# 1NC --- UKSO R4

## C1 --- Subs

### Maritime drugs go under our noses

**Sadler 23** (Brent Sadler is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for National Defense at The Heritage Foundation) The National Interest, 12/11/2023, “Battling the Cartels Requires A Refocus: **Cutting all maritime smuggling routes is the best way to defeat the cartels**, their Chinese enablers, and the Fentanyl overdose epidemic.” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/battling-cartels-requires-refocus-207866> //jjoy recut by // adam west + brask

**Hitting** the **cartels’ bottom line** will **require intercepting** both **shipments** of cocaine and the precursor chemicals needed for fentanyl production. **Critically, the cartels rely on several sea routes to move 90 percent of their drugs.** The most important sea routes cross the Pacific with precursor chemicals from China and cocaine from South America to intermediary stops before moving into the United States or via Europe’s most porous border in French Guiana. Smugglers are attracted to French Guiana since, once inside, they can use local drug mules to access direct flights to Europe with fewer customs and immigration restraints. Established in 1989, the Joint Interagency Task Force South has had measured success interdicting this illicit trade. However, it has not been able to deliver a knockout blow to the cartels. **Today, officials assert they are, on average, only interdicting approximately 10 percent of this illicit trade, given too few Coast Guard cutters and patrol aircraft at their disposal.** By integrating multiple U.S. agencies, JIATF-S has leveraged twenty-one regional partners’ maritime policing capacities with timely intelligence sharing. This has made a meaningful but not a mortal impact on the cartels. The collaboration has resulted in almost 80 percent of JIATF-S’ drug seizures being executed by regional partner nations. But sadly, this impacts only a fraction of the cartels’ overall bottom line. Last year, JIATF-S enabled the capture of over $7 billion worth of narcotics. This is good but not good enough, given the global trade in narcotics was estimated at over $652 billion in 2017. In 2020, it’s estimated that almost 2,000 tons of undiluted cocaine were produced. If well placed, a single Coast Guard cutter on station can take fifty tons of narcotics out of supply. Still, this is not good enough, making greater partner nations’ active support critical moving forward. Securing Americans from the scourge of illegal drugs will mean actually **putting the cartels out of business.** **Doing this will require cutting the cartels’ critical narcotics maritime trade routes—not only south-to-north routes to North America but also the other routes that keep them in business**. In the past, cartel transit routes have adapted as interdiction grew more effective in the Caribbean, with cocaine smugglers shifting to transit routes via West Africa to Europe. Importantly, in recent years, the cartels have expanded their European operations, making it a significant part of their bottom line. Unfortunately, the establishing legislation for JIATF-S focuses only on routes from Latin America to the United States. This has prevented broader interdiction on a scale that would seriously threaten the cartels’ bottom line. Fixing this will require reframing the current mandate of JIATF-S to focus on cutting all the sea routes on which the cartels rely. An unholy alliance between the cartels and Chinese chemical suppliers is delivering massive profits to crime syndicates on both sides of the Pacific. As in Europe and Africa, increased criminality is weakening Latin American governments that are being exploited by the cartels and the Chinese criminal gangs—notably the Bang Group. This is already apparent as Venezuela slides deeper into criminality and active support of the drug trade while China courts a weakened Maduro government. The bottom line is that China benefits by operating on both sides of the narcotics trade: Chinese criminal gangs generate income and influence while weakening local governments. Those weakened governments then turn to China for policing assistance to fight the very crime their crime gangs are spreading—see, for example, the experience of the Republic of Palau. Exposure of China’s hand in these nefarious networks is needed but too seldom seen. On a rare occasion this October, the Justice Department announced indictments against eight Chinese companies and twelve Chinese nationals involved in illegally shipping fentanyl precursor chemicals to the United States. That said, the scope of illicit Chinese activity in the Western Hemisphere is likely higher than publicly reported, and the sooner China held to account to begin meaningfully curtailing this trade, the better. The critical issue is that focusing on only cocaine and fentanyl headed to the United States will not be enough to destroy the cartels behind the illicit narcotics trade. To up the pain on the cartels, **JIATF-S needs more cutters and aircraft to halt this illegal trade.** Doing this better and more comprehensively targets the cartels’ business model. **Cutting off their access to sea routes will squeeze their bottom line where they are most exposed. A comprehensive approach building on the success of JIATF-S with additional platforms and authorities can finally and mortally smash the cartels.**

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### They use subs

**Toledano ‘23** [Javier Sutil Toledano, 10-12-2023, "Narco-Submarines Guide: The Underwater World of Drug Trafficking", Grey Dynamics, <https://greydynamics.com/narco-submarines-guide-the-underwater-world-of-drug-trafficking/>] // adam west

These **sub**marine**s** are built to **avoid law enforcement** patrols. Law enforcement agencies such as the US Coast Guard, devote considerable resources to the detection and interdiction of narco-submarines, as they **pose** a **significant challenge to drug interdiction** efforts. Despite these efforts, narco-submarines continue to be used by drug traffickers due to their ability to covertly transport large quantities of narcotics. In this article, we explore the history of these vessels and the different types that exist today. It also looks at their limitations and operations where they have been most relevantly used. This article focuses on the use of narco submarines in America and its expansion to Europe through Spain.

### Maritime surveillance would be implemented.

**Duffie 23** (Warren Duffie Jr. is a contractor for ONR Corporate Strategic Communications.) Office of Naval Research, 08/21/2023, “‘SCOUT-ing’ for Solutions: Naval Exercise Seeks to Improve Maritime Drug Interdiction” <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3499461/scout-ing-for-solutions-naval-exercise-seeks-to-improve-maritime-drug-interdict/> //jjoy + brask

Compiled using **sophisticated a**rtificial **i**ntelligence **and m**achine-**l**earning **systems** — **combined with advanced detection and tracking software** — the images, along with other sensor systems, **enabled U.S. military and law enforcement to deploy maritime assets to stop the drug runners from delivering their illegal goods**. The scenario was part of a larger July 2023 experimentation event designed to emulate drug-smuggling activities in the maritime domain as well as efforts to deter the flow of such contraband. Called the SCOUT Main Experimentation Event, the two-week exercise involved partners such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR), Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and numerous naval warfare centers and industry and academic partners. Chief of Naval Research Rear Adm. Kurt Rothenhaus, who was one of several ONR leaders at the maritime operations center, said, “I’m truly impressed by the innovation, teaming and analytic rigor you’ve all brought to this exercise. Your pioneering approach is leading the way for us to learn faster with new partners to tackle the hardest operational challenges.” ONR SCOUT is an ongoing, multiagency campaign to identify new ways to collaborate with industry and academia to bring novel capabilities to warfighter challenges, experiment with them in realistic operating conditions and operationalize them in partnership with the fleet and force. Since being established 18 months ago, SCOUT has worked with JIATF-S, SOUTHCOM and partner naval forces to **leverage all-domain technologies and unmanned capabilities to detect, track and target illicit drug trafficking in the maritime environments. This facilitates interdiction and apprehension to reduce the flow of drugs into the U.S. and partner nations, and helps degrade and dismantle transnational criminal organizations.** The July 2023 Main Experimentation Event built on lessons learned from previous SCOUT sprint exercises (scenario-based demonstrations of technology capabilities and characteristics), warfighter-driven challenges and design-thinking workshops. It also incorporated aspects of the four primary problem areas outlined by SCOUT since its inception, including: Deploying algorithms that enable operators to manage and exploit overwhelming amounts of diverse data, for improving accuracy in assessing threats. Improving capabilities to detect and monitor suspect vehicles, across wider areas and over longer detection intervals. Integrating promising new software into the JIATF-S operations center, in order to use air and maritime assets more effectively in counter-narcotics operations. Delivering JIATF-S capabilities that can enhance operations, mobility and tactical flexibility, in a cost-effective manner. Last month’s large-scale event involved two dozen participants from organizations within the Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and industry and academic partners. The coverage area stretched from the Bahamas to the mid-Atlantic Ocean region along the U.S. East Coast. The total coverage area exceeded 100,000 square miles — larger than the five Great Lakes combined in terms of surface area. “The goal was to integrate different types of prototype technologies together, from all-domain sensor systems to artificial intelligence, and see how their performance was affected in an operationally relevant environment using realistic smuggling behaviors,” said Shane Stein, the ONR program officer overseeing the event. “This enabled us to stress-test various systems and strategies under real-world conditions to see if they could solve identified naval problems, and potentially be applied across the fleet and force in the future.” Participants deployed diverse manned and unmanned technologies, including prototypes still in development. These included **crewed maritime patrol aircrafts, crewed ships, u**nmanned **u**nderwater **v**ehicle**s and small boats, sensor buoy systems and commercial satellites.** Many of the assets were controlled remotely from locations in Virginia, Maryland, California and Florida. The participants were divided into two teams: Blue (representing U.S. military and law enforcement) and Red (representing a drug cartel). They engaged in numerous unscripted “cat-and-mouse” encounters during the event that replicated narcotics smuggling and counter-illicit trafficking operations. Now that the event is over, SCOUT and its partners are reviewing the accumulated data to see how it could be used to strengthen the mission capabilities of JIATF-S and SOUTHCOM.

**But,**

**Neuhard 18** [Ryan Neuhard, 03-20-2018, "Submarine Detection and the Future of the U.S. Fleet", Georgetown Security Studies Review, <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/30/submarine-detection-and-the-future-of-the-u-s-fleet/>] // adam west

The development of robotics, seabed infrastructure, and underwater communications are now providing opportunities to integrate these capabilities into large detection networks. These networks can incorporate mobile unmanned underwater vehicles, fixed seabed and **buoy sensors**, and potentially independent commercial infrastructure, like sensors monitoring fish stocks.[[v]] Real-time underwater communication systems can then exchange information between these sensors to **pinpoint submarines and alert anti-submarine forces**.

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### Targeting in the gulf decks Russian self sufficiency.

**Peck 18** [Michael Peck, 12-11-2018, "Coming Soon: Russian Submarines in the Gulf of Mexico?", National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/coming-soon-russian-submarines-gulf-mexico-38442>] // adam west

Our **submarines**, too, might have **surface**d suddenly some place **in the Gulf** of Mexico to shock America,” Korotchenko said. “We have the **corresponding forces of our submarine fleet** **there**. We do not do that for the simple reason our purpose is not to show off in such a silly way, but **to cope with** the **assigned tasks**.” Russia’s message to the United States: Sail your warships into Russian coastal waters, and we’ll send our warships into yours. That threat comes after a U.S. Navy destroyer sailed into an area of the Sea of Japan, near the Russian port of Vladivostok, that is claimed by Russia. The USS McCampbell conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOPS) cruise to demonstrate that the United States does not recognize Russian sovereignty over those waters. The McCampbell sailed on December 5 “in the vicinity of Peter the Great Bay to challenge Russia’s excessive maritime claims and uphold the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by the United States and other nations,” announced the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer can carry up to 96 Tomahawk missiles. While the U.S. Navy did not provide exact details of the McCampbell’s route, Russia’s Defense Ministry said the destroyer did not come closer than 100 kilometers (62 miles) to Russian territorial waters, and was continually tracked by a Russian destroyer and aircraft. Just which waters were considered Russian territory wasn’t clear. The following day, Russian state news agency TASS published an interview with Igor Korotchenko, the editor-in-chief of Russian magazine Natsionalnaya Oborona (National Defense), which hinted that Russia could return the favor. “Our submarines, too, might have surfaced suddenly some place in the Gulf of Mexico to shock America,” Korotchenko said. “We have the corresponding forces of our submarine fleet there. We do not do that for the simple reason our purpose is not to show off in such a silly way, but to cope with the assigned tasks.” Interestingly, Russia claimed earlier this year that in 2013, its submarines did in fact sail into the Gulf of Mexico without being detected. A Russian submarine officer told Russian media (Google English translation here) that the subs—allegedly Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarines armed with Kalibr cruise missiles—came within “missile strike distance from one of the main bases of American submarines.” The article hinted that the base in question was the U.S. Navy submarine installation at King’s Bay, Georgia, separated by the narrow Florida peninsula from the Gulf of Mexico. Korotchenko warned that attempts to intimidate Russia were "useless and senseless." "**Russia** has **conducted** a **self-sufficient policy** of its own and it keeps conducting it,” he added. “We defended our interests all along and we continue to do so." Russia’s neighbor Ukraine would say that Moscow has an expansive definition of Russian interests. The USS McCampbell’s show-the-flag mission came after Russia’s seizure last month of three Ukrainian warships sailing in the Sea of Azov, which borders the Crimean peninsula (which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014). Several Ukrainian sailors were injured by Russian fire. The Sea of Azov is supposed to be shared by Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko has called for NATO warships to patrol these waters.

### The policy is continuing.

**Cayman 7-6** [Cayman, 7-6-2024, "Russia sending warships to Caribbean for naval exercise : Cayman News Service", No Publication, <https://caymannewsservice.com/2024/06/russia-sending-warships-to-caribbean-for-naval-exercise/>]

(CNS): **Russia** plans **to send** combat **vessels into the Caribbean** region this summer as part of naval exercises that will likely include port calls in Cuba and possibly stops in Venezuela, a senior US official said Wednesday, according to reports on Reuters. The United States said it didn’t see the move involving a relatively small number of vessels and planes as threatening, but the US Navy will monitor the exercises, the official told reporters.

The US has been tracking Russian warships and aircraft that are expected to arrive in this region in the coming weeks for the **military exercise** in **a show of force as tensions rise** over Western military support for Ukraine. US officials described the planned exercises as notable but not concerning and are expected to involve just a “handful” of Russian ships and support vessels.

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### Tensions are high.

**Starchak ‘24** [Maxim Starchak, expert on Russian nuclear policy, strategic weapons, arms control, and defence and nuclear industry, as well as a fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy of the Queen’s University, 7-16-2024, "Putin’s Russia Will Continue to Pursue Nuclear Escalation", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie Politika, <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/06/russia-nuclear-war-threats?lang=en>] // adam west

For many decades, international security has depended on dialogue between **Moscow** and **Washington** on the topic of **nuclear** arms control. In recent years, however, this **dialogue has** all but **ground to a** complete **halt**, and the use of nuclear blackmail has spiraled. In Russia, there have been calls for nuclear strikes on Europe and for a “demonstrative nuclear explosion.” In May, Russia held tactical nuclear drills in response to the West’s so-called “direct support for terrorist actions against Russia.” Russian officials have even **threatened to use strategic** **nuc**lear weapon**s** against the **West**. Moscow rejects Washington’s proposal to restart arms control talks. It has made it clear that this isn’t a priority, and that it will continue to break taboos until its demands in other areas are met. In other words, Russia is exploiting the U.S. desire for arms control. Nuclear threats have become routine for the Kremlin. Every time Kyiv is supplied with new weapons, is given permission to use Western arms to strike Russian territory, or attacks Russia’s missile warning systems, Moscow resorts to nuclear threats. Ignoring the limits Washington has placed on its support for Ukraine, the Kremlin is doing everything it can to show that it doesn’t care about upholding arms control. Indeed, Russia has been trying to bully the West with nuclear weapons for years. In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to muddy the waters by announcing the development of weapons not covered by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), including the nuclear-powered Burevestnik long-range cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-capable super torpedo. Along with talk of modernizing its nuclear triad, this was all intended to underline Russia’s strategic edge, impress the U.S. establishment, and make Washington more accommodating on other issues. Putin has dismissed U.S. proposals for talks on arms control as “demagoguery,” and apparently expects the West to accept Russia’s ultimatum issued in the run-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “We need guarantees. And the guarantees should be… ones that would satisfy us, that we would believe in,” the Russian leader said earlier this year. Since the start of the fighting in Ukraine, Russia’s Defense Ministry has seen nuclear weapons as the sole obstacle to a war with NATO, while the Foreign Ministry approaches them as just another diplomatic tool. Accordingly, agreeing to nuclear arms control negotiations now would be seen in Moscow as a defeat. In addition, many in Russia believe that the Cold War–era arms control system was created on the West’s terms, and they want that to change. For them, the West’s involvement in Ukraine is the result of ineffective nuclear deterrence, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was an example of how to successfully use nuclear threats to achieve military-political goals. In response to U.S. support for Kyiv, Russia has stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus, withdrawn from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as well as withdrawn ratification of START III. This is supposed to frighten Washington into dividing the world—or at least Europe—into spheres of influence. And it has yielded some results: U.S. pledges of support for Ukraine come with caveats, and Washington is pushing for talks on strategic arms control and a ban on nuclear weapons in space (Moscow, of course, rejects any initiative that would reduce tensions). Nevertheless, the Kremlin is a very long way from seeing Washington meet its maximalist demands. The United States is not reducing its support for Ukraine, nor is it preparing a Cuban missile crisis–style response. This means **Russia will continue escalating**. Moscow’s options include **changing** its **doctrine on** **nuclear** weapons **use**, increasing weapons stockpiles, building a national missile defense system, **revising** its **commitment not to be the first to deploy** intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, increasing nuclear capabilities in the exclave of Kaliningrad, and even—as some experts propose—carrying out a “demonstrative nuclear explosion.” With nuclear blackmail, Moscow is trying to recreate the world order that prevailed in the second half of the twentieth century. While the Kremlin sees this as a period of stability, in fact neither side trusted the other, and each continued to increase its arsenal and pursue its own interests. The same would be true today. A deal to end the war in Ukraine and carve up Europe would not make the world safer. In fact, it would convince the Kremlin of its own invincibility and make it more aggressive. Moscow sees itself as the stronger side in Ukraine and, as such, is ready to wait out the West. In the meantime, the world can expect significant displays of nuclear power. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in May that Russia would shelve the issue of “red lines,” and mirror the West’s nuclear threats. Unpredictable years of confrontation lie ahead. First, we’re likely to see the development of new weapons, both real and modeled. Nuclear drones, hypersonic missiles, and lasers will be a constant feature of official speeches and military exercises. Second, nuclear weapons will be moved closer to the enemy. Third, strategic missile carriers and **nuclear sub**marine**s** **will appear more often in border areas**. Fourth, there will be a buildup of conventional weapons and troops in Europe as soon as funds and manpower are available (probably once the active phase of the war in Ukraine is over). Fifth, there will be an increase in the number and scale of military exercises. Sixth, there will be more military incidents. Seventh, we will return to a nuclear arms race. Finally, and most worryingly, **nuclear arsenals** could—at some point—be put **on high alert**. Some of this is **already under way**. Russia has moved nuclear weapons to Belarus, and the United States is scouting for sites for a similar deployment. Moscow appears ready to lift the moratorium on the deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe after Washington put ground-based Typhon missile systems in the Philippines. And experts in both Russia and the United States are trying to justify the buildup of strategic offensive weapons. Moscow hopes its demands will be met after a changing of the guard in the West. Washington has similar hopes for Russia. It hasn’t forgotten how Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in 1985 led to nuclear arms control agreements and a stable Europe. These expectations mean that the current worrying trends could continue for years—at least for as long as Putin remains in office.

### Subs are k2 second strike.

**Seibt ‘23** [Sébastian Seibt, Masters in Journalism @ Centre universitaire d'enseignement du journalisme de Strasbourg, 12-13-2023, "Putin unveils new Russian nuclear submarines to flex naval muscle beyond Ukraine", France 24, <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20231213-putin-unveils-new-russian-nuclear-submarines-to-flex-naval-muscle-beyond-ukraine>] // adam west + brask

It is no coincidence that Putin chose to invest in submarines rather than other types of warships, says Germond. "**Russia has never managed to create a fleet capable of competing with the West**. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union could not develop an aircraft carrier that could rival those of the Americans."

In contrast, Russia’s heavy investment in **sub**marine**s** has long **provide**d **guarantees against a** hypothetical **American** nuclear **attack**. They are an essential element of Russia’s deterrence strategy, **providing** what analysts call a “**second-strike capability**” – a nuclear power will think twice before bombing another if it knows that somewhere under the water, submarines are hiding, ready to retaliate.

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### Aff is a perceptual link that triggers first strike.

**Johnson 20** James Johnson, 4/16/2020, RUSI Journal, “Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026> //jjoy + brask

Significant advances in power, sensor technology and communications would be needed before these autonomous systems have a game-changing strategic impact on submarine reconnaissance.43 However, irrespective of the veracity of this emerging capability, **the mere perception that nuclear capabilities face new strategic challenges would nonetheless elicit distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries, in particular where strategic force asymmetries exist. Autonomous capabilities** – like the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Sea Hunter – demonstrate how autonomous weapons could **accelerate** the completion of the iterative targeting cycle to support joint operations – **thereby reducing the reliability and survivability of states’ nuclear second-strike capability, and potentially causing use-them-or-lose-them situations. In the near term, therefore, the most significant destabilising impact of AI on nuclear deterrence will likely be the synthesis of autonomy** with a range of machine-learning-augmented sensors, **potentially undermining states’ confidence in the survival of their second-strike capabilities, which could trigger a retaliatory first strike**.44 Enhanced exponential growth in computing performance,45 together with advances in the machine-learning techniques that can rapidly process data in real time, will empower drone swarms to perform increasingly complex missions, such as hunting hitherto hidden nuclear deterrence forces. In short, the ability of future iterations of AI that are able to make predictions based on the fusion of expanded and dispersed datasets, and then **locate, track and target strategic missiles in underground silos (especially mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers), onboard stealth aircraft, SSBNs and truck- or railmounted transporter erector launchers (TELs), is set to grow.**

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## C2 --- Autocracy

#### **Democracy is on the rebound.**

Thomas **Carothers**, 5-30-20**23**, Is the Global Tide Turning in Favor of Democracy?, Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/05/is-the-global-tide-turning-in-favor-of-democracy?lang=en%C2%A2er=global //CChun (recut from BZ)

Despite some recent democratic gains, it is too early to declare that the global democratic recession is over. Overcoming the deep roots of democracy’s global woes will require sustained efforts by the United States and many other democracies to address a myriad of continuing challenges In his March 29 address during the second U.S.-led Summit for Democracy, U.S. President Joe Biden declared that democracies are “**turning the tide**” against democratic backsliding and that “democracies of the world are getting stronger, not weaker,” while “autocracies of the world are getting weaker, not stronger.” In a recent Foreign Affairs article on countering autocracy globally, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Samantha Power, wrote that 2022 might have been “a high-water mark for authoritarianism” and the “autocrats are now on the back foot.” This optimistic narrative builds on the case made by various political observers who in global political retrospectives at the end of 2022 pointed to accumulating good news for democracy and speculated that a **new positive tipping point** for **global democracy** might be at hand. Those end-of-year accounts centered on five cases: China, Russia, Iran, Brazil, and the United States. In this view, the Chinese government’s **retreat from its Zero COVID** policy in the **face of mounting public anger and resistance** was a **major setback** for China’s authoritarian model. Russia’s enormous miscalculations in its military intervention against Ukraine **shattered the idea of** Russian President Vladimir **Putin’s strongman competence**, gravely weakened the Russian military, and resulted in harsh economic sanctions against the country. Massive, **sustained protests in Iran** had the regime **more on the ropes than at any time in its history.** The **electoral defeat of president Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil halted** a **dangerous slide in the country’s democracy**. And the **U.S. midterm elections saw the defeat of a number of far-right candidates** steeped in election denial, especially ones seeking to gain positions in state offices from which they could potentially undercut the integrity of the 2024 presidential election. The idea of a global turning of the tide in favor of democracy is appealing. After many years of sagging democratic fortunes, characterized by analysts as a profound “democratic recession,” all who care about democracy are hungry for some good news. But is it accurate? Certainly there is some good news for democracy here and there in the world. The global democratic retreat is neither an unrelieved nor an unshakeable condition. Yet, the roots of the democratic recession are deep, and its reversal will require fundamental progress on multiple daunting challenges at the same time. Today, that progress is still only incipient on many fronts. Mixed News for Democracy A second look at the five big positive cases described above somewhat tempers the optimistic picture. China’s reversal of its Zero COVID policy was a huge shift, but with economic growth having resumed and Chinese President Xi Jinping continuing his forceful, repressive leadership, it does not seem to have constituted a major unsettling of the Chinese political system. The war in Ukraine has been disastrous in some ways for Russia, but Putin still commands significant popularity and his political hold seems secure, at least for now. The Iranian protests have subsided, and the regime, while certainly shaken, is intact. Brazil is back to some degree of democratic normality, but the attack on the National Congress on January 8, 2023, signaled the continued presence of antidemocratic forces. In the United States, the extraordinarily harsh divide between Republicans and Democrats—including the perception on both sides that the other represents a fundamental threat to American democracy—continues, and the unfolding presidential election campaign is certain to further inflame divisions. Of course, there is other positive recent news for democracy around the world. Democratic **openings have occurred via elections in Honduras, Slovenia, and Zambia** in the past two years, with democratically **backsliding** or stagnant parties or leaders being **replaced by ones promising democratic reform**. In Moldova, political reformers have gained power and are struggling valiantly to bring about prodemocratic change. In Tanzania, President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who succeeded an autocratic predecessor in 2021, has reversed her country’s authoritarian drift. In Thailand’s May 2023 elections, the reformist opposition parties’ victory over the military-backed parties has been an encouraging sign, though how much democratic change the military will really allow remains uncertain. But overall, recent democratic openings—which the Biden administration hails as “democratic bright spots” and has usefully stepped up support for—have mostly emerged in small countries and **remain fragile.** Meanwhile, democratic backsliding continues in many places, including in quite a few regionally or globally influential countries. In Latin America, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is intent on weakening key democratic guardrails, such as the country’s National Electoral Institute, while in El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele is well along such a path. Peru is beset by perpetual political conflict and instability, and Guatemala’s political and security elite are steadily undercutting the country’s weak democratic institutions. In South Asia, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s relentless pursuit of an illiberal Hindu majoritarian agenda threatens his country’s democracy, while democratic politics in many other countries in the region, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, have either corroded significantly or are in a state of disruptive churn. In the Middle East, Israel’s long-standing democracy has come under unprecedented internal pressure from a government bent on undercutting the independent judiciary, while Tunisia’s once-promising democratic transition has been derailed by a president determined to wield absolute power. In Africa, military coups or other unconstitutional power transitions have multiplied in the past two years, hitting Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. The recent reelection of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Türkiye is a sobering reminder of just how difficult it is to best an entrenched strongman leader, even when the leader’s recent economic record is manifestly terrible. The Deep Roots of the Democratic Recession Thus, while the overall international picture is not a landscape of unbroken democratic gloom, it is still very mixed at best. There is some inspirational value, as well as some political utility, in the U.S. government and other prodemocratic actors projecting confidence about democracy’s overall global fortunes. And it is certainly possible that the global democratic recession will recede significantly over time; democracy has waxed and waned globally since the early twentieth century. Yet, it is important to avoid unrealistically positive and ultimately unpersuasive narratives. To assess whether the democratic recession is in fact starting to lift, it is necessary to go beyond simple scorecards of countries that are up or down on democracy and instead focus on what brought on the recession in the first place. Democracy’s global retreat over the past decade and a half was the unfortunate confluence of three broad and deeply rooted negative global political developments. At the heart of the democratic recession is the fact that many of the countries in the Global South and in the former communist world that attempted democratic transitions starting in the 1980s and 1990s—the core part of democracy’s “third wave”—have encountered serious problems in attempting to consolidate those changes. In some countries, such as Cambodia, Hungary, and Nicaragua, predatory political actors have amassed outsized amounts of political power, steamrollered relatively shallowly rooted democratic norms and institutions, and convinced a sizable share of populations disillusioned with the early results of democracy to go along for the illiberal ride. Other third wave countries, such as Kyrgyzstan and Peru, have suffered chronic political churn among weakly institutionalized political parties and have made little progress on addressing core governance challenges. Still others, including Haiti and Lebanon, have experienced either state collapse or near governance paralysis. It was almost inevitable that many of the third wave’s democratic experiments would run into rough sledding given that they were launched in contexts of profound institutional weaknesses, harsh socioeconomic realities, and thin experience with democratic practices and norms. But the falling short of prodemocratic aspirations has been wider and deeper than most observers—and, very importantly, most citizens of such countries—expected back when democracy seemed to be gaining global momentum. Contributing to this widespread democratic malaise among newer democracies has been a second trend: an unexpectedly serious wave of democratic tremors hitting established wealthy democracies, the United States most sharply but many parts of Europe as well. This wave has been marked by widespread citizen alienation from conventional democratic institutions, including long-standing center-left and center-right parties, and the rise of illiberal right-wing parties and politicians. Powerful drivers have propelled these troubling political currents. These drivers have included long-term economic stagnation and rising insecurity of the middle class; illiberal counterreactions to progressive sociocultural change in domains such as immigration, ethnic and racial diversity, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights; and the disruptive effects of technological change on the integrity of public information spaces and on basic societal cohesion. Although democracy has survived in the wealthy democracies of North America, Europe, East Asia, and Oceania, these tremors have damaged their standing as democratic models for other countries and weakened the appeal of democracy around the world. Adding still further to this troubled situation for global democracy in the first two decades of this century was the slow but ultimately deep authoritarian hardening of two crucial countries—China and Russia—that have gained the capacity and embraced the intent to challenge U.S. power and project antidemocratic practices and ideas widely beyond their borders. Other autocratic states, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, have also at different times and in different ways over the past fifteen years expanded efforts to influence the political trajectory of some of their neighbors, usually with antidemocratic intent and effects. Indicators of Fundamental Change Given that democracy’s current challenges are rooted in these three major developments, observers will know therefore that the global democratic recession is receding when these developments change in the following ways. A significant number of developing countries and postcommunist countries where attempted democratic transitions went off track manage to find new, more productive ways forward. Doing so will require a combination of a dauntingly long and challenging list of gains and reforms, including defeating elected autocrats, renovating prodemocratic political parties, widening the constituencies of independent civil groups, bolstering key guardrail institutions such as courts and electoral management bodies, strengthening the delivery of basic socioeconomic services, shoring up independent media, and nurturing local- and provincial-level oases of prodemocratic innovation. Wealthy established democracies put illiberal parties and politicians on the defensive and reengage meaningfully with disaffected citizens by offering economic hope and results rather than stagnation and insecurity, achieving productive consensus over divisive social issues and forging solutions for making new technologies reinforce rather than disrupt societal cohesion. Major autocratic powers come up against hard limits to their efforts to undercut democracy beyond their borders and experience real competition to their attempts to serve as alternative models to liberal democracy. The various recent pieces of good news on democracy touch all three of these categories. Brazil’s ouster of a populist strongman is an example of the first, the electoral defeat of some antidemocratic politicians in the United States an example of the second, and the strong coalition of countries supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression an example of the third. But much wider, **sustained actions** and **progress** in all three areas are necessary before it can be declared with confidence that the tide has turned for democracy globally. **Under** Biden’s leadership, **the United States** is making valuable efforts to help bring about such an outcome through multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, and enhanced democracy assistance. But much more will need to be done on all these fronts, not just by the United States but by democracies around the globe, for the considerable democratic backsliding and malaise still present in many places to be reversed. Overstating what is at best incipient progress to date risks underselling what will be needed to widen and sustain this progress in the years to come.

#### **2024 is the tipping point**

Joe **Mathews**, 8-1-20**24**, "Can Democracy Survive 2024?", No Publication, https://www.democracy.community/stories/can-democracy-survive-2024 //CChun

2024 is the **biggest election year** in history. That may be bad for democracy. 2024 will be the biggest election year in history. Some **4.2 billion** people, or more than **half** of **humanity**, live in the 76 countries that are scheduled to hold national **voting**. Can democracy survive it? That question may sound cynical. Much of the world has been taught to equate elections with democracy, and to think of voting as a civic sacrament. “The vote is a trust more delicate than any other,” wrote the 19th-century poet José Martí, a martyr of Cuban independence, “for it involves not just the interests of the voter, but his life, honor and future as well.” In the 21st century, such romantic ideas of democracy are dying. The latest global reports show democracy contracting across every region of the world. For six straight years, more countries have experienced net declines in democratic processes than net improvements. Polling shows widespread disillusionment in democracy among the planet’s young people. In this context, elections rarely serve to renew faith in democracy. They produce too little positive change, thus inspiring frustration. They can be used by authoritarian rulers to consolidate power. And they can be so bitterly contested that they divide societies or inspire violence. Elections can also make democracies vulnerable to outside attack. That’s perhaps most apparent in Taiwan, site of the second of the national elections planned for 2024, on January 13. When I visited Taiwan this past December, Vincent Chao, a top official of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), told me that the election itself was a form of national security against China, which has pledged to return the island nation to its control—by force if necessary. “Democracy is our best defense,” Chao said. In other words, Taiwan must be democratic enough to deserve to be protected from Chinese attack by the U.S. and its allies. But democracy also makes Taiwan vulnerable. The Chinese government and its proxies exploit the island’s open politics to spread misinformation, funnel money to friendly politicians and institutions, and raise doubts about democracy itself. Chinese influence operations reach every neighborhood; many of Taiwan’s borough wardens—essentially, elected neighborhood presidents—have received Chinese financial support, mostly via free trips to the mainland. Despite this, Taiwan’s election is freer and fairer than most. The first election of 2024, in Bangladesh on January 7, will merely cement existing rule; the main opposition party, citing threats to its members, is refusing to contest the election. Pakistan’s February 8 election is likely only to add to the conflict involving the country’s most popular politician, former premier Imran Khan, who has been in prison since last year, when he was removed from office by political opponents and the powerful military. And in Iran, the ruling mullahs are in the process of disqualifying thousands of candidates in March 1 elections for the 290-seat parliament. On February 14, Indonesia will host the world’s largest single-day election, with more than 250,000 candidates competing for 20,000 offices across the national, provincial, and district parliaments. The country’s two-term president, Joko Widodo, is barred from running for re-election in 2024. But the increasingly autocratic leader, after weakening local democracy and a national anti-corruption commission, is using state power to back a successor, Prabowo Subianto, who has a record of human rights abuses and supports Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine. Indeed, it is in Russia where the vast chasm between elections and democracy may be most clearly demonstrated in 2024. On March 17, both Russia and Ukraine are scheduled to hold elections. But it’s likely that only Russia’s unfree and unfair voting will go forward, with the dictator Putin seemingly guaranteed a fifth term as president. Ukraine’s democratic election, meanwhile, may be postponed to protect its voters from being killed by Russian missiles and bombs on their way to the polls. In the spring, some **crucial elections** could reveal whether oppositions can reverse democratic decline—or whether they will deepen it. On April 10, South Korea holds legislative elections in which the political opposition seeks to check President Yoon Suk Yeol, who has reduced rights for women and freedoms of association and the press.

#### **Increased surveillance leads to autocratic oppression**

Evan **Greer**, 2-13-20**19**, More border surveillance tech could be worse for human rights than a wall, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/02/13/more-border-surveillance-tech-could-be-worse-human-rights-than-wall/ //CChun

President Trump wants a border wall — a symbolic monument to xenophobia and hate. But Democrats’ counter proposal could be even more dangerous for human rights. Rather than challenge Trump’s baseless insistence that there is a crisis or push back on the notion that immigrants are criminals who should be targeted, opponents have focused on how Trump’s plan is “medieval” or outdated. Top Democrats have repeatedly advocated for a “smart wall” or “technological wall” as an alternative to a physical barrier at the southern border. The House majority whip, Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-S.C.), made a case for a “technological barrier too high to climb over, too wide to go around, and too deep to burrow under.” These are more than just TV talking points. During the most recent round of negotiations to avert another government shutdown, Democratic lawmakers came in not just with a conciliatory offer of more than $1.3 billion for fencing, but also proposals to fund a swath of invasive surveillance technologies. Expanding these programs will simply shift migration routes to **more remote terrain**, leading to more unnecessary suffering, dehydration and death at the border. They also pose a grave threat to millions of citizens’ privacy and civil liberties across the nation. As of Monday night, negotiators say they have reached an “agreement in principle” on border security funding. Details are scarce because the deal is being negotiated behind closed doors. But as their previous proposals have made clear, **Democratic appropriators** appear **ready to spend hundreds of millions of dollars** on “**new cutting edge technology** along the border to improve situational awareness.” If this sounds a bit dystopian, that is because it is. Lawmakers are not just proposing more cameras at ports of entry — they are pushing for the federal government to spend enormous amounts of money on technologies that can be used to trample human rights at an unprecedented scale. Entering talks, **Dem**ocrat**s supported** more funding for the Border Patrol’s “air and marine operations” — which technology experts say is probably code for **expanding** U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s **fleet of drones.** The CBP already has the largest such fleet outside of the Defense Department and frequently “shares” its aircraft with law enforcement. Under current policies, **video feeds and other data** from those flights can be **stored indefinitely in massive databases** and **shared with hundreds of government agencies and local police.** We should be cautious about expanding these drone capabilities because **technology originally deployed at the border** or in war zones **does not** tend to **stay there**. Too often, it later **gets used against marginalized populations or political dissidents**: An aerial surveillance system **explicitly designed for military use in Iraq** was **later used to watch the residents of Baltimore**, for example, and **police in** the **San Francisco** Bay area **were caught using drones to spy on peaceful protesters** in 2017. Unmanned aerial vehicles are already capable of vacuuming up images of millions of license plates and scanning the faces of people who live and work near the U.S. border. Having more of them could **enable** the government to conduct **constant and ubiquitous** video and photographic **surveillance across large areas.** Democrats have also called for “an expansion of risk-based targeting,” which means increasing the use of **artificial intelligence** software to **determine which** travelers should be detained and subjected to invasive screening, interrogation or **incarceration.** Numerous civil rights groups have spoken out about the dangers of using this type of technology in law enforcement: **Artificial intelligence programs** — created by humans, with human biases — frequently **exhibit racial bias** and can **exacerbate** existing forms of **systemic discrimination.** More funding could eventually lead to a border security system akin to the criminal justice system’s “risk assessment tools,” which help determine bail and sentencing: An algorithm could decide, in some cases, whether someone goes free or dies in ICE custody, is granted asylum or deported. The Democrats’ “opening offer” also provided for more intrusive searches and scans of travelers. They have suggested reinstating funding for VIPR, a controversial “counter terrorism” program with authority to conduct warrantless searches of travelers, with no proven benefit to security. Their proposal also includes $250 million for DHS’s Office of Biometric Identity Management, which is tasked with conducting facial recognition and biometrics collection of travelers entering and exiting the country. Beginning in 2004 by scanning foreign citizens, the program has gone on to collect — and retain — this sensitive information from U.S. citizens; now, Democrats are encouraging this creep. Lacking meaningful oversight, there is essentially no limit to the ways the government could abuse this kind of data, which includes personal details like family history and health information. Spending more money on these existing surveillance programs will only **increase their scope** and their **capacity for harm**. It seems only defense contractors and big tech companies stand to profit from government contracts by helping to build a “smart wall.” From start-ups to Silicon Valley giants, tech companies are looking to government contracts as a source of revenue and influence. These corporations aggressively market their surveillance tech to the government, regardless of whether it works. It is appalling that lawmakers are willing to accept the human cost of supporting these policies. Our government’s **mass surveillance** apparatus already has a **documented chilling effect on free expression and civil rights**. A majority of Americans from across the political spectrum, and lawmakers from both sides of the aisle, have voiced concerns about existing government spying programs. Our elected officials in Congress should be scrutinizing and dismantling them, not promoting their growth and entrenchment. Democratic concessions expose how broken this debate has become. Funding for border enforcement is already at an all-time high. We should not have to choose between an unnecessary physical wall and unaccountable government snooping. By pushing for expanded surveillance as an “alternative” to a literal barrier, Democrats have caved to the president’s worst impulses. The more money the government pumps into this sector, the more people will accept the incorrect idea that surveillance keeps us safe, and this technology will become more enmeshed with our daily lives.

#### **US actions justify tech**

**Weiss 20** [Jessica Chen Weiss, Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies @ Cornell University, 2-17-2020, "Understanding and Rolling Back Digital Authoritarianism," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/understanding-and-rolling-back-digital-authoritarianism/, Willie T.]  
**What’s Driving It?** First is **emulation**. Anecdotally, many governments around the world have **looked to China’s success with high-tech surveillance** and censorship and to a lesser extent to Russia’s success in using social media to spread disinformation. In 2015, Tanzania passed cyber security laws that mirrored China’s. A Tanzanian official later spoke enviously of China’s ability to develop homegrown social media that is “safe, constructive, and popular.” Second is **diffusion**. Organizations and companies tied to Russia have been linked to social media influence operations in countries across Africa, including Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique. In the realm of **technology-enhanced surveillance**, China’s **willingness to finance and build this infrastructure has helped facilitate the widespread adoption** of these technologies in **democratic and authoritarian countries alike.** But Chinese companies are not alone in spreading these technologies. According to a report by Steven Feldstein, repressive countries like Saudi Arabia rarely buy such technologies from a single source, relying not only on Huawei but also companies based in democracies such as the United States (Google and Amazon), the United Kingdom (BAE), and Japan (NEC). Whether technology is inherently illiberal or neutral, with their usage depending on local interests, norms, and protections, it is clear that these technologies have not emanated solely from authoritarian regimes. China has also provided softer forms of assistance, such as trainings for foreign officials, but it is unclear what foreign officials actually learn from those sessions and junkets to China. As Maria Repnikova finds in her ongoing research, Chinese trainings are aimed more at showing off China’s success than teaching foreign officials how to adopt Chinese practices. As we know from decades of experience with international development programs, local conditions and incentives often determine whether participants are interested and able to take up whatever lessons are conveyed. And local officials are often more interested in advancing their own projects and parochial interests than in following foreign advice. As Iginio Gagliardone notes in his book, China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet: African states, rather than being passive recipients of blueprints developed elsewhere, have demonstrated remarkable skills in making use of Beijing’s openings in the ICT [information and communication technologies] sector to bolster their own development projects. Local actors have more latitude than Western commentators often assume in dealing with China — whether to coopt China’s largesse for their own ends, or to push back when Chinese terms are too onerous. Tanzanian admiration for China’s example did not stop the newly elected president, John Magufuli, from suspending a major Chinese-invested port project, calling the terms “exploitative and awkward.” A third factor is the evolving character of international norms, **both formal and implicit**, that govern the digital space. Since the birth of the internet, China and Russia have voiced concerns over the threat it poses to their domestic ability to govern. Both countries have sought to promote “cyber sovereignty” in international discussions over how the internet should be governed. But **norms concerning the appropriate use of digital tools are also shaped by the practices of powerful governments, including the United States** and other democracies, to permit, condone, or carry out intrusions on **individual privacy**, whether by government or private actors. **Support for illiberal practices within established democracies mean that would-be adopters of these technologies**, both authoritarian and democratic, **face fewer international costs to deploying these systems** of technologically enhanced control over society. What’s Not Driving It? It is equally important to recognize that, unlike the Cold War, neither China nor Russia today is engaged in a messianic effort to topple foreign governments and replace them with ideologically similar regimes. While Xi has mooted a China “solution” to the problems facing humankind, this kind of rhetoric has sought to create space for autocracy to survive in a system dominated by liberal democracies – rather than forcibly exporting Chinese-style autocracy. As for Russia, Lucan Way writes, “While Putin has consistently crushed democracy at home, he seems happy to support competitive elections and opposition media in countries with anti-Russian governments.” Leaders in both Moscow and Beijing welcome evidence of democratic dysfunction, as it **makes them look better by comparison**. Both governments have grown more assertive in using “sharp power” — including disinformation and censorship — to shape public opinion. Russia’s disinformation efforts in the 2016 U.S. election have been well documented, though some observers have argued that Russian interference was motivated as much by an opportunistic desire to retaliate. As for China, there is evidence of nascent but less sophisticated government-backed efforts to use social media to spread disinformation and discourage international support for Taiwan and Hong Kong. But while some see Beijing’s efforts in Taiwan as a test run for a global propaganda strategy, Beijing’s primary motivations stem from domestic insecurity and a desire to thwart perceived threats to national unity. (And Beijing’s heavy-handed tactics seem to be losing rather than winning hearts and minds in Taiwan and Hong Kong.) Overseas, the Chinese government is more focused on advancing its economic and security interests than in determining whether the governments it deals with are fairly elected. Material interests, not a universalist mission of promoting autocracy abroad, are the key drivers of China’s global strategy. Democratic Backsliding and Digital Authoritarianism **Fears of democracy’s retreat around the world are rising**, with setbacks in countries from Turkey to Brazil to Hungary. But fears of democracy’s demise may be exaggerated, as the global proportion of countries that are democratic remains high. In China’s backyard, for example, there is little evidence of democratic backsliding across Southeast Asia. Even if democratic practices have weakened in some countries, as in the Philippines and Indonesia, others have become more liberal, such as Myanmar. Assessing the political impact of technological change must also take into account factors that condition its usage, as well as other forces that determine political outcomes. Democratic backsliding has many fathers, including not only domestic conditions but also systemic developments, as Seva Gunitsky’s work suggests. As a social scientist, I expect that it will be very difficult to determine the relative importance of technology vis-à-vis other factors, just as economists and political scientists are still debating whether it is technology (robots) or outsourcing (the “China shock”) that has done more to decimate manufacturing jobs in the United States. These are econometric debates that are unlikely to be definitively resolved. When assessing technology’s political impact, one must keep in mind selection effects and counterfactuals. Let’s start with selection effects: What differentiates a country that has adopted tools of digital authoritarianism from one that considered but declined to adopt those tools? Understanding the different political trajectories or preexisting conditions that separate adopters from non-adopters is crucial to diagnosing the difference that these technologies make. On to counterfactuals: What would politics in that country have looked like if that technology had not been adopted? Would it be **more or less autocratic** had the government relied instead on old-fashioned methods of repression and surveillance**? Reinforcing Democracy** Answering these questions is a **necessary first step to right-sizing the challenge posed by the spread of digital technologies** that can be used to enhance the power of the state — whether to combat terrorism or repress dissent. Exaggerating the threat posed by technology could lead to the mistaken conclusion that combating the global spread of surveillance technologies will be enough to secure democracy. At the same time, liberal governments and organizations can help draw attention to examples of governments that have chosen to roll back or constrain the use of digital authoritarianism and predatory surveillance techniques. Just as nonproliferation experts have studied countries that chose to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs voluntarily, so might democracy and privacy experts hold up the path taken by citizens and elected leaders who have **worked to roll back and constrain technologies that were promoting illiberal practices**. Ecuador, which installed a Chinese monitoring system in 2011, began an investigation into its abuses under the new administration that came to office in 2017, including opening its records to The New York Times. The story highlighted China’s export of digital authoritarianism, but it is equally or perhaps more interesting as a story of the conditions under which democratic institutions and publics can say “no” to the excesses of digital surveillance by replacing “illiberal democrats” at the ballot box. **Even within liberal democracies, some localities have taken preemptive measures against tools of digital authoritarianism**. For instance, in 2019 the cities of San Francisco and Somerville **banned local agencies, including the police, from using facial recognition technology.** The state of California also enacted a ban on the use of facial recognition or biometric surveillance in police body cameras, holding that “facial recognition and other biometric surveillance technology pose unique and significant threats to the civil rights and civil liberties of residents and visitors.” **The future of democracy is not only being fought across the globe. It is also being fought at home**. **To the extent that** **emulation** is **driving states to mimic or import Chinese or Russian practices**, **liberal governments need to** perform better — to **lead by example and demonstrate that democracy can deliver.**

#### **It’s a fate worse than extinction**

**Minardi ‘20** [Di Minardi, 10-15-2020, The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence] \*\*brackets in original\*\*

When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad. It’s called the “world in chains” scenario, where, like the preceding thought experiment, a global totalitarian government uses a novel technology to lock a majority of the world into **perpetual suffering**. If it sounds grim, you’d be right. But is it likely? Researchers and philosophers are beginning to ponder how it might come about – and, more importantly, what we can do to avoid it. **Existential risks** (**x-risks**) are disastrous because they **lock humanity** into a **single fate**, like the **permanent collapse of civilisation** or the e**xtinction of our species.** These catastrophes can have natural causes, like an asteroid impact or a supervolcano, or be human-made from sources like nuclear war or climate change. Allowing one to happen would be “an abject end to the human story" and would let down the hundreds of generations that came before us, says Haydn Belfield, academic project manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge. Toby Ord, a senior research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University, believes that the odds of an existential catastrophe happening this century from natural causes are less than one in 2,000, because humans have survived for 2,000 centuries without one. However, when he adds the probability of human-made disasters, Ord believes the chances increase to a startling one in six. He refers to this century as “the precipice” because the risk of losing our future has never been so high. Researchers at the Center on Long-Term Risk, a non-profit research institute in London, have expanded upon x-risks with the even-more-chilling prospect of suffering risks. **These “s-risks” are** defined as “**suffering** on an astronomical scale**, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far**.” In these scenarios, **life continues for billions** of people, but the **quality** is so **low** and the **outlook so bleak** that **dying out would be preferable.** In short: a future with **negative value** is **worse than one with no value at all.** This is where the “world in chains” scenario comes in. If a malevolent group or government suddenly gained world-dominating power through technology, and there was nothing to stand in its way, it could lead to an extended period of abject suffering and subjugation. A 2017 report on existential risks from the Global Priorities Project, in conjunction with FHI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, warned that “**a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could** arguably **be worse than** complete **extinction**”. Singleton hypothesis Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence. In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. **Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance** or autonomous weapons, **and**, with this monopoly, **remain perpetually stable**. If the singleton is totalitarian, **life** would be **bleak.** Even in the countries with the **strictest** regimes, **news leaks in** and out from other countries and **people can escape.** A global totalitarian rule would **eliminate even these small seeds of hope.** To be **worse than extinction**, “that **would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all"**, says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research. “In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.” “We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like t**he kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier.** And it seems **plausible** that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.” AI and authoritarianism Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others. “We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies. **In the past, surveillance required hundreds of** thousands of **people** – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – **but now it can be done by technology.** In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it. What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before. In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive.**This undermines our epistemic security** – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on. “Over the last few years, we've seen the rise of filter bubbles and people getting shunted by various algorithms into believing various conspiracy theories, or even if they’re not conspiracy theories, into believing only parts of the truth,” says Belfield. “You can imagine things getting much worse, especially with deep fakes and things like that, until it's increasingly harder for us to, as a society, decide these are the facts of the matter, this is what we have to do about it, and then take collective action.”

#### **Additionally, it’s existential.**

**Belfield 23** [Haydn Belfield (Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk), “Collapse, Recovery, and Existential Risk,” in How Worlds Collapse: What History, Systems, and Complexity Can Teach Us About Our Modern World and Fragile Future, p. 74-76]

A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, **more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress** than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world would be worse. It would **increase the risk of** another collapse and **extinction** and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories(Beckstead, 2013). Totalitarian states are incompetent. They are **bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters** (Caplan, 2008).16 This can be seen most clearly in the **great famines of Communist China and the USSR**, in which millions died (Applebaum, 2017; Becker, 1996; Dikotter, 2010; Snyder, 2010). In comparison, functioning multiparty democracies rarely, if ever, experience famines (Sen, 2010). “Established autocracies” (or “personal”/“sultanist”) are particularly bad, as there are **few checks or restraints** on **arbitrary rule and the whims and ideology** of the single individual, even from other elites (Svolik, 2012). From the inside, the “inner circle” around Mao, Stalin, and Hitler seems incredibly chaotic, with elites strongly incentivized to conceal information and encouraged by the autocrat to squabble and feud—so they are divided (Conquest, 1992; Kershaw, 2008; Zhang & Halliday, 2006). If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems, then a world dominated by them would likely be worse at **responding to risks of** collapse and **extinction**. A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have **major wars**. States with near-universal adult suffrage rarely (if ever) go to war with one another (Barnhart et al., 2020), so a world dominated by democracies has fewer wars. **Miscalculation** might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate information, leading to well-known strategic disasters such as Hitler and Stalin’s blunders in World War II (Bialer, 1970; Noakes & Pridham, 2001), or at a smaller level, Saddam Hussein’s rejection of diplomacy (Atkinson, 1993). **War** makes collapse and extinction more likely, by raising the chance of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction being used. Linked to this,totalitarian states are **less cooperative** than democratic states. While cooperation is possible (Ginsburg, 2020), their internal norms are **characterized by paranoia** and treachery, and their lack of transparency limits their ability to credibly commit to agreements. This is bad for **all risks that require cooperation** such as **pandemics or climate change** (Tomasik, 2015). Finally, continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of collapse and extinction. Social progress could reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could help address natural risks and climate change (Sandberg, 2018), differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power(Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019), and **solve safety challenges in AI or biotech**nology (Russell, 2019). However, as we will now discuss totalitarian states would likely **inhibit social progress**. A central question from a longtermist perspective is: Which values should shape the future? I would argue that we should prefer it to be shaped by liberal democratic values. This is not to say that the current democracy-dominated world is perfect—far from it. The fate of billions of factory-farmed animals or hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty makes that abundantly clear. However, democracies have two advantages. First, democracies have space for cosmopolitan values such as human rights, plurality, freedom, and equality. These are better than those that characterize life under totalitarianism: Fear, terror, subjection, and secrecy. Second, they have within themselves the mechanism to allow progress. In the last 100 (or even 50) years, the lives of women, LGBT people, religious minorities, and non-white people have dramatically improved. Our “moral circle” has expanded, and could continue to expand (Singer, 1981). The arc of the moral universe is long, but given the right conditions, it might just bend toward justice (King, 1968). A global society dominated by these values, and with the possibility of improving more, has a better longterm potential. A totalitarian-dominated world, on the other hand, would reduce the space for resistance and progress—distorting the human trajectory.

## C3 --- Tradeoff

#### **Global terrorism is rising**

Seth **Jones 22**, Harold Brown Chair and Director, Transnational Threats Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/14/22, “Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Threat in Afghanistan,” https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-resurgent-terrorist-threat-afghanistan //soumil

**In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of Taliban rule, the United States is now contending with a resurgent terrorist threat. Both al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) are growing in strength and could pose a significant threat beyond Afghanistan,** according [PDF] to recent U.S. government estimates. As a recent UN Security Council assessment concluded [PDF], “terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom in Afghanistan than at any time in recent history.” A 2020 CFR Contingency Planning Memorandum, A Failed Afghan Peace Deal, warned that a U.S. military withdrawal from the country could result in a collapsed peace process and an overthrow of the Afghan government. It also argued that one of the most significant consequences of a withdrawal would be a resurgence of terrorist groups. These concerns have proved true. This update assesses the evolving terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and how best to counter it. Two factors account for the growing terrorist threat in Afghanistan. First, the Taliban government has close links with several terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, and has allowed them to rebuild and reestablish training camps in the country. **Second, Afghanistan is a weak and failing state, a prerequisite for a terrorist sanctuary.** The Taliban does not control law and order outside of most cities. In addition, the Taliban government has been unable to establish basic services, and the Afghan economy has shrunk by at least 40 percent since the U.S. withdrawal. The poverty rate could hit 97 percent of the population by the middle of this year. Afghanistan has jumped to the top of the International Rescue Committee’s 2022 Emergency Watchlist as it nears the collapse of virtually all basic services. The combination of a weak state and a collapsing economy gives terrorist groups relative freedom within which to operate and provides a pool of potential recruits. **With the terrorism problem worsening, the United States needs to design and implement a more effective counterterrorism strategy to mitigate this threat. New Concerns In August 2021, President Joe Biden remarked that the United States’ “only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on [the] American homeland.” Since the U.S. withdrawal, however, the terrorist problem has become steadily worse. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, the number of al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan has increased since U.S. forces withdrew in August 2021. As one senior U.S. Department of Defense official concluded [PDF], “the intelligence community [assessed] that both ISIS-K and al-Qaeda have the intent to conduct external operations,”** with ISIS-K capable of conducting external attacks in 2022.

#### **But funding is on thin ice**

**Katz 24** [Eric Katz, 2-13-2024, DHS to slash operations, reshuffle workforce without additional funds, agency warns, Government Executive, https://www.govexec.com/management/2024/02/dhs-slash-operations-and-reshuffle-workforce-without-additional-funds-agency-warns/394190/] // MVSG

The Homeland Security Department is preparing to **potentially move some employees** from their primary functions and **reprogram funds to address a budget shortfall**, the agency said on Wednesday, sending out a warning to lawmakers that their inaction could **harm national security**. The Biden administration is imploring Congress to provide more funds throughout DHS to avoid the slashing of operations. Among the expected cut backs would be upgrades to ports of entry and border surveillance technology, shelter services for migrant arrivals, deportation rates and asylum processing. “The administration has repeatedly **requested additional resources** for DHS’ vital missions on the southwest border and Congress has **chronically underfunded them**,” a department spokesperson said. “Most recently, Congress rejected the bipartisan national security bill **out of hand**, which will put at risk DHS’s **current removal operations**, put further strain on our already overtaxed workforce and make it harder to catch fentanyl at ports of entry.” The Senate rejected the bipartisan measure that took months to negotiate after former President Trump and House Republicans put pressure on the lawmakers to vote against the restrictive immigration reform and border security bill. The measure included $18 billion for components throughout DHS, including for the hiring of thousands of new employees. “Without adequate funding for CBP, ICE and USCIS, the department will have to **reprogram** or **pull resources from other efforts**,” the DHS spokesperson said. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services would have to reassign hundreds of personnel from their normal duties to conduct initial screenings of new migrant arrivals, the spokesperson added. That would take them away from adjudicating green cards and addressing the asylum backlog, leading to longer wait times for the applicants. USCIS just last week announced it had reduced its total backlog for the first time in a decade. It completed 10 million cases in fiscal 2023, an all-time record, reducing its overall number of pending cases by 15%. UCSIS is still struggling to dig out from a hiring freeze it implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the agency threatened to furlough most of its workers as normal funds collected through fees dried up. Congress eventually intervened, but not before a longstanding hiring pause depleted the agency. The border measure would have provided USCIS with 4,300 asylum officers, quintupling that part of the agency’s workforce, while also adding new responsibilities. Without an injection of funding, Immigration and Customs Enforcement would have to scale back its current pace of border and removal operations. ICE in fiscal 2023 removed more than 140,000 individuals and turned away nearly 63,000 migrants when the Title 42 policy remained in effect, though a spokesperson said it would no longer be able to sustain that ramped-up operational capacity. Under the bipartisan border deal, ICE would have received $7.6 billion and 1,200 new employees. The Washington Post reported on Wednesday ICE is considering releasing thousands of detained immigrants as it can no longer afford to hold 38,000 individuals. “A reduction in ICE operations would significantly harm border security, national security and public safety,” the DHS spokesperson said. Customs and Border Protection would repurpose funds away from “nonessential areas,” which DHS said would require **sacrifices** to **priority capital investments**. Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., the top Democrat on the House Homeland Security Committee, said Republicans were playing “political games” rather than addressing an urgent matter. “Because Republicans refuse to actually govern and have stated they won’t provide another dime to DHS, ICE will soon be forced to reduce operations and release significant numbers of detainees,” Thompson said. “If it is a crisis at the border, then Republicans must agree to fix it now.” Rep. Mark Green, R-Tenn., who chairs the panel and led the effort to impeach DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, called the administration’s warnings “absurd,” accusing ICE of letting bed space for detained migrants go unused and noting the agency proposed cutting its detention capacity in its fiscal 2024 budget proposal. “Instead of treating enforcement as a hostage negotiation—‘give us more money or else’—Secretary Mayorkas should just do his job and follow the law,” Green said. DHS, like all agencies, is currently operating under a continuing resolution that is funding it at fiscal 2023 levels. That is set to expire March 8 as lawmakers negotiate final appropriations bills, though overall spending throughout government will stay flat. The Senate this week advanced a supplemental spending package that stripped out all funding initially included for DHS. The department has become the latest of several in the Biden administration to warn the uncertainty of the CR and expected flat funding environment is negatively impacting operations. Facilities throughout the Veterans Affairs Department are restricting hiring as they deal with budget shortfalls. The Social Security Administration told Congress at the start of the fiscal year it had to freeze hiring and overtime, with leaders noting the agency has been underresourced for a decade. Once Congress completes the full-year appropriations process, agencies across government will be dealing with budget constraints due to a spending agreement originally negotiated by the White House and House Republicans.

#### **Surveillance breaks balance sheets.**

**CPI '08** [Center for Public Integrity, 12-10-2008, "$30 billion virtual border fence faces problems", Center for Public Integrity, https://publicintegrity.org/politics/30-billion-virtual-border-fence-faces-problems/] //leon

In 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection decided to **outdo the border walls** of the past and build a **great barrier of data** — a **system** of **ground sensors**, remote-control **cameras**, and **radars that transmit real-time data to border agents** — along the U.S.–Mexican border. But as of late 2008, only **28 miles of the “virtual” fence**, known officially as the Secure Border Initiative Network, or **SBInet**, are up and running. The finished job is expected to run **6,000 miles** along the northern and southern borders of the United States at a cost of **$30 billion**. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) awarded the initial **$2 billion contract** for the project to Boeing, which promised to have **large sections of the fence** up and running by 2008. The first phase ran **six months late** and used commercially-available technology that was replaced almost immediately with **fancier gadgets.** In theory, border agents can use the information to intercept illegal transit, but after taking the pilot project for a test-run, border agents told the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that it was “**not an optimal system**” for their needs. From the program’s inception, the GAO warned about the **vagueness of the requirements** set out in the contracting order, a problem that plagued **two predecessors**, the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System and America’s Shield Initiative. Now land-**management issues have delayed the project**. A September 2008 agreement with the Department of the Interior over DHS’s use of government land should have come through last July, but DHS failed to file the necessary paperwork. The department also will have to grab private property from some border land owners by eminent domain. Testifying before Congress in September, Randolph C. Hite, the GAO’s director of information technology architecture and systems, put the problem bluntly: “Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a **continued state of flux**, making it unclear and uncertain **what technology capabilities will be delivered and when**, where, and how they will be delivered.”

#### **It’s costly**

**Boyce 15** [Geoffry A. Boyce, 10-14-2015, “The rugged border: Surveillance, policing and the dynamic materiality of the US/Mexico frontier,” Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263775815611423, accessed 7-13-2024] // BZ

In part, DHS has responded to this criticism by **pivoting** its drone program away **from active enforcement operations to the gathering of visual data** that can be analyzed to indicate crossing patterns and ‘‘hot spots’’ in remote, inaccessible areas along the border. This effort supplements the culling of data from national geo-spatial intelligence collections, which is then run through the DHS’s big data ‘‘Processing Exploitation and Dissemination Center’’ to detect visual anomalies that could indicate footprints or vehicle tracks, revealing otherwise undetected patterns of cross-border incursion in areas that agents are unable to regularly access or monitor (according to US Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher, at present such areas amount to 55% of the linear United States / Mexico border alone). Yet, despite the novelty of this innovation, its process and outcomes remain highly imperfect, time intensive, and **at best can proceed piecemeal** – **revealing anomalies** in remote locations **that then require substantial resources and personnel to investigate and ‘‘ground truth’**’ – while providing decidedly little operational flexibility and no immediate support to the realtime tracking of an individual incursion or enacting a physical arrest. Being able to periodically visualize and analyze an area is a far cry from being able to access or control it in anything like a sustained fashion. At times, the latter requires an extraordinary effort to re-engineer space to make it more suitable to the Border Patrol’s operational ambitions. Between 2006 and 2011, as part of the Secure Border Initiative, the United States spent approximately $1.2 billion to construct 670 miles of new vehicle and pedestrian barriers along the United States/Mexico boundary, accompanied by new roads required to access these locales(GAO, 2009b). To maintain the rapid pace of construction DHS invoked the authority designated by Section 102 of the Real ID Act to waive a total of 36 separate federal land conservation and cultural preservation laws(cf Millis and Nicol, 2013; Sundberg, 2015). As shown in Figure 3, this juridical move was initially undertaken specifically to proceed with a $71 million effort using more than 1,520,000 cubic meters (53,600,000 cubic feet) of rock to completely fill in a canyon outside of San Diego, California popularly dubbed ‘‘Smuggler’s Gulch’’ (as its name suggests, the topography of this locale had long created a vexing corridor for enforcement). In nearby Otay Mesa, the Border Patrol invoked the Real ID Act waiver to build 400 meters (approximately 1300 feet) of pedestrian fencing, constructing miles of access road through this federally designated wilderness area – which also served as the preserve for the last known stands of Tecate Cypress in the world (Sierra Club, 2013). As observed in the case of Smuggler’s Gulch and Otay Mesa, state agencies may very well accomplish exceptional interventions in specific locales. Yet, the **topography and hydrology** of the **US/Mexico border remain unruly and disruptive,** **requiring a continuous investment of energy and resources.** Consider, on July 12, 2008, a monsoon thunderstorm dumped 1 to 2 inches of rain near Lukeville, Arizona, causing floodwater to back-up behind the 15-foot high-border wall, flooding downtown Lukeville, causing massive damage and shutting down the international port of entry. On 10 August 2011, a 40-foot section of the border wall constructed through Organ Pipe National Monument was knocked out by a similar southern Arizona monsoon storm (McCombs, 2011a). And on 27 July 27 2014, flooding near Nogales, AZ knocked out a 60-foot section of the border wall, costing more than $700,000 to repair (Galvan, 2015). As of 2011, DHS had taken out a $97 million annual contract with Houston-based Kellog, Root, and Brown to repair this and similar damage to the border wall, caused by humans and non-humans alike (McCombs, 2011b).

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#### **Empirically,**

Governmental Affairs, **Homeland Security**. “U.S. Senate Report: Administration Budget Cuts Counterterrorism Programs by $583 Million.” Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 13 July 20**17**, www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/us-senate-report-administration-budget-cuts-counterterrorism-programs-by-583-million/. Accessed 23 July 2024. //soumil + brask

WASHINGTON – The **Democratic staff** of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee today issued a report detailing that **cuts proposed** in the Administration’s FY18 budget **to** a variety of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) **counterterror**ism programs could threaten efforts to combat terrorism. The proposed cuts come **in the wake of** attacks in multiple countries on ‘soft’ targets such as concert venues and mass transit. **These cuts** are especially concerning given they **come with a funding request for $1.6 billion to construct 74 miles of** physical **barrier along the Southwest border** at a cost of approximately $21.6 million per mile. Click HERE to read the minority staff report, Fighting Terror: Administration’s Budget Slashes Counterterrorism Programs as Attacks Continue to Increase Abroad The report’s key findings include: Although DHS has informed the American people that “the United States is engaged in a generational fight against terrorists,” **the** Administration’s **budget proposal for** FY **2018 will cut $582.8 million from critical counterterrorism programs that DHS administers.** If the Administration’s budget proposal is adopted, critical counterterrorism grant programs **like the Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program, the Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Grant Programs, and the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program will be eliminated. Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams will be reduced by 74 percent.** While the Administration’s budget calls for deep **reductions to critical counterterrorism** programs throughout DHS, nearly $1.6 billion of the Administration’s **budget** proposal **will be used to construct** 74 miles of physical barrier along the Southwest border at a cost of approximately $21.6 million per mile. No metrics have been developed or cost-benefit analyses conducted to systematically measure the contributions of a new border barrier to **border security.** “The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for advancing critical federal efforts to prevent and mitigate terror threats in the United States,” states the report. “Budgetary cuts of this magnitude to a variety of important counterterrorism efforts will have significant negative impacts.”The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Democratic staff report, led by the staff of U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill, is available online [HERE](https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/fighting-terror_-administrations-budget-slashes-counterterrorism-programs).

#### **DHS Counterterror is critical.**

**McDonnell 18** ([James F. McDonnell, 25 years of experience in the field of counterterrorism, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; MA, Georgetown University], “Examining the Department Of Homeland Security’s Efforts to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 5/11/2018, Serial 115-42, GPO Press, accessed 11/14/18, ) //CL + brask

Mr. MCDONNELL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today to discuss Department of Homeland Security’s work to counter the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction, otherwise known as WMD. I shortened the acronym just a bit. Today as we discuss the creation of a new organization in **DHS**, it is on the anniversary of one of the two most catastrophic attacks in U.S. history, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, an attack that caused the United States to enter in a global war that would preserve the freedoms of our democracy. Like Pearl Harbor, 9/11 also began a war to preserve our way of life, a war against terrorism, which continues today. The purpose of the Countering WMD office will be to work every day to **prevent** another catastrophic attack, one using weapons or materials that have the potential to kill our citizens in numbers that dwarf previous attacks. In the last year, we have observed a credible increase in **terrorist** interest in using WMD against the United States. These **threats** come **from** all fronts—**chem**ical, **biological**, radiological, **and nuclear weapons**. Certain WMDs once thought to be impossible for non-state actors, non-state groups to acquire are now closer to getting in the hands of terrorists. Today, as you heard in the committee’s recent threats hearing, we know that non-state actors have information and technology at their disposal that make the threat much more dynamic, requiring more flexible and aggressive response. The CWMD office is an operational support office. Our mission is to assist the Department’s front-line operating components, first responders and interagency partners. We will draw on the WMD expertise within the Department and across inter-agency to integrate expertise and operational support. In planning for the establishment of the CWMD office, Mr. Fluty and I reached out to each of the **DHS** operating components, HEATH 7 agency partners, and State and local officials to understand their needs and requirements. We are tailoring the CWMD organization to provide the best unified efforts and operational support possible. We are working closely with FEMA to ensure that actions taken by CWMD in support of first responders are coordinated and complementary. Another example of early integration and unity of effort into the larger Department is a recent move by OHA and DNDO to embed a core team of WMD expertise in the CBP National Targeting Center. DNDO and OHA leadership have been working closely with DOD as it transitions the CWMD mission from STRATCOM to SOCOM. We are in near daily contact with the Department of Defense and believe this partnership will benefit us in threat awareness and the adoption of new technologies and capabilities that can be developed into homeland capabilities. We are planning against smuggling pathway. **Rather than limiting our detection** of mission **to** a **defense** **at the 1-yard-line** strategy, we plan to work through the **DHS** joint task forces and others to **push** out **capability** **into** **known smuggling pathways**. We want to deploy into the environment where we know bad guys are operating, be less predictable, **and** find the threat before it reaches our borders. The CWMD core leadership team brings decades of operational and executive leadership experience. I personally led the development of the WMD capability in United States Special Operations Command, and Dave Fluty has 23 years as a CBP officer, which includes a detail into the DNDO office when it was stood up. The entire CWMD team has a clear objective to safeguard America and understands their contribution to the DHS mission. The clarity of purpose and contribution to the homeland security mission addresses the feedback from our staffs, meetings, and survey results. I take seriously the feedback from Congressional oversight bodies, the GAO, and the DHS inspector general. These provide guidelines and roadmaps to improvement. I continue to meet with the GAO regularly. I support the findings of the blue ribbon panel on biodefense and a number of their recommendations, for example, the recommendation to replace BioWatch. I agree with this recommendation. We intend to develop and deploy a system that will be innovative and leverage business practices and the best practices already resident within DNDO. DNDO’s solutions development process focuses on gap identification and the development of tangible operational requirements to drive R&D and expeditious deployment of operational capabilities which will close the gaps and reduce direct threats. This approach **has been successful in** the deployment of a **nuclear detection** architecture and will be utilized for a biodetection system that uses the latest technology and shares the information communications backbone that we are already deploying for the nuclear mission. We will optimize the integration of the DNDO’s solution development process with the expertise that resides in the Office of Health Affairs. This will be done with our existing resources. WMD terrorism remains a pressing issue for our National security. It is with your support that we may build a world-class In the June 2015 ‘‘DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Functions Review Report’’ to House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees, the Department reviewed its CBRN programs’ organization, operations, and communications pursuant to Congressional direction in the Joint Explanatory Statement (JES) and House Report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Pub. Law No. 113–6). In the JES, Congress identified the need to ‘‘elevate and streamline the Department’s focus on efforts to address [CBRN] threats and deter and counter weapons of mass destruction.’’ 2 H.R. 3875, Department of Homeland Security CBRNE Defense Act of 2015, sec. 2 (Passed House amended (12/10/2015)). H.R. 3875 was referred to the Senate. nization within DHS focused solely on countering the threat of WMD terrorism. I look forward to working with you further on this matter, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. [The joint prepared statement of Mr. McDonnell, Mr. Fluty and Mr. Bryan follows:] JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES F. MCDONNELL, LARRY D. FLUTY, AND WILLIAM BRYAN DECEMBER 7, 2017 Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, thank you for inviting us to speak with you today. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) work to bolster efforts to counter the threat of terrorist actors using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the homeland. As the leaders of the organizations involved in the reorganization of WMD functions into one office within DHS, we appreciate your interest in this matter. We also appreciate the support from former Secretary John Kelly and Acting Secretary Elaine Duke in pursuing a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office aimed at elevating and streamlining DHS’s role in the WMD mission and further unifying associated activities under one office. BACKGROUND As Acting Secretary Elaine Duke stated in her September 27, 2017 testimony to the Senate, our intelligence professionals have seen a renewed terrorist interest in WMD. The United States faces a significant danger from threat actors who could use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to harm Americans or U.S. interests. Certain WMD, once viewed as out-of-reach for all but nationstates, are now closer to being attained by non-state actors. Terrorist groups are already using chemical weapons, using battlefield environments to test them, and may consider using such weapons in external operations. A WMD terrorist attack against the United States would have a profound and potentially catastrophic impact on our Nation, increasing our need to invigorate efforts to stop them and improve our own capabilities to defend, deter, and detect.

#### **Indeed,**

Brian Glyn **Williams 22**. Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth who worked previously for the CIA. “The killing of al Qaeda’s leader shows we can wage ‘over-the-horizon’ counterterrorism” 08/03/22. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3585051-the-killing-of-al-qaedas-leader-shows-we-can-wage-over-the-horizon-counterterrorism/. //recut brask

Iraq-based U.S. Delta Forces were able to launch a dangerous, long-distance on his compound in western Syria’s Idlib province, killing the man who was then most-wanted in the world on Oct. 27, 2019. Al Baghdadi’s successor as ISIS caliph, Ibrahim al Qurayshi, was similarly located in a compound in the same Turkish-dominated western Syria region and in a risky Special Forces heliborne strike launched on Feb. 4, 2022. The killing of al Qaeda’s leader shows we can wage ‘over-the-horizon’ counterterrorism There have been **other** **successful** **commando and drone** **strikes** on terrorists operating in **Libya**, **Somalia**, **Pakistan** and **Yemen** that speak to robust intelligence gathering being married to **state-of-the-art**, **long-distance** **killing tech**nology and **Special** **Forces** **capabilities** that clearly demonstrate America no longer necessarily needs to occupy foreign lands **to take out terrorists** **who operate in them**.

#### **Otherwise, extinction**

Phil **Torres 21**, Visiting Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, M.Sc. Doctoral Candidate at Leibniz Universität Hannover, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, Master's Degree in Neuroscience from Brandeis University, “Can We Clean Up The Mess We've Created? We Have To Do It Now, or Face Extinction”, Salon, 9/5/2021, https://www.salon.com/2021/09/05/can-we-clean-up-the-mess-weve-created-we-have-to-do-it-now-or-face-extinction/ //recut brask

So, what do the trend lines show? The rapid takeover of Afghanistan from the Taliban is **fuel**ing worries that **al-Qaida** could make a **comeback**, which once again raises the prospect of **terrorist attacks** against the U.S. Although al-Qaida is weaker than before, it is worth recalling that the core membership of the group in 2002 was only around 170 people. But this time around the inventory of political grievances that drive Islamist terrorism has **grown**, thanks to the U.S.-led pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, the indefinite detention of "detainees" in Guantánamo Bay, the use of torture as "enhanced interrogation" and so on. One heard the slogan "never forget" from Americans ad nauseam after 9/11, but the cultural memory of peoples in the Middle East is far more robust than ours. Consider "The Management of Savagery," an influential jihadist manual published in 2004, which foregrounds a number of past foreign policy missteps by the West, including the Sykes-Picot Agreement that carved up the Middle East after the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the aftermath of World War I. As the now-deceased "caliph" of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared in 2014, "this blessed advance will not stop until we hit the last nail in the coffin of the Sykes-Picot conspiracy." If events from the World War I era have prominently driven extremism over the years, imagine how long the atrocities committed by Western forces since 2001 will continue to motivate actions and recruitment in the future. To borrow an insight from Robert Pape at the University of Chicago, terrorism is a demand-driven rather than supply-limited phenomenon. Add to this the fact that emerging **tech**nologies, most notably **syn**thetic **bio**logy, **cyber**-t**ech**nologies and **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence, will place **unprecedented** destructive power in the hands of non-state actors — e.g., terrorists — meaning that the next 9/11 could claim **far more victims**. In fact, **ISIS** — which grew out of al-Qaida in Iraq and espoused an even more violently apocalyptic ideology — explicitly fantasized about **weaponizing** the **bubonic** **plague**. As an ISIS member who was educated in physics and chemistry wrote in a document obtained by the U.S., "the advantages of biological weapons is the low cost and high rate of casualties." The growing **power** and **accessibility** of so-called "dual-use" **tech**nologies (those that can be used to benefit humanity or inflict terrible harms) is one of the main **reason**s global catastrophic risk scholars believe the threat of **civilizational collapse** and even **human extinction** is **higher** today than **ever before**. As Lord Martin Rees famously speculated in his 2003 book "Our Final Hour," civilization has no better than a 50/50 chance of surviving this century. Three years earlier, the co-founder of Sun Microsystems, Bill Joy, compellingly argued in a much-discussed Wired article that, because of technology, it is no exaggeration to say we are on the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads well beyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to the nation-states, on to a surprising and terrible empowerment of extreme individuals. The intersection of these historical and technological trend lines — of religio-political terrorism and the democratization of science and technology — do not bode well for the future. Add to this the fact that climate change may have played an integral role in the creation of ISIS (by causing record-breaking droughts in Syria that fueled the Syrian civil war, which spawned the organization), and one wonders whether the mayhem since late 2001 might be a **mere preview** of **what's to come**.

#### **Old defense doesn’t apply**

**Thompson June 21st** (Jess Thomson is a Newsweek Science Reporter based in London UK. Her focus is reporting on science, technology and healthcare. She has covered weird animal behavior, space news and the impacts of climate change extensively. Jess joined Newsweek in May 2022 and previously worked at Springer Nature. She is a graduate of the University of Oxford. Languages: English.) Newsweek, 06/21/2024 “**Nuclear Terrorism 'Risks Are High,**' Researchers Warn” [c](https://www.newsweek.com/nuclear-terrorism-threat-high-report-1915199) //jjoy recut by // adam west

India and Pakistan each have about 170 warheads, Israel has 90, and North Korea possesses 50, according to the Federation of American Scientists. The report said that during the 20th century Russia and the U.S. both wanted to limit the world's supply of nuclear weapons, while now there is an increased demand for, and availability of, nuclear materials, with fewer ways of controlling them. "**We're in a world right now where most of the control of the programs in place to manage supply and control of nuclear weapons basically unraveling**," Flynn said. "With rising world tensions, there is no scope now for arms reductions to take place, sadly," Rod Thornton, an associate professor in international studies, defense and security at King's College London, told Newsweek. The report also said the National Academies committee is concerned about the flourishing of the civilian nuclear sector. "**Many new nuclear plants are going to places they've not gone before, and this is not happening with the U.S. setting and enforcing the rules but being led by the Chinese and Russians, with fewer security controls in place,**" Flynn said. "**Most of the materials that can be used to produce a 'dirty bomb' have always been challenging to control, and now there are more available. Even without state actor complicity, there is more risk that terrorist groups can get their hands on these materials**," he said.

#### **That triggers escalation**

Matthew **Bunn &** Nickolas **Roth 17**. \*Professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. \*\*Research associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University and research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. “The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/effects-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb11150

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city. At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—**we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of** **a** **single terrorist nuclear bomb** **on a major city**, **and its** **subsequent ripple effects** **on the rest of the planet**. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the **blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin**, **killing** tens or **hundreds of thousands of people** and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. **Economic, political, and social** **aftershocks** **would** **ripple throughout the world**. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same. The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs. Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality. Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun. That furious energy would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense heat; and deadly radiation. The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields, incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise, sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.) At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.) The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.) No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected. Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm, as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors to see. The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles per hour. The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death. Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over, killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged. Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned, blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and fall off in sheets. The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone. The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants especially so. Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack. The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to evacuate. Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond. Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed. Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day. And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area, communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic pulse from the explosion. Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale, occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear, lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days. The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”) On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate. Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting. The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast. These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again. Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid. Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.) Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher. The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty. Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city, and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How to respond or retaliate? Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread havoc and economic chaos is very real. If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous. Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been made. In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11 saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance. And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? **The country attacked might** **well** **lash out militarily** at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) **With the nuclear threshold already crossed** **in this scenario**—at least by terrorists—**it is** **conceivable** that some of the **resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use**. **International politics could become more brutish and violent**, **with powerful states taking unilateral action**, **by force if necessary**, **in an effort to ensure their security**. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. **Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less**

#### **Extinction**

Norman **Solomon**, 7-3-20**22**, "Nuclear War Could Mean Human Extinction. Biden and Congress Should Stop Messing Around.", Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/nuclear-war-could-mean-annihilation-but-biden-and-congress-are-messing-around/ //CChun

President Joe Biden and top subordinates have **refused** to publicly **acknowledge** the **danger of nuclear** war — even though it is now **higher** than at any other time in at least 60 years. Their silence is insidious and powerful, and their policy of denial makes grassroots activism all the more vital for human survival. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy was more candid. Speaking at American University, he said: “A single nuclear weapon contains almost **10 times** the explosive **force** delivered by all the allied **air forces** in the Second World War.” Kennedy also noted, “The **deadly poisons** produced by a nuclear exchange would be **carried by wind** and water and soil and seed to the **far corners** of the **globe** and to generations yet unborn.” Finally, he added, “All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.” Kennedy was no dove. He affirmed willingness to use nuclear weapons. But his speech offered some essential honesty about nuclear war — and the need to seriously negotiate with the Kremlin in the interests of averting planetary incineration — an approach sorely lacking from the United States government today. At the time of Kennedy’s presidency, nuclear war would have been indescribably catastrophic. Now — with **large arsenals** of hydrogen bombs and what scientists know about “**nuclear winter**” — experts have concluded that a nuclear war would virtually **end agriculture** and amount to **omnicide** (the destruction of human life on earth).

## Underview

#### **2nd speaking debaters should fully respond to all the arguments made in the first speaking team’s constructive or concede them. To clarify, respond to everything from the first speech and don’t read any new responses afterwards – 3 warrants**

#### **[A] Predictability - If they can respond in the second rebuttal they can sandbag DAs and we wouldn’t know what they are going for in summary.**

#### **[B] Time Skew - Not responding in the next speech means we have to wait until summary to frontline – puts us at a 4:3 time disadvantage.**

#### **[C] Clash - Responding early increases depth of clash b/c our args are discussed in more speeches throughout the round**

#### **Drop the second-speaking team if they violate – that’s key to normsetting and deterring abuse – also balances out the time skew from reading the underview – comes before substance b/c it sets norms for substance read in future rounds**

# 2NC --- UKSO R4

## 

## One Off — Comic Sans

## 

**​​Interpretation:** Debaters must use comic sans as their font in the speech docs they send to their opponents and judges in round.

**Violation:** The doc is not in comic sans.

**Standard:**

**1] Inclusion —** Comic Sans is easiest to read for people with dyslexia.

**Hudgins-17** (Lauren Hudgins, [Bilingual Speech-Language Pathologist @ AIM Educate, Research Assistant @ Dual Language Development Lab, B.A. in Literature @ Pacific University, M.S. in Communication Disorders @ University of Oregon], 2-23-2017, “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist,” Medium. https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093)

The **irregular** **shapes** of the **letters** **in** **Comic** **Sans** **allow** her to **focus** **on** the **individual** **parts** of **words**. While **many fonts use repeated shapes** to **create different letters**, such as a “p” rotated to made a “q,” **Comic Sans uses few repeated shapes**, **creating** **distinct** **letters** (although it does have a mirrored “b” and “d”). **Comic** **Sans** is **one of a few typefaces recommended** by **influential organizations like** the **British Dyslexia Association** and the **Dyslexia Association of Ireland**.Using Comic Sans has made it possible for Jessica to complete a rigorous program in marine zoology at Bangor University in Wales.

**The ability to change font doesn’t solve – it’s ableist to expect debaters to do something for your aesthetic preference.**

**Hudgins-17** (Lauren Hudgins, [Bilingual Speech-Language Pathologist @ AIM Educate, Research Assistant @ Dual Language Development Lab, B.A. in Literature @ Pacific University, M.S. in Communication Disorders @ University of Oregon], 2-23-2017, “Hating Comic Sans Is Ableist,” Medium. https://medium.com/the-establishment/hating-comic-sans-is-ableist-bc4a4de87093)

In addition, she cannot proofread in a font that’s difficult for her to read. “You cannot fix formatting errors you cannot see!” To her, **asking** her **to change to** a **font she cannot adequately use** “is the **epitome** **of** **ableism**.” Sometimes she can ask someone in her cohort to help her spot errors, but it’s a lot to ask. “I can and have had people in my class look over my work, but you need to understand that we’re not collaborators, they’re my peers. This is an encroachment on their time.” **Asking** her to **change** **her** **font** is **asking** **her** to **take a task that is already very difficult** for **someone with dyslexia** and **demanding that she take extra steps** to **please the aesthetic preferences** of **someone for whom reading is easy**.

**Voters:**

**1] Inclusion –** you have to be in debate in the first place to gain all the benefits of all other voters, makes this a prerequisite issue.

**a. A vote for us endorses a positive model of debate. Wins and losses determine the direction of the activity, teams losing for bad practices incentivizes change in the future which makes debate more educational and fair as a whole. Also rectifies the abuse in round.**

**B. Competing Interps:**

**a. Reasonability is arbitrary – we don’t know your bs meter**

**b. Reasonability causes race to the bottom – incentivizes debaters to read increasingly unfair args and appeal to a “reasonable standard”**

**No RVIS:**

**a. We should be allowed to test the legitimacy of the other team. We shouldn’t lose for being wrong, or else nobody would ever risk checking abuse.**

**Theory is a prior question to the content of case arguments – if they had not violated each speech then the content of the debate would have been different.**

## Their case

### C1: Politics

**1] Taylor Swift flips the election b/c the Tortured Poets Department will win Album of the Year and she’ll endorse Kamala at the Grammys — empirically proven that she saves big announcements for the show, ie: she announced her newest album after winning for Midnights.**

1. **B/c she’s fixed her reputation she’ll be able to swing independents and moderates which means the aff is NU**
2. **O/W on prob: taylor’s get out the vote drives in 2020 helped biden win the election**

#### **2] Even 20 degrees won’t cause extinction.**

**Ord ’20** [Dr. Toby; 2020; Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford; Hachette Books, “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity,” p. 110-112]

But the purpose of this chapter is finding and assessing threats that pose a direct existential risk to humanity. Even at such **extreme levels** of warming, it is difficult to see exactly how climate change could do so. Major effects of climate change include reduced **ag**ricultural yields, sea level rises, water scarcity, increased tropical diseases, ocean acidification and the collapse of the Gulf Stream. While extremely important when assessing the overall risks of climajte change, **none** of these **threaten extinction** or irrevocable collapse. Crops are very sensitive to reductions in temperature (due to frosts), but less sensitive to increases. By all appearances we would **still have food** to support civilization.85 Even if sea levels rose **hundreds of meters** (over centuries), **most** of the Earth’s land area would remain. Similarly, while some areas might conceivably become uninhabitable due to water scarcity, other areas will have increased rainfall. More areas may become susceptible to tropical diseases, but we need only look to the tropics to see civilization **flourish** despite this. The main effect of a collapse of the system of Atlantic Ocean currents that includes the Gulf Stream is a 2°C cooling of Europe—something that poses no permanent threat to global civilization. From an existential risk perspective, a more serious concern is that the high temperatures (and the rapidity of their change) might cause a large loss of biodiversity and subsequent ecosystem collapse. While the pathway is not entirely clear, a large enough collapse of ecosystems across the globe could perhaps threaten human extinction. The idea that climate change could cause widespread extinctions has some good theoretical support.86 Yet the evidence is **mixed**. For when we look at many of the **past cases** of extremely high global **temp**erature**s** or extremely rapid warming we **don’t see** a corresponding loss of **biod**iversity.87 [FOOTNOTE] We don’t see such biodiversity loss in the **12°C warmer climate** of the **early Eocene**, nor the rapid global change of the **PETM**, nor in rapid **regional** changes of climate. Willis et al. (2010) state: “We argue that although the underlying mechanisms responsible for these past changes in climate were very different (i.e. natural processes rather than anthropogenic), the rates and magnitude of climate change are similar to those predicted for the future and therefore potentially **relevant** to understanding future biotic response. What emerges from these past records is evidence for **rapid community turnover**, **migrations**, **development** of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another, but there is **very little evidence** for **broad-scale extinctions** due to a warming world.” There are similar conclusions in **Botkin** et al. (2007), **Dawson** et al. (2011), **Hof** et al. (2011) and **Willis & MacDonald** (2011). The best evidence of warming causing extinction may be from the end-Permian mass extinction, which may have been associated with large-scale warming (see note 91 to this chapter). [END FOOTNOTE] So the most important known effect of climate change from the perspective of direct existential risk is probably the most obvious: **heat stress**. We need an environment cooler than our body temperature to be able to rid ourselves of waste heat and stay alive. More precisely, we need to be able to lose heat by sweating, which depends on the humidity as well as the temperature. A landmark paper by Steven Sherwood and Matthew Huber showed that with sufficient warming there would be parts of the world whose temperature and humidity combine to exceed the level where humans could survive without air conditioning.88 With 12°C of warming, a very large land area—where more than half of all people currently live and where much of our food is grown—would exceed this level at some point during a typical year. Sherwood and Huber suggest that such areas would be uninhabitable. This may not quite be true (particularly if air conditioning is possible during the hottest months), but their habitability is at least in question. However, **substantial regions** would also **remain below** this threshold. **Even with an extreme 20°C of warming** there would be **mated regions**) that would**ny** coastal areas (and some **eleva** have no days above the temperature/humidity threshold.89 So there would remain **large areas** in which humanity and **civ**ilization could **continue**. A world with 20°C of warming would be an unparalleled human and environmental tragedy, forcing mass migration and perhaps starvation too. This is reason enough to do our utmost to prevent anything like that from ever happening. However, our present task is identifying existential risks to humanity and it is hard to see how any realistic level of heat stress could pose such a risk. So the runaway and moist greenhouse effects remain the only known mechanisms through which climate change could directly cause our extinction or irrevocable collapse. This doesn’t rule out unknown mechanisms. We are considering large changes to the Earth that may even be unprecedented in size or speed. It wouldn’t be astonishing if that directly led to our permanent ruin. The best argument against such unknown mechanisms is probably that the PETM did not lead to a mass extinction, despite temperatures rapidly rising about 5°C, to reach a level 14°C above pre-industrial temperatures.90 But this is tempered by the imprecision of paleoclimate data, the sparsity of the fossil record, the smaller size of mammals at the time (making them more heat-tolerant), and a reluctance to rely on a single example. Most importantly, anthropogenic warming could be over a hundred times faster than warming during the PETM, and rapid warming has been suggested as a contributing factor in the end-Permian mass extinction, in which 96 percent of species went extinct.91 In the end, we can say little more than that direct existential risk from climate change appears **very small**, but cannot yet be ruled out.

**3] Turn. Trump prevents war with China. Luft-22 writes:**

Gal **Luft**, “Why China has reason to wish for a Trump presidency in 2024,” 01-08-20**22**, *SCMP*, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3162409/why-china-has-reason-wish-trump-presidency-2024> //WP

**By 2025**, America’s diplomatic quiver of arrows fired at China will have been emptied. At the current rate of anti-China legislation initiated by Congress, there will soon be few Chinese companies left to blacklist, few Chinese products to impose tariffs on, and few unrealised ideas left on how to cripple the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s technology ascendance. By **the time Trump entered office**, America would have been disabused of the notion that China could somehow be prevented from becoming the world’s largest economy as well as a global leader in some of the most important technologies of the 21st century. If America is to be great again, it can only be so by lifting itself up, rather than pulling China down. So what would Trump do? On the military front, while investing considerable resources in upgrading US capabilities, particularly in the space, cyber and nuclear domains, Trump would be deeply suspicious of his generals and spy agencies, taking their warnings about China’s aggression with a pinch of salt. **He would be reluctant to be dragged into military adventures in the Indo-Pacific** unless America was attacked first. He would maintain strategic ambiguity about US commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked. Trump has no illusions about Taiwan. “We are 8,000 miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a f\*\*\*\*ing thing we can do about it,” **he** reportedly said in 2019. Asked what he might do, he would resort to his favourite answer: “We’ll see what happens.” On the economic front, Trump **would** be expected to break from Biden’s aversion to trade deals. He would want to **revive the** phase-one **trade deal he signed just days before he left office** and continue from where he left off on phase-two issues, not before negotiating free trade agreements with India and Japan to strengthen his hand in the negotiations with Beijing. He would also revive his US “energy dominance” doctrine that emphasises the **expan[d]**sion of US **energy exports to**, among other places, **China**. Finally, he would **[and] be** much **more eager than Biden to engage with President Xi** Jinping on a personal level.

**Concluding:**

Gal **Luft**, “Why China has reason to wish for a Trump presidency in 2024,” 01-08-20**22**, *SCMP*, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3162409/why-china-has-reason-wish-trump-presidency-2024> //WP

In a December interview, Trump said: “I really believe he liked me, I like him.” Such a personal touch is very much needed to calm things down. For all his peculiarities, Trump offers the possibility of discontinuity in US-China relations – which is exactly what is needed today. **Staying on the current trajectory will only lead to more tension until**, at some point, one of the guardrails that keeps the powers from veering into conflict will snap, paving the road to an **armed conflict**. If Trump could this, he would be one of America’s most consequential presidents.

**Talmadge-17 terminalizes:**

Caitlin Talmadge, Spring-xx-2017, "Would China Go Nuclear?: Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States" International Security, MIT Press, <https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/07/Talmadge-IS-2017-y16c9h.pdf> //EZG

Chinese nuclear escalation in the event of a conventional war with the United States is a signiacant risk, although for reasons not fully surfaced in the exist- ing debate. A U.S. conventional campaign would indeed pose a large, though not total, threat to China’s nuclear arsenal. More important than the purely military-technical implications of the U.S. campaign, however, is what China is likely to believe the campaign signals about U.S. intentions in a world where conventional deterrence has just failed. Reasonable **Chinese fears that the U**nited **S**tates **might be attempting conventional counterforce**, or considering or preparing for nuclear counterforce, **could lead China to engage in** limited **nuclear escalation to gain military advantage** or coercive leverage—despite China’s no-first-use policy.

**4] Turn. Trump losing causes a civil war.**

David **Freedman**, “Millions of Angry, Armed Americans Stand Ready to Seize Power If Trump Loses in 2024,” 12-20-20**21**, *Newsweek*, <https://www.newsweek.com/2021/12/31/millions-angry-armed-americans-stand-ready-seize-power-if-trump-loses-2024-1660953.html> //WP

**Millions of angry, armed Americans stand ready to seize power if Trump loses in 2024.** Mike "Wompus" Nieznany is a 73-year-old Vietnam veteran who walks with a cane from the combat wounds he received during his service. That disability doesn't keep Nieznany from making a living selling custom motorcycle luggage racks from his home in Gainesville, Georgia. Neither will it slow him down when it's time to visit Washington, D.C.—**heavily armed and ready to** do his part in **overthrow**ing **the U.S. government**. Millions of fellow would-be insurrectionists will be there, too, Nieznany says, "a ticking time-bomb" targeting the Capitol. "There are lots of fully armed people wondering what's happening to this country," he says. "Are we going to let Biden keep destroying it? Or do we need to get rid of him? We're only going to take so much before we fight back." The 2024 election, he adds, may well be the trigger. Nieznany is no loner. His political comments on the social-media site Quora received 44,000 views in the first two weeks of November and more than 4 million overall. He is one of many rank-and-file Republicans who own guns and in recent months have talked openly of the need to take down—by force if necessary—a federal government they see as illegitimate, overreaching and corrosive to American freedom.

**Furthering:**

David **Freedman**, “Millions of Angry, Armed Americans Stand Ready to Seize Power If Trump Loses in 2024,” 12-20-20**21**, *Newsweek*, <https://www.newsweek.com/2021/12/31/millions-angry-armed-americans-stand-ready-seize-power-if-trump-loses-2024-1660953.html> //WP

**What might lead to large-scale armed threat or even violence around the 2024 elections? There may be only one** narrow **path to avoiding it**: **A** comfortable, incontestable **win by Trump,** assuming he's the Republican candidate. Democrats might despair at the loss, but it's not likely that they will go into mass protests against what could be seen as a legitimate election win. But **if Trump loses, by any margin**, and is unable to overturn the results through legal or political means, it seems likely **Republicans will declare the election fraudulent**. In 2020, the conviction—against all evidence—that Trump had the presidency stolen from him brought an insurrectionist mob to the U.S. Capitol. The mob was mostly unarmed, undoubtedly thanks to Washington D.C.'s strict gun-control laws.

#### **A second civil war causes extinction from great power conflict, terrorism, anarchy, and heg decline, as Milos-18 finds:**

**Milos 18** — Knjaz Milos, political reporter and cofounder of Foreign Policy, 2018 (“What A Second American Civil War Might Look Like,” *Foreign Policy,* May 10th, Available Online at<https://foreignpolicyi.org/what-a-second-american-civil-war-might-look-like/>, Accessed 03-04-2020)

One thing is certain. Second American civil war will be nothing like the first one. And we are not talking about the difference between muskets and M16s, but rather the entire concept. Last time there were two clearly defined sides, with a clearly defined territory and clearly defined forces. If the recent conflicts in the Middle East have thought us anything, it is that there is nothing distinctly defined in modern warfare.

[image omitted]

It will be messy. A second civil war on the US territory would be more similar to what we have witnessed in Yugoslavia during the nineties. “The war among brothers” as it’s called in Balkans would be a grain of salt compared to which lengths could a civil war in America **escalate**. The number of victims would be closer to what we have seen during the civil wars in Russia or China in the 20th century.

It is hard to imagine how much of an impact would a war on US soil had on the rest of the world. The US interest in rest of the world would become things of secondary interest which would countries such as **China, Russia, and North Korea** try to use.

[image omitted]

The effect that it would have on America as a country and their citizens would be even more devastating. If such thing as a new civil war occurs, it could result in cataclysmic consequences in which law and order would be hard to restore. Also, this type of conflict would change the outline of global politics. The outbreak of civil war in Syria took thousands of lives and created millions of refugees. It brought the entire Middle East into conflict, and not to mention the involvement of **world powers** such as America and Russia. The US civil war could also create refugees who would seek refuge in Canada or even Mexico. And who knows how would these **neighboring countries** react. To see the mess which civil war creates you need to look no further than Syria.

Perhaps the best example of how a second American civil war would play out is the rise of ISIS. The Islamic state came to being not as a single offensive force that conquered vast patches of territory, but as a confederation of loosely connected groups each taking their own neighborhood and connecting with each other in a fascinating display of network violence. This could be a clear blueprint for any conflict on American soil.

Groups like Antifa and Alt-right, who lack any centralized structure and are both incapable and unwilling to coordinate on the national level can use their decentralization to their advantage. They would wage **asymmetric warfare**, aimed at maximum effect through violence and casualties. Any future homeland conflicts would have to be looked through the prism of modern insurgencies in Arab countries and the inability of U.S. military to decisively stop them, despite the vast firepower it has at its disposal.

We have learned repeatably from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria that modern armies deal poorly with insurgent campaigns, especially in urban areas and that United States military isn’t an exception. The one factor that may be different is that in the past the military was deployed in foreign lands and communication with native population was difficult and cultural barriers too high to effectively employ “hearts and minds” campaign, essential for any counter-insurgency campaign to work.

In case of the second American civil war, the situation would be even worse, since the civilian casualties would have to be kept at a minimum, something modern armies aren’t always prepared to do. A string of terrorist attacks could easily bring the nation to its knees, and if perpetrators are US citizens of appropriate ethnic background (e.g., white), it would be very hard to stop them. That is why thinking of civil war in traditional terms can be a fatal mistake, as it would leave us unprepared for the real shape of the second American civil war.

Two aspects of America would ensure that any civil conflict would spread out like a wildfire. First, the number of weapons Americans have in their homes. There are estimated 357 million weapons in civilian hands in the country, a staggering figure made worse by the fact that population at the time, according to estimations from 2017, was 325 million. That means that there are 30 million more weapons than people living in America.

Most of these are civilian guns, but a vast number of them is easily transformed into a fully militarized version in a very short time. Add to this various organized civilian groups that are essentially paramilitary organizations, like several **militia organizations** and border watch groups, just itching to start using their shiny guns, and the recipe for disaster becomes clear. Closely connected to them are preppers’ organizations, who would see American 2nd Civil War as a fulfillment of their doomsday prophecies. Although some of these can be dismissed as wannabes, a significant number of these groups’ members have a military background, which could make them formidable opponents.

The other factor is American military. Although constitutionally obliged to support the existing government, in case of an open civil war, there is no telling what might happen. The wholesale desertion of entire units isn’t an unimaginable scenario and something that can top the scales of conflict **very fast**. Complete company of Abrams tanks or a battalion of marines are forces to be reckoned with, especially if all they are facing are civilian groups.

### C2: Cartels

**1 – SQUO solves.**

**Roy-24** (Diane Roy, 6-18-2024, How the U.S. Patrols Its Borders, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-us-patrols-its-borders, 7-16-2024 //tristanM recut doobz)

However, between December 2023 and April 2024, **illegal** **border** **crossings** **dropped** by some **50 percent**. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas credited the decrease to **various** **U.S. efforts**, including **stronger** **border** **enforcement** and the **expansion** of **legal** **immigration** **pathways**. Other experts also point to Mexican authorities’ increased efforts to slow U.S.-bound migration and rising deportations.

**And,**

**Pandit-24** (Puja Pandit, 5-14-2024, 4th consecutive year of improvement in peacefulness in Mexico, Vision of Humanity, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/fourth-consecutive-year-of-improvement-amid-persistent-organized-crime-challenges/, 7-16-2024 //tristanM recut doobz)

**Mexico’s** **peacefulness** improved by **1.4** **percent** in 20**23**, with all **five** **indicators** of the MPI **registering** modest **improvements**. The homicide rate decreased by 5.3% in 2023, marking the **fourth straight year** of improvement. However, homicides continue to be a significant concern, with more than 30,500 victims last year.

**2 – New Mexican president solves.**

**Kitroeff 24** [Natalie Kitroeff (Mexico City bureau chief for The New York Times, leading coverage of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean), 6-22-2024, Sheinbaum’s American Experience Offers Clues to Her Approach to U.S. Relations, No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/22/world/americas/mexico-sheinbaum-us.html, accessed 7-20-2024] // BZ

In recent years, criminal groups in Mexico have expanded their dominance across the country, experts say, smuggling large quantities of synthetic opioids across the U.S. border while killing Mexicans at will. American officials say privately that they believe security coordination could improve with Ms. Sheinbaum. As mayor of Mexico City, she took a different approach than Mr. López Obrador, **pouring money into the civilian police force**, while he relied heavily on the military. She **raised police salaries**, and her administration **collaborated well with U.S. law enforcement agencies** to **confront criminal groups**, according to American officials and experts. **Homicides and other violent crimes declined precipitously**. “They have, in fact, cooperated very well with U.S. agencies in terms of security in Mexico City,” said Lila Abed, the acting director of the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, who said there was “cautious optimism” about Ms. Sheinbaum’s strategy for combating violence. Juan Ramón de la Fuente, who was just named foreign minister in Ms. Sheinbaum’s future administration, said in an interview that he saw a potential for more security collaboration with the United States under Ms. Sheinbaum. “We all acknowledge that we need to collaborate and we need to work together more effectively,” Mr. de la Fuente said.

#### **3 – Corruption thumps surveillance.**

**Kim 21** [Diana Kim, Yuhki Tajima, “Smuggling and Border Enforcement”, April 14, 2021, Cambridge, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/1A197DF22C69535657079CB8EA5044DA/S002081832200011Xa.pdf/smuggling\_and\_border\_enforcement.pdf, Accessed 07/15/2024] // ilake-cady

Incorporating this information asymmetry and the variation in smugglers’ skills, we develop a simple theoretical framework that models the strategic interactions between smugglers and border agents. Our logic is as follows. Border enforcement sites can operate as sorting mechanisms that filter smugglers into different types based on their ability to transport contraband across borders. High-skilled smugglers can traverse borders with low transportation costs, and profitably forge their own unofficial routes to circumvent border enforcement strategies. By contrast, low-skilled smugglers must **collude with border agents to traverse the border** because they face **higher transportation costs** for overcoming border patrols, checkpoints, walls, and fences. Because border officials know only the general characteristics of smugglers’ costs, they will set a uniform fee for smugglers who wish to pass via official border crossings. This fee will be kept low enough that it can be profitable for low-skilled smugglers to use the official crossing rather than unofficial routes. As a result, border enforcement **does not necessarily reduce the total volume** of smuggling but merely **diverts low-skilled smugglers to seek safe passage** by bribing border agents, when the **two nominal adversaries** are able to collude. However, in the absence of such collusion, low-skilled smugglers will be deterred from smuggling; only high-skilled smugglers will be able to cross profitably (using their unofficial routes), and overall smuggling volume will be reduced. What conditions enable collusion between border agents and smugglers? We argue that it depends on both the local bureaucratic environment and human geography. In a permissive local bureaucratic environment, the central government **lacks the capacity** and/or the **will to monitor border agents** on the ground, who in turn know that their **likelihood of being punished for corruption is low**. However, we stress that these parameters alone do not necessarily lead to collusion. Border agents must also be able to anticipate interacting repeatedly with smugglers and value these future inter- actions sufficiently. Reasons for such predictability may include physical terrain that facilitates both smuggling and its regulation, shared historical knowledge of smuggling routes, or steady demand for contraband across borders. Thus, even when a central government lacks the capacity to detect and punish corruption, local border agents may not be able to engage in corruption if they cannot maintain interactions with smugglers. Scholars generally recognize that weak state capacity and a lack of political commitment explain why border enforcement against smuggling **fails**.5 However, a key contribution of our argument is that it can explain why border corruption and smuggling occur even when states have strong coercive capacity to enforce borders and prioritize anti-corruption. An agent of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation succinctly described the incentives of “bad apples” inspecting cars crossing the border in San Diego: “If you’re an inspector and you are legitimately waving through ninety-seven out of one hundred cars anyway ... and you **realize you can make as much as your annual salary** by letting the ninety-eighth car go by, it can be **easy to rationalize that**.”6 Our micro-logic approach sheds light on how the incentives of border agents in such situations are **shaped by interacting** with illegal actors, and how those local interactions can influence the efficacy of enforcement against smuggling. In addition to drugs and contraband goods, our argument can extend to a wide range of cross-border activities, including the smuggling of humans.

## Pigeons DA

#### **You have an ethical obligation to think and advocate in place of animals whose screams are categorically ignored and silenced**

Rosemary-Claire **Collard**, 09-20**19**, Capitalism Nature Socialism, https://www.cnsjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Collard.24.1.13.pdf

‘‘A **true** political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of **contestation** for those who are not-all, who are **uncounted and unnamed**.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their **exclusion**\*animals, the ‘‘**constitutive outside**’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an **imperfect** way of describing my **objective** (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a **‘‘spokesperson’’** for animals, which are often **characterized as speechless** and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization. This paper is therefore written **in the place** of those **uncounted and unnamed** non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the **nonhumans**, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are **refused** speech, reason, **morality**, emotion, clothing, **shelter**, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The **belief** in human superiority is firmly **lodged and dear** to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into **the dominant political order**, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, **neglects** how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

#### **Differences shouldn’t determine moral equality, including IQ -- same observation applies to racism/sexism**

Peter **Singer**, 19**89**, Cambridge University Press,

https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf // BL

A **liberation** movement demands **an expansion of** our moral **horizons and an extension** reinterpretation of **the basic moral principle of equality.** Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, **I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality** that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species. All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of other liberation movements than a serious objective. In fact, in the past the idea of "The Rights of Animals" really has been used to parody the case for women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a forerunner of later feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecraft's reasonings by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when applied to women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally well for these "brutes"; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in each case. One way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to nonhuman animals. Women have a right to vote, for instance, because they are just as capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have the right to vote. There are many other obvious ways in which men and women resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ greatly. So, it might be said, men and women are similar beings and should have equal rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have equal rights. The thought behind this reply to Taylor's analogy is correct up to a point, but it does not go far enough. There are important **differences between humans and other animals**, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, **is no barrier to the case for extending** the basic principle of equality **to nonhuman animals.** The differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women's Liberation are aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since these same people are campaigning for equality between men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can't vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote. There is no reason why either Women's Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights. So there is a different way of replying to Taylor's attempt to parody Wollstonecraft's arguments, a way which does not deny the differences between humans and nonhumans, but goes more deeply into the question of equality and concludes by finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to so-called "brutes." I believe that we reach this conclusion if we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds of race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans.When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, **we must face the fact that humans come in different** shapes and sizes; they come with differing **moral capacities,** differing **intellectual abilities,** differing **amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others,** differing **abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain.** In short, **if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality.** It would be an unjustifiable demand. Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. **Although humans differ** as individuals **in various ways**, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. **From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism.** The white racist claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex. This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks. The existence of **individual variations** that cut across the lines of race or sex, however,**provides us with no defense** at all **against a more sophisticated opponent of equality**, one **who proposes that**, say, the **interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to** the interests of thosewith I.Q.below **100.Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not.** But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of Inegalitarianism. There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who

#### **Pigeons are government surveillance**

**PAR** [Pigeons Aren'T Real, xx-xx-xxxx, **Pigeon Drone**, **Pigeons Aren't Real**, https://pigeonsarentreal.co.uk/pigeon-drone-the-surveillance-technology/, accessed 6-26-2024] // BZ

Pigeon Drone – The Surveillance Technology The concept of government surveillance pigeons is a tough one. They walk like pigeons, squawk like pigeons, and everything we’ve grown up believing about pigeons is a lie. It’s no surprise that we hear “i kILLeD A rOboT pIgEon aNd iT wAsN’t mEtAL. Well no shit, an obviously robot surveillance camera walking about would draw attention and that wouldn’t be a very effective method for invading your privacy. The success of the **pigeon surveillance drone program** is entirely down to the fact that **these ‘robots’ blend into the everyday.** There are however some tell tale signs when you know what you’re looking at – for example the explanation behind why pigeons bob their heads when they walk. But you really wouldn’t look twice at a pigeon anywhere in London, even when they’re taking the tube. **The modern pigeonbot** is made possible by **decades of technological advancements in surveillance equipment** and more importantly, **the emerging field of biotechnology.** The **metabolic power** of the **living pigeon host** is essentially **harnessed by the government’s control.** This diagram illustrates how some of the key surveillance equipment is strategically embedded in the organism. The main components of the pigeon drone are the camera, microphone and wireless antenna. The camera and microphone are the obvious recording devices collecting public information on the streets. The wireless antenna broadcasts the information to central facilities where the data is analysed. A new addition in 2020 pigeon drones is a wifi interceptor. As they perch on your windowsill, hacking your private network. The inductive charging coil is another recent addition to the pigeon drone. Using magnetic charging technology, the surveillance pigeon can recharge from electricity pylons around the country. This has greatly enhanced their time in the field and flying range. In past times, the surveillance drone would have returned to data centres where the recordings were downloaded and the pigeon was recharged. Advances in battery technology, becoming smaller and more powerful have also aided the pigeon drone. Being lighter and more agile the pigeon can convincingly walk and fly better than ever before. The remaining component is the CPU which acts as the brain for the surveillance technology. While the pigeon organism itself, still has its natural brain powering the animals instincts, the CPU contains the biotech to control the pigeon via impulse. The processor also acts to encode the surveillance data and transmit the data via its internal wireless communication. Hopefully this clears up all the confusion about what a pigeon is, and how they’ve come to be.

#### **Empirics**

**Ewin 23** [Steven Ewin, 1-11-2023, When the CIA Spied on American Citizens—Using Pigeons, Atlas Obscura, https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/cia-cold-war-pigeon-spies, accessed 6-26-2024] // BZ  
When **the CIA Spied** on **American Citizens**—**Using Pigeons** The seemingly birdbrained Cold War experiment is still partially classified. FLYING ABOVE THE WASHINGTON NAVY Yard, a spy was taking a series of pictures that revealed more than even the most advanced satellites, while the workers below went about their day-to-day lives, not knowing they were the subject of an espionage mission. Looking to gain an edge in the Cold War, in 1977 the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited a new, nearly invisible agent: a pigeon. It may sound unusual, but the idea of using pigeons for espionage wasn’t without merit. The place of pigeons in an army was first recorded by the Roman historian Pliny, who described their role in communication, and the German army in World War I were the first to explore the use of pigeons for reconnaissance. The United States military had itself been using pigeons since the late 1800s for communication, but “I could not document any instance of them being used for reconnaissance,” says Elizabeth Macalaster, author of War Pigeons: Winged Couriers in the U.S. Military, 1878-1957. Enter the CIA. “For several years, the Office of Research and Development [ORD] has carried out endeavors…to train different species of birds,” states a declassified September 1976 CIA working paper. However, until January 1976 the avian programs had been, “dismissed…as an improbable, exotic, humorous idea.” This opinion changed when someone realized **birds** could potentially be the answer to an **ongoing problem**: **photographic coverage of sensitive areas such as naval yards in Leningrad.** “We didn’t have the opportunity in so many cases to get so close,” James David, curator of National Security Space at the Smithsonian Institution, told me in an interview about the history of the CIA’s Cold War satellite program. Maybe the pigeons could. The project quickly ballooned in scope. By September 1976, the ORD had already invested $100,000 not just training pigeons, but designing harnesses and cameras for the operation. Testing and training were conducted throughout the United States. Various methods of releasing the pigeons were trialed, including modifying a VW Beetle to transport the birds; taking inspiration from stage magicians, the CIA cut a hole in the floor of the Beetle, allowing for pigeons to be surreptitiously released. By October 1976, the birds were flying over Andrews Air Force Base near Washington D.C., and in February 1977, the CIA proposed a further feasibility test at the Navy Yard in Southeast DC. The Navy Yard was a bustling center of activity. Ceremonial docks mingled with active docks for ships under repair. Parking lots along the Anacostia River were filled by employees who worked for the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corp, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and more. The iconic entrance to the facility, the Latrobe Gate, has remained unchanged since 1881. It is immediately identifiable in pictures taken by the clandestine pigeons. The **images** the **birds captured**—since **declassified by the CIA**—**were of astounding quality.** **Air conditioners** could **easily be seen on top of buildings** and it was **possible to count the window panes on the old Naval Gun Factory.** The full resolution capabilities of the state-of-the-art American spy satellite GAMBIT-3’s are still classified, but it is known that it could spot an object as small as four inches square. “In comparison with [GAMBIT-3] photography of the same target,” reads a CIA report, “the avian system was rated as having a higher image interpretability as well as the ability to see smaller objects.” The pigeons could provide a resolution of ¾ of an inch.

#### **Two impacts:**

#### **1] Tornadoes**

**Tornado Alley Armor**, xx-xx-xxxx, Texas Tornado Facts, https://tornadoalley.com/texas-tornado-facts-sp-16195/ //CChun

**An average of 132 tornadoes touch Texas soil each year.** The annual total varies considerably, and certain areas are struck more often than others. Tornadoes occur with greatest frequency in the Red River Valley of North Texas. More tornadoes have been recorded in Texas than in **any other state**, with **8,007 funnel clouds** reaching the ground between 1951 and 2011, thus becoming tornadoes. Texas ranks 11th among the 50 states in the density of tornadoes due to its size, with an average of 5.7 tornadoes per 10,000 square miles per year (or 100 mi x 100 mi area) during this period. However, the arid southwestern 1/3 of the state experiences very few tornadoes annually, so the adjusted average number of tornadoes per square mile for the remainder of the state is much higher at roughly 9 to 11 per 10,000 square miles, ranking Texas among the highest occurance rates in the country. The greatest outbreak of tornadoes on record in Texas was associated with Hurricane Beulah in September 1967. Within a five-day period, 115 known tornadoes, all in Texas, were spawned by this great hurricane. Sixty-seven occurred on Sept. 20, a Texas record for a single day. The greatest number of tornadoes in Texas in a single year is 232, also in 1967. The second-highest number in a single year is 1995, when 223 tornadoes occurred in Texas.

#### **We’d say tornadoes probably kill them**

#### **2] Excessive weight**

Mike **Prospero**, 6-7-20**24**, Which GoPro is Right For You?, Tom's Guide, https://www.tomsguide.com/best-picks/best-gopro-cameras //CChun

We know all the numbers and specs can be a little overwhelming, so we've laid them all out side by side in this table to make it easier for you to compare the details. Remember, though, specs aren't everything and don't necessarily make a camera right for you, so keep reading to see our full analysis of each **GoPro**.

| Row 0 - Cell 0 | GoPro Hero12 Black | GoPro Hero11 Black | GoPro Max | Hero10 Black | Hero9 Black |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Price | $399 | $499 | $399 | $349 | $349 |
| Video Resolution | 5.3K/60 fps | 5K/60 fps | 5.6K/60 fps (spherical), 1080p/60fps (rectilinear) | 5K/60 fps | 5K/30 fps |
| Photo Resolution | 27MP | 27MP | 16.6MP (spherical), 5.5MP (rectilinear) | 23MP | 20MP |
| Display | Front and rear | Front and rear | Rear only | Front and rear | Front and rear |
| Slo-Mo | 120 fps (4K), 240 fps (2.7K) | 240 fps (2.7k) | 2x / 60 fps (3K) | 240 fps (2.7k) | 240 fps (1080p) |
| Livestreaming | Yes (1080p) | Yes (1080p) | Yes (1080p) | Yes (1080p) | Yes (1080p) |
| HDR | Yes | Yes (1080p) | No | Yes | Yes |
| Motion Stabilization | Hypersmooth 6.0 | Hypersmooth 5.0 | Max Hypersmooth | HyperSmooth 4.0 | Hypersmooth 3.0+ Boost |
| Microphones | 3 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Water Resistance | 33 feet | 33 feet | 16 feet | 33 feet | 33 feet |
| Battery | 1720 mAh | 1720 mAh | 1600 mAh | 1720 mAh | 1720 mAh |
| Size | 2.8 x 2 x 1.3 inches | 2.8 x 2 x 1.3 inches | 2.7 x 2.5 x 0.98 inches | 2.75 x 1.9 x 1.6 inches | 2.75 x 1.9 x 1.6 inches |
| **Weight** | **150 grams** | 150 grams | 154 grams | 150 grams | 158 grams |

#### **That’s way too much**

**Wikipedia**, xx-xx-xxxx, Homing pigeon,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homing\_pigeon //CChun

With training, pigeons can carry up to **75 g** (2.5 oz) on their backs. As early as 1903, the German apothecary Julius Neubronner used carrier pigeons to both receive and deliver urgent medication.[[37]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homing_pigeon#cite_note-37) In 1977, a similar system of 30 carrier pigeons was set up for the transport of laboratory specimens between two English hospitals. Every morning a basket with pigeons was taken from Plymouth General Hospital to Devonport Hospital. The birds then delivered unbreakable vials back to Plymouth as needed.[[38]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homing_pigeon#cite_note-38) The carrier pigeons became unnecessary in 1983 because of the closure of one of the hospitals.[[39]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homing_pigeon#cite_note-39) In the 1980s a similar system existed between two French hospitals located in Granville and Avranche.[[40]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homing_pigeon#cite_note-40)