# **1AC**

Cards

# **1AC---Piracy**

**C1 is Piracy**

## **Somali piracy is resurging.**

**Larocco '24** [Lori; Senior Editor & Reporter @ CNBC News; 1-29-2024; CNBC; “Somali pirates are back on the attack at a level not seen in years, adding to global shipping threats,” https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/06/somali-pirates-are-back-on-the-attack-at-a-level-not-seen-in-years.html; accessed: 12-13-2024] tristan

**Somali** **pirates** are **back** on the **attack**, with **piracy** around the Horn of **Africa** rising **sharply** in recent months and adding to **concerns** for **shipping** **vessels**, government **forces** and private security already **locked** in a **battle** in the **Red** **Sea** with Houthi rebels.

Over the past three months, there has been **more** **piracy** in the Horn of **Africa** region than at **any** **point** in the last **six** **years**, according to Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), an independent think tank, with **high** **ransoms** for seafarers or vessels, and **robbing** of ship **passengers** by pirates.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia had been on the **decline** in recent years after peaking in 2011 when Somali pirates launched 212 attacks. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed seven resolutions targeting Somalia piracy between December 2010 and March 2022, permitting foreign naval and air forces to enter and patrol Somali waters and authorizing the European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta, working with a U.S.-led task force, to use “all necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery at sea.”

The **cost** of piracy to the global economy is a **steep** **one**. A 2013 World Bank study, still widelt cited today, estimated that piracy cost the global economy around **$18 billion annually**.

According to the **UNSC**, the **anti**-**piracy** **measures** in place to enforce the freedom of navigation off the coast of Somalia **expired** quietly after its last renewal for three months after December 3, 2021.

Since last November, merchant **vessels** have been the **target** of about 20% of Somali piracy-related **incidents**, according to Dan Mueller, lead analyst for the Middle Eastern Region for maritime security firm Ambrey. On December 14, The International Chamber of Shipping reported the hijacking of a Handymax bulk carrier, the first successful hijacking of a vessel off the coast of Somalia since 2017. The pirates have also been attacking fishing vessels, mostly Iranian, as well as many other small boats such as skiffs.

## **It’s raising shipping costs and will exceed previous levels.**

**Paravicini 24** [Giulia; Correspondent @ Reuters; 3-21-24; Reuters; "Somali pirates return, adding to global shipping crisis," https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-pirates-return-adds-crisis-global-shipping-companies-2024-03-21/] tristan

A week later, the Abdullah is anchored off the coast of Somalia, the latest victim of a resurgence of piracy that international navies thought they had brought under control.¶ The **raids** are **piling** risks and **costs** onto **shipping** **companies** also **contending** with repeated drone and missile **strikes** by Yemen's **Houthi** militia in the Red Sea and other nearby waters.¶ More than 20 attempted hijackings since November have **driven** up **prices** for **armed** **security** guards and **insurance** coverage and **raised** the **spectre** of possible **ransom** payments, according to five industry representatives. Two Somali gang members told Reuters they were taking advantage of the distraction provided by Houthi strikes several hundred nautical miles to the north to get back into piracy after lying dormant for nearly a decade.¶ "They took this chance because the **international** naval **forces** that **operate** off the coast of **Somalia** **reduced** their **operations**," said a pirate financier who goes by the alias Ismail Isse and said he helped fund the hijacking of another bulk carrier in December.¶ He spoke to Reuters by phone from Hul Anod, a coastal area in Somalia's semi-autonomous northeastern region of Puntland where the ship, the Ruen, was held for weeks.¶ While the threat is not as serious as it was in 2008-2014, regional officials and industry sources are concerned the **problem** could **escalate**.¶ "If we do **not** **stop** it while it's still in its **infancy**, it can become the **same** as it **was**," Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Reuters last month at his highly-fortified art deco palace, Villa Somalia.

**AND Pirates are innovating,**

**Walker 24** [Timothy; Senior Researcher @ ISS Pretoria; 11-7-2024; ISS Africa; "New Somali piracy threats require partnerships and holistic responses," https://issafrica.org/iss-today/new-somali-piracy-threats-require-partnerships-and-holistic-responses] tristan

Unlike **previous** **years**, when incidents were more sporadic, there has been a **steady** **build**-**up** of **piracy** **activity** since late 2023, with **several** attempted **attacks** and two confirmed hijackings of commercial vessels. The MV Ruen and MV Abdullah were the first vessels to be successfully captured by pirates since 2017 (Chart 2).¶ The last reported pirate activity in the region before the recent alert occurred on 7 June – a suspicious approach on the cargo ship Pacific Honor. There are several factors behind the rise in attacks. The pattern suggests **pirate** **groups** have again developed **sophisticated** **operational** **capacity**. Also, the seasonal monsoon winds have dropped. The rough seas and high winds of the southwest monsoon from June to September make **small**-**boat** **operations** **difficult**. With the season subsiding until March next year, **piracy** could **resurface**.¶ The **uptick** is also **linked** to **Houthi** **attacks** in the **Red** **Sea**, which are **pushing** shipping **routes** **south**. This has **increased** **vessel** **activity** along **Somalia’s** **coast**, creating **opportunities** for **pirates** to **exploit** maritime **vulnerabilities**.¶ With **ships** **deviating** from established routes, maritime **security** **forces** have been **stretched** **thin** as naval **forces** such as the United Kingdom and United States are **redeployed** in the **Red** **Sea**. This has created **gaps** that **pirates** can **exploit**.

## **That shreds trade.**

**Ruzza 20** [Stefano; Assistant Professor @ the University of Turin; 2020; SpringerLink; "Piracy and the Privatisation of Maritime Security," https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-50156-3; accessible at: https://sci-hub.ru/10.1007/978-3-030-50156-3] tristan

Over **90%** of the **commodities** traded worldwide travel by **sea**. Container **ships** and **tankers** are **crucial** **suppliers** of **vital** **commodities** including 2.9 billion tons of **oil** per year, roughly **62%** of all the **petroleum** produced worldwide. Consequently, the shipping industry plays a **crucial** **role** in enabling today’s economic globalisation. The **Gulf** of **Aden**—close to the strategic Suez chokepoint and crossed by around 30,000 ships per year at the **peak** of the **piracy** **emergency**—plays an especially **prominent** **role** among **international** **shipping** routes (Reuters 2011). For this reason, the **rise** of **Somali** **piracy** threatened an **incalculable** economic **damage** to the world **economy**. In **2011** alone, ship owners and operators paid a **grand** **total** of USD **146** **million** in **ransoms** for **hijacked** **ships** and **crews** (Brown 2012: 4). Ransoms were only one among the many externalities of Somali piracy. Higher **insurance** **premiums**, the extra **fuel** and time spent on **rerouting** and the need to maintain **higher** **speed** caused **additional** **costs** that could **endanger** the **economic** **viability** of **shipping**, disrupting international **trade** at **large**. The risk that hijackers would cause natural disasters by deliberately or inadvertently damaging tankers, combined with the concern that the money obtained from ransoms could be used to fund terrorist organisations like Al Shabaab, further magnified the threat posed by Somali pirates (Singh and Bedi 2016)

## **Continued disruption decks the global economy.**

**CRS 24** [CRS; 5-8-2024; Congressional Research Service; "Red Sea Shipping Disruptions: Estimating Economic Effects, " https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12657; accessed: 12-14-2024] tristan \*\*brackets r og\*\*

**Attacks** by the Yemen-based Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement in the Red Sea and **Gulf** of **Aden** since November 2023 have disrupted a **critical** **maritime** **passage** for **global** **supply** **chains**, creating bottlenecks at the **Suez** **Canal** and **Bab** al-**Mandab** **Strait**—one of the world’s most **significant** **trade** **chokepoints**—and forcing vessels into longer and more **costly** **journeys** around Africa. These shipping disruptions **compound** **ongoing** **challenges** to the global **economy** created or **exacerbated** by the COVID-19 **pandemic**, Russia’s war against **Ukraine**, conflict and tension in the **Middle** **East**, and a **drought** that has substantially scaled back shipping through the Panama Canal, another key artery of global trade flows. Members of Congress may have an interest in monitoring the situation to help inform potential U.S. economic policy responses. ¶ The **Suez** **Canal**—which connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and links Europe, Africa, and Asia— handled approximately 12% to **15%** of **global** **trade** **volumes** in 2023. This strategic passage is also significant to trade in specific products; by some estimates, it has handled 25% to 30% of all container shipping, 12% of seaborne oil, 8% of seaborne liquified natural gas, and 8% of the grain trade in recent years. The disruptions to the safe use of this waterway have highlighted the vulnerability of global supply chains to ocean-based security threats. ¶ Preliminary information suggests that the global **economic** **effects** of the Houthi **attacks** on ships have been **limited** thus far, although they have rippled across various industries and countries differently, primarily via trade linkages (e.g., delays and shortages). **Potential** **remains** for **greater** **near** **term** **risks** and **challenges** to the **economies** of **Europe**, the **Middle** **East**, and the Horn of **Africa**. As two analysts from the St. Louis Fed noted in February 2024, “[w]hile geopolitical conflict often takes place in relatively narrow geographic areas, the global nature of the market for international shipping services could act as a channel through which local shocks are **amplified** and **transmitted** to the rest of the **global** **economy**.” ¶ The attacks have **increased** shipping **costs** and affected **humanitarian** **flows** of food, fuel, and medicine into in these regions. If prolonged, **disruptions** to Red Sea shipping could **contribute** to **global** inflationary **pressures** and exert a **drag** on the **global** **economy**. Ultimately, the overall impact of the crisis will depend on its duration and the extent to which its fallout is contained, and on the responses of all stakeholders, including governments, shipping companies, and international organizations.

## **Somaliland is critical to counter piracy but needs investment.**

**Farley '10** [Benjamin; Professor @ the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs, Visiting Fellow @ Emory University School of Law, former DOD member, term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, JD with honors from Emory University School of Law, MA from the Elliot School of International Affairs; 9-13-2010; Emory International Law Review; "Calling a State a State: Somaliland and International Recognition," https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1676428] tristan

Continued **non**-**recognition** has **deleterious** **consequences** for **Somaliland**. Non-recognition **denies** Somaliland access to “bilateral donor development **assistance** or the support of international financial institutions.”317 It also **imperils** **Somaliland’s** **survival**.318 The goal of non-recognition may be the termination of the secessionist entities that seek recognition.319 In this case, however, non-recognition ignores the benefits generated by Somaliland. As discussed above, Somaliland does not share rump Somalia’s instability or rump Somalia’s abundance of Islamic militants and pirates.320 The most probable outcome of extinguishing Somaliland is an **increase** in the threats to international security that Somalia currently represents: **pirates** currently **kept** at **bay** by **Somaliland’s** **coast** **guard** would be able to **expand** their **base** of **operation** around the **Horn** of **Africa**; **Islamist** **militants** affiliated with al-Qaeda would find even **more** **lawless** **territory** in which to hide, train, prepare, and eventually **launch** **transnational** **terrorist** **acts**.

On the other hand, recognizing Somaliland would afford it access to bilateral **aid**, international **financial** **institutions**, and development **assistance**. Recognition would likely encourage **f**oreign **d**irect **i**nvestment, including the development of offshore oil and gas fields.321 Outside investment and economic **development** are in turn likely to **contribute** to **Somaliland’s** **survival**, preserving the international security largesse it provides. In light of the political nature of recognition, states can be expected to choose recognition when it serves their interests. With regard to Somaliland, its **contribution** to international **security** as a **bulwark** against **piracy** and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants suggest that it is in the interest of Western states to see it preserved, irrespective of the interests of regional actors like the African Union, Ethiopia, or Egypt. Western states should therefore extend recognition to Somaliland.

## **Indeed,**

**Langfitt 11** [Frank; NPR’s Roving National Correspondent; 4-12-2011; NPR; "Somaliland Struggles In Effort To Fight Piracy," https://www.npr.org/2011/04/13/135345974/somaliland-struggles-in-effort-to-fight-piracy] tristan

Somali piracy has become an **epidemic**.¶ Last year, Somali pirates seized more than a thousand hostages — a record. This year, they have already hijacked 15 vessels, including an American yacht whose four passengers were killed.¶ The government of **Somaliland**, a self-ruling part of Somalia, is **trying** to **fight** the **problem** with a **ragtag** **coast** **guard** and a new prison, but **battling** **piracy** is like fighting a **stiff** **current**.¶ A visit to the local jail in Somaliland's port of Berbera goes a long way toward explaining why. Duale Jama Sirat is sitting on the jail's concrete floor. The cell reeks of urine, and the walls are etched with names and phone numbers. Sirat has been here ever since the Somaliland coast guard boarded his skiff last month about 50 miles off the coast in some of the world's most pirate-infested waters. "We don't know why they captured us," says Sirat, feigning surprise at his predicament. "The coast guard from Berbera fired on us and ordered us to stop." Dressed in a black T-shirt and a Somali-style sarong, Sirat says the coast guard found no weapons. He insists he is innocent. "I'm not a pirate," he declares in English. "Fishing. I fishing." This is the mantra in the jails of Somaliland. People accused of piracy claim they are misunderstood fishermen. There's just one problem with that defense. When Sirat and his crew members were picked up in the Gulf of Aden, they had no nets, no fishing gear — just a global positioning system. Sirat struggles to explain. "We didn't bring the equipment," he says. "First, we had to look for the fish." From about a hundred miles away — that's how far Sirat lives from where he was picked up in the water. Fighting Piracy With No Anti-Piracy Law Sirat's story is laughable, but he's almost certain to walk, because it's hard to catch pirates in the act and the evidence against them is often painfully thin. "Some of those captured pirates, when they are on the boat and they see the coast guard, they throw their guns in the sea," says Guleid Ahmed Jama, a Somaliland prosecutor. Jama says there's another legal problem: Somaliland is working on an anti-piracy law but doesn't actually have one yet. "In reality, I don't see anyone who has been accused of piracy," Jama says. "They have been accused of illegal weapons ... accused of breaching immigration law ... accused of attempting to make a robbery." Somali piracy exploded several years ago. Criminals took advantage of the country's lawlessness and began attacking ships with a vengeance. Pirates now hold nearly 30 vessels and more than 600 hostages, according to RiskIntelligence, which monitors the problem. Staying Alert In A High-Stakes Game Osman Daud captains the Safina Al Ibrahimi, an Indian freighter docked at the Port of Berbera. Standing on the deck of the wooden dhow, Daud says sailing to Somaliland through the Gulf of Aden is perilous. "I have 20 people on the boat," Daud says. "Nobody sleeps when we enter these waters. We're on a 24-hour lookout for pirates." Daoud says he does everything he can to avoid them, including changing his route. He uses his radio to monitor reports of pirate attacks and to find out where foreign naval vessels are providing protection. Then, he plots his course accordingly. Daud says he has been held up at sea and robbed of radios and cellphones. "I've been boarded so many times, I can't remember," he says wearily. But his boat, which carries everything from food and SUVs to brooms and TVs, has never been held for ransom. Daud says that's because in the high-stakes game of Somali piracy — where multimillion-dollar ransoms are common — a small freighter like his just isn't worth it. **Boats** And **Prisons**¶ While naval warships try to protect the sea lanes, Somaliland's **coast** **guard** uses small patrol **boats** to **monitor** the **waters** closer to shore. The trouble is that there **aren't** nearly **enough** of them.¶ Somaliland is **desperately** **poor** and mostly made up of desert, scrub and camels. It has more than 500 miles of coastline, but only **eight** working coast guard **vessels**.¶ Asked what are the top three things his coast guard **needs**, Somaliland Adm. Ahmed Osman answers without hesitation: "**Boats**. **Boats**. **Boats**."¶ Perhaps. But even if Somaliland had enough boats to catch pirates, where would it put them all?¶ The **prisons** here are dreadful. The one in Berbera was built in 1884 during the Ottoman Empire and doesn't look like it has changed much since. Piles of garbage dot the prison yard. Prisoners reach out through rusted bars to complain about conditions, including a lack of food.

## **Non-recognition limits cooperation, resources and training.**

**Clapham 11** [Christopher; Professor of African Studies @ University of Cambridge, former editor of The Journal of Modern African Studies; 5-2011; The Brenthurst Foundation; " AFRICAN GAME CHANGER? The Consequences of Somaliland’s International (Non) Recognition," https://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/uploads/3d1c56a0-f8a3-4a8b-8b2f-a2cbe84e4bb6.pdf] tristan

**Non**-**recognition** means that **Somaliland** to a large extent stands **outside** the **mechanisms** **established** by the **international** **system** for regulating the flows of people, **money** and **goods** across national frontiers. Though the Somaliland government is **anxious** to **play** the **role** of a responsible state in this respect, and the international community is equally anxious for it to do so, it is unable to assume full membership of the relevant international treaties and organisations, while other global actors can make only very partial use of the facilities that it may provide. Time and again, awkward ad hoc expedients have to be devised in order to manage issues that could be straightforwardly regulated between states. Examples include: ¶ **Piracy**: The **Somaliland** **coast** **borders** the vital commercial waterway of the **Gulf** of **Aden**, currently **threatened** by **pirates** based largely in neighbouring Puntland; while some international aid has helped to strengthen the Somaliland coastguard, further **collaboration**, including the **use** of **Somaliland** **ports** by other navies, is **prevented** by **non**-**recognition**. People Trafficking: Again because of its strategic location, Somaliland provides a natural departure point for trafficking people into the Arabian Peninsula and further afield. ¶ Financial Crime: Because of its massive diaspora and very high dependence on remittances, Somaliland stands at the centre of financial flows that may readily be exploited for money laundering, narcotics, piracy and terrorism; despite the cooperation of the local authorities and private remittance businesses, this could more effectively be regulated by a recognised state. ¶ Other Crime: Somaliland is denied membership of Interpol, and normal mechanisms for tracing the movement of criminals and controlling cross-national crime do not apply. ¶ Terrorism: Somaliland provides a centre of relative calm at the core of one of the world’s most threatened regions; while we have no information on informal contacts that may exist, recognition would make it markedly easier to maintain collaboration to monitor and control terrorist activities. ¶ International Security: Non-recognition **prevents** **other** **states** and international organisations from **providing** necessary **assistance** to the **Somaliland** **army**, including **training** and appropriate **weaponry**, though some assistance has filtered through to the fledgling coastguard on the basis that this is a ‘policing’ operation. Recognition would also make it possible to exclude Somaliland from international sanctions rightly imposed on Somalia as a whole.

## **Efforts spill over regionally.**

**SM 19** [Saxafi Media; 8-29-2019; SaxafiMedia; "International Experts Say Somaliland’s Recognition Will Assist In Strengthening Accountability In Regions That Are Now Pirate Infected," https://saxafimedia.com/international-experts-say-somalilands-recognition-will-assist-in-strengthening-accountability-in-regions-that-are-now-pirate-infected/] tristan

A group consisting of twenty-five scholars, diplomats, lawyers, military officers, shipping industry officials, and other **experts** on maritime piracy and Somalia from nine nations who convened at the Harvard Kennedy School in December 2009 have **recommended** that one of the **ways** of exerting control over and **reducing** the **threat** from **pirates** is to **recognize** **Somaliland**.¶ “If African states and the **AU** can be persuaded to **recognize** the now independent but otherwise unacknowledged polity of **Somaliland**, doing so will **strengthen** the **incentives** for **Puntland**, which **aspires** to **greater** **autonomy**, and parts or all of the remainder of **Somalia** to make **similar** **progress** in terms of **political** **institution** **building**. Recognition of Somaliland will thus assist in **strengthening** **accountability** and **governance** in **regions** that are now **pirate** **infected**. Indeed, if Puntland knew that **international** **engagement** were **possible**, following on a full **recognition** of **Somaliland**, a **powerful** **incentive** would exist for Puntland to **exert** **control** over and **reduce** the **threat** from **pirates** on its soil,” the experts said

## **Decline causes great power war.**

**Brands 21** [Hal Brands, professor @ John Hopkins University and senior fellow @ the American Enterprise Institute, 5-14-2017, China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/] tristan

**Slowing** **growth** makes it **harder** for **leaders** to **keep** the **public** **happy**. **Economic** **underperformance** **weakens** the **country** against its **rivals**. **Fearing** **upheaval**, **leaders** **crack** **down** on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep **geopolitical** **enemies** at **bay**. **Expansion** seems like a **solution**—a way of **grabbing** economic **resources** and **markets**, making **nationalism** a **crutch** for a wounded regime, and **beating** **back** foreign **threats**.¶ **Many** **countries** have **followed** this **path**. When the **U**nited **S**tates’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, **Washington** violently **suppressed** **strikes** and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and **imperial expansion** during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial **Russia** fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government **cracked** **down** hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century.¶ A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances. Facing a severe, **post**-20**08** economic slowdown, Russian President Vladimir Putin **invaded** **two** neighboring **countries**, sought to create a new **Eurasian** economic **bloc**, staked Moscow’s claim to a resource-rich **Arctic**, and steered Russia **deeper** into **dictatorship**. Even democratic France engaged in **anxious** **aggrandizement** after the end of its postwar **economic** **expansion** in the 1970s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops to its former colonies and undertaking a **dozen** **military** **interventions** over the next two decades.¶ All of these cases were complicated, yet the **pattern** is **clear**. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the **fear** of **decline** serves up a **powerful** **motive** for **rasher**, more **urgent** **expansion**. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. In fact, some of history’s most **gruesome** **wars** have come when revisionist **powers** concluded their **path** to **glory** was about to be **blocked**.

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## **The draw-in causes extinction**

Hans **Binnendijk 16**, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, January 2016, “Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World,” //Michi Synn’s Partner

Today, **the most important external challenge faced by the United States is the reemergence of potential confrontation between great powers and with rogue states. The United States now faces a risk of conflict with several potential adversaries: Four are nation-states with nuclear weapons or nuclear ambitions (Russia, China,** North Korea, and Iran) and one is a diverse group of Salafi jihadists. Currently, the United States is engaged in military action against a wannabe state, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 Most of these potential adversaries also cooperate with at least one other hostile nation, compounding the challenge for the United States.

This is a fundamental change from the previous decade, when the focus of U.S. national security policy was on two stability operations in the greater Middle East, nonstate actors, and transnational threats. Those threats still exist, but a new set of challenges from nuclear states and nuclear aspirants is of greater concern.

There are dramatic differences among these potential adversaries in terms of their ability to threaten vital U.S. interests and the extent to which their goals overlap with Washington’s. As a result, the United States must design a set of flexible and differentiated policies to deal with each potential foe. The overall goal should be to reduce these threats and the prospect of close cooperation among adversaries to challenge U.S. interests. To do this, the United States needs to quickly defeat ISIS, deter North Korea, dissuade Russia, constrain Iran, and engage China.

These potential adversaries have created situations in which a large number of U.S. allies and partner nations are more vulnerable today than they were a decade ago. Many U.S. friends are in more danger than the United States is itself, and if the United States should be drawn into conflict with any of these adversaries (as it has already been drawn into conflict with ISIS), it will probably be to defend its partners more than itself. The principal risk to the United States is that **conflicts with any of these adversaries could escalate. Involvement by the three nuclear powers (Russia, China, or—to a lesser degree— North Korea) could pose existential risks.**

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# **1AC---Revitalization**

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## **The second is food aid**

**RW 24** [No Author, 9-12-2024, Somaliland: Nourishing vulnerable rural and displaced communities, Relief Web, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somaliland-nourishing-vulnerable-rural-and-displaced-communities] BZ

As a result of **climate-related shocks**, several districts in Somaliland continue to face high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, with women and children worst affected. According to recent IPC data, the food security situation in most of Somaliland can be characterised as ‘stressed’ or level 2, with pockets of level 3 – crisis situation - in Togdheer region. Like the acute food security situation, the acute malnutrition situation is **projected to continue to worsen** until June of this year, with a growing number of areas that are projected to experience Phase 3 – serious malnutrition. ¶ Children are particularly affected by malnutrition throughout the country. Over **1.7 million children** under the age of 5 need treatment. Among those, almost half a million are experiencing severe acute malnutrition and are at risk of acute wasting. Acute wasting is a condition where children experience rapid weight loss and malnutrition, often resulting in a dangerously low weight for their age and height. This condition can have severe consequences on their physical and cognitive development, leaving them vulnerable to illness and even death if not addressed promptly. While levels of wasting have improved in some parts of Somalia, they are **projected to deteriorate** from the current Alert to Serious phase among Burao IDPs, who are one of the target groups of this project. ¶ With the support of the French Embassy, Acted, in partnership with Candlelight and Barwaaqo Volunteer Organization BVO, is implementing a one-year project titled “Nourishing Communities: Restoring Resilience Through Enhanced Food and Nutrition Security for Vulnerable Rural and Displaced Crisis-Affected Communities in Somaliland” from October 2023 to September 2024. ¶ The project aims to increase resilience though improved food security and nutrition outcomes for vulnerable, displaced, and rural populations in crisis affected areas in Somalia. The beneficiaries amount to 5,120 households (30,720 individuals) dispersed throughout 18 IDP sites and rural communities in Burco District (Togdheer Region), and Caynaba and Laas Canood (Sool Region).

### **Lack of recognition hinders ability to receive timely aid.**

**Beaubien 17** [Jason Beaubien, staff writer @ NPR with a focus on global politics and current events, 5-29-2017, Somaliland Wants To Make One Thing Clear: It Is NOT Somalia, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/30/530703639/somaliland-wants-to-make-one-thing-clear-it-is-not-somalia] BZ

Somaliland is being hit by a regional food crisis that the U.N. has described as one of the **largest humanitarian emergencies since 1945**. More than a million of Somaliland's four million people are at risk of starvation yet relief has been slow to come.¶ "We are being treated unfairly," Shire says seated in a conference room of a consulting firm in downtown Washington, D.C. He's in town lobbying American lawmakers for what has become his perpetual cause — official recognition of Somaliland as a nation. "You know by **lumping Somalia and Somaliland together**, it is slowing down the delivery of assistance."¶ Somaliland declared its independence from the failed state of Somalia in 1991, but the world ... for the most part ... has ignored the declaration. The similar names are rooted in colonial history: Somaliland became known as British Somaliland in the 19th century, while the southern region was Italian Somaliland.¶ "We have a functioning democracy. We have our own army. We have our own police. We have our own coast guard. You know, we have our own border police. We have fulfilled all the conditions of a sovereign state," Shire says as he ticks through why Somaliland is its own nation. And there's more. Somaliland has its own currency. It regularly holds elections.¶ "The only thing that's missing is the sovereign recognition," he says.¶ Bronwyn Bruton, the director of programs and studies at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, says the international community has been uninterested in recognizing Somaliland as a new nation for several reasons.¶ Quite frankly, she says, the first is apathy. Somaliland doesn't have oil or other resources to make other players on the international stage care about it.¶ Second, she explains, is the belief that recognizing Somaliland would undermine international efforts to get a functioning government in Mogadishu, which Somaliland broke away from.¶ "The international community led by the United States and Britain has put a lot of time and effort into trying to build a government in Mogadishu," Bruton says. "And it's perceived that if Somaliland were to be granted its separation it would reflect poorly on that nascent government."¶ Finally the African Union doesn't want to encourage independence movements in other restive regions around the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says lack of recognition is impeding what has already been a slow international response to the food crisis in Somaliland. Aid from international agencies is being **coordinated and routed through war-ravaged Mogadishu** — the Somali capital **900 miles to the south**.¶ "It is affecting us in many ways," Shire says. "We are not present in the forums in which these [aid efforts] are discussed. We **cannot access bilateral aid**. We **cannot get loans**. **We cannot attract international investors**."¶ Because it's not officially a country **Somaliland isn't eligible for loans that the World Bank makes to poor nations**. It **can't get in on other assistance programs** that are traditionally delivered to governments.¶ Somaliland broke away from Somalia to keep from getting sucked down as Somalia disintegrated in to a failed state in the 1990's. It lacked any central government from 1991 to 2006. Pirates took to terrorizing ships in its waterway. Islamist militants set up shop. Somalia is still one of the world's most dangerous countries for international aid groups to work in.¶ And Somaliland continues to be tarnished by its former partner's woes.¶ When aid groups consider working in Somaliland, officials at their head offices in Europe or the U.S. often treat the project as if it's occurring in Mogadishu.¶ "For example a U.S. NGO will go to the State Department website," Shire says. "They look at the traveler advice [for Somalia] and they would be dissuaded by what they see on the screen. This really does not reflect what's on the ground in Somaliland."¶ Africa specialist Bruton says Shire's frustration is justified. Somaliland, she says, has created a relatively stable enclave in a turbulent part of the Horn of Africa.¶ "Somaliland gets a ton of good press for being stable and kind of a peaceful island in a sea of violence that is Somalia," Bruton says. "The reality is that unlike southern Somalia, where you have a lot of violence, Somaliland is essentially a single clan territory. And so what's happening is it's being run as a traditional clan democracy." This has its drawbacks if you aren't part of the dominant clan, she points out, but one of the upsides is stability.¶ "Somalilanders have made an excellent case that because they were a British rather than an Italian colony, they were never really part of Somalia and so they have a right to be separate," Bruton says. The two colonies merged after they each won their independence from the Europeans in 1960. But she says African nations worry that Somaliland secession from the rest of Somalia sets a dangerous precedent on the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says what's dangerous for Somalilanders right now is to stay in international limbo. The lack of recognition is impeding international relief, he emphasizes, and stymying development.¶ Bruton at the Atlantic Council says he definitely has a point: "Somaliland is effectively being held hostage to the chaos in southern Somalia, Which is grossly unfair."

**Thankfully, the AU already has strategies in place to help improve food security. AU 24** [No Author, “CAADP Strategy and Action Plan: 2026-2035,” 09/15/2024, African Union, https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44344-doc-3.\_EN\_CAADP\_Strategy\_and\_Action\_Plan\_-\_20 26-2035\_September\_15\_2024\_Final.pdf] // cady

Strategic Objective 3: Ensuring **Food and Nutrition Security** Despite **laudable progress** in improving food and nutrition security across the continent, **much remains to be done** for the large portion of the population facing **food insecurity**. Addressing this issue poses significant challengesfor policymakers and stakeholders in light of the increasingly **complex and interconnected** nature of **agriculture, food security**, nutrition, health, and food safety. The challenges are manifested through the lack of diversified nutrient-dense crops, the high cost of healthy diets, limited consumer food choices, and SPS-related obstacles. Food-borne illnesses, for example, affect about 130,000 people annually, resulting in high medical costs in addition to lost productivity (from work or school days missed). Yet, a healthy and productive workforce is essential for the continent’s socio-economic transformation. The **CAADP** Strategy and Action Plan **highlights the role of agri-food systems** in **eliminating hunger** and all forms of **malnutrition**. It advocates **adopting practices** to **improve** the **availability**, **affordability**, and consumption of healthy and safe dietsfor improved human health outcomes. It also emphasizes consumer education and the development of diet quality and nutrition-sensitive policies, strategies, and programs at the national, subregional, and regional levels. Strengthening SPS and One Health protocols is essential for safeguarding public health and ensuring that the food produced in Africa is safe and nutritious. The **interventions**, which are designed to **address significant challenges** within the agrifood system, focus on **enhancing the capabilities** of **smallholder farmers** and SMEs. These actors are **indispensable** for **food production**, yet they frequently find it difficult to meet essential SPS standards. The objective of the proposed interventions is to enhance the capacity of these actors to comply with the relevant standards, thereby improving food safety and quality while promoting sustainable agricultural practices. The private sector is

critically important throughout **the agri-food value chain**, from input supply to production, processing, and distribution. **Maximizing** the private sector’s **potential** is possible only when the public sector creates an enabling environment that **supports food security**. Ensuring the affordability and accessibility of nutrient-dense foods is a principal objective, particularly for the vulnerable populations disproportionately affected by food insecurity. The success of these interventions will depend on the active involvement of stakeholders, including government agencies, private companies, civil society organizations, and local communities, all of whom must work together to enhance food and nutrition security. In essence, these endeavors aspire to construct a more sustainable and equitable food environment by addressing obstacles at each phase of the agri-food system, thereby cultivating resilience and inclusivity. To achieve this objective, the following strategic interventions will be undertaken: Create **agri-food systems** that enhance human nutrition and health outcomes. Key actions include: Encourage the **diversification** of agricultural production, including by **increasing the production** and consumption of nutritious traditional and indigenous African crops Encourage the cultivation of diverse, nutrient-dense crops, including biofortified crop varieties, and strengthen the value chains for nutrient-dense foods Improve access to nutritious foods by supporting homestead gardening and smallscale livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture production, especially among marginalized populations and communities Establish and expand home-grown school feeding initiatives that prioritize locally sourced foods, enhancing nutritional quality while supporting local farmers and communities Strengthen nutrition policies and programs, with a focus on nutrition education and awareness-raising initiatives that help consumers make healthier dietary choices Enhance agricultural extension services and mainstream nutrition education Integrate nutrition-sensitive interventions in the agricultural sector Support programs that celebrate traditional foods and cultural cuisines, emphasizing Africa's rich food heritage, while strengthening value chains for nutrient-dense foods and integrating a nutrition-focused approach across all supported value chains Use the annual commemoration of Africa Day for Food and Nutrition Security to deepen Member State engagement and promote Africa’s rich food heritage Support programs that close the gender gap in food and nutrition security Increase access to fruits, vegetables, and animal-source foods through local markets

**New systems promoted by the AU are key in the long term.**

**Heermans 24** [John Heermans, Deputy Project Director for USAID funded Comprehensive Action for Climate Change Initiative, “The African Union’s Approach to Integrating Sustainable Food Systems in Climate Action,” 09/10/2024, AgriLinks,

https://agrilinks.org/post/african-unions-approach-integrating-sustainable-food-systems-climate-action] // cady

**Adapting** Africa’s food systems to climate change is **imperative** to **address food security** and ensure long term sustainability. By some estimates, Africa requires nearly US $50 billion annually to implement climate-smart agriculture practices. However, the continent only receives a fraction of the necessary funding, with significantly less of its global climate finance directed toward agriculture, forestry, and land use sectors. Addressing sustainable food systems in Africa is also hampered by poor infrastructure and technology deficits and weak policy coordination across sectors and vertically from national to local governments. Historically, the agricultural sector has been perceived as a zero-sum game, where reducing emissions and providing food to a growing population seemed incompatible. Recent **advances** in sustainable agriculture show that **climate-smart** and regenerative practices can increase food production, reduce emissions, and improve soil health. Climate-smart agricultural **practices** that are **adopted and integrated into policies** contribute to local **economic growth**, funding, and secure local livelihoods. African Union Strategies on Building Sustainable Food Systems in a Changing Climate The African Union Commission (AUC) collaborates with its Member States to **promote** climate-smart **agricultural practices**, develop **enabling policies** and **strengthen** national and local **capacity** to **enhance food security** and sustainable food systems. In 2022, the **African Union** (AU) launched the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032), serving as the overarching framework for **addressing climate change** and enhancing **sustainable food systems** in Africa. The Strategy focuses on areas such as combating land degradation, promoting ecosystem protection, and encouraging sustainable agricultural practices. Under Axis two, the Strategy emphasizes transformative, climate-resilient development, including biodiversity and soil organic carbon management, groundwater recharging and enhancing farmers’ access to financial resources, ultimately aiming to reduce emissions and boost agricultural productivity and resilience. The Strategy also highlights the importance of engaging local actors, such as smallholder farmers, women, and youth, as critical stakeholders in delivering sustainable food systems. Complementing these efforts, USAID’s Comprehensive Action for Climate Change Initiative (CACCI) is supporting implementation of the AU Climate Strategy. The AUC is collaborating closely with CACCI to develop a Monitoring, Reporting, and Learning Dashboard (MRLD) to track the strategy’s progress. Through the MRLD system, each African Member State will report on how country level actions to implement their NDCs and national climate ambitions contribute to the AU’s overall vision of a sustainable, prosperous and climate

resilient Africa. Additionally, CACCI provides technical capacity to the AUC Department of Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy (SEBE). Throughout its work, CACCI emphasizes expanding the participation and leadership of women, youth, and other marginalized groups in the climate processes. Underlying the AU’s climate objectives in climate smart agriculture and contributing to its Climate Strategy, the AU oversees the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), launched in 2003. CAADP encourages governments to allocate at least 10 percent of national budgets to agriculture and rural development and achieve agricultural growth rates of at least six percent per year. Through CAADP, countries are adopting evidence-based policies to **strengthen food systems** and security, and accountable to biennially report on progress agricultural budgeting, investment, and progress toward low-carbon, climate-resilient food systems. In 2014, CAADP was further elaborated through the AU Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods. The 10-year Malabo Declarations are flagship initiatives under the AU’s Agenda 2063, and closely aligned with the goals of the AU Climate Strategy. As we approach COP29,the AU’s commitment to building **sustainable** food systems remains a top priority. The AUC’s strategies, including the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and CAADP, are pivotal in **addressing climate impacts** and **enhancing agricultural resilience**. These initiatives align with Africa’s **broader goals** under **Agenda 2063**, aiming to **eradicate hunger**, boost **productivity**, and **foster economic growth**. Continued **collaboration**, **investment**, and **innovation** are **essential** to **achieving these goals** and **ensuring a sustainable future** for Africa’s **agriculture sector**. COP29 presents a crucial opportunity for Africa to advocate for increased climate finance and support for sustainable food systems, reinforcing the continent’s role in global climate action.

### **And tariff reductions under the AU increase food access to millions.**

**Rius 22** [Adria Rius, Postdoctoral Research Fellow @ the SOAS Department of Economics, “The AfCFTA

and the Berbera Corridor: opportunities for and potential impact on Somaliland’s economy,” 10-xx-2022,

ODI, <https://media.odi.org/documents/AfCFTA_and_Berbera_Corridor_Somaliland_PDF.pdf> // cady

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) aims to boost intra-African trade, industrialisation, and investment. Ultimately, the objective is for Africa to operate under a common market with the free movement of goods and services, capital, and labour. The AfCFTA negotiations have been structured into two main stages. Phase I regulates the provisions that cover trade in goods, trade in services, and the settlement of disputes. Phase II concerns investment, intellectual property rights (IPR), competition policy, and digital trade. Phase II negotiations are ongoing. The AfCFTA foundational agreement, with the first three protocols, was signed in March 2018 by 44 countries, and as of October 2021 it had been signed by a further 10 countries and ratified by a total of 38. Trade under AfCFTA officially started in January 2021 and is applicable to those countries which have deposited their instruments of ratification. Under Phase I, countries are expected to remove trade tariffs for 90% of product categories over a period of five years(10 years for least developed countries). Out of the remaining 10% product lines, 7% shall be considered as sensitive goods and should be liberalised over a period of 10 years (13 years for least developed countries). Finally, countries can exclude 3% of product categories from tariff reductions (AU, 2018a). In addition, trade liberalisation consists, indeed, not only of lowering/removing tariffs, which in many African countries are already low given their **participation in one or more regional trade agreements**, but also of fostering trade by removing non-tariff barriers (NTB)3 . Regulations related to NTB such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are incorporated in the Annex of the 2018 AfCFTA Agreement (AU, 2018b). Following the implementation of these measures, boosting trade is expected to promote inclusive growth through various mechanisms. First,spurring intra-African trade, which is more intensive in manufacturing than extra-African trade, is likely to promote industrial development through the emergence ofregional value chains. Second, it **can enhance food security by unleashing intra-African agricultural trade, currently underexploited due to high tariff rates, NTBs, and poor infrastructure.** Third, a more vibrant intra-regional trade is estimated to create millions of jobs annually. Fourth, it can address gender inequality provided trade is expected to expand in key female labour-intensive industries. Finally, it can increase the competitiveness of small-scale enterprises(UNECA, 2020). Indeed, WB (2020) estimates that under AfCFTA continental income could increase by 7% and intracontinental exports by over 81% by 2035. **In the case of Somaliland, the country’s capacity to benefit from the AfCFTA is critically determined by its unrecognised status.** In this respect, the options for Somaliland to formally enter into multi-lateral agreements seem, in principle, limited, and indicate that in the short term it shall not be eligible to formally join the AfCFTA. **AfCFTA membership explicitly requires state parties to be members of the African Union,** and so far the African Union has not vowed in favour of Somaliland’s recognition (ISS, 2020). A possible alternative would be accessing AfCFTA privileges through Somaliland’s official status as part of Somalia4 , but that is likely to not be practical given the lack of cooperation between the two governments. In this respect, there is no evidence that Somaliland currently benefits from preferential treatment by countries which Somalia has trade agreements with, such as in the case of COMESA members. Finally, shall Somaliland unilaterally abide by the AfCFTA protocols, it is unclear the extent to which African countries would apply reciprocal treatment to Somaliland without first formalising trade relations through bilateral agreements. In the event that Somaliland were able to join the AfCFTA, an often-cited challenge is the high dependence of the government revenue on customs duties. As has been outlined in Section 2, 41% of Somaliland’s budget comes from import tariffs. This is an anomalous situation in comparison to other African countries’ government budgets. For African countries, the average share of tariff revenue coming from imports is less than 10%. For neighbouring countries, the figure is 13.9% for Ethiopia, and 6.9% for Kenya (WB, 2018a; WB, 2021b). Thus, while this risk is not considered as particularly concerning in most estimates, which predict average revenue losses could be less than 1.5% for 49 out of 54 countries, the case of Somaliland might deserve special attention (UNCTAD, 2021; WB, 2018a; UNECA, 2020). Moreover, and in contrast to other countries, Somaliland would most probably not be able to effectively borrow funds from abroad to compensate for temporary revenue losses. There are three arguments that could help address these concerns. First, since Somaliland is not solely dependent on intra-African trade for its customs revenues, the impact of lowering tariffs with these countries could be cushioned by tariffs against imports from non-African countries. In this case, the percentage of customs revenue collected by customs other than Berbera, and therefore susceptible to be foregone by trade integration with other African countries was 32.8% during the first six months of 20205 (MoF, 2020a). Second, the bulk of Somaliland’s imports is concentrated in a few products, and the government could use the 7% and 3% buffers to protect revenue from taxes on these goods for a longer period of time while the country finds a suitable compensation mechanism. Third, an overall increase in both trade volumes and values could partly compensate for some of these losses, and/or the savings that would accrue to traders and households could revert back into the treasury through an increased tax base. Shall these concerns be overcome, implementing the AfCFTA protocols could bring important benefits to Somaliland’s economy. Given the high tariff rates currently applied by Somaliland’s customs authorities, liberalisation of trade in goods could contri**but**e to increase food security, facilitate access to basic goods such as pharmaceutical products, and reduce SMEs intermediate input costs. In this respect, while **Somaliland’s import tariffs imposed on basic food items** are low in relation to other product lines, in absolute terms these **are still considerable (approximately 10%), and there are important food items such as frozen chicken, fruits and vegetables, or shampoo, which face higher tariffs, of between 35% and 50%.**

#### **Otherwise, famine triggers wars which leads to extinction.**

Cribb 10 (Julian Cribb, principal of JCA, fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2010, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We Can Do to Avoid It, google books,)

The character of human conflict has also changed: since the early 1990S, more wars have been triggered by disputes over food, land, and water than over mere political or ethnic differences. This should not surprise US: people have fought over the means of survival for most of history. But in the abbreviated reports on the nightly media, and even in the rarefied realms of government policy, the focus is almost invariably on the players—the warring national, ethnic, or religious factions—rather than on the play, the deeper subplots building the tensions that ignite conflict. Caught up in these are groups of ordinary, desperate people fearful that there is no longer sufficient food, land, and water to feed their children—and believing that they must fight ‘the others” to secure them. At the same time, the number of refugees in the world doubled, many of them escaping from conflicts and famines precipitated by food and resource shortages. Governments in troubled regions tottered and fell. The coming famine is planetary because it involves both the immediate effects of hunger on directly affected populations in heavily populated regions of the world in the next forty years—and also the impacts of war, government failure, refugee crises, shortages, and food price spikes that will affect all human beings, no matter who they are or where they live. It is an emergency because unless it is solved, billions will experience great hardship, and not only in the poorer regions. Mike Murphy, one of the world’s most progressive dairy farmers, with operations in Ireland, New Zealand, and North and South America, succinctly summed it all up: “Global warming gets all the publicity but the real imminent threat to the human race is starvation on a massive scale. Taking a 10—30 year view, I believe that food shortages, famine and huge social unrest are probably the greatest threat the human race has ever faced. I believe future food shortages are a far bigger world threat than global warming.”2° The coming famine is also complex, because it is driven not by one or two, or even a half dozen, factors but rather by the confluence of many large and profoundly intractable causes that tend to amplify one another. This means that it cannot easily be remedied by “silver bullets” in the form of technology, subsidies, or single-country policy changes, because of the synergetic character of the things that power it.

### **Extinction First:**

Nick Bostrum. [Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School @ University of **Oxford**, Founding Director of the [Future of Humanity Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_of_Humanity_Institute) at the University of Oxford] xx-xx-20**13**. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” *Global Policy*, Vol 4, Issue 1 (2013): 15-31.<https://existential-risk.com/concept#:~:text=The%20scope%20of%20a%20risk,affecting%20humanity%20over%20all%2C%20or> //JYu

**Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates**, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives.** The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that **the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere *one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point* is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any "ordinary" good,** such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the *indirect* effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk — positive or negative — is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.10

# **2AC**

**Lot of analytics this round, this is all ev read:**

Kathryn **Tyson**. 01-09-20**25**. “Africa File, January 9, 2025: Islamic State Suicide Attack in Somalia; AUSSOM Dysfunction; M23 Captures District Capital in Eastern DRC.” Institute for the Study of War. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-9-2025-islamic-state-suicide-attack-somalia-aussom-dysfunction-m23> //JYu

**ISS carried out its most complex attack in Somalia yet on December 31.** The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) used a combination of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) and suicide vests (SVEST) **to target security force bases in the Bari region, Puntland, in northern Somalia on December 31.**[1] The bases are roughly 60 km south of ISS’s support zones in the Cal Miskaad mountains.[2] ISS detonated at least two SVBIEDs to breach the perimeter of the bases before SVEST-equipped fighters subsequently entered the outposts with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.[3] Puntland authorities said that security forces killed at least nine SVEST bombers during the attack, and Somali media reported that ISS killed 18 security forces.[4] **The attack is the first ISS suicide attack in Somalia since early 2023 and the first offensive attack of this scale and sophistication by ISS since the group besieged Puntland’s regional port capital Bosaso in 2017**.[5] The attack represents the first up-armored SVBIED attack in Puntland, according to SVBIED analyst Hugo Kaaman.[6] **ISS likely conducted the attack to disrupt the Puntland government’s ability to carry out a counter-ISS offensive.** The Puntland government has planned an offensive against ISS since at least October 2024 and said that the offensive would target ISS fighters and havens in the Cal Miskaad mountains and other areas in the Bari region.[7] Puntland’s president said on December 22 that Puntland Security Forces (PSF) finalized preparations for the offensive, and Puntland claimed to launch the offensive on December 26.[8] **The ISS attack targeted a military base where the PSF had mobilized for counter-ISS operations and showcased “thousands” of security personnel and “hundreds” of armed trucks for the offensive on December 26.[9]**

1. **[Delink] - AU mission is expiring and replacement forces aren’t decided.**

Kathryn **Tyson**. 01-09-20**25**. “Africa File, January 9, 2025: Islamic State Suicide Attack in Somalia; AUSSOM Dysfunction; M23 Captures District Capital in Eastern DRC.” Institute for the Study of War. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-january-9-2025-islamic-state-suicide-attack-somalia-aussom-dysfunction-m23> //JYu

**The new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia began on January 1, 2025, but the AU’s ongoing struggle to finalize the mission’s force composition could benefit al Shabaab.**[25] The AU Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) replaced the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on December 31, 2024.[26] The new AUSSOM mission prioritizes peace-building measures and combating al Shabaab while deferring state-building efforts to international partners and the Somali Federal Government (SFG).[27] The new mission’s security goals carry over directly from the ATMIS mandate and AUSSOM force size is similar to that of the former ATMIS mission at 11,911 personnel.[28] **The countries that will contribute troops to the mission continued to change in the days before—and even after—the start of AUSSOM, and the current force composition remains unclear. Burundi pulled out of the new AUSSOM mission** on December 23 due to a disagreement with the SFG over a discrepancy in allocated troop numbers.[29] Somalia allocated Burundi 1,000 soldiers to the mission, but Burundian officials said that it needed at least 2,000 soldiers to ensure adequate force protection.[30] The SFG accepted Burundi’s withdrawal on December 26.[31] **The SFG has not publicly specified what troops, if any, will replace the Burundian forces. Ethiopia agreed to contribute an unspecified number of troops to AUSSOM in early January 2025 but did not specify how many troops it would deploy.** Ethiopia and Somalia separately issued statements on January 2 and 3 that the two countries had agreed to collaborate on the AUSSOM mission and strengthen bilateral relations after a visit by a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Somalia.[32] Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s agreement on AUSSOM comes after Turkey mediated the Ankara Declaration in December 2024.[33] The agreement eased a yearlong dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over a naval port deal that Ethiopia signed with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024.[34] Somali officials said throughout 2024 that Ethiopia would not be included in AUSSOM, called for the expulsion of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and signed deals with Egypt in August 2024 for Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian troops in the AU mission and on a bilateral basis.[35]

**Boko Haram being defeated rn.**

**Seun Opejobi. 2-1-2025. “Nigerian Army will overcome Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits, Lakurawa – Shehu Sani.”Daily Post.** [**https://dailypost.ng/2025/02/01/nigerian-army-will-overcome-boko-haram-iswap-bandits-lakurawa-shehu-sani/**](https://dailypost.ng/2025/02/01/nigerian-army-will-overcome-boko-haram-iswap-bandits-lakurawa-shehu-sani/)

**Former Kaduna Central senator, Shehu Sani on Saturday expressed hope that the Nigerian Armed Forces will overcome bandits, ISWAP, Boko Haram and Lakurawa terrorist groups. Sani pointed out that no Army in Africa is as engaged and stretched like that of Nigeria. Posting on X, Sani wrote: “The Nigerian Armed Forces are fighting the ISWAP and Boko Haram in the North East and bandits and Lakurawa terrorist group in the North Western part of the country.**

**On Civil War**

**Brendon J. Cannon. 11-22-2024. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its 3 big goals.” The Conversation.** [**https://theconversation.com/somalilands-new-government-is-ready-to-drive-change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189**](https://theconversation.com/somalilands-new-government-is-ready-to-drive-change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189) **//JYu**

**Equitable governance The election was Somaliland’s fourth successful one-person, one-vote presidential election. Despite a shaky few years, the poll demonstrates a commitment to democracy, rule of law and peaceful power transitions. Waddani’s victory signifies a strong public endorsement for change – 64% of Somalilanders voted for the opposition party. This ended 14 years of rule under the Kulmiye party. In the lead-up to the election, Waddani said it would prioritise equitable governance. This would move away from what many Somalilanders saw as Kulmiye’s approach of centralising power and growth in the capital city. Kulmiye was also perceived as favouring the Isaaq majority clan, which outgoing president Bihi belonged to. In shifting the approach, Waddani hopes to ease clan-based tensions. These efforts, if successful, would foster the political integration of clans in Somaliland. They would also help direct economic and social support to regions far from the capital and the major trade corridor centred around the Berbera port. Independence quest Waddani will remain committed – like the majority of Somalilanders – to gaining international recognition as an independent state. Somaliland joined the Somali Republic in 1960 but departed in 1991.**

**On secessionism**

1. **[Delink] - Somaliland is not a secessionist movement in the same vein.**

**Abdi Daud. 07-02-2024. "Recognising Somaliland would be in Australia’s interest.” Strategist.** [**https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/recognising-somaliland-would-be-in-australias-interest/**](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/recognising-somaliland-would-be-in-australias-interest/)

**The main argument against a country recognising Somaliland is that doing so can supposedly set a precedent that encourages secessionist movements in Africa. But Somaliland’s story is unique, because it gained independence from Britain initially as a state. Its context aligns with the principle of state continuity, as with the Baltic republics, which regained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These nations were recognised based on their historical sovereignty and legal continuity, providing a precedent that supports Somaliland’s case. If Somaliland were a mere secessionist movement, Ethiopia, with great ethnic diversity, wouldn’t countenance its recognition. But it’s not concerned. Australia has been ahead of the United States, for example, in recognising new states when self-determination and democratic governance have been involved, such as Kosovo and East Timor. It is time to do the same with Somaliland.**