

# Constructive

See R2 Peach OS.

## Rebuttal

Ping-Kuei **Chen 17**, 10/xx/2017, Assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 221-238, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) // JZ

While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for claims about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, we believe it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed lead Taiwanese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining power vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: it is also plausible that, in such a scenario, Taiwan's leaders would feel they had no other choice but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn't obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing's incentives to consider military force. In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.

Taiwan's president is willing to cooperate.

**Reuters**, Oct 16 20**24**, "China won't renounce use of force over Taiwan; Xi visits frontline island", CNBC, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/17/china-wont-renounce-use-of-force-over-taiwan-xi-visits-frontline-island.html> // RB

**Lai**, in his Oct. 10 speech, **said** China has no right to represent Taiwan, but **the island was willing to work with the government in Beijing** to combat challenges like climate change, striking both a firm and a conciliatory tone which Taiwan officials said was a show of goodwill. "There was no goodwill to speak of," Chen said. Lai has repeatedly offered talks with China but been rebuffed. China's military on Monday held open the possibility of more drills around Taiwan depending on the level of "provocation". In a report to lawmakers, a copy of which was reviewed by Reuters, Taiwan's defense ministry said China was trying to legitimize the use of force against Taiwan, to undermine military morale and to "deplete the military's combat power".

Christopher **Bodeen**, 01-09-20**24**, "Taiwan presidential candidate Lai says he is willing to reopen talks with China", AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-politics-reopen-talks-lai-election-d1181df3d51fa3c25c9e6a5a75e7fd72> // RB

**Taiwan's** leading **president**ial candidate William **Lai** said Tuesday he **hopes for a reopening of dialogue with China**

following almost eight years of Beijing's near-complete refusal to communicate **with leaders of the** self-governing **island** it considers its own territory.

Rest were analytics.