

FEM IR Counter-Plan

The Affirmative reinforces a structure of Masculine IR. Gendered discourses create ongoing militarism and endless wars - This entire k is post-fiat

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. "Gendering the Cult of the Offensive," in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78, SPP)

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence." While states have been more or less secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been affected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack erases the distinction between security and expansion," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

C1 Links - Detraz, 2010 (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, "the genders of environmental security," in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 106-107; spp)

The environmental security approach is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings. While environmental conflict can still directly be linked to military security, environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of "human security." In other words, environmental security is a broader notion than environmental conflict, because it is concerned not only with those directly susceptible to environmental conflict, but instead with all of humanity. In environmental security, the security referent is people and threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage. Some of the main themes in this body of work include the environmental impact of accelerating globalization, concerns over population increases, the spread of disease, and the potentials for sustainable development. There is much more conceptual affinity between feminist approaches to security and the environmental security approach. Like feminist approaches, it argues for a much broader definition of security. Still, while the environmental security approach takes account of many of the complexities of the relationship between humans and their environment, it omits both the gendered nature of making that dichotomy to begin with and many of the gendered impacts of its key constitutive factors. First, the environmental security approach fails to take note of gendered content of human/nature dichotomy. A caution from ecofeminists would be the potential to de-link humans and the nonhuman environment in this approach. Merchant recognizes that humans have a degree of control over nature through human behaviors; however, nature also has the power to destroy and evolve with or without humans in many cases. She therefore calls for "an earthcare ethic, which is premised on this dynamic relationship, [and] is generated by humans, but is enacted by listening to, hearing, and responding to the voice of nature." Second, environmental security authors typically fail to recognize the gender dynamics that would transform their analyses. For example, environmental security scholars pay substantial attention to sustainable development as a way to combat environmental degradation and human insecurity simultaneously. Feminists have pointed out that many sustainable development programs have not been gender-sensitive. Since different paths to development often have survival implications for its population, a gender-sensitive approach to sustainable development that takes into account the needs of women, the ecosystem, and future generations within a particular setting appears necessary to ensure security. This means that if sustainable development or sustainability are advocated as providing security, then the specific needs of women also need to be addressed within that framework. Feminist have also expressed concern that advocates of sustainable development remain entrenched in current (gender-subordinating) social and political structures. Feminists have expressed concern that a sustainable development approach to environmental security maintains the state-centric and top-down foci of the environmental conflict approach, masking it under a broader definition of who merits security.

C2 Links

Claire **Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008)**, University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, "Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident", New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

We begin by looking at the way the White Paper talks about nuclear weapons technology. There are three strands to the feminist critique of the way in which states in general talk about nuclear weapons technology: first, the deployment of sexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and,

third, a **reliance on gendered axioms**. On the first point, feminists have long highlighted that the political and military power associated with nuclear weapons is linked metaphorically with sexual potency and masculinity. This linkage is neither arbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors are a way of mobilising gendered associations in order to create excitement about, support for and identification with both the weapons and the political regime possessing them.¹⁵ Thus feminist histories of the development of the nuclear arms race in the decades after World War Two demonstrate the extent to which it was a race to prove masculine prowess, fuelled by “missile” **envy**,¹⁶ with the nuclear weapons of the Cold War superpowers “wheeled out like monumental phalluses” on parade.¹⁷ **Such imagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and space**. Thus when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader Balasaheb Thackeray argued that “[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs” and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as **propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned “Made with Viagra.”**¹⁸ Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented: Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they were talking about the bomb—“We have superior strength and potency.”¹⁹ **Similar language has permeated the nuclear discourse of the military and defence industry**. In her ground-breaking study of the discourse of American defence intellectuals who formulated nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, Cohn noted that sexualised metaphors, phallic imagery and the promise of sexual domination thrived.²⁰ Lectures were dominated by discussion of: vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, and the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks—or what one military adviser to the National Security Council has called “releasing 70 to 80 percent of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump.”²¹ Cohn suggests that **such sexual imagery serves not only to underline the connections between masculine sexuality and nuclear weapons but also to minimise the seriousness of militarist endeavours.**²² **It makes the nuclear arms race seem the stuff of jocular locker-room rivalry, denying its deadly consequences.** Perhaps most importantly, sexualised metaphors are one of the reasons that talk of nuclear disarmament is so readily dismissed: “If disarmament is emasculation, how could any real man even consider it?”²³

C3 Links

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space*, Routledge, p. 67-68, SPP)

The US is, of course, heavily reliant on its satellite-based systems, and to this end works (to a certain extent) within a regime framework of international space ‘law’ (Bready 2005: 14). This is not to suggest that US discourse is not constructed around the imbedded belief that the US itself represents the global hegemon, and the only viable, indeed legitimate keeper of global ‘order’. The US may be challenged ‘regionally’, but considers itself ‘unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor’ (US Space Command, ‘Vision for 2020’), control of space assures the US ‘access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’, with the US casting itself in a classic ‘warfighter role’. Sexing US Outer Space Discourse[:] The

gendered assumptions that underlie this rhetoric are tacit but striking, and depend on two distinct, heteronormative, tropes of masculinization and feminization. First, the US's ability to control 'space capabilities' depends upon assumptions of dominance and inherent superiority that revolve around the (gendered) signifier of the US's role as 'classic' or 'active warfighter': assumptions including the need for speed and watchfulness ('real time space surveillance'), agility and technical superiority ('timely and responsive spacelift'), 'enhanced protection' (of 'military and commercial systems'), robustness and efficient repelling capabilities ('robust negation systems'), 'precision force' and 'enhanced "sensor-to-shooter" capabilities. Just as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson summoned the spectre of an active, robust, potent American with the 'Pilgrim and Pioneer spirit of initiative and independence' (Kennedy, quoted in Dean 2001: 180), so George W. Bush calls to those able to show 'daring, discipline, ingenuity, and unity in the pursuit of great goals', the 'risk takers' and 'visionaries' of who America is so 'proud' (Bush 2004). Second, in establishing its (heterosexually masculine) credentials, the US's techno-strategic discourse reconfigures all other space-able nations as subordinate, constructing a binary, heterosexual relationship of masculine hegemony/feminine subordination. Tellingly, US Space Command cites the forging of 'global partnerships' as essential to protecting US national interests and investments, where such partnerships are at the behest of the US, with those that partner the US 'warfighter' little more than passive conduits for US 'opportunity' and 'commerce' ('Joint Vision 2020').

Reject the aff– it constitutes a “protection racket” by perpetuating toxic masculine worldviews. complete overthrow of this system is necessary.

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While this image of the just warrior as defender of civilization at first glance seems to favor the defensive (and, would therefore not contribute to the cult of the offensive), a closer look shows that the discourse of the protection racket is actually offensive in three distinct ways. First, it leads states to value offense in order to be the best possible protectors, since offense is associated with increased chance at victory and a perception of an active approach to protection. Second, it allows militaries aspiring to the idealized or hegemonic masculinity to identify those in need of protection outside of its borders, and to start aggressive wars to protect those in need.⁸¹ Third, inasmuch as protection is a performance rather than an actual service, the appearance of boldness and bravery in actions taken on behalf of this chivalrous ideal brings attention to the protecting which is being done. In these ways, the protection racket can be associated with the increased likelihood of pursuing offensive military strategies.

The chivalric codes in vogue at the turn of the century identified the vulnerable female body as the main cause for war. The enemy was cast as an inhuman, sexual predator. Propagandists described German attacks on Belgium towns in late summer, 1914 as “rape of Belgium.” The famous World War I propaganda poster illustrates this melding of race and gender: a large brown gorilla-like creature with a bloodied bat labeled “kulter” grasps a half-naked white woman who appears to have fainted. “Destroy this mad brute: Enlist,” the poster demands. Posters in Britain encouraging men to volunteer evoked women and children as defenseless targets of war and drew upon chivalric discourses of honor and protection, declaring, “Your rights of citizenship give you the privilege of joining your fellows in defence of your Honour and your Homes,” and “There are Three Types of Men: Those who hear the call and Obey, Those who Delay, and – the Others.” Discourses of chivalrous

masculinity served not only to make offensive approaches to international politics in World War I possible but also to constitute a set of gendered power relations that posited white men as protectors of the nation against racialized others who threaten the purity of naïve and defenseless women.

Examples of the influence of the protection racket on perceived offensive dominance and the cult of the offensive are common in present-day politics as well. This chivalric narrative has been resurrected in the post-Cold War era, and gendered identities have not only legitimated but also promoted wars. The various humanitarian wars of the 1990s are read as a narrative in which NATO, and other actors re-invent themselves as masculine, heroic, rescuers of weak and passive victims. Farmanfarmaian describes how the reports of the Iraqi Army raping women in Kuwait were used to construct Iraq as a barbaric enemy so that war was not only thinkable, but necessitated. This new American masculinity was "tough and tender," capable of awesome military prowess but also compassion and empathy.

The mission of "liberating" Afghan women was used to garner public support for the invasion of Afghanistan, and served also to silence feminine protests against the war. Two and a half years later, this same discourse of "liberation" was used to fueled support to overturn the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, represented in racialized terms as an inhuman despot when the evidence against weapons of mass destruction turned out to be fabricated or exaggerated. This narrative of rescuing the Iraqi people (as "damsels in distress") from the clutches of an evil man may help to explain why many people in the US and its allies came to believe, with little evidence, that the invading forces would be "greeted as liberators." These rescue narratives demonstrate that the protection racket encourages offensive military policies even when it is couched in the language of defense and protection. The protection racket is a gendered discourse that produces the gender identities of just warriors and beautiful souls. It is also the backdrop that allows for offensive military policies to be viewed as defensive, thereby gaining traction and legitimating war by enabling offensive wars to take place under the mantle of "protection." The existence of discourse of protection can therefore help us understand the occurrence of offensive policies in the light of an ostensible defensive dominance.

Conclusion

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves." Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence. While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war.

Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] erases the distinction between security and expansion. the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes.

Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

The ROTB is to dismantle hegemonic masculinity, pure post-fiat, and the alternative is epistemological and ontological revisionism is essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – the counter plan and alternative is a prerequisite to any ethical FIAT in the international arena

Youngs 04

(Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world 'we' live in*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced.

Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities. This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe's research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. When Enloe claimed that 'gender makes the world go round', she was in fact turning the abstract logic of mainstream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: 'During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy-making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.'⁵ Nearly a decade

earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,⁶ she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: **'Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women's lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?'** Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security

and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. 'We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender

hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.'⁷ **The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.**⁸

So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely

to be even more challenging for those in the mainstream camp. **The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics—and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) 'others'**

because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as 'the "man" question in international relations'.⁹ I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski's introductory chapter, 'From the "woman" question to the "man" question in International Relations', offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.¹⁰ Reflecting critically on the editors' learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms 'women', 'masculinity' and 'feminism', finally ending with 'the "man" question'—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. The project's starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly

accepted that women's subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. **Posing the 'man' question**

instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.¹¹ **Adding women appeared to have failed to 'destabilize' the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject 'man' head-on could help to do so. 'This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations'** (emphasis added).¹²

The deeper level of **ontological revisionism** called for by feminist International Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it **press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective** (most significantly state) **and individual forms.**

China scenario links in

In attempting to find one nation dominating and one lacking, at its root is still a masculine form of politics that ignores violence across the globe because great powers are at peace.

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. "Gendering Power Transition Theory," in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 90-93 - spp)

Feminist evaluations of power transition hypotheses A feminist analysis of PTT needs to reformulate the PTT hypotheses. This section applies the feminist critiques of the mechanism (power), the object (great states), and the variables (power parity and dissatisfaction) that PTT uses to explain international conflict to the reformulation of the major PTT hypotheses. It posits alternative explanations and alternative possible solutions and futures (Table 5.1). Relative position, state hegemonic masculinity, and bellicosity: Power transition theorists found that "occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position."⁸⁸ Even if **those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars**,⁸⁹ feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. **Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state's hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity.** The feminist argument is that **the more competitive a state's hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war**; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse's study of the ideal German man⁹⁰ in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man . . . , not only did he embody the older aristocratic values of bravery, courage, and chivalry, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained ... The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.⁹¹ This German masculinity "increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism."⁹² This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as "the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior ... jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and ... ugly-nearly deformed."⁹³ In the 1930s, "German fascists ... took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme."⁹⁴ Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains' that while "Western stereotypes of the 'real man' have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, ... in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male."⁹⁵ The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity, since, while "the core meaning of wen-wu still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour ... [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] ... has generated idealized images of workers and peasants" rather than soldiers⁹⁶ Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.⁹⁹ Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R 1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany's level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans' hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states. Hegemony and Peace: **PTT claims that the greater and more stable the concentration of power, the more peaceful that system will be. PIT associates peace with the absence of armed conflict between great powers.** As such, **the world can still be "at peace" if dozens of civil wars are going on in countries outside of the class of "great powers."** The dominant/challenger dichotomy means that **PTT ignores all but the most powerful states.** Instead of limiting the discourse on security to the concerns of the dominant global power and the (few or even only one) challenger(s), **feminists pay attention to the entire global political community.** The PTT **understanding of "peace" obscures terrible atrocities and conceals a crucial and contradictory effect of the concentration of power in the international arena.** Feminist work has consistently shown that, **as the powerful wield more power, the weak feel more pressure. This pressure**

is manifested not only in the form of interstate war, but also in civil war and structural violence.

Feminists' interrogation of state centrism suggests that lack of war between great states does not automatically create peace within them, and that the marginalized citizens of great states should be a topic of concern in global politics. Feminists' interest in gender subordination shows that women's security and their lives are constantly at risk. As such, the feminist reformulation (R2) predicts that concentrated power is a net negative, empirically, normatively, and epistemologically. Empirically, it is likely to increase international conflicts and internal unrest outside of the center of power, and to draw attention away from the world's worst humanitarian disasters. As Ann Tickner notes, much of the violence in the world is outside of great power war and, as theorists, "we in the west can no longer afford to privilege a tradition of scholarship that focuses on the concerns and ambitions of great powers." Feminists reject the dominance of the strong over the weak as a mechanism of control in favor of empathy and connectedness. Epistemologically, feminists note different social experience produces different knowledges. A theory of international security that excludes most people also leaves out important knowledge. An empathetic approach might increase the inclusiveness of knowledge about global politics. These insights mean that a feminist perspective would draw attention to the security of the people on the margins rather than focusing on an improbable conflict between the US and China. Feminist insights suggest it is important to recognize that in a world where the US and China compete for dominance, more than four billion other people neither compete nor dominate. Decisions made by states with the preponderance of power-over reverberate around the world. If the US and China decided to fight a nuclear war, their decision would be felt around the world. Even less severe decisions by powerful states have wide-ranging impacts on individuals' lives. For example, the US government's decision to condition continued military presence in South Korea on mandatory STD testing in Korean prostitution villages impacted the social and economic dynamic between Korean prostitutes. Neither the US nor China provides its poorest citizens adequate humanitarian aid to avoid death from starvation or preventable disease. Yet the US and China are the two biggest military spenders in the world. In real terms, the most marginalized citizens of each nation lose when strategic posturing inspires them to focus on military readiness. Feminists have documented how militarization of women's lives decreases freedoms and changes economic and social patterns.¹⁰⁹ Because of these threats, feminists problematize the assumption that entities called the US and China legitimately merit more consideration than the most marginal citizens within those states or the citizens of states that their dominance subordinates.

Rebuttal

A - Interpretation: Debaters should be allowed to read counterplans with implementable advocacies on the negative

B - Violation: Their model prevents this

C - Standards

1. Clash: Topical counterplans increase the quality of clash because the negative can choose the best policy option. Panetta

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School, Nicolet High School, and Good Counsel High School.), 02-18-2021, "The Evolution of Plans In Policy Debate, Part 4: Topical and Plan-Inclusive Counterplans," No Publication, <https://the3nr.com/2021/06/18/the-evolution-of-plans-in-policy-debate-part-4-topical-and-plan-inclusive-counterplans/>, accessed 4-12-2025 //RP

The advantage to debate from the acceptance of a topical counterplan is enhanced clash in rounds. **With the ability to choose the best of options**

negative ground is reasserted. For example, under the energy topic if the affirmative instituted nuclear power the

negative could now offer solar power as an alternative to solving the energy crunch. **Presently the negative is often**

forced to defend inferior non-resolutional alternatives. To preclude the

negative from advocating a competitive topical alternative may very well

beg the real policy questions. Many a judge has found him/herself listening to a noncompetitive position, including the

foundation and study counterplan. The judge is forced to serve as head of a national foundation, or the lead researcher for the National Academy of Sciences. **Jurisdictional problems and tedious fiat questions would be removed**

from debate. The topical counterplan could serve as the rationale for

rejection of the affirmative example. Even if judges lack the jurisdiction to

implement a topical counterplan (a somewhat preposterous judgment since s/he is assumed to have the ability to implement a topical plan), the counterplan is still a reason reject the affirmative plan. By this rationale the affirmative plan should be sent back to the committee (and personally rejected) until it is given in its optimal form.

The highest quality of clash is best for any kind of education because it requires the most defense of one's advocacy. If the negative has to defend a bad advocacy less education comes out of the round.

2. Strat Skew: The aff's resolution policies are always inherently created to do good since no one drafts legislation just to waste time which means there is always a bias towards the resolution being good. Counterplans balance this disparity by giving the neg the same benefit, upholding fairness