

Rebuttal Evidence

AFP 24 [The AFP, "Xi Jinping calls to prepare for war as China launches live-fire exercise in Taiwan Strait", **10/22/2024**, The Hindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-jinping-calls-to-prepare-for-war-as-china-launches-live-fire-exercise-in-taiwan-strait/article68781757.ece>] ZG

China's military began a live-fire exercise near Taiwan on Tuesday (October 22, 2024), **maintaining pressure on the self-ruled island after staging large-scale drills and President Xi Jinping called for troops to prepare for war.**

China's Communist Party has never ruled the island, but it claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has said it will not renounce the use of force to bring it under its control. This month it sent planes and warships around the island in what Beijing said was a "stern warning to the separatist acts of 'Taiwan Independence' forces". On Monday, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in the eastern island of Pingtan announced that "gun firing" would take place in a limited area close to the Chinese mainland, about 105km (66 miles) from Taiwan. The MSA said they would start at 9:00 a.m. local time (0100 GMT) and take place for four hours in an area encompassing about 150 sqkm (60 square miles).

Jared M. **McKinney & Peter Harris**, 11-22-20**21**, "Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan," USAWC Press, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/4/> // MH

Unlike strategies placing the threat of military reprisal at their core, a **deterrence-by-punishment** strategy **does not rely on** the United States **bolstering** its **military forces** in Northeast Asia. This approach **leaves the United States some room to adopt a force posture capable of reassuring allies such as Japan and South Korea** about their collective defense, **while** also **convincing** both **Taiwan and China the United States is truly committed to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It also frees the US military to divest itself from vulnerable bases in Japan that may on balance make great-power war more**, rather than less, **likely— via a preemptive Chinese attack** in an active-defense situation. Shifting the burden of deterrence from military reprisal to non-military punishment might **also reduce the likelihood of a war caused by miscalculation**, while **also removing** the pretext that China's buildup is a response to **US** and Taiwanese **provocations. Of course, there are dangers associated with reducing the US military footprint around Taiwan. Careful** research and **planning must be conducted in conjunction with regional partners** to ascertain what level and type of US forward deployment would be necessary **to reassure allies** while also lessening the chances of war. **There should be no drawdown** of military forces **until** such a time as **a credible deterrence-by-punishment strategy has been put in place**; otherwise Beijing might perceive a window of opportunity to wage a successful attack. Additionally, Taiwan might be less encouraged to stage an independent fight against China if it no longer believes the United States would (or could) intervene on its behalf. **That said**, given reports about low morale in the Taiwanese Armed Forces, as well as low defense spending (around 2 percent of GDP), **a shock to the status quo** might be **just what the situation requires**. Regardless, **relying less on threats** of force **is not the same as ruling out the use of force** altogether. **Ambiguity will always exist** about whether the United States would use force in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.³⁷

Micheal **Beckley 24** [Micheal Beckley is a noted scholar in the field of international relations, particularly regarding U.S.-China relations and global security. He specializes in topics such as great power competition, military strategy, and the implications of rising powers. 1-17-2024, "A Peaceful Solution on Taiwan Is Slipping Away," American Enterprise Institute - <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/a-peaceful-solution-on-taiwan-is-slipping-away/>] //RT

There is a belief that the United States can head off **the** possibility of **Chinese** aggression by voicing its opposition to Taiwan independence. **The idea is that this will ease concerns in Beijing, which, beset by an ailing economy, will want to avoid the massive economic, social and diplomatic disruptions of starting a war.** But Taiwan provokes China simply by being what it is: A prosperous and free society. Taiwan's blooming

national identity threatens China with the **prospect of** permanent territorial dismemberment; and Taiwan's elections, rule of law and free press make a mockery of Beijing's claim that Chinese culture is incompatible with democracy. America's words can't change any of that **Chinese law explicitly states that Beijing may use force if possibilities for peaceful unification are "completely exhausted."** **Because of politics in Taiwan and the United States, those possibilities are dwindling.** Taiwanese and American **political leaders need to** recognize this stark reality, do far more to improve military deterrence, **start national conversations** about the growing threat of war and work toward public unity about how to confront that threat, **all while avoiding** rhetoric or **actions that needlessly throw fuel on the fire.**

Liu Xuanzun, 8-13-2023, "VOA's dissent on US arms sales to Taiwan island being 'outdated, overpriced' pale, self-conflicting," No Publication, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202308/1296176.shtml>, accessed 11-7-2024 //cy **In terms of whether the weapons sold to the island of Taiwan were outdated, VOA alleged that "many of the US weapons sold to Taiwan are quite advanced in terms of both technology and capabilities," listing examples such as the Javelin anti-tank missile, the Stinger man-portable air defense missile, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system, the F-16V fighter jet and the M1A2 main battle tank.** While some of these weapons remain in active service in modern warfare, it **is a questionable argument** to say that they are advanced, Song Zhongping, a Chinese mainland military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Sunday. Song said these **weapons' performances were overstated** by the US, and they were **only used against less powerful forces** and were **not proven in high intensity warfare. Compared to weapons used by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), these US weapons** suffer from a generational gap, which makes them **outdated**, Song said. The PLA operates new-generation weapons and equipment including the J-20 stealth fighter jets, the Type 055 large destroyers, the DF-17 hypersonic missiles and the PHL-191 modularized multiple rocket launcher systems, which are generations more advanced than weapons the US offered to the island of Taiwan. In an attempt to shift blame to the island of Taiwan, VOA also admitted that some of the island of **Taiwan's** systems are indeed outdated because the island "tends to **hold onto systems for a long time.**" **However, many of the weapons the US has sold to the island of Taiwan have yet to be delivered, according to media reports.** The VOA report first admitted that US weapons are more expensive than comparable weapons used by the PLA, then failed to mention that the **currently commissioned PLA weapons are more advanced than their US counterparts** that are **provided to** the island of Taiwan. **The VOA report is not persuasive at all in rebutting the report by the Global Times, analysts said.**

Jared M. **McKinney**, 02-12-20**24**, "Understanding the Deterrence Gap in the Taiwan Strait", War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/understanding-the-deterrence-gap-in-the-taiwan-strait/> // RB

In all, the combination of eroding constraints and **loosening restraints** is a toxic mix, implying that whatever might have been doing the heavy lifting **of dissuading China's leaders from invading Taiwan in the past is likely not operating today.** Given the high probability for major provocations relating to the Taiwan issue going forward, especially as Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party enters an unprecedented third presidential term in a row, and that fact that two **recent polls suggest** that **more than half of China's population already support armed unification**, the upshot is that the **Chinese leadership is becoming less likely to act with restraint compared to the past.**

The rest were analytics