

# Constructive

See R2 Peach OS.

## Rebuttal

Independent, private corporations in Taiwan are securing cybersecurity deals.

Global Taiwan Institute, 03-20-2024, "The Nexus of Cybersecurity and National Security: Taiwan's Imperatives Amidst Escalating Cyber Threats",

<https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/03/the-nexus-of-cybersecurity-and-national-security-taiwans-imperatives-amidst-escalating-cyber-threats/> // RB

In a similar vein, the two nations convened a [cybersecurity forum](#) in 2020, which provided a platform for the exchange of insights and strategies drawn from the private sector. Building upon these foundations, the forthcoming Lai Administration should not only sustain collaboration with the United States, but also expand such endeavors into a comprehensive cyber collective defense framework, ideally in conjunction with likeminded nations such as Japan, which similarly confront cyber threats emanating from China. Moreover, **Taiwan's cyber capabilities** can be substantially **augmented through** the cultivation **of robust public-private partnerships**. The burgeoning landscape of Taiwan's cybersecurity industry, propelled by initiatives spearheaded during the Tsai Administration, helped to underscore the potential of such collaborations. As it enters office, the **Lai government** would be well-advised to champion and **incentivize public-private partnerships** aimed at fortifying the nation's cybersecurity posture.

Lennon Y.C. **Chang**, 05-0-2024, "Taiwan is experiencing millions of cyberattacks every day. The world should be paying attention", Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/taiwan-is-experiencing-millions-of-cyberattacks-every-day-the-world-should-be-paying-attention-225677>

However, the country's existing cybersecurity regulations primarily target cybercrime. Because of [the blurry line between cybercrime and cyber warfare](#), Taiwan needs to adopt a more holistic approach. This should encompass preventive measures, rapid response strategies and enhanced public-private and international collaborations. For example, **Taiwan is now developing its own satellite internet service – an alternative to Elon Musk's Starlink** – to reduce the potential harm from severed underwater internet cables.

Lili **Pike**, 10-04-2024, "Taiwan's Greatest Vulnerabilities Extend Beyond Its Military", Foreign Policy,

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/04/taiwan-financial-risks-china-unification-tabletop-fdd-wargame/>

**Taiwan's Greatest Vulnerabilities Extend Beyond Its Military** A new tabletop exercise reveals **financial, cybersecurity, and energy risks that China could exploit**. In recent years, Taiwan wargames have become standard practice from [Capitol Hill](#) to [Wall Street](#). The exercises model pathways China might pursue to achieve its desired end goal: bringing the island democracy, which Beijing still considers to be part of its territory, under its political control. Over the years, such wargames have played out different military scenarios, from a Chinese [blockade](#) of the island to a full [amphibious invasion](#), and assessed the capacity of Taiwan and the United States and its allies to respond. But these games tend to focus primarily on hard power. And in recent years, when Chinese President Xi Jinping has spoken about so-called reunification, he has [repeatedly said](#) that although China does not rule out using military force to achieve

that end goal, it seeks a “peaceful reunification.” Thus, many **Taiwan** experts **contend** that while the island must prepare itself for a military confrontation, **not** enough **attention has been paid to likelier scenarios** in which Beijing weaponizes nonmilitary **“gray zone” tactics**.

Japan will support Taiwan instead – affirming gives Japan a greater capability to do so bc the U.S. can reinvest into Japan

Adrian **Chiu**, 11-27-20**23**, "Cybersecurity and National Security in Taiwan and Japan", Taiwan Insight, <https://taiwaninsight.org/2023/11/27/cybersecurity-and-national-security-in-taiwan-and-japan/>

In an era where digital technology permeates every aspect of our lives, national security strategies increasingly hinge on robust cybersecurity measures. This is particularly evident in the approaches of **Taiwan and Japan**, two democratic governments at the forefront of **integrating advanced technological defences against emerging digital threats**. The evolving **cybersecurity** strategies of Taiwan and Japan are not merely reactive measures to emerging threats but are emblematic of broader global trends where digital security is inextricably linked to political stability. Their experiences offer vital insights for other governments grappling with similar challenges, emphasising the importance of agility, technological innovation, and international cooperation in crafting national security strategies for an interconnected digital world.

Charles L. **Glaser**, 04-28-20**21**, Glaser is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China," Foreign Policy, archive.is, <https://archive.is/5m5xT> // MH // re-cut

**A better bet would be retrenchment. The United States could end its commitment to Taiwan and** scale back

its opposition to China's assertive policies **simply to avoid conflict**. Washington would be seeking a clear benefit: lowered odds of a crisis or going to war over secondary or tertiary interests. Retrenchment's success would not depend on whether China's goals are limited **or** on whether China agreed with the United States on the purpose of the concessions.

What would this policy look like in practice? **The U**<sub>nited</sub> **S**<sub>tates</sub> **would make its revised position public**, thereby laying the foundation **to**

**minimize pressure** from foreign policy elites and the public **to intervene if China attacked Taiwan**. **It would continue to**

**make clear that China's use of force to conquer Taiwan would violate international norms**, and it could even

continue to sell arms to Taiwan to make conquest more difficult. Retrenchment need not necessarily entail defense cuts. In fact, **Washington could boost spending**

**to** preserve and even **enhance its capability to defend Japan and South Korea**. **These investments would send a**

**clear signal to China and to U.S. allies: the United States is determined to protect the commitments it**

**hasn't cut**.

Rest were analytics.