#### **1AC --- Accidents**

#### **Contention One is ACCIDENTS**

## The Taiwan strait is <u>overcrowded</u> with <u>risky behavior</u> --- risk of <u>collisions and accidents</u> are <u>high</u>.

Buckley 23 [Chris Buckley, chief China correspondent @ NYT & Undergraduate in CCP History @ 北京的人民大學, 10-19-2023, China's Military Is Making Risky Moves and Adding Nuclear Warheads, U.S. Says, New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/asia/china-military-nuclear-weapons.html, Willie T.] China has been stepping up military pressure on Taiwan, sending jets, drones, bombers and other planes near the island. China's military has been taking increasingly dangerous actions to deter U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including maneuvers to intimidate American aircraft, while also bolstering its nuclear capabilities, the Pentagon said in a report released on Thursday. The United States has recorded more "coercive and risky" air intercepts by the Chinese military in the past two years than in the previous decade, the Defense Department said in its annual report to Congress on China's military might. At the same time, China is continuing to build up its strategic nuclear arsenal and had most likely amassed 500 nuclear warheads as of May, the Pentagon said, an increase of about 100 over last year's estimate. Risky Maneuvers Since the fall of 2021, the Pentagon report says, the United States has recorded more than 180 intercepts of U.S. aircraft by Chinese military forces in the region. Beijing has long bristled at the U.S. military aircraft and ships that operate in international skies and seas near China. China has been increasingly assertive in the region, from building military infrastructure in the disputed south China Sea to buzzing planes flown by the United States, Canada and other Western allies. Such moves risk a midair crash and a wider crisis. Examples cited in the report and a separate press statement from the Pentagon earlier this week included a Chinese fighter jet that sped toward a U.S. military plane, dipped under its nose and later came as close as 10 feet underneath it; a Chinese plane that flew within 20 feet of the nose of a U.S. plane, which took evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision; and a Chinese fighter jet that fired eight flares while only 900 feet from a U.S. plane. Beijing did not immediately comment on the Pentagon report. Chinese officials have previously depicted the air intercepts as reasonable responses to foreign military patrols that threatened the country's security. Taiwan Like his predecessors, China's leader, Xi Jinping, has said that he seeks a peaceful unification with Taiwan, but he has also said that he will not rule out the use of military force. But over the past year, China has been extending its campaign of military pressure on Taiwan, sending jets, drones, bombers and other planes farther and in greater numbers to expand its presence around the island. It has warned that it could impose a blockade to choke off Taiwan.

## De-escalation fails --- <u>lack of communication</u>, <u>preemption pressure</u> and <u>tech</u> ensures quick escalation <u>before dialogue</u>.

**Shugart 24** [Thomas Shugart, Former submarine warfare officer & senior fellow @ the Center for a New American Security, 5-1-2024, Uncrewed but Confident: Forging New Rules of the Road to Avoid Accidental Escalation, War on the Rocks,

https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/uncrewed-but-confident-forging-new-rules-of-the-road-for-drone-de-e-escalation/, Willie T.]

risks of Inadvertent Escalation In recent years, analysts of AI and autonomous military systems have discussed new risks associated with these tools, such as the **brittleness of algorithms**, the potential for arms racing, and the risk that militaries might put **too much trust** in AI-driven systems. Another cause for concern is that, while accidental or inadvertent escalation into open conflict is somewhat rare in the historical record, there are Several factors that put the United States and China at **higher** 

risk of such an event happening in the future. First, if an air or maritime incident occurs between China and the United States, there are likely to be quite different perceptions of among the parties as to what caused the incident. If the incident happened within china's "Nine Dash Line" or the Taiwan Strait, China may believe that it happened in "their" air or sea space, despite these areas' status as international waters. From the U.S. side, a challenge to freedom of navigation and overflight that goes unmet would be a betrayal of generations of American commitment to the concept, going back to the initial forging of the ethos of the U.S. Navy in the Barbary Wars of the early 19th century, Unlike when the United States and Soviet Union maintained Cold War-era military communication links that were useful for defusing an accident- or misperception-driven crisis, the United States and China have not been using similar links. And this is despite an increasing number of close encounters. U.S. efforts to restore these links have been frequently rebuffed, though there have been some recent signs of progress at the highest levels. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not necessarily see these links as tools whose utility may be at its greatest when bilateral relations are at their lowest. Instead, Chinese officials seems to perceive them as a reward to be given to the U.S. government for what they consider less hostile behavior and aim to dissuade U.S. military operations in China's neighborhood by deliberately raising the perception of risk. Perhaps the most important factor is a piling up of first-mover military advantages that may drive escalation ferociously if one side believes it has been attacked — or even is about to be attacked. Decades of war at sea in the missile age show that, even more so than in past eras of naval warfare, victory is likely to go the side that can attack effectively first. This is reinforced by history (and arithmetic) that shows that - given roughly equal technology and training — the larger navy almost always wins. The Chinese navy is — perhaps more so than any other major navy in the world — a missile-centered force. Further driving first-mover incentives, Chinese military doctrine writ large is focused on attacking suddenly to seize air and information dominance before an adversary like the United States can bring its other advantages to bear. For both sides, the incentives to quickly escalate by striking first could cause a crisis driven by accident and/or misunderstanding to spiral far more quickly than has been seen in previous international confrontations. This is on top of the even greater speed with which developments may unfold given the faster decision-making that may occur when conducted by Al systems — or due to their assistance to human decision-makers. Key Considerations for Confidence Considering the history of confidence-building measures, a few principles emerge that provide a useful framework for potential rules development. First, successful confidence-building agreements are rare and tough to get right. The process of negotiating such agreements can actually consume trust, and they are only as strong as the fundamental political will for compromise. There are numerous challenges to negotiating and implementing them, including the perceived cost of the measures — political, military, and otherwise — versus their likely benefits. Such challenges are particularly acute when the negotiating parties lack a shared understanding of the risks of conflict or its potential causes, and if asymmetries exist in military capability and investment. Challenges to implementation can include difficulty in maintaining the interest of parties, incomplete and vaguely drafted agreements, domestic political challenges, and deceptive or selective compliance with the agreements.

### Decreasing support solves --- it ends a cycle of military activity.

**Swaine 22** [Michael D. Swaine, 10-24-2022, Ending the Destructive Sino-U.S. Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft,

https://quincyinst.org/report/ending-the-destructive-sino-u-s-interaction-over-taiwan-a-call-for-mutual-reassurance/, Willie T.]

As shown in the recent Quincy Institute brief "Ending the Destructive Sino–American Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance,"

Washington and Beijing are engaged in a dangerous, interactive pattern of coercive

deterrence—centered behavior regarding Taiwan (and their larger bilateral relationship) that is increasing the chance of severe crises and even military conflict in the coming years. 2 And yet neither side recognizes this interactive dynamic, opting instead to blame one another for provoking the problem while admitting no fault of their own. Both countries must take responsibility for the worsening situation by combining credible deterrence with equally credible reassurance signals. 3 The latter should consist of concrete efforts to revitalize the U.S. One China policy on one side and the Chinese commitment to peaceful unification as a top priority on the other. Without such credible reassurance and restraint measures, ever greater levels of military deterrence will reinforce each party's worst—case assumptions. This will increase the risk of more crises and conflict. A

deterrence—dominated competition could shape an environment vulnerable to escalation, especially when both countries will almost certainly possess the capabilities and will to sustain an open-ended arms race. This is particularly the case because there is no evidence to suggest that any one side will acquire a breakthrough military technology capable of sustaining a near-permanent advantage in such a competition.4 However, even if attainable, no amount of superior U.S. (and Taiwanese) military capability will prove sufficient to deter Beijing from using force in the absence of accompanying, credible reassurances regarding Washington's continued fidelity to its long-standing One China policy. As indicated in the previous Quincy Institute Brief "Ending the Destructive Sino-U.S. Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance," Washington is already well on the way to hollowing out its One China policy. Beijing's response is to signal resolve by relying increasingly on its own forms of military deterrence, which in turn forces Washington to draw Taiwan ever closer in this vicious downward spiral, growing U.S. deterrent capabilities coupled with closer ties to Taiwan will simply reinforce the Chinese perception that Washington will ultimately discard its One China policy entirely and move to keep Taiwan permanently separate from mainland China.6 Such a policy would be intolerable to Beijing and would trigger direct military or other pressures intended to either reverse U.S. policy or resolve the issue outright, regardless of how much military power Washington might employ to deter Beijing. For China's leaders, the existential regime costs and national humiliation of accepting permanent separation from Taiwan by force would outweigh the risks of going to war. Even if it lost the war, Beijing would almost certainly continue to challenge the U.S. position to achieve its ends. This would result in a sustained high level of crisis, and probably even ongoing conflict.

#### Specifically, sea drones are coming to Taiwan

**Michaelson 24** [Katherine Michaelson, reporter @ VOA with a focus on East Asia, 7-25-2024, US, Taiwan, China race to improve military drone technology, Voice of America,

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-taiwan-china-race-to-improve-military-drone-technology/7713168.html ] BZ

Washington — This week, as Taiwan was preparing for the start of its Han Kuang military exercises, its air defense system detected a Chinese drone circling the island. This was the sixth time that China had sent a drone to operate around Taiwan since 2023. Drones like the one that flew around Taiwan, which are tasked with dual-pronged missions of reconnaissance and intimidation, are just a small part of a broader trend that is making headlines from Ukraine to the Middle East to the Taiwan Strait and is changing the face of warfare. The increasing role that unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, play and rising concern about a Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan is pushing Washington, Beijing and Taipei to improve the sophistication, adaptability and cost of drone technology. 'Hellscape' strategy Last August, the Pentagon launched a \$1 billion Replicator Initiative to create air, sea and land drones in the "multiple thousands," according to the Defense Department's Innovation Unit. The Pentagon aims to build that force of drones by August 2025. The initiative is part of what U.S. Admiral Samuel Paparo recently described to The Washington Post as a "hellscape" strategy, which aims to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan through the deployment of thousands of unmanned drones in the air and sea between the island and China. "The benefits of unmanned systems are that you get cheap, disposable mass that's low cost. If a drone gets shot down, the only people that are crying about it are the accountants," said Zachary Kallenborn, a policy fellow at George Mason University. "You can use them at large amounts of scale and overwhelm your opponents as well as degrade their defensive capabilities." The hellscape strategy, he added, aims to use lots of cheap drones to try to hold back China from attacking Taiwan.

## Independently, US UUVs create <u>use or lose pressure</u> on China's <u>2nd strike</u> --- guarantees <u>first strike</u>.

Johnson 20 [James S. Johnson, PhD in international relations from the University of Leicester, xx-xx-2020,

Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability, Air University, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14 Issue-1/Johnson.pdf] BZ Finally, in the maritime domain, unmanned underwater vessels (UVV), unmanned surface vessels (USV), and UAVs supported by AI-enabled intra-swarm communication and ISR systems could be deployed simultaneously in both offensive and defensive antisubmarine warfare operations to saturate an enemy's defenses and to locate, disable, and destroy its nuclear-armed or nonnuclear attack submarines. 64 Despite continued advances in sensor technology design (e.g., reduced size and extended detection ranges) to overcome quieting challenges, other technical challenges still remain. These include communicating underwater between multiple systems, processing power requirements, generating battery life and energy, and scaling the system.65 While some experts do not expect a technically reliable and effective capability of this kind will be operational for at least a decade, others are more optimistic.66 From a tactical perspective, drone swarms would not need ocean-wide coverage (or full ocean transparency) to effectively detect and track submarines. According to UK rear admiral John Gower, a relatively even spread of sensors might be sufficient to enable "a viable search and detection plan ... conceived for the open ocean" (emphasis added).67 Moreover, advances in mobile sensing platforms could enable drones in swarms to locate submarines through chokepoints (or gateways) as they emerge from ports. Due to the current slowness of drones with extended sea ranges, however, trailing them autonomously seems implausible.68 Future iterations of machine-learning-augmented UUVs and USVs may eventually complement, and perhaps replace entirely, the traditional role of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and manned surface vehicles in tracking and trailing submarines of adversaries at chokepoints while simultaneously mounting sparsely distributed and mobile distributed network systems (DNS) sensors on uuvs.69 If a state views the credibility of its survivable nuclear weapons (especially nuclear-armed submarines) <mark>to be at risk</mark>,70 conventional capabilities such as <mark>drone swarms will</mark> likely <mark>have a **destabilizing**</mark> effect at a strategic level.71 Thus, even if swarm sorties were not intended as (or indeed technically capable of ) a disarming first strike, the perception alone of the feasibility of such an operation would be destabilizing nonetheless. Moreover, the speed of AI could put the defender at a distinct disadvantage, creating additional incentives to strike first (or preemptively) technologically superior military rivals. Consequently, the less secure a nation considers its second-strike capabilities to be, the more likely it is to countenance the use of autonomous systems within its nuclear weapons complex to bolster the survivability of its strategic forces. According to analyst Paul Scharre, "winning in SWARM combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms" (emphasis added).72 Combining speed, persistence, scope, coordination, and battlefield mass, AWSs will offer states attractive asymmetric options to project military power within contested A2/AD **ZONES.** 73 Enhanced by sophisticated machine learning neural networks, China's manned and unmanned drone teaming operations could potentially impede future US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas.74 Its air- and sea-based drones linked to sophisticated neural networks could, for example, support the People's Liberation Army's manned and unmanned teaming operations. Were China to infuse its cruise missiles and hypersonic glide capabilities with Al and autonomy, close-range encounters in the Taiwan Straits and the East and South China Seas would become more complicated, accident- prone, and destabilizing—at both a conventional and nuclear level. 75 China is reportedly developing and deploying UUVs to bolster its underwater monitoring and antisubmarine capabilities as part of a broader goal to establish an "underwater Great Wall" to challenge US undersea military primacy. US AI-enhanced UUVs could, for example, theoretically threaten China's nuclear ballistic and nonnuclear attack submarines. 76 The deployment of new military technology in the nuclear domain, therefore, affects states differently depending on the relative strength of their strategic force structure. Thus, even if US UUVs were programmed only to threaten China's nonnuclear attack fleets, Chinese commanders might nonetheless fear that their country's nascent and relatively small—compared to US and Russian SSBN fleets—sea-based nuclear deterrent could be neutralized more easily. 77 Moreover, advances in machine learning

sensor technology for enabling more accurate detection of Chinese SSBNs would likely reinforce Beijing's concerns that it was being targeted by a militarily superior power—especially the United States. To test the veracity of this scenario, a better understanding of Chinese thinking on the utility of its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities—and how it could inform China's attitude to escalation risk—would be required. Perceived as a relatively low-risk force majeure with ambiguous rules of engagement, and absent a robust normative and legal framework, autonomous weapons will likely become an increasingly attractive asymmetric to erode a militarily superior adversary's deterrence and resolve.78 In sum, notwithstanding the remaining technical challenges (especially the demand for power), swarms of robotic systems fused with AI machine learning techniques may presage a powerful interplay of increased range, accuracy, mass, coordination, intelligence, and speed in a future conflict.79

#### 50 nukes are existential.

**Cribb 19** [Julian Cribb, Emeritus Faculty @ The Australian National University & Fellow @ the Australian Academy of Technology, Science and Engineering, August 2019, Food or War, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/food-or-war/2D6F728A71C0BFEA0CEC85897066DCAF, Willie T.]

Because of the long, cryptic, industrial and international trade chains which hide it, most of us are unaware of the vast damage we do to the planet through our simple habit of shopping. Yes, some of us have a notion that some of our purchases may be bad for gorillas in the Congo, orangutans in Borneo or flamingos in the Atacama - but we mostly have no true appreciation of the wider havoc we inflict on the Earth and its natural systems by the 'innocent' act of consumption, which business and governments try constantly to convince us is essential to 'growth and jobs'. It should therefore come as no surprise that the world finds itself increasingly short of key resources like fresh water, soil, phosphorus, timber and certain minerals - and that these shortages are giving rise to tensions and even to conflicts. Indeed, resource scarcity has for some time been considered by strategic experts to be one of the most likely causes of war in the twentyfirst century.10 However, people are not equally responsible for the devastation of Planet Earth. The diagram below (Figure 6.1), from Oxfam, illustrates how just one tenth of humanity consumes five times as much in the way of material resources (expressed here in the form of their carbon footprint) as the poorest half of the world population. The affluent are chiefly responsible for the destruction taking place on a global scale as they seek to sustain lifestyles that the planet can no longer afford or support. The significance of this blind spot around consumption for global food security is very great. As described in earlier chapters, the world food system depends critically on soil, water, nutrients and a stable climate, to supply humanity's daily need for nutriment – and all of these essential resources are in increasingly short supply, chiefly because of our own mismanagement of them and our collective failure to appreciate that they are finite. On current trends, the existing food system will tend to break down, first regionally and then globally, owing to resource scarcity from the 2020s onward, and especially towards the mid century – unless there is radical change in the world diet and the means by which we feed ourselves. This will lead to increasing outbreaks of violence and war. Nobody, neither rich nor poor, will escape the consequences. Weapons of Mass Destruction Detonating just 50-100 out of the global arsenal of nearly 15,000 nuclear weapon<mark>s would</mark> suffice to end civilisation in a nuclear winter, causing worldwide famine and economic collapse affecting even distant nations, as we saw in the previous chapter in the section dealing with South Asia. Eight nations now have the power to terminate civilisation should they desire to do so - and two have the power to extinguish the human species. According to the nuclear monitoring group Ploughshares, this arsenal is distributed as follows: – Russia, 6600 warheads (2500 classified as 'retired') - America, 6450 warheads (2550 classified as 'retired') - France, 300 warheads - China, 270 warheads - UK, 215 warheads - Pakistan, 130 warheads - India, 120 warheads - Israel, 80 warheads - North Korea, 15-20 warheads.11 Although actual numbers of warheads have continued to fall from its peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid 1980s, scientists argue the danger of nuclear conflict in fact increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. This was due to the modernisation of existing stockpiles, the adoption of dangerous new technologies such as robot delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence and electronic warfare, and the continuing leakage of nuclear materials and knowhow to nonnuclear nations and potential terrorist organisations. In early 2018 the hands of the 'Doomsday Clock', maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, were re-set at two minutes to midnight, the highest risk to humanity that it has ever shown since the clock was introduced in 1953. This was due not only to the state of the world's nuclear arsenal, but also to irresponsible language by world leaders, the growing use of social media to destabilise rival regimes, and to the rising threat of uncontrolled climate change (see below).12 In an historic moment on 17 July 2017, 122 nations voted in the UN for the first time ever in favour of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons. This called for comprehensive prohibition of "a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons."13 However, 71 other countries - including all the nuclear states - either opposed the ban, abstained or declined to vote. The Treaty vote was nonetheless interpreted by some as a promising first step towards abolishing the nuclear nightmare that hangs over the entire human species. In contrast, 192 countries had signed up to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the use of

chemical weapons, and 180 to the Biological Weapons Convention. As of 2018, 96 per cent of previous world stocks of chemical weapons had been destroyed - but their continued use in the Syrian conflict and in alleged assassination attempts by Russia indicated the world remains at risk.14 As things stand, the only entities that can afford to own nuclear weapons are nations – and if humanity is to be wiped out, it will most likely be as a result of an atomic conflict between nations. It follows from this that, if the world is to be made safe from such a fate it will need to get rid of nations as a structure of human self-organisation and replace them with wiser, less aggressive forms of self-governance. After all, the nation state really only began in the early nineteenth century and is by no means a permanent feature of self-governance, any more than monarchies, feudal systems or priest states. Although many people still tend to assume it is. Between them, nations have butchered more than 200 million people in the past 150 years and it is increasingly clear the world would be a far safer, more peaceable place without either nations or nationalism. The question is what to replace them with. Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twentyfirst century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying. It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored. That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated 'it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming'. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited. A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the 'Doomsday Clock' so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species. Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9). Climate Change The effects of food and war on climate change as it is presently predicted to occur were described in Chapter 3: in brief, the stable climate in which agriculture arose over the past 6000 years is now becoming increasingly unstable as a result of the billions of tonnes of carbon that humans are injecting into the atmosphere and oceans, forming a colossal heat engine to drive more frequent, violent weather. This in turn impairs food production in regions of the world already facing severe stresses from population growth and resource depletion. Military analysts describe climate change as a 'threat multiplier', augmenting the tensions, conflict and instability which already exist. In reality it is a feedback loop, in which worsening climate conditions cause greater food insecurity, which is met by measures (like increased land clearing and use of fossil fuels and chemicals), which in turn worsen climate conditions, which worsen food security, which cause wars, which inflict more eco-damage... Two degrees (2 C) of global warming – described as the danger point for humanity – are predicted to occur well before 2050 because of our collective failure to curb our carbon emissions.16 Those 2 C of warming portend bad things for any food system that depends on the weather - but just how bad cannot easily be forecast as both the climate state and the response of the global food system are governed by human behaviour, which is fairly unpredictable. Current estimates suggest crop losses of the order of 20–50 per cent at the very time we are trying to raise food output by 50–70 per cent. What can be confidently predicted, however, is that there will be an increase in both the frequency and scale of harvest failures and agricultural disease outbreaks around the world as we approach the mid century – and that beyond 2 C of warming it will become very hard indeed to maintain a stable outdoors, agriculture-based system to meet an anticipated doubling in world demand for food by the 2060s. The 'worst case' risk of this, as previously outlined, would be ten billion people having to subsist on enough food to feed only four billion. That, however, is by no means the worst case of the climate story. There are ominous signs that humans have already unleashed planetary forces over which we have absolutely no control – and that these, should they become large enough, will take charge of the Earth's climate engine and drive it into a superheated condition of +9-10 C or even higher. Today, more people are aware that global warming may lead to complete melting of all glaciers and the polar ice-caps, thereby raising sea levels by 65 metres and inundating almost all of the world's seaboard cities, fertile river deltas and coastal plains, 17 This would clearly have a devastating effect on coastal food production. However, this process will probably take several centuries, allowing populations ample time to relocate inland. That sea levels previously rose by a similar quantum at the end of the last Ice Age, flooding part of Australia, severing Britain from Europe and America from Asia, is proof enough that such events occur as a regular part of the Earth's warming and chilling cycles. The great existential threat to humanity lies in vast stores of frozen methane gas (CH4) locked into the soils of the tundra regions of Canada and Siberia, in colossal deposits of frozen methane on the continental seabed surrounding the Arctic Ocean, and in massive stores of methane submerged in peat deposits and swamps in places such as the Amazon and the wet tropical forests of Southeast Asia and Africa. Methane is a gas with 20–70 times the climate-forcing power of carbon dioxide. These deposits are the accumulation of the slow decomposition of planet and animal matter in the Earth's sediments over several hundred million years – they are identical in origin to the gas bubbles that surface when we stir the bed of a pond or lake. The actual volume of these methane deposits is still being assessed by science. Recent estimates suggest: • seabed deposits - between 500-2500 billion tonnes of frozen carbon; 18 • tundra deposits - potentially emitting 180-420 million tonnes of carbon a year by 2100; and • tropical peat swamps – could emit 480–870 million tonnes of carbon a year by 2100.19 That carbon released from peat swamps, tundra and possibly the oceans can have a catastrophic effect on the Earth's climate is foreshadowed by an even known as the Palaeocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), which took place some 55 million years ago, when Earth took a sudden fever and its temperature rocketed upwards by +5–9 C. This 'heat spike' caused a lesse extinction event involving widespread loss of ocean life and a smaller toll of land animals.20 However, the heating occurred over a much longer period – 100–200,000 years, compared with human-driven heating (50–100 years) – and is thought to have been mainly caused by the drying out and burning of tropical peat swamps as the climate warmed. However, the volume of carbon which caused this sharp planetary heat spike in the past is estimated to be barely a tenth of that released by humanity today.21 Today, human activity in clearing rainforests, draining swamps and burning the world's forests to open them up for farming and food production is releasing vast amounts of methane and CO2. Explosion craters have been reported across Canada and Siberia as frozen methane deposits well up and erupt with the melting of the tundra. And scientists from Sweden, Russia, Canada and America have reported methane bubbling from the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, though not yet in massive volumes. The risk in all this is that, by warming the planet by only 1-2 C, we have set in train natural processes that we are powerless to control, setting ourselves on an inescapable trajectory to a Hothouse Earth, 5–10 C or more above today's levels. Although it is hard to estimate, some scientists are of the view that fewer than one billion humans would survive such an event22 - in other words, nine people out of every ten may perish in the cycle of famines, wars, heatwaves and pandemic diseases which global overheating would entail. This underlies the deadly urgency of ceasing to burn all fossil fuels, locking up as much carbon as possible and re-stabilising the Earth's climate. In that, food production can and will play a central role. Poisoned Planet 'Earth, and all life on it, are being saturated with man-made chemicals in an event unlike anything which has occurred in all four billion years of our planet's story. Each moment of our lives, from conception unto death, we are exposed to thousands of substances, some deadly in even tiny doses and most of them unknown in their effects on our health and wellbeing or upon the natural world. These enter our bodies with every breath, each meal or drink, the clothes we wear, the products with which we adorn ourselves, our homes, workplaces, cars and furniture, the things we encounter every day. There is no escaping them. Ours is a poisoned planet, its whole system infused with the substances humans deliberately or inadvertently produce in the course of extracting, making, using, burning or discarding the many marvellous products on which modern life depends. This explosion in chemical use and release has all happened so rapidly that most people are blissfully unaware of its true magnitude and extent, or of the dangers it now poses to us all as well as to future generations for centuries to come.' This is a summation of the chemical crisis facing all of humanity, as well as all life on Earth, which I wrote in Surviving the 21st Century, and which is based on the extensive scientific research reported in Poisoned Planet. 23 It is a crisis with profound impact for everyone. According to the medical journal The Lancet, nine million people – one in six – die every year from chemical pollution of their air, water, food and living environment. 24 A further 40 million die from the so-called noncommunicable or 'lifestyle' diseases (NCDs), cancer, heart disease diabetes and lung disease, which are mostly diet-related.25 Food production, as we have seen, is deeply implicated in the chemical deluge. However, it is also an existential threat to human health, both in terms of infectious disease and the new 'lifestyle' diseases. No-one to my knowledge has compiled an accurate assessment of the total chemical effusion of humanity or presented a realistic impression of its true scale. Box 6.1 represents my own bes estimate, drawn from various reliable sources. From this it can easily be seen that the scale of humanity's chemical assault on ourselves and on the planet is many times the scale of our climate assault – yet this issue commands nowhere near the political or scientific priority that it should. It is arguably the most under-rated, under-investigated and poorly understood of all the existential threats to humanity. The poisoning of the Earth by human activities has grave implications for the health and safety of the global food chain and its eight billion consumers. It is not only the use of chemicals in food production that is of concern, but also the contamination of water, soils and livestock by industrial pollutants from other sources, such as mining or manufacturing. It is also the disruption of vital services such as pollination by insects of a third of the world's food crops and 90 per cent of wild plants.26 It is the contamination of up to three quarters of the world fish catch with microscopic plastic particles and clothing microfibres made by the petrochemical industry.27 The ending of this flood of poisons is a prerequisite for a safe, healthy and sustainable global food supply in future. And, since government regulation has largely failed to stem the worldwide flood, the task now falls to consumers – to choose foods which have been produced by safe methods and shun

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foods produced by unsafe methods. That is the only way that the food industry can be encouraged (and penalised) into doing the right thing by humanity and the planet; by consumers rewarding it for producing clean food and
punishing it for toxic food. Otherwise it will continue to pollute as profitably as it can. It follows that the urgent global education of consumers about which foods are safe and which are
toxic is also a pre-requisite. Food Security Our demand for food is set to double by the 2060s - potentially the decade of 'peak people', the
moment in history when the irresistible human population surge may top out at around 10 billion. However, as we have seen, many of the
resources needed to supply it agriculturally could halve and the climate for the growing of food outdoors become far more hostile. Why food
insecurity is an existential threat to humanity should, by now, be abundantly clear from the earlier chapters of this book:
present systems are unsustainable and, as they fail, will pose risks both to civilization and, should these
spiral into nuclear conflict, to the future of the human species. The important thing to note in this chapter is that
food insecurity plays into many, if not all, of the other existential threats facing humanity. The food
sector's role in extinction, resource scarcity, global toxicity and potential nuclear war has already been
explained. Its role in the suppression of conflict is discussed in the next chapter. Its role in securing the future of
the megacities, and of a largely urbanised humanity, is covered in Chapter 8. And its role in sustaining humanity
through the peak in population and into a sustainable world beyond is covered in Chapter 9. Food clearly has a
pivotal role in the future of human population – both as a driver of population growth when supplies are abundant and as a
potential driver of population decline, should food chains collapse. It is no exaggeration to state that the
fate of civilisation depends on it. Pandemic Disease Disease pandemics have been a well-known existential
risk to humanity since the plague of Athens in 430 BC – itself linked to a war. However, a point that escapes many people
nowadays is that, as humans have become so numerous – indeed the predominant lifeform on the planet – we have also
become the major food source for many microbes. We are now the 'living compost heap' on which they
must dine and in which they must reproduce, if they are themselves to survive. As our own population grows, pandemics
are thus likely to increase, as more and more viruses and bacteria are forced to take refuge in humans following the depletion or total
extinction of their natural hosts, the wild animals we are exterminating. This process is greatly assisted by our creation of megacities, tourism
and air travel, schools and child-minding centres, air-conditioned offices, night clubs, sex with strangers, pet and pest animals, insects which
prosper from climate change or human modification of the environment (like mosquitoes), ignorance, poor public hygiene, lack of clean water,
and deficient food processing and handling. So, while humanity is confronted with an ever-expanding array of
parasites, we are simultaneously doing everything in our power to distribute them worldwide in record
time - and to seed new pandemics. The World Health Organisation has identified 19 major infectious diseases
with potential to become pandemic: chikungunya, cholera, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola, Hendra, influenza, Lassa
fever, Marburg virus, meningitis, MERS-CoV, monkeypox, Nipah, plague, Rift Valley fever, SARS, smallpox, tularaemia, yellow fever and Zika virus
disease.28 While none of these is likely to fulfil the Hollywood horror movie image of wiping out the human species - for the simple reason that
viruses are usually smart enough to weaken to a sublethal state once comfortably ensconced in their new host – the apocalyptic
horseman representing Pestilence and Death will nevertheless continue to play a synergetic role with his
companions warfare, famine, climate change, global poisoning, ecological collapse, urbanisation and other existential threats.
Food insecurity affects the progression of pandemic diseases, often in ways that are not entirely obvious. First, new
pandemics of infectious disease tend to originate in developing regions where nutritional levels are poor or agricultural
practices favour the evolution of novel pathogens such as, for example, the new flu strains seen every year – which arise mainly from places
where people, pigs and poultry live side-by-side and shuffle viruses between them – and also novel diseases like SARS and MERS. Second,
because totally unknown diseases tend to arise first in places where rainforests are being cut down for farming and viruses hitherto confined to
wild animals and birds make an enforced transition into humans. Examples of novel human diseases escaping from the rainforest and tropical
savannah in recent times include HIV/AIDS, Hendra, Nipah, Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Hanta, Lujo, Junin, Machupo, Rift Valley, Congo and
Zika.29 And thirdly, because the loss of vital micronutrients from heavily farmed soils and from food itself predisposes many populations to
various deficiency diseases - for example, a lack of selenium in the diet has been linked with increased risk from both HIV/AIDS and bowel
cancer.30 A key synergy is the way hunger and malnourishment exacerbate the spread of disease, classic examples being
the 1918 Global Flu Pandemic which spread rapidly among war-starved populations, or the more recent cholera
outbreak in war-torn Yemen. In a fresh twist, Dr Melinda Beck of North Carolina University has demonstrated that obesity – itself a form of
malnutrition - may cause increased deaths from influenza by both aiding the virus and suppressing the patient's immune response.31
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### 1AC --- North Korea

#### **Contention Three is NORTH KOREA**

#### NoKo Nuclear testing is at its brink with potential for unprecedented escalation.

**JoonAng 11/23** [No Author, 11-23-2024, North Korea is prepared for seventh nuke test, awaits 'only a political decision': U.S. official, Korea JoonAng Daily,

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-23/national/northKorea/North-Korea-is-prepared-for-7th-nuke-test-awaits-only-a-political-decision-US-official/2184509]

The United States believes that North Korea is prepared for a possible seventh nuclear test while awaiting 'only a political decision" to go ahead, a senior U.S. official said Friday, warning another nuclear experiment would mark a "grave" escalation of regional tensions. Alexandra Bell, deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence and stability, made the remarks, reiterating America's "ironclad" security commitment to South Korea and its denuclearization objective for the Korean Peninsula. "The United States assesses that the DPRK has prepared its Punggye-ri test site for its potential seventh explosive nuclear test, awaiting only a political decision to move ahead," Bell said during a forum hosted by The Korea Society. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. "Such a test would constitute a grave escalation of tensions in the region and present a security risk to the entire world," she added. Bell criticized Pyongyang's weapons tests this year, including that of a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), as a violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. "Each missile launch (and) each nuclear saber-rattling speech is an indication that the DPRK is determined to advance its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, underscoring the clear need to further grow and adapt our alliance with the ROK to better prepare to defend against potential attacks, including nuclear employment," she said, referring to South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea. "It goes without saying that the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea remains ironclad and our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." She also reiterated the allies' warning to Pyongyang that any nuclear weapons attack by the North against the South will be met with a "swift, overwhelming and decisive" response. Bell underscored "remarkable progress" in the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the allies' key nuclear deterrence body launched last year as part of joint efforts to strengthen "extended deterrence," America's commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear arms, to defend its Asian ally. A fourth NCG session will take place in Washington in early December, according to her. Bell represents the State Department at the NCG. "In fact, the NCG's tremendous progress has been commended and endorsed by Presidents Yoon and Biden, including the completion of the U.S.-ROK guidelines for nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations on the Korean Peninsula," she said. At the forum, South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Cho Hyun-dong also mentioned the North's readiness to carry out another nuclear test, as he pointed out that the situation in East Asia remains a "tinderbox," with Pyongyang's "untethered" aggressiveness having the potential for "incitement at any time." "In the case of North Korea, their antagonistic stance shows no sign of abating," he said. "Beyond their traditional provocation and the recent release of multiple trash-filled balloons across the DMZ, they launched an ICBM merely days before the U.S. election -- a strategic provocation that, though not unexpected, signals the likelihood that they are ready to conduct another nuclear test anytime." Noting the presidential transition in Washington, he expressed confidence for the future of the Seoul-Washington alliance. "It is clear that even with the expected changes, our alliance will remain strong and continue to thrive," he said.

#### This would be the first test under Yoon.

**Kyodo 11/23** [Kyodo News, 11-23-2024, U.S. says North Korea ready for nuclear test, awaits political go-ahead, Kyodo News,

https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/11/a25c08014ea0-us-says-n-korea-ready-for-nuclear-test-aw aits-political-go-ahead.html] Shah

In the days leading up to the Nov. 5 election, North Korea test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in almost a year. The ICBM, which North Korea calls its new Hwasong-19, flew for about 85 minutes, the longest duration registered yet in any such test by Pyongyang. In addition to the ICBM, North Korea

test-fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles just ahead of the election. Since Trump emerged as the decisive winner over Vice President Kamala Harris, however, North Korea has halted its saber-rattling. The president-elect has said he plans to "get along" with the country's leader Kim Jong Un as he sought to do in his first term. North Korea sprevious nuclear test, conducted in September 2017, was by far its most powerful ever. It took place in the first year of Trump's presidency, before he and Kim held the inaugural summit between U.S. and North Korean leaders in Singapore in June the following year.

### Current containment efforts fail --- China's slacking off.

**Suderman 22** [Alan Suderman, Associated Press investigative reporter focusing on national security and cybersecurity, 3-24-2022, China supported sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program. It's also behind their failure, AP News,

https://apnews.com/article/china-north-korea-sanctions-6e69cd6c0c17fba261f62ea8e5bc25c5, Willie T.]

WASHINGTON (AP) — Chinese middlemen launder the proceeds of North Korean hackers' cyber heists while Chinese ships deliver sanctioned North Korean goods to Chinese ports. Chinese companies help North Koreans workers — from cheap laborers to well-paid IT specialists — find work abroad. A Beijing art gallery even boasts of North Korean artists working 12-hour days in its heavily surveilled compound, churning out paintings of idyllic visions of life under communism that each sell for thousands of dollars. That's all part of what international authorities say is a growing mountain of evidence that shows Beijing is helping cash-strapped North Korea evade a broad range of international sanctions designed to hamper Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, according to an Associated Press review of United Nations reports, court records and interviews with experts. "It's overwhelming," Aaron Arnold, a former member of a U.N. panel on North Korea and a sanctions expert at the Royal United Services Institute, said of the links between China and sanctions evasion. "At this point, it's very hard to say it's not intentional." China has had a complicated relationship with Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Though uneasy with a nuclear menace at its doorstep, China doesn't want its neighbor's government to collapse, experts say. China views North Korea as a buffer against the U.S., which maintains a significant troop presence in South Korea. Beijing has long maintained it enforces the sanctions it has supported since North Korea started testing nuclear weapons and forcefully pushed back on any suggestions to the contrary. "China has been fully and strictly implementing the (U.N. Security Council) resolutions," a Chinese ambassador said in a recent letter to the U.N, adding that his country had "sustained great losses" in doing so. But in recent years, Beijing has sought to weaken those very sanctions and last year vetoed new restrictions on Pyongyang after it conducted a nuclear test. This summer a top ruling Chinese party official provided a vivid example of China's ambiguity on sanctions as he stood clapping next to North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un during a Pyongyang military parade. Rolling past the two men were trucks carrying nuclear-capable missiles and other weapons the regime isn't supposed to have. They were joined by Russia's defense minister, apparently part of a new effort by the Kremlin, struggling in its invasion of Ukraine, to strength ties with North Korea. The U.S. has accused North Korea of supplying artillery shells and rockets to Russia, while new evidence shows Hamas fighters likely fired North Korean weapons during their Oct. 7 assault on Israel. But while Russia and a handful of other countries have been accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions, none has been as prolific as China, according to court records and international reports. "China violates North Korea sanctions it voted for and says won't work because it's afraid they'll work. And, also, says it isn't violating them" said Joshua Stanton, a human rights advocate and attorney who has helped write U.S. sanction laws against North Korea. A review by the AP found a majority of the people placed on the U.S. government's sanctions list related to North Korea in recent years have ties to China. Many are North Koreans working for alleged Chinese front companies while others are Chinese citizens who U.S. authorities say launder money or procure weapons material for North Korea. North Korea has said the U.S.-led sanctions against it are stifling its economy, calling them proof of U.S. hostility against the country. Besides sanctions, U.S. criminal prosecutions against individuals or entities assisting North Korea's regime often have links to China. That's especially true for cases related to North Korea's sophisticated hackers, who experts believe have stolen upwards of \$3 billion in digital currency in recent years. That windfall has coincided with the speedy growth of the country's missile and weapons program. An indictment filed earlier this year alleges that a Chinese middleman helped launder cryptocurrency stolen by the regime's top hackers into U.S. dollars. And a similar case was filed in 2020 that accused two Chinese brokers of laundering more than \$100 million in digital currencies stolen by North Korea. Such "over-the-counter" brokers allow North Korean hackers to bypass know-your-customer rules governing banks and other financial exchanges. North Korea depends heavily on China's financial

gain access to the global financial system, records show. "The (Chinese) banks are less rigorous because the Chinese government is not pushing them," said former top U.S. Treasury official Anthony Ruggiero. North Korea imported more than \$250,000 worth of aluminum oxide, which can be used in processing nuclear weapons fuel, from a Chinese company in 2015, according to customs records cited in a think tank report. U.S. prosecutors have alleged the same company accounted for a significant share of overall trade between North Korea and China; its customers included the Chinese government's Ministry of Commerce, which was bidding on North Korean projects. Images from North Korean military parades have shown the regime's nuclear missiles being transported on launchers made with Chinese heavy-duty truck chassis. China told the U.N. panel of experts that North Korea had promised it would use the trucks to move timber. China regularly ignores reams of satellite photos and vessel tracking data compiled by a U.N. panel of experts showing Chinese-flagged vessels docking with North Korean ships and transferring goods. North Korean ships are banned by U.N. sanctions from participating in ship-to-ship transfers, which are often done to obscure the flow of sanctioned goods like coal exports and oil imports.

## US-China cooperation solves. NoKo <u>relies on China</u>, BUT <u>concessions on Taiwan</u> are key --- it's a <u>bargaining chip</u>.

**Hiim 18** [Henrik Stålhane Hiim, Associate Professor @ the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies & PhD in Political Science from Oslo University, 2018, Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Asian Security,

https://sci-hub.ru/10.1080/14799855.2017.1351951, Willie T.]

Chinese analysts acknowledge that Beijing has used the Iran nuclear issue as a card against the US. However, they also point out that playing the Iran card has risks and has to be done with caution, as maintaining positive relations with the United States is ultimately more important than protecting Iran.64 Nevertheless, although applied selectively, there is little doubt that the Iran nuclear issue has provided China with a source of leverage over the United States. North Korea: A less credible card The North Korean nuclear conundrum is another proliferation concern where the United States is dependent on Chinese help. In fact, China's impact on the North Korean nuclear issue is even greater than its influence on the Iran program. Beijing has closer political ties to the hermit kingdom than any other state, and its trade and aid keep the regime's moribund economy afloat. Efforts at sanctioning the regime are therefore ineffective without Chinese support. From the very onset of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China has attempted to use this influence to gain bargaining leverage with the United States. At an early stage, Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo hinted to US officials that a change in Chinese policy on North Korea should be compensated by a change in US Taiwan policy.65 At times when the relationship faced setbacks, China has hinted that US policies that harm its interests may lead to a reduction in Chinese cooperation on North Korea. For example, during a meeting with Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control John Rood in June 2008, Chinese officials made the linkage very clear, with Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei remarking that strategic cooperation required respect for core interests like Taiwan, and that such respect would ensure cooperation on North Korea and Iran.66 However, unlike the Iran case, in which China has actually retaliated by curtailing cooperation on several occasions, Chinese leaders have been much more circumspect on North Korea. The reason for this is simple: Chinese threats are not fully credible. Preventing North Korea from launching provocations and keeping negotiations going are as much, if not more, in China's interest as in the US interest. North Korean provocations have contributed to several developments that are unfavorable to China, such as Japanese–US missile defense cooperation, the bolstering of US alliances to South Korea and Japan, and a greater willingness in Japan to strengthen its military.67 Thus, by halting cooperation on North Korea, Beijing would potentially risk worsening its own security climate. This makes North Korea less useful than Iran as a bargaining chip. Despite this, there are aspects of policy towards North Korea that China has been able to utilize with greater credibility. Most importantly, China appears to use North Korea's exports of missilerelated goods and technology, particularly to Iran, as an issue through which it can obtain leverage. Chinese ports have been used as transshipment ports for much of this traffic: for example, flights carrying missile parts and technology from North Korea to Iran have frequently landed at Beijing airport. Evidence suggests that China turned a blind eye to these transfers, as it was made aware of them at numerous occasions without acting.68 In 2008, US leaders became so frustrated that they reached out to several other countries, asking them to "convince" China to do more to stop this trade.69 Yet the trade continued into at least 2011.70 The fact that the trade continued for years indicates that Chinese leaders at least did not

give stopping it sufficient priority. One reason for the lack of Chinese action is maintaining leverage with the United States. China is aware that preventing proliferation from North Korea to other states is of crucial importance to the US and therefore expects concessions for its cooperation. As the International Crisis Group argues, China tends to see North Korean proliferation as an aspect of the US—China relationship, and believes that its cooperation should draw a price.71

#### Military support is a sticking point

**Thomas 24** [Richard Thomas, editor-in-chief for defense and transport @ GlobalData, 7-17-2024, US-China crisis as Beijing suspends arms control talks over Taiwan weapons sales, Army Technology, https://www.army-technology.com/news/us-china-crisis-as-beijing-suspends-arms-control-talks-over-taiwan-weapons-sales/, Willie T.]

Tensions between China and the US have escalated since the turn of the year over weapons sales to Taiwan. China has suspended talks with the United States on arms control and non-proliferation consultations, with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs blaming Washington for continuing to engage in defence sales to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a rogue province. In an article published on the website of China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) on 17 July, citing state-run news outlet CGTN, it was revealed that China had "decided to suspend talks with the United States" on holding a new round of consultations over arms control and non-proliferation. The responsibility for the suspension "lies squarely on the US side", said Lin Jian, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to the MND article.

### Chinese sanctions <u>empirically work</u> as a <u>carrot</u> for Kim to scale down nuclearization.

**Jiang 19** [Yang Jiang, Senior Researcher @ the DIIS specializing in the contemporary political economy of China 2-22-2019, Sanctions are an important tool in China's North Korea diplomacy, Danish Institute for International Studies,

https://www.diis.dk/en/research/sanctions-are-an-important-tool-in-chinas-north-korea-diplomacy, Willie T.]

It is widely believed that China holds the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue because China is North Korea's biggest economic benefactor, accounting for around 90% of the latter's trade, and being the main aid provider and investor. Many American and Japanese politicians and analyzers do not believe that China is genuinely pursuing denuclearization in North Korea and is not willing to pull North Korea's lifeline. However, an examination of China's use of economic sanctions against North Korea shows that it is indeed very sensitive about North Korea's nuclear program, having imposed economic sanctions on North Korea each time the latter has conducted a nuclear test. Moreover, China's pressure on North Korea through sanctions, though so far not comprehensive or devastating to North Korea's economy, seems to have worked to change the behavior of the regime in Pyongvang in some instances, with the imposition of sanctions being followed by North Korea returning to the negotiating table. Recently, China has reportedly followed a strategy of gradually lifting sanctions, in particular since the first summit between North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump in June 2018. China's aim is to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and carry out economic reform under Beijing's mentorship. Sanctions against North Korea have also become a tool for Beijing to negotiate with the US on trade and other broader issues and to enhance its international position more generally. Adopting a new sanctions policy China is sensitive to North Korea's nuclear tests, as they provoke Beijing to carry out unilateral or collective UN-authorized sanctions. Prior to the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea in 2006, China opposed economic sanctions, arguing that they were not an effective way of resolving conflicts and might produce catastrophic results. However, in 2006 China began to change its policies. After North Korea tested its conventional missiles in July 2006, China followed the US' campaign by freezing North Korea-related assets at the Macau branch of the Bank of China in August of that year. This was the first time that China had imposed explicit economic sanctions on North Korea. China has recently advocated gradually lifting sanctions to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons After North Korea's first nuclear test in October, China approved UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and conducted intensive mediation between North Korea and the US, which led at the end of the year to the return of North Korea to the Six Party talks— since 2003 the main China-sponsored forum for negotiating the North Korea nuclear issue. In 2009, after North Korea tried to launch a satellite (in preparation for launching long-range missiles) and conducted a second nuclear test, China stopped oil exports to North Korea for four months, as well as endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 1874. In response to UN condemnation of its satellite trial, North Korea announced it was permanently pulling out of the Six-Party talks. After North Korea carried out a long-range rocket launch in December 2012 and its third nuclear test in February 2013, China endorsed two new sets of UN Security Council sanctions. The newly installed Chinese president Xi Jinping said that 'no country should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains'. Beijing is seeking to retain its leverage over Pyongyang and its seat at the North Korea nuclear talks. Sanctions have also become a tool for Beijing to negotiate with the US on trade and to enhance its international position more generally Pressuring North Korea to return to the table Beyond UN sanctions, China unilaterally stopped exports of oil to North Korea in February, June and July 2013, citing technical problems. The Bank of China also halted all business with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank beyond the list of institutions targeted by UNSC sanctions. These measures were followed by a conference chaired by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, in Beijing with the aim of re-launching the Six-Party talks. North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator, Kim Kve-gwan, subsequently stated that North Korea was willing to return to the negotiating table without preconditions. China was shocked when the young North Korean leader Kim Jong-un executed his uncle Jang Song-thaek in December 2013, as he had been a major conduit between Beijing and Pyongyang. In response, China stopped exports of crude oil to North Korea for five months in the first half of 2014. China also reduced food aid, halted investment in the special economic zones on the border, and started restricting work visas for North Koreans. In January 2014, China's official news agency Xinhua said on Twitter that North Korea had agreed to a resumption of the Six-Party talks, although ultimately nothing came of this. Assassination triggering more restrictions After North Korea's fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016, China endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 2270 and 2321, which sought to limit North Korea's coal exports. But it was the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother Kim Jong-nam in February 2017 that induced China to take a significant step in suspending coal imports from North Korea for the rest of the year. Chinese state-owned commercial banks also restricted the financial activities of North Korean individuals and businesses in mid-2017. After North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China moved to explicitly impose limitations on the supply of oil in October of that year in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2375. Although this fell short of being a complete ban on oil exports to North Korea, it led to soaring petrol prices in the country. Combined with restrictions on coal, textiles, agri-cultural and other imports from North Korea, the latter's many economic activities came to a halt, and its foreign currency reserves dropped sharply. North Korea responds to the Chinese approach The Summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump in June 2018 can be seen as the culmination of a combined strategy of US military threats and President Trump's openness to meeting Kim, coupled with harsh sanctions, including those imposed by China, and the mediation efforts of the South Korean president, Moon Jae-in. The three meetings in March, May and June 2018 between the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jong-un show that China supports the approach of gradually lifting sanctions to induce Pyongyang to denuclearize, as well as this being a card to negotiate trade with the US and to enhance China's international position overall. Although North Korea announced a unilateral halt to nuclear and missile tests in April, Kim later asked for the gradual lifting of sanctions in return for North Korea reducing its nuclear facilities, an example of the reciprocal approach that China has advocated. According to Dan De Luce and Ken Dilanian of NBC News, China has relaxed its sanctions against North Korea since the first meeting between Kim and Trump was announced in March 2018. This can be under-stood as a move by Beijing to retain its leverage over Pyongyang and its seat in the North Korea nuclear talks. This also serves as a bargaining chip in China's trade war with the US.

#### NoKo provocations risk escalation cycles and war.

Mackenzie 23 [Jean Mackenzie, Seoul correspondent @ BBC News, 1-3-2023, "North Korea: What we can expect from Kim Jong-un in 2023, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64123657, Willie T.]

Tensions on the peninsula In the meantime, a volatile situation is developing on the Korean peninsula. For every perceived "provocation" by the North, South Korea - and sometimes the United States - retaliates. This began in May 2022, with the arrival of a new South Korean president, who promised to be tougher on North Korea. President Yoon Suk-yeol is guided by the belief that the best way to stop the North is to respond with military strength. He re-started arge-scale joint military exercises with the United States, against which the North protested and launched more missiles. This set off a tit-for-tat cycle of military action, which has involved both sides flying warplanes near to their border, and firing artillery into the sea. Last week, the situation escalated, when the North unexpectedly flew five drones into South Korean airspace. The South failed to shoot them down, exposing a weak spot in its defences and triggering concern among ordinary South Koreans, who are usually unfazed by the North's activities. The president vowed the South would retaliate and punish the North for every provocation. Chad O'Carroll, CEO of Korea Risk Group, an analysis service which monitors North Korea, predicts that in 2023, this could likely lead to a direct confrontation between the two Koreas, which could even result in deaths. "Responses by either the North or South

could escalate to the point where we see the exchange of actual fire, intentional or otherwise," he said.
One mistake or miscalculation and the situation could spiral.

## Kim uniquely <u>miscalculates this time</u> --- South Korea and Biden threatened leadership decapitation.

**Ward 22** [Alexander Ward, security reporter @ Politico, North Korea will 'automatically' launch nukes if Kim killed, Politico,

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/09/09/north-korea-will-automatically-launch-nukes-if-kim-killed-00055863, Willie T.]

North Korea will launch a nuclear retaliation "automatically and immediately" if KIM JONG UN is incapacitated in an attack, according to a new law, codifying for the first time that the leader has delegated his strike authority under that severe condition. The legislation, passed by Kim's rubber-stamp parliament, also allows for preemptive nuclear strikes if North Korea judges that foreign weapons will soon streak toward its strategic targets or state leadership. The measure comes as the dictator vowed to never part with the nuclear and missiles program it took his country decades to build, making them more and more dangerous by the year. North Korea will "never give up nuclear weapons and there is absolutely no denuclearization, and no negotiation and no bargaining chip to trade in the process," Kim declared Friday, according to state-run media. Kim, like his father before him, is reluctant to part with his nukes because they help keep the regime in place. But the thinking was Pyongyang would only use the weapons in the event of foreign nations first attacking North Korea, presumably some combination of the United States, Japan and South Korea. Not anymore: The law says Kim's bombs can fly in the event of any weapons of mass destruction attack and/or a non-nuclear strike on state leadership, command of nuclear forces or "important strategic objects" that is underway or "judged to be on the horizon," "This raises serious questions about the North's ability to get accurate intelligence and what the threshold of evidence will be to make those judgment calls," said JENNY TOWN, a senior fellow and director of the 38 North program at the Stimson Center. Kim's move is likely in response to comments made by South Korean President YOON SUK-YEOL, who previously suggested that a preemptive strike on the "kill chain" in North Korea is necessary as Pyongyang prepares an attack. Indeed, Kim has now let the world know the red button may still get pushed even if he's dead. "In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance," the new law reads. "The new law underscores the dangers of the U.S. and South Korea focusing on leadership decapitation strategies," said ANKIT PANDA, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It was quite predictable that the North Koreans would go down the path of threatening automatic retaliation if Kim is killed." Don't expect President JOE BIDEN to shift course, though. "Our policy remains unchanged," ADRIENNE WATSON, the National Security Council spokesperson, told NatSec Daily in an email. The U.S. will continue to coordinate with allies for "the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." U.S. officials are prepared to meet their North Korean counterparts without preconditions, an offer repeatedly made to counterparts in Pyongyang. North Korea "continues to not respond," Watson said.

### Conflict goes <u>nuclear</u>.

Davis 23 [Katie Davis, chief foreign reporter @ The Sun, "FIRE & FURY How war with North Korea could be the bloodiest in history if Kim Jong-un unleashes arsenal of nukes & chemical weapons," 7-30-23, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/23206308/war-north-korea-nukes-chemical-weapons/]

WAR with North Korea could be the bloodiest in history if Kim Jong-un unleashes his arsenal of nukes and chemical weapons, experts warn. America has sent a nuclear submarine to the South for the first time in decades as the drums of war begin to beat on

the Korean peninsula. Kim, meanwhile, has launched a flurry of missile tests as he steps up weapon trials. The deranged dictator and his sadistic sister continue to grow their nuclear arsenal amid fears they are ramping up to a devastating new atomic test. Biden is focused on Ukraine and Taiwan, but experts warn a Korean war could cost millions of lives and prove far more destructive than the hell that Vladimir Putin has unleashed in Europe. And it could just as easily drag the US into a fight against China, sparking World War Three and possible nuclear Armageddon, which would likely make it the bloodiest war in history. As tensions hit boiling point, The Sun has mapped out how a new Korean War might play out and how bloody the toll could be. Dr Bruce Bennett, a North Korea expert from the RAND think-tank, believes the war would play out in three broad phases along with a preliminary phase of escalation. Preliminary phase Since the last time North and South Korea almost came to blows back in 2017 while Donald Trump was President, Kim has dedicated himself to building up his nuclear stockpile. He now has so many nukes the US no longer believes they are for defensive purposes but instead to allow Kim to carry out conventional military strikes south of the border. In this scenario - which a recent National Intelligence Council paper warned is the "most likely" - Kim may strike out at infrastructure, ships, South Korean islands or other targets, confident that his nukes will deter the South or the US from hitting back. The aim would be to get the allies to give him concessions - such as sanctions relief - in return for stopping the strikes, but if he goes too far then he may trigger a retaliation. Dr Bennett said: "The potential for war is that the South gets tired and responds more aggressively, trying to reign in the North, and we get stuck into an escalation cycle. "For example, the South responds by destroying a military HQ, the North then responds with artillery along the de-militarized zone, the South expands that, and it all escalates up to major conflict." Phase 1: Decapitation Should a major conflict break out, then it is likely to be one of the bloodiest the world has ever seen. Beyond that, there are few certainties. But Dr Bennett believes the most likely scenario is that the war would play out in three broad phases - the first of which would involve decapitation strikes by both sides against the other. South Korea's ground forces - even with US reinforcements are no match for the size of the North Korean army. In 2022, Seoul had just 365,000 active duty troops at its command and the US currently has a little under 30,000 men on the peninsula. By comparison, Kim has 1.2million. To make up for the shortfall in manpower, South Korea has invested heavily in technology such as F-35 fighter jets to even the odds. The first target for North Korea will be airfields, ports, and military bases to leave South Korea's vulnerable ground troops exposed. And Kim could well decide to use his nuclear weapons for those strikes. having recently passed a law allowing him to launch them preemptively. Dr Bennett says official US policy is that Kim's regime "will not survive" if he uses nukes - meaning Washington would launch its own atomic weapons to wipe him out. But he added: "Kim may hope he can coerce the US with his ICBM threat. Would America really risk striking Pyongyang if it meant Seattle or New York getting hit?" The dictator also has large stockpiles of nerve agents such as sarin and VX, as well as chemical weapons containing anthrax and smallpox that he could unleash. If the US decided not to strike back with nukes, then Washington and Seoul would carry out their own decapitation strikes on the North using jets, missiles, and special forces. As well as launching from air bases in South Korea, the USS Ronald Reagan - an aircraft carrier deployed to the Pacific - would likely join, along with long-range bombers from US bases in Japan and Guam. The prime target, according to Dr Bennett, would be Kim's missiles. South Korean doctrine calls for a "kill chain" that would first wipe out North Korea's missile launchers, then its spare missile stockpiles and warheads. After that, they would move on to Kim's air defences including his ageing air force and much newer and more-sophisticated anti-air missiles. Third would be the elimination of Kim himself, which the South has vowed to do using "massive" force levelling cities if necessary.

## 1AC --- Escalation

#### **Contention Three is ESCALATION**

### Lai Ching-Te surprised Beijing with pro-independence and anti-China rhetoric.

**Staats 24** [Jennifer Staats, PhD in International Security @ Harvard & M.A in International Relations @ Princeton, 6-6-2024, Taiwan's New President Faces Tensions with China and Domestic Division, United States Institute of Peace,

https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/06/taiwans-new-president-faces-tensions-china-and-domestic-division, Willie T.]

Over four months after winning Taiwan's presidential election, William Lai Ching-te from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officially took office on May 20. Beijing fiercely criticized Lai's inaugural address and conducted military drills and patrols around Taiwan in a bid to "punish" Lai for failing to heed China's preferred positions. In the days following the speech, Lai also faced challenges at home, as opposition parties in Taiwan's legislature passed a set of reform bills that critics warn could increase China's ability to interfere in Taiwan's domestic affairs. All signs point to increasing cross-Strait tensions over the next four years as Taipei and Beijing test each other's limits and seek to advance their political objectives. Lai Signals a Tougher Approach on China Lai, who was vice president under previous president Tsai Ing-wen, aimed to reassure Taiwan voters that his administration would have continuity with his predecessor's approach to domestic issues such as economic development and energy policy, as well as foreign policy. On cross-Strait relations, however, Lai made three key points that demonstrated a relatively tougher stance on China, surprising some in Beijing. First, Lai pledged to stand firm on Taiwan's sovereignty. Lai used the word "sovereignty" seven times during his speech, a significant increase over Tsai's single mention of the word in her 2016 inaugural address and its total absence from her 2020 speech. Lai also referenced "Taiwan" 82 times, far exceeding Tsai's 41 mentions in her 2016 speech and 47 uses in 2020. While many use the terms Taiwan and Republic of China interchangeably, calling the island "Taiwan" suggests that it is a separate entity from China. The Republic of China, or ROC, is the official name and more palatable to Beijing. And while Tsai used diplomatic terms like "the other side of the Strait" or "Beijing authorities" in her inaugural speech, Lai directly mentioned "China" seven times, clearly distinguishing Taiwan from China. Second, Lai's speech adopted a stronger and more assertive position toward Beijing. Although Lai's cross-Strait approach seems largely aligned with Tsai's broad direction on the surface, subtle differences lie in the finer details. He endorsed Tsai's "Four Commitments" but specifically only elaborated on the one that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other. Lai also condemned China's military threat in a more straightforward and assertive way than Tsai ever did. He called China's military actions and gray-zone coercion "the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability," and emphasized that "China's ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear." Third, "democracy" was a prominent theme throughout Lai's speech. Lai positioned democratic Taiwan as a beacon of global peace and a driver of global prosperity. By placing Taiwan in the pantheon of the world's democratic nations, Lai was likely hoping to build international support for Taiwan's political system, boost Taiwan's status on the global stage, and further distance Taiwan from Beijing. Lai sent a clear signal to Beijing that he would not back down in the face of pressure. Still, his speech reflected a degree of restraint. The new president's team knew that China would object to any speech that did not explicitly accept the 1992 Consensus — a vague agreement reached in the early 1990s that stipulates that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to "one China" — which Lai would not do. Instead, he mixed tough words with subtle olive branches to Beijing, such as mentioning the historical figure Chiang Wei-shui, who is deemed acceptable on both sides of the Strait. He also used the term ROC 15 times, which was more than Tsai did in 2016 or 2020. In Beijing's eyes, however, the limited conciliatory language in the speech was not enough to counterbalance Lai's harsher rhetoric. Lai sent a clear signal to Beijing that he would not back down in the face of pressure. Still, his speech reflected a degree of restraint. China Pushes Back No matter what Lai might have said in his speech, Beijing's opposition to the address was a foregone conclusion. But Lai's stance on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's sovereignty further intensified Beijing's displeasure. Since Lai was nominated as the DPP's presidential candidate in April 2023, Beijing has consistently accused him of being a "stubborn Taiwan independence worker" and "destroyer of cross-Strait peace." Indeed, Beijing's rhetorical response was swift and harsh. Just hours after

the speech, China's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) issued a short statement accusing Lai of "vigorously promoting the separatism fallacies" and "inciting cross-Strait confrontation," echoing previous criticisms. The following day, the TAO gave a comprehensive response to Lai's speech, characterizing it as a complete "confession of Taiwan independence." The statement accused Taiwan's leader of promptly "revealing the true face of 'Taiwan independence' upon taking office." China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, said that "all Taiwan independence separatists will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history." On May 29, during the TAO's first press conference after the speech, a spokesperson further criticized the speech for filling with lies and deceit, distorting history, and promoting Taiwan independence under the guise of "democracy." On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party's official People's Daily newspaper dedicated its entire fourth page to strongly refuting Lai's approach to cross-Strait affairs. A commentary titled "Taiwan independence worker's empty rhetoric harms Taiwan" accused Lai of deceitfully promoting a "two-state theory" and exacerbating cross-Strait tensions. Mainland academics described the speech as sending a "very intense" signal to Beijing with its "pro-independence" language. Zhou Zhihuai, former director of the Institute of Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, said Lai's was the "most pro-independence speech" ever given by a Taiwanese leader.

#### Military support shifts voters to resist China.

the two sides

**Chen 24** [Alyssa Chen, Diplomacy Reporter @ SCMP & graduate of University of Hong Kong 1-7-2024, Why Taiwan arms sales, in place for decades, will remain a source of US-China tensions, South China Morning Post,

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3247421/why-taiwan-arms-sales-place-decades-will-remain-source-us-china-tensions, Willie T.] \*\*brackets and ellipses in original\*\*

Zhang Zhizhou, a professor at the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University, said Beijing Was likely to view the sale as part of Washington's strategy to obstruct reunification efforts, and be spurred to step up its efforts towards achieving that goal. "Beijing will view it as Washington's [move] ... to intentionally suppress China, making its peaceful reunification with Taiwan more difficult," zhang said. "The US' arming of Taiwan not only limits the mainland's options in its peaceful policy towards Taiwan, but also reinforces the urgency for Beijing to achieve reunification by force." Both Xin and Zhang said the timing of the move, just a month after the breakthrough San Francisco summit, would also undermine strategic trust as the two sides try to rebuild ties following months of heightened tensions over issues including Taiwan, Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea, and US-led tech curbs on Beijing. "From Beijing's point of view, the US is playing the Taiwan card by stepping up military security cooperation," Xin said. "It will deal a blow to the fragile strategic mutual trust between the US and China, deepening China's worries that the US is hindering China's reunification plan." Robert Sutter, a professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington University, said while the US-China divide over the arms sales issue had existed since 1979, it had now become "irreversible". Such sales "will continue after Taiwan's elections [this month]," sutter forecast. "The US government today is strongly committed to supporting Taiwan and to using such sales and other efforts to deter China from using coercive means against Taiwan and thereby changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait." More than 19 million Taiwanese are expected to vote in presidential and legislative elections on January 13, with the outcome expected to shape both cross-strait and US-China relations. Vice-President and DPP candidate William Lai Ching-te is the favourite in the race, with almost all opinion polls placing him ahead of the mainland-friendly Kuomintang's Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je of the smaller Taiwan People's Party. Beijing has urged Taiwanese voters to "stand on the right side of history ... and advance the process of the peaceful reunification of the motherland". This came two days after Xi in his New Year's Eve address said "reunification" with Taiwan was inevitable, a point he also highlighted to Biden when they met in November. Taiwan election exposes generational rift over potential reunification with mainland China Continued US arms sales could also undermine Beijing's charm offensive approach towards eventual reunification, said Raymond Kuo, director of the Taiwan Policy Initiative and a senior political scientist at US-based think tank Rand Corporation. "International support simply makes it harder [for Beijing] to entice or coerce the people [in Taiwan] back into the mainland," Kuo said. "Providing the Taiwanese with an independent defensive capability means that China must rely more on attraction. Beijing has struggled with that approach." Taiwan's increased engagement with Washington under Tsai has seen Beijing step up military and economic pressure on the island. The People's Liberation Army has

frequently staged exercises around the island in recent years, including major live-fire drills after then-US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited in August 2022 and Tsai met Pelosi's successor Kevin McCarthy in the US in April. PLA warplanes now also regularly cross the Taiwan Strait median line, once an unofficial barrier between

## Xi <u>has to respond</u> --- Lai's rhetoric <u>decks legitimacy</u> and <u>causes secessionist chaos</u> AND Xi's concerned about Taiwanese <u>popular opinion</u>.

**Yeung 19** [Jun Tao Yeung, Bachelor of Government and Laws) & Bachelor of Laws from the University of Hong Kong, 10-29-2019, Why Is Taiwan So Important? The Manipulation Of Nationalism In Legitimizing One-party Rule In China, Yale Review of International

Studies, https://yris.yira.org/essays/why-is-taiwan-so-important-the-manipulation-of-nationalism-in-legit imizing%E2%80%8B-one-party-rule-in-china/, vh + wt]

Experts in international relations must ask themselves: why is Taiwan so important to China such that <u>Beijing has to **emphasise its**</u>

forceful attitudes towards Taiwan independence advocates? compared to the mainland's population of nearly 1.4 billion[7] and area of 9,388,211 km², Taiwan is just a very small island with a population of 23.58 million[8] and area of 35410 km² [9]. The military power of Taiwan is totally outweighed by that of the mainland.[10] Given the military superiority enjoyed by the mainland over Taiwan, the latter certainly constitutes no military threats to the former. Then, why is Beijing so eager to unify the island which is extremely small compared to the mainland upon which it bases its rule? Both realist and liberalist perspectives in the field of international relations fail to explain why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is eager to declare its sovereignty over Taiwan. The realist perspective argues that mainland China and Taiwan are two strategic competitors, competing with each other through either balance of power or balance of threat.[11]However, it cannot explain why the mainland still escalates its military actions towards Taiwan when the island no longer constitutes any tangible threat. The liberalist perspective holds a firm belief that the social and economic cooperation between the mainland and Taiwan will lead to political integration. However, it fails to explain why the two sides have remained hostile towards each other recently. This essay attempts to argue that the main audience of Beijing's Taiwan policy is neither Taiwan nor the international community, but the people in the mainland instead. In this essay, I find that the major purpose of Beijing in standing firmly against the Taiwan independence movement is to legitimise the one-party rule of CCP over the mainland China instead of unification. The first part will provide a brief background on different sources of legitimacy employed by authoritarian regimes. Next, the background of nationalism in the history of modern China will be discussed. Third, the role of how nationalism affects Beijing's attitude in its territorial disputes with its neighbouring countries will be analyzed. Finally, the means by which the CCP creates a nationalist image by standing firmly against the Taiwan authority will be examined. Legitimising Authoritarian Regimes Legitimacy has long been a headache for authoritarian regimes. In order to sustain long-term existence, simply relying on repression and coercion is insufficient.[12] Without societal support, the regime needs to employ a large military force in repressing dissidents and vast resources on monitoring citizens, incurring a large cost to the regime. Legitimacy refers to the rightfulness and justification of the authority in ruling a territory. With legitimacy, the authority can prove to the citizens why they should **consent to be subordinate** to the authority and observe the rules set by such authority. The authority can then secure societal support. This makes governance more effective and less expensive, and in turn makes the authoritarian regime more enduring and sustainable. Authoritarian regimes usually suffer the problem of a legitimacy deficit that democratic governments do not.[13] In a modern democracy, the institutional arrangement, which is usually popular voting, guarantees that popular support is the prerequisite for the ruler to stay in power. It solves the problem of legitimacy, as the ruled public decides who will be the ruler. However, an authoritarian regime is one that implies the institutional arrangement excludes the ruled public from deciding the leader. Political participation by ordinary citizens is excluded. Therefore, the ruler does not have the direct endorsement of the ruled public and can hardly claim to represent the public. In order to survive for a long period of time, an authoritarian regime can not only rely on coercive apparatus suppressing any revolts and dissidents, but they also need to overcome the legitimacy deficit to prevent the

Questioning of its legitimacy by the public.[14] The CCP, as an authoritarian regime in East Asia, suffers from the problem of a legitimacy deficit which its democratic neighbours such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan do not share. It takes regular and universal elections that allow citizens to select their leaders and vote the noncompetitive officers out of office. Out illustries and political participation are also limited which prevent the citizens from voicing that opinions against the government. Therefore, the CCP has to resort to various means in legitimistic pit fair in the citizens of the

history of China. The **economic reform** also caused serious **social problems** such as rising income **disparities**, regional development imbalances, deficits in the provision of public goods, and growing employment.[24] The CCP noticed that it could not rely on its economic performance as the sole source of legitimacy and must seek other bases of legitimacy. Had the CCP solely relied on economic performance, it would have been very unlikely that it would still hold power when its economic growth decelerated in recent Years[25]. In view of the shortcomings of both ideological legitimacy and performance legitimacy, the CCP regime realised that nationalism is the strongest weapon in legitimising its rule over the country. Capitalising on the history of modern China and boosting the nationalist atmosphere, the CCP successfully employed nationalism to legitimise its rule by standing firm in various territorial disputes and exploiting the Taiwan agendum. Nationalist Narratives Created by the CCP The historical memory in the 19th and 20th centuries shared by millions of Chinese provides a hotbed for the rise of nationalism in China. To many Chinese, the narratives of the history of the 19th and 20th centuries are filled with national shame and humiliation. [26] Since the first Opium War (1839-1842), China experienced a continuous period of invasions by foreign imperialists. The period between the first Opium War and the Second World War marked the weakest period of China in its history. China suffered foreign invasions in various external wars, including the First Opium War, the Second Opium War (1856-60), the Eight Nation Allied Army's invasion (1900), Japan's Twenty-one Demands (1914) and the War of Resistance against Japanese invasion (1937-1945). In these invasions, China surrendered its territories to foreign powers as either colonies or semi-colonies. With this history, the CCP included four features in its nationalist narrative templates: (i), China was invaded by imperial powers, (ii) enormous crimes were committed against China by these imperial powers, which included forcing China to accept a series of unequal treaties, compromising Chinese sovereignty, (iii) some heroic Chinese bravely resisted the invasion of imperial powers in spite of the failure of the weak and corrupt government to do so, and (iv) the CCP successfully led the Chinese to win the eventual and ultimate victory against imperialists and restore the national spirit.[27] All these point to the fact that the CCP is the true savior of the nation from foreign invasion and humiliation. Making use of the historical memory of the century of national shame and humiliation, the CCP narrates that it has a historical role in saving the Chinese nation and restoring the national strength. The preamble of the Constitution states that the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was a "glorious revolutionary tradition" that overthrew the imperialism that made China a semi-colonial country. [28] It emphasises that the CCP, under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, ignited such a revolution. Besides, the leaders of the CCP also in various occasions emphasise the historical role of the CCP in revitalising the nation.[29] The CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping pledged for a "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" by 2049, which means that China will once again appear as a global power by that time. The nationalist mission and agenda of the CCP justify its exercise of the sovereignty of China, consolidate the popular support of its rule and build its

egitimacy. The CCP benefits from the nationalist narratives and nationalist legitimacy two main ways. First, it successfully demonstors any foreign criticisms on its political system by branding them as an attempted humilation of Clinices coveringing. This invalidates all foreign criticisms on its again content to the successful system of the policy with the policy of the grant political system of the politic ways to expend the branching of the politic ways to expend the branching of the politic ways to expend the branching of the politic ways to expend the political system of the CD political agends. In the early 1970, the CCP branches the political ways to expend the political system, and the political system of the political system, and the political system of the political system, and the political system of the politi

and replace the Chinese national identity wareness among the Taiwanese people and down play the pan-Taiwanese identity. Despite this, the pan-Taiwanese identity still begins to emerge and replace the Chinese national identity, which first motivated the CCP to assert its sovereignty over the island. In the 1980s, Taiwan was transformed from a one-party authoritarian system to a multiple-party democracy, with the KMT and the DPP as the two dominant parties. The DPP was a pro-independence party and aims to replace the Chinese national identity with the

Taiwanese one. [46] In 2000, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election and became the first non-KMT president of Taiwan. During his eight years in office from 2000 to 2008, he promoted a "de-Sinification" series, which included the promotion of Xiangtu Wenxue(native literature) and adding the word "Taiwan" to the passport jacket. The school curricula were also amended to emphasize the unique cultural and historical characteristics of Taiwan. Taiwanese people experienced a significant change in their identity recognition.[47] According to a survey conducted by the Institute in Political Science at the National Sun Yat-sen University in 2015, 74% of Taiwan's people identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This echoes with the study of the National Chengchi University's Election Study Center, which showed that the percentage of Taiwan's people who identified themselves as Taiwanese increased dramatically from 17.6% in 1992 to 59.3% in 2016, while the percentage of people identifying themselves as Chinese fell from 46.4% to 33.6%. Both surveys indicated that a majority of Taiwan's people do not identify themselves as Chinese. Besides, the Taiwanese people's support of unification also decreased significantly.[48] Various surveys by Opinion Research Taiwan, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University and TEDS concluded that the percentage of people supporting unification fell from 56.9% in 1992 to 15.8% in 2016 whereas the percentage of people who would rather desire for the status quo increased from 30.6% to 52.3% in the same period. All these results point to the fact that most Taiwanese people do not view the island as part of China and do not value unification as a top priority. The CCP is worried that the various Taiwan opinion polls may encourage the DPP to declare formal independence. If the DPP really does so, it translates to the CCP's failure in unifying the territory and thus undermines the CCPs' nationalist legitimacy. Besides, it would encourage secessionist movements in other parts of China, including the Tibetan independence movement and the Uyghur independence movement, which would make it much harder for the CCP to maintain social stability in the related regions. Therefore, leaders in Beijing cannot afford any risk of Taiwan seeking formal independence and continue to openly warn the Taiwanese government on the consequences of declaring independence. In 2016, Secretary General Xi Jinping announced his zero tolerance policy for any separatist movements in the Chinese territory, which to his understanding included Taiwan.[49] In 2019, Wang Zaixi, a former deputy director of the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office warned Taiwan that the Chinese authorities would accelerate the reunification of Taiwan if the island's authorities continued its support of the independence movement. To the CCP, Taiwanese independence is too big of a risk, as it brings into question the notion that the CCP will rebuild the Chinese nation and restore the national spirit.

#### Hence, invasion comes by 2025.

**Mollman 23** [Steve Mollman, 1-28-2023, "War with China over Taiwan is likely in 2025, warns U.S. General Mike Minihan: 'I hope I am wrong'", Fortune,

https://fortune.com/2023/01/28/war-china-taiwan-likely-by-2025-warns-american-general-mike-miniha n/, Willie T.]

The U.S. and China will likely be at war over Taiwan in 2025, a high-ranking American military officer has warned. U.S. Air Force General Mike Minihan outlined the series of circumstances that would embolden Chinese president Xi Jinping to invade Taiwan in a memo sent Friday to leaders of Air Mobility Command, which he heads. "I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025. Xi secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan's presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a areason. United States' presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi's team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025," Minihan wrote in the memo, first reported by NBC News. As head of Air Mobility Command, Minihan oversees the Air Force's fleet of transport and refueling aircraft. In the memo, he urged personnel to "consider their personal affairs" and be more aggressive about training. "If you are comfortable in your approach to training," he wrote, "then you are not taking enough risk." He directed airmen to "fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most." "Aim for the head," he added. China's big military exercises "These comments are not representative of the department's view on China," a U.S. defense official told Reuters in response to the memo. China considers Taiwan its own, but the latter operates as an independent democracy and has never been controlled by Beijing. In the past few years, China has been flying larger sorties of warplanes near Taiwan, including large-scale exercises it held when U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August. It's also increased its military presence in the South China Sea, including on

<u>bases built atop reefs-turned-artificial islands in disputed waters</u>. Some of those reefs are claimed by the Philippines, where President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. this month called U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan "very, very worrisome for us," adding he expected Manila's military ties with America to deepen.

#### Affirming is key to tone down Lai's bold stances.

**Chen 17** [Ping-Kuei Chen, Professor @ National Chengchi University's Department of Diplomacy & Ph.D. from the University of Maryland's Department of Government and Politics, 2017, A Farewell to Arms?: US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15, Willie T.]

while we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for claims about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, we believe it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed lead Taiwan ese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining power vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: it is also plausible that, in such a scenario, Taiwan's leaders would feel they had no other choice but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn't obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing's incentives to consider military force. In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.

# Conflict goes nuclear --- attacks on conventional targets affect 2<sup>nd</sup> strike, forcing use or lose pressure on China's nukes.

**Brown 21** [Gerald C. Brown, M.A in International Public Policy & Strategic Studies from John Hopkins & Defense Analyst focused on cross-Strat security, 6-2021, Understanding the Risks and Realities of China's Nuclear Forces, Arms Control Association,

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/features/understanding-risks-and-realities-chinas-nuclear-forces, TM + recut-WT]

similar entanglement risks exist with Chinese forces. PLARF bases all appear to host conventional and nuclear missile brigades. These are geographically separated from each other, but most of the weapons are on mobile platforms. creating overlapping risks when deployed. Conventional and nuclear forces seem to rely on the same supply and logistics infrastructure. Although command and control infrastructure are ostensibly separate, the extent of this separation is not fully understood, and overlap seems likely to exist.21 Additionally, China's nuclear submarine force appears to share the same onshore communications systems with Chinese conventional submarines.22 DF-26 missiles are featured in the military parade in Beijing, China, Sept. 3, 2015. (Photo: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)DF-26 missiles are featured in the military parade in Beijing, China, Sept. 3, 2015. (Photo: Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)Furthermore, an increasing number of midrange to intermediate-range weapons systems are dual use. Although the DF-21 maintains distinct conventional and nuclear variants that are typically not co-located, they are likely indistinguishable when deployed. In the case of the DF-26, conventional and nuclear warheads are likely co-located. Reports have highlighted DF-26 brigades, equipped with conventional and nuclear weapons, that hold drills in which units launch a conventional attack and then reload with a nuclear warhead to prepare for nuclear counterattacks.23 In conflict, attacks against China's shore-based communications systems that are directed at China's conventional submarine force would cut off its nuclear-armed submarine force as well. Campaigns against China's vast conventional missile force would almost certainly degrade China's nuclear force too. The fixed bases supporting PLARF brigades would be likely targets as the dual nature of these bases means conventional and nuclear forces share the same base headquarters, resulting in severed communications and logistics networks for PLA nuclear forces. Even if China's nuclear and conventional command and control networks were sufficiently separate, it would be challenging to distinguish between them. Conventional and nuclear midrange to intermediate-range weapons would likely be indistinguishable in conflict. How would China respond to attacks against these dual-use systems and the degradation of its nuclear force? It is somewhat comforting that China's ICBM force is relatively distinguishable from its dual-use weapons, and the majority of the force is located deeper within the Chinese mainland. What is not obvious is how strikes against

regional-range nuclear forces would be perceived by Beijing in the middle of armed conflict. If China's nuclear forces were degraded in any way, authorities could conclude that they no longer have a survivable deterrent. In the heat of a conflict, it is difficult to assess how Chinese decision-makers would react to this. Further, a degraded Chinese nuclear force, in the middle of a crisis, could provide a tempting counterforce target for the United States. In such a case, there would be a challenge of perceptions, with neither the United States nor China truly knowing the other's intentions. In conflict, with the ability to destroy China's nuclear force or at least limit damage to itself should China opt for nuclear use, would the United States decide that a counterforce strike is worth the risk? The United States would understand that if it failed to strike, China could opt to use its remaining nuclear forces and inflict substantial damage. Similarly, knowing the United States faced such a dilemma and that it could face a disabling counterforce strike, China would be faced with strong use-it-or-lose-it pressures. All of these circumstances would be exacerbated by the fog of war, a degraded information environment, and the speed required to make decisions.