

Definitions:

Skeleton:

Con 1: Regional Instability

Somaliland wants the MoU for steps towards recognition -> Somali Government does not support Somaliland's independence and deal. -> Already withdrawn Ethiopian troops -> Ethiopia eased tensions, Somalia lets troops back.

Subpoint A) AUSSOM Participation

L: Further recognition creates legitimacy for port deal -> Au recognition provides that -> Ethiopia has reasons to pursue the deal and has the legitimacy -> pursues port deal -> tensions rise again -> Somalia withdraws Ethiopia troops.

IL: Withdrawal of such a large number of troops creates a power vacuum -> power vacuum emboldens terror groups

I: Such a power vacuum causes government collapse of Somalia, al shabaab has full dominance

Subpoint B) Al Shabaab Capabilities

UQ: MoU has created bad tensions with Al-Shabaab and Somalia -> Al-Shabaab increased power due to this -> Ethiopia has eased MoU tensions -> Al Shabaab on the decline

L: Arms Embargo was Lifted (Main factor preventing civil war) -> number of arms in the illicit market increases -> more guns to Al-Shabaab

L: Au recognition -> Ethiopia pursues MoU -> tensions rise

IL: We've showed how tensions and things from MoU cause attacks and more power -> Al Shabaab uses arms from embargo to attack

I: Death (from attacks that only occur from tensions in AFF world)

UQ: Ethiopia stepped away from the port deal, which lowered tensions and allowed Ethiopian troops back into Somalia to help fight Al-Shabab (good)

UQ: Ethiopia withdrawal prevents ignition of conflict with Al-Shabaab, a group that is seen to take action due to precedent.

UQ: Al-Shabaab is currently on the decline -> keep tensions low -> good

CON 1: Regional Instability

SUBPOINT A: The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM)

Somaliland is striving towards international relationships. They are doing this by signing a port deal.

[Ethiopia's Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders – The Reporter Magazine](#) Ethiopia's Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for African Borders, Hagos **Gebereamlak (24)**

A provisional constitution was adopted in February 1997, and after a referendum, a final constitution was established on May 31, 2001. More than two decades later, **Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (referred to as the MoU)** that proposes to grant the former (Ethiopia) a 50-year lease for **a military base along Somaliland's** strategic Gulf of Aden **coastline, in return for recognition of** the latter's **independence**. The deal has triggered a fierce dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.

Ethiopia's Steps Toward Somaliland Recognition: Despite the MoU being signed nine months ago, it has yet to be formalized into a binding agreement. However, the Somaliland government recently announced that Ethiopia had appointed Teshome Shunde as its ambassador to Somaliland and had elevated its consulate in Hargeisa to an embassy. Ambassador Shunde presented his credentials to Somaliland's President Muse Bihi, marking a significant diplomatic step. **This move by Ethiopia is seen as a major advancement towards the formal recognition of Somaliland** as an independent state. According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the establishment of an embassy and the exchange of ambassadors are typically viewed as full diplomatic recognition between states. While Ethiopia has not yet made an explicit formal declaration recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, these actions implicitly signal full recognition.

There have been conflicts between Somalia and these two countries because the agreement violates Somali ideology.

[Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps - Somaliland Reporter](#) Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps Kathryn **Tyson (24)**

Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland's Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia's recognition of Somaliland's independence. Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only. **The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty**—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—**and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces** from the country. **Ethiopia has (already) deployed approximately 10,000 troops** in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda's Somali affiliate, al Shabaab. Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal

This withdrawal is detrimental because of the upcoming AUSSOM mission in 2025, a crucial measure being taken against Al-Shabaab, a terror group.

[Somalia Excludes Ethiopia From AUSSOM Following Presidential Visit To Asmara](#), Somalia excludes Ethiopia from AUSSOM following presidential visit to Asmara, Ashenafi **Endale (24)**

Ethiopia will not take part in an upcoming African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia

according to representatives from Mogadishu who announced the decision during a UN Security Council meeting this week. The meeting on December 27, 2024, revolved around the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which is set to begin in the coming week, and the session featured input from representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia. Tesfaye Yilma, permanent representative of Ethiopia to the UN, emphasized the importance of the new mission in fighting the escalating threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia. "Extra-regional actors who have no constructive role in the region and in fighting terrorism in Somalia should be advised to abandon their reckless pursuit," Tesfaye said in his conclusion. Mohamed Rabi Yusuf, Somalia's permanent representative, followed up by requesting the chair for the floor: "Due to documented actions of Ethiopian and Somalia in the past eleven months, the federal government of Somalia has undertaken a comprehensive review of its security arrangements, as we transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. In that period, our regional partners from troop contributing countries have shown remarkable solidarity, pledging to maintain our necessary force of 11,000 troops of AUSSOM. This commitment addresses any security vacuum created by Ethiopia while sustaining progress in the fight against Al-Shabaab. In that vein, we emphasize that the current AUSSOM troop allocations are completed through bilateral agreements which have been in place [since] November. As Somalia moves forward, we will continue to engage in future security partnerships that serve our national and shared regional interests," said the Somali rep. The speech indicates that Somalia determined who would take part in the peacekeeping mission last month, while Mogadishu was in the midst of a diplomatic row with Addis Ababa over a deal the latter made with breakaway Somaliland. Although the Somali government has not disclosed the list of troop-contributing countries, reports suggest Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, and Burundi will take part. Uganda reportedly will cover more than half of the 11,000 troops, according to unofficial sources. Ethiopia has been fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia since the first AU-led mission (AMISOM) began in 2007. AMISOM was reconfigured to ATMIS, which is set to end on December 31, 2024. AUSSOM is set to take over the following day

and last for a period of one year. For several months before amends were made in Ankara, Somali officials had been adamant they would not permit Ethiopia to take part in AUSSOM unless it backpedaled on the MoU it signed with Somaliland

Luckily the threats to exclude Ethiopia have de-escalated due to Ethiopia's defense minister visiting Somalia.

Somalia is considering reversing its decision not to participate in the new peacekeeping mission, Somalia is considering reversing its decision not to participate in the new peacekeeping mission, Al-Ain(24)

Somalia is reportedly considering reversing its decision not to participate in the African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which replaces Atmis. Ethiopian Defense Minister Aisha Mohamed traveled to Somalia's capital Mogadishu on Thursday to discuss Addis Ababa's participation in the mission, Somali Foreign Minister Ali Balkad told me by phone, Bloomberg reported. Ethiopia has for decades been one of the main contributors to the U.N.-backed force fighting al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militants in neighboring Somalia. It should be recalled that the two neighboring countries have also been under diplomatic tensions following the port memorandum of understanding signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia last year. Somalia has insisted that it will not participate in the new peacekeeping mission if Addis Ababa does not cancel its agreement with Hargeisa. Recently, Turkish negotiators have been trying to defuse tensions between the countries following an agreement to improve relations through their leaders, Bloomberg reported. Ethiopia's defense minister's visit to Mogadishu was also made to ease tensions and confirm Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping missions, the report added. Somalia's Minister of State Ali Balkad said: "Since the disputed issues between Somalia and Ethiopia have been resolved through the Ankara dialogue, Somalia is considering its decision to include the Ethiopian Defense Forces in the upcoming (Ausom) mission."

The problem is, Ethiopia has not directly withdrawn from the MoU, and AU diplomatic recognition provides the grounds for them to sign it.

Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps - Somaliland Reporter, Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps, Karr(24)

Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration "does not concern" Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.

Future international **recognition of Somaliland**'s statehood **would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland**. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland's independence, however.

AU recognition is what Ethiopia requires to legitimize the port deal, but it is crucial we do not provide the chance to do so, because tensions from the port deal will create a power vacuum, empowering Al Shabaab and causing GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE.

I) Power Vacuum and GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE

Without Ethiopian Forces, a power vacuum is created.

From the Ankara Agreement to the Implications of the AUSSOM Mandate, What's Ethiopia's Red Sea Strategy?, [From the Ankara Agreement to the Implications of the AUSSOM Mandate, What's Ethiopia's Red Sea Strategy? - Somaliland Reporter](#), Nassir Hussein **Kahin (24)**

AUSSOM Mandate vs. Ankara Agreement(:) The Ankara Agreement, mediated by Turkey, sought to secure Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia (realistically impossible without the Berbera Port which is Ethiopia's number one choice) while emphasizing cooperation and mutual respect between the two nations. However, the AUSSOM mandate disrupts this delicate balance by effectively sidelining Ethiopia—a nation that has shed blood and resources to stabilize Somalia for nearly 30 years. Ethiopia's forced exclusion from the mission is a stark contradiction to the recognition of its sacrifices by "hand and finger-licking" one Hassan Sheikh Mahamud who even uttered that Ethiopian troops would continue its mission while signing the shady Ankara Agreement. Ethiopia now faces a dilemma: 1. Retreat or Stay? but **Ethiopia** risks **creat(es)**ing **a power vacuum if it withdraws its troops** from Somalia entirely. **Such a vacuum** could **embolden(s)** tribal **armed terror groups** and other extremist factions, posing direct threats to Ethiopia's sovereignty along its conflict-ridden borders.

2. Undermining Ankara's Promises: With no assurances of Ethiopia's security interests being honored, the Ankara Agreement may collapse, leaving Ethiopia with little incentive to cooperate with Somalia on Red Sea access or broader regional stability.

The reason a power vacuum is created is because the pullout of troops caused by the MoU creates windows of opportunity for other military powers to take their place INCLUDING AL SHABAAB

These power vacuums then allow terror groups to largely increase their dominance.

[Terror groups take advantage of power vacuums, insecurity to thrive at home](#), Terror groups take advantage of power vacuums, insecurity to thrive at home, Greg **Botelho(15)**

As leaders around the world say, terrorism can be anywhere. But some places have it worse than others. For all the well-founded worries in the West and elsewhere around the developed world, these kinds of locales are more likely stopping points than long-term homes for terror groups. Such **violent, extremist organizations** tend to **gravitate toward less stable**, more turbulent **areas where they can operate** more freely, recruit from a desperate populace and build up resources and momentum. **If there's a power vacuum**, in other words, militant **groups can** more **easily amass power**. And that creates big problems for those trying to root them out at the source. Below is a look at some places where terrorists are operating -- oftentimes in the absence of a central government with the resources to stop them -- and what is being done about them.

This power vacuum leads to another impact, the possibility of state collapse

Hassan 23'

Mohamed Olad Hassan, June 17 2023, Mohamed Olad Hassan is a senior editor and writer with the [VOA Somali service](#). Before joining VOA, he was a Mogadishu-based correspondent for the Associated Press and the BBC World Service. He has received the Speaker Abbot Award given by the British House of Commons and here in the United States has received the Louis M. Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism from Harvard University's Nieman Foundation., "Somalia Facing Uncertainty as African Troops Leave", VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-facing-uncertainty-as-african-troops-leave/7141702.html>, //DS

Abdisalam Yusuf Guled, the founder of Eagle Range Services, a security company in Mogadishu, and former Somalia's deputy chief of the National Security Agency, is among those who voiced concern.

"I have a great concern that **Somalia could be another Afghanistan** if the African Union troops leave the country, **without** Somalia getting strong and **well-armed security forces** that have international funding and backing similar to that for ATMIS," Guled said.

Last week, **the Somali government said it is ready to take over security responsibilities** from ATMIS, **as 2,000 troops will withdraw from the country** in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions 2628 and 2670.

This week, a technical team was appointed with ATMIS and the U.N. Support Office in Somalia that will oversee the implementation of the ATMIS drawback.

But security experts warn that a swift **pullout of African Union troops in Somalia could lead to a swift collapse of the Somali government**, similar to what happened in Afghanistan when U.S. troops left in August 2021.

"The Somali Army has been emboldened by anti-al-Shabab clan militias backing, as well as foreign military support. **If the withdrawal of 2,000 troops can cause government collapse, the withdrawal of 10,000 Ethiopian troops BECAUSE of the MoU will be even worse**

SUBPOINT B: Al-Shabaab Capabilities

Somaliland's effort to gain recognition from the MoU increased their tensions with Somalia and Al-Shabaab

[The overlooked dangers of lifting Somalia's arms embargo](#). The overlooked dangers of lifting Somalia's arms embargo. Suhaib **Mahamoud (24)**

Additionally, **the** recently signed and controversial [Memorandum of Understanding \(MoU\)](#) between **Somaliland and Ethiopia** on 1 January 2024 only further **inflames** the potential **repercussions** of the decision to lift the embargo, **with Somali elites** in Mogadishu openly advocating for a "jihad" against Ethiopia, with President Mohamud himself **referring to Ethiopia as a "historical enemy"**. With **Al-Shabab** having **invested in clear** rhetoric of **hostility towards** both Ethiopia and **Somaliland**, and **its spokesman** Ali Dheere having **officially declared holy war** against them, there are real fears that the group could exploit current tensions to its advantage.

In the time period following the MoU, Al-Shabaab gained power and initiated several attacks.

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/nine-months-later-the-regional-implications-of-the-ethiopia-somaliland-mou/>, Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, **Webb (24)**

Throughout all of this, Al-Shabaab has grown stronger and still poses a threat to all the countries of the region. Despite Mohamud having launched what he called in 2022 an **"all out war"** against the militant group, **Al-Shabaab has regrouped and made significant gains since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU**, with reports saying **the group has had an influx of financial capital and a surge in recruiting**, particularly drawing in people who do not like Ethiopia. In February, **Al-Shabaab attacked an Emirati-run military base** in the region, **and** the following month **attacked several** **Somalian military sites** in the Lower Shabelle region. In June, it was **reported** that US intelligence learned of discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab about the former providing weapons to the latter. In **August**, **Al-Shabaab killed** thirty-two and injured **more** than sixty **in a suicide bombing** at a beach in **Mogadishu**. At the same time, the current international mandate to fight Al-Shabaab, the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia, is in the final stages of its drawdown, and a proposal was submitted to replace it with the **AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)** on January 1, 2025, pending approval by the African Union in November. Though Ethiopia has played a massive role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia—**with** three thousand troops deployed under the current AU mission and 5,700 troops deployed throughout the Somali security sphere—**Somalia requested** that Ethiopia not contribute forces to AUSSOM and said it would expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia unless it cancels the MOU with Somaliland. Meanwhile, **Egypt plans** to commit five thousand troops to AUSSOM at the start of the deployment and another five thousand troops separately.

We have already shown that Ethiopia eased tensions with Somalia. With AU anti-terrorism efforts, the surge in power for Al-Shabaab has now turned into a decline in Al-Shabaab.

Kiage November 24 [Nyaboga Kiage, Kenyan-based Reporter, 11-11-2024, Al Shabaab activities in North Eastern on decline – Report, Nairobi News, <https://nairobineews.nation.africa/al-shabaab-activities-in-north-eastern-on-decline-report/>] leon + tristan

There has been a decline in the activities of members of the terrorist group **Al Shabaab**. The decline has been seen in the vast northeastern region, where members of the militant group used to carry out a series of attacks on non-locals and the police. Horizon Analysts and Researchers Network (HARN), an organization that conducts research in the northeastern region, **has linked the decline in such attacks to cooperation between security forces** and local communities. The North Eastern region consists of Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, **and** Garissa counties. “From September last year to August 2024, **there has been a significant improvement in the deterrence, interception, and disruption of potential terrorist attacks** as part of the fight against extremism and insurgency activities along the areas bordering Somalia compared to the same period last year,” the organization said in a statement. HARN said **there had been a 60 percent reduction in attacks** in **the four countries**. This, the organization said, had been made possible by a newfound camaraderie between locals and security agencies. **It also said that propaganda material, which is also shared to recruit young people into the militia group, has also decreased on both online and offline platforms.** Even in Somalia, HARN said there had been a serious operation carried out by officers attached to the Somali National Army (SNA) targeting terrorists and terror-related activities. According to the organization, the security services have been receiving timely information that is helping to counter the activities of the extremist group. These activities include disrupting planned attacks, countering insurgent propaganda, and **pre-empting their new recruitment tactics.**

It is crucial that we do not provide Somaliland recognition from the AU. We’ve shown how Ethiopia would pursue the MoU this way, and this is a surefire way to ignite tensions. Right now is the worst time to increase tension. This is because of the increase of the flow of arms into Somalia.

<https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/arms-trafficking-somalia-ocindex/>, Countering the arms race in Somalia, **Gentili (24)**

Despite these challenges, **the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to end the embargo on the supply of weapons to the Somali government** and its security forces (but at the same time extended for one year the sanctions regime, including the arms embargo, imposed on al-Shabaab militants). First imposed by UNSC Resolution 733, on 23 January 1992, the embargo on the Somali government was designed to stem the flow of weapons into the country during the civil war that followed the ousting of President Mohamed Siad Barre. Over the past three decades, the embargo has been amended through subsequent resolutions, and due to improvements observed in the marking and registration of weapons, the proposal to fully lift it was eventually adopted. The move signalled the belief that Somalia would be able to strengthen its security capacity and provide for its own defence. In the words of **the country’s UN envoy**, Abukar Dahir Osman, the decision allows the country to ‘bolster the capacity of the Somali security forces by accessing lethal arms and equipment to adequately safeguard [their] citizens and [their] nation’. However, **concerns have been raised about** the difficulty of consistently implementing a weapons and ammunition management strategy, and **calls have been made for**

Somalia's neighbours and allies to support the government in its capacity-building process. The number and security levels of ammunition storage facilities in Somalia are still considered by many to be insufficient, with a risk of leakages from national stockpiles and arms depots. Reportedly, (how)arms diverted to the black market have often ended up in the wrong hands and have been used in attacks by al-Shabaab militants. Sceptics recall how this issue was exacerbated following the partial lifting of the UN arms embargo on Somalia in 2013, which allowed the Somali government to legally import weapons and ammunition up to a prescribed calibre. According to a Reuters investigation, around 35 to 40 per cent of the weapons imported by Mogadishu ended up on the illicit market in the three years following the easing of the embargo. These considerations have sparked a debate on whether the full lifting of the arms embargo was too premature a decision. The capacity of Somali institutions to handle a larger influx of weapons that would inevitably follow the UNSC resolution has been questioned. Besides concerns around the security of the country's storage facilities, some argue that the risk of arms being diverted to criminal syndicates or terrorist groups can be linked to a number of structural shortcomings and domestic dynamics that still affect Somalia's political and social landscape.

Currently, Al Shabaab is on the decline and tensions are low thanks to counter terrorism efforts, but the lifted embargo indicates an increase of arms in the whole region. This provides incentive to ensure AUSSOM's success. Remember that recognition of Somaliland will exponentially increase tensions. Reigniting tensions with Al-Shabaab instead of focusing on combating them is like pouring gasoline on a fire.

Voting for the NEG for this debate means that you help support putting out this fire. Thank you