Contention 1 is Russia

Russia's economy is at the brink --- oil is Putin's last straw.

Matthews 25 [Owen Matthews, Degree in Modern History at Oxford University, 3-13-2025, The Russian economy is on the **brink of collapse** and Putin knows it, The Independent, https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/russia-economy-putin-ukraine-war-deal-talks-trump-b2714371.html, Willie T.] **edited for objectionable language**

How close is Russia's economy to collapse? As Donald Trump's negotiators open direct talks with the Kremlin, Kyiv's European allies hope that a final push on sanctions against Russia could be Ukraine's last – and best – hope of victory. Mr Trump has warned that the US could impose a "devastating" financial blow on Russia if Putin refuses to accept the ceasefire agreement. "There are things you can do that wouldn't be pleasant in a financial sense. I can do things financially," he said in the Oval Office.

Putin intended his full-scale invasion of Ukraine to be a three-day operation that would force regime change in Kyiv. Neither Putin nor his military or economic planners anticipated a grinding war that now soaks up over **40 per cent of Kremlin spending**.

Nor did they expect Europe to impose serious sanctions, and even less did they anticipate the destruction of three of the four Gazprom gas pipelines under the Baltic Sea that before the war supplied over 30 per cent of Europe's gas.

The result in Russia has been **rampant inflation**, currently running at over 9 per cent, crippling **interest rates** of 21 per cent and runaway price hikes on staple goods that far **outpace the headline inflation rate** and have hit ordinary Russians hard.

Last summer the price of **eggs jumped by 42 per cent**, **bananas by 48 per cent, tomatoes by 39.5 per cent and potatoes by 25 per cent**. The Russian ruble has lost over **half of its value** since Putin first invaded Crimea in 2014, and over $600bn of the Kremlin's foreign currency reserves have been frozen in Western banks.

More than **1,000 Western businesses** – including Ikea and McDonald's – pulled out, as did Western car manufacturers. Imports of Western goods – especially technology – are now **expensively routed through sanctions-busting neighbours** like Kazakhstan and Georgia. And last month Russian utility companies hiked prices for electricity by up to **250 per cent.**

"Everyone drives Chinese cars these days, but there are no spare parts," says Alexandra, 39, a former journalist who lives in Moscow and whose ex-husband is fighting in Ukraine. "The only foreign cars you buy are right-hand-drive [from Japan]. Anyone with a mortgage is paying crazy interest. People complain how expensive everything has become."

Russia spent more on its military in 2024 than the rest of Europe combined, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' latest Military Balance report – a staggering $462bn, if adjusted for purchasing power. The Kremlin's spending splurge on its war effort has produced some winners, notably the 1.5 million troops currently serving in Putin's army who are paid up to $2,500 a month to fight – four times the average salary in Russia's most impoverished provinces.

Massive losses on the battlefield have **worsened labour shortages**, with a record-low unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent. Factories are **running at capacity and beyond**. Russia's economy has "reached the **limits of its productive capacity** while demand continues to be stimulated," Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina warned the Russian parliament in November, predicting a fatal combination of economic stagnation and inflation known as "stagflation".

For the first three years of the war, the Kremlin's war spending fuelled GDP growth which peaked at a staggering 5.4 per cent in early 2024. But 2025 will be the year that growth flatlines, experts predict.

The Kremlin has been able to afford its spending spree thanks, mostly, to India and China, which have continued to import Russian oil in record quantities. The EU has in theory capped the price that customers can pay for Russian Urals crude at $60 a barrel – somewhat below the current market price of $67. But so-called "attestation fraud" – such as making up the difference in fake transportation and other costs – makes the rules easy to bend.

Natural gas has **never been sanctioned** by the EU at all – and until 1 January of this year, 13 per cent of Europe's piped gas was still being shipped from Russia through Ukrainian pipelines to Slovakia and Hungary.

Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia's war economy that near-**nonexistent European sanctions have failed to achieve**

Southern Europe **continues to import** millions of cubic meters of Russian gas via Turkey. And despite its posturing, Europe still sources more than 15 per cent of its liquefied natural gas or LNG from Russia – with some 17.8m tonnes of LNG docking in European ports in 2024, **up by more than 2 million tonnes from the year before**, according to analysts Rystad Energy.

In fact the only really effective "sanctions" on the Russian energy sector – which accounts for over **two-thirds of government revenues** – have been in the form of Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, pumping stations and storage facilities. Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia's war economy that European "sanctions" have failed to achieve.

International pressure has made it harder, but not impossible, for the Russian war machine to obtain important components such as semiconductors. And sanctions have certainly "achieved the crucial goal of leaving Russia's economy highly unstable in the medium to long term", according to Oliver Ruth of London's Royal United Services Institute.

The current crazy levels of expenditure are unsustainable, so Putin has a strong economic incentive to bring his war to an end. Ukraine's economy is also under attack.

But on the flip side, even as Russia's economy slips into stagflation Ukraine's economy is doing far worse. Concerted Russian assaults, damage to vital energy infrastructure and mass emigration have inflicted catastrophic damage of up to 40 per cent of the country's pre-war GDP. Kyiv's budget payments to millions of soldiers and state employees are currently being paid by the EU. Without those subsidies – the lion's share of the €60bn in direct financial support so far sent by Brussels – Ukraine's government finances would instantly collapse.

Ukraine's European allies hoped that sanctions would force Putin into taking an early off ramp and bring his **economy crashing down**. That hasn't yet happened yet – largely because Europe has been unable to kick its addiction to Russian gas, and the US did not want to risk a global **oil price spike by cutting off Russian exports.**

But while they have **not brought Putin to his knees**, they have made the war disastrous for Russia. As Moscow and Washington begin talks in Riyadh, and European leaders hold their own emergency meeting, keeping up economic pressure on Putin is the real weapon that they still have left in their arsenal.

Sanctions won't come.

Bush 25 [Daniel Bush, Master of Arts in U.S. politics @ Columbia & B.A. from NYU, 3-13-2025, If Trump wants new pressure on Moscow, oil and gas is 'only thing left', Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/if-trump-wants-new-pressure-moscow-oil-gas-only-thing-left-2044476, Willie T.] **brackets in original**

Perhaps Trump's **best available option** to pressure Moscow is the one thing he might be **least willing to do**, experts said: put a much tighter squeeze on Russia's oil and gas exports, which provide Russia with its **main source of revenue** and help pay for the war in Ukraine.

"If you're trying to get to a quicker settlement to the conflict in Ukraine, that's what you go after, those continued [Russian] energy sales," said Emily Kilcrease, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. "It's the only thing left."

But Kilcrease said the Trump administration may be hesitant to take a "full-blown approach on energy-related sanctions against Russia, because that would cause additional turmoil" during a **moment of rising economic uncertainty** at home over the president's trade policies.

Trump's **domestic energy agenda** also makes it harder for him to go after the **heart of Russia's economy**. He has blamed his predecessor for the rise in energy prices that was largely driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and ran on a promise to cut costs and lower inflation. A new spike in prices at the pump sparked by tougher energy sanctions on Russia could backfire with voters, analysts said.

"President Trump came in **promising to drive prices at the pump down** by half. That highlights the **delicate needle** he has to thread in engaging with Russia on energy right now," said Mark Finley, an energy expert at Rice University's Baker Institute. "I suspect they'll be very cautious about sanctions that would risk taking Russian **barrels off the market place."**

Russia has found ways to skirt the sanctions, however, including by relying on a so-called "shadow fleet" of vessels to continue exporting oil by sea. Russia has also continued exporting natural gas to parts of Europe and ramped up its energy exports to China, India and other countries that have not participated in the sanctions.

Russian **oil and gas revenue increased by 26 percent** to $108 billion last year, a Reuters report shows. The European Union spent more on Russian oil and gas in 2024 than it did on financial assistance to Ukraine, according to a study published last month by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

So far, the West "hasn't wanted to put **real pressure** on Russia," Oleksandr Merezhko, the chairman of the Ukraine Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a phone interview with *Newsweek*. Trump could do that, he said, "by depriving Russia of the profits it receives from selling oil and gas."

There are several steps the U.S. and allies could take, Merezhko and others said. They include lowering the price cap on Russian oil, cracking down harder on the shadow fleet operators and placing secondary sanctions on companies and trading partners like China that continue buying Russian energy.

Affirming decreases oil demand AND insulates Americans from sanctioning Russia.

Zadrowski 24 [William Zadrowski, Squadron Commander @ the USAF Academy & bound for B.S. in Military and Strategic Studies, 12-8-2024, Nuclear Energy: The Overlooked Energy Solution, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/08/nuclear-energy-the-overlooked-energy-solution/, Willie T.]

The U.S. faces a persistent energy worry. Over the last few years, **electricity demand has soared** while U.S.-based energy suppliers have tried their best to keep up. While energy demand usually fluctuates throughout the year due to varying weather conditions and as the seasons change, the U.S. Energy Information Administration has shown that energy demand has steadily increased over the last fifty years. This can be attributed to population growth and the expansion of electricity production to meet society's rapidly growing energy needs. While total electricity supply has adequately met the increasing demand over the last fifty years, the steadily increasing need for greater electricity places the U.S. in a vulnerable situation – one that can become susceptible to disruptions and shortages. The power sector already experiences immense strain during peak electricity consumption, namely during periods of intense weather such as heatwaves, snowstorms, and other weather phenomena. Considering the **already-strained power sector** in the U.S., further concerns about energy security in the U.S. center around the U.S.'s ability to create **viable alternative energy solutions** to ensure energy demand is met with adequate supply in the event of energy disruptions.

Nuclear Energy: Where It's Been and Where It's Going

The U.S.'s energy consumption portfolio **consists largely of fossil fuels**, accounting for more than **eighty percent** of the U.S.'s total energy consumption in 2023. Putting aside environmental concerns and considerations, the U.S. needs to invest more in another energy source capable of matching fossil fuel consumption in the near future. The best solution to this concern is nuclear energy. Although the U.S. consumes a significant proportion of available electricity from nuclear sources, roughly nine percent, nuclear energy has the potential to **supplement the U.S.'s dependency** on fossil fuels. The nuclear power industry cannot replace the need for fossil fuels, nor should it, but it would provide a safety net for supply chain disruptions and create alternatives to domestic energy consumption. This would prove especially important when considering the fragility of fossil fuel imports from foreign sources and the detriment to national security should there be a fossil fuel shortage in the U.S. and/or abroad. For this to happen, though, obstacles to nuclear power production must be overcome.

The U.S. already has **nuclear energy production** facilities and infrastructure to contribute to the existing energy portfolio, but not nearly at the same scale as fossil fuels. Why might this be? The short answer might be that there exist **high initial costs to producing the infrastructure and plants** required to make a nuclear reactor; however, the more likely reason would be widespread public opposition to and negative perception of nuclear energy production in the U.S. As many American citizens could point out, nuclear energy's past is riddled with catastrophic meltdowns and lasting environmental impacts – things that pose obvious issues with public support investment into nuclear energy production. Notable incidents such as the Chornobyl meltdown, the Fukushima disaster, and the Three Mile Island Accident are well-known examples the public tends to associate with nuclear energy. The risk of a nuclear meltdown and severe environmental effects from accidents at nuclear power facilities are legitimate concerns and should not be ignored, however, nuclear power plant infrastructure and production technology have progressed significantly, partially influenced by these notable disasters to prevent similar accidents from ever occurring in the future. The nuclear power industry is not the same as it was some twenty years ago – it has seen significant increases in safety, regulation, and output optimization through new technologies. If the public can continue moving towards greater support for widespread nuclear power production, which appears to be trending that way in recent years, nuclear energy as the **main source of consumer energy** consumption in the U.S. is a real possibility.

Nuclear Energy as a Domestic **Alternative to Fossil Fuels**

Nuclear power production for energy's sake is not the primary reason for the needed increase in nuclear power output. The need for increased output stems from the vulnerabilities in the U.S.'s energy supply and demand trends. Over the last few years, the U.S. has increased its crude oil exports and became a net exporter of crude oil in 2021, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The U.S. being able to produce more crude oil than it consumes is great for energy security interests since it means the U.S. is less dependent on foreign oil, at least when compared to when the U.S. was a net importer of foreign oil. A decreased dependency on foreign fossil fuel imports provides a host of benefits to the U.S. One of these is the **increased stability** of fossil fuel supply. Considering that the U.S.'s largest source of crude oil and other fossil fuel imports are from areas of the world with complex geopolitical concerns, such as armed conflict, crude oil supply chains face the ever-persistent threat of disruption, whether from direct conflict or supply management used as a tool of coercion, For example, countries that export crude oil may use their production capabilities as a tool of coercion and pressure by restricting the supply of their exports to certain markets, often those that align with their political goals and ideals. This disruption of crude oil was seen following the start of the Russo-Ukraine war, where shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, Russian oil exports were drastically decreased to Western countries following embargoes and sanctions, namely put in place by those in the European Union (EU) and the U.S. These sanctions were designed to be a form of hard power in which the EU and the U.S. **aimed to deter Russian aggression** in hopes that it would accomplish a political end. Whether or not these sanctions are producing their desired effect is beside the point, but they resulted in the **increase in crude oil prices** in the U.S. and abroad, since a major exporter of crude oil, Russia, could not supply crude oil to the U.S. In terms of international diplomacy, the U.S. pursued an option to deal with Russia and its invasion of Ukraine which had **immediate effects on the U.S. economy** and the fossil fuel industry. Whether it proved successful for U.S. interests is yet to be determined, but one thing is certain – if the U.S. had a greater energy consumption available to consumers from nuclear power, crude oil prices may not have increased, as less crude oil and fossil fuels would be needed to power homes, businesses, and other everyday electricity consumers since nuclear power could have **reduced the demand for fossil fuels**.

Decreased demand means more exports.

Rua 13 [Antonio Rua, Senior Economist @ Banco de Portugal & Associate Professor of Economics @ Nova School of Business and Economics, September 2013, Is there a role for domestic demand pressure on export performance?, European Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1594.pdf, Willie T.]

Typically, export performance is modeled as a function of the foreign demand for a country's output and a country's price competitiveness indicator. In general, the foreign demand is proxied by the evolution of imports in the trade partners and its relative evolution vis-à-vis exports is used as a measure of market share developments. The relative price advantage of a country over its competitors is often captured by the real exchange rate. Ceteris paribus, a depreciation makes the country's products cheaper relative to its competitors in the foreign market, which will raise the corresponding demand and increase exports leading to an increase of the market share. These factors are essentially related to the demand side. In fact, most studies **do not consider supply** side variables explicitly when modeling exports. However, it has been recently widely acknowledged that such determinants are far from able to fully explain export performance (see, for example, Fagan et al. (2001, 2005), di Mauro and Forster (2008), European Commission (2010), Dieppe et al. (2012)). Such evidence reinforces the need to search for other factors that may influence exports dynamics.

In line with some previous literature, this paper suggests considering domestic demand pressure as an additional explanatory variable. In fact, it is likely that domestic conditions influence firms willingness or ability to supply exports. In a context of high domestic demand pressure, firms will work at full capacity and will not be able to follow, in the short-run, external demand increases. In contrast, during a domestic recession, firms will be able to **allocate more resources** to exports. In other words, in periods of **slacking** domestic demand firms try to **compensate** for the decline in domestic sales through increased efforts to export while in boom periods production can be mainly sold on the domestic market. Early work focusing on the short-run effects of domestic demand pressure on exports includes Ball et al. (1966), Smyth (1968), Artus (1970, 1973), Zilberfarb (1980), Faini (1994), Sharma (2003), among others. In those studies it was found a significant negative effect of domestic demand pressure on exports for several countries, including the United Kingdom, **the United States**, Germany, Israel, Turkey, Morocco and India. Thus, when modeling export performance, one should take into account not only the driving forces of external demand but also **domestic demand**, as the former affect exports from the demand side and the latter from the supply side. More recently, there has been theoretical and empirical research at the firm level that allows for a better understanding of the negative relationship between domestic demand and exports. Such developments will also contribute to influence the macroeconometric modeling of exports.

In this paper, we revisit the theoretical role of domestic demand pressure on exports and assess its importance on modeling the export performance of the Portuguese economy.1 Besides the recent literature at firm level, such assessment is also motivated by the fact that the standard exports modeling approach is unable to capture properly the Portuguese export performance over the most recent period. In particular, it has been observed a significant and continuous increase of exports market share which cannot be explained by developments on price competitiveness indicators. Such phenomenon is happening along with a dramatic fall of domestic demand. In fact, this relationship could be particularly important in the current economic situation, not only in Portugal but also in other European countries under macroeconomic adjustment and facing strong declines of domestic demand

Empirically, increased supply lowers oil prices --- decks Russia's military and economy.

Cooper 24 [Luke Cooper, Associate Professorial Research Fellow In International Relations @ The London School Of Economics and Political Science, 11-10-2024, Will oil decide the fate of the Russia-Ukraine War?, International Politics and Society Journal, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/will-oil-decide-the-fate-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-7836/, Willie T.]

Saudi Arabia's decision to increase oil supply at a time of falling global demand could **jeopardise** the Russian war effort. With Russia already selling its oil at discounted rates and with higher production costs, a low-price environment in oil markets may impact its ability to **finance its aggression** in Ukraine.

Russia and Saudi Arabia have **previously clashed** in oil markets. For a brief one-month period at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia launched a foolish price war, increasing production as the world moved into lockdown. Once Saudi Arabia responded in kind, the oil price **went into freefall.** In an illustration of how geopolitics 'overdetermines' oil markets, the trigger for the negotiations that brought the crisis to an end was allegedly US President Donald Trump's threat to withdraw American military assistance from Saudi Arabia. Under this geopolitical pressure and collapsing market demand, making a **price war potentially ruinous for all parties**, Russia and Saudi Arabia stepped back, agreeing to the supply cuts required to stabilise world prices.

As recounted in Cambridge professor Helen Thompson's Disorder: Hard Times in the 21st Century, the oil supply glut in 2014 – 2016 was also shaped by the competitive postures of the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Then as now, Saudi Arabia increased the supply of oil into the world market at a time of falling demand with the economic aim of disincentivising American investment in shale oil and the geopolitical aim of pressuring Russia and Iran to retreat from their support for the Assad regime in Syria. That Russia was able to weather the financial crisis produced by the combination of Western sanctions and the Saudi expansion in oil supply, emerging with the Assad regime intact and Russia's hold on occupied southern and eastern Ukraine stable, provides a salutary warning for the hope that the present conjuncture may prove problematic for Putin's regime. But with Russia facing both much **more radical external sanctions** – in effect its near-removal from the Western trade and financial order altogether – and **fighting an enormously costly all-out war** against Ukraine, the **conjuncture** of late 2024 poses a **far more serious challenge.**

The limits of military Keynesianism

Trends in the global oil market **bear down heavily on Russia's strategic choices**. By 2030, the International Energy Agency anticipates that global supply capacity will outstrip demand by some 8 million barrels per day, a situation they describe as 'staggering' and 'unprecedented' (outside of the Covid-19 pandemic). As Iran and the Gulf States have oil wells close to the surface, making them cost-efficient to extract from, these states are in a much more commercially advantageous position to cope with falling oil prices. Their breakeven price for new drilling projects is also far lower than that of their international competitors, including Russia and the United States.

By moving towards a more competitive posture, Saudi Arabia is challenging America's more expensive production but also tacitly acknowledging that the OPEC+ group has a diminished price-setting power. For Russia, this is the worst of both worlds. Unlike the United States, it has an oil-dependent economy, which benefits from the cartel power of OPEC+. Yet, unlike Saudi Arabia, its oil is not cheap to extract, making it poorly equipped to deal with low-price conditions. This drives a short-term escalatory logic for Russia's war on Ukraine, requiring rapid battlefield successes prior to the emergence of low-price oil market conditions.

With oil accounting for between **30-50 per cent of annual state budget** revenues since 2014, Russia is, fundamentally, a petrostate.

Russia's successful adaption of its domestic economy to the war effort has been an important story of the full-scale invasion to date. The Russian state has utilised a suite of policies that Volodymyr Ishchenko, Ilya Matveev and Oleg Zhuravlev identify as 'military Keynesianism', with war-related spending stimulating demand in the economy. They note, in particular, the important distributional effects of this in terms of wage growth and industrial expansion, how this may have impacted support for the war effort among the Russian working classes and the internal limits that these policies have encountered in the form of acute labour shortages constraining economic output.

Putting the Russian war economy in a global context that recognises its oil dependency can help us build a **fuller picture of its vulnerabilities**. While sanctions have ruptured Russia's relationship to Western markets, this does not make its war economy autarchic. On the contrary, revenues from oil exports are **critical**. As the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies has argued, the Russian economy is dualistic in the sense that it may be divided between revenue-generating sectors (of which the most important is oil) and revenue-dependent sectors that are sustained through the distribution of rents. With oil accounting for between 30-50 per cent of annual state budget revenues since 2014, Russia is, **fundamentally, a petrostate**. The Putin regime manages these rents and has **drawn on them** to fund military aggression in Ukraine.

While Russia has not been publishing trade data since the full-scale invasion, estimates from Bruegel suggest that, despite its successful application of military Keynesian instruments, it continues to **fund its trade deficit** in non-fossil fuel goods through the sale of fossil fuels (delivering an overall surplus). As these imports are necessary to meet the **needs of the Russian populace** and the state's war effort, maintaining the flow of oil rents is critical.

Russia has faced rising costs while selling to markets at a discounted rate (advantaging non-Western buyers in general and India and China in particular).

It's instant AND turns case.

Baltvilks 22 [Witajewski; Expert @ the Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses @ the Polish National Centre for Emission Management; April 26; euractiv; "How the green paradox and climate policy can become Putin's nightmare," https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/how-the-green-paradox-and-climate-policy-can-become-putins-nightmare/; DOA: 3-21-2025] tristan

Russia's invasion of Ukraine **pushed** global **oil** and **gas prices** even **higher** than they stood in 2021 because of the Russian **export restriction**. Many experts believe that further sanctions on Russia, including the gradual isolation of Russia in the sphere of global trade, would **keep** oil and gas **prices high** in the medium term.

Ironically, **high** global **prices imply** that many Asian **countries** are more likely to **purchase** Putin's **oil**, especially if it is **offered** at a **lower price**. Should this happen, Putin's oil revenues will remain high, and sanctions by G7 countries will not achieve their primary goal.

This risk can be avoided if sanctions are complemented by a firm climate policy.

The ability of climate policy to influence the oil market and oil prices is illustrated in the so-called green paradox. The green paradox is a hypothetical scenario in which the **announcement** of a rigid **climate policy** becomes a **signal** for **oil producers** that the **demand** for oil will **end** soon, motivating them to **sell** as **much** as they **can** as soon as they can.

Flooding the **market** with oil **depresses** its **price** and **incentivises consumers** to **use more**. If this were to happen, emissions would increase, **rendering** the climate **policy ineffective**. The green paradox is particularly relevant in the context of oil markets, but the mechanisms of the paradox can also apply to natural gas and coal.

Until recently, the green paradox was a problem for climate change economists, but the one who should be most concerned is, in fact, Vladimir Putin. The green paradox has the potential to turn radical climate policy into a weapon against Putin's regime. It is especially important because Russia, the second-largest worldwide gas producer and the third-largest oil producer, currently uses fossil fuels as a weapon against the West for the purpose of pacification.

A **clear** and credible **commitment** by the largest economies in the world to halve the consumption of oil over the next two decades would be a **clear signal** to all oil producers that their **resources** will soon **lose value**. **No producer** with low extraction costs will **keep** its **reserves** for the **future** – they will **attempt** to **pump** their **oil** into the market as long as it **exists**.

Low-cost oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will, at least partly, **crowd out** the more **expensive product** from **Russia**, Venezuela and Iran. Even if that crowding out is not complete, the low oil price will **render** these countries' **oil revenues negligible**. In Russia, where **oil rents** constitute more than **9% of** the nation's **GDP** (**36%** of public-sector **revenue**), this will unavoidably **complicate** the **financial landscape** of the regime.

A losing warfront ensures nukes.

Stein 24 [Janice Stein, founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy and the Belzberg Professor of conflict management with the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, "How impossible is the risk of nuclear escalation in Ukraine?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

20 December 2024,
https://thebulletin.org/2024/12/how-impossible-is-the-risk-of-nuclear-escalation-in-ukraine/ //akang]

In the bizarre interregnum since the US presidential elections, world leaders have been calling President-elect Donald Trump in Florida before his inauguration on January 20. Some of them worry that the ongoing war between an increasingly desperate Ukraine that kills a Russian general in Moscow as it did this week and an emboldened Russia could spin out of control through miscalculation. The darkest scenario is one that culminates in escalation when Russia detonates a nuclear weapon. How likely is such a scenario in the few weeks left before inauguration day?

The likelihood of nuclear escalation cannot be estimated. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States in 1945 are the only cases of the use of nuclear weapons. That strategy was deliberate, not a product of miscalculation, and can best be described as "escalate to de-escalate." There is no case of nuclear escalation through miscalculation from conventional war to nuclear fighting. No estimate of likelihood has any validity unless there are a large enough number of cases to generate a probability distribution. Nuclear escalation occurs in a world of what Oxford University's John Kay calls "**radical uncertainty**" in which historical information provides **no reliable guidance.**

One way to think about nuclear escalation in the context of Russia's current war against Ukraine is to build scenarios in which Russia uses a nuclear weapon and then trace a logically compelling pathway back to the present. It then becomes possible to ask what conditions could enable such a pathway to escalation.

Tactical nuclear weapon. In one scenario that has been discussed, Russia explodes a tactical nuclear weapon to **force Ukraine** to end the fighting and agree to cede Crimea and the four Ukrainian provinces that Russia **is currently occupying** and claiming as its own. Under what conditions is it possible that Russia might adopt such a strategy? Detonating a single tactical nuclear weapon would provide very limited battlefield advantage to Russian forces, and there is some risk that the radioactive fallout could blow back and inflict harm on nearby Russian troops.

Nor would the damage from a single tactical nuclear weapon be grave enough to so demoralize the Ukrainian public that it would buckle under the pressure. If anything, the use of a tactical nuclear weapon would likely radicalize Ukrainians who have been reluctantly moving toward grudging acceptance of a ceasefire.

Were Russia to use a tactical nuclear weapon, such a strategy might backfire. The Ukrainian public might well rally around the flag, unite behind its leader, and stiffen its resistance to ceasefire proposals that are increasingly the subject of discussion inside Ukraine.

Finally, the detonation of a single tactical nuclear weapon—however small its payload—would break the "nuclear taboo" that has held for almost eight decades. **In** October 2022, encouraged by the United States, Russia's key partners—China and India—signaled their strong opposition to the use of any nuclear weapon under any circumstances. Now isolated from the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not want to alienate his fellow leaders of the nine BRICS countries, which include China, India, and Iran.

There is, therefore, no compelling logic that supports the use of even a single tactical nuclear weapon. What conditions could change that logic?

Russia could face a situation where its forces are being pushed back and **out of Ukraine**. Putin faced a version of that scenario in the autumn of 2022 when Ukraine's armed forces were pushing the Russian army back. It was then that the CIA issued the estimate that there was a 50 percent chance that Russia would use a nuclear weapon.

After Ukrainian troops broke through and pushed Russian forces back from Kharkiv in the northeast and Kherson in the south, US intelligence overheard a conversation among senior Russian military commanders about when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Putin was reportedly not part of these conversations. That intelligence was circulated inside the US government in mid-October. In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that Russia moved some tactical weapons out of storage and loosened operational controls that would make the use of a tactical nuclear weapon easier. It was these two developments that pushed up the US intelligence estimate that Russia might use a nuclear weapon.

Around the same time, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, in one of his calls with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, accused Ukraine of planning to use a "dirty bomb." Concern among Western officials grew that Putin was preparing a false flag operation. Only a long phone call between Gen. Mark Milley, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov, reduced the tensions. The most senior military officer from each country discussed Russia's doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons and reassured one another. This episode tells us that even when Russian forces were retreating in Ukraine, Putin did not break the nuclear taboo.

Russia has since **significantly lowered the threshold** of when it would use nuclear weapons. In November 2024, Putin signed a decree amending Russia's nuclear doctrine in two important ways. The doctrine now

declares that Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state that attacks Russia or its **allies** and is supported by a nuclear power. In addition, Russia's nuclear doctrine released in 2020 declared that Russia would use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack when the very **existence of the state is in jeopardy**. The new amendment lowers that threshold to a conventional attack that is a critical threat to Russia's sovereignty or territory.

Putin also railed against the Biden administration's decision in November to allow Ukraine to use US-supplied longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, against military installations inside Russia and warned that this decision was tantamount to NATO declaring war on Russia. Moscow then launched the Oreshnik, an intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads, against Ukraine. The missile can carry nuclear warheads. Despite the bellicose rhetoric and the new missile launch, Russia has not loosened operational controls on any tactical nuclear weapons nor moved any of these weapons out of storage. Instead, Gerasimov again reassured the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., in a phone call that the missile launch was planned long before the announcement about the ATACMS.