

Constructive

The lack of security at the Southern border has created unchecked crisis

Selene **Rodriguez**, 01-11-20**22**, "How Porous Borders Fuel Human Trafficking in the United States", Texas Public Policy

Foundation, <https://www.texaspolicy.com/how-porous-borders-fuel-human-trafficking-in-the-united-states/> // TT

Sophisticated transnational syndicates are notorious for using children to get single, adult males not just across the border, but through Border Patrol processing. Once these men are granted a stay, they smuggle the children back across the border where they will continue to be trafficked. **Studies done by the Latin American branch of the Coalition Against**

Trafficking In Women estimates that 60% of Latin American children who set out to cross

the border alone or with smugglers **have been caught by the cartels** and are being abused in child

pornography or drug trafficking. In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security, under the Trump Administration,

launched a pilot program that allowed for ICE to DNA test families that were deemed suspicious of fraudulent activity. This program was designed to help prevent minors from being trafficked or recycled, and it resulted in criminal charges for the adults exploiting them. Yet this program was met with great disdain by activist groups and lawmakers and is not being used by the current

administration. **Under the Biden administration, human traffickers are busier than ever,**

expediting the flow of migrants across the southern border. The president has made it abundantly clear

that his administration does not wish to stop illegal immigration, nor does it wish to enable necessary enforcement of the immigration

laws that are on the books. It is factors such as these that drive **large numbers of people** to **surge the border,**

overwhelming federal and local agencies and—most importantly—risking the lives of

millions. With the Border Patrol overwhelmed by the large number of migrants to

process, they are being compelled to get people through as quickly as possible, leading

to a less rigorous vetting process. It is unknown how many victims of human trafficking have been smuggled across

the border to date, but it is clear that scandalously **loose border policies and inadequate federal**

resources incentivize innocent people to put themselves at the mercy of human

smugglers, fueling human trafficking in the United **S**tates. Human trafficking must be a fight that Americans

work together to combat relentlessly, across party lines. In the U.S., **almost no group is more vulnerable to**

falling victim than migrants recently arriving, specifically children who have no legal guardian. The

U.S. must work towards restricting human trafficking by securing and maintaining its borders. **Customs and Border**

Protection personnel should be given every tool at their disposal to intercept and stop

human trafficking efforts, both at and between ports of entry.

Consequently, the rate of human trafficking is rising

Jorge **Ventura**, 06-21-20**24**, "Mexican cartels offer 'VIP' border crossing packages to migrants", NewsNation,

<https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/immigration/border-coverage/cartels/mexican-cartels-vip-packages-migrants/> // RB

Meanwhile, **cartels now prefer human trafficking over drug trafficking due to lower risk and**

higher profitability. For example, while a kilogram of cocaine might bring in about \$1,500

with significant risk, smuggling a person can yield between \$10,000 and \$15,000.

As a result, **approximately 70% of their activities now focus on migrant smuggling, shifting**

away from their traditional drug trafficking operations.

BP, deprived of resources, is at fault

Miriam Cristal **Ordoñez**, 01-29-20**22**, "Audit shows Border Patrol hampered by outdated technology, flawed evaluation of new

equipment", Cronkite News,

<https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2022/01/04/cbp-border-patrol-audit-flaws-upgrading-us-mexico-border-technology/> // TT

U.S. Customs and Border Protection is lagging in updated technology and staff need **to secure the** 1,954-mile **Southwest border with Mexico**, according to a February inspector general's audit by the Department of Homeland Security. **Customs and Border Protection has acquired just 28% of the new technology planned for border detections**, despite receiving \$743 million for such upgrades since 2017. The audit said **CBP lacks tools, technologies and manpower, as well as a reliable way to assess the effectiveness of the equipment in use**. "Shifting priorities, construction delays, **a lack of available technology solutions**, and funding constraints **hindered** CBP's **planned deployments**," the audit said. "Consequently, **most Southwest Border Patrol sectors still rely predominantly on obsolete** systems and **infrastructure** with limited capabilities."

Affirming solves the deficit in 4 ways

1. Corruption

Tech detects suspicious behavioral patterns to catch corrupt officials

Artificial Intelligence – a promising anti-corruption tool in development settings? U4 Anti-Corruption **Resource Centre**.

Published 20**19**. Accessed July 10, 2024.

<https://www.u4.no/publications/artificial-intelligence-a-promising-anti-corruption-tool-in-development-settings/fullversion#uncovering-corruption-and-fraud-with-artificial-intelligence//JN>

he term artificial intelligence (**AI**) covers technologies where machines mimic human intelligence to solve complex problems. On one side we find methods where an algorithm, a 'recipe' on how to handle a specific set of inputs, drives the computing process that determines or suggests an output. Machine learning (ML) resides in this domain, where multiple methods of various levels of complexity are applied to solve different kinds of problems. Some of these techniques need a dataset to 'train' the algorithm on how to handle the information. Algorithmic bias is often inherited from the datasets used to train the algorithm. Some **systems**

‘learn’ how to achieve the optimal result with no supervision. Artificial neural networks mimic the way

our brain is constructed. **Millions of calculations** are **performed** and sent between the nodes of the network, generating complexity

that can become impossible to explain. The ‘black box problem’ refers to opaque calculations in complex algorithms. More advanced imitations of human intelligence, artificial general intelligence (AGI) or superintelligence, still belong in the future, and is not a focus of this document. Neither shall we address robotics. In our highly digitised societies, artificial intelligence is embedded in gadgets, cars, and consumer goods. Algorithms calculate what music you should listen to based on your previous choices. Machines suggest which book to buy or who to invite for a date. Translation tools are rapidly improving. Algorithm driven chatbots reply to our questions in text or spoken language. The technology is affecting more and more parts of life in sufficiently digitised economies with a certain level of e-government, where transactions or interactions with authorities to a large extent are digital. Automated decision systems are controversial, but still deployed in social security programmes, within the legal sector, in policing, insurance and security. AI and machine learning are also applied to uncover or detect money laundering. Tax authorities use AI to predict risk for tax evasion, or to monitor and identify suspicious tenders or bids in public procurement. Transparency International UK is adopting AI-solutions to automate searches in public records and strengthen its analytical capacity. However, some applications of AI and automated decision systems in society remain controversial. Questions persist on how to handle biased algorithms, our ability to contest automated decisions, and accountability when machines make the decisions. How such systems relate to the right to privacy, the right to explanation, and the ‘right to be forgotten’ also remain topics of debate. Nevertheless, due to the efficiency, apparent neutrality, stable performance, and cost savings associated with AI based processes, such tools are likely to be applied in more and more areas in the future. High hopes in development Development agencies express hopes to the promises, and sometimes deep concern over the pitfalls, embedded in these technologies. **Projects in which AI plays a key role in anti-corruption**, or

where digital processes or mobile technologies are drivers for new ways to do business, are discussed below. Some designs are introducing novel, **digitised procedures omitting previous corruption-prone tasks**. Other projects have a ‘direct’ approach to reveal previously hidden

transactions or actors in fraudulent behaviours. Digitised interactions between society and its citizens are in many cases the foundation on which to build AI applications. S. Redesigning the ways of doing business or governance to enable automation and the assistance of AI may in some cases also reduce the risk for fraud or corruption. Some fear that AI and automation of processes will lead to the loss of valuable jobs, in particular in developing countries. Jobs lost to automation are in digitised societies replaced by jobs demanding higher or different skillsets. One challenge is therefore to strengthen the education system. Another challenge in developing countries is the lack of consistent, digital, reliable data. Reforms are needed in education, governance, and the legal sector to take advantage of the fourth industrial revolution. Some researchers have argued that only a handful of countries in Africa are able to exploit AI to advance sustainable development. Technology-driven businesses such as Uber, where AI is at the core of its operations, are present in several African countries. The term ‘uberisation’ is derived from the name of the company and characterises peer-to-peer transactions with the aid of a digital platform. Such transactions bypass corporations as the organising body of the workforce. Becoming self-employed contractors is the new norm. Affordability and the spread of internet and mobile connection will be an important driver for future AI development and digital governance. In May 2019, Uber drivers in several countries went on strike due to decreasing average wages and the company charging them increased commissions. AI applications have been pilot-tested to identify risk of corruption or fraud in public procurement in Mexico and Ukraine. South African tax authorities are looking into possibilities of utilising AI, and India is discussing options to monitor social media to spot possible tax evasions. However, some of the solutions are questionable from an ethical perspective. How and by whom the technology is introduced in developing countries should gain attention and possibly trigger debate. Enterprises such as DeepMind, Google, Facebook, and IBM are establishing AI-driven projects and research institutions in the Global South. This might lead to increased interest in investment and applications of AI within sectors such as health, agriculture, education, and production. Several agents emphasise the importance of research happening on site, where the technology is to be applied. The hope is that local ownership of the knowledge and tools will reduce the effect of a new, digital colonialism where multinational corporations own the data and therefore can profit from its exploitation. Some of the projects, institutions, and reference documents identified through this study are collected in an online knowledge base. The dataset contains links to projects, companies, and institutions in the field of AI related technologies such as blockchain or big data. The entries are not restricted to applications within the fields of

anti-corruption, since technology applications used in other areas in society might have solutions suitable as models for possible anti-corruption projects. In a roundtable session during the 2019 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum, we briefly presented our preliminary findings. More important, however, was the opportunity to receive feedback from a wide array of stakeholders during the forum. Feedback from the sessions and individual meetings are to a certain extent included in the following sections.

Uncovering corruption and fraud with artificial intelligence Oxford Insights lists **Artificial intelligence as ‘the next frontier in anti-corruption,’ partly due to its ability to reveal patterns in datasets too large for humans to manage. Applying AI to detect elements of interest, humans can focus on details and follow up on suspected misuse, fraud, or corruption.** Mexico is an example of an economy where AI tools alone might not be sufficient to win the battle. During the last decade several reforms in Mexico have been carried out to stimulate economic growth and address high levels of corruption. **The Tax Administration Services of Mexico piloted a project to detect fraudulent operations among taxpaying companies using AI algorithms and analysis tools. ‘Within three months of a six months pilot scheme, 1200 fraudulent companies were detected, and 3500 fraudulent transactions identified.** The identification and analysis of these irregular activities **would have taken an estimated 18 months of work without the use of AI,** says the report Towards and AI Strategy in Mexico, authored by Oxford Insights and C-Minds and initiated by the British Embassy. Many areas of the Mexican economy have seen progress, including the telecoms sector. Telecom was previously dominated by one player and is now open for competition. This has led to a significant reduction of connectivity cost, and the country is now preparing for its highest investment ever. The goal there is to deliver 4G mobile connectivity to more than 90% of the population within 2024. Affordable connectivity is key in a society working towards digital government services. The next step is to develop an AI strategy for the country. Suggestions such as working towards AI-based solutions to deliver government services for less or to introduce AI driven smart procurement will be included in the forthcoming national AI strategy. In short, Mexico has ambitions to be among the first ten countries in the world to commit to a national strategy for AI. Digital tools and artificial intelligence have also been applied in pilot projects to uncover fraud and tax evasion in public procurement. **The Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO), together with Participatory intelligence (OPI) used automated queries (AI) on millions of data records to analyse the government’s**

contracting procedures to identify corruption risks. The dataset covered public procurement from 2012 to 2017 and contained 6 million data lines, with 230 million cells from 9 different sources. Using the evidence from that project, they built a Corruption Risk Index, identifying risk in the more than 1500 buying units studied.

2. Overstretch

Empirically proven to reduce overstretch

Edward **Graham**, 07-09-20**24**, "AI can enhance border security but won't close workforce gap, lawmakers say", Nextgov,

[https://www.nextgov.com/artificial-intelligence/2024/07/ai-can-enhance-border-security-wont-close-workforce-gap-lawmakers-say/39](https://www.nextgov.com/artificial-intelligence/2024/07/ai-can-enhance-border-security-wont-close-workforce-gap-lawmakers-say/397943/)

[7943/](#) // RB

Lawmakers did, however, express strong support for **the federal government to work more closely with private sector firms** to acquire and field new capabilities that could empower CBP and Border Patrol agents to more effectively police the border. Despite not being a silver bullet on their own, emerging technologies were seen as a necessity for combating threats posed by cartels, including their increasing reliance on drones. Dan Bishop, R-N.C. — chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Accountability — said “using artificial intelligence can help alleviate the manpower issue” and added that these tools are bolstering border security as “**cartel tactics and use of technology have become increasingly advanced**.” Federal officials have touted the benefits of **enhanced tools** and their **ability to identify more illicit contraband**. CBP said its use of **non-intrusive inspection systems** in **fiscal year 2022, for instance, resulted in “the interdiction of more than 100,000 pounds of narcotics, approximately \$2 million of undeclared U.S. currency and the identification of 86 illegal travelers.”** While Bishop said **these tools** — including the use of more **AI technologies** — **could not replace the work of border agents**, he cited their ability to **ease some of the pressure**

on personnel and allow them to focus other enforcement activities. **Enabling**

surveillance and processing tools **to operate with greater autonomy can reserve time for agents**

to review the most imminent threats,” he said. “Automating previously labor-intensive tasks also helps free Border

Patrol agents to be back out in the field to safeguard the homeland.”

3. Infrastructure

Updated infrastructure solves – we have the tech but just need to implement and scale-up

Hannah **Tyler**, 02-02-20**22**, “The Increasing Use of Artificial Intelligence in Border Zones Prompts Privacy Questions”, Migration Policy

Institute, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/artificial-intelligence-border-zones-privacy> // TT

Border-focused AI technologies come in multiple forms and can **include** **algorithms designed to evaluate**

travelers’ nuanced and almost imperceptible **emotional expressions,** **biometric analysis of fingerprints**

and facial recognition, **and scanner software that can differentiate humans from wildlife** in

remote border sections. **Many of the systems derive from surveillance tools that have existed in some**

form for decades but have become increasingly automated so that computers—not human beings—make

preliminary determinations about possible threats and how authorities should respond. Artificial intelligence promises to supercharge this

surveillance, **making tools more powerful and capable of processing and interpreting more**

data than in the past. Yet the rapid deployment of these technologies, which has often moved faster than legislative and other frameworks to

regulate their usage, has also raised concerns about privacy and growing government surveillance of not just migrants and travelers but, at a

larger scale, entire populations.

Miroff 23 [Nick Miroff, WaPo reporter covering immigration enforcement & the DHS, 3-9-2023,

U.S. deploys powerful scanners at border to fight fentanyl smuggling, Washington Post,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/03/09/united-states-arizona-border-fentanyl/>,

Willie T.]

NOGALES, Ariz. — The trucks packed with cucumbers, green beans and bananas inched forward in a long, looping line, waiting to come into the

United States at the Mariposa port of entry, one of the border's busiest crossings for Mexican-grown produce. U.S. inspectors used to

refer only a handful of drivers for cargo screening with powerful scanning equipment to check

for illegal drugs. But on a recent morning they routed every truck through a new drive-through

machine the size of a carwash. Known as a "multi-energy portal," the equipment has allowed

U.S. Customs and Border Protection to scan nearly six times as much cargo per day. Construction

crews were busy installing a second machine alongside it, racing to finish before peak grape season this spring, when trucks coming from Mexico are

expected to roll through with 30 million pounds of fruits and vegetables per day. The harvest is an auspicious time for drug smugglers. The Nogales

crossing is the front line of the government's beleaguered effort to stem the flow of cheap fentanyl into the United States. The synthetic opioid is fueling

the most lethal drug epidemic in U.S. history, and last year, Nogales surpassed San Diego to become the southern border's primary gateway for

fentanyl trafficking. U.S. officers have seized more than 21 million fentanyl tablets in the Nogales port of entry over the past five months, more than they

did during the entire previous year, according to CBP. Officers are finding sacks of baby-blue fentanyl pills inside

seat cushions, car batteries, even hollowed-out bicycle frames. One pedestrian tried to come through in January

wearing a sheaf of tablets that looked like a pair of shorts. Another smuggler jammed 14,000 pills inside the metal frame of a walker. "Fentanyl is so

small that they're hiding it in places that weren't imaginable before," said Michael Humphries, CBP's Nogales port director. Drug overdoses killed more

than 107,000 people in the United States in 2021, the highest total ever, according to the most recent available tallies by the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention. Two-thirds of those deaths were caused by fentanyl. The highly addictive opioid can be prescribed by physicians to treat

severe pain, but illegal tablets from Mexico are flooding across the border at powerful and potentially fatal dosage levels. Mexican drug trafficking

organizations manufacture the pills in clandestine labs using chemicals primarily imported from China, mass producing tablets that retail on U.S. streets

for less than \$5 apiece. Fentanyl trafficking is dominated by the two most powerful criminal organizations in Mexico, the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco

New Generation cartel, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Those groups control smuggling routes through western Mexico that lead to

U.S. border crossings into Arizona and California. The two states accounted for 90 percent of all the fentanyl seized by CBP during the 2022 fiscal year, according to agency data. President Biden's critics blame his border policies for the fentanyl boom, attempting to link narcotics trafficking with the record numbers of migrants CBP has taken into custody during his first two years in office. CBP data show the drug is overwhelmingly smuggled through U.S. ports of entry — the official crossings — which account for more than 96 percent of fentanyl seizures along the border since the start of the 2023 fiscal year on Oct. 1. The White House and the Department of Homeland Security have responded to the fentanyl surge by promoting the advanced scanning machines — known as “non-intrusive inspection” technology, or NII — as a centerpiece of their interdiction strategy.

During his State of the Union address last month, Biden pledged to combat fentanyl “with more drug detection machines to inspect cargo and stop pills and powder at the border.” Democrats and Republicans support the broad outlines of those plans. But enthusiasm for the scanning technology is especially pronounced among Democrats eager to push back at criticism that they’re weak on border security. Unlike physical barriers such as a wall, they see NII machines as a border tool that symbolizes openness to trade and travel as well as high-tech security. The government has

struggled to keep pace with traffickers. Congress gave CBP \$564 million in 2019 for a major expansion of the NII systems, but

the agency was slow to award contracts, according to current and former federal officials who monitor the programs. The Biden administration has picked up the pace of deployment, but the NII program is still roughly three years behind schedule, and the artificial

intelligence software needed to manage the huge amount of data remains in development. CBP’s recent investments in the scanning equipment have also outpaced the government’s ability to reconfigure U.S. border crossings to accommodate the large machines and reroute entry lanes through them. In some locations, the agency underestimated the costs of making the machines fit, causing further delays. “We’re now in situation where the civil works costs are becoming astronomical, and they’re eating

the program alive,” said one government employee who tracks the issue closely but was not authorized to speak publicly. The 2024 White

House budget released Thursday includes \$305 million for NII upgrades at CBP’s ports of entry “with a primary focus on fentanyl detection.” The increase is part of a Biden plan to install 123 “new large-scale scanners” by 2026. The administration’s goal is to raise the number of multi-energy portals used to screen cross-border trucks from four — including the one already operating in Nogales — to 35, according to DHS. The plan would boost the number of “low-energy portals” for scanning passenger vehicles from seven to 88. Most of CBP’s previous-generation truck scanners require drivers to park and exit their vehicles, then go to waiting rooms until they can be cleared for entry. The new systems allow the drivers to roll through

while remaining at the wheel, because the multi-energy portal screens the truck cab with safer, low-intensity X-rays before switching to more powerful high-energy beams for the cargo area. CBP is separately deploying low-energy portals that can quickly scan passenger vehicles in secondary inspection. The new machines will ramp up U.S. inspection capacity from around two percent of passenger vehicles and about 17 percent of cargo vehicles to 40 percent of passenger vehicles and 70 percent of cargo vehicles, according to Biden officials. What CBP is doing is harnessing technology to address a product of technology — a synthetic product of technology,” said Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, referring to fentanyl. These machines are making and will continue to make an enormous difference.” Mayorkas said, in an interview. “They speak to the president’s directive to bring all resources to bear in the fight against fentanyl and to think creatively and innovatively to develop new tools.” Congress has worked with CBP to develop separate funding streams for equipment, civil works and artificial intelligence acquisition in an attempt to make sure the three elements of the NII systems are in sync. But in the meantime, at busy crossings like Nogales, CBP officers have to manually review the images produced by the scanners. A team of six officers in a new command post here scrutinized the vehicles’ cargo, hunting for suspicious densities or shapes that could be narcotics. The government’s physical infrastructure at the ports of entry is also a problem. Most of the land and buildings is owned by the General Services Administration, not CBP, and the border officials say they are often frustrated that they cannot make repairs or alterations to the sites. Lawmakers from both parties said they want CBP to have more control of the ports of entry.

4. Processing

Pathways for legal immigration are backlogged now

David J. **Bier**, 04-20-20**23**, "Streamlining to End Immigration Backlogs", Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/streamlining-end-immigration-backlogs> // RB

The agencies responsible for the legal immigration system are failing to process applications promptly, creating immense backlogs for visas and other immigration benefits. More than 20

million applications are stuck in backlogs, and no relief is in sight. This backlog is separating U.S. citizens from their families and keeping open jobs

unfilled across the country. Although the pandemic and the Trump administration exacerbated these problems, inefficiencies have plagued the U.S. system for decades. Given the current situation, the time for broad, ambitious reform has come. Tinkering with flawed procedures or spending more on them will not fix the immigration system's deep-seated problems. This paper outlines how to reverse many of the most critical inefficiencies, which lead to unnecessary filings and work for the immigration agencies: the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Department of Labor's Office of Foreign Labor Certification. The agencies want more funding from Congress and more fees from applicants, but the reforms outlined here would eliminate millions of duplicative applications, dramatically reduce wait times, and create a more flexible and sustainable immigration architecture without more money. The agencies could initiate many of these reforms on their own, but to sustain the progress, Congress should also consolidate immigration authorities and require more accountability from administration officials.

Updated tech solves

Hasalyn **Modine**, 05-01-20**24**, "DHS Embraces AI for Faster, Fairer Immigration Processes," Boundless,

<https://www.boundless.com/blog/dhs-embraces-ai-for-faster-fairer-immigration-processes/> //lumbo

What Could AI Mean for U.S. Immigration? Faster USCIS Processing Times: **AI can automate tasks like data entry and document**

review, freeing immigration officers to focus on the complexities of specific cases. This could

significantly reduce wait times for applicants, a crucial factor given the current backlog of 4.3 million

applications. Reduced Workload: By automating routine tasks and streamlining processes, AI could reduce the overall workload, allowing officers to dedicate

more time to complex cases.

The impact is trafficking

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in the Schar School of Policy and Government and the founder and Director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) at George Mason University, "Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective," Page 72-76,

[http://demografi.bps.go.id/phpfiletree/bahan/kumpulan_tugas_mobilitas_pak_chotib/Kelompok_7/Human_Trafficking_a_global_perspektif_\(Shelley\).pdf](http://demografi.bps.go.id/phpfiletree/bahan/kumpulan_tugas_mobilitas_pak_chotib/Kelompok_7/Human_Trafficking_a_global_perspektif_(Shelley).pdf), ag

Health Consequences **Trafficking victims die, become seriously ill, or are injured in many**

locales around the world each year as a result of the hazardous work conditions in which

they labor, the abuse of their traffickers and their clients, and their sheer physical

exhaustion. For many who are impaired, there are no effective treatments, as they are

psychologically damaged for life, suffering frequent nightmares and flashbacks and manifesting suicidal

tendencies.⁴² The constant abuse, violence, and intimidation they have suffered make it nearly impossible for them to return to normal lives. As one official at the International Organization for Migration in Moldova explained, they can repair the broken jaws and bones but they cannot mend the often irreparable psychological effects.⁴³ Research in Great Britain reveals that women who had stopped engaging in prostitution had the same levels of mental health problems (40 percent) and drug addiction (73 percent) as those who remained in the sex industry. This is consistent with posttraumatic stress disorder. These data affirm the insight of the IOM official in Moldova that the damage may be permanent, even in a society such as the United Kingdom, where those engaged in prostitution would have greater access to medical care than most trafficked into the sex industry.⁴⁴ Addiction to alcohol and drugs, sometimes imposed on the victim by the trafficker, impairs and shortens their lives. These conditions contribute to the untimely demise of youthful U.S. trafficking victims, who often survive only seven years after they have been trafficked into prostitution.⁴⁵

Hundreds of victims die annually of dehydration **while attempting to cross the deserts from Mexico into**

the United States. Others die in transit, as previously mentioned, in overcrowded vans or unseaworthy boats before they

reach their destinations. **Every year young women who resist their traffickers die,** such as the Afghan

girls who jump into wells rather than be trafficked.⁴⁶ Others die from HIV contracted through unprotected sex, as victims have no

possibility to protect themselves in their sexual encounters, or access to life-prolonging drugs. **In the trafficking culture,**

their lives are cheaper than the cost of medication. An unknown number of sex trafficking victims are killed

by their customers. Limited research has been done of the longevity of trafficking victims. But research conducted in the United

States on mortality of prostitutes reveals a high likelihood of premature death. As researchers explained, To our knowledge, no

population of women studied previously has had a crude mortality rate, standardized mortality ratio, or percentage of deaths due to

murder even approximating those observed in our cohort. The workplace homicide rate for prostitutes (204 per 100,000) is many

times higher than that for women and men in the standard occupations that had the highest workplace homicide rates in the United

States during the 1980s (4 per 100,000 for female liquor store workers and 29 per 100,000 for male taxicab drivers).⁴⁷ This fate is hardly unique. **One can presume that the rates of mortality are higher among trafficking**

victims than those among all prostitutes, as trafficking victims have the least control over their fates and are harmed regularly by both their traffickers and their customers

Trafficking is the root cause of border crime

Babatunde 14 — Abosede Omowumi Babatunde, lectures at the Centre for Peace and Strategic

Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan,

Nigeria, “Human Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime: Implications for Security in Nigeria,”

The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies Volume 46, Number 1 (2014), JSTOR

Human trafficking also **threatens national security in its link to transnational organized crime**, for in many

states, including Nigeria, international criminal networks that support mafia-like organizations undermine the states sovereignty over particular areas. A growing realisation through the 1980s and 1990s was that the rise of transnational organized crime is closely connected with the

weakness of states and their inability to control their territorial borders.⁵⁴ **The uncontrolled flow of** illegal **migrants** and refugees

across porous borders heightens competition over scarce resources, exacerbates ethnic and sectarian tensions, and **adds stress on already**

weak state institutions.

Crackdowns will destroy cartels

Nathan **Jones**, 01-02-20**14**, Will recreational marijuana sales in Colorado hurt Mexican cartels? – Baker Institute Blog, No

Publication, <https://bakerinstituteblog.blogs.rice.edu/2014/01/02/will-recreational-marijuana-sales-in-colorado-hurt-mexican-cartels/>

//recut nr

In terms of the impact on Mexican cartels in the short term, we might see a spike in other extortion-related crimes as profit starvation

sets in for certain cells in illicit networks. Attributing this to changing market dynamics in the United States will be difficult, given that

violent black market forces (rival cartels) may be a much more important confounding variable. These **illicit networks**

may further **diversify** into territorial extortionist activities, **but over the long term will be wiped out by**

civil society and **the state as these crimes draw a powerful backlash.** I documented this

process in Tijuana in my 2011 doctoral dissertation. The real benefits of legalization will be seen in the medium- and long-term. By

cutting into Mexican cartel **profits, other cartel activities and power could be**

reduced. We know that cartel profits can be redistributed to local cells to maintain territorial control. **The ability to**

weaken or reduce these payments could limit their activities and capital

investments in kidnapping and extortion franchises. Finally, **reducing cartel profits**

could help Mexico strengthen its institutions. Building effective police and security institutions takes

decades. Decades can stretch into centuries if those agencies are constantly rejiggered and re-corrupted by highly profitable and sophisticated organized criminal networks.

The impact is stopping terrorism

The threat of terrorism is increasing

SOAA June (Special Operations Association of America (SOAA) represents thousands of Army Rangers

and Green Berets, Navy SEALs, Marine Raiders, Air Force Air Commandos, and other special operators

who have fought and currently serve on behalf of our nation) Special Operations Association of America,

06/25/2024, "An Open Letter of Concern"

<https://soaa.org/wp-content/uploads/SOAA-Open-Letter-Final.pdf> //jjoy

We are gravely concerned by the current heightened risk of terrorist attacks against targets inside the

United States and both U.S. and allied interests abroad. Our complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, without a viable stay-behind or over-the-horizon counterterrorism and intelligence capability to suppress threats,

has created a **vacuum in the region in which anti-American terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic**

State, are flourishing once again. The United States has lost significant intelligence collection capabilities in the region, leaving federal authorities blind and deaf to emerging threats emanating

from the region. The creation of new and reestablishment of previous terrorist training camps within

Afghanistan has led to successful, deadly attacks by the Islamic State's regional branch against

targets in Iran and Russia and elsewhere, adding further credence to the notion that the U.S. is at risk.

This heightened risk has been verified by multiple departments and agencies of the federal government, mainstream journalists and publications, former senior officials from both parties, and from former allies with whom we

maintain communication. This risk is compounded by developments in the Middle East and the porous,

unsecured southern border through which we have seen numerous instances of individuals on terrorist watchlists and others from adversarial countries

attempt to enter the U.S. – and those are the ones we know about only because they were detected. We do not know how many other terrorists are already currently inside the U.S. At the same time, the U.S.

has continued to send the Taliban millions of dollars for “counterterrorism cooperation”, which has proved to be only marginally successful given developments on the ground in Afghanistan. Millions more in aid that is being

repurposed by the Taliban to suit its own purposes. As former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Morell recently wrote, The Terrorism warning lights are blinking

red again – echoes of the run-up to 9/11. Time is not on our side and urgent executive action is needed to

address this ever-increasing threat to U.S. national security, our families, our allies, and our homeland.

Terrorists are preparing to attack in 6 months

Mitchell 24 (Ellen Mitchell is the senior defense reporter for The Hill) The Hill, 04/01/2024, “Retired

general says US ‘target No. 1’ for ISIS-K after Moscow attack”

<https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4568198-us-target-isis-k-moscow-attack/>

ISIS-K, the Central Asian offshoot of the Islamic State (ISIS) terror group that carried out the deadly Moscow concert hall attack last month, badly wants to target the U^{nited}S^{tates}, two

former U.S. Central Command leaders are warning. Retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, former CENTCOM head, said Sunday that the group has a “strong desire” to attack the

U.S. and Biden administration officials should “believe them when they say that.” “I think the threat is growing.” McKenzie told ABC News’s “This

Week,” noting that it began to grow after U.S. forces left Afghanistan in August 2021, which took

pressure off ISIS-K. He also pointed to the March 22 attack on Crocus City Hall theater in Moscow, where at least 143 people were killed and more than 100 others were injured by four gunmen, as an

indication **“we should expect further attempts of this nature against the United States as well as our partners**

and other nations abroad. I think this is inevitable.” And retired Army Maj. Gen. Mark Quantock, who oversaw intelligence operations for CENTCOM, told USA Today that

the U.S. “remains target No. 1 for ISIS-K.” “They clearly would like to strike the homeland, but their

challenge is penetrating our security, which has proven to be quite resilient in recent years.” Quantock said. Created in

2014, ISIS-K seeks to form a caliphate across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and is known for its extreme brutality. Following the Moscow attack, experts have warned that ISIS-K, whose plots were

once largely confined to Afghanistan, has been picking up speed in the size and scope of its attacks. **The current U.S. Central Command leader, Gen. Michael**

Kurilla, last March warned Congress that ISIS-K was rapidly building up its ability to conduct “external

operations” in Europe and Asia and could even be able to hit U.S. and Western interests outside

Afghanistan “in as little as six months and with little to no warning.” McKenzie, who was head of CENTCOM during the U.S.

withdrawal from Afghanistan, has long argued that the U.S. should have kept a small troop presence in Afghanistan, and without one Washington has “almost no ability to see into that country and almost no ability to strike into that

The border lacks tools k2 radiological detection

Flynn et al. June 18th (Stephen Flynn is an expert in homeland security, most recently appointed head of the National Nuclear

Security Administration. This was a report governed by multiple subgroups and boards of the Department of Defense and the

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.) NNSA, 06/18/20**24**, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S.

strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction” //bm + jjoy /re-cut

Notwithstanding the good work of the departments and agencies and these post-9/11 programs, there are gaps in the overall security picture. The ISPS code addresses the security of the ships, terminal, and personnel but not the cargo they handle and transport. The U.S. Coast Guard’s International Port Security (IPS) program, which is responsible for confirming compliance with the ISPS Code, has never been adequately funded to carry out regular inspections at the individual port facility level. CTPAT currently has more than 11,000 certified partners that account for more than 50 percent of cargo (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2023), by value, imported into the United States, but CBP does not have adequate staffing to validate that the security measures of CTPAT members are reliable, accurate, and effective. They are not able to conduct periodic audits of CTPAT certified partners. This makes it difficult to distinguish between those companies who are making good faith efforts to implement supply chain security best

practices and those who are not. **CBP’s** Container Security Initiative **is operating** in 61 ports and **prescreens cargo manifest and other**

trade information for more than 80 percent of U.S.-bound maritime containerized cargo (U.S.

Customs and Border Protection 2022). Only a fraction of one percent of containers, **however**, are subject to non-intrusive inspection at the overseas ports of loading. **Upon arrival in**

a U.S. port, CBP typically inspects just 3% of inbound cargo containers (Green Worldwide Logistics 2019).

The selection of which containers warrant such an inspection is based primarily on an algorithm developed to identify high-risk shipments. In 2021, however, when the National Cargo Bureau conducted inspections of 500 containers that are not traditionally inspected they found that 55 percent of containers were out of compliance with safeguard regulations and 2.5% of inspected dangerous goods containers were found to include misdeclared cargo that “represented a serious risk to crew, vessel, and the environment.” (National Cargo Bureau 2020) Nine major containership fires reported in 2019 were attributed to poorly

stowed, undeclared or misdeclared dangerous cargo (National Cargo Bureau 2020). The post-9/11 programs to counter nuclear terrorism and proliferation launched by the U.S. Department of Energy, Department of Defense, and Department of State also have significant limitations. In the absence of non-intrusive inspection equipment that can identify shielding, the stand-alone radiation portals that have been deployed at major seaports and border crossing under the U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense, MegaPorts, and successor programs are not able to detect shielded radiological materials. Thus, criminals or terrorists could use readily available materials such as lead to encase nuclear materials or a weapon that might then be able to pass through a radiation portal without setting off an alarm. Interdiction efforts of suspected nuclear shipments that are pursued under the Proliferation Security Initiative face the practical challenge of

gaining access to the contents of individual containerized cargo shipments once they are loaded aboard a container ship. When containers are stowed, there typically is only 18-24 inches of space between them. They are placed in stacks that can be 10 or more deep below and above decks, and as many as 20 across. A boarding team has no practical way to gain access to an individual container while it is aboard a vessel. Instead, the ship must come into a port equipped with a gantry crane to remove the containers stacked on top of and around the suspected container. This may mean the ship must divert to a port where the container can be safely offloaded. Consent of the state that

has registered the ship (flag state consent) or other permissions such as ship's master or owner must first be obtained. Consideration must also be given to liability if the cargo ship is significantly delayed from its schedule. UNSCR 1540 has played a helpful role in advancing the norm that UN member states should independently and collectively work to reduce the nuclear terrorism risk. It calls for each state to prepare a

national implementation action plan, but these are done on a voluntary basis and not all states have done so. The 1540 Committee can respond to requests for technical assistance, but the Committee is not authorized to confirm compliance by member states. With respect to preventing shipments of nuclear and other materials, the Committee has not yet developed programs to guide member states on what they should be doing to mitigate the risk of non-state actors transporting nuclear materials within their jurisdictions and across their national borders. Nor has the Committee established a collaborative relationship with its fellow UN agency, the International Maritime Organization, to undertake counterproliferation efforts in seaports and within global shipping channels. Today, **many developing**

countries simply lack the resources and capabilities to prevent the transport of nuclear materials within and across their borders. To summarize, the **authorities and programs that touch on ports, ships, cargo, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation are spread across an array of U.S. departments and agencies with varying levels of domestic and international reach.** Individually and collectively, these **efforts** have raised awareness, helped to **advance global norms, engage international partners, facilitate closer cooperation with the private sector, and have provided expanded capacity for detection and interception of illicit nuclear materials.** Yet all these efforts have been advanced in an uncoordinated manner with uneven funding and staffing to sustain them. No one agency or department has

been assigned to serve as the overall lead for detection and interdiction efforts. 8.3 THE RISK NUCLEAR TERRORISM POSES TO THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN FINDING 8-2: **A nuclear incident involving the global supply system would expose gaps in the system's security and lead to catastrophic economic consequences arising from system-wide delays while new security measures were developed and deployed.** Highly dangerous materials continue to evade safeguards within the maritime

transportation system upon which the smooth operation of global trade flows depend. (National Cargo Bureau 2020) **Should a terrorist organization decide to** put the current security measures to the test by **intercepting a container from a "trusted shipper" and inserting a shielded Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), it would be very difficult to detect the shipment** in the absence of an intelligence tip. **If the RDD were detonated at an arrival port, the efficacy of all the post-9/11 port and container security measures would be called into question.**⁴ **Beyond the direct damage done by the nuclear device itself, the aftermath of a nuclear**

incident would have widespread economic consequences. These consequences would arise from the inevitable public anxiety that

the incident would generate about the dangers posed by uninspected cargo containers. **Addressing this anxiety by physically inspecting all**

inbound cargo containers would lead to supply chain gridlock. These inspections could not be done aboard a loaded vessel

at anchor or at sea, and suspect vessels might not even be allowed to dock and unload uninspected containers so that they can be examined within a port. Under the "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11

Commission Act" of 2007, there is already a legal requirement mandating 100-percent of U.S. bound cargo containers undergo non-intrusive imaging and pass **through** radiation detection equipment

prior to their being loaded overseas. This requirement has been waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security at two-year intervals since 2007, but there would likely be enormous public and political pressure to

immediately implement the law in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. **One hundred percent inspections would result in the kind**

of vessel backups that took place during the COVID-19 emergency with the associated

cascading global supply chain effects and impacts on worldwide economic activity. 8.4

ENHANCING THE MEANS TO MONITOR CARGO SHIPMENTS FINDING 8-3: **Technologies are available to enhance supply chain**

transparency and the means to detect contraband including nuclear materials. These

improved methods include non-intrusive inspection technologies and processing

scanned images with the assistance of AI and machine learning to better detect and

intercept contraband to include nuclear materials. It is possible to **adapt port facility operations to**

use non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology to routinely scan all containers entering a

port facility so as to confirm that the contents do not pose a nuclear or radioactive risk to

the terminal, ship and its crew (Bakshi, Flynn, and Gans 2011).⁵ Note, scanning for nuclear materials is part of the overall contraband identification process, along with

other types of contraband. When a container triggers an alarm, it can be transferred to a secondary inspection area to scan the contents by more sensitive NII equipment. In most instances, this more detailed

examination would resolve the concern in minutes⁶ and the container could then be cleared and transferred back into the container yard in time to make its scheduled voyage. **This additional**

scanning data could then be forwarded to customs inspectors in the destination port to

supplement their information.⁷ In the rare instances where alarms are not resolved by the secondary inspection scanning, the appropriate protocol would be for officials

in both the loading and destination ports to be alerted⁸ and the container moved to a secure holding area where its contents could be inspected by local officials or in collaboration with the Container Security

Initiative team that the United States has deployed overseas.⁹ Any breaking of the container seal to gain physical access to the container's contents would only be done by authorized inspectors.

Otherwise, nuclear terror is likely

Thompson June 21st (Jess Thomson is a Newsweek Science Reporter based in London UK. Her focus is reporting on science, technology and healthcare. She has covered weird animal behavior, space news and the impacts of climate change extensively. Jess joined Newsweek in May 2022 and previously worked at Springer Nature. She is a graduate of the University of Oxford. Languages: English.) Newsweek, 06/21/2024 “**Nuclear Terrorism 'Risks Are High,'** Researchers Warn”

<https://www.newsweek.com/nuclear-terrorism-threat-high-report-1915199> //jjoy

India and Pakistan each have about 170 warheads, Israel has 90, and North Korea possesses 50, according to the Federation of American Scientists. The report said that during the 20th century Russia and the U.S. both wanted to

limit the world's supply of nuclear weapons, while now there is an increased demand for, and availability of, nuclear materials, with fewer ways of controlling them. **We're in a world right now**

where most of the control of the programs in place to manage supply and control of nuclear weapons

[is] basically unraveling,” Flynn said. “With rising world tensions, there is no scope now for arms reductions to take place, sadly,” Rod Thornton, an associate professor in international studies, defense

and security at King's College London, told Newsweek. The report also said the National Academies committee is concerned about the flourishing of the civilian nuclear sector. **Many new nuclear**

plants are going to places they've not gone before, and this is not happening with the U.S. setting and

enforcing the rules but being led by the Chinese and Russians, with fewer security controls in place,” Flynn

said. **Most of the materials that can be used to produce a 'dirty bomb' have always been challenging to**

control, and now there are more available. Even without state actor complicity, there is more risk that

terrorist groups can get their hands on these materials,” he said.

The impact is trade

Alejandro Berlanga **Azlaga**, Texas A&M Transportation Institute, "Applying AI, Drones and Satellites to Improve Border

Transportation — Center for International Intelligent Transportation Research", March 14, 20**22**,

<https://ciitr.tti.tamu.edu/2022/03/14/applying-ai-drones-and-satellites-to-improve-border-transportation/> //AS

When you think of drones, you may think of a package getting delivered to your doorstep. Many companies conduct flight missions of drones for delivering goods, but other applications for **drones can benefit the public (and commercial vehicle**

drivers) in another way — travel across the border. Alejandro Berlanga Alzaga. Valeria Martinez. We

and our colleagues at the Texas A&M Transportation Institute's (TTI's) Center for International Intelligent Transportation Research (CIITR) get to work with the latest technologies in three areas — AI, drones and satellites — and apply them to improving transportation at the border.

Recent research allows us to become AI specialists. We explore new AI algorithms, closely monitor trends and note improvement areas and figure out ways to apply them to facilitate trade, improve border security and encourage economic growth in border communities. You've probably seen

AI or drone technology depicted in the movies, and that's built up hype (and often negative hype). But AI **technology can** help

resolve real-world problems today, **like achieving more accurate and reliable border wait time**

estimates at land ports of entry. Longer wait times can mean delays in goods getting to market, and if that delay is long

enough, it can even mean spoilage of goods like milk or produce. **Combining AI algorithms with satellite**

and aerial imagery can help facilitate distribution via the border by getting

trucks to their destinations more effectively. Visualizing results (shown here) after taking satellite images

facilitates a better understanding of vehicles at the border and can identify exactly where delays occur. Drones (like the one pictured here) capture aerial images that can provide information about border traffic conditions. Recent enhancements in satellite imagery, for example, allow for better control of the frequency and number of images collected at border crossings, as well as advanced imaging capabilities. Drones, for example, offer flexibility and dexterity, advantages over cameras and radar sensors installed in fixed locations at the border. Better data help agencies charged with monitoring the border to work more efficiently, and that efficiency is passed downstream, benefiting the entire distribution process. It can

even mean lower prices for consumers on store shelves. To assess these technologies for effectiveness, we collected aerial and satellite images to use in building 3-D models to better visualize the data associated with stalled traffic at heavy wait times at border crossings. Stalled traffic in extreme border queuing conditions can ratchet up costs and travel time. Our research suggests a lower cost and an improved ease of use, which could fit well with agency staff new to (and eager for) these technologies. Challenges will inevitably arise in implementing these new methods for monitoring the border. That's why we do our research, to ultimately troubleshoot potential problems in applying new tech solutions to achieve the most bang for the taxpayer's buck in applying them. Better tech, better methods, better policy benefit manufacturers, distributors and ultimately consumers — everyone wins.

It brings a plethora of economic benefits

Andrea **Ratiu**, Atlantic Council, "The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation - Atlantic Council", September 27, 20**22**,

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-economic-impact-of-a-more-efficient-us-mexico-border>

Improvements in border management and the adoption of new technologies at the US-Mexico border have the potential to enhance security and generate economic benefits for the United States and Mexico through expedited flows of goods and people. Reduced border wait times would lead to more traffic entering the United States from Mexico, both in terms of commercial trucks loaded with goods for US consumers and shoppers ready to buy US goods. This

report **quantifies** the economic impact of this additional commerce and cross-border spending, which would lead to further economic

prosperity in the two countries. We know that long wait times at the border can hurt our businesses and economy, especially in my district.

Ensuring our ports of entry have sufficient funding to reduce wait times is necessary to keep our economy on track and ensure businesses on both sides of the border succeed.” The Hon. Juan Vargas Representative (D-CA-51) US House of Representatives Research shows **that a**

10-minute reduction in wait times could lead to an additional \$26 million

worth of cargo entering the United States each month via commercial vehicles. This translates to

more than **\$312 million** in further commerce from Mexico into the United States annually. The extra inventory of finished and

intermediate goods would drive down US domestic prices, creating increased economic well-being for US citizens. This report also finds that

reducing border wait times by 10 minutes has a positive annual impact of \$5.4 million on the US economy due to purchases by additional families

and individuals entering the United States from Mexico. While the immediate effect of these purchases is most evident in border communities,

economic benefits would spread to the continental United States due to the economic linkages between local economies, with approximately 25

percent of the total impact reaching non-border states. Strengthened US-Mexico collaboration at our border will **unlock significant**

economic growth, promote supply chain resilience, and boost competitiveness,

benefiting Mexican workers and families. These benefits will reverberate far beyond the border,

reaching states throughout Mexico. Now is the time to invest in initiatives to create an even more efficient and

secure shared border.” H.E. Luz Maria de la Mora Subsecretary of International Commerce, Secretariat of the Economy United Mexican States

Beyond the \$312 million in added commerce from Mexico into the United

States, a 10-minute reduction in border wait times would promote the creation

of nearly 18,700 direct and indirect jobs in Mexico, increase labor income per

sector by an average of \$17,474, and boost growth for various Mexican **economic sectors,**

particularly manufacturing, wholesale trade, and mining.

Rebuttal

Affirming is k2 break the cycle and reduce the demand for migration.

Taylor Leonard, Eva Lee, xx-xx-2020, "US-Mexico Border: Building a Smarter Wall through Strategic Security Measure Allocation", Journal of Strategic Innovation and Sustainability Vol. 15, <https://articlegateway.com/index.php/JSIS/article/view/2735/2601> // TT

The drastic difference/increase in the ratio of deaths to apprehensions is due to the 75% decrease in apprehensions in the last 18 years

(U.S. Border Patrol Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Fiscal Year). It is correct that the number of deaths has increased in

certain sectors due to the "Funnel Effect," or avoidance of increased border surveillance technology in

other sectors, but the rates also drastically decreased in the monitored areas (Chambers, 2019). Overall, this

tells us that deterrence-based strategic efforts are possibly contributing to the reduction in attempted

illegal crossings. There are arguments that deterrence based strategies increase injuries to immigrants. The literature actually presents the

scenarios where immigrants attempt to cross the border over the large border fences and have injured themselves from falling off of them

(Jusonyte, 2018). It is obvious in the results presented in this paper that spending additional funds on the wall is not the best solution and that there

are other, more effective, and less physical methods that can deter immigrants. Obviously, any loss of life is tragic, but our mathematical model can be

used to encourage funding of deterrence and detection methods, even in remote areas. Not only would

this aid in decreasing migrant attempts in the dangerous routes, but it would also assist CBP agents

and first responders in assisting those individuals that are injured in their crossing attempts. The

US-Mexico border is approximately 1,933 miles long. As a result of the Secure Fence Act in 2006, hundreds of miles of physical fence were

constructed along the border. Currently, 1,279 miles, 66% of the border is unfenced; the Rio Grande River makes up much of this

unfenced border.

Monique O. **Madan**, 03-21-20**24**, "The future of Border Patrol: AI is always watching", Government Executive,

<https://www.govexec.com/technology/2024/03/future-border-patrol-ai-always-watching/395167/> // RB

USBP had nearly **250,000 encounters with migrants crossing into the United States from**

Mexico in December 2023, the most recent month for which data is available. That was the highest monthly total on record,

easily eclipsing the previous peak of about 224,000 encounters in May 2022. Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, an associate policy

analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, a research organization, called the growing tech arena "a double-edged sword." "On the one

hand, **advances in automation are really helpful for certain aspects of what happens at the**

southern border. I think it's **been extremely helpful, especially when migrants are stuck in**

perilous situations, if they've been hurt, if a member of their group is dehydrated or ill or

something like that, there are different ways that, whether it's via a cell phone or via

some sort of remote tower or via something, Border Patrol has been able to do search

and rescue missions," she said.

Border security will increase DHS funding due to economic gains.

Melyana R. **Pugu**, 20**24**-04-28 "INFLUENCE OF BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN

BORDER AREAS", INJOSER, <https://injoser.ioln.org/index.php/123/article/view/172> // RB

The results of the research show that the **improvement of the infrastructure in the border area has a**

significant positive impact on the volume of trade, with reduced logistics costs and

improved efficiency of the flow of goods and services. Better infrastructure is strongly correlated with

higher levels of foreign investment and closer regional economic integration. Further analysis shows that increased access to education, health care, and public services, catalysed by infrastructure investment, significantly contributes to economic and social development in the border areas. The research also found that strong border infrastructure increases economic

resilience to external disturbances and drives long-term growth through economic diversification and innovation.

Rest were analytics.