

# Constructive

The United States has struck gold. Over the past 60 years, we've developed a crucial role in Asia, stabilizing relationships between Taiwan, China and other regional allies. That's why **Heath 24** finds:

Timothy R. **Heath**, 06/13/20**24**, Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, with expertise in

China's military and political strategies. His testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission outlines reasons why China is unlikely to engage in war, emphasizing economic risks, lack of military superiority, and Xi Jinping's preference for long-term strategic positioning. "Is China Prepared for War? Indications and Warning of a Potential Chinese Conflict," RAND Corporation,

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CTA3381-1.html> // keshav

**Little Evidence of National War Preparation** To determine whether China actually expects war, it is far more important to observe what the leadership is

saying and doing in the nonmilitary policy domains. **There is no evidence that China is carrying out any type of mobilization for**

**war** and little evidence of national war preparation, Although a comprehensive review of the state of preparations in all nonmilitary policy domains lies beyond the scope of this testimony, I

will highlight a few key areas: politics, economy, defense industry, defense mobilization, and medical care. Politically, Xi Jinping has made no statement suggesting the entire nation must prepare for war or otherwise suggesting war is likely or at all desirable. On the contrary, Xi has consistently affirmed that Beijing adheres to the pursuit of the "China Dream" of national revitalization through a peaceful development strategy.<sup>18</sup> To be clear, Xi has made numerous criticisms of the United States and has stated on several occasions that Taiwan unification must occur and that use of force cannot be ruled out. Yet his statements about Taiwan largely resemble those of his predecessors.<sup>19</sup> For example, when Xi makes pledges to ensure Taiwan's unification, he has done so in sections of long speeches that outline national priorities and imperatives, such as the 19th or 20th Party Congress reports. In such reports, mention of Taiwan usually appears near the end of the report, in a section typically reserved for the issue. **The overwhelming focus** of those speeches **is on socioeconomic**

**issues, such as jobs,** corruption, and in **equality**.<sup>20</sup> What about China's **economy** and defense industry? **Countries that are serious**

**about waging war tend to significantly increase their defense spending to maximize the odds of**

**victory.** In World War II, mobilized Allied and Axis powers increased defense spending to between 50 and 70 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In more recent wars, states have

ramped up spending, though to a lesser degree. U.S. defense spending surged to around 6 percent of GDP in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example.<sup>21</sup> Russia has ratcheted defense spending to between 6 and 9 percent of GDP in its war in Ukraine.<sup>22</sup> By contrast, **China's defense spending remains relatively modest** at under 2

percent of GDP, although the actual amount spent is probably slightly underreported.<sup>23</sup> Although China has pursued a "military-civil fusion" strategy, its purpose seems as much to be about supporting the country's economic development strategy as it is about improving military capability.<sup>24</sup> Some have cited evidence of stockpiling to suggest war preparations. But this may be explained more simply by Chinese concerns over a more unstable and unpredictable global economy, given the disruptions from the Russia-Ukraine war and other crises. It is a concern shared by many countries. For example, China may have amassed about 300-400 million barrels of oil, while the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has accumulated 364 million barrels.<sup>25</sup> China has carried out reforms to streamline defense mobilization procedures and clarify roles and responsibilities. However, the system continues to face shortfalls.<sup>26</sup> As an example, the People's Armed Forces Department (PAFD) has experienced a resurgence in activity. The PAFD is responsible for overseeing the recruitment, organizing, and management of militia forces and also plays a key role in the mobilization of militia. However, improvements to the PAFD do little to address the more fundamental problems with China's defense mobilization system, such as a lack of standardized data management, understaffed and misaligned bureaucracies, inconsistent authorities, and unresolved compensation policies.<sup>27</sup> China's medical infrastructure has made little progress in national war preparations as well. Chinese hospitals appear, at most, to be prepared for earthquakes but otherwise have little capacity to cope with mass casualties.<sup>28</sup> A survey of academic reports in 2018 observed that China lags its counterparts in the study of emergency medical systems for mass casualty incidents.<sup>29</sup> Chinese military medical journals have also judged the existing system of medical evacuation and treatment of war-related injuries deeply inadequate.<sup>30</sup> China's medical system has seen some improvements during Xi's tenure, but it continues

to suffer serious deficiencies, including ineffective regulation and inconsistent training and education of providers.<sup>31</sup> China's mishandling of the exit from the COVID-19 pandemic underscored weaknesses in the system.<sup>32</sup> China may have made little effort to put the country on a war footing, but Beijing has clearly sought to bolster the country's security. This activity has contributed to the perception that China is stepping up war preparations. However, Chinese leaders have fairly consistently highlighted domestic dangers as the principal reason for such preparations. When Xi described the threats to national security at the 20th Party Congress, he began by listing issues of "social governance," likely referring to popular discontent over corruption, inequality, and local malfeasance. He then mentioned "ethnic separatists, religious extremists, and violent terrorists," as well as organized crime and natural disasters, before moving on to discuss other perils, including pressure from the United States.<sup>33</sup> The strong emphasis on domestic dangers should not be surprising. International polls similarly show that domestic issues, such as crime, unemployment, and corruption, are top concerns in many developing countries, including China.<sup>34</sup> **The security preparations observed in industry,**

**defense mobilization**, the PAFD, the medical system, **and elsewhere are consistent with a country worried first** and foremost **about a deteriorating domestic situation and are less consistent with those** undertaken by a leadership **contemplating major war.**

## CI

### Subpoint A is China's Motive

Political leaders in China are walking a fine line – they want to gain power by reunifying with Taiwan – but are held back by U.S. military presence.

Shelley **Rigger**, xx-xx-20**11**, "Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China", American Enterprise Institute,

<https://www.ijstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep03112.pdf> // RB

Although we can hardly expect them to admit it, **the status quo in the Taiwan Strait serves the political interests of Chinese** **leaders whose top priority is domestic development and regime stability.** Indeed, **even the best-case** **scenario for Beijing is unpredictable and potentially destabilizing.** We can say Gilley is right, and Taiwan is moving toward

Finlandization. In fact, there is ample evidence for a consensus within Taiwan that deeper engagement with mainland China is both inevitable and desirable. At the same time, however, the

Taiwanese people are more attached than ever to their political autonomy and distinctive identity. Withdrawing US security assistance would not change these

attitudes, but many Taiwanese people would view this action, rightly or wrongly, as a deathblow to the island's

autonomy. Some would try to flee. Others would urge their government to develop doomsday weapons to keep

the PRC at bay, a desperate measure the United States has so far dissuaded Taiwan from pursuing. Others

still would encourage Taipei to hold out as long as possible. The economic costs of undermining the Taiwanese people's confidence in their own security would be

huge, and negotiating a peaceful, mutually acceptable unification in such an environment would be nearly impossible. To finish the job, China would almost certainly be forced to resort to

coercive measures—precisely the expensive and risky undertaking Chinese leaders are hoping to avoid. And even if its coercive measures succeeded in winning the Taiwan government's

acquiescence, integrating 23 million sullen and terrified Taiwanese into the PRC would be yet another daunting and

expensive project. US security assistance stabilizes both sides of the Taiwan Strait by reassuring the

Taiwanese people and justifying Beijing's decision to be patient.

Problematically, cutting support for Taiwan proves the U.S. is weak and unreliable. That emboldens China to push for an invasion now.

Shelley Rigger, xx-xx-2011, "Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China", American Enterprise Institute,

<https://www.istor.org/stable/pdf/resrep03112.pdf> // RB

US security assistance—both the possibility of direct intervention and support for Taiwan's self-defense— makes unification risky and expensive. If the United States

withdraws its support, we should expect nationalists and hardliners in the PRC to press the Chinese Communist

Party leadership to solve the Taiwan problem sooner rather than later. China's newly muscular posture in the East and South China Seas is already

raising eyebrows around the region; the last thing Beijing needs is a reinvigorated nationalist movement howling for satisfaction on

another offshore issue.

Nancy B. **Tucker** and Bonnie S. **Glaser**, xx-xx-20**11**, "Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?". The Washington Quarterly Vol. 34, Issue

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Careful examination of these variables leads us to conclude that **the United States should neither abandon nor reduce its**

**commitments to Taiwan**, but strengthen them. Taiwan remains the single issue which could spark war between the U.S. and China. What Would Sacrificing Taiwan Gain?

Would abandoning or reducing support for Taiwan secure smoother U.S.–China relations? Those in China and the United States who call for a change in Taiwan policy insist there would be significant benefits. The decision by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to trade Taiwan for normalization with Beijing facilitated a momentous improvement in U.S.–China relations, setting a powerful precedent.[ 2] To choose China over Taiwan once again, it is asserted, could help Washington resolve differences with China over maritime rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber security, and the uses of space. This line of thinking argues that even issues not directly connected with Taiwan policy could be easier to reconcile if what China deems a core interest were satisfied. Beyond breaking the U.S.–Taiwan bond, Beijing has denied any desire to push the United States out of Asia. It has reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping's injunction to "hide its light and bide its time, while getting something accomplished" (taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei).[ 3] It has repeatedly put development and peace first. However, China's superior economic performance during the recession, surging global trade and investments, and developing military might led Beijing during 2010 to implement a series of assertive initiatives which caused widespread anxiety in its neighborhood and internationally. As China's power grows, its allegiance to Deng's maxim becomes more dated and stale. **A decision to jettison Taiwan, or even**

**cut back significantly on U.S. support, would prove to an increasingly confident China that Washington**

**has become weak, vacillating, and unreliable**. The 2009 U.S.–China Joint Statement reflected Beijing's estimate that Washington could be intimidated or

misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to Taiwan as a Chinese core interest with concurrence that "the two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to

ensure steady progress in U.S.–China relations."[ 4] **Analysts who argue that Washington can safely appease Beijing** because "territorial

concessions are not always bound to fail" **are**, without evidence, **assuming improbably modest Chinese objectives** (emphasis added).[ 5]

**Relying on the sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese ambitions ignores** more than intentions, it also **overlooks internal**

**dynamics in China. Beijing confronts constant domestic turmoil. Corruption, income inequality, and environmental**

degradation **have tarnished the** accomplishments of the government and **party**. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine

Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, is still difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability.

Accordingly, **a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan**, while gratifying, **could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to**

**demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh**

**efforts** to satisfy that need.

Historically,

Keren **Yarhi-Milo**, Alexander Lanoszka, Zack Cooper, 10-01-20**16**, "To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances", MIT Press,

<https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/41/2/90/12143/To-Arm-or-to-Ally-The-Patron-s-Dilemma-and-the-//RB>, \*\*brackets, ellipses in og\*\*

Whatever its intent, the Carter administration failed to anticipate Congress's negative reaction regarding the **lack of consultation on the termination of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979** and **the end of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980**.

**Members were also outraged because they perceived Carter's actions as abandoning an ally and damaging the United States' reputation. Indeed, shortly after China received diplomatic recognition from Washington, it invaded North Vietnam**—an action that amplified the concerns expressed in Congress.<sup>103</sup> The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which

came into force on April 10, 1979, committed the United States to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character . . . in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability . . . based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan."<sup>104</sup> The TRA also required that Washington maintain the capacity to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan."<sup>105</sup> In a memorandum to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance noted: "We have a dual problem in determining our position on the resumption of arms sales to Taiwan. On the one hand, our action should be taken in such a way as to reassure Congress and Taiwan that we continue to have an interest in Taiwan's legitimate defense requirements. On the other hand, we wish to avoid provoking the PRC to react in a manner harmful to our developing bilateral relationship."<sup>109</sup> Nevertheless, Vance warned: **"Taiwan views our arms sales commitment as the keystone of**

**their security policy and will be anxious** for reconfirmation of our pledges early in the new year."<sup>110</sup> Indeed, on November 8, 1979, Taiwan placed a request

for "high-performance fighter aircraft... with most other requests focused on air and sea defense weapons."<sup>111</sup> U.S. officials now reconsidered selling F-4s to Taiwan, noting that "F-4 sale would dramatize that the U.S. is not 'abandoning' Taiwan.... Both with Congress and on Taiwan, an F-4 sale is probably the most popular step we can take."<sup>112</sup> Responding to Taiwan's demands, however, Vance reasoned in December 1979 that an upgrade in the U.S. military commitment to Taiwan was unlikely. To him, there was "no reason at this point to change our position of denying sales to Taiwan of F-4, F-16 or F-18 aircraft, all of which have offensive capability as well as violate the arms transfer policy." Reagan's election elicited hope in Taipei that Washington would upgrade its military commitment by supplying Taiwan with newer fighter aircraft. Reagan's election elicited hope in Taipei that Washington would upgrade its military commitment by

supplying Taiwan with newer fighter aircraft. **Threatened by Reagan's stance toward normalization, China demanded in**

**1981 that the United States** commit not only to denying Taiwan advanced fighters, but also to **ending all arms sales**. Ultimately, **the Reagan administration rejected** the sale, **explaining that "[t]he military and intelligence communities agree that for the foreseeable future Taiwan's legitimate defense needs can be fully met,** by continuing the F-5E coproduction line on Taiwan

with the possibility in addition of replacing older worn out aircraft with used aircraft of a comparable type."<sup>114</sup> **Beijing was adamant that U.S. arms sales**

**to Taiwan should cease**, arguing that even a supply of defensive military capabilities could have negative effects on U.S.-China relations. **Yet China**

**eventually yielded** to a "phase-down" instead of a "phaseout" of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, **without an explicit U.S. commitment to end**

them. The Third Joint Communiqué of August 18, 1982, embodied this compromise. The communiqué acknowledged that “the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”

Similarly,

Ann Wang, 09-25-2024, "U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts", Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts> // TT

The U.S. Navy’s departure in early 1953 triggered the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55), which saw a significant exchange of military strikes between mainland Chinese forces and nationalists stationed on small fortified islands in the strait. A similar crisis again occurred in 1958. While both crises were limited, the United States and Soviet Union both at points warned of their willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend their putative allies in an expanded conflict.

### Subpoint B is Taiwan’s Fear

Richard Weitz, 01-12-2016, "Taiwan Arms Deal Aims To Reduce Cross-Strait Tensions", China-U.S. Focus,

<https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwan-arms-deal-aims-to-reduce-cross-strait-tensions> // TT

In addition, Washington worries that declining to assist the Taiwanese military could encourage Beijing to adopt aggressive policies toward Taipei, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation and thereby inflicting a major economic shock on China, Taiwan, the United States, and other countries. China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorizes the use of force if Beijing concludes that peaceful reunification efforts will prove unsuccessful. U.S. officials have also feared that stopping conventional arms sales to Taiwan could have the untoward effect of prompting a panicky Taipei and other U.S. security partners, such as Japan and South Korea, to pursue nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, or

**other destabilizing strategic weapons. Each of these three actors has been building offensive**

**conventional weapons and they have the capacity to make nuclear weapons.** From a moral perspective, Taiwan is an

attractive partner for Americans given its democratic political system, with competitive multi-party elections in which the results are not decided in advance, and its other political and economic freedoms. Under present circumstances, the transfer of the PRC's political system to the island would result in a setback for the global democracy and human rights agenda

supported by the United States. From a realpolitik perspective, **Taiwan** contributes to U.S. security in multiple ways, from **serv**ing **as a strategic indicator**

**regarding** how China will use its growing international power to reinforcing **the credibility of the U.S. security guarantees that**

**underpin** the **East Asian security architecture** that has **promote regional peace and prosperity,** including to the benefit of

China and the United States. From the bargaining perspective, **the U.S. administration cannot** seem to **yield to Chinese threats to**

**suspend defense exchanges** or otherwise punish the United States over the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or related questions. Not only would encourage

negotiators from China and other countries to think they can achieve more gains from further threats, but a stream of unbalanced **U.S. concessions would**

**undermine** domestic public confidence and **support for a** generally **cooperative U.S. government policy toward China.**

Fundamentally, the United States continues its policy of strategic ambiguity, not taking sides on what Taiwan's ultimate fate should be, but insisting that Beijing-Taipei differences should be settled by peaceful means. U.S. arms sales policy have sought to balance enhancing Taiwan's defense capacity without emboldening rash Taiwanese actions, and to deter Beijing without

provoking the Chinese government. The United States could suffer as much as any actor from military conflict between China and Taiwan. **By providing the weapons,**

**the U**nited **S**tates **has** arguably **made Taipei more confident about working with Beijing to reduce** cross-Strait

**tensions** in recent years. **Continuing arms sales will help provide the reassurance the Taiwanese need to**

**engage with Beijing in coming years without really threatening China,** as even Chinese scholars acknowledge, presenting a security

threat to China.

However, affirming would effectively concede, giving China a springboard to boost their power.

**Brands '20** [Hal; April 20; Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, resident

scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; Foreign Affairs, "Don't Let Great Powers Carve Up the World: Spheres of Influence Are Unnecessary and Dangerous," <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world>] (recut lcp 10.29.24)

Offering **concessions to a revisionist state** may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply **give that challenger a better position** from which to realize its ambitions. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. **The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions. A growing body of literature** by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that **China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective.** Meanwhile, the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. Russia and **China**, by contrast, still have to deal with U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to **pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale.** Measures of Powers Fortunately, new spheres of influence are avoidable. Russia is a formidable player because of its willingness to take risks and pursue asymmetric strategies; but Moscow will not rebuild a meaningful sphere of influence so long as the United States opposes that ambition.

**McCoy 23** [Alfred McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison., 03-07-23, "The Devastating Consequences of a War Over Taiwan", Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-war-taiwan-military/> DOA: 11-1-24] cgc

Should China launch an all-out invasion, however, **Taiwan would likely succumb within a few days** once its air force of just 470 combat aircraft was overwhelmed by the PLA's 2,900 jet fighters, 2,100 supersonic missiles, and **its massive navy, now the world's largest.** Reflecting China's clear strategic advantage of simple proximity to Taiwan, the island's occupation might well be a fait accompli before the US Navy ships could arrive from Japan and Hawaii in sufficient numbers to challenge the



massive Chinese armada. If Beijing and Washington somehow let the pull of policy and planning drag them into such an ever-widening war, however, the damage could still prove incalculable—with cities devastated, untold thousands dead, and the global economy, with its epicenter in Asia, left in ruins. Let us only hope that today's leaders in both Washington and Beijing prove more restrained than did their counterparts in Berlin and Paris in August 1914 when plans for victory unleashed a war that would leave 20 million dead in its wake.

## C2

Right now, U.S. security policy remains a lifeline for Asian allies.

Edward Wong 24, Nieman Fellow at Harvard; Diplomatic correspondent and foreign policy writer, 7-26-2024, "As Trump Looms, Blinken Aims to Reassure Allies on U.S. Commitment to Asia", New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/blinken-asia-us-election.html>, Accessed 10-2-2024, ARC (recut lcp 10.29.24)

For three and a half years, President Biden and his aides have insisted that the United States is a Pacific power, and that its allies and partners in the region need not worry about Washington's commitments. For U.S. officials, underscoring that message has become increasingly important as China's power has grown. Now Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken plans to deliver assurances in person across six nations, his most ambitious trip in the region. When Mr. Blinken lands in Vientiane, the capital of Laos, on Saturday, he will face a barrage of questions about what dramatic shifts in U.S. policy might or might not occur next year, given the upcoming change in the presidency. Mr. Biden's announcement last Sunday that he is no longer running for re-election sent shock waves around the world. Many of America's allies are especially concerned about a second Trump presidency, given that former President Donald J. Trump has constantly declared that those allies are conning the United States into providing military support. They are uncertain if Vice President Kamala Harris, the presumptive Democratic nominee, can beat him in November. Regardless, Mr. Blinken's core message will be one of American resolve. "I think the message that the secretary is going to be conveying to the region is that America is all in on the Indo-Pacific," Daniel J. Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, told reporters on Monday. "I think from Day 1 of this administration, we have significantly and dramatically stepped up our engagement." But the talking point does not answer in concrete terms the

main question from allies: Starting next year, will the United States invest significantly in Asia — in both economic and military terms? Mr. Blinken could argue that Ms. Harris's foreign policy would be a continuation of Mr. Biden's, but in no way can he speak for Mr. Trump. "Honestly, it will be a challenging task because countries in the region, including China, are looking beyond the Biden administration and thinking of the future," said Yun Sun, a director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a research group in Washington. Mr. Biden, Mr. Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, have spoken about China as the greatest long-term challenge to American power. They have tried to shape U.S. foreign policy around that but have often been forced to address crises elsewhere in the world. Even for this trip, Mr. Blinken left **Washington** one day later than initially planned after Mr. Biden agreed to meet with Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, at the White House on Thursday. Yet, there has been a constant in Mr. Biden's approach to Asia: He has bolstered military alliances, to the consternation of Xi Jinping, China's leader. Along those lines, he **has signed new agreements with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and South Korea.** The United States is sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Japan and nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, and it has obtained greater access to military bases in the Philippines. Mr. Biden has also, for the first time, used presidential authority to send weapons to Taiwan, the de facto independent island that the Chinese Communist Party aims to rule.

Abandoning Taiwan sends a dangerous message to our allies – they could be next.

Shelley **Rigger**, xx-xx-20**11**, "Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China", American Enterprise Institute,

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep03112.pdf> // RB

The most-cited strategic argument for continuing **US security assistance to Taiwan is** that **the existing security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region** and beyond **serves the interests of many nations**. Within the network of global security relationships, **Washington's behavior toward Taiwan indicates its attitude toward security assistance** generally, including **its alliance commitments and willingness to honor other obligations** around the world. As retired admiral Eric McVadon said, "**American credibility as an alliance partner** and as a bulwark of peace and stability in the region and around the world **would be sorely diminished were we to** abandon the [Taiwan Relations Act], **cease**

**support of Taipei, and lead Beijing to conclude that it can attack Taiwan and not be repulsed.”**<sup>6</sup>The system

of alliances the United States constructed in Northeast Asia after World War II and the Korean War is not to be discarded on a whim. From 1895 to 1945 Japan, Russia, and China battled for regional supremacy, devastating huge swaths of Korea and China. American security guarantees put in place in the midtwentieth century suspended those conflicts. Ample evidence exists in current affairs—including conflicts over contested islands in the East and South China Seas—to suggest that military rivalry could return to East Asia. The US presence, however it may offend China, actually lightens Beijing’s military burden by restraining neighboring countries’ military investments and easing their strategic anxiety. As Glaser acknowledges, “the U.S. alliance with Japan also benefits China by enabling Japan to spend far less on defense.

Allies would lose confidence in American defense obligations, leading them to acquire their own weapons.

Kelly **Wadsworth 19**, Non-Resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, PhD Student in International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, MBA and MA in International Studies (Korea Studies) at the University of Washington, Former Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, BA in International Relations and East Asia from the University of California, Davis, “Should Japan Adopt Conventional Missile Strike Capabilities?”, Asia Policy, Volume 14, Number 2, April 2019, p. 83-87, Accessed 10-21-2024, ARC (recut lcp 10.29.24)

American proponents of Japan obtaining a conventional missile strike capability interviewed for this research argued that the United States could use a more capable ally in the region to address the threat posed by heightened Chinese naval activity. While that prospect might be a tempting short-term fix to offset the U.S. Department of Defense budget cuts over the last decade, the long-term interests of the United States in maintaining regional stability should also be considered. In addition to the negative reactions of Beijing and Seoul, a Japanese offensive strike capability could **decrease regional confidence in the credibility of U.S. power in Asia.** As noted above, some experts argue that if Japan strengthens its offensive capability, such a move might be interpreted by neighbors reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a sign that Tokyo is losing confidence in the United States’ credibility.<sup>71</sup> This **could start a chain reaction that causes more U.S. allies to hedge with China or to develop their own strike capabilities,** further **increasing instability in Asia.**

Unfortunately, this rapid build-up would spiral into an arms race, as each country rushes to pursue arms.

**Gilber**, Douglas. "Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry" Journal of Peace Research, Vol.

42, No. 2 (Mar., 20**05**)//AB

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270?seq=1>

In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as

Table II shows, **the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16% on average to 35%**

**during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes [increases 5 times] from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20**

**during arms race years.**

## **Rebuttal**

Denny **Roy**, 10-13-20**23**, "The Likelihood of U.S.-China War Still Hinges on Taiwan," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/likelihood-us-china-war-still-hinges-taiwan-206944> // TT

**Faced with a choice between fighting a war it did not think it could win and acquiescing to Taiwan's independence, the regime would likely see the former as offering the better chance of keeping the CCP in power.**

Beijing also defines Taiwan as Chinese territory that would be "lost" if it became the Republic of Taiwan—particularly valuable territory, as Taiwan by itself is the world's twentieth-largest economy. For the United States, the most likely path to a war on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean is the need to defend a friend or ally that is under attack.

Rest were analytics.