

# Constructive

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Empirically, U.S. intervention in Taiwan invites Chinese retaliation.

Ben **Blanchard**, Ryan **Woo**, 10-27-20**24**, "Taiwan reports Chinese 'combat patrol' after Beijing slams US arms deal", Reuters,

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows-countermeasures-after-2-bln-us-arms-sale-taiwan-2024-10-27/> // TT

**Taiwan's defence ministry said** on Sunday that **Chinese warplanes** and warships had **carried out** another

**"combat patrol"** near the island, after Beijing threatened to take countermeasures **in response to a \$2**

**billion arms sale package by the U** **S** **ates**. The United States is bound by law **to** provide Chinese-claimed **Taiwan** with the means to defend itself

despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, to the constant anger of Beijing. The Pentagon said on Friday the United States had approved a potential \$2 billion arms sale package to Taiwan,

including the delivery for the first time to the island of an advanced air defence missile system battle-tested in Ukraine. **Taiwan's defence ministry said it had**

**detected 19 Chinese military aircraft**, including Su-30 fighter jets, carrying out a "joint combat readiness patrol" **around Taiwan in**

**conjunction with Chinese warships** starting on Sunday morning.

Deterrence fails – it never takes into account China's incentive.

Michelle **Gavin**, 10-16-20**24**, "The Upside to Uncertainty on Taiwan", Foreign Affairs,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/upside-uncertainty-taiwan> // RB

**But past performance is no guarantee of future results. U.S. policy has succeeded** in part **because all sides**

were content to **push off a definitive resolution to the future, believing that time was on their side. For**

**decades, China's leaders hoped that its growing economic** dynamism and **prosperity would make**

**unification increasingly attractive to** the people of **Taiwan** and more acceptable to the United States. This belief was

reinforced by an observation Kissinger made to the Chinese during a 1971 meeting in Beijing: "As a student of history, one's prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be

in the direction which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai indicated to me. . . . We will not stand in the way of basic evolution." From the U.S. perspective, the passage of time was thought likely to

narrow the differences between Taiwan and the mainland, so that the two sides could come to an understanding in which Taiwan could preserve its democracy and respect for human rights,

perhaps under the rubric of "one country, two systems." **Today**, many argue, **the situation is far different**, with **none of the three parties**

**believing that time is on its side.** From the perspective of some in the United States and in Taiwan, **China's growing military and**

**economic might means that Beijing will soon have the capability to prevail in a military conflict**; even today,

many argue, a successful defense of the island would be problematic. According to this camp, only by dramatically enhancing deterrence through an unambiguous commitment to Taiwan's

defense, including both military and political support, can a takeover be forestalled. From the perspective of China, political trends in Taipei and Washington are moving in the wrong direction.

**In January, Taiwan's** voters **elected** Lai Ching-te as **president**, a leader whom **Beijing considers much more**

**pro-independence** than his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. That, **coupled with Congress's increasingly militant support for**

**Taiwan, means** that the island is at risk of slipping from Beijing's grasp. In a mirror image of the U.S. debate, hawks in **China**

**advocate accelerating their country's military capability** to subdue Taiwan. It is **this** very **mirror imaging** that

**contributes to** the current sense of **crisis**, a familiar pattern in which anxiety and insecurity lead one side to take

**preemptive measures that induce even more fear on the other side**—what international relations theorists call the **"security**

**dilemma"** or the **"spiral model."** The more China flexes its muscles toward Taiwan, **the more the United States**

**promotes arms sales** and Congressional visits to Taiwan to bolster deterrence. And the more it does that, **the more China feels the need to**

**escalate its threats to forestall future actions.**

China's a defensive realist – they're only willing to go to war because, to them, Western encirclement is existential.

**Jalil 19** (Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2019, "China's Rise: Offensive or Defensive

Realism", issi.org, [https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-SS\\_Ghazala\\_Yasmin\\_Jalil\\_No-1\\_2019.pdf](https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-SS_Ghazala_Yasmin_Jalil_No-1_2019.pdf), DOA: 10/26/24) HB

**Taiwan issue is one instance where China's policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo.**

**However, the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last**

**few decades, America continued selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these**

**developments to encourage Taiwan's independence and a threat to its interests.** According to Yiwei Wang, "on the

Taiwan issue, **America's logic is that peace comes from "balance of power." China has time and again**

**protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to no avail. China sees these moves as an**

**effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn, China has threatened Taiwan against**

**moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as well. Consequently, this makes the**

**US suspicious of China's revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security**

**dilemma. Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the**

**South China Sea.** The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area provides

valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.<sup>51</sup> China, Vietnam, the Philippines,

Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The **dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last**

few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval patrols. It can be argued that China's actions are

defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under the garb of "freedom of

navigation" operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key

shipping and air routes.<sup>52</sup> In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the South China Sea under the garb of

"freedom of navigation."<sup>53</sup> Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.<sup>54</sup> These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind

claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China. China does not have expansionist or

hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new.

Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful.

However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other

claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This has resulted in China acting more

assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more

aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders. Overall, from the above

analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather than

as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China's engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the regional and international

institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power. The claims of Mearsheimer's offensive

realism are in contrast with Waltz's defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power

that they are the ultimate hegemon in the system, Waltz's defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of

power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining "their position in the system."<sup>55</sup> Defensive

realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, a robust defence and careful

balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are

concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits.

Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China's current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China's security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the **Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist**

**strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances.** "This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security

strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation."<sup>57</sup> Moreover, China's military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China's Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan's independence — the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China's military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.<sup>58</sup> On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, "There seems to be little doubt that China's military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region."<sup>59</sup> It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. **China has not**

**shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared.** Instead of guided by offensive realism,

China's policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China's hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China's policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, **there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive**  
**realism.**

Absent accommodation, China's primed to invade Taiwan – conflict is guaranteed in 2025.

Dan **Blumenthal**, 08-21-20**24**, "Exploring a PRC Short-of-War Coercion Campaign to Seize Taiwan's Kinmen Islands and Possible

Responses", American Enterprise Institute,

<https://www.aei.org/articles/exploring-a-prc-short-of-war-coercion-campaign-to-seize-taiwans-kinmen-islands-and-possible-responses/> // TT

Second, **Xi may see a unique opportunity in the next six months** presented by the political dynamics of

**Taiwan and the United States, which he could assess will prevent both governments from responding**

**in an effective or escalatory way.** In **Taiwan** the new **Lai administration is** still relatively **inexperienced**. 20 Copyright© Institute

for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute's Coalition Defense of Taiwan, 2024 The DPP holds a minority in the Legislative Yuan for the first time since 2016. It **faces**

**frequent political battles with the opposition coalition** of the KMT and TPP, which are trying to hinder the DPP's agenda and to implement

reforms to check the administration's executive powers. In the United States, President Joe Biden is in his lame-duck period after announcing his withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race.

**The US domestic political landscape is turbulent and divisive amid the ongoing election, the foreign**

**policy establishment is preoccupied with ongoing wars** in Ukraine and Gaza, and the US populace has

**little appetite for more war.** Xi may believe these factors will preclude a timely and forceful US response to his Kinmen campaign before the inauguration of a new US

president in January 2025. There are many characteristics of this particular short-of-war approach to seize Kinmen that may appeal to Xi in the near term over other forms of compellence

against Taiwan.

**Mollman '23** [Steve; 01-28-2023; Fortune; "War with China over Taiwan is likely in 2025, warns U.S. General Mike Minihan: 'I hope I am

wrong', " <https://fortune.com/2023/01/28/war-china-taiwan-likely-by-2025-warns-american-general-mike-minihan/>; Willie T.]

**The U.S. and China will likely be at war over Taiwan in 2025**, a high-ranking American military officer has warned. U.S. Air Force General

Mike Minihan outlined the series of circumstances that would embolden Chinese president Xi Jinping to invade Taiwan in a memo sent Friday to leaders of Air Mobility Command, which he

heads. "I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025. **Xi secured his third term and set his war council** in October 2022.

**Taiwan's presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States' presidential**

**elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi's team, reason, and opportunity are all**

**aligned for 2025**." Minihan wrote in the memo, first reported by NBC News. As head of Air Mobility Command, Minihan oversees the Air Force's fleet of transport and refueling

aircraft. In the memo, he urged personnel to “consider their personal affairs” and be more aggressive about training. “If you are comfortable in your approach to training,” he wrote, “then you are not taking enough risk.” He directed airmen to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most.” “Aim for the head,” he added. China’s big military exercises “These comments are not representative of the department’s view on China,” a U.S. defense official told Reuters in response to the memo. China considers Taiwan its own, but the latter operates as an independent democracy and has never been controlled by Beijing. In the past few years, **China has been flying larger sorties of**

**warplanes near Taiwan,** including large-scale exercises it held when U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August. **It’s also increased its**

**military presence in the South China Sea** including on bases built atop reefs-turned-artificial islands in disputed waters. Some of those reefs are claimed by

the Philippines, where President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. this month called U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan “very, very worrisome for us,” adding he expected Manila’s military ties with America to deepen.

Reducing military support de-escalates the region in 4 ways:

### **First, perceptually accommodating China**

China’s aggression is a result of Western encroachment.

(Michael **O’Hanlon** is a senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, April 16 20**24**,

“Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?”, Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/>, DOA 10/26/24) RK

**U.S.-China relations are plagued by mutual distrust and a drift toward potential conflict. In addition to**  
**intense competition over new technologies with military implications, the primary driver of tensions**

**involves Taiwan. The security dilemma prevails, with each side reading aggressive intent into the**

**other's policies and actions. This vicious circle should be met with** active diplomacy and **a return to**

**predictable adherence to a U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding Taiwan.** At the same time, it will be

important to maintain deterrence in the Taiwan Strait within this context. Strains between the United States and China grew with the 2008

financial crisis, leading to the Obama administration's "pivot" (rebalancing) to reassert U.S. influence in Asia with an initial focus on China's role

in the South China Sea. Ironically, as the United States turned to Asia, China began its own pivot toward Eurasia with an ambitious geoeconomic

strategy epitomized in the Belt and Road Initiative. So far, the Chinese challenge globally is more economic and diplomatic than military. It is on

the Asian littoral around Taiwan that military confrontation looms with the United States. **When nuclear powers perceive, rightly**

**or wrongly, encroachment and potential aggression on their immediate periphery—whether Ukraine,**

**Cuba, or Taiwan—they predictably react. Chinese concern that the United States seeks to use Taiwan**

**as part of a containment strategy is one driver of worsening tensions**. On the U.S. side, there is rare bipartisan

agreement in Congress on countering unfair Chinese trade practices, human rights violations, and rapid advances in tech, while also stepping up

support for Taiwan as a vibrant democracy and vital link in key supply chains. An underlying motivation for this more assertive posture is also the

long-standing U.S. resolve to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon, or peer competitor, in Eurasia. Realizing this ambition is more

complex in a multipolar world of strengthened regional powers, and it increasingly requires buy-in from allies. Such strategic concerns have

come to frame U.S. policy on Taiwan more overtly. For example, in a December 2021 Senate testimony, Pentagon official Ely Ratner described

Taiwan as "a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners ... that is critical to the region's security

and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific." The evocation of vital security interests implies that for strategic reasons the

United States opposes the reunification of Taiwan with China, even as it cautions the Taiwanese against declaring outright independence. Prior

adherence to "strategic ambiguity" has given way to mixed messaging on the "One China" policy that has provided the basis of U.S.-China

reconciliation since 1972. Given these developments, **there is now a need for change in the current trajectory of U.S.**

**policy on Taiwan. To reverse the rising danger of military confrontation between the United States and**

**China, the United States should once again embrace "strategic ambiguity" while engaging in active**



diplomacy and military confidence-building measures with Beijing. Such steps will be essential to meet the security dilemma that plagues the U.S.-China relationship. The military balance around Taiwan should be addressed within this context. The escalation of China's military buildup, including toward Taiwan, has coincided with the unfolding of the U.S. "pivot" to Asia since 2010. For both sides, military distrust has come to dominate bilateral relations in the region. Xi has urged the Chinese military to be prepared to seize Taiwan, if necessary, as early as 2027, although decisions will depend on future developments. U.S. defense planners must also prepare for more likely scenarios involving Chinese quarantines, blockades, or seizure of islands off Taiwan. In addition, China has embarked upon a diversification of its nuclear arsenal, moving away from a "minimum deterrence" posture toward a credible nuclear second-strike capacity based on launch on warning and new strike options such as the fractional orbital bombardment system.

Affirming reverses containment measures, eliminating the need for China to use force.

Richard C. **Bush**, 01-14-20**14**, "Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan", Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/thoughts-on-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan/> // TT

It is my great pleasure to provide a few comments on a policy report by Piin-Fen Kok and David Firestein. This is a really valuable resource that pulls together a lot of useful information. For example, when I worked on Capitol Hill, I kept track of way in which notification of defense articles to Taiwan differed sometimes sharply from deliveries, as this report does. That material is probably somewhere in my basement, but if I had to find it I'm not sure I could. Now I don't have to worry because it's all in "Threading the Needle." So it will be on my shelf of studies that need to be accessible on a moment's notice. More importantly, I agree with the sound conclusions that are drawn from the report's analysis. Each of us comes at the general subject of Taiwan and at specific subsidiary issues in different ways. The authors of "Threading the Needle" have their way. This morning, I would like to provide my own analytical perspective. As an aside, I have long felt that the August 1982 communique, which figures a lot in "Threading the Needle," was not one of the shining hours of American diplomacy. Far from it. In terms of substance and

process, it was not a good outcome for the United States. But I've discussed that elsewhere and won't dwell on it here. From my own perspective, I would make five basic points. The first point

is that **any analysis of China's approach to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan must start with Beijing's own logic on**

**the issue**. The starting point here is Deng Xiaoping's conversation with Leonard Woodcock on December 15, 1978 on the arms sales issue. This was a difficult meeting that revealed that

the two governments had a fairly significant disagreement. Among other things, Deng told Woodcock that "continued arms sales would amount to retaining the essence of the MDT, that

**such sales would block efforts to find a rational means of settling the Taiwan issue peacefully**, and that force

would be left as the last resort." Specifically, Deng warned that if Chiang Ching-kuo "should lean on certain powerful support, say the provision of arms, and refuses to talk to us about the

problem of reunification," that was a circumstance in which China would use force against Taiwan. When Deng visited the United States in January 1979, he repeated this condition. He claimed

that Beijing had a "fair and reasonable policy" towards Taiwan and would "try our very best to use peaceful means" to solve the issue. China had patience, he said, but the patience was not

unlimited. **This link between Taiwan's willingness to negotiate and China's non-use of force continues**, I would

argue until today. It occurs in an important speech that Qian Qichen gave in 2001 on the "two hands" of Beijing's Taiwan policy. It occurs in the 2000 White Paper. And it was enshrined most

authoritatively in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005. Note how this relationship sheds new light on the key linkage in the August 1982 Communique: between China's statement of a "fundamental

policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question" and the U.S. agreement to reduce arms sales. **For Washington, China's stated policy**

**provided, it claimed, a context that made weapons sales to Taiwan less necessary. For Beijing, on the**

**other hand, a U.S. reduction in arms sales, "leading to a final resolution" is the precondition for**

**avoiding the use of force**. My second point has to do with odd, asymmetric character of the bargain undertaken in the August 1982 Communique. Simply put,

**Beijing** makes a commitment about its intentions (that is, it **commits to strive for a peaceful solution**) in return for a U.S. commitment to restrict

Taiwan's military capabilities.

## Second, preventing miscalculation

Increased military build-up makes accidental confrontation inevitable – every aid package raises the

likelihood.

Michael D. **Swaine**, 1/23/20**23**, Senior research fellow in the Quincy Institute's East Asia Program, the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, served as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, What the US Gets Wrong About Taiwan and Deterrence,

<https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-taiwan-and-deterrence/>)

Moreover, while some Asian countries are certainly hedging against China's growing military power and the danger of a Sino-American conflict

by increasing their defense spending, **the region as a whole is more worried about economic issues such as**

**recovering from the pandemic**, overcoming **recession**, and promoting **sustainable growth** through continued close

economic ties with both the United States and China. **For the United States, a deterrence policy** predicated on keeping Taiwan

separate from China for strategic reasons **is totally incompatible with its one China policy**, whereby Washington opposes any

unilateral move toward Taiwan independence, maintains strategic ambiguity regarding its defense of Taiwan, and remains open to the possibility

of peaceful, uncoerced unification. This position remains the core of the understanding reached in 1972, which formed the basis of the

normalization of Sino-American relations, in which the U.S. acknowledged the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China while Beijing

stressed that peaceful unification would be a top priority of its cross-strait policy. **If the United States were to abrogate that**

**critical understanding by, for example, extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, or making the**

**island into a full-fledged security ally (as the deterrence-only approach advocates)**, **China** would without

doubt respond by dropping its part of the understanding and **proceed to reverse any such U.S. actions by all means**

**necessary**, including military force. The PRC government's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens would

simply **not survive if Beijing failed to respond to such a basic challenge to its nationalist credentials.**

Equally significant, **China's leaders would** almost certainly **resort to force even if the U.S. enjoyed superior**

**military deterrence capabilities**, a point that is apparently not fully grasped by proponents of the deterrence-only approach. Given

the incredibly high political stakes involved, **even a failed effort to forcibly prevent the loss of Taiwan would be**

**viewed in Beijing as favorable to doing nothing.** The latter would almost certainly result in a severe domestic crisis, putting at

risk not only the personal positions of China's leaders but the stability of the entire PRC regime. The former, however, would leave open the possibility of future rounds of conflict over the island, since any U.S. "victory" in a conventional Taiwan conflict would by necessity remain

limited due to the danger of nuclear escalation. **The Biden administration seems to be inviting such desperate**

**Chinese calculations with its** erosion of the one China policy and its **growing reliance on aspects of the**

**deterrence-only approach to Taiwan.** President Joe Biden has said repeatedly that the United States will intervene militarily if

China attacks Taiwan, thereby treating the island as a sovereign security ally. He has also asserted that Taiwan alone must decide whether it

should be independent, which denies the long-standing U.S. stance of opposition to any unilateral move toward Taiwan independence. **The**

**government has also designated Taiwan as a non-NATO U.S. ally, giving it a status similar to sovereign**

**nations with which it has formal security ties.** It has sent senior U.S. officials to Taiwan under quasi-official conditions and

sought to pressure countries against shifting their diplomatic representation from Taiwan to China, despite Washington having taken exactly the

same action in 1979. And one senior U.S. defense official recently indicated in congressional testimony that Taiwan is indeed a critical U.S.

strategic node central to its entire defense position in the Western Pacific, implying that the United States would be opposed to Taiwan uniting

with China under any circumstances. **China's leaders have concluded from** these and other **actions that U.S.**

**statements in support of the one China policy are no longer entirely credible. Beijing has responded by**

**increasing military pressure on Taiwan, while acquiring capabilities to deter U.S. military intervention.**

**The United States has in turn interpreted China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait as evidence of**

**Beijing's bad faith intentions and** possible **rejection of peaceful unification.** **The two** countries **are** thus

**increasingly** **locked in an** escalating, interactive process, while each denies responsibility and accuses

**the other. This confrontational** **action-reaction cycle** greatly **raises the risk of a** **miscalculation** that could

**spark a military conflict. If the United States and China are sincere in their desire** **to avoid going to war**

over Taiwan, they must take meaningful actions to end the existing vicious cycle. They can start by rejecting  
the military-centered, worst-case assessments of their hawkish strategists and defuse the Taiwan issue  
as an escalating object of Sino-American strategic competition. This can only be done by Washington  
reviving the credibility of the one China policy through actions, not just words, in return for credible  
Chinese actions that convey Beijing's clear, continued preference for peaceful unification. Washington  
should place clear limits on Taiwan-U.S. interactions to emphasize that they are unofficial and do not  
involve contacts between senior officials. The administration should also reject in unambiguous terms  
any strategic rationale for keeping Taiwan separate from China and reassert its acceptance of any peaceful, uncoerced  
resolution of the Taiwan issue. It should also clarify that it expects Taipei to do far more to defend itself and will actively oppose any efforts to  
establish unilaterally its de jure status as a sovereign, independent state. Beijing should affirm unambiguously that it has no timeline for  
unification, while reducing its military exercises and presence near Taiwan. **Washington** and Beijing **should** then agree upon  
reciprocal reductions in military plans and activities relevant to Taiwan, such as nearby surveillance and  
reconnaissance operations, the development of a large-scale Chinese amphibious capability, and the U.S. sale of offensive  
weapons such as ballistic missiles to Taiwan. None of this can occur in the context of continually escalating  
Sino-American rivalry centered in intense competition and ever greater levels of deterrence. Washington and Beijing  
have the means of neutralizing Taiwan as a source of strategic competition and establishing a durable floor under their relationship, based on  
resolving problems and building incentives for real cooperation, not endless push-back. Le[1] [2] t us hope they also have the will.

### Third, increasing diplomacy

U.S. military support hurts U.S.-China cooperation.

Michael E. O'Hanlon, Philip H. Knight, Ivan **Kanapathy**, Rorry Daniels, Thomas Hanson, 04-16-20**24**, "Should the United States change its policies toward Taiwan?", The Brookings Institute,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/> // TT

**Attempts to reassure China regarding U.S. intentions are** misguided and **fruitless.** **From Beijing's view, U.S.**

**weapons** and training cannot but **support Taiwan's continued separation**. Furthermore, **Washington openly opposes** the

**governance methods deployed in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong—presumptive models for a “unified”**

**Taiwan.** **In the minds of PRC leaders, the U**nited **S**tates remains the duplicitous “black hand” **stirring anti-China dissent** **an**d the

“strong **enemy**” the PLA must prepare to **defeat**. By its nature, **the PRC government cannot** meaningfully **separate U.S.**

**support for Taiwan's democracy from perceived U.S. support for Taiwanese independence.**

However, political will exists for U.S.-China arms control talks – Taiwan is the sole obstacle to strong relations.

Patricia M. **Kim**, 01-12-20**24**, "The US-China relationship in 2024 is stabilized but precarious", The Brookings Institute,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-china-relations-in-2024-are-stabilized-but-precarious/> // TT

As the people of Taiwan prepare to select their next president this weekend, all eyes are on Beijing's reaction to the election results and what this means for U.S.-China relations. Washington and Beijing are acutely aware of the sensitive year ahead, which is why both sides carefully choreographed a smooth summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in San Francisco last November after relations hit rock bottom following the Chinese spy balloon crisis in early 2023. **While the bilateral summit exceeded expectations**

**— with Beijing promising to curb the export of fentanyl precursors and agreeing to reopen**

**communication channels between the two militaries that it cut after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's**

**visit to Taiwan in 2022** — the summit did not chip away at both sides' deeply entrenched threat perceptions. **It also did not set an ambitious**

**agenda for the year ahead. Rather, the objective was and remains risk management.** The focus on preventing the

relationship from spiraling further makes sense, given intense U.S.-China competition. **But without a more proactive agenda beyond**

**consultations, not to mention longstanding areas of tension from trade to Taiwan threatening to flare**

**at any moment, both leaders will struggle to convincingly make the case at home that continued**

**diplomacy with the other side is worth the effort and not coming at the expense of national interests.**

Deep mutual skepticism remains. The **desire to stabilize relations is genuine on both sides.** In the days following the San

**Francisco summit, one felt a palpable sense of relief in both bureaucracies that the meeting, which**

**capped off months of shuttle diplomacy, was a success.** During my trip to China in December, nearly everyone I encountered — from policy

experts to businesspeople to students and cab drivers — asked whether U.S.-China relations might improve in the coming months. This interest wasn't surprising given **many**

**Chinese believe their country's development and economic fate still heavily depend on good relations**

**with the United States and the West.** But even as most Chinese support stabilizing ties with the United States, the entrenched view in Beijing and across the broader Chinese public remains that the U.S. desire to preserve its

"global hegemony" is depriving "China's right to develop," and that no amount of reassurance from Chinese leaders or a change in U.S. administrations will shift Washington's basic direction. Negative perceptions of China are also at historic highs among Americans. A poll conducted last fall by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 58% of Americans see "China's development as a world power" as a serious threat, and only 19% have "a great deal" or "a fair amount" of confidence that China will "responsibly deal with world problems." A recent bipartisan report released by the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called on Washington to undertake a "fundamental reevaluation" of its economic relationship with China, asserting that the United States has a twofold choice: either "accept Beijing's vision of America as its economic vassal" or "stand up for our security, values and prosperity." Both political systems understand clearly that the other side is unlikely to budge on key issues. Beijing wants Washington to drop export controls on advanced chips, sanctions on Chinese companies like Huawei, and tariffs on Chinese imports; to curb its support for Taiwan; and to stop criticizing China's human rights record. Washington wants China to stop coercively advancing its claims vis-à-vis Taiwan and in the East and South China seas, to curtail its unfair trade policies and non-market economic practices, and to drop its strategic partnership with Russia. There is zero chance Beijing or Washington will concede to the other's demands in the foreseeable future. The risks of risk aversion Given this context, neither Washington nor Beijing has high hopes for the bilateral relationship in 2024. As Ambassador Nicholas Burns put it at a Brookings event last month, he is "not optimistic" but "realistic" about the U.S.-China relationship. His comments aptly reflect the sentiment in both capitals. The upside is that both sides share low expectations — it's often when expectations are mismatched that there's turbulence. They are clear-eyed about their differences. Neither Biden nor Xi seeks to trigger a larger conflict, and both leaders have endorsed using working-level exchanges to manage friction. The downside is that there is little incentive for either side to pursue a more proactive agenda. Such an approach would admittedly be riskier but could give leaders more to point to when skeptics question the utility of maintaining stable ties. As Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen remarked in her speech on

the U.S.-China economic relationship last month, "continuing to stabilize our relationship to prevent escalation" is incredibly important, but it "won't make news." The pressure will be higher on Biden as the leader of a democracy, who faces political attacks accusing him of pursuing "zombie engagement" and "appeasing" Beijing. The two lines of cooperation thus far — coordination on counternarcotics and the resumption of military dialogue — are off to a good but complicated start. Beijing has cracked down on the manufacture and export of fentanyl precursors, but experts caution that controlling a fragmented chemical and drug industry will be challenging, disappointing those who seek immediate, comprehensive results. Also, while Beijing has toned down its public remonstrations that Washington is "blaming China for its own fentanyl problem," the underlying view in China that Beijing is "helping" the United States solve a crisis of its own making creates a shaky foundation for cooperation. Military-to-military communications have resumed, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Q. Brown Jr., and his Chinese counterpart, General Liu Zhenli, speaking for the first time in late December. After months of U.S. calls to restore communication channels, the Chinese political system seems to have accepted the dangers of not talking. Among Xi's "five pillars for China-U.S. relations" that were presented in San Francisco, the second involves "more communications, more dialogues and more consultations" to manage disagreements. But the view in China remains that if Washington would simply "respect China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights," there would be no need for hotlines or risks of escalation. In short, both counternarcotics cooperation and military dialogue are still viewed by the Chinese as U.S. asks, benefiting Washington more than Beijing. As such, the temptation for Beijing to walk away when the relationship hits turbulence will be strong. The upcoming bilateral dialogue on managing artificial intelligence (AI) risks may prove to be a more promising avenue of cooperation with potential discussions on keeping AI out of nuclear command and control systems, among other safety norms. Given the sensitivities around AI technology and binding agreements, it is unclear whether AI cooperation can serve as a bright spot in an otherwise challenged relationship. Lamentably, Beijing seems to have little interest in coordinating with Washington on global crises, whether on the wars in Ukraine and Israel-Gaza, or North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs. While the United States and China do not see eye-to-eye on any of these crises, the two states share broad interests in maintaining global stability and preventing proliferation. Beijing's general posture that Washington is to blame for these conflicts and must first address their "root causes" is wrong and incredibly reckless. The failure of the world's two greatest powers to coordinate on such pressing challenges casts further doubt on the notion that better U.S.-China relations are good for the two countries and the rest of the world. Taiwan still looms Washington and Beijing are wary of potential turbulence following the Taiwan elections, especially as leaders in both capitals face domestic pressure to avoid "looking weak." China has continued to send military aircraft, naval vessels, and balloons into the Taiwan Strait. Its Taiwan Affairs Office recently denounced Democratic Progressive Party candidate Vice President William Lai, who leads polls, as a "destroyer of peace across the Taiwan Strait." A Chinese official recently warned that the Taiwanese people must make the "correct choice" if they seek to avoid "war" and "decline." While a maximally violent reaction by Beijing in response to the election is looking less likely, Xi and the CCP have already backed themselves into a corner by discrediting Lai as a "troublemaker" and a "separatist." If Lai wins, Beijing will believe it has no choice but to react to Lai's every move — his statements, policies, and diplomatic exchanges — that it deems as asserting Taiwan's independence. If there's one issue that heightens emotions in China, it's Taiwan, which disincentivizes moderation below the threshold of war. In the U.S. political arena, **Taiwan has become a litmus test**

**of how tough U.S. leaders are on China. Aggression by Beijing will put pressure on Biden, the GOP candidates, and other U.S. leaders to take higher-profile steps in support of Taiwan, spurring further reactions from Beijing. Such action-reaction dynamics will diminish the prospects for thoughtful discussions in the United States around Taiwan policy amid a shifting military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and limit space for the consideration of reassurance measures by Beijing, Taipei, and Washington for maintaining the cross-Strait status quo.**

**Reuters 24**, (July 17, 2024, Reuters, China says it has halted arms-control talks with US over Taiwan, China says it has halted arms-control talks with US over Taiwan, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-has-halted-arms-control-talks-with-us-over-taiwan-2024-07-17/>, 10-09-2024) sag

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said repeated **U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in recent months had "seriously compromised the political atmosphere for continuing the arms-control consultations."** **"Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the U.S. on a new round of consultations on**



**arms control and non-proliferation.** The responsibility fully lies with the U.S.," Lin told a regular news briefing in Beijing. Advertisement · Scroll to continue Report

this ad Lin said **China was willing to maintain communication on international arms control, but that the U.S.**

**"must respect China's core interests and create necessary conditions for dialogue and exchange."** U.S. State

Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said China has chosen to follow Russia's lead by asserting that arms-control engagement cannot proceed while there are other challenges in the bilateral relationship. 1.00 00:0001:36 "We think this approach undermines strategic stability, it increases the risk of arms-race dynamics," Miller told reporters. "Unfortunately, by suspending these consultations, China has chosen not to pursue efforts that would manage strategic risks and prevent costly arms races, but we the United States will remain open to developing and implementing concrete risk-reduction measures with China."

Affirming brings China back to the negotiating table.

Charles L. **Glaser**, 04-01-20**15**, "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation", MIT Press

Direct,

<https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/39/4/49/12308/A-U-S-China-Grand-Bargain-The-Hard-Choice-between?redirectedFrom=fulltext> //

TT

**U.S. unilateral adoption of** less dramatic changes in the government's Taiwan policy—most importantly, **slowing or ending U.S. arms sales**

**to Taiwan**<sup>110</sup>—is an option that might **provide a better balance of risks and benefit**. Even this much smaller change in U.S. policy, however, risks

sending China the wrong signal. Another way to balance feasibility and benefits, therefore, could be to look for a path that divides the grand bargain into smaller, more attainable increments.

One can **imagine a series of steps, including the United States ending its arms sales to Taiwan and China**

**ending its use of force to advance its maritime claims, that could be implemented sequentially to**

**create a phased grand bargain. This approach would enable the U** nited **S** tates **to** revert to its current Taiwan policy if China failed to

uphold its side of the phased agreement. Another possibility might include partial resolution of the maritime disputes. An agreement that delayed resolution of the sovereignty disputes far into the future, or indefinitely, while settling the resource disputes would be more feasible to achieve than a full resolution. This type of agreement could be possible because, for the most part, the

sovereignty disputes can be separated from the resource disputes. In fact, China and Japan reached this type of arrangement in 2008, although it has yet to be implemented.<sup>111</sup> **The**

**United States could pursue** a variant of **this** staged **approach** that would enable it to try **to push the diplomatic process**

**forward**. In this more proactive model, **the United States would make its initial concession unilaterally, while**

**explaining that further concessions would hinge on China's reciprocation** of its initial move.

Dialogue prevents an arms race in Asia.

**Rajagopalan 24**, (9-24-2024, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, China-US Nuclear Arms Control Talks: A Much-Needed First Step, No

Publication, China-US Nuclear Arms Control Talks: A Much-Needed First Step,

<https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/china-us-nuclear-arms-control-talks-a-much-needed-first-step/>, 10-9-2024) sag

**With China undertaking a significant expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, any effort**

**toward more sustained arms control talks is a welcome step. Such efforts can bring about a certain**

**amount of predictability and stability**. But for some time, China has dismissed the possibility of joining these arms control talks, saying that its nuclear arsenal

is nowhere near the size of the United States' or Russia's. However, an expanding arsenal could mean that China might end up with over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, as per the Pentagon's

latest China military power report. The talks last week were led on the U.S. side by Mallory Stewart, assistant secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) at the

Department of State, and on the Chinese side by Sun Xiaobo, director general of the arms control department at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A State Department press release on the

meeting said that the two sides "held a candid and in-depth discussion on issues related to arms control and nonproliferation as part of ongoing efforts to maintain open lines of

communication and responsibly manage the U.S.-PRC relationship," referring to China's formal name, the People's Republic of China (PRC). The U.S. side underscored "the importance of

increased PRC nuclear transparency and substantive engagement on practical measures to manage and reduce strategic risks across multiple domains, including nuclear and outer space." The

United States also called for both sides to "promote stability, help avert an unconstrained arms race, and manage competition so that it does not veer into conflict." Even though there was no

joint statement, China also issued a similar statement that highlighted the "in-depth, candid and constructive exchange of views" that the two sides had on a number of areas including the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), cooperation among the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members – who are also recognized nuclear weapon states under the

NPT – nuclear security, non-proliferation and export control, and space security and broader arms control. The statement also said that the two sides noted the importance of "maintain[ing]

communication and exchanges, to increase mutual trust, pool more consensus, manage differences, and explore cooperation." **China's statement went on to add**

that Washington and Beijing “should carry out dialogue and cooperation on the basis on mutual trust.”

China also “stressed that the two sides should adhere to the vision of common, comprehensive,

cooperative and sustainable security, earnestly respect each other’s sovereignty, security and

development interests, increase strategic mutual trust, and remain committed to safeguarding the

international system of arms control and non-proliferation, so as to realize lasting peace and universal

security in the world.” That the two sides additionally recognized the importance of addressing the growing competition in other domains, including outer space, is

significant. Space security conditions have worsened particularly in the last few years. The steady growth of counterspace capabilities, both vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the greater

willingness shown by major space powers to demonstrate these capabilities are worrying trends. Reaching even an early common understanding of the nature and scope of space security

threats at the bilateral level can be useful in making progress on the global space governance front. The November nuclear talks could possibly set in motion the first steps for a sustained

constructive engagement between the United States and China in order to develop a common understanding of the challenges and threats as they pertain to strategic stability. But it is too early

to say if it will follow a particular format in terms of the process or substantial aspects. In fact, a few days ahead of the talks last week the White House clarified to Reuters that the meeting

“would not resemble formal arms reduction talks, like those the U.S. has had with Russia.” As nuclear analysts comment, there are not going to be any breakthroughs in the immediate future,

but these talks could be useful in establishing certain structural and institutional processes to develop

crisis management and stabilizing measures. There are multiple benefits to this kind of engagement

for the broader region as well as for the global non-proliferation regime. China entering the arms

control talks would have a calming and stabilizing effect on its neighbors, for one. A potential spiraling

arms race in southern Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, as a result of China’s nuclear advancement,

could be halted if these talks continue and there is some moderation to the nuclear trends. The talks

will have a significant impact also on the global rule making exercise in the area of outer space and halt

some of the negative trends in space security as well as strengthen the NPT and the broader non-proliferation regime.

Otherwise, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan deck arms control. It's existential – new nuclear states miscalculate or strike first before they lose their arsenal.

Stephen J. Cimbala, xx-xx-2015, "The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy" // TT

**Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia.** Japan and South Korea

might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, and

the two Koreas—not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) **could put deterrence at risk and create enormous**

**temptation toward nuclear preemption.** Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere

**existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.**<sup>19</sup> A **five-sided**

**nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked,** in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, **to the existing nuclear**

**deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear** weapons **status of Iran.** An arc of nuclear

**instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and**

**call for** more drastic military options, not excluding **preemptive war,** defenses and counter- deterrent special operations. In addition, an **unrestricted**

**nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war.** It would

do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) **states may have** politically **unreliable** or immature **command and**

**control systems,** especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable **or** immature systems **might permit a technical**

**malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a** deliberate, but **unauthorized, launch** by rogue commanders; and (3)

**faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive**

**moves to forestall attack as offensive** preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

#### Fourth, deterring Taiwanese separatism

Currently, U.S. backing emboldens separatism in Taiwan – Taiwan thinks it can cross China with American support, a mindset that invites retaliation.

**Potkin '24** [Fanny; 06-02-2024; Reuters; "Prospect of peaceful 'reunification' with Taiwan being 'eroded', China says,"

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/prospect-peaceful-reunification-with-taiwan-being-erodedchina-says-2024-06-02/>; TM]

**The prospect of peaceful "reunification" with Taiwan is being increasingly "eroded" by Taiwanese**

**separatists and external forces,** Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun said on Sunday, drawing an angry response from the government in Taipei. China views

democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, over the strong objections of the government there, and last month staged war games round the island in anger at the May 20 inauguration

of President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing calls a "separatist". Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue conference in Singapore, Dong said **Taiwan was the "core of core**

**issues" for China, but Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party is incrementally pursuing**

**separatism and bent on erasing Chinese identity.** "Those separatists recently made fanatical statements that show their betrayal of the Chinese nation

and their ancestors. They will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history," he said. After his speech, Dong was asked several questions by delegates but he remained focused on Taiwan and had

to be prompted by the moderator to address other issues. **He accused foreign powers of interfering in "domestic issues", and**

**"emboldening Taiwan separatists".** Dong added that while China was committed to peaceful reunification with Taiwan, the People's Liberation Army "will remain

a strong force for upholding national reunification". "We will take resolute actions to curb Taiwan independence and make sure such a plot never succeeds," he said. "We're very confident in

our capability to deter Taiwan independence." Taiwan's presidential office said China had misrepresented the Taiwan government's position at the forum, where Taiwan was not allowed to send representatives. "China lacks the confidence to engage in dialogue with the Taiwan government, and its irrational remarks cannot gain international recognition," the office said in a statement. Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, which makes policy concerning China, said it deeply regretted the "provocative and irrational" comments, and reiterated that the People's Republic of China has never ruled the island. China has repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan at international venues, and its threats were in violation of the United Nations charter, the council said in a statement. "It is an objective fact that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other, and that is also the status quo in the strait," it said. **China**

**has been repeatedly angered by U.S. support for Taiwan and arms sales to the island, even in the**

**absence of formal diplomatic ties between Washington and Taipei.** "Every year for three years, a new Chinese defence minister has

come to Shangri-La," said a U.S. official. "And every year, they've given a speech at complete odds with the reality of the PLA's coercive activity across the region. This year was no different." Dong called the U.S. arms sales a test of China's "red lines". "They are selling a lot of weapons to Taiwan. This kind of behaviour sends very wrong signals to the Taiwan independence forces and makes them become very aggressive. I think we are clear that the foreign power's true purpose is to use Taiwan to contain China." Andrew Yang, a former Taiwan defence minister, said Beijing has said it will pursue "reunification" by winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese but "their deeds have yet to match their words". Beijing instead is "holding a big stick" and is "confrontational and contradictory", he said.

Without U.S. assurance, Taiwan must approach China diplomatically to avoid annexation.

Ping-Kuei **Chen 17**, 10/xx/2017, Assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, A Farewell to

Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 221-238,

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) // JZ

While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is

especially so for claims about the prospects for **stability in the Taiwan Strait.** For instance, **we believe it is likely that an**

**end to arms sales would** indeed **lead Taiwanese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining**

**power vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should** in itself **make them less likely to negotiate**

**with Beijing:** it is also plausible that, **in such a scenario, Taiwan's leaders would feel they had no other choice**

but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Straits balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn't obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove Beijing's incentives to consider military force. In short, how a shifting cross-Straits military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not

straightforward; in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.

That's key – Taiwan-China diplomacy ensures a peaceful solution. Empirically,

**Ndegwa 24** [Stephen Ndegwa prior to joining the World Bank, Mr. Ndegwa was Associate Professor of Government at The College of

William and Mary (Virginia, USA, 1994-2002). In 2010, he was a Rice Family Faculty Fellow at Yale University and a non-resident Visiting Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy (Spring 2011). He is the author or editor of several books and his research articles have appeared in leading journals including award-winning work in the American Political Science Review, "How the U.S. Blocks China's Diplomatic Path to Taiwan Reunification," Capital Bank, <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2024/09/how-the-u-s-blocks-chinas-diplomatic-path-to-taiwan-reunification/>]

lay cgc // re-cut

China's proposal of "One Country, Two Systems" in the 1980s is a clear demonstration of its diplomatic approach. Originally put forward by Deng Xiaoping, the policy was intended to offer Taiwan a high degree of autonomy while maintaining its reunification with mainland China. Though Taiwan has consistently rejected the proposal, it symbolized Beijing's flexibility in seeking a non-military solution. During periods of relatively warmer cross-strait relations, especially under Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou presidency

(2008-2016), Beijing made significant diplomatic strides. The historic 2015 meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Ma was the first between the two sides' leaders since 1949, marking a milestone in

**Beijing's efforts to foster dialogue with Taiwan. Despite these efforts, U.S. interference has remained a**

**major roadblock.** **Washington** has long inserted itself into the cross-strait equation, **perpetuating**

**tensions** and undermining China's attempts at peaceful resolution. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (**TRA**)

**is central to this interference. While the TRA does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, it**

**guarantees American support for Taiwan's defense.** This has led to consistent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, emboldening pro-independence factions

and undermining China's diplomatic efforts. The **U.S. narrative** of "protecting democracy" **in Taiwan masks its true geopolitical interests,**

**using Taiwan as a strategic buffer in its broader competition with China.** In recent years, **U.S. actions**

**have grown more provocative.** Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan, for instance,

**flagrantly violated diplomatic norms and escalated tensions.** Such visits signal to pro-independence

**factions in Taiwan that they have U.S. backing, dampening the prospects for peaceful dialogue.** Though

**Washington claims to support the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, its increasing militarization of**

**U.S.-Taiwan relations—through arms deals and strategic dialogues—indicates a different agenda.** The U.S. is

more focused on using Taiwan in its rivalry with China than on preserving peace. This approach blocks Beijing's diplomatic avenues and heightens distrust. **U.S. influence also**

**stirs skepticism within Taiwan about Beijing's intentions.** By casting China as an imminent military threat, Washington fuels fear among the

Taiwanese people, making any peace proposal from Beijing appear suspect or coercive. This perpetuates a cycle of distrust, making peaceful negotiations more difficult. If the international

community genuinely seeks peace in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. must step back and allow direct, unimpeded dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. **Ending arms sales that**

**undercut diplomacy and ceasing provocations that escalate tensions** are essential steps. Respecting

**China's sovereignty and allowing the Chinese people to resolve their internal matters is key to a peaceful**

**solution.** China has demonstrated its willingness to engage diplomatically. **It is now up to the U.S. to**



stop being the obstacle. Peace in the Taiwan Strait depends not on military might but on diplomatic engagement, and the world should support that path.

It's agreed upon by both sides.

Philip Hou, 08-24-2024, "Taiwan and China must negotiate a new political agreement to avoid war", East Asia Forum,

<https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/08/24/taiwan-and-china-must-negotiate-a-new-political-agreement-to-avoid-war/> // RB

Efforts to fortify Taiwan against decapitation assaults and amphibious invasions can only do so much to prevent conflict with China in the long run. Taipei and Beijing have pushed political boundaries closer to their respective red lines. To prevent conflict, Taiwan and China need to negotiate a new mutually acceptable political framework that clarifies, strengthens and respects each other's red lines and political concerns.

Taiwan can reassure China's concerns about 'independence' by formally recognising relations as region-to-region, government-to-government, non-state-to-state or a combination thereof. Unlike the 1992

Consensus, such frameworks shift the emphasis from sovereignty disagreements toward defining

cross-strait relations while preserving the assumptions of 'One Country' included in the 1992

Consensus. In return, China should recognise domestic pressure in Taiwan against such political agreements by acknowledging

cross-strait relations as a non-hierarchical relationship between two equal political entities. China could also recognise and

reassure the autonomy of Taiwan's democratically elected government to govern the 'Taiwan region'

and participate in international organisations. Under such a political framework, Taiwan can still assert that it is an

independent, sovereign country. China would also maintain space to express its commitment to peaceful

reunification.

The impact is preventing U.S.-China war.

It'll go nuclear – the CCP cannot afford to lose.

Mark Massa, 11-22-2023, "The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis", Atlantic Council,

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-role-of-nuclear-weapons-in-a-taiwan-crisis/> // TT

There are eight key features of this scenario that affect the roles both sides' nuclear forces might play during a crisis and conflict: 1. A Taiwan invasion would be

unprecedented: a high-intensity armed conflict between two nuclear-armed major powers. The

leaders of both sides would face challenges to nuclear deterrence that no one has faced before. 2. Each

side's stake in the outcome of such a conflict would be very high. A Chinese defeat could pose an

existential internal political threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and result in Taiwanese independence. A US and allied

defeat could undermine US-led alliances in Asia and Europe, and fundamentally undermine the US and allied strategic position in Asia. Chinese occupation of Taiwan would transform that

island from a geographic constraint on China's military operations to a platform from which to project power further. And the incorporation of Taiwan's economic capacity would further

strengthen the PRC.

Emily **Feng**, 10-17-20**24**, "China repeatedly threatens to invade Taiwan. What would an invasion look like?", NPR, [Emily Feng is an

international correspondent for NPR covering China, Taiwan and beyond.]

<https://www.npr.org/2024/10/18/nx-s1-5147096/china-repeatedly-threatens-to-invade-taiwan-what-would-an-invasion-look-like> //USAK

China has repeatedly said it could invade Taiwan, which it claims as part of its territory. What would an invasion actually look like, though? An upcoming television show in Taiwan imagines just that. NPR's Emily Feng tells us why people in Taiwan would even want to watch such a show. (SOUNDBITE OF HELICOPTER) EMILY FENG, BYLINE: The groundwork for a Chinese invasion might start like this. A Chinese helicopter goes down and the Chinese military uses it as a pretext to surround Taiwan, creating an international blockade that stops most international shipping. (SOUNDBITE OF TV SHOW, "ZERO DAY") UNIDENTIFIED ACTOR: (As character, speaking Chinese). FENG: Then a Chinese disinformation campaign stokes fear in Taiwan, prompting bank runs and looting. Gangs run amuck. Don't worry, this is not real. These are scenes from the 17-minute trailer for "Zero Day," a new television show. But even watching these scenes is stressful, perhaps even traumatic, for people in Taiwan. After all, **a Chinese invasion could kill millions of people, devastate the global economy**

**and risk nuclear war**. So why make this kind of show? CHENG SHIN-MEI: (Speaking Chinese). FENG: This is Cheng Shin-mei, the executive producer for the series. She says

she's been cogitating on the idea for "Zero Day" ever since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The result is extinction.

**PND 16**. Internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock's 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans' International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016.

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf>

Consequences human survival 12. **Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning**

**cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable,**

**potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades.** Toon and Robock note in 'Self Assured Destruction', in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

68/5, 2012, that: 13. "A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by

either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each

country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so

much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries,

shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore,

there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface.

Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would

decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade." 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian

federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/ all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other

species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day

'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million

tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably

problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146

governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans' ICNND (International Commission on

Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least

threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate

change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well

# Rebuttal

**Hornung et al. 23** [Jeffery W. Hornung, et al., Rand Corporation, "Like-Minded Allies?," 10/01/23,

[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA700/RRA739-7/RAND\\_RRA739-7.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-7/RAND_RRA739-7.pdf)] //ibby

This is notable because Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines have mutual defense treaties with the United States, which include an explicit U.S. promise to support these countries if attacked, something Taiwan no longer enjoys. **The value that Japan and the ROK place on their alliances with the United States**

**suggests that concerns about U.S. reliability would lead them to first try to draw the U.S. closer.**

Interviewees' comments on potential responses to reductions in U.S. support to Taiwan over their objections were limited. Nevertheless, our interviews offer some insights into allies' views of their options. Interviews reinforced government statements about Japan's deep security concerns regarding China and determination to push back against China's growing influence in the region. Moreover, interviewees emphasized **Japan's view that its alliance with the United States is fundamental to Japan's**

**security. This suggests that Japan's initial response to concerns about U.S. reliability would likely be to**

**try to pull the United States closer. There was no indication that Japan would consider building closer**

**ties with China in response.** Similarly, official statements and interviews show that **the ROK sees the U.S. alliance as an**

**indispensable part of countering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the ROK's greatest**

**threat. The ROK does not believe that China's influence on the DPRK alone can provide the ROK with**

**security.** Therefore, in the face of concerns about U.S. reliability, **the ROK too would likely try first to pull the United States**

**closer.** Past behavior suggests that the Philippines' response to concerns about U.S. reliability would depend on who is in power and on China's recent behavior. Interviewees had

divergent views about how they would respond to a U.S. decision to reduce support to Taiwan. Currently, **the Philippines sees China as a significant**

**threat.** However, past Philippine leaders have sometimes attempted closer relations with China in periods when China's behavior was less assertive. Therefore, we assess that the

**Philippines' responses to concerns about U.S. reliability may depend** more **on** the context, specifically who is leading the

Philippines and **China's recent behavior.**

Pascal-Emmanuel **Gobry**, January 11, 20**15**, "America's biggest foreign policy problem: No one trusts America anymore", theweek,

<https://theweek.com/articles/445904/americas-biggest-foreign-policy-problem-no-trusts-america-anymore> //nw

**Today, the United States cannot be trusted.** This is not a new problem. If you were to **look at the history of America's**

**conflicts since the end of World War II,** the main lesson would be: "Don't trust America." What do the following groups have in common? **Koreans**

**above the 38th parallel in 1953; South Vietnamese in 1975; anti-Taliban Afghans in 1989; Iraqi Kurds in**

**1991; Somalis in 1993.** Here's the commonality: **They all put their trust in the United States of America, and they**

**got screwed as a result.** States are, in Nietzsche's words, the coldest of all cold monsters. But not all states are as untrustworthy as the United States. Imperial Britain was

ruthless. But it was rationally ruthless. This is not the case for America. When **America intervenes in a country, forms local alliances, and**

**then screws its allies**, it is almost never because of cold-hearted calculation. Most of the time, it is because of frightened improvisation. All the cases I have laid out involve

**America pulling out of a half-finished conflict, primarily for domestic political reasons, rather than**

**reasons of national interest.** Please understand my point: In each of these particular cases, you can debate the case for or against what America did, and in some, or

even many, America might have even done the right thing. But you are still left with the problem that groups of non-Americans trust the American state at their own peril. And it really is a big problem for U.S. foreign policy. If you lead an important faction in a country where America intervenes, why should you help the Americans, since the record so clearly shows they will drop you when the going gets tough? This leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy: Because America is not seen as trustworthy, local stakeholders don't support America; because local stakeholders don't support America, the going gets tough; because the going gets tough, America gets going. This is pretty much what happened to the U.S. in Afghanistan. That self-fulfilling prophecy leads to a never-ending, vicious cycle.

That puts them in a double-bind – either 1) allies will proliferate in both worlds, because they'd never trust the U.S., or 2) allies will never proliferate because they aren't doing so rn.

Alliances are unique.

Doug **Bandow**, 08-29-20**24**, "What Price Are Americans Prepared to Pay for Defending Taiwan?", Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/what-price-are-americans-prepared-pay-defending-taiwan> // RB

Other arguments for war are similarly unpersuasive. Would failing to defend Taiwan ruin U.S. credibility, especially with Washington's Asian

allies? **Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea all have defense treaties with the U.S.**, the purpose of which is **to**

**provide a formal legal guarantee.** The U.S. formally ended its Taiwan treaty **in agreeing to mutual**

**recognition with the PRC.** **Washington has no obligation to go to war for Taipei,** **which America's** treaty

**allies** surely **understand.**

Regional organizations fill-in.

Wawan **Rahmadi**, 05-15-20**24**, "Conflict Escalation in the South China Sea: Measuring the Direction of Indonesia's Maritime Policy",

Modern Diplomacy,

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/05/15/conflict-escalation-in-the-south-china-sea-measuring-the-direction-of-indonesias-maritime-policy/>

Bilateral Relations as a Conflict Reducer **Conflicts in the South China Sea region are feared to have an impact on bilateral**

**and regional relations between Indonesia and China.** Therefore, both China and Indonesia are trying to defuse the dispute over the Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ) dispute in the Natuna Waters. This is done to maintain stability and good relations between the two countries and as a step to enhance international cooperation through

cooperative and persuasive maritime diplomacy, in accordance with Indonesia's Vision as the World Maritime Axis. Source: (Databoks 2023) **Co-operative relations in**

**almost all sectors mean that the two countries will seek peaceful means rather than conflict in order to**

**maintain a mutually beneficial relationship.** According to the author, a **diplomatic approach will benefit both parties**

**more than militarisation.** Therefore, **it is very important to close the space for intervention in the form**

**of military support,** joint exercises and political declarations from other parties (outside the region) that can complicate regional dynamics. **Demilitarization of**

**the South China Sea issue will increase trust and cooperation among regional countries and thus**

**contribute positively to resolving territorial and maritime disputes.** The use of the Navy should only be seen as an instrument of

diplomacy, not as a force of war, in the context of the South China Sea dispute. This should be based on the application of international law governing territorial waters. **The**

**importance of sustained diplomatic efforts and the development of an inclusive and comprehensive**

**maritime security strategy will be more effective in upholding Indonesia's sovereignty in the South China**

**Sea.**

It's the best approach – countries in the region are better-equipped to solve their own issues.



**Velasco 13** Juliana Velasco; "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace"; University of Central Florida; August 2013;

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd>; // JL- grao recut (recut 10.31.24 lcp)

The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, **regional organizations are 6.728 times more**

**likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.** The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition

of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis. It also reinforces the theory in general. Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of the remaining

variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, **regional organizations**

**are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement** that last five years and when controlling for outstanding issues,

almost 3.5 times more likely. Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with 3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations,

ranging from peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of

peace agreements in keeping the peace

The U.S. will re-invest into other allies.

Charles L. **Glaser**, 04-28-20**21**, Glaser is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security

and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions

on Taiwan and China," Foreign Policy, archive.is, <https://archive.is/5m5xT> // MH // re-cut TT

**A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and** scale back

its opposition to China's assertive policies **simply to avoid conflict.** Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or

tertiary interests. Retrenchment's success would not depend on whether China's goals are limited **or** on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.

What would this policy look like in practice? **The United States would make its revised position public,** thereby laying the foundation **to**

**minimize pressure** from foreign policy elites and the public **to intervene if China attacked Taiwan. It would continue to**

make clear that China's use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms, and it could even

continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, **Washington could boost spending**

**to** preserve and even **enhance its capability to defend Japan and South Korea. These investments would send a clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the commitments it hasn't cut.**

Which is why, on-net, affirming strengthens America's other alliances.

Lyle J. **Goldstein 15**, xx/xx/2015, Associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College and founding

director of the NWC's China Maritime Studies Institute, Meeting China Halfway,

<https://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=580C85FEC8741CABF2FB23DAD83D75FB>)// JZ

If US commitments in the Asia-Pacific region are constrained to cover only the clearest threats to US

national security (thus excluding Taiwan, in addition to various rocks and reefs along China's maritime periphery), those

alliance relationships will actually be strengthened. Thus, it is well known that many South Koreans,

Japanese, and others in the region have been reasonably concerned that their states, quite against their will,

might be pulled by treaty commitments into the vortex of a Taiwan scenario. Having alleviated such

alliance strains, chiefly caused by unreasonable war-fighting requirements, these alliances will actually

benefit from enhanced and increasingly stable Taiwan–Mainland integration.

It's too lucrative to let go of.

**B**usiness **S**tandard **W**orld **N**ews, 11-08-20**24**, "Taiwanese happy with domestic capital despite China woes: Cathay executive", Reuters,

<https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/taiwanese-happy-with-domestic-capital-despite-china-woes-cathay-executive-124110500352>

[1.html](#) // TT

He said a major factor in their reasoning was the importance of **Taiwanese companies like contract chip manufacturer**

**TSMC in the booming artificial intelligence industry, making investment opportunities** on the island

**too lucrative to pass up.** "I think now is a time of precarious balance. **Clients would rather remain in place than**

**move. Taiwan stocks have been pretty immune to (cross-strait) tensions,** mainly **because Taiwan has built**

**unique technological industries that no other countries would be able to replicate** and build up any time soon,"

he said.

Rest were analytics.