "it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary."^[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It's a paradoxical truth that **military readiness can keep the peace.** The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. "If you wish for peace, prepare for war." President George Washington put it more genteelly: "There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy." Or, in the same way, "We infinitely desire peace," President Theodore Roosevelt declared. "And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war." **After the West gambled civilization's very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength.**

Winston Churchill proposed "defense through deterrents." President Harry Truman called NATO "an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength....we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war"[i] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, "Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction." President John Kennedy vowed to "strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack." And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, "None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong." Reagan also argued, "Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace." [iv] Even so, arms alone aren't enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren't clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson's admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. "The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act," explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It's a "cost-benefit calculus." [v] So, given the anemic state of America's military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then all there wouldn't have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their armaments to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary

must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin *deterrere*: “to frighten off”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steady American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained arsenies in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. . . . Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to [peace through strength](#). Again, in line with the Christian

we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent

great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail [to deter war, a tremendous](#)

[number of civilians will be killed](#).”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced...from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently...all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny—now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book *The World America Made*, Robert Kagan explains how “[America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war](#).” [This role has depended on America’s military might](#). “[There is no better recipe for great-power peace](#),” Kagan concludes, “[than certainty about who holds the upper hand](#).”[xvii]

Dr. Barnett 11 continues that

Thomas P.M. Barnett (An award-winning professor, a journalist, novelist and editor, who specializes in narrative journalism. He was the editor-in-chief of Miller-McCune, a national public policy magazine. Mecklin is currently the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. Barnett has written for Esquire, Foreign Policy, Wired, National Review, and the Washington Post, and has been interviewed by Rolling Stone, Economist, Time, BBC World Service, CNN, Fox News, NPR, and many foreign media. Thomas has been described by U.S. News & World Report's Michael Barone as "one of the most important strategic thinkers of our time), 2011, "The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads," World Politics Review,

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads> //VN Recut //MVSG

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known.** Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, **America** stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace.** We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was** the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, **the** persistent **spread of human rights**, the liberation of women, the **doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and **a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based **conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop **and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war.**

Contention 2 is Ukraine

AP News 4 days ago (Dasha Litvinova, an Associated Press correspondent covering Russia, Belarus, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Matthew Lee, 2-18-25, "Russia and US agree to work toward ending Ukraine war in a remarkable diplomatic shift", AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-riyadh-talks-trump-putin-rubio-0c3beebfef5839e9d509ff58239a6bc5>)

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia (AP) — **Russia and the U.S. agreed** Tuesday **to start working toward ending the war in Ukraine and improving** their **diplomatic** and economic **ties**, the two countries' top diplomats said **after talks** that reflected an extraordinary about-face in U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump. In an interview with The Associated Press after the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said **the two sides agreed broadly to pursue three goals: to restore staffing** at their respective embassies in Washington and Moscow, **to create a high-level team to support Ukraine peace talks and to explore** closer relations and economic **cooperation.** He stressed, however, that **the talks** — which were attended by his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, and other senior Russian and U.S. officials — **marked the beginning of a conversation, and more work needs to be done.** Lavrov echoed Rubio's remarks and told reporters that **"the conversation was very useful."** **"We not only listened, but also heard each other,"** he said. Trump's national security adviser, Michael Waltz, and special Mideast envoy Steven Witkoff joined Rubio at the table, along with Lavrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin's foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov. No

Ukrainian officials were present at the meeting, which came as the beleaguered country is slowly but steadily losing ground against more numerous Russian troops in a grinding war that began nearly three years ago. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country would not accept any outcome from the talks since Kyiv didn't take part, and he postponed his own trip to the kingdom scheduled for Wednesday. European allies have also expressed concerns that they are being sidelined. Trump showed little patience for Ukraine's objections to being excluded from the talks. He said repeatedly that Ukraine's leaders never should have allowed the war to begin, suggesting the country should have been willing to make concessions to Russia before the 2022 invasion. "Today I heard, 'Oh, well, we weren't invited.' Well, you been there for three years. You should have ended it three years" ago, Trump said during a news conference at his Florida residence. "You should have never started it. You could have made a deal."

Hubenko yesterday writes [Dmytro Hubenko, DW, 2-21-2025, "Trump tells Putin, Zelenskyy to 'get together' to end war – DW",

<https://www.dw.com/en/trump-tells-putin-zelenskyy-to-get-together-to-end-war/a-71695121>] / MS
DEMON RAY HE

US President Donald Trump called Friday for his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin to "get together" to end the Ukraine conflict. "I think that President Putin and President Zelenskyy are going to have to get together. Because you know what? We want to stop killing millions of people," Trump told reporters at the White House. Trump has been pushing for a deal to end the war soon and has held separate calls with both leaders. His top officials recently met their Russian counterparts in Saudi Arabia in talks that did not include Ukraine. Trump's new call follows comments by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio earlier Friday, who said a potential meeting between Trump and Putin would "largely depend on whether we can make progress on ending the war in Ukraine."

Monaghan 25 [Sean Monaghan (a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 January 2025, "Can Trump Persuade Putin to Make Peace in Ukraine?"]

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-trump-persuade-putin-make-peace-ukraine>] / MS DEMON RAY HE

The Trump Factor Ukraine's Western allies have been unable to issue any credible ultimatums due to a combination of Russia's surprising economic resilience, a war both sides think they can win—so each prefers fighting to conceding—and a cautious, incremental approach to arming Ukraine.

But this situation is in flux as Trump arrives in the White House. Russia's wartime economy is on a precipice, while on the battlefield slow gains have come at a massive cost in lives and equipment. Meanwhile, Ukraine has managed to take and hold Russian territory in the Kursk region while conducting a growing campaign of missile and drone strikes deep inside Russia. The most significant change may be the one driven by Trump himself: a reverse in sentiment over U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Despite sometimes talking about "peace through strength," Trump campaigned on reducing levels of support to the point where Ukraine may not be able to continue fighting for long even if it wanted to.

Moreover, Trump is not known for caution. Quite the opposite: he cultivates an image of being unpredictable and "crazy" to gain leverage. His instincts for playing hardball were on display last week when his demand for Putin to stop the war was sandwiched between two other dramatic coercive moves: withholding widely expected tariffs on China to provide leverage in upcoming talks with Beijing, and threatening Colombia with massive tariffs if Bogota did not accept deported migrants. As Zelensky has stated: "I believe (Trump) is strong and unpredictable. I would very much like President Trump's unpredictability to be directed primarily toward the Russian Federation.

The Art of Coercive Diplomacy Despite his detractors, Trump's unpredictability and dealmaking instincts may help Ukraine strike a ceasefire and peace deal on its own terms. His temperament and character, combined with shifting political, military, and economic conditions around the war, could make an ultimatum strategy viable again.

Burc **Journalist Eruygur 24**, 22.05.2024, "Russia claims US has always used ICC as 'hand tool' to achieve its goals," Anadolu Ajansı, [I am a young professional currently working as a correspondent for Anadolu Agency, with a specific focus on Russia and Eurasia. I previously worked for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) and I was also the Assistant Editor for MENA Affairs: a new online platform affiliated with ORSAM, focused on publishing insightful and challenging analyses and commentaries to understand breaking political, economic and social developments in the Middle East and North Africa region. I focus specifically on foreign policy, geopolitical, and geoeconomic matters. I also follow developments in Russia and the post-Soviet space, stemming from my studies on the region during my Bachelor studies.], accessed 2-6-2025, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russia-claims-us-has-always-used-icc-as-hand-tool-to-achieve-its-goals/3226693> //vh

Russia on Wednesday claimed that the US has always used the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a “hand tool” to achieve its goals.

“When investigations were carried out against countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia that Washington disliked, the US supported these decisions, moreover, often initiated them themselves,” Vyacheslav Volodin, the head of the Russian State Duma, said on Telegram. Recalling that the ICC is seeking arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant as well as three Hamas leaders, Volodin said the US “rushed in” to defend the Israeli officials. Volodin said that this action is not surprising as this is the first time that the leader of Washington’s closest ally has been prosecuted by the ICC. **“It is unacceptable for the US leadership when such pocket structures as the ICC, as well as** PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), the European Parliament and others, **try to make decisions against the will of the hegemon,”** Volodin further said. **He also said that Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly spoken about these issues, and that the US promotes a world order “not based on international law, but a ‘rules-based order’ that no one has seen or agreed with.” “At the same time, the rules change depending on the current political situation and the interests of those who come up with them. This state of affairs is unacceptable,”** he went on to say. He added that only strengthening a multipolar and fair world order will make it possible to get rid of the “political fraud” of the US and solve many global problems. On Monday, Karim Khan, the ICC’s prosecutor, applied for arrest warrants against Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and three leaders of the Palestinian group Hamas for “war crimes and crimes against humanity” committed in Israel and the Gaza Strip. On the same day, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Mike Johnson said on X: “In the absence of leadership from the White House, Congress is reviewing all options, including sanctions, to punish the ICC and ensure its leadership faces consequences if they proceed. If the ICC is allowed to threaten Israeli leaders, ours could be next.”

Pomper 23 of the International Crisis Group states [Stephen Pomper, Chief of Policy at the International Crisis Group, 5-8-2023, Can Ukraine Get Justice Without Thwarting Peace?, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-ukraine-justice-thwarting-peace>, Willie T.]

Russia’s unlawful war on Ukraine appears to be on a different trajectory. It is unclear how the conflict will end, but Russian surrender is **not in the cards**. One likely scenario is a negotiated deal; another is a frozen conflict. Moscow’s political leadership will **remain almost certainly ensconced** for the foreseeable future, and international actors will **continue to need to work with them** in forums such as the United Nations. Ukraine’s Western partners are trying to weaken Russia, but they are also trying to steer clear of a **direct conflict**, aware that any confrontation the Kremlin sees as posing an **existential threat** could bring the risk of escalation, including the use of **nuclear weapons**.

Plans to stand up a new tribunal do not easily fit into this landscape. **Seeking accountability for** Russian President Vladimir **Putin** and other senior Kremlin officials now, while Russia and Ukraine remain **locked in combat**, is hard to reconcile with any realistic Western war aims. A big push to prosecute Russian leaders for starting the war **signals a desire to remove Russia’s leadership**, risks escalation, **and would almost surely **complicate diplomacy** to bring the war to an end**. If establishing such a court ultimately proves futile, it could also weaken rather than strengthen the international criminal justice project. Rather than barreling ahead and risking a full-on collision between the interests of peace and justice, Ukraine and its partners should pursue a sequenced approach in which accountability efforts are better harmonized with the goals of conflict resolution.

A LOOPHOLE IN THE LAW

There are very few examples of war-time leaders being tried on aggression charges, and fewer still of trials that took place while the leaders were still waging war. Most precedents date back to the post–World War II International Military Tribunal, which the victorious Allies created at Nuremberg to prosecute senior German leaders. The other most notable case comes from Nuremberg’s sister tribunal held in Tokyo, which was created to try Japanese officials. There have also been a handful of domestic trials, including those conducted in Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea, including one that resulted in the in absentia conviction of Ukraine’s former president, Victor Yanukovich.

This sparse record is no accident. The powers driving the creation of the post–Cold War architecture for international criminal law—the United States chief among them—were ambivalent about lumping together the crime of aggression with so-called atrocity offenses (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). U.S. officials worried about the lack of clarity and consensus around what constitutes aggression. They also feared the exposure they might be creating for themselves and up their chains of command. The U.S. government fretted that these legal changes would hamper Washington’s ability to build coalitions to undertake operations such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which lacked UN Security Council authorization and which was widely seen as unlawful. (The United States has hewed to the position that its actions in Kosovo were “legitimate,” but it has not argued that they were legal.) Senior U.S. officials were also concerned about the ICC being drawn into political thickets that would undercut its effectiveness. They foresaw that the threat of being prosecuted for aggression could impel leaders to fight to the last rather than negotiate for peace.

Doctor Chorakis of Harvard 23 continues [Andreas Chorakis; PhD in International Law; 11-14-2023; "The ICC’s Arrest Warrant Against Putin: A Grenade Against Peace in Ukraine?"; Harvard; <https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/2023/11/the-iccs-arrest-warrant-against-putin-a-grenade-against-peace-in-ukraine/>; accessed 02-12-2025] //RG

In the case of Ukraine, the EU can be the main negotiator and peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine War. The EU has played the same role in the past, on certain occasions with great success, such as the Bosnian War, and on other occasions with great failure, such as the situation in Cyprus. As a mainly political organization, the EU has the capacity, the skills, and the appropriate means to provide a peaceful solution for Ukraine. However, under the pressure of the arrest warrant, the EU could not fulfill its role. Having a fear of being arrested and being transferred to The Hague, the Russian political authority would avoid any visit to EU countries or any negotiations in an EU Member State’s territory. Therefore, the EU would lose its main advantage as a neutral negotiation mediator.

Professor Sachs of Columbia in ‘22 (Jeffrey Sachs is a professor and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University and president of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. His most recent book is “The Ages of Globalization” (Columbia University Press, 2020). The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author. View more opinion on CNN.), CNN, “Opinion: Opinion: A negotiated peace is the only way to end Russia’s war on Ukraine”, April 21, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/20/opinions/sachs-ukraine-negotiation-op-ed/index.html>) DOA 02-07-2025//abhi

There is only one answer to the war in Ukraine: a peace deal. Jeffrey D. Sachs Jeffrey D. Sachs Gabriella C. Marino The two-pronged US strategy, to help Ukraine overcome the Russian invasion by imposing tough sanctions and by supplying Ukraine’s military with sophisticated armaments, is likely to fall short. What is needed is a peace deal, which may be within reach. Yet to reach a deal, the United States will have to compromise on NATO, something Washington has so far rejected. Putin started the war in Ukraine and has said negotiations have reached an impasse, without slamming the door on them. But before the war started, Putin presented the West with a list of demands including, most notably, a halt to NATO enlargement. The US, pointedly, was not willing to engage on that point. Now would be a good time to revisit that policy. Putin also would have to show a willingness to make concessions for negotiations to succeed. America’s arms-and-sanctions approach may sound convincing in the echo chamber of US public opinion, but it doesn’t really work on the global stage. It enjoys little support outside of the United States and Europe, and eventually may face a political backlash inside the US and Europe as well. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin attends a press conference with his Belarus counterpart, following their talks at the Kremlin in Moscow on February 18, 2022. - Vladimir Putin said on February 18, 2022 that the situation in conflict-hit eastern Ukraine was worsening, as the West accuses him of planning an imminent attack on the country. (Photo by Sergei GUNEYEV / Sputnik / AFP) (Photo by SERGEI GUNEYEV/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images) Opinion: Putin is planning a victory parade on May 9 — no matter what To anyone familiar with the Russian war effort and the horror it has unleashed on civilians, it may seem obvious that Russia would be relegated to pariah status globally. But that’s not the case: Developing countries, especially, have declined to join in the West’s campaign of isolation, as seen most recently in a US-led vote to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. It’s true that 93 countries supported the move, but 100 other countries did not (24 opposed, 58 abstained, and 18 did not vote). Even more striking, those 100 countries are home to 76% of the world population. Countries may well have had nonideological reasons for opposing the US initiative, including trade ties with Russia. But the fact remains that much of the world has rejected isolating Moscow, especially to the degree Washington would like. Sanctions are a big part of the US strategy. They are not likely to defeat Russia, but they are likely to impose high costs around the world. At best, they can push Russia toward a peace agreement and therefore should be deployed in conjunction with an intensive push for a negotiated peace. There are countless problems with economic sanctions. The first is that even as sanctions cause economic distress in Russia, they are unlikely to change Russian politics or policies in any decisive way. Think of the harsh sanctions the US has imposed on Venezuela, Iran and North Korea. Yes, they’ve weakened these economies, but they’ve not changed the politics or policies of these countries in the ways the US government has sought. The second problem is that sanctions are easy to evade at least in part, and more evasions are

likely to emerge over time. The US sanctions apply most effectively to dollar-based transactions involving the US banking system. Countries seeking to evade the sanctions find ways to make transactions through non-bank or non-dollar means. We can expect a rising number of transactions with Russia in rubles, rupees, renminbi and other non-dollar currencies. The third and related problem is that most of the world does not believe in the sanctions – and also does not take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war. Add up all of the countries and regions imposing sanctions on Russia – the US, UK, European Union, Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and a handful of others – and their combined population comes to just 14% of the world population. The fourth problem is the boomerang effect. Sanctions on Russia hurt not just Russia but the entire world economy, stoking supply-chain disruptions, inflation and food shortages. This is why many European countries are likely to continue to import gas and oil from Russia, and why Hungary and perhaps some other European countries will agree to pay Russia in rubles. The boomerang effect will also likely hurt Democrats in this November's midterm elections as inflation eats away at the real earnings of voters. The fifth problem is the inelastic (price-insensitive) demand for Russia's energy and grain exports. As the quantity of Russian exports is reduced, the world prices of those commodities increase. Russia can end up with lower export volumes but nearly the same or even higher export earnings. The sixth problem is geopolitical. Other countries – and most importantly China – see the Russia-Ukraine war at least in part as a war in which Russia is resisting NATO enlargement to Ukraine. That's why China repeatedly argues that Russia's legitimate security interests are at stake in the war. FILE PHOTO: A service member of pro-Russian troops walks near an apartment building destroyed in the course of Ukraine-Russia conflict in the besieged southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine March 28, 2022. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko/File Photo Russian bombardment of Ukrainian cities blunts hopes of swift breakthrough The US likes to say that NATO is a purely defensive alliance, but Russia, China and others think otherwise. They look askance at the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, NATO forces in Afghanistan for 20 years after 9/11, and the NATO bombing of Libya in 2011, which toppled Moammar Gadhafi. Russian leaders have been objecting to NATO's eastward enlargement since it began in the mid-1990s with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. It is notable that when Putin called on NATO to stop its enlargement into Ukraine, Biden pointedly refused to negotiate with Russia over the issue. In short, many countries, certainly including China, will not back global pressures on Russia that could lead to NATO expansion. The rest of the world wants peace, not a victory by the United States or NATO in a proxy war with Russia. The US would love to see Putin defeated militarily, and NATO armaments have dealt a huge and heavy blow to Russian forces. But it's also true that Ukraine is being destroyed in the process. Russia is unlikely to declare defeat and retreat. Russia is much more likely to escalate – even, potentially, by using nuclear weapons. Thus NATO arms can inflict huge costs on Russia but cannot save Ukraine. All of this is to say that the US strategy in Ukraine can bleed Russia but can't save Ukraine. Only a peace deal can do that. In fact, the current approach will undermine economic and political stability throughout the world and could divide the world into pro-NATO and anti-NATO camps to the deep long-term detriment of the United States. American diplomacy is therefore punishing Russia, but without much chance of real success for Ukraine or for US interests. Real success is that Russian troops return home and Ukraine's safety and security are achieved. Those outcomes can be achieved at the negotiating table. The key step is for the US, NATO allies and Ukraine to make clear that NATO will not enlarge into Ukraine as long as Russia stops the war and leaves Ukraine. The countries aligned with Putin, and those choosing neither side, would then say to Putin that since he has stopped NATO's enlargement, it's now time for Russia to leave the battlefield and return home. Of course, negotiations might fail if Russia's demands remain unacceptable. But we should at least try, and indeed try very hard, to see whether peace can be achieved through Ukraine's neutrality backed by international guarantees. All of Biden's tough talk – about Putin leaving power, genocide and war crimes – will not save Ukraine. The best chance to save Ukraine is through negotiations that bring the world onside. By prioritizing peace instead of NATO enlargement, the US would rally the support of much more of the world and thereby help to bring peace to Ukraine and security and stability for the entire world.

Murray 25 of the Guardian (Warren Murray, 1-22-2025, "Ukraine war briefing: Depends what Trump means by a 'deal', says Russia," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/23/ukraine-war-briefing-depends-what-trump-means-by-a-deal-says-russia>) //recut collin

A Russian UN envoy on Wednesday gave a guarded response to Donald Trump's demand for Vladimir Putin to make a deal and end the war in Ukraine. "It's not merely the question of ending the war. It's first and foremost the question of addressing the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis," said Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia's deputy ambassador at the United Nations. "So we have to see what does the 'deal' mean in President Trump's understanding." As Pjotr Sauer reports, Trump has threatened Russia with taxes, tariffs and sanctions if a deal to end the war in Ukraine is not struck soon. Trump said Russia's economy was failing and his Russian counterpart must "settle now and stop this ridiculous war". Tatiana Stanovaya, the founder of the political analysis firm R.Politik, said that despite Trump's efforts to force Putin to negotiate, the Russian leader appeared convinced that he had the resources to outlast Ukraine. "A peace deal on Russian terms would save significant resources, but absent such an agreement, Putin is prepared to fight for as long as it takes." Russia's current economic situation was unlikely to compel Putin to negotiate with Ukraine. "If the Kremlin concludes that no favourable deal with Trump is forthcoming, they will likely focus on

prolonging the conflict.” Russia claimed on Wednesday it had taken control of the village of Zapadne in Ukraine’s north-eastern Kharkiv region. Russia has managed to establish a bridgehead on the western bank this year and Zapadne is located about 4km (2.5 miles) west of the Oskil River, marking a significant gain. The Kharkiv region is under constant shelling and two men were killed one day earlier in the village

of Goptivka, according to the Ukrainian governor, Oleg Synegubov. The Ukrainian air force said on Wednesday that air defences had shot down 65 Russian drones in 10 regions, including Kharkiv. **The claimed Russian advance came as its troops close in on**

Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, acknowledged on Tuesday that “in the east, we have a difficult situation”. The general staff of the Ukrainian armed forces said the Russians continued

to concentrate their main efforts on Pokrovsk. The financier-turned-activist Bill Browder is making a push for all \$300bn (£243bn) of frozen Russian assets to be spent on funding Kyiv’s military. Graeme Wearden and John Collingridge write that Browder, speaking on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, warned that if US military support for Ukraine dried up and alternative funding was not found, Russian territorial gains would force millions of Ukrainians to flee, creating “a refugee problem like we’ve never seen before”. Browder has been a leading campaigner against Vladimir Putin’s regime since his lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, was arrested and died in custody 15 years ago. The Yantar, a Russian “spy ship”, was tracked closely by the Royal Navy this week after it entered UK waters on Monday and passed through the Channel at a time of heightened concern about the safety of undersea cables, Dan Sabbagh writes. The defence secretary, John Healey, said: “We see you. We know what you’re doing,” as he accused the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of trying to threaten European security by targeting undersea infrastructure. The Yantar had been “mapping the UK’s critical underwater infrastructure” as it passed through British waters for the second time in less than three months, Healey said in front of MPs. A French official told Agence France-Presse that French military resources had also been mobilised to monitor Yantar but the ship “had no proven hostile intent”. Residents of Russia’s Kursk region have made co-ordinated social media posts appealing for help to find relatives after the Ukrainian border offensive launched last August, Russian media reported on Wednesday. People in the Russian region have for months accused authorities of not doing enough to secure their loved ones, and of keeping them in the dark about the scale of fighting. Ukraine says thousands of its own civilians are being held in areas seized and occupied by Moscow since its assault began in February 2022, and that it is providing safe passage to Russians in the Kursk region. A Russian military court on Wednesday upheld a life sentence for Alexander Permyakov, convicted of seriously injuring the pro-Kremlin writer Zakhar Prilepin by blowing up his car in 2023. Permyakov, who has both Russian and Ukrainian citizenship, told the court that Ukraine’s SBU security service had promised him \$20,000 for killing Prilepin. Permyakov’s defence team at the appeal hearing said he had given investigators information on hidden weapons and told them the location of an unexploded device. Ukraine has not formally claimed the attack on Prilepin but the head of the Ukrainian SBU, Vasyl Maliuk, called the Russian writer a “real war criminal” and said that in the attack, the victim’s “pelvis and legs were badly injured and sorry, he was left without genitals”. Prilepin denied the latter claim.

Journalist Gadzo 24 [Mersiha Gadzo, "Record high deaths in the Russia-Ukraine war: What you should know", October 16th, 2024, Aljazeera,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/16/russia-ukraine-wartime-deaths>] //SC

The war in Ukraine, a conflict that continues to expand, **has been devastating**, with civilian casualties this summer reaching an all-time high since 2022. Just how many people have been killed in the war since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022? Here’s what we know: How many people have died in the war? Last month, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing intelligence and undisclosed sources, reported a grim milestone: about **one million Ukrainians and Russians have been killed** or wounded since the war began. The majority of dead are soldiers on both sides, followed by Ukrainian civilians. According to government figures, in the first half of 2024, three times as many people died in Ukraine as were born, the WSJ reported. Experts have long warned of a bleak demographic future for Ukraine. Population loss is one of the reasons why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has refused to mobilise men aged 18-25, as most of them have not had children yet, according to Ukrainian officials. The eligible age range for Ukraine’s military is 25 to 60. How many are civilians? Statistics vary. In June, Ukrainian officials said “Russian invaders” had killed more than 12,000 civilians, including 551 children. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reported in February that more than 10,200 civilians had been confirmed as killed, with nearly 20,000 injured. The London-based Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) charity reported that 7,001 people had been killed in Ukraine as of September 23, with more than 20,000 civilians injured. About 95 percent of civilian casualties occurred in populated areas, with the Donetsk region the most affected, AOAV said. **But** these figures are the lowest estimates as the charity solely records “incident-specific casualty figures” reported in English-language media, it added. Last month, the NRC reported that this summer Ukraine marked its highest three-month civilian casualty total since 2022. More than 3,200 civilian casualties were recorded in Ukraine between June and August this year – a 33.7 percent increase compared with the same period last year, the NRC said. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) also documented a sharp increase in civilian deaths and injuries over the summer. Attacks in government-controlled territory from August 26 to September 6 killed 64 civilians and injured 392 people, it said. In August alone, 184 civilians were killed and 856 injured, the second-highest monthly casualty figure of the year after July, when at least 219 civilians were killed and 1,018 were injured. Why did Ukrainian casualties rise in the summer? Joachim Giaminardi, NRC’s advocacy manager in Ukraine, told Al Jazeera that the conflict has widened. “We are seeing an expansion of the conflict, both geographically and in terms of the frequency and intensity of the attacks,” Giaminardi said. “The people who are paying the price are civilians.” Danielle Bell, the head of HRMMU, said in a statement last month that “powerful missiles and bombs have struck populated areas, killing and injuring civilians across the country”. “Targeted attacks on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure have again triggered lengthy

nationwide power cuts while recent attacks have destroyed or damaged hospitals, schools, supermarkets, and critical energy infrastructure.” Have Russian civilians been killed? Yes, but Russia has suffered far fewer civilian deaths than Ukraine. Russian civilians have been killed in border areas amid fighting. Moscow has not released an official overall casualty toll. Media outlets, some linked to the state, occasionally report on civilian deaths. Last August, The Moscow Times, citing independent news website 7×7, said 80 civilians had been killed since the invasion began. Two months ago, the Kremlin-aligned outlet TASS reported that 31 people had been killed during Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Kursk. How many Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have been killed? The death toll is impossible to verify. More on that later. Let’s start with what has been reported. More than 71,000 Russian soldiers have been identified and confirmed to have been killed in Ukraine, according to a late-September report by the independent Russian media outlet Mediazona. Using open source research, Mediazona has been documenting the names of Russian soldiers killed, verifying the information through obituaries, posts by relatives, statements from local authorities and other public reports. Leaked US documents suggest that more Russian soldiers have been killed than previously estimated. In July, The Economist reported that between 462,000 and 728,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, injured or captured by mid-June, citing documents by the US Department of Defense. “Russia’s losses in Ukraine since 2022 dwarf the number of casualties from all its wars since the second world war combined,” The Economist reported, referring to wars in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Ukraine from 2014 until February 2022. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, as of October 1, more than 654,000 Russian personnel have died. As for Ukrainian troops, the Russian Ministry of Defence estimates that Kyiv has lost almost half a million men, according to a report published last month by the RT news website. However, according to Western estimates, some 80,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since February 2022. In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters that Ukrainian losses are five times higher than Russia’s, with Kyiv losing at least 50,000 service personnel a month. Both Russia and Ukraine face manpower woes. A Ukrainian platoon commander cited by the Reuters news agency estimated that only 60-70 percent of the several thousand men in the brigade at the start of the war were still serving. The rest had been killed, wounded or signed off due to old age or illness. Play Video 1:48 Why is the death toll so hard to verify? Marina Miron, a researcher at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that governments do not publicly report on their casualties to avoid giving the enemy information on how effective their operations have been. During World War II, for instance, each side underreported their casualties by half and exaggerated enemy casualties by two to three times, she said. A death is confirmed only once the body has been found, and the concerned defence ministry thereby sends a death notification to the family. But many bodies have not been recovered and are categorised as MIA (missing in action). They could be an army deserter or could have been taken prisoner, Miron said. If a government does not officially accept a soldier as dead, it manages to evade the obligation to pay the families of the deceased, which has become a problem in Russia and Ukraine, she added. Casualties among non-state actors, like Russia’s Wagner Group, are not included in available statistics. What’s next for Ukraine? Miron told Al Jazeera that she does not see the war as sustainable for Ukraine, which faces numerous problems: a shortage of troops, a struggling economy, and its dependence on Western aid. “Ukraine does not have an actual strategy, neither does NATO,” she said. While the Russians operate their equipment, Ukraine does not have enough troops who know how to operate Western weapons systems; training them is time-consuming. Training 20 pilots to operate F-16 fighters took more than a year, she said. “Russia will have enough resources to go on for a couple [of] years more. Ukraine does not have that time, neither does NATO because NATO itself is facing shortages in air defence systems,” Miron said, adding that Ukraine is not a priority for policymakers as the Middle East crisis worsens. With Ukraine’s counteroffensive lagging, **officials are searching for a diplomatic solution to end the war, one that would include Russia.** “Russia can sustain this [war], but Ukraine cannot,” she said.