

Constructive

See R1 Yale OS.

Rebuttal

The aff takes away tech used for processing to militarize the border.

Enninga and Goodman 23 (Justus Enninga and Nathan Goodman: Visting Research Fellow at NYU and Senior Fellow at Mercatus Center. 25 July 2023, “Adapting to Climate Change through Migration”, The Center for Growth and Opportunity, <https://www.thecgo.org/research/adapting-to-climate-change-through-migration/> .//. DOA: 6/26/24) TZL, **brackets in og**

Increased illegal migration creates demands for greater border security” (Powell 2016, 347–348). Often, political leaders find that they can signal their seriousness about border security via border militarization. When migrants visibly cross borders illegally, voters and anti-immigrant activists may hope for leaders to visibly demonstrate their commitment to “law and order.” Militarizing border policing can display this commitment quite effectively, regardless of its effectiveness at controlling migration. Andreas (2011, 11) argues that “the popularity of the border as a political stage is based as much on the expressive role of law enforcement (reaffirming moral boundaries) as it is on the instrumental goal of law enforcement (effective defense of physical boundaries).” **Border security issues are treated as matters for the central government, which means that**

border enforcement is typically more monocentric than many other law enforcement matters. This reinforces the tendency towards militarization for at least two reasons. First, national governments are also the home of national militaries and therefore possess both physical capital and human capital suited for militarized social control. Second, central governments often have close ties to defense contractors, who have incentives to lobby for additional purchases of military hardware. Existing physical and

human capital play a crucial role in explaining the monocentric and militarized nature of present-day border control. Coyne and Goodman (2022) argue **that a highly advanced military-industrial complex makes it relatively cheap to repurpose military capital from foreign intervention to border control. Military interventions in the past have left a considerable stock of human and physical capital aimed at militarized social control.**

Physical capital like Blackhawk helicopters and human capital like “skills, knowledge, habits, and expertise related to surveilling, intimidating, and controlling other people” cannot be used for every task, but they are multi-specific: They are “useful for foreign wars and for patrolling the U.S. Mexico border” (6–7). Since officials in immigration enforcement agencies can choose between different strategies to control borders, it is likely that **when military-specific capital is made more available they will choose the relatively cheap route of militarization. After all, the needed capital is already there. The monocentric organization of the military in countries of the Global North, therefore, reinforces the monocentricity of militarized borders.** The close ties of the central government with defense contractors are a

second reason for stronger militarization of border controls. Coyne and Goodman (2020) describe in detail how “private defense contractors, who build and sell surveillance equipment, have strong incentives to lobby for more spending on these surveillance systems” (174). The authors outline different channels through which government is influenced by privately interested

parties. **Firms lobby legislators directly, they engage in extensive financing of campaigns for certain politicians, and they exert influence on government agencies** (see also Golash-Boza 2009; Miller 2019). The influence of private defense

contractors on politicians and bureaucrats results in lucrative contracts to maintain and further expand the monocentric militarized border system. This not only leads to costs for the domestic taxpayer, but also to immense costs for prospective climate change–induced migrants. A militarized border involves direct violence against migrants by border guards, **it shifts**

resources away from attempts to process and admit migrants and travelers in an orderly manner, instead directing those resources towards shows of force and investments in surveillance technology. It

diverts migrants towards more dangerous routes, causing well-documented increases in migrant deaths (Chambers et al. 2019; Bansak, Hall-Blanco, and Coon 2022). Moreover, it undermines the privacy and civil liberties of citizens living in border regions (Coyne and Goodman 2020). Unfortunately, **it is unlikely that political officials will react**

to these costs. The incentives are misaligned and “those who reap the benefits [private defense contractors] have the strongest incentive to influence these policies” (176). These perverse incentives are likely to continue to shape responses to climate migration. Staff at defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, and officials from the Pentagon attend the same events discussing the national security implications of climate change (Miller 2017), which raises concerns that the same rent-seeking and cronyism that has shaped border policies will shape the response to climate migration.

Rest were analytics.