

Constructive

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Companies' profit-driven incentives lead them to not focus on catching actual criminals

Todd **Miller**, 09-16-20**19**, "More Than A Wall", Transnational Institute, <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/more-than-a-wall-0> // RB

Focusing in on **CBP contracts** – the largest government contractor in border and immigration control – the report identifies 14 companies that **are giants in the border security business. These are Accenture, Boeing, Elbit, Flir Systems, G4S, General Atomics, General Dynamics, IBM, L3 Technologies, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, PAE, Raytheon, UNISYS, among several other top firms we list in the report that are receiving contracts.** They include technology and security firms, but **are clearly dominated by the same global arms firms that reap rewards from high levels of US military spending.** In addition, **it also profiles, private prison companies** CoreCivic and Geo Group who along with G4S **are major players in providing immigration detention services. The volume and value of CBP contracts has grown** to the point that in 2009, Lockheed Martin landed a contract potentially worth more than \$945 million for maintenance and upkeep of 16 P-3 surveillance planes equipped with airborne and surface-to-radar systems. This one contract was equal to the total entire border and immigration enforcement budgets from 1975 to 1978 (around \$923 million). Similarly, the contract to the San Diego-based General Atomics, worth \$276 million in 2016 for the operational maintenance of the Predator B drone systems, almost exceeds any of the INS annual budgets in the 1970s.

That justifies biased technology

Nicol Turner **Lee**, Caitlin **Chin-Rothmann**, 04-12-20**22**, "Police surveillance and facial recognition: Why data privacy is imperative for communities of color", Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/police-surveillance-and-facial-recognition-why-data-privacy-is-an-imperative-for-communities-of-color/> // TT

Since historically biased policing patterns have contributed to their higher rates of interrogation and arrest, **communities of color are** often **overrepresented in law enforcement databases** compared to the overall U.S. population.^[42] The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) reports that Black individuals are five times more likely than white individuals to be stopped by police officers in the United States, and that Black and Latino individuals comprise 56% of the U.S. incarcerated population but only 32% of the overall U.S. population.^[43] This means that **not only are police officers more likely to employ surveillance or facial recognition programs to compare images of Black and Latino individuals, but** that mugshot **images** or arrest records of Black and Latino individuals **are more likely to be stored in these databases in the first place**—two distinct problems that, when aligned, will **exacerbate existing patterns of** racial inequity in **policing**.^[44] Apart from the dual challenges of accuracy and transparency, there remains an ethical question of if or when it is appropriate to use facial recognition to address legitimate security concerns, regardless of its accuracy. **even if facial recognition hypothetically could improve to a point where the technology itself has near-perfect accuracy** rates **across all demographic groups, it would still be possible for law enforcement officers to apply it in ways that replicate existing racial disparities in their outcomes.**

Post—aff,

Jack **Corrigan**, 05-30-20**19**, "CBP's Airport Facial Recognition 'Is Not a Surveillance Program'", Nextgov, <https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/05/cbps-airport-facial-recognition-not-surveillance-program/157373/> // RB, brackets in og

Jeramie Scott, director of the Domestic **Surveillance Project** at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said he worries **CBP** and other federal agencies **start using the systems deployed** in airports **for other purposes, like identifying people who committed petty crimes.** Today, there are no federal laws regulating agencies' use of facial recognition, and without those restrictions, **government officials** and vendors **have incentives to expand the scope of the program.** Scott told Nextgov. "It's just a powerful **surveillance** tool ... with no rules in place," he said. "There is **potential for abuse because there's not really the rules in place to make sure [the program] remains narrow.**" During last week's hearing, Giuliani also said that without more regulations in place, she feared the **program could expand into something far more intrusive than identifying travelers.** While face scans are optional for U.S. citizens today, Scott worries CBP could eventually make it de facto mandatory for people to use the system, either by making alternative ID checks more laborious or explicitly requiring it for international travelers. Already, the Transportation Security Administration is planning to build off CBP's work and **stand up its own biometrics program** for domestic travelers, and as the public gets more exposure to the tech, the agencies could continue expanding its reach in the name of safety, according to Scott.

This harms women

Rebecca **Chowdhury**, 06-02-20**22**, "High-Tech Surveillance Could Track Abortion-Seekers in U.S.", TIME, <https://time.com/6184111/abortion-surveillance-tech-tracking/> // TT

According to **ICE**'s website, these data sharing programs enable the agency to work with "law enforcement partners in the shared responsibility for ensuring the safety of our communities" by **"using biometrics to identify foreign-born**

individuals arrested for criminal offenses." This data collection could affect citizens and non-citizens, alike, organizers say—whether or not people have interacted with police. The Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law, a Washington, D.C. think tank, [released a major report on ICE in May](#). It claims that **ICE** can access the driver's license data of 74% of adults. The agency has already used **facial recognition technology** to search the driver's license photographs of 32% of adults in the US, according to the report. Advocates say these ongoing **surveillance tactics could be directed against abortion seekers or providers in states that restrict or criminalize abortion.** In a new [report](#), the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project predicts that **state officials will "turn to the surveillance tools that have become so central to American policing**, using technology to peer into the most intimate aspects of our lives."

Across the nation, surveillance creeps in

Hannah **Tyler**, 02-02-20**22**, "The Increasing Use of Artificial Intelligence in Border Zones Prompts Privacy Questions", Migration Policy Institute, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/artificial-intelligence-border-zones-privacy> // TT

Critics warn that **the use of this technology could lead to endless surveillance and a vast, ever-growing dragnet, as technology that is deployed to patrol the border is also used by local police miles in the U.S. interior.** Local police in border communities—and those far from the border—have been revealed to use facial recognition technology, cellphone tracking "stingray" systems, license-plate cameras, drones, and spy planes, with **immigration authorities** sometimes **sharing information with law enforcement for non-immigration purposes. CBP flew nearly 700 surveillance missions between** 2010 and 2012 **on behalf of other law enforcement agencies** according to flight logs, some of which were not directly related to border protection. During Black Lives Matter protests in Minneapolis in 2020 following the murder of George Floyd, a CBP Predator drone flew over the city and provided live video to authorities on the ground. Similar operations involving helicopters, airplanes, and drones also took place in 14 other cities, broadcasting about 270 hours of footage live to CBP control rooms. Critics'

concerns about the creep of these kinds of technologies from the border into the interior of the country have escalated in recent years, as their use has become more widespread.

The result is a chilling effect, surveillance is used to identify and arrest abortion seekers

Li **Zhou** and Youyou **Zhou**, 07-01-20**22**, "Who overturning Roe hurts most, explained in 7 charts", Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/2022/7/1/23180626/roe-dobbs-charts-impact-abortion-women-rights>

"The US already has higher maternal mortality than many countries. This will exacerbate that. The

US already has higher child poverty than many countries. This will exacerbate that." The data, ultimately, backs up Raifman's assertion. Missouri is one of nine states where a ban or near ban on abortion was set to go into effect since Roe was overturned, and as many as 17 other states could soon follow suit. (Notably, several bans have been put on hold because of legal challenges that have been filed.) **About 33.7 million women**, or about half of reproductive-age women (defined as those between

15 and 44, in this analysis) **in the US, live in states where there are poised to be new restrictions.**

Research has shown that **losing access to legal abortion means that more women will die, that**

more families will live in poverty, and that society will bear larger consequences in the decades to come...

women who were denied an abortion were three times more likely to be unemployed than women who were able

to access an abortion. After a year, they were less likely to have aspirational future plans. By the fifth year, they **were four**

times more likely to live in poverty.

C2

Although fragile, an economic recovery is on the way

Fortinsky Sarah, 9-19-20**24**, "Yellen on 'soft landing' prediction: 'I believe that's exactly what we're seeing in the economy'," Hill//vivyells,

<https://thehill.com/business/economy/4888824-yellen-soft-landing-us-economy/>

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Thursday she believes **the U.S. economy is making** the **“soft landing”** that she predicted two years ago, when inflation

soared after the pandemic. In a live interview during the Atlantic Festival 2024, journalist Ron Brownstein recalled their interview in 2022, when, he said, **“there was a great**

deal of apprehension about the economy, about the Biden administration’s management of the

economy.” “Well, here we are now, two years later: unemployment 4.2, inflation under 3 percent, Fed finally, cutting interest rates,” he said. “I know Taylor Swift has been in the news

a lot lately, so let me ask you: Are we out of the woods?” **Yellen cautioned against overconfidence, since “there are always risks**

to the economy,” but she said today’s economy is exhibiting key markers of a soft landing, as she outlined them two years ago. “When we spoke two years ago, what I said was, I

believe that **there was a path to bring inflation down, in the context of a strong job market, and if the Fed**

and the administration’s policies could succeed in accomplishing that, we’d call that a soft landing.”

Yellen said. “And I believe that’s exactly what we’re seeing in the economy,” she continued. **the Federal Reserve** on Wednesday **cut interest rates by 50**

basis points, in its first rate reduction after a two-and-a-half-year crusade against inflation. The new federal funds rate is 4.75-5 percent. The Fed incrementally increased interest

rates from near zero in March 2022 to a range of 5.25-5.5 percent last July as it battled rising inflation, which peaked at 9.1 percent in June 2022. **While rate hikes fueled**

recession concerns and layoff fears, the unemployment rate maintained its lowest sub-4 percent

streak since the 1960s. Yellen said she wouldn’t comment on the decision to cut rates by the Federal Reserve, which she previously chaired, but said the decision is **“a**

very positive sign for where the U.S. economy is.” Yellen said **the labor market remains “strong,”** despite

having cooled significantly. “It’s not as hot as the labor market was a year and a half or two years ago,

when firms were utterly struggling to hire back employees that they had laid off during the pandemic,

and there had been huge shifts in demand, wages were rising very rapidly.” Yellen said she believes the U.S. economy can

continue down this path, which **would be “an excellent outcome.”**

Affirming quashes our soft landing

1. Reducing migrant inflows

Kevin **Appleby**, Center For Migration Studies, 09-02-20**24**, "The Importance of Immigrant Labor to the US Economy", Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS), <https://cmsny.org/importance-of-immigrant-labor-to-us-economy/> // RB

Despite **calls to deport all undocumented persons** in our nation, such an operation **would cause a severe** strain on

US citizens, as **labor shortage**s would accrue **and inflation** would rise. Moreover, federal, state, and local budgets would be reduced, as **taxes**

paid by undocumented workers would be lost, including their contributions to the Social Security and Medicare systems. The

following offers a profile of immigrant laborers in the US economy and measures their economic and fiscal contributions to the United States. It also argues that legalizing the undocumented workforce, instead of deporting them, and creating legal avenues for immigrant workers would serve the best interest of the United States and the US citizenry. Immigrants in the Labor Force. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2023, foreign-born workers, including the undocumented, accounted for 18.6 percent, or 29.1 million, of the US labor force, up from 18.1 percent in 2022. The labor force participation rate of the foreign-born increased to 66.6 percent, almost five percent higher than the native-born population (61.8 percent). Foreign-born workers were mainly employed in service occupations, construction, transportation, and material moving occupations, with native-born workers employed in management, professional, and sales and office occupations, making their roles in the labor force largely complementary. Almost half (47.6 percent) of the foreign-born workforce was Hispanic, with about a quarter (25.1 percent) being Asian. According to estimates from the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) and other groups, as many as **8.3 million undocumented immigrants work in the US economy**, or 5.2

percent of the workforce. They work in **construction** (1.5 million), restaurants (1 million), agriculture and farms (320,000), landscaping (300,000), and **food**

processing and manufacturing (200,000), among other occupations. [1] Unauthorized workers hail from Mexico (30 percent), Central and South

America (20 percent), and Central and Eastern Asia (15 percent). Occupations which will continue to demand undocumented workers over the next decade include cooks, home health/personal care aides, delivery and taxi drivers, and medical/therapy assistants. In New York State, CMS estimates a total of 470,100 undocumented workers, with 56 percent coming from six countries: Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, China, and the Dominican Republic. They work as construction workers (29, 500), maids/housekeepers (20,900), cooks (16,800), home and personal care aides (16,800), janitors (13,600), and delivery drivers (13,400), among other occupations. Potential Labor Shortages. In order to grow, the US economy will continue to need immigrant workers in certain industries. A Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas study found that immigrant

laborers have helped grow the post-pandemic economy, spurring job growth while also keeping down inflation.

But surveillance would scare civilians from crossing, creating massive labor shortages

Historically

Stephen **Devadoss**, 06-28-20**11**, "IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR THE U.S. FARM SECTOR AND WORKFORCE", Wiley Online Library, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00300.x>

Consequently, the U.S. Congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The goals of IRCA were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty² and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigrants by increasing the border surveillance. Amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigrants because only about half of the [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigrants filed for citizenship, and it created future expectation of amnesty and more [REDACTED] [undocumented] unauthorized entry. Furthermore, domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantily enforced. **To stop the influx of immigrants, IRCA focused**

heavily on tightening border control. The IRCA also legislated the H-2A program, which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations (ERS 2007). However, farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of H-2A and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking.³ In spite of IRCA's amnesty provision and strengthened control

measures, [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigration continued to rise—about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2007 (Martin 2007) which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports—leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigration problem. Several bills were proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements,⁴ paths to citizenship, and guest-worker programs (Montgomery 2006). These bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest-worker programs. As a result of the failed legislations and the September 11 attack, the government primarily focused on border security. Accordingly, funding for border enforcement has steadily increased,⁵ and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement. However, Boucher and Taylor (2007) documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority (GAO 2005). For example, from 1999 to 2003, the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480,000 to 18,000.^{6,7} But, by late 2005, the U.S. government started to intensify domestic surveillance. For example, only 25 criminal arrests relating to [REDACTED] [undocumented] immigration occurred in 2002, but increased to 716 by 2006 and 1,103 by 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008c). Domestic surveillance has further intensified under the current administration (Meyer and Gorman 2009). According to Passel (2008), a decreasing trend in the unauthorized immigrant population is recently occurring.⁸ This is largely due to worksite and border enforcements and the recent U.S. economic recession. These enforcements have exacerbated U.S. agricultural labor shortages before the 2008/2009 economic crisis. **According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey,**

80% of the newly hired farm labor force is from Mexico, of which 96% are unauthorized

(U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Therefore, **as border** and domestic **enforcements intensified, entry of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. farm labor force was thwarted, which led to an acute labor scarcity.** For example, the Wall Street Journal (2007) reported that in 2006, **about 20% of agricultural products were not harvested nationwide.** Furthermore, the Rural Migration News (2007) provides a detailed and specific list of these shortages and the adverse effect on crucial cultivation operations which resulted in heavy losses. As a result, farm groups are one of the strongest allies of overhauling the current guest-worker program to bring immigrants to legally work in U.S. agriculture. For the last several decades, **immigrants played a crucial role in the development and competitiveness of U.S. agricultural production** (Torok and Huffman 1986). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead (2008) provide evidence of the importance of immigrant farm workers to vegetable production which is highly labor intensive. The United States has a great land endowment and ideal growing conditions; however, **without immigrant labor who perform the back-breaking labor-intensive operations that U.S. low-skilled workers are unwilling to perform, agricultural productivity and total production would decline. Consequently, costs to U.S. consumers of agricultural products would increase and net exports would also decrease.**

In recent years, Mexican immigrant labor contributed significantly to the expansion of U.S. agricultural exports, particularly between the United States and Mexico. For example, between 1994 and 2008, net U.S. exports to the world and to Mexico increased by 82% and 200%, respectively (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008f). Devoid of these laborers, this dramatic increase would not have been possible.

2. Increasing migrant outflows

Avi **Asher-Schapiro, 07-20-2024**, "Trump, armed with tech, could supercharge deportations", No Publication,

<https://www.context.news/ai/trump-armed-with-tech-could-supercharge-deportations>. //brask

Surveillance and AI **could** speed Trump's promise to **deport millions of immigrants**. Immigrants brace for crackdown post-election AI and surveillance bolster US borders LOS ANGELES - Maru Mora-Villalpando had been living in the United States for 21 years when a letter arrived at her door with a deportation notice. It was 11 months into Donald Trump's presidency, and Mora-Villalpando thought she had taken all the necessary steps to keep her address hidden from authorities. But she did not realise that immigration officials could track her whereabouts using basic information she had assumed was private, such as her car registration or utility bills. "I didn't know all this data was being packaged up and given to authorities," said Mora-Villalpando, a community organiser who works with immigrant and undocumented communities in Seattle, Washington. "People would see ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) agents outside their homes, and we didn't know how they would find us - well now we know." The Trump campaign and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not respond to requests for comment. High-tech enterprise Immigration enforcement is increasingly a high-tech enterprise. Authorities can track migrants using data brokers that create detailed profiles of immigrants based on thousands of data points, as well as other state-of-the-art **surveillance tools including** facial recognition and licence plate readers. Algorithms can help decide an immigrant's fate on a range of issues, from whether they should wear an ankle monitor to whether an asylum case is flagged as suspicious. Authorities

are also using ever more artificial intelligence (**AI**), which campaigners worry **could generate target lists for deportation or automatically**

reject asylum applicants **en masse**. With Trump leading in the polls, many organizations that work with immigrant communities worry these **tools could be**

used to speedily target then **deport** some of the **more than 11 million undocumented people** who are estimated to live in the U.S.

"There's a huge tech infrastructure ready to do just that," said Jacinta Gonzalez, field director of Mijente, a grassroots organisation that works on immigration issues. In a memo released in 2023, the DHS, which oversees immigration enforcement, said it would "not use AI technology to enable improper systemic, indiscriminate, or large-scale monitoring, surveillance or tracking of individuals." Undocumented immigrants always have risked deportation - even those who came as children or who are near-lifelong U.S. residents. Despite more than two decades of trying, Congress has never been able to pass a law that would normalise their status.

The impact is recession

Austin **Denean**, Fri, September 20th 20**24**, "Fed turns focus toward bolstering economy with obstacles ahead", WLOS,

<https://wlos.com/news/nation-world/fed-turns-focus-toward-bolstering-economy-with-obstacles-ahead-inflation-unemployment-jobs-interest-rates-consumer-spending-soft-landing-jerome-powell-federal-reserve>

The **Federal Reserve is moving onto its next mission after the first rate cut** since ratcheting them up to tame the rate

of price increases earlier this week marked a symbolic **end to its fight with inflation** and the beginning of a new phase **to steer the**

economy into a soft landing. Keeping the labor market intact is one of the chief

challenges for the Fed to navigate as it eases interest rates to a more neutral level where

they do not spur or slow economic activity. Signals that the **employment situation in the U.S. is declining** have grown more prominent

in recent months. Unemployment rose to 4.2% last month compared to 3.7% in January and the rate at which businesses have added jobs has also declined. Labor data is still strong to solid compared to historical averages but is significantly weaker than it was in the peak of the post-pandemic resurgence of the economy. Policymakers' projections showed they are predicting unemployment to continue to climb modestly through the end of the year to 4.4% and stay there by the end of 2025. That is an increase of 4% this year and 4.2% for 2025. Powell said on Wednesday that the **labor market is no longer causing inflationary pressure**

through a labor shortage that caused wages to rise rapidly and was passed onto

consumers in the form of higher prices. They are now turning their focus to the maximum employment side of their dual mandate of

overseeing the economy. **Economists also noted that Powell was very clear about further weakening**

in the labor market being an unwelcome development. The other big challenge facing the central bank is determining what

its benchmark interest rate needs to be to have a neutral effect on the economy, meaning that it would neither spur growth nor weaken activity. There is some debate among economists as to exactly what that range is, and Powell signed governors are also unsure but that it is higher than it was prior to the pandemic.

Absent a soft landing

Boston University, 11-01-20**13**, "The Financial Crisis and The Great Recession," Boston University.

https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2019/06/MAC_2e_Chapter_15.pdf recut Aaron

The financial crisis that commenced in 2007 and its aftermath have been widely referred to as the "Great **Recession**"—and with good reason. From its beginning until its nadir in 2009, it was **responsible for the destruction of** nearly **\$20 trillion worth of financial assets owned by U.S. households**. During this time, the **U.S. unemployment rate** rose from 4.7 percent to 10 percent (not counting the discouraged and marginally attached workers discussed in Chapter 7). By 2010, college graduates fortunate enough to find a job were, on average, earning 17.5 percent less than their counterparts before the crisis—and experts were predicting that such **a decline in earnings would persist for more than a decade**. The crisis also **spread beyond U.S. borders**. **As consumption and income decline[s]d in the United States**, many countries experienced a significant **reduction in exports** as well as a decline in the investments that they held in the United States. As a result, **global GDP declined by 2 percent** in 2009. It has been estimated that between 50 million and **100 million people around the world** either **fell into** or were prevented from escaping, extreme **poverty** due to the crisis. Why did this happen?

C3

As the U.S. enhances surveillance, it spreads border technology globally via modeling and exports

Brady-19 (Aaron Brady, 8-20-2019, "How the US Exported Its Border Around the World." The Nation.

<https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/todd-miller-new-book-empire-of-borders-interview/> doobz)

Journalist Todd Miller's *Empire of Borders* is about how dramatically and completely this easy simplicity can mislead us about what the border really is, where it is, and where it is going. Borders aren't just there. Not only were they made (often arbitrarily and with great cruelty and violence), but the US border, in particular, extends far beyond the frontier line that separates one country from

another, even far beyond the 100-mile range that Homeland Security considers the border zone. The US border is a massive global apparatus, an interconnected network of partnerships, funding, multinational industries, and international agreements, stretching across every continent and saturating the world. Most important, it's still growing. With a climate-changed future on the horizon—and the **prospect of climate refugees** from around the globe growing exponentially—walls and fences and towers are proliferating, as the **global border security industrial complex** accelerates its efforts. From his home in Arizona, Miller tracks the border from Guatemala and Honduras to the Caribbean, Israel, the Philippines, and Kenya, interviewing subjects on every side of that multidimensional line. I recently spoke with Miller about tracking the border and reporting on it. Our conversation has been edited for style and content. Todd Miller: The idea first occurred to me in 2012, when I was on the west coast of Puerto Rico, on a research trip for my book *Border Patrol Nation*. I saw the same green-striped Border Patrol vehicles roving the west coast as in southern Arizona, where I live. When I learned that Border Patrol could legally operate only 30 miles away from the Dominican coast—since the Mona Island was a US territory—I thought, “Wow, this thing, the border, is so much more extensive than I realized.” Mind you, this was all happening a thousand miles from the US mainland. Then, when I went to the Dominican Republic to investigate US funding and training of the DR’s border patrol, for the border with Haiti, I really began to see the multiple, widespread, programs that were, as officials would say, pushing out the border. AB: What does that mean, “pushing out the border”? TM: Well, the idea that the US border is just the boundary line with Mexico, for example, is not true. It’s much bigger and more expansive. In 2004, [Customs and Border Protection] Commissioner Robert Bonner talked about “extending our zone of security where we can do so, beyond our physical borders—so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first line of defense.” And during his confirmation hearing to be secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Gen. John Kelly said that “border security cannot be attempted as an endless series of goal line stands on the one-foot line at the ports of entry or along the thousands of miles of border between this country and Mexico.” “The defense of the southwest border,” he said, “starts 1,500 miles to the south, with Peru.” AB: But it also blurs borders into one another, into one single, continuous, global border regime. You write about the “Palestine-Mexico” border, for example, the way technologies, techniques, and even laws are being standardized across the world, the way border control is a kind of globalization. TM: The Palestine example is a good one to demonstrate how this works. “Smart wall” technology gets tested out in the occupied Palestinian territories first, like the West Bank wall. “Smart wall” means walls that are either equipped with or reinforced by sensor systems, cameras, radar systems, drones, and linked to command and control centers. These are technologies of segregation, of apartheid. But if a company can show that their technology is effective, like the Haifa-based company Elbit Systems claims in the West Bank, they can then sell it to other countries for their own border and homeland security enforcement systems. It’s field-tested. If it works in the occupation of Palestine, the argument goes, then it can work everywhere else. And that is exactly what is happening. In 2014, Elbit got a contract from US Customs and Border Protection to build 52 surveillance towers in

southern Arizona, **for the border** with Mexico. But now that those towers are being deployed, **they get showcased to other countries as a model of what US border enforcement is**. This also leads to another big part of the US pushing out the borders—sending officials to the other borders around the world so they can diagnose the problems with that border and give recommendations that result in trainings and resource transfers and suggestions for technology deployments.

This happens in 2 key places

First, Israel

Tyler Austin **Harper**, 05-21-20**24**, "The Grim High-Tech Dystopia on the US-Mexico Border", No Publication,

<https://jacobin.com/2024/05/high-tech-ai-mexico-border> // RB

CBP has described these towers as "a partner that never sleeps, never needs to take a coffee break, never even blinks." These **autonomous, AI-powered surveillance towers** are, in fact, the creation of Elbit Systems, a controversial Israeli company that **routinely tests out its technology on occupied Palestinian territory** in the West Bank, as well as on dissidents, journalists, and critics.

Tech has forcibly displaced countless people

Opachevsky **Irina**, Arab Center Washington Dc (Acw), 02-01-20**24**, "Gaza as Ground Zero for Israel's Border Technology", Arab

Center Washington DC, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/gaza-as-ground-zero-for-israels-border-technology/> // RB

According to a Washington Post **report**, on October 7 Hamas fighters breached Israel's border wall with Gaza in at least thirty places. The reaction in the international intelligence and defense community was panic that, as **Newsweek** put it, "Israel's High-Tech Border Failure Could Happen in the U.S." Israel, with one of the most sophisticated border defense systems in the world, was defeated by what western observers considered a "low tech" foe that circumvented its high-end technology, leading to **questions** about whether automated technology was indeed a replacement for defensive personnel. The concern in the United States stemmed from the fact that much of **the technology set-up by Israel to blockade Gaza is the same used by the US government to violently repel unwanted migrants at the southern border**,

and by many other countries including **NATO members** to control their territories. That Israel, a relatively small country, is the global exemplar of military technology is a function of **its** history. Israel is a state founded in and maintained through violent dispossession

of Palestinians. This began with the [Nakba](#), which between 1947 and 1949 **forcibly displaced more than 750,000** **Palestinians**, **killed approximately 15,000 people through systematic massacres**, and resulted in the Palestinians' loss of 78 percent of historic Palestine. It continues with regional wars and Israel's suppression of multiple intifadas, uprisings of the Palestinian people, and with its systemic bombing of Gaza well before October 7. Today Palestinians who are citizens of Israel are second-class citizens, while those living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza live under [an apartheid system](#). Gazans are entirely sequestered.

Second, India

Peace in the squo

Reuters, 07-31-20**24**, "China, India to speed up border talks, says Chinese foreign ministry", Reuters News,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-india-speed-up-border-talks-says-chinese-foreign-ministry-2024-08-01/> // RB

China and India will speed up negotiations around a disputed border and continue to

maintain peace and tranquility in the areas, China's foreign ministry said in a statement on Thursday. Officials from both countries held the 30th meeting of the China-India Border Affairs Consultation and Coordination Working Mechanism in New Delhi on Thursday, centered on hashing out a long simmering dispute over their shared Himalayan border, much of it poorly demarcated.

However

International **C**risis **G**roup, 11-14-20**23**, "Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute", No Publication,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-border-dispute> // RB

Military reinforcement and **infrastructure** building **on** both sides of **the border**, while not technically in violation of these accords, **break with their spirit and deepen mistrust. A loss of confidence by both governments in the security guarantees offered by existing agreements has fuel[s]led the belief that military power is a more dependable option.** Without a clearer definition of what "mutual and

equal security" looks like, and a new understanding of the military balance of power that both sides can live with, India and

China will continue to jostle for advantage and the risk of miscalculation will remain high.

Recommendations A definitive resolution of the China-India border dispute remains elusive. The most feasible solution to date was China's proposal, aired until the early 1980s, of a territorial swap. But in the current climate such a compromise appears far-fetched. Bilateral tensions and domestic politics tie the hands of decision-makers – neither side can afford to look weak on matters of sovereignty and territory. A. Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention. Without a realistic political solution in sight, China and India should make crisis management and de-escalation along the border their priorities. At the heart of the dispute is lack of agreement over where the LAC lies. Without consensus, soldiers from the two countries will continue to encounter each other in areas of overlapping claims, maybe sparking fresh clashes. Ideally, the clarification process that came to a halt in 2002 could restart. The two governments could begin demarcating the line in the middle sector – where disagreements are fewest and maps have been exchanged in 2000 – as a confidence-building measure.¹⁸⁹ While that would be a welcome start, defining the entirety of the LAC could come at a high political cost, given that it might appear that any such bargain is in fact an agreement on the boundary itself. Despite the challenges, it would be ideal for the sides to take mutual small steps toward the goal of delineating the LAC. Even without deciding on the LAC, the two governments should consider other measures to reduce the risk of conflict. Discussions at the special representative level – between China's foreign minister and India's national security adviser – have been paused since 2019 and should resume.¹⁹⁰ The two sides should consider making the existing buffer zones permanent and creating additional ones in areas where standoffs between the two armies regularly occur. Given Indian views that the most recently created buffer zones are tantamount to territorial losses, New Delhi would need to be willing to defend to a domestic audience the physical separation of the two militaries as the most effective way of reducing the risk of conflict, including by making clear that both sides are giving up patrolling rights.¹⁹¹ The two sides should seek reciprocity in terms of the size of patrolling areas and rights each side is giving up in establishing more buffer zones. New Delhi and Beijing should continue to abide by [the existing bilateral agreements], particularly the ban on using firearms. Despite waning confidence in existing bilateral agreements, New Delhi and Beijing should continue to abide by them, particularly the ban on using firearms.¹⁹² Joint public statements reaffirming the sides' commitment to the agreements can help offset lost confidence. If discussions have not already taken place, the two sides should also review recent violations and discuss additional ways to prevent more from occurring through the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. Because the top brass on both sides makes many vital decisions, the two sides should consider establishing a high-level communication channel that could serve to clarify misunderstandings, supplementing the existing hotlines at the front-line commander level. ¹⁹³ The two sides could, for instance, set up a channel between the Indian army's director general of military operations and the head of the China's Western Theatre Command; if protocol continues to prevent progress – as it has in the past – the two sides should identify alternative end points.¹⁹⁴ As a first step, the sides should establish means of rapid communication between the foreign ministries, a measure that they have already agreed to in principle.¹⁹⁵ Such a communication channel, however, will likely be valuable only for preventing misunderstandings, not for managing crises. In its dealings with the U.S., China has a history of not communicating in a timely manner during crises despite the existence of hotlines.¹⁹⁶ For those areas along the border where there is no buffer zone and troops are likely to run into each other, the two governments should consider alternative measures. The 2005 agreement asked soldiers on both sides to withdraw during faceoffs. Further accords could be reached at the highest military and political levels to set limits on the number of troops patrolling in disputed areas. A new ban on the use of deadly weapons that are not firearms – such as nail-studded clubs and tasers – should be considered. The two sides could draw up a list of disputed areas along the LAC where standoffs are more frequent and regulate patrolling in these areas – or even establish no-patrol zones. With both sides relying more on drones, Beijing and New Delhi could also agree on parameters for their use in intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance. B. Containing Mutual Fears over Reinforcements More broadly, the two sides should seek to prevent the upgrading of infrastructure and military outposts from becoming a source of instability. Reinforcement of military positions will likely remain the norm, meaning that efforts should turn to finding a mutually acceptable equilibrium. The parties could attempt to reach an understanding over levels of forces, arms and facilities – and their proximity to the border – that are in accord with the "principle of mutual and equal security". Striking such an agreement will be exceedingly challenging for both governments, not least because of the potential political cost of being perceived as ceding too much ground. Furthermore, as long as at least one of the parties believes it can shift the balance of power in its favour, there will be little incentive to freeze current capabilities. Still, the two sides should as a minimum engage in more regular dialogue to share concerns over each other's military deployments and infrastructure development, and thereby lower the risks of misunderstanding. C. Handling a Competitive Relationship As the two sides continue to compete on various fronts, the potential for distrust to spill over into the border dispute is likely to remain. A return to the era in which the border issue was shelved to let the bilateral relationship get stronger seems improbable in the short term. Instead, New Delhi and Beijing should seek ways to improve management of their troubled relationship and its effects on their perceptions of threats from the other side. As a start, Beijing should immediately appoint an ambassador to India, a post that has been left vacant since October 2022.¹⁹⁷ In addition, there is an immediate need to restart high-level encounters: informal interactions between the two countries' heads of state, which used to happen regularly, have barely taken place since the Galwan clash. Meetings on the sidelines of multilateral summits should continue, but more sustained high-level engagement is crucial. New Delhi will likely be concerned about giving the impression that relations have returned to normal. But it can make clear to its domestic audience that leader-to-leader discussions are intended to air Indian concerns and press for national interests rather than accommodate Chinese demands, not unlike interactions between senior U.S. and Chinese officials. New Delhi and Beijing

should also be more sensitive to the ways in which their relations with third parties – the U.S. for India, and Pakistan for China – can spur overreaction from the other side. India could become more cognisant of how **accepting U.S. security support for its border** operations, or security and economic cooperation in general, **may incline Beijing to believe that New Delhi's assertiveness at the border is part of a design aimed at helping the West contain China or take advantage of Western containment to strengthen itself.**¹⁹⁸ For its part, China should be conscious that its strategic and defence cooperation with Pakistan only confirms India's suspicions that Beijing's aim is to keep Indian regional power in check.¹⁹⁹ Regular, senior-level dialogue can help manage perceptions and deepen each side's understanding of the types of cooperation that raise red flags for the other.

Indo-Pak conflict ensues and causes nuke war

Menon 19 [Prakash Menon, Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at Takshashila Institution's Policy School, "The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race", Telegraph India, [https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608# //recut akang](https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608#//recut%20akang)]

The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race Even a limited India-Pakistan nuclear conflict could pose an existential challenge to life on Earth. The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a 'Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. **One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives**. The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a 'Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives. iStock Prakash Menon | | Published 15.11.19, 08:04 PM With the recent administrative changes in Jammu and Kashmir, Indo-Pak hyphenation has come back to haunt India's aspirations to break out of that narrow mould and be perceived as an independent player on the global stage. The clubbing of India with Pakistan is an echo of India's political and strategic confinement to the sub-continent. Pakistan has always attempted to paint the Indo-Pak situation as a nuclear flashpoint essentially to invite international intervention in what India insists is a bilateral issue. **A recent report in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Toon et al entitled 'How an India-Pakistan Nuclear War Could Start and have Global Consequences' provides grist to the mill of the nuclear flashpoint theory. But it also raises** an issue that has yet not found its place in the public imagination nor has sufficient cognisance been taken by the political and military leadership of nuclear weapon powers – **the climatic consequences of nuclear explosions.** It is well known that nuclear powers have and continue to base their targeting requirements of nuclear weapons on calculations that are restricted mostly to the major but immediate effects of nuclear explosions – blast, heat and radiation. According to General Lee Butler, the former United States, Strategic Forces Commander, during the cold war, the Standard Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) had targeted Moscow with 400 nuclear weapons and Kiev with 40. **Several scientific studies of the impact of nuclear explosions since the 1980s up to the present which utilises advanced computer models, confirm** the effect of smoke injected into the stratosphere that would block sunlight from reaching the earth's surface and is described as **'Nuclear Winter'**. In essence global temperatures would **plunge below freezing point thus posing threats to life support systems especially food production. In short, it threatened human existence itself.** Later studies that focused on regional nuclear wars especially in the Indo-Pak context, have indicated that the impact of a nuclear exchange would have an immediate significant and catastrophic impact in terms of death

and destruction. The latest Toon study, estimates that in a situation where around 350 warheads are used by India and Pakistan, the immediate casualties would vary between 50 to 125 million lives depending on the yields of the weapons used which could vary between 15-100 Kilotons. (a Kiloton being the explosive equivalent power of 1000 tons of TNT). Such scales and speeds of destruction for both parties would indeed be of an existential nature. Therefore, both India and Pakistan despite the rhetoric during times of tension have so far displayed caution and refrained from getting into situations where nuclear weapons are alerted. The speedy de-escalation after Balakot is indicative of a cautionary approach. Of course, this is no guarantee that the next round would not witness a different outcome. For as long as nuclear weapons exist in the arsenals of both countries, the possibility of use remains, however low the probability. It is now well known (but widely ignored by the strategic cognoscenti) that even a regional Indo-Pak nuclear war with hundreds of low yield nuclear explosions can also pose an existential threat at the global level. The latest study states “In the India-Pakistan scenario, we calculated a total of 16.1 TG (1 TG is equivalent of one million tons of smoke) of black carbon injected into the upper atmosphere (11 from India and 5.1 from Pakistan) for weapons with yields of 15 kilotons; 27.3 TG (19.8 from India and 7.5 from Pakistan) for 50 kiloton weapons; and 36.6 TG (27.5 from India and 9.1 from Pakistan) for 100 kiloton weapons. The smoke would be heated by sunlight and lofted high into the stratosphere, where it could remain for years, since it does not rain in the stratosphere”. The Climate Model indicates that global average temperatures and precipitation would be significantly lowered and comparisons are drawn to the ice age that prevailed thousands of years ago. Agriculture around the world would be impacted and billions of people could face starvation. In earlier studies, even 5 TG of smoke produced (which is one third of what is expected in a lower scale Indo-Pak conflict), food production would change in China and the US for specific crops causing widespread shortages at the global level. Moreover, the ozone layer would be degraded as the rising smoke absorbs the sunlight and heats up the stratosphere that would permit ultra-violet rays of greater magnitude to reach the earth causing negative effects. The political and strategic implications of the long-term impact on climate change challenges the foundations of the edifice on which nuclear weapon strategy has been constructed. It is obvious that any deliberate initiation of nuclear war has a high probability of posing an existential threat to humanity. Even with the achievement of the complete destruction of an adversary’s arsenal through a first strike, the initiator cannot itself escape the existential threat posed by long term climate change. This indicates that the First Use doctrine in the name of strengthening deterrence stands fully exposed for its incredibility and the utter stupidity of the use of nuclear weapons.

C4

Cybersecurity’s on the chopping block

David **Jones**, 11-10-20**23**, “As Congress weighs budget priorities, top cyber execs urge CISA funding support”, Cybersecurity

Dive, <https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/congress-budget-cyber-execs-cisa-funding/699461/> // TT

CISA has faced rising backlash from Republican House members in recent months related to the agency’s work to combat disinformation related to election security. A failed amendment to the House Homeland Security Appropriations bill included language to slash the CISA budget by 25% and was supported by 108 Republican House members. “We have heard there may

still be calls for significant cuts to CISA and we remain concerned that cuts like these could undermine CISA's network defense and critical infrastructure coordination mission," Tenable officials said via email. Eric Goldstein, CISA's executive assistant director for cybersecurity, told a House Homeland Security Committee hearing that the **proposed cuts would greatly harm CISA's ability to monitor threats against federal networks.** "We would not be able to sustain that visibility **with that significant of a budget cut,** and **our adversaries would unequivocally exploit those gaps.**" Goldstein said.

Affirming is the nail in the coffin

Katz 24 [Eric Katz, 2-13-2024, DHS to slash operations, reshuffle workforce without additional funds, agency warns, Government Executive,
<https://www.govexec.com/management/2024/02/dhs-slash-operations-and-reshuffle-workforce-without-additional-funds-agency-warns/394190/>] // MVSG

The **Homeland Security** Department **is preparing to potentially move some employees from their primary functions and reprogram funds to address a budget shortfall,** the agency said on Wednesday, sending out a warning to lawmakers that their **inaction could harm national security.** The Biden administration is imploring Congress to provide more funds throughout DHS to avoid the slashing of operations. Among the expected cut backs would be upgrades to ports of entry and border surveillance technology, shelter services for migrant arrivals, deportation rates and asylum processing. **The administration has repeatedly requested additional resources for DHS' vital missions on the southwest border and Congress has chronically underfunded them,**" a department spokesperson said. "Most recently, Congress **rejected the bipartisan national security bill out of hand,** which will put at risk DHS's **current removal operations,** put further strain on our already overtaxed workforce and make it harder to catch fentanyl at ports of entry." The Senate rejected the bipartisan measure that took months to negotiate after former President Trump and House Republicans put pressure on the lawmakers to vote against the restrictive immigration reform and border security bill. The measure included \$18 billion for components throughout DHS, including for the hiring of thousands of new employees. **Without adequate funding for CBP, ICE and USCIS, the department will have to reprogram or pull resources from other efforts,**" the DHS spokesperson said. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services would have to reassign

hundreds of personnel from their normal duties to conduct initial screenings of new migrant arrivals, the spokesperson added. That would take them away from adjudicating green cards and addressing the asylum backlog, leading to longer wait times for the applicants. USCIS just last week announced it had reduced its total backlog for the first time in a decade. It completed 10 million cases in fiscal 2023, an all-time record, reducing its overall number of pending cases by 15%. USCIS is still struggling to dig out from a hiring freeze it implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the agency threatened to furlough most of its workers as normal funds collected through fees dried up. Congress eventually intervened, but not before a longstanding hiring pause depleted the agency. The border measure would have provided USCIS with 4,300 asylum officers, quintupling that part of the agency's workforce, while also adding new responsibilities. Without an injection of funding, Immigration and Customs Enforcement would have to scale back its current pace of border and removal operations. ICE in fiscal 2023 removed more than 140,000 individuals and turned away nearly 63,000 migrants when the Title 42 policy remained in effect, though a spokesperson said it would no longer be able to sustain that ramped-up operational capacity. Under the bipartisan border deal, ICE would have received \$7.6 billion and 1,200 new employees. The Washington Post reported on Wednesday ICE is considering releasing thousands of detained immigrants as it can no longer afford to hold 38,000 individuals. "A reduction in ICE operations would significantly harm border security, national security and public safety," the DHS spokesperson said. **Customs and Border Protection would**

repurpose funds away from "nonessential areas," which DHS said would require

sacrifices to priority capital investments. Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., the top Democrat on the House Homeland Security Committee, said Republicans were playing "political games" rather than addressing an urgent matter. "Because Republicans refuse to actually govern and have stated they won't provide another dime to DHS, ICE will soon be forced to reduce operations and release significant numbers of detainees," Thompson said. "If it is a crisis at the border, then Republicans must agree to fix it now." Rep. Mark Green, R-Tenn., who chairs the panel and led the effort to impeach DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, called the administration's warnings "absurd," accusing ICE of letting bed space for detained migrants go unused and noting the agency proposed cutting its detention capacity in its fiscal 2024 budget proposal. "Instead of treating enforcement as a hostage negotiation—'give us more money or else'—Secretary Mayorkas should just do his job and follow the law," Green said.

DHS, like all agencies, is currently operating under a continuing resolution that is funding it

at fiscal 2023 levels. That is set to expire March 8 as lawmakers negotiate final appropriations bills, though **overall**

spending throughout government will stay flat. The Senate this week advanced a supplemental spending package that stripped out all funding initially included for DHS. The department has become the latest of several in the Biden administration to warn the uncertainty of the CR and expected flat funding environment is negatively impacting operations. Facilities throughout the Veterans Affairs Department are restricting hiring as they deal with budget shortfalls. The Social Security Administration told Congress at the start of the fiscal year it had to freeze hiring and overtime, with leaders noting the agency has been underresourced for a decade. Once Congress completes the full-year appropriations process, agencies across government will be dealing with budget constraints due to a spending agreement originally negotiated by the White House and House Republicans.

The impact is economic crisis

CISA's the pillar of our economy

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, xx-xx-xxxx, "Financial Services Sector", Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,

<https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/financial-services-sector> // TT

The Financial Services Sector represents a vital component of our nation's critical infrastructure. Large-scale power outages, recent natural disasters, and an increase in the number and sophistication of cyberattacks demonstrate the wide range of potential risks facing the sector. Overview **The Financial Services Sector includes thousands of depository**

institutions, providers of investment products, insurance companies, other credit and financing organizations, and the providers of the critical financial utilities and services that support these functions.

Financial institutions vary widely in size and presence, ranging from **some of the world's largest global companies** with thousands of employees and many billions of dollars in assets, to **community banks and credit unions** with a small number of employees serving individual communities. Whether an individual savings account, financial derivatives, credit extended to a large organization, or investments made to a foreign country, these products allow customers to: Deposit funds and make payments to other parties Provide credit and liquidity to customers Invest funds for both long and short periods Transfer financial risks between customers.

Absent adequate defense

Ronald **Orol**, 05-14-20**19**, "In Cyberspace, All Banks Are Vulnerable," Centre for International Governance Innovation,

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/cyberspace-all-banks-are-vulnerable> // TT

According to a paper issued in March by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the hackers used a "hot patch" of the payments system to bypass security features. They also built custom malware to carry out the attack, which the authors described as **an "unprecedented escalation" of cybercrime**. Bankers, regulators and big investors continue to worry about another hack of the SWIFT system. However, beyond **cyber heists**, policy makers now have a much bigger concern: **a future attack on the financial system's network infrastructure, or on a big bank, could**

trigger the next global economic crisis. “We are all aware of what happened in the great financial crisis,” David Hunt, CEO of PGIM, Prudential Financial Inc.’s global investment management business, told a confab of big investors and executives in April at the annual Milken Institute Global Conference in Beverly Hills, California. “But **the next crisis is likely to come from technology and cyber.**”

The risk is uniquely high now

Hadley **Spadaccini**, 04-18-20**24**, “Risks are higher than ever for US- China cyber war”, Responsible Statecraft, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-china-cyberwar/> // TT

This announcement came on the heels of warnings from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Director Jen Easterly and National Cyber Director Harry Coker that **Chinese hackers are making a strategic shift to target critical infrastructure, are likely able to launch cyberattacks that could cripple that infrastructure**, and are increasingly exploiting Americans’ private information. It’s apparent then that **a conflict between China and the United States would include disruptive, dangerous cyberwarfare.**

Indeed, as U.S.-China military-to-military communications restart, **cyber needs to become a key part of these conversations to develop bilateral crisis management mechanisms.** Unfortunately, cyber crisis management is still in its infancy. The United States and China have engaged in multiple bilateral and multilateral dialogues on cyber-related issues in the past. For example, the 2015 summit between President Obama and Xi Jinping created a series of agreements — tacit and explicit — on cyber espionage, the joint investigation of cybercrimes, and a process that eventually produced the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues. However, **direct U.S.-China official dialogues have not led to substantial cooperation.** President Biden warned Xi during a recent call against China using cyberattacks to target sensitive infrastructure, but no solutions nor potential dialogues appear to have been brought up. There is no dearth of unofficial dialogues, and some have proposed discrete steps that would enhance U.S.-China cyber relations and crisis management mechanisms, such as coming to mutual definitions of cyber terms, strengthening bilateral communications, and promoting restraint in cyber usage. Unfortunately, **despite the many attempts at facilitating U.S.-China cyber dialogues and improved relations, no concrete standards or guidelines**

on cyber usage in a potential conflict have been adopted, nor have U.S.-China cyber relations appeared to improve.

It's existential

Liu 18 [Qian Liu (Qian Liu is an economist and executive who frequently publishes in highly regarded academic journals and business outlets, and is frequently interviewed by news outlets), 11-13-2018, "The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-here-s-why/>]

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive **monetary stimulus**, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now

higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have **built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots**, in the form of **ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies**, has severely **depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy**. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard's Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of **economic distress** have been characterized also by **public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries** – attitudes that can help to **fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be **trigger points for a future crisis**. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world's unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump's US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help

us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

Rebuttal

BIC means surveillance tech never solves the issue bc corporations' incentive is not to catch crime

National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, xx-xx-xxxx, "Border Militarization Policy", National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, <https://nnirr.org/programs/seeking-border-justice/border-militarization-policy/> // RB

One of the clearest ways to identify the growth of militarization at the border is by looking at the colossal spike in funding for border security over the years. The funding for border enforcement agencies surpasses the funding of all other federal law-enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA, ATF, Secret Service and U.S. Marshals Service). The American Immigration Council estimates that \$263 billion dollars have been spent on immigration enforcement since 1986. This graph above depicts federal funding for ICE and CBP per year, from 2005 through the proposed 2022 budget (released May 2021) which is to be approved in fall 2021. NNIRR and allies in the immigrant rights movement are enraged with the Biden administration for keeping funding at the same level as during Trump years, breaking with a promise to bring relief to immigrant communities and decrease the funding for enforcement. Who benefits from these numbers? The many corporations with government contracts providing technology, security and military equipment, private prisons and more... According to a 2013 Migration Policy Institute Report, "funding, technology, and personnel growth are the backbone of the transformations in

immigration enforcement.” The majority of government funding for border securitization ends up going to security and technology corporations like Boeing Company, Raytheon, and Elbit

Todd **Miller**, 09-16-20**19**, "More Than A Wall", Transnational Institute, <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/more-than-a-wall-0> // RB

This report looks at the history of US border control and the strong political consensus – both Republican and Democrat – in support of border militarization that long pre-dates the Trump administration. It shows how **this political consensus has been forged to a significant degree by the world’s largest arms** (as well as a number of other **security** and IT) **corporations that have made massive profits from the exponential growth of government budgets for border control. Through their campaign contributions, lobbying, constant engagement with government officials, and the revolving door between industry and government, these security corporations and their government allies have formed a powerful border–industrial complex.** The evidence shows that it is these corporations – and their role in border infrastructure and policies – that have led to a predominantly militarized response to migration and thereby become the single biggest impediment to a humane response to migration.

The aff fails, construction takes too long and destroys local economies

EDZARENSKI (Jan 07, 2019), "Trump’s Wall", Construction Analytics, ,

<https://edzarenski.com/2016/05/22/trumps-wall-02-19/>. Accessed on July 16, 2024. //DM

Best case scenario, at the low end of **cost at \$22 billion, it would take** 10,000 men **11 years to build 1000 miles of** steel fence **barrier**. It is likely that the low end estimate is much too optimistic, citing some issues outlined below. A word about

HSS steel tubes. US annual production for Hollow Structural Sections in 2016 was 1.6 million tons per year. That annual demand does not go

away if 3 million tons of tube steel is needed for a wall. Over a period of 10 years, at 0.3 million tons/year, steel needed for a wall would be 20%/year of tube steel production. To prevent shortages, production capacity must increase or that extra tube steel must be imported. The US imports about half of all the steel pipe and tube is uses in a year from South Korea, but most of that is oil industry pipe. Manufacturing mills typically cannot increase capacity by 20% in a year. So, this extra demand for tube steel would either cause shortages or increase imports. Energy cost just to produce 3 mil tons of steel is enough to power 500,000 homes for

The aff creates a force multiplier effect

Elizabeth **Vallet**, 20**14**, "Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?"

<https://www.routledge.com/Borders-Fences-and-Walls-State-of-Insecurity/Vallet/p/book/9781138308404> // RB

Walls, sensors, drones and other border technologies are all the result of acts of volition on the part of policymakers responding to the adaptation of clandestine agents whose business model is to defy and exploit border interdiction. **Policymakers** aspire to impose behavioral changes on these human networks by **introduc**ing to the **border** ecosystem a series of **tech**nological changes meant **to multiply the capacity** and effectiveness **of border authorities**. The stated goal is absolute "operational control" of the border, defined by law as the "prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics and other contraband" (H.R. 2006). The "zero risk" objective to prevent 100 percent of unlawful entries will theoretically be attained because of the environmental design taking place around the border landscape, building infrastructures that ultimately should deter all illegal activities in the borderlands. **These walling acts of volition have allocated billions of dollars in resources to attain this seemingly impossible goal,** creating in the process a new security and defense market to use corporate innovation against the clandestine networks. This private/public research and development effort culminates in an escalating deployment of security systems at the borderline. Walls, sensors and drones have different specifications and different political functions, even if all of them share the objective of bringing governance and operational control to the border spaces, and ultimately creating a deterrence-based "system of systems".

HSR, December 20, 20**23**, NEW: BORDER PATROL AGENTS STUCK PROCESSING [REDACTED] [MIGRANTS] INSTEAD OF PERFORMING BORDER SECURITY MISSION

<https://homeland.house.gov/2023/12/20/new-border-patrol-agents-stuck-processing-illegal-aliens-instead-of-performing-border-security-mission/> // RB, **bracketed for problematic language**

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Mark E. Green, MD (R-TN) issued the following statement after the Committee released new selections from transcribed interviews conducted with Border Patrol chief patrol agents responsible for the sectors along the Southwest border. These interviews confirm that **significant numbers of their Border Patrol agents have been reassigned to processing and releasing [redacted] [migrants] into the country rather than patrolling the border between ports of entry.** The chief patrol agents describe how **this negatively affects morale of these agents in the field and increases the likelihood of gotaways at the border, putting U.S. homeland security at risk.** Finally, several of these senior leaders describe how Border Patrol agents are being temporarily assigned to other sectors to help process surges, affecting manpower in their home sectors.

Vigilantes won't ever stop, they're motivated by hate

Tobias 03 [Glen A. Tobias, xx-xx-2003, Border Disputes Armed Vigallantes in Arizona, ADL, <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Border-Disputes-Armed-Vigilantes-in-Arizona.pdf>, accessed 7-18-2024] // AZ

Historically, hate groups and other extremist groups have tried to exploit immigration, legal and illegal, as an issue to gain support and publicity. Anti-Semite and former Klansman David Duke organized Klan border patrols in the late 1970's. In the early 1980's, White supremacist Louis Beam conducted paramilitary activities to intimidate immigrant Vietnamese fishermen in Texas. Beam, then head of the Texas Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, urged Klansmen to reclaim their country "by blood." More recently, in October 2002, **New Jersey white supremacist radio talk show host Hal Turner encouraged his shortwave audience to "kill every single one of these invaders."** Turner's remarks reflect a new radicalism. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave extremist groups an opportunity to exploit the fear and anger that the attacks raised in the United States. **Extremists sought to direct those emotions against immigrants. Racist groups such as the Council of Conservative Citizens blamed the attacks on a lack of American vigilance against immigrants.** Just months after the attacks, the neo-Nazi National Alliance distributed fliers in the Chicago area that **featured the World Trade Center and the phrase "Close our Borders!"** In March 2003, a number of **white supremacist groups, including White**

Revolution, the National Socialist Movement, Aryan Nations, the Celtic Knights of the KKK,

and the Creativity Movement (formerly World Church of the Creator), joined to hold an

anti-immigration rally in San Antonio, Texas, to speak out against the “tide of illegal brown wretched refuse steadily darkening our

land.” **Given these sentiments, it is no surprise that the effort of right wing extremist groups to**

take the law into their own hands and administer **their own form of “justice”** coincides with a wave of

border violence in Arizona. **Several extremist groups are spearheading an effort to mobilize armed**

vigilantes to “patrol” the Arizona border and stop what they view as a Mexican “invasion.” By

appealing to xenophobic fears and creating a menacing atmosphere in the communities in which they are active, they could detonate an already

volatile situation. **The most organized of these groups openly invite people to “patrol” the borders**

using technology and weapons. Meanwhile, they promote an ideology that is often not one of

immigration reform or immigration control, but simply of hate and intolerance. Their hope is

to capitalize on recent alarm over a rising tide of illegal immigration in Arizona that naturally followed

increased U.S. Border Patrol presences at once popular crossing points such as San Diego and El Paso. American Border Patrol The border crisis

in Arizona has attracted many anti-immigration ideologues seeking to capitalize on the wave of anti-Mexican rhetoric at the border. Foremost

among them is 65-year-old Glenn Spencer, head of the American Border Patrol. Spencer, a retired California businessman, moved the

headquarters of his virulently anti-Hispanic group to Sierra Vista, Arizona, in August 2002 in order to be, in his words, “on the front lines,”

claiming that “nothing more could be done for California.”

Biased results thump effectiveness of surveillance

Carlyn **Greenfield**, 03-11-20**20**, "As Governments Build Advanced Surveillance Systems to Push Borders Out, Will Travel and Migration

Become Unequal for Some Groups?", migrationpolicy.org,

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/governments-build-advanced-surveillance-systems> // RB

The data double is meant to create the most thorough profile of a traveler or migrant. This profile is processed through algorithms to assign risk

levels and predetermine the aims of the traveler or migrant. However, **since algorithms are created by people, they carry**

the biases of the original creator rendering the process imperfect. The meanings assigned to specific data points, such as the

significance of previous visa rejections, is decided by the creators. In addition, as the machine learns from itself, patterns related to categorization become more fixed, further stratifying travelers. For instance,

according to U.S. officials, the addition of Nigeria to the list of countries facing heightened travel restrictions in January 2020 was said to be due to a heightened risk environment in Nigeria and the number of Nigerian visa overstays. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) explicitly noted the use of an assessment model to rank countries' performance against their criteria on information sharing, identity-management systems, and public-safety risks. It is not publicly known whether this assessment model includes machine learning or algorithms, but it seems likely that they would be in use. In such a scenario, if several Nigerians committed a terrorist act in the United States, it likely would raise barriers for Nigerian would-be immigrants as the machine would input a higher level of risk for Nigerians. Moreover, others with similar profiles to the terrorists, such as men of a similar age, from a similar area, or with a similar background could also find themselves moved into higher-risk categories. Yet a data double is not a person: humans cannot be fully summarized through data because certain traits, such as ambition or respect for the rule of law, cannot be quantitatively measured and assured. Therefore, the system denies a holistic approach and instead opts for reinforcing assumptions about what certain data points mean. Indeed, algorithms are not only vulnerable to error and discrimination but may compound bias due to the nature of the system. The human effect on risk analysis is evident: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)'s Risk Classification Assessment was reprogrammed in 2018 to remove the "release" option for unauthorized migrants, creating a system that always recommended detention. When the system was first introduced in 2013, it was modeled on other criminal justice reforms to reduce pretrial detention. Even prior to the reprogramming in 2018, however, the system hardly ever recommended "release"—with one DHS Office of Inspector General report finding release was suggested only 0.6 percent of the time between July 2012 and December 2013. DHS called the system ineffective in managing complicated cases In Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has been working to procure a predictive analytics system for cases such as preremoval risk assessments. The efforts have been heavily criticized by immigrants' rights activists and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto for issues of bias and possible discrimination.

Circumvention

Solis 21 [Gustavo Solis, xx-xx-2021, Drug smuggling, and the endless battle to stop it, USAToday, <https://www.usatoday.com/border-wall/story/drug-trafficking-smuggling-cartels-tunnels/559814001/>, accessed 7-18-2024] // BZ **edited for offensive language**

Fences went up, but drugs kept moving. **After the government built fences in San Diego, drug smugglers turned to the ocean, underground tunnels** and, most commonly, the ports of entry. Last year more than 90 percent of the drug seizures happened in the port of entry, where millions of cars drive into San Diego from Mexico every year. David Shaw is Unzueta's successor at Homeland Security Investigations. The unit investigates cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, money laundering and drug smuggling. Cartels "operate like a business," Shaw says. "If you put up one wall, they find a way to get around it." The USA TODAY NETWORK spoke with current and retired law-enforcement experts who have patrolled the border on a daily basis. Asked about President Donald Trump's proposed border wall, they seem to agree: San Diego, at least, would benefit more from additional personnel, training and investment in investigative tools like wiretaps and paid informants. **Drug smuggling along the border is like a balloon, experts say. If you squeeze one part, the air simply shifts to another.** The San Ysidro Port of Entry, which connects Tijuana, Mexico, to San Diego, is the busiest land crossing in the world. Every year, more than 14 million vehicles and 23 million passengers cross through one of 26 inspection lanes to get into the United States. "We probably lead the nation as far as smuggling attempts from [redacted] [undocumented immigrants] and narcotics, so we are very dynamic and very busy," says Acting Port Director Robert Hood. "It's a fun place to be if you're an officer. Something is always going on." During the 2016 fiscal year, Border Patrol agents in San Diego confiscated nearly 83,000 kilograms of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin from the three ports of entry in the area. The next closest border sector in terms of drug seizures was Laredo, Texas, which covers twice as much land and where agents confiscated 10,000 fewer kilograms of drugs, according to Customs and Border Protection data. The San Ysidro port is a giant bottleneck that funnels a seemingly endless flood of traffic to inspection booths. There, Border Patrol agents have about 40 seconds to find signs of smuggling. Agents look for anything that could point to drug smuggling, such as custom-made compartments, uneven tires, a nervous driver or a weighted down trunk. Inspectors do this while knowing that drivers have been in line for hours and that those drivers contribute millions to the U.S. economy. "When I worked the primary lanes, my goal was to look at the folks as they are coming at me and to determine which one of all this traffic is not like everybody else," Hood says. "It's kind of like when the Secret Service identified counterfeit currency. They know what legitimate currency is like so well that when the bad one comes, you go, 'That's it.' " When drug smuggling moved to the ports of entry, it was by design. The idea was that fences would divert drug trafficking to one area: the ports. Here, the agents have the advantage of lights, drug-sniffing canine patrols, X-ray machines and other high-tech equipment. Diverting drugs to the ports was a safer option than sending agents to rural areas of the country, two hours away from their nearest backup. In this sense, the fencing has been a success. But there have also been unintended consequences. Since 2001, the **San Diego** Sector's **Tunnel Task Force has found more than 60 smuggling tunnels** in the county. **"With the**

advent of the infrastructure between the ports of entry, one of the unintended consequences

were the huge narcotics tunnels that were created **that went over 100 feet deep** and ran seven

or eight football fields in length,” says Unzueta. Most of those tunnels are in Otay Mesa, a massive warehouse district just

north of a commercial truck port of entry. The warehouses are the perfect spot to dig exits from Mexican tunnels. The constant truck traffic keeps the noise levels up so that much construction goes unnoticed. Subleasing of warehouses makes it difficult for law-enforcement officers to keep tabs on who is renting them out. The Tunnel Task Force finds and seals tunnels. Its members call themselves the “tunnel rats,” in homage to the tunnel rats of the Vietnam War who cleared the tunnels the Viet Cong used to run their guerrilla warfare operations. San Diego’s soil, at least along certain stretches of the county, makes the area ideal for building tunnels. The soil is strong enough to support the weight of a tunnel but soft enough to dig through. Other parts of the border are too sandy, and sophisticated tunnels require infrastructure to support the weight.

“We just happen to be in the right place at the right time where most of the tunneling activity takes place,” says Lance LeNoir, captain of the tunnel rats. “We’ve developed a niche. We didn’t have a script to go off in here so we borrowed from the fire department, from geologists, from everything. It’s just been a collaboration.” While the majority of smuggling attempts happen in the ports of entry, the biggest loads of drugs enter San Diego through tunnels. The ones equipped with rails can carry packages as big as 35 tons. It can take more than a million dollars to build one of these tunnels, but the drug-smuggling organization can get a return on its investment after

two successful shipments. “Even if you put every single resource you have on something, I’m not sure you stop it because the

other side has a lot more resources to actually move it along,” Shaw says. “It goes back to the demand side in the U.S. If the demand wasn’t so high, then you wouldn’t have the supply problem.” Smuggling in the ocean has evolved from Jets Skis dropping off packages on deserted beaches near San Diego to multiday expeditions taking ships 150 miles west into the ocean and as far north as San Francisco. A group of about 50 border patrol agents, mostly former military, patrol an area that’s larger than the state of Connecticut but has no roads and only a handful of visual landmarks. “They are going so far out of our area of operations that we can’t even cover that area,” says Kurt Nagel, a marine interceptor for Customs and Border Protection’s air and sea patrol. “We are trying to set up task forces in San Francisco to give us a hand. ... Right now

with how far they are going, we can’t keep up.” After the border fences in San Diego were built, law enforcement noticed

more pangas — small, open fishing boats that run on outboard motors — abandoned on the city’s beaches. “We were completely

overwhelmed,” says Unzueta, the retired ICE investigator. When agents focused on pangas, the smugglers began using

expensive recreational vessels that blend in with the boats San Diegans use for weekend fishing

or scenic cruises. Border Patrol agents have to figure out which ones are coming from Mexico. “A lot of it is just knowing the people,

knowing the seasons, knowing what fish is in season, what kind of tackle you use to go sea fishing as opposed to lake fishing,” Nagel says.

“Smugglers sometimes mix that up.” If a wall is built, don’t expect it — or the Border Patrol — to stop the flow of drugs. Border Patrol agents in San Diego agree that they need more people and funding for investigative work. “It’s old-school police work,” Shaw says. “That’s where I think

our best money is spent.” Wiretaps and paid informants are among the unit’s most effective tools for uncovering the inner workings of drug-smuggling organizations, he adds. “You can have all the technology you want and all the infrastructure you want, but if you have nobody to make an arrest when someone comes across illegally, it really doesn’t do you any good because they are going to get right past that technology eventually,” Hernandez says. “And if you have all the agents you want but no technology to help you find them, people are going to get away anyway. We want to try to find the right balance.” And any wall that is built can’t wall off the bustling border ports. Sealing San Ysidro would decimate a multimillion dollar, trans-border economy. “Some of our better tools are the officers’ skill and the canines’ ability,” says Hood, the ports chief. Beyond that, their work is done with intelligence, paying informants in Mexico and building cases so that they know what is approaching the border before it gets there. “I think what we are likely to see with the border wall is probably increased levels of smuggling going on within the ports of entry, potentially increased levels in narcotics tunnels,” Unzueta says.

Not many die

WHO 24 [WHO. Dengue And Severe Dengue. WHO, 20 June 2024, <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue>. Accessed 20 July 2024.//CT]

Dengue is a viral infection transmitted to humans through the bite of infected mosquitoes. About half of the world's population is now at risk of dengue with an estimated 100–400 million infections occurring each year. Dengue is found in tropical and sub-tropical climates worldwide, mostly in urban and semi-urban areas. While many dengue infections are asymptomatic or produce only mild illness, the virus can occasionally cause more severe cases, and even death. Prevention and control of dengue depend on vector control. There is no specific treatment for dengue/severe dengue, and early detection and access to proper medical care greatly lower fatality rates of severe dengue.

Vaccines solve

WHO. *Vaccines And Immunization: Dengue*. WHO, **20-June** 2024, <https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/dengue-vaccines>. Accessed 20 July 2024.//CT

There is a growing public health need for effective preventive interventions against dengue, a disease caused by four viruses, termed serotypes 1–4. Two dengue vaccines have been licensed, Dengvaxia® (CYD-TDV), developed by Sanofi Pasteur, and

Qdenga® (TAK-003), developed by Takeda. Another dengue vaccine developed at the Laboratory of

Infectious Diseases, at the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in the United States, is in the late stages

of clinical development.