## 1NC---Instability

### Contention One is INSTABILITY.

#### Turkish mediation has lowered tensions and put counter-terror back on track.

**Karr 24** [Liam Karr, Africa team lead @ Critical Threats Project and a writer @ American Enterprise Institute with a bachelors from the University of Notre Dame, 12-12-2024, Kremlin Pivot to Libya or Sudan Post-Syria; Turkey Mediates Ethiopia-Somalia Deal, Institute for the Study for War, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-december-12-2024-kremlin-pivot-libya-or-sudan-post-syria-turkey-mediates] tristan \*\*brackets in original\*\*

**Somalia**: The SFG and **Ethiopia** **agreed** to **work** toward **granting** **Ethiopia** **access** to the **Red** **Sea** on December 11, after **Turkish**-mediated **talks**. This agreement will likely lead **Ethiopia** to **withdraw** from its controversial **naval** **port** **agreement** with **Somaliland** and **decrease** the **possibility** of a direct or proxy **conflict** between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia’s **withdrawal** from the **Somaliland** **agreement** would likely **lead** the Somali Federal Government (**SFG**) to **reverse** its **decision** to **expel** Ethiopian **troops** from **Somalia** and **exclude** **Ethiopian** **troops** from the new **African** **Union** **mission** in Somalia, which will begin in 2025. Ethiopia and Somalia’s **rapprochement** may quicken the **end** of an **ongoing** **dispute** between the SFG and the Jubbaland state government in southern Somalia by leading Ethiopia to cut alleged military support for Jubbaland and freeing the SFG’s military and political bandwidth to address the dispute. The SFG and Jubbaland may engage in further clashes in the following weeks, although the fighting will likely remain limited.¶ Assessments: Russia Russia has maintained the security of its Syrian bases in the short term but expressed long-term uncertainty about the future of these bases, the loss of which would undermine Russia’s ability to project power into the Mediterranean and support Russian military logistics in Africa. The Kremlin newswire Tass reported on December 8 that “Syrian opposition leaders guaranteed the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic institutions in Syria.”[1] An unspecified Syrian source told Tass on December 9 that Syrian opposition forces do not intend to capture the Russian bases and that both bases are functioning normally.[2] Figure 1. Reported Control of Terrain in Syria Source: Institute for the Study of War; Critical Threats Project. The Kremlin is working to negotiate a long-term solution for the bases with the Syrian transitional authorities. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that Russia was “nearing an agreement” with the transitional authorities and believed it already had an “informal” agreement to allow Russia to keep its air base in Hmeimim and naval base at Tartus.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 9 that the Kremlin will host “serious discussions” with the future Syrian authorities about its two Syrian bases at an unspecified future date.[4] Russian officials and affiliated media outlets quickly softened their characterization of Syrian rebels from “terrorists” to “opposition” to set conditions for dialogue as the Bashar al Assad regime’s imminent fall became obvious, on December 8.[5] The Kremlin has expressed uncertainty about the stability of any potential deals with the new Syrian transitional authorities, however. Peskov noted on December 9 that it is too early to discuss future plans for these bases since such a discussion involves “those who will lead Syria” and on December 10 that it is “difficult to predict” what will happen in Syria.[6] Russian state outlet RBC reported on December 9 that the Syrian National Coordination Committee’s foreign relations head Ahmed al Asrawi stated that Syria would continue to uphold agreements that are in Syria’s interest and “never” take a hostile position toward Russia or any other friendly country.[7] The loss of its bases in Syria would undermine Russia’s strategic ambition to project power into the Mediterranean. Tartus is Russia’s only formal overseas naval base, and Russia uses it to project power into the Mediterranean for various purposes. Russia built up its presence in Tartus before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to counter, deter, and monitor any NATO operations in the Mediterranean, particularly aircraft carriers, among other things.[8] The base also linked Russia’s Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean, although the closure of the Turkish Straits has severed this link for the duration of the Russian war in Ukraine.[9] The loss of Russia’s footprint in Syria would immediately interrupt Russia’s Africa Corps rotations and resupply efforts in Africa. Russia’s bases in Syria are hubs for shipments from Russia intended for Libya and eventually sub-Saharan Africa.[10] Syrian bases would presumably serve a similar purpose if Russia ever secured its long sought-after base in Sudan. Figure 2. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa Source: Liam Karr; Grey Dynamics; Jules Duhamel; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Russia is preparing to move some assets out of Syria, although Russia has not made any moves that signal that a complete withdrawal from Syria is imminent. The Russian Baltic Fleet’s Alexander Shabalin Project 775 large landing ship exited the Baltic Sea maritime zone on December 10, and the Institute for the Study of War assesses that this ship may relocate some Russian military assets from Tartus.[11] Satellite imagery taken on December 9 and 10 shows that all Russian ships and submarines have left the Port of Tartus.[12] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate reported on December 10 that Russian forces are still disassembling and removing troops, weapons, and equipment from Hmeimim Air Base in An-124 and Il-76 military transport aircraft and are “dismantling” equipment at Tartus under the supervision of Russian Spetsnaz.[13] The reported drawdown at Hmeimim Air Base follows earlier reports on December 6 that the Russian military redeployed some of its air defense assets previously positioned at the base.[14] Open-source analyst MT Anderson and ISW reported that four of Russia’s six ships previously stationed at Tartus are in a holding pattern roughly five miles west of the Port of Tartus.[15] ISW assesses that Russia’s posture in Syria suggests that the Kremlin is still waiting to decide on a path forward as events in Syria continue to unfold. ISW has assessed that the Kremlin is “very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.”[16] The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior fellow Dara Massicot assessed that a full Russian withdrawal from Syria would involve the Russian Mediterranean flotilla sailing around Europe to the Baltic Sea due to Turkey’s closure of the Turkish straits under the Montreux Convention and a massive Russian airlift with hundreds of cargo sorties from Hmeimim and Tartus.[17] Russia will likely turn to Libya to mitigate its reliance on or replace its Syrian bases for its military logistics and objectives to project power into the Mediterranean. Libya is crucially the only country with a Russian military presence in Africa that Russian cargo planes can directly reach from Russia without refueling.[18] Heavier cargo planes can reach Libya only by flying over Turkish airspace.[19] This range issue will increase the political leverage that Turkey will hold over Russia or the practical costs of supporting Russian operations in Africa if more cargo planes stop to refuel at other airfields. The Kremlin had already increased Libya’s role as an operational hub for its various Africa Corps deployments in sub-Saharan Africa throughout 2024. Russia sent at least 1,000 soldiers and 6,000 tons of equipment to Libya via Syria in March and April 2024.[20] Africa Corps then deployed some of these soldiers and equipment to sub-Saharan countries.[21] Russia refurbished several bases in Libya in 2024 to accommodate Russian cargo planes and expand the storage capacities of the bases.[22] Russia’s newly upgraded military facilities in Libya could handle some Russian logistics traffic that previously went through Syria. Wagner Group–linked sources told the French magazine Jeune Afrique on December 9 that Russia could expand its use of airports near Benghazi.[23] This report presumably refers to al Khadim Air Base, which is roughly 60 miles east of Benghazi. The Telegraph reported that Russia significantly renovated three other air bases in 2024—al Qardabiyah and al Jufra in central Libya and Brak al Shati in southwestern Libya.[24] These upgrades included renovations to the airstrips to expand runways and enable Il-76 cargo planes to land. All three bases are 200–400 miles farther away from Russia, however, which means that planes would have to carry less cargo to be in range for direct flights. These renovations are presumably part of the upgrades that the Kremlin promised to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar in 2023 in exchange for permanent Russian docking rights at Tobruk.[25] Haftar and the Kremlin have not announced any formal agreement, but a Russian naval base at Tobruk would help offset the negative logistics and strategic impact of Russia’s loss of Tartus. The Polish Institute of International Affairs assessed in May 2024 that Russia may already have begun to upgrade infrastructure at Tobruk for a future naval base.[26] The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2023 that Russian officials claimed that Tobruk was already able to support Russian refueling, resupply, and repair of their naval vessels.[27] Bloomberg reported in November 2023 that the port is currently insufficient for permanent basing use, however.[28] Figure 3. Africa Corps Network in Libya Source: Liam Karr. The Kremlin faces political obstacles that make Russia’s long-term position in Libya vulnerable, however. Russia’s precarious position in Libya is dependent on Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, since Russia lacks any formal historical agreement with Libya.[29] Libya’s frozen civil war currently prevents Russia from reaching a more solid agreement with a unified government. This fact essentially makes any Russian basing in Libya vulnerable to the same fate as its Syria bases if Haftar’s regime collapsed. Major players such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States may obstruct Russia in Libya. The UAE is Haftar’s main patron and would presumably need to at least tacitly allow Haftar to agree to a Russian naval base. The United States has increased outreach to Haftar in recent years and pressed him to reduce his ties with Russia.[30] US officials have specifically warned Haftar against accepting a Russian naval base as part of these discussions.[31] US activity incentivizes Haftar to hedge his partnership with Russia to avoid retaliation from the United States. Russia may increase the small but already growing role of Port Sudan in Russia’s logistic network and strategic power projection objectives. The Kremlin has increased support for Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2024 in exchange for promises to revive a stalled 2017 deal for a Red Sea naval base that would host up to 300 Russian service members and four ships.[32] The assistant SAF commander-in-chief claimed in late May 2024 that Sudan and Russia would soon sign a series of military and economic agreements to finalize the exchange.[33] Sudanese media reported in August that the sides are still finalizing aspects of the deal related to the conditions of the base and Russian provision of fighter jets, however.[34] Russia has long pursued a Red Sea port to protect its economic interests in the region and improve its military posture vis-à-vis the West in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.[35] Russian media have reported that a base in Sudan would serve primarily as a resupply and stopover hub to enable Tartus to transition from a resupply base to a multipurpose naval base, a goal Russia has previously outlined as a key element of its effort to bolster its Mediterranean power projection.[36] The loss of Tartus would eliminate this broader benefit and require that Port Sudan replace Tartus as a resupply base. The Royal United Services Institute assessed that a naval base in Sudan would also help position Russia as a bulwark against perceived maritime security threats in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and serve as a local logistics hub for its activity in Sudan.[37] Russia has likely already started to incorporate its limited capacity in Port Sudan into its logistics network. US-sanctioned and Wagner-linked Russian military cargo airline Avicaon Zitotrans has sent several Il-76TD cargo flights from Russia to Port Sudan since August.[38] Some of these flights then went on to Mali.[39] A Kremlin-linked milblogger included Port Sudan on a map of Africa Corps logistics across Africa.[40] The milblogger notably omitted an air route between Russia and Sudan, however. This omission suggests that Russian planes cannot or do not regularly travel directly between Russia and Port Sudan. The Kremlin faces political vulnerabilities in Sudan like those it faces in Libya, a fact that limits Russia’s ability to quickly scale up its activity in Sudan to replace Syria in the short term. Sudan is in the middle of a civil war and lacks a unified government that can promptly push ahead with negotiations or offer long-term guarantees. This conflict has already undermined Russia’s basing plans in previous years as various military and transitional governments constantly renegotiated the deal, while governmental change paused any implementation.[41] Russia’s original plans aimed to build on the preexisting naval infrastructure at Port Sudan, and it is unclear whether Port Sudan is currently capable of basing Russian naval vessels.[42] The United States and others are pressuring Sudanese leaders to reject any Russian naval base agreement. US officials warned Sudan’s military rulers against accepting a Russian naval base in 2022 before the outbreak of the civil war in 2023.[43] SAF officials have notably rejected Iranian overtures for a naval base to avoid alienating its historical allies—Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as well as Western countries.[44] Russia’s failure to reinforce the Assad regime damages the global perception of Russia as an effective partner, which could politically undermine the Kremlin’s partnerships with African autocrats and its economic, military, and political influence in Africa. Syria has served as the blueprint for the Russian “regime survival package.”[45] Russia offers military and population control support to keep autocrats in power and economic and political cover in the international system to shield them from international pressure as part of this “package.”[46] Russia expands its military footprint and increases its economic and political hold over target governments as a result. This influence translates into partner support for Russia’s broader aims to create a Russian-led multipolar world, bolsters Russia’s status as a superpower, and gives the Kremlin preferential economic access in partner countries.[47] Russia has offered this regime-protection package to several African allies. Such partners include the central Sahelian juntas that face an existential threat from local al Qaeda– and Islamic State–affiliated insurgencies. None of these juntas have commented on the collapse of the Assad regime. Figure 4. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation in the Sahel Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), could draw parallels or inspiration from Syria and increase pressure on the juntas and Russia. JNIM publicly congratulated its “brothers in Syria” twice in December.[48] Their most recent statement expresses hope that the people of “all Muslim countries” will experience the joy of the people of Syria and Sudan. This rhetoric frames Syria as an example or desired end-state for JNIM. JNIM attacked the Malian capital for the first time in nearly a decade in September.[49] The attackers notably targeted an air base that houses Africa Corps personnel during the attack. JNIM also attacked the suburbs of the Nigerien capital, Niamey, in October and is slowly encircling Burkina Faso’s capital.[50] A JNIM spokesperson gave a speech in November before the Syrian rebel offensive that warned that JNIM had entered the “second stage” of its jihad and would soon capture city centers.[51] CTP and others have assessed for over a year that JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province are capable of attacking and overrunning major population centers across the Sahel but have decided not to do so in favor of siege-like tactics.[52] The Sahelian regimes and other Russian partners could alternatively view the Assad regime’s collapse as an indictment of the Assad regime, not of Russia as a partner, and not seek to change their approach to the Kremlin. The juntas have all capitalized on popular anti-French and anti-colonial sentiment and promised to fix faltering Western-backed counterterrorism strategies. This political strategy has helped them capitalize on decades-long grievances and local fears of the Salafi-jihadi insurgency to bolster their popular support. The Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the Sahel also has an ethnic layer that differs from the Assad regime’s sectarian minority rule in Syria. The Sahelian insurgents are associated with minority ethnic groups at the geographic and political periphery of the Sahel states because the insurgent groups have historically exploited grievances among these ethnic communities to recruit militants. This trend adds a dimension of ethnically-based fear and loyalty to the junta’s base among the majority ethnic groups at the geographic and political core of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The relative popularity of the Sahelian regimes compared to the Assad regime, and to their respective military opponents, makes the Sahelian regimes less vulnerable to rapid collapse than the Assad regime was. Syrian rebels toppled the Assad regime in less than a week as regime forces melted away due to more than a decade of dysfunction that hollowed out the regime and the collapse of the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance forces that had bolstered it as a result of Hezbollah’s defeat.[53] The Sahelian juntas have had less time to damage their popularity, state apparatuses, and militaries, and they are not dependent on third-party ground forces for survival, as Assad was. These comparative advantages almost certainly mean that an insurgent offensive to topple the Sahelian juntas would be more costly and take longer. A more capable partner and longer timeline would give Russia more ability, incentive, and time to reinforce the juntas than the one week Russia had to bolster collapsing Assad regime forces. Somalia The SFG and Ethiopia agreed to work toward granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea on December 11, after Turkish-mediated talks. This agreement will likely lead Ethiopia to withdraw from its controversial naval port agreement with Somaliland and decrease the possibility of a direct or proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia and Somalia reached the deal after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara on December 11.[54] Erdoğan expressed optimism that the agreement would eventually ensure Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea.[55] Abiy and Mohamud said that both sides are ready to cooperate and implied that the discussions addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ethiopia’s naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region.[56] Ethiopia and Somalia have been in a political conflict since Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with in January 2024.[57] The agreement granted Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a naval base on the Red Sea in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[58] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as illegal—as it considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[59] Ethiopia has approximately 10,000 troops deployed in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[60] Figure 5. Somalia-Ethiopia Dispute: 2024 Timeline Source: Liam Karr. Turkey has sought to mediate the dispute at least in part because of its significant economic and defense ties to both Ethiopia and Somalia.[61] Turkey previously mediated two rounds of talks between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[62] Turkey has been a major defense partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed an economic and defense deal in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy and defend against “any external violations or threats” to Somalia’s coast in the interim in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore exclusive economic zone.[63] Turkey is the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[64] Turkey also sent Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tides against Ethiopian rebels between 2021 and 2022.[65] ¶ Ethiopia will likely pull out from the Somaliland deal as a result of its new agreement with the SFG. This revocation would decrease the risk of a proxy or direct conflict between Ethiopia and the SFG. The Turkish-mediated agreement does not directly address the Somaliland deal, but **Somalia** would presumably **not** **agree** to a **deal** that **includes** **recognizing** **Somaliland’s** **independence**, which Somalia has repeatedly rejected as a **violation** of its territorial **integrity**.[66] Somali officials said that Ethiopia **retracted** its **agreement** with **Somaliland** as part of the **talks**.[67] The December 11 agreement stipulated that in February 2025, Ethiopia and Somalia will hold “technical talks” for four months, respect Somalia’s territorial integrity, and recognize “potential benefits” of Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea.[68]¶ Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia and to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia, which will begin in 2025, a reversal that will decrease tensions and the risk of a clash between Ethiopia and the SFG. **Somali** **officials** said in **June** that the Somali **government** expects all **Ethiopian** **forces** to **withdraw** from Somalia by the end of 2024 if **Ethiopia** **follows** **through** on its port deal with Somaliland.[69] Ethiopia likely intended to keep soldiers in Somalia regardless of the SFG’s demands so that Ethiopia could counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent future cross-border incursions by al Shabaab or Egyptian forces that have deployed to Somalia in 2024.[70] Ethiopia remaining in Somalia past the SFG deadline would have provided a pretext for the SFG to attack Ethiopian forces on Somali territory.

### Scenario One is INVASION.

#### Recognition forces invasion.

**Hassan 24** [Abdillahi Hassan, Somali Journalist and Social Activist, 1-21-2024, Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia, https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/] leon + Aaron

Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity ¶ To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums. **However**, it is **crucial** to **understand** that **Somalia’s reaction** is rooted in its **perception** of **recent successes** to “**bring Somaliland** back to **the fold**”. What **infuriated Somalia** the **most** is in **not** the **prospect** of **Ethiopia getting** an **access** to the sea as **President Mohamud** himself **hinted** at **his openess** to that **possibility**. **Rather** it is the **sense** of **an opportunity** to **submit Somaliland** to its **will** slipping **away** from **their hands** with the **possibilities** that this **deal opens** for **Somaliland**. ¶ This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi’s administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu’s steps to capitalize on them. The president’s extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland’s army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the **Somalian government** abruptly **capitalized** on by **recognizing** the **administration** of **Las Anod** which claims **three regions** in **Somaliland** either **wholly** or **partially**. And finally, the **neglect** of **economic development** has finally **caught up** with the **country** and put **considerable strain** on its **strength**. ¶ In contrast to Muse’s setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year, securing debt relief, East Africa Community membership, and the lifting of a long-standing weapons import ban. ¶ These factors have emboldened Mogadishu’s administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland’s quest for independence on the negotiation table. ¶ **Bitter Confrontation** in **Djibouti** ¶ Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. Confronting Bihi on his “lack of legitimacy” and control over all of Somaliland’s territory, Somalia **further issued** a **clear threat** of **destabilization** in Somaliland’s **western regions** by exploiting **clan cleavages**. **Insult** was **added** to **injury** when **Mohamud** demanded that **president Bihi** represent only his **personal interests** and **those** of his immediate **kin group** as “**there** were **no thing** as **Somaliland** to **speak off**”. ¶ Later statements from Somalia’s Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi’s faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by “surrender to” Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. In fact, the **Somali side** was so **smug** about **their advantage** in **Djibouti** that **Minister Fiqi** announced that **it was** a “**historic milestone** for the **unification** of **the country**”. ¶ Indeed, the **over-reaction** from **Mogadishu** was **nothing more** than **frustration over** the **loss** of **perceived opportunity**. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. And **for that**, they are **willing** to **go** to **war**, not **against Ethiopia** as **Somalian officials** have **repeatedly stated**, but **against Somaliland**. **Somalia** is **too weak** to **maintain confrontation** with **Ethiopia** for **prolonged time**. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. There is **great difference** in the **resources** and **capacities** of the **two nations** at this **juncture**. Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, there is hardly **any country** that would **pick Somalia** over **Ethiopia**. ¶ Subterfuge and Subversion ¶ In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it’s Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia’s attack on multiple fronts. ¶ Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing “pro-union” politicians serving in Somalia’s parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland’s claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. ¶ However, **Somalia’s fury** over **Somaliland’s** self-**determination** as **manifested** in the **signing** of the **M**emorandum **o**f **U**nderstanding **does not** end **there**. What follows the **legalese arguments** is **concerted efforts** to **challenge** Somaliland’s **de facto** sovereignty **over** the **land**. This **takes** the **form** of **subversion**, **destabilization** and **attempts** to **break** the **consensus** of **Somaliland’s majority** on the **independence project**. ¶ The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu’s approach to the Somaliland question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the “members of Awdal community” to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. ¶ As **tensions escalate**, the long-deferred **confrontation** between **Somaliland** and **Somalia** over **self-determination** becomes inevitable, **risking** wider **regional involvement**. In this confrontation, **Somaliland suffers** from the **obvious disadvantage** of **being led** by a **divisive** and **quite incompetent** administration. However, as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland’s narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia.

#### It's perceived as an existential threat.

**SC 24** [No Author, 1-8-2024, Somali President's Desperation Escalates: Issues Threats to Ethiopia and Somaliland over MoU, Takes Off for Eritrea, Somaliland Chronicle, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2024/01/08/somali-presidents-desperation-escalates-issues-threats-to-ethiopia-and-somaliland-over-mou-takes-off-for-eritrea/] tristan

In a recent speech, President Hassan Sh Mohamoud of the Federal Republic of **Somalia** **asserted** that his **country** is **ready** to **defend** its **sovereignty** using **every** available **means**. This declaration directly corresponds to the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia. The agreement encompasses the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base in the Red Sea, as well as the recognition of Somaliland as Africa’s 55th state and the initiation of significant economic cooperation between the two nations. ¶ “Do not push us. Do not push us into knocking on doors we have not knocked on before. We will defend our state, cooperate with anyone to defend it.” ¶ Hassan Sh Mohamoud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. ¶ The Somali government has issued multiple statements objecting the MoU and accusing Ethiopia on infringing on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to the Somali President’s hawkish and hinting of use of force to stop the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, other government **officials** including the spokesman for Somalia’s Ministry of Defense have threatened to **wage** **war** on **Somaliland** and Ethiopia. ¶ The potential Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland has sparked outrage from the **Somali** President. **Framing** it as an “**existential** **threat**” and rushing laws to void the memorandum of understanding between the two neighboring countries requires a closer look. Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity since 1991, raising questions about the “true nature” of the **perceived** **threat** by the **Somali** **government** and its **allies**, including **Egypt** and **Djibouti**. The Somali government’s anxieties seem focused less on immediate territorial violation and more on the potential Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland. This **recognition** could effectively **erase** **Somalia’s** territorial **claim**, granting Somaliland the coveted 55th seat in the African Union, solidifying its independence and providing Ethiopia access to the strategic Red Sea.

#### Somalia has the capabilities.

**CS 20** [No Author, 9-24-2020, With an eye on Taiwan, China arms Somalia against Somaliland, Somaliland Current, https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/with-an-eye-on-taiwan-china-arms-somalia-against-somaliland/] leon

According to reports dated September 19, **almost** a **week** after **Somaliland** opened its **representative office** in **Taiwan**, China **delivered** ‘**large-scale**’ **military aid** to **Somalia**. The **gesture** came with a **message** impelling **Somalia** to **retaliate** against **Somaliland**, which **refused** to **kneel** to **China’s command** and **established** commercial **ties** with **Taiwan**. ¶ As per a Somali-language news report, the **addition** of **Chinese muscle** to **Somalia** has rung major **warning bells** for **Somaliland**, with its **diplomats** fearing **possible conflicts** between the **two nations** on the **behest** of **imperialist China**.

### Scenario Two is TERROR.

#### Africa on the brink of instability.

**Odera '24** [Christine Odera, Kenyan Peace & Security expert and Co-Chair of the Kenya Coalition on Youth Peace, 3-4-2024, Newsweek, America's Failed 'War on Terror' Has Left **Africa** on the **Brink** of **Chaos**, https://www.newsweek.com/americas-failed-war-terror-has-left-africa-brink-chaos-opinion-1875142] squasha recut tristan

One of the most horrific results of America's failed and utterly nebulous "War of Terror" is an Africa left **teetering** on the **brink** of **chaos**. ¶ The continent has become a **grim** **theatre** of ever-**escalating** **terrorism**, **violence**, **anti**-**poverty** **protests**, and **disillusionment**. A recent report from a Pentagon research institution shows **deaths** from **terror** **attacks** in Africa **surged** an astonishing **100,000 percent** since the beginning of the U.S.' global anti-terrorism campaign. That surge includes a 20 percent increase in Islamist violence in the past year. ¶ These bleak metrics are a brutal reminder that Africa has become a "**global** **epicenter**" of **jihadism**, as local and international **terrorists** have **joined** **forces** in the face of America's scattershot attacks on the Middle East. ¶ And yet, 23 years after 9/11, America has no appetite to address the disaster left in the wake of the problem it created. ¶ The U.S. and the rest of the West's callous neglect of a continent riven by **division**, **extremism**, and **economic** and **climate** **meltdown** ignores the **disastrous** **consequences** it could have for the world.¶ Along with the jihadi terror cells of Daesh (also known as ISIS) and al-Qaeda, Russia and China have been planting more flags in the continent by erecting military bases and embedding mercenaries accused of some of the world's most horrific human rights abuses—particularly against African women. ¶ These superpowers are on a mission to extract Africa's vast resources—and use its youth to wage wars. Their growing stranglehold on the **terror**-**torn** **continent** could easily **slide** towards all-out **global** **conflict**. ¶ Only last month African leaders at the African Union Commission's summit urged world leaders to take action in the continent before it's too late. But America's idea of helping fix its "forever war" is—predictably—military-based. ¶ Last month also saw a U.S.-led operation codenamed "Justified Accord" launch in Kenya, bringing together 1,000 military personnel from 23 nations to "increase partner readiness for peacekeeping missions, crisis response and humanitarian assistance."

#### Thankfully, Al-Shabaab is on the decline.

**Kiage 11/11** [Nyaboga Kiage, Kenyan-based Reporter, 11-11-2024, Al Shabaab activities in North Eastern on decline – Report, Nairobi News, https://nairobinews.nation.africa/al-shabaab-activities-in-north-eastern-on-decline-report/] leon + tristan

There has been a **decline** in the **activities** of members of the terrorist group **Al** **Shabaab**. ¶ The decline has been seen in the vast northeastern region, where members of the militant group used to carry out a series of attacks on non-locals and the police. ¶ Horizon Analysts and Researchers Network (HARN), an organization that conducts research in the northeastern region, has **linked** the **decline** in such **attacks** to **cooperation** between **security** **forces** and local communities. ¶ The North Eastern region consists of Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties. ¶ “From September last year to August 2024, there has been a **significant** **improvement** in the **deterrence**, **interception**, and **disruption** of potential terrorist **attacks** as part of the fight against extremism and insurgency activities along the areas bordering Somalia compared to the same period last year,” the organization said in a statement. ¶ HARN said there had been a **60** **percent** **reduction** in **attacks** in the four countries. This, the organization said, had been made possible by a newfound camaraderie between locals and security agencies. ¶ It also said that **propaganda** **material**, which is also shared to recruit young people into the militia group, has also **decreased** on both online and offline platforms. ¶ Even in Somalia, HARN said there had been a serious operation carried out by officers attached to the Somali National Army (SNA) targeting terrorists and terror-related activities. ¶ According to the organization, the security services have been receiving timely information that is helping to counter the activities of the extremist group. These activities include disrupting planned attacks, countering insurgent propaganda, and **pre**-**empting** their new **recruitment** **tactics**.

#### Recognition causes troop withdrawal and empowers Al-Shabaab.

**Phillips 24** [Michael M. Phillips, 10-13-2024, A Port Deal Unsettles U.S. Counterterror Fight in the Horn of Africa, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/a-port-deal-unsettles-u-s-counterterror-fight-in-the-horn-of-africa-dbf69b0c, Willie T. + BZ + tristan]

NAIROBI—A **surprise** **deal** that could allow Ethiopia to base warships in a breakaway region of Somalia is **stoking** **tensions** throughout a corner of **Africa** already ablaze with militant violence.¶ Under the agreement, **Somaliland**, a self-declared state within Somalia’s recognized borders, would **grant** landlocked **Ethiopia** **rights** to naval and commercial port **facilities** on the Red Sea. In exchange, Ethiopia would become the first country in the world to **recognize** **Somaliland** as an independent state.¶ The accord, announced at the beginning of the year, has set the region on **edge**, with bellicose **rhetoric** now **heating** **up** between Somalia and Ethiopia, and international players from Cairo to Washington getting involved.¶ Somali **authorities** are **opposed** to **Somaliland’s** **independence**. In response to the port deal, they are **threatening** to **expel** Ethiopian **troops** who have been helping them **fight** **al**-**Shabaab**, the local al Qaeda affiliate.¶ “As a landlocked nation, Ethiopia has no right or claim to Somali territory for the establishment of a naval military base,” Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi told the United Nations Security Council this month.¶ Egypt—furious over a giant dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile—has joined Somalia’s camp and last month delivered a shipload of artillery and antitank weapons to Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.¶ The U.S., which has 450 commandos and other defense personnel stationed in Somalia to advise local troops fighting al-Shabaab and Islamic State, worries the **contretemps** is **distracting** **Mogadishu** from the **18-year** counterinsurgency **war**.¶ A year ago, **Somalia’s** **campaign** against **al-Shabaab** seemed to be a rare case where the U.S. and its **allies** had the **upper** **hand** in the global competition with militant Islamists.¶ But American officials and their Western allies worry Mogadishu is so preoccupied with its **quarrel** with **Ethiopia** that it has **allowed** **al-Shabaab** to **regain** **territory** and **momentum** it had lost.¶ “Somalia did appear to be on a rebound and more positive trajectory,” said a senior Western official. “Since then the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement has just given a **renewed** **opportunity** for al-Shabaab to create **mischief**, **violence** and **destruction**.”¶ In August, militants launched a suicide attack on Mogadishu’s Lido Beach, killing 37 civilians and injuring more than 210, according to the U.N.¶ Al-Shabaab is using the **prospect** of **Ethiopia** taking **control** of **Somali** **territory** to **recruit** nationalistic **Somali** **youth**, according to Somali and Western officials.¶ A small force of Islamic State fighters in Somalia’s northeast is also gaining ground, according to a report last month by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.¶ Western officials believe Yemen-based Houthi militants, who have been launching missiles at shipping in the Red Sea in a purported show of support for Palestinians in Gaza, have made contact with al-Shabaab. The officials fear it is a prelude to providing Somali militants with advanced weapons, such as armed drones, that might enable al-Shabaab to mount deadlier attacks on U.S. and allied positions in Somalia.¶ Today’s tensions trace their roots to two decades-old independence movements, one in Ethiopia and one in Somalia.¶ In 1991, Eritrea split off from Ethiopia after a three-decade war, taking Ethiopia’s only seacoast with it. Ethiopia has “been poking around the region for some time for access to the sea,” said Michael Woldemariam, associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.¶ Like Eritrea, Somalia was colonized by Italy. Somaliland, in the country’s northwest, was a British protectorate and secured independence in 1960, five days before Somalia formally broke free of Italian rule. Somalia and Somaliland united soon afterward, only to fall out when Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre oversaw the slaughter of tens of thousands of Somalilanders in the late 1980s.¶ Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, but has failed to win international recognition. The port deal with Ethiopia offers Somaliland its first crack at being accepted on the **world** **stage**.¶ Neither side has released the text of the memorandum of understanding. But it appears likely that Somaliland is offering Ethiopia use of the port at Berbera.¶ Somaliland authorities had previously offered use of the port and adjacent runway to the U.S. military, in exchange for an upgrade of relations with Washington. While top American officials have visited the site, the U.S. has been reluctant to provoke Mogadishu by accepting Somaliland’s offer.¶ The **dispute** over the Somaliland-Ethiopia pact has **delayed** **replacement** of a 20,000-strong **African** **Union** military **force** that has been **fighting** **alongside** the **Somali** **military** against al-Shabaab.¶ The AU is supposed to replace the existing force, which is scheduled to withdraw from Somalia by year’s end, with a new, 12,000-strong international unit. ¶ The outgoing AU force includes thousands of Ethiopian troops deployed when Ethiopia and Somalia were on better terms. Western officials say the Ethiopians are critical to **fending** **off** **al**-**Shabaab** in certain areas of the country.

#### Failure to beat Al-Shabaab causes mass instability

**Al-Aqidi** **24** [Dalia Al-Aqidi, 12-17-2024, Defeating Al-Shabab should be a global priority, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2229356] tristan + BZ

Al-Shabab **militants** have **escalated** their terrorist **activities** in response to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s pledge to fight and defeat the radical movement and cut off its financial sources. When Mohamud was elected in 2022, he declared an “all-out war” on the radical group by adopting a new security strategy with regional and international support.¶ The recent escalation reminds the international community that the **war** on **terrorism** is **far** from **over** and sparks renewed concerns about an **expansion** of the movement’s **activity** in the **Horn** of **Africa**.¶ From a mosque in the country’s capital, Mogadishu, the determined president called on young Somalis, who, as he said, were brainwashed by the radicals, to surrender to the security forces. He pleaded with the militants to denounce the terrorist ideology before it is too late.¶ Al-Shabab has always aimed to **extend** its **operations** **beyond** the borders of **Somalia** to **destabilize** the **whole** **region**. It has carried out **terrorist** **attacks** in **Uganda**, **Kenya** and **Ethiopia**. In 2020, Al-Shabab killed three Americans at a Kenyan military base used by US forces.¶Following the defeat of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and the failure of its ideological mission, it is **natural** for **Al**-**Qaeda** and its **affiliate** terrorist **organizations** to think about a **geographical** **area** that would be **easier** to **terrorize** and control.¶ The world is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, inflation, energy sources and several other challenges, but the UN Security Council remains concerned about the continued presence of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa.¶ But the **Somali** **government** **cannot** **confront** and defeat Al-Shabab **alone** — it needs a **global** **commitment** to continue supporting the war-torn country.

#### Conflict causes great power war.

**Elmi 24** [Afyare A. Elmi, professor @ City University of Mogadishu, 8-26-2024, The Coming War Nobody Is Talking About, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/26/opinion/ethiopia-somalia-conflict.html] leon + tristan

**War** would be **devastating**. Involving rival and well-armed nations, ethnic communities, religious groups and international backers, **conflict** would bring **bloodshed** and **disaster** to **both countries**. Somalia, slowly recovering from a devastating three-decade civil war, would scarcely be able to bear it. Ethiopia is already mired in multiple conflicts within its borders — in its Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions — and is facing conflict on its Eritrean and Sudanese borders. **Another front**, stretching **thousands** of **miles**, could **bring** the **country** to **collapse**.¶ The region, already racked by the war in Sudan, would become even more unstable. **Conflict** could draw in **Red Sea** states such as **Saudi Arabia**, **Egypt**, **Yemen**, **Sudan**, **Djibouti** and **Eritrea**, all of which **consider** the **body** of water **essential** for their **national security**. The **U**nited **S**tates, **China** and some **European nations** already have a **military presence** in the **Red Sea**; **countries** like **Turkey**, **Iran**, the **U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates and **Russia** have **lately entered** the **fray**. The region could **quickly become** a **dangerous battlefield** for **global** and **regional powers**.¶ For all its precariousness, **East Africa** is **vital** for **international commerce** and **security**. The Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea connect Asia to Europe and the Americas, while the Horn serves as Asia’s gateway to the whole African continent. By **disrupting** key **maritime routes**, **war** in the **area** would endanger **global trade**. Equally worrying, it would **also revive** Islamic **extremist groups** such as **Al-Shabaab**, which has **already claimed** to have **recruited thousands** of **young Somalis** to fight the **Ethiopians**. An **unstable** East Africa **poses** a **risk** to the **entire world**.

#### Extinction!

**Clare 23** [Stephen Clare, former research fellow @ the Forethought Foundation, 6-xx-2023, Great power war, 80,000 Hours, https://80000hours.org/problem-prof**i**lesgreat-power-co**n**flict/]

A modern great power war could see nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, and other destructive new technologies deployed on an unprecedented scale.¶ It would probably be the most destructive event in history, shattering our world. It could even threaten us with extinction.¶ We’ve come perilously close to just this kind of catastrophe before.¶ On October 27, 1962 — near the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis — an American U-2 reconnaissance plane set out on a routine mission to the Arctic to collect data on Soviet nuclear tests. But, while flying near the North Pole, with the stars obscured by the northern lights, the pilot made a navigation error and strayed into Soviet airspace.1¶ Soviet commanders sent fighter jets to intercept the American plane. The jets were picked up by American radar operators and nuclear-armed F-102 fighters took off to protect the U-2.¶ Fortunately, the reconnaissance pilot realised his error with enough time to correct course before the Soviet and American fighters met. But the intrusion enraged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was already on high alert amidst the crisis in Cuba.¶ “What is this, a provocation?” Khrushchev wrote to US President John F. Kennedy. “One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time when everything has been put into combat readiness.”¶ If the U-2’s path had strayed further west, or the Soviet fighters had been fast enough to intercept it, this incident could have played out quite differently. Both the United States and the USSR had thousands of nuclear missiles ready to fire. Instead of a nearly-forgotten anecdote, the U-2 incident could have been a trigger for war, like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.¶ Competition among the world’s most powerful countries shapes our world today. And whether it’s through future incidents like the lost U-2, or something else entirely, it’s plausible that it could escalate and lead to a major, devastating war.¶ Is there anything you can do to help avoid such a terrible outcome? It is, of course, difficult to imagine how any one individual can hope to influence such world-historical events. Even the most powerful world leaders often fail to predict the global consequences of their decisions.¶ But I think the likelihood and severity of great power war makes this among the most pressing problems of our time — and that some solutions could be impactful enough that working on them may be one of the highest-impact things to do with your career.¶ By taking action, I think we can create a future where the threat of great power war is a distant memory rather than an ever-present danger.¶ Summary¶ Economic growth and technological progress have bolstered the arsenals of the world’s most powerful countries. That means the next war between them could be far worse than World War II, the deadliest conflict humanity has yet experienced.¶ Could such a war actually occur? We can’t rule out the possibility. Technical **accidents or diplomatic misunderstandings** could spark a conflict that quickly **escalates**. Or international **tension could cause leaders to decide they’re better off fighting than negotiating**.¶ It seems hard to make progress on this problem. It’s also less neglected than some of the problems that we think are most pressing. There are certain issues, like making nuclear weapons or military artificial intelligence systems safer, which seem promising — although it may be more impactful to work on reducing risks from AI, bioweapons or nuclear weapons directly. You might also be able to reduce the chances of misunderstandings and miscalculations by developing expertise in one of the most important bilateral relationships (such as that between the United States and China).¶ Finally, by making conflict less likely, reducing competitive pressures on the development of dangerous technology, and improving international cooperation, you might be helping to reduce other risks, like the chance of future pandemics.¶ Our overall view¶ Recommended¶ Working on this issue seems to be among the best ways of improving the long-term future we know of, but all else equal, we think it’s less pressing than our highest priority areas (primarily because it seems less neglected and harder to solve).¶ Scale ¶ There’s a significant chance that a new great power war occurs this century.¶ Although the world’s most powerful countries haven’t fought directly since World War II, war has been a constant throughout human history. There have been numerous close calls, and several issues could cause diplomatic disputes in the years to come.¶ These considerations, along with forecasts and statistical models, lead me to think there’s about a one-in-three chance that a new great power war breaks out in roughly the next 30 years.¶ Few wars cause more than a million casualties and the next great power war would probably be smaller than that. However, there’s some chance it could escalate massively. Today the great powers have much larger economies, more powerful weapons, and bigger military budgets than they did in the past. An all-out war could kill far more people than even World War II, the worst war we’ve yet experienced.¶ Could it become an existentially threatening war — one that could cause human extinction or significantly damage the prospects of the long-term future? It’s very difficult to say. But my best current guess is that the chance of an existential catastrophe due to war in the next century is somewhere between 0.05% and 2%.¶ Neglectedness ¶ War is a lot less neglected than some of our other top problems. There are thousands of people in governments, think tanks, and universities already working on this problem. But some solutions or approaches remain neglected. One particularly promising approach is to develop expertise at the intersection of international conflict and another of our top problems. Experts who understand both geopolitical dynamics and risks from advanced artificial intelligence, for example, are sorely needed.¶ Solvability ¶ Reducing the risk of great power war seems very difficult. But there are specific technical problems that can be solved to make weapons systems safer or less likely to trigger catastrophic outcomes. And in the best case, working on this problem can have a leverage effect, making the development of several dangerous technologies safer by improving international cooperation and making them less likely to be deployed in war.¶ At the end of this profile, I suggest five issues which I’d be particularly excited to see people work on. These are:¶ Developing expertise in the riskiest bilateral relationships¶ Learning how to manage international crises quickly and effectively and ensuring the systems to do so are properly maintained¶ Doing research to improve particularly important foreign policies, like strategies for sanctions and deterrence¶ Improving how nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are governed at the international level¶ Improving how such weapons are controlled at the national level¶ ¶ Why might preventing great power war be an especially pressing problem?¶ A modern great power war — an all-out conflict between the world’s most powerful countries — could be the worst thing to ever happen to humanity.¶ Historically, such wars have been exceptionally destructive. Sixty-six million people died in World War II, likely the deadliest catastrophe humanity has experienced so far.¶ Since World War II, the global population and world economy have continued to grow, nuclear weapons have proliferated, and military technology has continued to advance. This means the next world war could be even worse, just as World War II was much deadlier than World War I.¶ It’s not guaranteed that such a war will break out. And if it does, it may not escalate to such a terrible extent. But the chance can’t be ignored. In fact, there are reasons to think that the odds of World War III breaking out this century are worryingly high.¶ A modern great power war would be devastating for people alive today. But its effects could also persist long into the future. That’s because there is a substantial chance that this century proves to be particularly important. Technologies with the potential to cause a global catastrophe or radically reshape society are likely to be invented. How we choose to develop and deploy them could impact huge numbers of our descendants. And these choices would be affected by the outcomes of a major war.¶ To be more specific, there are three main ways great power conflict could affect the long-term future:¶ High international tension could increase other risks. Great power tensions could make the world more dangerous even if they don’t lead to war. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the USSR never came into direct conflict but invested in bioweapons research and built up nuclear arsenals. This dynamic could return, with tension between great powers fueling races to develop and build new weapons, raising the risk of a disaster even before shots are fired.¶ War could cause an existential catastrophe. If war does break out, it could escalate dramatically, with modern weapons (nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, or other future technologies) deployed at unprecedented scale. The resulting destruction could irreparably damage humanity’s prospects.¶ War could reshape international institutions and power balances. While such a catastrophic war is possible, it seems extremely unlikely. But even a less deadly war, such as another conflict on the scale of World War II, could have very long-lasting effects. For example, it could reshape international institutions and the global balance of power. In a pivotal century, different institutional arrangements and geopolitical balances could cause humanity to follow different long-term trajectories.¶ The rest of this profile explores exactly how pressing a problem great power conflict is. In summary:¶ Great power relations have become more tense. (More.)¶ Partly as a result, a war is more likely than you might think. It’s reasonable to put the probability of such a conflict in the coming decades somewhere between 10% and 50%. (More.)¶ If war breaks out, it would probably be hard to control escalation. The chance that it would become large enough to be an existential risk cannot be dismissed. (More.)¶ This makes great power war one of the biggest threats our species currently faces. (More.)¶ It seems hard to make progress on solving such a difficult problem (more) — but there are many things you can try if you want to help (more).¶ International tension has risen and makes other problems worse¶ Imagine we had a thermometer-like device which, instead of measuring temperature, measured the level of international tension.2 This ‘tension metre’ would max out during periods of all-out global war, like World War II. And it would be relatively low when the great powers3 were peaceful and cooperative. For much of the post-Napoleonic 1800s, for example, the powerful European nations instituted the Concert of Europe and mostly upheld a continental peace. The years following the fall of the USSR also seem like a time of relative calm, when the tension metre would have been quite low.4¶ How much more worried would you be about the coming decades if you knew the tension metre would be very high than if you knew it would be low? Probably quite a lot. In the worst case, of course, the great powers could come into direct conflict. But even if it doesn’t lead to war, a high level of tension between great powers could accelerate the development of new strategic technologies, make it harder to solve global problems like climate change, and undermine international institutions.¶ During the Cold War, for instance, the United States and USSR avoided coming into direct conflict. But the tension metre would still have been pretty high. This led to some dangerous events:¶ A nuclear arms race. The number of nuclear warheads in the world grew from just 300 in 1950 to over 64,000 in 1986.¶ The development of new bioweapons. Despite signing the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the search for military advantages motivated Soviet decision makers to continue investing in bioweapon development for decades. Although never used in combat, biological agents were accidentally released from research facilities, resulting in dozens of deaths and threatening to cause a pandemic.5¶ Nuclear close calls. Military accidents and false alarms happened regularly, and top decision makers were more likely to interpret these events hostilely when tensions were high. On several occasions it seems the decision about whether or not to start a nuclear war came down to individuals acting under stress and with limited time.¶ This makes international tension an existential risk factor. It’s connected to a number of other problems, which means reducing the level of international tension would lower the total amount of existential risk we face.¶ The level of tension today¶ Recently, international tension seems to have once again been rising. To highlight some of the most salient examples:¶ China-United States relations have deteriorated, leading to harsh diplomatic rhetoric and protectionist trade policies that aim to reduce the countries’ economic interdependence.¶ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has killed about a hundred thousand people so far, raised the risk of nuclear war, and sent United States-Russia relations to their lowest point since the Cold War.¶ Chinese and Indian soldiers fought deadly skirmishes along their countries’ disputed border in 2020–21.¶ These dynamics raise an important question: how much more dangerous is the world given this higher tension than it would be in a world of low tension?¶ I think the answer is quite a bit more dangerous — for several reasons. First, international tension seems likely to make technological progress more dangerous. There’s a good chance that, in the coming decades, humanity will make some major technological breakthroughs. We’ve discussed, for example, why one might worry about the effects of advanced artificial intelligence systems or biotechnology. The level of tension could strongly affect how these technologies are developed and governed. Tense relations could, for example, cause countries to neglect safety concerns in order to develop technology faster.6¶ Second, great power relations will strongly influence how nations do, or do not, cooperate to solve other global collective action problems. For example, in 2022, China withdrew from bilateral negotiations with the United States over climate action in protest of what it perceived as American diplomatic aggression in Taiwan. That same year, efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention were reportedly hampered by the Russian delegation after their country’s invasion of Ukraine raised tensions with the United States and other western countries.¶ And third, if relations deteriorate severely, the great powers could fight a war.¶ How likely is a war?¶ Wars are destructive and risky for all countries involved. Modern weapons, especially nuclear warheads, make starting a great power war today seem like a suicidal undertaking.¶ But factors like the prevalence of war throughout history, the chance that leaders make mistakes, conflicting ideologies, and commitment problems, make me think that conflict could break out anyway.¶ On balance, I think such an event is somewhat unlikely but hardly unthinkable. To quantify this: I put the chance we experience some kind of war between great powers before 2050 at about one-in-three.7¶ War has occurred regularly in the past¶ One reason to think a war is quite likely is that such conflicts have been so common in the past. Over the past 500 years, about two great power wars have occurred per century.8¶ Naively, this would mean that every year there’s a 2% chance such a war occurs, implying the chance of experiencing at least one great power war over the next 80 years — roughly until the end of the century — is about 80%.9¶ This is a very simple model. In reality, the risk is not constant over time and independent across years. But it shows that if past trends simply continue, the outcome is likely to be very bad.¶ Has great power war become less likely?¶ One of the most important criticisms of this model is that it assumes the risk is constant over time. Some researchers have argued instead that, especially since the end of World War II, major conflicts have become much less likely due to:¶ Nuclear deterrence: Nuclear weapons are so powerful and destructive that it’s just too costly for nuclear-armed countries to start wars against each other.10¶ Democratisation: Democracies have almost never gone to war against each other, perhaps because democracies are more interconnected and their leaders are under more public pressure to peacefully resolve disputes with each other.11 The proportion of countries that are democratic has increased from under 10% in 1945 to about 50% today.¶ Strong economic growth and global trade: Global economic growth accelerated following World War II and the value of global exports grew by a factor of almost 30 between 1950 and 2014. Since war disrupts economies and international trade, strong growth raises the costs of fighting.12¶ The spread of international institutions: Multilateral bodies like the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council promote diplomatic dialogue and facilitate coordination to punish transgressors.13¶ It is true that we are living through an unusually long period of great power peace. It’s been about 80 years since World War II. We just saw that a simple model using the historical frequency of great power wars suggests there was only a 20% chance of going that long without at least one more war breaking out. This is some evidence in favour of the idea that wars have become significantly less common.¶ ¶ At the same time, we shouldn’t feel too optimistic.¶ The numerous close calls during the Cold War suggest we were somewhat lucky to avoid a major war in that time. And a 20% chance of observing 80 years of peace is not that low.14 Structural changes might have dramatically reduced the likelihood of war. Or perhaps we’ve just been lucky. It could even be that technological advances have made war less likely to break out, but more deadly when it occurs, leaving the overall effect on the level of risk ambiguous. It just hasn’t been long enough to support a decisive view.15¶ So while the recent historical trend is somewhat encouraging, we don’t have nearly enough data to be confident that great power war is a thing of the past. To better predict the likelihood of future conflict, we should also consider distinctive features of our modern world.16¶ One might think that a modern great power war would simply be so destructive that no state leader would ever choose to start one. And some researchers do think that the destruction such a war would wreak globally makes it less likely to occur. But it would be hard to find anyone who claims this dynamic has driven the risk to zero.¶ First, a war could be started by accident.¶ Second, sometimes even prudent leaders may struggle to avoid a slide towards war.¶ We could blunder into war¶ An accidental war can occur if one side mistakes some event as an aggressive action by an adversary.¶ This happened several times during the Cold War. The earlier example of the wayward American reconnaissance plane shows how routine military exercises carry some escalation risk. Similarly, throughout history, nervous pilots and captains have caused serious incidents by attacking civilian planes and ships.17 Nuclear weapons allow for massive retaliatory strikes to be launched quickly — potentially too quickly to allow for such situations to be explained and de-escalated.¶ It is perhaps more likely, though, that an accidental war could be triggered by a technological malfunction. Faulty computers and satellites have previously triggered nuclear close calls. As monitoring systems have become more reliable, the rate at which such accidents have occurred has been going down. But it would be overconfident to think that technological malfunctions have become impossible.¶ Future technological changes will likely raise new challenges for nuclear weapon control. There may be pressure to integrate artificial intelligence systems into nuclear command and control to allow for faster data processing and decision making. And AI systems are known to behave unexpectedly when deployed in new environments.18¶ New technologies will also create new accident risks of their own, even if they’re not connected to nuclear weapon systems. Although these risks are hard to predict, they seem significant. I’ll say more about how such technologies — including AI, nuclear, biological, and autonomous weapons — are likely to increase war risks later.¶ Leaders could choose war¶ All that said, most wars have not started by accident. If another great power war does break out in the coming decades, it is more likely to be an intentional decision made by a national leader.¶ Explaining why someone might make such a costly, destructive, unpredictable, and risky decision has been called “the central puzzle about war.” It has motivated researchers to search for “rationalist” explanations for war. In his 2022 book Why We Fight, for example, economist Chris Blattman proposes five basic explanations: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions.19¶ This section discusses how great power tensions may escalate to war in the next few decades. It focuses on three potential conflicts in particular: war between the US and China, between the US and Russia, and between China and India. These are discussed because each of these countries are among the world’s largest economies and military spenders, and seem particularly likely to fight. At the end, I briefly touch on other potential large conflicts.¶ United States-China¶ The most worrying possibility is war between the United States and China. They are easily the world’s largest economies. They spend by far the most on their militaries. Their diplomatic relations are tense and have recently worsened. And their relationship has several of the characteristics that Blattman identifies as causes of war.¶ At the core of the United States-China relationship is a commitment problem.¶ China’s economy is growing faster than the United States’. By some metrics, it is already larger.20 If its differential growth continues, the gap will continue to widen between it and the United States. While economic power is not the sole determinant of military power, it is a key factor.21¶ The United States and China may be able to strike a fair deal today. But as China continues to grow faster, that deal may come to seem unbalanced. Historically, such commitment problems seem to have made these kinds of transition periods particularly dangerous.22¶ In practice, the United States and China may find it hard to agree on rules to guide their interactions, such as how to run international institutions or govern areas of the world where their interests overlap.¶ The most obvious issue which could tip the United States-China relationship from tension into war is a conflict over Taiwan. Taiwan’s location and technology industries are valuable for both great powers.¶ This issue is further complicated by intangible incentives.¶ For the United States, it is also a conflict over democratic ideals and the United States’ reputation for defending its allies.¶ For China, it is also a conflict about territorial integrity and addressing what are seen as past injustices.¶ Still, forecasts suggest that while a conflict is certainly possible, it is far from inevitable. As of 8 June 2023, one aggregated forecast23 gives a 17% chance of a United States-China war breaking out before 2035.24¶ A related aggregated forecast of the chance that at least 100 deaths occur in conflict between China and Taiwan by 2050 gives it, as of 8 June 2023, a much higher 68% chance of occurring.25¶ United States-Russia¶ Russia is the United States’ other major geopolitical rival.¶ Unlike China, Russia is not a rival in economic terms: even after adjusting for purchasing power, its economy is only about one-fifth the size of the United States’.¶ However, Russia devotes a substantial fraction of its economy to its military. Crucially, it has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. And Russian leadership has shown a willingness to project power beyond their country’s borders.¶ ¶ Top five countries by estimated military spending, 2021. Source: SIPRI¶ Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the dangers of renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States-led West. The war has already been hugely destructive: the largest war in Europe since World War II, with hundreds of thousands of casualties already and no end to the conflict in sight. And it could get much worse. Most notably, Russian officials have repeatedly refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons.¶ Unchecked interests and intangible incentives are again at play here. Vladimir Putin leads a highly-centralised government. He has spoken about how his desire to rebuild Russia’s reputation played in his decision to invade Ukraine.¶ Given their ideological differences and history of rivalry, it is reasonable to expect that the United States and Russia will continue to experience dangerous disagreements in the future. As of 8 June 2023, an aggregated forecast gives a 20% chance that the United States and Russia will fight a war involving at least 1,000 battle deaths before 2050.¶ China-India¶ India is already the world’s third-largest economy. If national growth rates remain roughly constant, the size of the Indian economy will surpass that of the United States’ sometime this century. India also has nuclear weapons and is already the world’s third-largest military spender (albeit at a much lower level than China or the United States).¶ One reason to worry that China and India could fight a war is that they already dispute territory along their border. Countries that share a border, especially when it is disputed, are more likely to go to war than countries that do not. By one count, 88% of the wars that occurred between 1816 and 1980 began as wars between neighbours.26¶ In fact, China and India already fought a brief but violent border war in 1962. Deadly skirmishes have continued since, resulting in deaths as recently as 2020.¶ Forecasters agree that a China-India conflict seems relatively (though not absolutely) likely. An aggregated forecast gives a 19% chance of war before 2035.¶ Other dangerous conflicts¶ These three conflicts — United States-China, United States-Russia, and China-India — are not the only possible great power wars that could occur. Other potential conflicts could also pose existential risk, either because they drive dangerous arms races or see widespread deployment of dangerous weapons.¶ We should keep in mind India-Pakistan as a particularly likely conflict between nuclear-armed states and China-Russia as a potential, though unlikely, conflict between great powers with a disputed border and history of war. Plus, new great powers may emerge or current great powers may fade in the years to come.¶ While I think we should prioritise the three potential conflicts I’ve highlighted above, the future is highly uncertain. We should monitor geopolitical changes and be open to changing our priorities in the future.¶ Overall predictions¶ Below is a table listing relevant predictions from the forecasting platform Metaculus, including the number of predictions made, as of 10 March 2023. Note the different timescales and resolution criteria for each question; they may not be intuitively comparable.¶ ¶ I have previously independently estimated the likelihood of seeing a World War III-like conflict this century. My calculation first adjusts historical base rates to allow for the possibility that major wars have become somewhat less likely, and uses the adjusted base rate to calculate the probability of seeing a war between now and 2100.¶ This method gives a 45% chance of seeing a major great power war in the next 77 years. If the probability is constant over time then the cumulative probability between now and 2050 would be 22%. This is aligned with the Metaculus predictions above.¶ We can also ask experts what they think. Unfortunately, there are surprisingly few expert predictions about the likelihood of major conflict. One survey was conducted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. The numbers were relatively aligned with the Metaculus forecasts, though slightly more pessimistic. However, it seems a mistake to put too much stock in this survey (see footnote).27¶ We now have at least a rough sense of a great power war’s probability. But how bad could it get if it occurred?¶ A new great power war could be devastating¶ At the time, the mechanised slaughter of World War I was a shocking step-change in the potential severity of warfare. But its severity was surpassed just 20 years later by the outbreak of World War II, which killed more than twice as many people.¶ A modern great power war could be even worse.¶ How bad have wars been in the past?¶ The graph below shows how common wars of various sizes are, according to the Correlates of War’s Interstate War dataset.28¶ The x-axis here represents war size in terms of the logarithm of the number of battle deaths. The y-axis represents the logarithm of the proportion of wars in the dataset that are at least that large.¶ Using logarithms means that each step to the right in the graph represents a war not one unit larger, but 10 times larger. And each step up represents a war that is not one unit more likely, but 10 times more likely.¶ What the graph shows is that wars have a heavy tail. Most wars remain relatively small. But a few escalate greatly and become much worse than average.¶ Of the 95 wars in the latest version of the database, the median battle death count is 8,000. But the heavy tail means the average is 334,000 battle deaths. And the worst war, World War II, had almost 17 million battle deaths.30¶ The number of battle deaths is only one way to measure the badness of wars. We could also consider the proportion of the population of the countries involved who were killed in battle. By this measure, the worst war since 1816 was not World War II. Instead, it’s the Paraguayan War of 1864–70. In that war, 30 soldiers died for every 1,000 citizens of the countries involved. It’s even worse if we also consider civilian deaths; while estimates are very uncertain, it’s plausible that about half of the men in Paraguay, or around a quarter of the entire population, was killed.31¶ What if instead we compared wars by the proportion of the global population killed? World War II is again the worst conflict since 1816 on this measure, having killed about 3% of the global population. Going further back in time, though, we can find worse wars. Ghengis Khan’s conquests likely killed about 9.5% of people in the world at the time.¶ The heavy tail means that some wars will be shockingly large.32 The scale of World War I and World War II took people by surprise, including the leaders who initiated it.¶ It’s also hard to know exactly how big wars could get. We haven’t seen many really large wars. So while we know there’s a heavy tail of potential outcomes, we don’t know what that tail looks like.¶ That said, there are a few reasons to think that wars much worse than World War II are possible:¶ We’re statistically unlikely to have brushed up against the end of the tail, even if the tail has an upper bound.¶ Other wars have been deadlier on a per-capita basis. So unless wars involving countries with larger populations are systematically less intense, we should expect to see more intense wars involving as many people as World War II.¶ Economic growth and technological progress are continually increasing humanity’s war-making capacity. This means that, once a war has started, we’re at greater risk of extremely bad outcomes than we were in the past.¶ So how bad could it get? How bad could a modern great power war be? Over time, two related factors have greatly increased humanity’s capacity to make war. 33 First, scientific progress has led to the invention of more powerful weapons and improved military efficiency. Second, economic growth has allowed states to build larger armies and arsenals. Since World War II, the world economy has grown by a factor of more than 10 in real terms; the number of nuclear weapons in the world has grown from basically none to more than 9,000, and we’ve invented drones, missiles, satellites, and advanced planes, ships, and submarines. Ghengis Khan’s conquests killed about 10% of the world, but this took place over the course of two decades. Today that proportion may be killed in a matter of hours. First, **nuclear weapons** could be used. Today there are around 10,000 nuclear warheads globally.34 At the peak of nuclear competition between the United States and the USSR, though, there were 64,000. If arms control agreements break down and competition resurges among two or even three great powers, nuclear arsenals could expand. In fact, China’s arsenal is very likely to grow — though by how much remains uncertain. Many of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the great powers today are at least 10 times more powerful than the atomic bombs used in World War II.35 Should these weapons be used, the consequences would be catastrophic. By any measure, such a war would be by far the most destructive, dangerous event in human history, with the potential to cause billions of deaths. The probability that it would, on its own, lead to humanity’s extinction or unrecoverable collapse, is contested. But there seems to be some possibility — whether through a **famine caused by nuclear winter**, or by **reducing humanity’s resilience** enough that something else, like a catastrophic pandemic, would be far more likely to reach extinction-levels (read more in our problem profile on nuclear war). Nuclear weapons are complemented and amplified by a variety of other modern military technologies, including improved missiles, planes, submarines, and satellites. They are also not the only military technology with the potential to cause a global catastrophe — bioweapons, too, have the potential to cause massive harm through accidents or unexpected effects. What’s more, humanity’s war-making capacity seems poised to further increase in the coming years due to technological advances and economic growth. Technological progress could make it cheaper and easier for more states to develop weapons of mass destruction. In some cases, political and economic barriers will remain significant. Nuclear weapons are very expensive to develop and there exists a strong international taboo against their proliferation. In other cases, though, the hurdles to developing extremely powerful weapons may prove lower. Improvements in biotechnology will probably make it cheaper to develop bioweapons. Such weapons may provide the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons at a much lower price. They also seem harder to monitor from abroad, making it more difficult to limit their proliferation. And they could spark a global biological catastrophe, like a major — possibly **existentially catastrophic — pandemic**. Artificial intelligence systems are also likely to become cheaper as well as more powerful. It is not hard to imagine important military implications of this technology. For example, AI systems could control large groups of lethal autonomous weapons (though the timeline on which such applications will be developed is unclear). They may increase the pace at which war is waged, enabling rapid escalation outside human control. And AI systems could speed up the development of other dangerous new technologies. Finally, we may have to deal with the invention of other weapons which we can’t currently predict. The feasibility and danger of nuclear weapons was unclear to many military strategists and scientists until they were first tested. We could similarly experience the invention of destabilising new weapons in our lifetime. What these technologies have in common is the potential to quickly kill huge numbers of people: A nuclear war could kill tens of millions within hours, and many more in the following days and months. A runaway bioweapon could prove very difficult to stop. Future autonomous systems could act with lightning speed, even taking humans out of the decision-making loop entirely. Faster wars leave less time for humans to intervene, negotiate, and find a resolution that limits the damage. How likely is war to damage the long-run future? When a war begins, leaders often promise a quick, limited conflict. But escalation proves hard to predict ahead of time (perhaps because people are scope-insensitive, or because escalation depends on idiosyncratic decisions). This raises the possibility of enormous wars that threaten all of humanity.

## 1NC---Civil War

### Contention Two is CIVIL WAR.

#### Tensions in Somaliland have de-escalated.

**Mahmood 12/11** [Omar Mahmood, senior analyst @ Crisis Group with a focus on Eastern Africa, 12-11-2024, Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains, Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains] BZ

What happened?¶ Somaliland held its long-awaited presidential election in mid-November, ending in victory for the opposition and a **swift concession by the incumbent**. The vote and its aftermath underlined Somaliland’s standing as a **consolidating democracy** with a reputation for **political stability** while the peaceful transfer of power marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa, where such handovers are a **rare occurrence**. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system.¶ Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognised it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote. ¶ In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 per cent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 per cent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017, when 64 per cent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east.¶ What are the main political divides in Somaliland?¶ Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation.¶ Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family. A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalisation by the Isaaq. In the east, members of the Darod clan family, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, have mostly **rejected inclusion in Somaliland**, favouring instead a **closer relationship with Mogadishu** or neighbouring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern Somalia with which they share close clan ties. These frictions were at the **heart** of the conflict that erupted between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below). ¶ The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Silanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favoured his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan.¶ Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organisations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics.¶ What were the challenges leading up to the polls?¶ The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. ¶ First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023.¶ Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. The desire for independence is **not shared by all** communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this. In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. ¶ The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than 150,000 civilians were displaced, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting **has not restarted** since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the **risk of the conflict reigniting remains**. ¶ Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.)¶ The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal. Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticised the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism. ¶ With Ethiopia facing concerted diplomatic pushback, the deal has as of yet had no meaningful effect in practice. But it remains a source of contention – particularly in the Horn of Africa – and the mere existence of the memorandum of understanding contributed to a tense pre-electoral environment. ¶ None of these controversies, however, managed to override the **smooth conduct of elections**, demonstrating Somaliland leaders’ commitment to the ballot box and sustaining the progress that the region has made toward developing democratic institutions. The National Electoral Commission and Supreme Court in particular showed leadership and independence during the electoral process. Bihi’s administration, meanwhile, successfully oversaw logistical challenges and refrained from manipulating the vote. ¶ What should be the incoming administration’s domestic priorities?¶ The conclusion of the elections is an opportunity for Somaliland to move on from an electoral process that concluded peacefully while also exposing the extent of its divisions. Somaliland’s new leadership faces a clutch of major challenges. Its domestic politics are increasingly fractious; the relationship with the Dhulbahante clan (and the frozen conflict in Sool) **remains tense**; and the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia continues to stir diplomatic bickering. Meanwhile, electoral democracy itself could face a new threat as the benefits of holding political power and the costs of losing it rise due to mounting foreign investment in Somaliland, giving top government officials far greater economic sway and access to financial resources. Important economic developments include the 2016 arrangement for the DP World logistics company, based in the United Arab Emirates, to manage and expand Somaliland’s main port of Berbera. This will allow Somaliland to profit from an important trade route linking states in the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea shipping lanes.¶ But for now, successful polls, and a smooth transfer of power, will go some way to **cooling domestic political tensions and redressing the reputational damage** Somaliland suffered as a result of the delayed polls and conflict in Sool. Incoming President Cirro – a long-time opposition leader who was speaker of Somaliland’s lower house from 2005 to 2017 – should take the opportunity to prioritise dialogue and de-escalation, moving on from the aggressive and antagonistic approaches that have prevailed over the last few years in Somaliland. ¶ To minimise post-election tensions, the incoming administration should demonstrate its commitment to governing on behalf **of all Somalilanders**, rather than just the communities that form its clan-based coalition. A first step would be to ensure that ministerial appointments in the new administration reflect a wide range of clans, not simply those that are most politically dominant, while also including more women’s voices to counter the marked gender bias in Somaliland’s political establishment. The new administration should also work to respect civil liberties and reverse recent efforts to curb these, a trend that has been manifested in the rising number of arrests of journalists and opposition politicians, including the detention of a member of parliament during the pre-electoral period.

#### Affirming sparks civil war --- clan dynamics ensure conflict.

**Batten 24** [Dr. Karl Von Batten, senior government advisor and founder of the Von Batten-Montague-York, L.C. policy advocacy group, 12-9-2024, Growing concern that the push for U.S. recognition of Somaliland will lead to civil war in Somaliland, https://foreignpolicynews.org/2022/05/13/growing-concern-that-the-push-for-u-s-recognition-of-somaliland-will-lead-to-civil-war-in-somaliland/] BZ

Unfortunately, history shows that well-intentioned U.S. foreign policies based on a simplistic understanding of internal dynamics in each country in Africa have resulted in more problems. The upheavals in Libya and South Sudan are recent examples of American and European good intentions turning into disasters. We Americans tend to look at things through the lens of good guys versus bad guys and freedom versus perceived oppression, enacting policies or government actions based on these conceptual viewpoints. In this way, the self-declared state of Somaliland appears to be the latest potential victim of U.S. good intentions.¶ There is a push by a group of highly respected individuals in Washington, D.C. for the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent country separate from Somalia. Joshua Meservey, a senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, is one of the finest minds when it comes to U.S. policies focused on Africa, and he is a strong advocate for U.S recognition of Somaliland as an independent country. On May 06, 2020, Joshua published a piece on the Heritage Foundation’s Daily Signal website titled “Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t ‘Neocolonial’ Plot. It’s Self-Determination.” In it, he said, “It is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019”[4]. Eritrean and South Sudanese independence movements both led to wars that, in part, are still being waged today[5][6]. Therefore, I do not think those are good examples to argue for Somaliland’s independence. Joshua is correct in that Somaliland did declare independence from Somalia in 1991. Nevertheless, what is missing from Joshua’s comment is that not all Somalis/Somalilanders in Somaliland are pro-secession from Somalia—many are against it. This dissent is why there is **strong opposition by many** Somalis/Somalilanders and Somaliland-Americans against U.S. recognition of Somaliland.¶ The opposition to U.S. recognition of Somaliland has little to do with independence from Somalia and everything to do with a **power struggle** between the clans. As with most African states with multiple tribes and clans, Somaliland is **not unified**. Somaliland is made up of five clans, namely the Isaak, the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi. The Isaak is the clan in power and pushing for independence. The four opposing clans—the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi—oppose the U.S. recognition of Somaliland because they know that will **translate to financial and military aid** to the Somaliland government, which is **controlled by the Isaak clan**. The fear among the other clans is that U.S. aid to the Somaliland government, and therefore the Isaak clan, will allow the Isaak clan to **dominate the other clans and take control of their land**. Currently, the Somaliland government only has complete control over Isaak territory, where the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, is also located. However, the recently introduced House and Senate Bills proposing the U.S. recognition of Somaliland and the expansion of the U.S. military relationship with Somaliland have increased **political anxieti**es in Somaliland. The opposing clans are now openly discussing the eventuality of a **civil war** against the Isaak clan. All it takes to start a war in Africa is a few people with Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) 47s.¶ I urge caution when it comes to Somaliland. This is why I support the current U.S. policy that calls for the African Union, Somalia, and Somaliland to resolve the Somaliland issue amongst themselves—this is the right approach. It is up to Africans to decide their fate. The days of Americans and Europeans dictating or influencing the borders of sovereign African countries should be left in the last century. I am opposed to H.R. 7170, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act, and Section 5 of S.3861, the Somaliland Partnership Act. Two pieces of legislation that directly and indirectly violate Somalia’s sovereignty. U.S. foreign policy must be color blind; we as Americans cannot oppose Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty and then turn around and put forward legislation that violates the borders and sovereignty of an African state.¶ The one rule for Europe and a different rule for Africa has not gone unnoticed by Africans. Instead of pushing legislation and policies that will further divide the region and lead to civil war, the U.S. can play a constructive role in the Somaliland issue; we can help the African Union facilitate a national dialogue between the opposing clans, the Somali government, and the government of Somaliland. The U.S. can also help by assisting in developing a road map for peace that will ensure peace and prosperity for all Somalis. This is a logical way forward. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and South Sudan, when it comes to Somaliland, we cannot pretend that the deadly outcome of possible U.S. policy missteps is unknown.

#### Somaliland civil war draws in great powers.

**Horton 23** [Michael Horton, research fellow @ the Jamestown Foundation and a co-founder of Red Sea Analytics International (RSAI), 3-2-2023, Clan fighting threatens Somaliland's independent, hard-fought security, Responsible Statecraft, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/02/clan-fighting-threatens-somalilands-independent-hard-fought-security/] Aaron

For much of the last 20 years, the autonomous, but unrecognized, Republic of Somaliland has been a bastion of stability in the perennially unstable Horn of Africa. However, fighting between the **government of Somaliland** and **clan based militias** in the eastern region of Sool threatens to upend the **security** and **stability** Somaliland has long enjoyed. ¶ Somaliland’s **strategic position** in the Horn of Africa combined with the recent confirmation of viable **oil reserves**, all mean that the **stakes are** high not only for Somaliland but for the **broader region**. The fighting may also allow **al-Shabaab** to **capitalize** on the instability and finally establish a **foothold** in Somaliland **which has,** for years, **successfully fought off the terrorist group**.¶ Since February 6, Las Anod — the regional capital of Sool — has witnessed escalating violence as militias broadly aligned with the Dhulbahante clan battle the army of Somaliland for control of the town and its outskirts. More than a hundred people have died as a result of the fighting and **thousands** have been **displaced**. ¶ The fighting in Las Anod is partly driven, as is often the case in Somalia, by **clan-centric politics**. The Dhulbahante clan claims Las Anod as its capital and is the predominant clan in much of the region of Sool. Somaliland, which bases its borders on those that demarcated British Somaliland, regards Sool as part of its territory. Since 2007 when Somaliland seized Las Anod from militias aligned with the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, the government of Somaliland has lightly administered Sool and its capital of Las Anod. ¶ On December 26 of last year, a politician from Somaliland’s opposition political party, Wadaani, who was also a member of the Dhulbahante clan, was assassinated by unknown assailants in Las Anod. Protesters subsequently took to the streets of the town and were engaged by Somaliland’s security forces. Local media claims that 20 protesters were killed during altercations with security forces. ¶ On February 6, some elders from the Dhulbahante clan announced that they intended to form a semi-autonomous state administered by Somalia rather than Somaliland. Since the February announcement, fighting between Somaliland’s military and clan aligned militias has intensified despite the government’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and an attempted intervention by clan elders from across Somaliland. The fighting may also be **drawing in** forces from neighboring **Puntland** which the government of Somaliland charges with supporting the uprising in Las Anod.¶ While there are legitimate local grievances driving the fighting in Las Anod, the conflict will almost **certainly** be exploited by **al-Shabaab**. The government of Somaliland has already warned that al-Shabaab **operatives** have **infiltrate**d some of the **militias** fighting to control Las Anod. While there is no firm open source evidence of this, it is likely that al-Shabaab will, if it already hasn’t, take full **advantage** of the instability in and around Las Anod to establish itself in Somaliland’s eastern regions. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) are both well-established in Puntland. Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, the Amniyat, has, for years, expertly assessed and exploited clan rivalries for its benefit. At the same time, al-Shabaab, like most terrorist and insurgent organizations, is first and foremost a business. Al-Shabaab, like any organization, must be able to fund itself and enrich its own elites. Thus al-Shabaab is deeply enmeshed in Somalia’s political and economic ecosystems. Al-Shabaab operatives and fighters are often knowingly and unknowingly used as political and economic tools by Somali elites to achieve particular agendas. ¶ For years, **Somaliland’s** security and intelligence services have effectively countereded al-Shabaab, and the **terror** group has not carried out a major attack in Somaliland since a suicide bombing in the capital city of Hargeisa in 2008. Somaliland’s intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism efforts have long been community-centric, both because this approach has proven effective, and out of need. ¶ Somaliland’s budget for its military and security and intelligence services is a rounding error when compared with that of Somalia, which has received and continues to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from foreign governments, including the US. Notably, the government of Somalia, which has launched yet another campaign to combat al-Shabaab, has now adopted some of Somaliland’s community-centric approaches to counter-terrorism. ¶ Somaliland has charted an independent course since its declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades, Somaliland has, with little outside assistance, steadily built-out its **state institutions** and held **multiple internationally monitored elections**. Despite receiving miniscule amounts of international aid, Somaliland’s cities, particularly Hargeisa and Berbera, have undergone **rapid development.** ¶ UAE based DP World has funded the expansion of the regionally vital port of Berbera. Most significantly, in light of the current conflict, multiple companies, including Taiwan based CPC Corp, are investing in the exploration and development of Somaliland’s potentially substantial oil reserves. On the other hand, Somaliland is one of the few countries in Africa that has spurned both Russian and Chinese offers of aid and investment. Rather than accept these offers, Somaliland, which values its relationship with the UK and the US, has instead developed its relations with Taiwan and other nations that support its autonomy. ¶ **Global** and **regional powers** are **engaged** in a new battle for access to the **Horn’s resources**. The Horn is viewed by **China** and the **Gulf States** as well as **Turkey** as the eastern door to Africa’s **vast** and still largely **untapped natural resources.** Somaliland’s **geo-strategic position** and the likelihood that it has commercially viable **oil** as well as other resources, place it at the **center** of a **combustible** mix of **competing interests** and **agendas**. The current conflict in Las Anod will almost certainly be **exploited** by not only al-Shabaab, but also those **local, regional,** and **global powers** that have an interest in moving their own particular agendas forward. ¶ If the fighting in Las Anod is not brought to a **quick end** through **meaningful negotiations by all sides**, the **conflict** will **intensify** and continue to spread to **neighboring regions**. **Al-Shabaab** and the **Islamic State** in Somalia will be the **chief beneficiaries** of such spread and intensification. ¶ **Somaliland has a history of solving problems and abating conflict through customary dispute resolution mechanisms.** All parties to the current conflict must step back from the brink and allow these mechanisms to function before groups like al-Shabaab and outside actors are able to fully subvert de-confliction efforts. Prolonged fighting will compromise not only Somaliland’s hard-earned security and stability, but further erode **security** and **stability** in the broader **region**.

## 1NC---Cohesion

### Contention Three is COHESION.

#### Africa is stabilizing the global economy but cohesion is key.

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Introduction The world economy now finds itself at a **critical juncture,** facing a series of extraordinary setbacks that have pushed down growth. Reigniting growth requires a unique combination of targeted policies, robust international cooperation, and a renewed look at the global economy, with a particular **focus on Africa**. Due to its **burgeoning and youthful population**, abundant **natural resources**, and a **strategic geographical location** that can facilitate global trade, Africa can play a major role in—and should be front and center of—any renewed efforts for revitalizing the global economy. A decade-long robust, inclusive, and green growth in Africa will not only **move hundreds of millions** living in the continent **out of poverty** but will also accelerate a global rebound and recovery. However, for this to materialize, Africa needs substantial investments in its failing and inadequate physical and social infrastructure. With access to basic infrastructure, alongside efficient institutions as well as its young population, massive natural endowments, and strategic location Africa can seize its economic potential and act as an engine of growth for the global economy for decades to come. Therefore, it is crucial to support Africa to unleash its immense economic potential, through massive and focused investments in the continent’s human capital and its physical and social infrastructure. I. The global slowdown: An overview The global economy has entered a **prolonged period of slowdown**. According to a 2023 World Bank report, “Nearly all the forces that have **powered growth** and prosperity since the early 1990s have **weakened**.” Even before the **COVID**-19 pandemic, an **aging population**, **slowing productivity**, and growing **barriers to trade** and the free movement of people were slowing global growth. Then came the triple back-to-back shocks: the pandemic, the **Ukraine** war, and **persistently high inflation** along with subsequent rapid rate hikes to fight it. Those shocks, combined with preexisting structural factors, have introduced strong headwinds for the global economy and its growth prospects in the next decade. If there is no significant policy intervention to revitalize the global economy, the potential result is a **lost decade**—not only for certain countries or regions, but for the entire world. According to the World Bank, the global potential gross domestic product (GDP) **growth rate is expected to decline to its lowest level in three decades**, i.e., 2.2 percent per year between now and 2030. Figures 1A and 1B demonstrate that the current global slowdown, which has become more pronounced following the pandemic, has been gradually developing over the past two decades. The five-year moving average of the world’s real GDP growth rate has decreased from 3.7 percent in 2000 to 2.4 percent in 2021, as depicted in Figure 1A. Similarly, growth has also decelerated in terms of GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 1B. The five-year moving average of the world’s real GDP per capita growth rate has declined from 2.2 percent in 2000 to 1.4 percent in 2021. The global slowdown can be attributed to various factors, many of which can be reversed through targeted and coordinated policies, including Aging labor forces and consumer markets, especially in advanced economies, but also in many emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) (Figure 2A); declining global productivity; the mounting debt burdens that have accumulated over the past decade (Figure 2B); the rising energy and food prices over the past three decades, which rose long before the Ukraine war (Figures 2C and 2D); the increasing geopolitical fragmentation, protectionism, and friend-shoring, and declining levels of international trade (Figure 2E); and the growing frequency and severity of natural disasters with ripple effects of security issues (Figure 2F). II. Revitalizing global growth: Some coordinated policy responses Reversing the above trends calls for a globally coordinated and targeted set of policies that would contribute to improvements in labor productivity and mobility, increasing aggregate demand, and promoting sustainable and inclusive growth at the global level. Some of these include the following. Increasing labor-force participation and facilitating the movement of labor: Globally, only 59 percent of the population above fifteen years of age is in the labor force. This is mainly driven by the lower participation of females and youths in the labor force. As seen in Figure 3A, globally, the female labor-force participation rate (47 percent) is less than two-thirds that for males (72 percent), with some regions—such as the Middle East and South Asia—having very large gender gaps in labor-force participation rates. Moreover, only 40 percent of the world’s youth (those aged 15–24) is in the labor force, with the Middle East again lagging behind the rest of the world—especially in terms of the female youth in the region (Figure 3B). Estimates show that increasing female and youth labor-force participation rates closer to the level of prime-age male workers (around 70 percent) could, on average, raise global potential growth by 0.2 percentage points by 2030. One way to increase the world’s youth labor-force participation rate is to facilitate an easier movement of labor from regions of the world with a growing young labor force to regions where the population and the labor force are aging. This would require governments in aging economies (with the support of international organizations such as the World Bank, International Labor Organization (ILO), and United Nations (UN)), to reform immigration policies and promote certain types of visas to attract the needed skills for various sectors. Enabling greater labor mobility would support the global economy for two main reasons. First, it will allow richer countries with aging populations to capitalize on the demographic advantage of those regions that have a significant youth population. Second, the regions of the world with younger labor forces—Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East—will benefit from the remittances. Expanding infrastructure investment: As seen in Figure 4, the current trends in infrastructure investments and needs will result in an $11.9-trillion shortage in infrastructure investment by 2040. The bulk of this gap will be in the transportation industry ($7.7 trillion), followed by the energy industry ($2.4 trillion). Moreover, adding the investments needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, the world’s infrastructure investment gap would increase to $14 trillion by 2040. In other words, over the course of the next seven years, $2.1 trillion of additional infrastructural investment is needed to achieve the SDGs. Boosting global investment to about 2–3 percent of the world’s GDP over this decade, especially in the infrastructure sector, can increase potential growth by about 0.3 percentage points per year. With growing debt levels, the governments in many economies—especially EMDEs—have been facing increasingly limited capacity to invest in physical and social infrastructure. Hence, there is a need for a global push to strengthen and optimize the frameworks of private-public partnerships (PPPs) to foster increased engagement of the private sector in infrastructure initiatives. Moreover, quasi-state actors, such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and public pension funds (PPFs) can also play a crucial role in infrastructure investment. With more than $33 trillion in assets under management (AuM), these institutional investors possess a distinct advantage in bridging the global infrastructure financing gap. This advantage stems mainly from the long-term investment horizons of institutional investors, which align with the secure, yet moderate, return expectations typically associated with large-scale infrastructure projects. Re-globalization and reducing the costs of and barriers to trade: The ratio of world trade to GDP grew from 25.3 percent in 1972 to 61 percent in 2008, an average annual rate of 2.5 percent (see Figure 5). With the onset of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis (GFC), world trade-to-GDP ratio dropped by more than 8 percentage points and has not yet recovered to the levels seen in 2008. Looking at the five-year moving average of the growth rate of the trade-to-GDP ratio (as seen earlier in Figure 2E), while the decade preceding the GFC was characterized by the rise of global trade and globalization, the post-GFC decade can mainly be seen as one of declining global trade and rising protectionism, especially after 2014. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade barriers have increased from less than four hundred in 2009 to about 2,500 in 2022. Recent policy decisions, such as reshoring and friend-shoring, could expose individual countries and the global economy to greater fragmentation and vulnerability to shocks. Moreover, according to the World Bank, the expenses related to shipping, logistics, and regulations significantly contribute to trade costs, often resulting in the doubling of prices for internationally traded goods. Reversing these global protectionism and geoeconomic fragmentation trends could add 0.2 to 7 percent to the global output, depending on how severe the protectionism and geoeconomic fragmentation could get. However, reversing these trends, which have been in the making for more than a decade, will require a momentous effort by all economies around the world—especially the members of the Group of Twenty (G20), among whom geoeconomic fragmentation has been rapidly rising. At the same time, enhancing the trade regulatory and physical infrastructure is another area that needs to be addressed. This is where investment in physical infrastructure (discussed in some detail above) can help reverse declining trends in global trade. The process of strengthening the role of trade in the global economy necessitates robust reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, reaching a consensus on intricate trade issues remains a challenge due to the WTO’s diverse membership, the growing complexity of trade policies, and heightened geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions. Plurilateral agreements, and creating several regional mini-WTOs among select groups of WTO members, can provide a viable way forward in certain areas. Reversing climate change and reducing global emissions: As seen earlier in Figure 2F, the severity and frequency of climate-related natural disasters have risen substantially over the past three decades, and experts link this trend to climate change and global warming. The economic cost of these disasters is also on the rise. According to the World Meteorological Organization, out of more than twenty-three thousand recorded disasters since 1970, more than eleven thousand can be directly linked to weather, climate, and water hazards. These devastating events led to a staggering 2.06 million fatalities, and incurred financial losses amounting to $3.64 trillion. Certain countries, particularly smaller states, have experienced significantly greater devastation than what is indicated by the average impact, amounting to approximately 5 percent of their annual GDP. Reducing the detrimental impacts from climate change calls for a coordinated global response, with the world’s major emitters and the largest emitters per capita in high-income economies taking the lead. As seen in Figures 6 and 7 carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita in high-income economies are thirty-two times larger than those in low-income economies. According to a report from the World Bank Group, if developing countries invest an average of 1.4 percent of their GDP annually toward adaptation and mitigation strategies, they could potentially achieve a remarkable 70-percent reduction in emissions by the year 2050. Such investments would also enhance their resilience to climate change impacts. The report estimates that, within lower-income countries, the financing requirements can surpass 5 percent of their GDPs, necessitating additional assistance from high-income countries and multilateral development banks (MDBs). III. Revitalizing global growth: Why **Africa matters** Through unlocking its economic potential, Africa can address its developmental needs, **contribute significantly to global economic growth**, and create a more prosperous and **economically stable future** for its people and the world. Africa’s role in reversing the global economic slowdown lies in leveraging its **young and growing population**, **natural resources**, and **strategic location**. Population, consumer markets, and labor forces: As seen in Figure 8, while all regions of the world have been aging—albeit at widely different paces—the share of population sixty-five and above in Africa has remained at a mere 3 percent over the past four decades. With nearly two-thirds of its population under the age of thirty, and 40 percent under the age of fourteen, the continent enjoys having the **youngest population structure in the world** (see Figure 9). This means that Africa will benefit from a growing young-consumer market (with a high marginal propensity to consume) and an ample supply of young workers for at least the next three to four decades. Nigeria is a case in point, as it will be the third most-populous country in the world in 2050 after India and China. With Africa’s population expected to double by 2050—from its current 1.4 billion to 2.8 billion—Africa’s growing and **young** consumer market will be the **main driver of global demand** for consumer, education, health, technological, and infrastructural products and services. For example, the doubling of population will translate to a **50-percent increase in demand for housing** and all that is needed to have a modern household, from electricity and water connections to basic appliances and furniture to municipality services. As of 2018, the continent had an estimated housing shortage of fifty-one million units and, at the current lackluster housing-construction rates, this gap is expected to increase to seventy-five million by 2050. Hence, the continent boasts an already enormous demand for housing and consumer goods and services, which is only expected to grow for decades to come. Additionally, the housing sector is well known for its job-creation potential. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), **each housing unit will create five full-time jobs in Africa**. This means that closing the housing gap by 2050 will lead to the creation of **375 million jobs** in Africa, practically **absorbing** all the **informal-sector employment**—which currently represents 83 percent of employment in Africa—and the **unemployed population**, and increasing the number of employed African adults age fifteen and up by more than 80 percent. This, in turn, will boost household income and aggregate demand in the region, igniting a positive loop of higher income and higher aggregate demand and imports into the continent, translating to higher aggregate demand for global consumer and technological goods and services. In other words, **closing the housing gap** in Africa can contribute significantly to global growth in the next three decades, while also providing the growing young population of the continent with housing and job opportunities. Considering that the youth labor-force participation rate (LFPR) is around 38 percent in Africa (see Figure 3B above), the continent needs to create about ten million jobs per year for the next 20–30 years in order to employ every new youth entrant into the labor force. Clearly, jobs created from closing the housing gap will address this growing demand and more. Given this capacity, supportive policies can be devised to increase Africa’s youth LFPR to level to that of North America (51 percent). Such policies will increase the needed volume of new jobs to 13–14 million per year, which can all be absorbed by efforts to close the housing gap on the continent. Moreover, increasing youth LFPR in the world’s youngest continent and creating jobs for them will only add to higher LFPR at the global level, increasing the world’s workforce productivity and employment-to-population ratio. As highlighted earlier, such policies would contribute to global growth. The same sorts of reasoning and statistics presented above for the housing sector can also be applied to the increasing demand for energy, basic infrastructure, education, entertainment, and healthcare services in Africa over the next few decades. In short, as the continent’s **middle class** grows and **disposable incomes increase**, African consumers will play a **vital role** in driving demand for basic infrastructure and goods and services, both domestically and internationally. This could be a major component of a robust global rebound because, on average, household consumption is responsible for about 60 percent of the world’s GDP. Natural resources: Africa is home to an incredible amount of diverse natural capital. Nearly 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves, 12 percent of its oil reserves, and 8 percent of its natural gas are located in Africa. The continent is also home to 40 percent of the world’s gold reserves. Moreover, the continent boasts the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds, uranium, and platinum in the world. In other words, **30 percent of world’s rare-earth deposits** are in Africa. These elements are central to the global economy, and their importance is **rising rapidly**—especially in various strategic high-tech industries such as semiconductors, batteries, and **green energy.** Finally, the continent also possesses 65 percent of the world’s arable land, making it central to long-term **food production** and security. Given its natural resources, Africa has the potential to play a **significant role** in the global **energy transition** and climate mitigation for three main reasons. First, Africa—especially Northern Africa—possesses abundant renewable energy resources. By tapping into these resources, Africa can contribute significantly to global green-energy production and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. For example, equipping a mere **1 percent of the Sahara** Desert area with concentrated **solar** power plants would be more than sufficient to meet the electricity demand of **all of Europe**, the **Middle East,** and **Africa**. Moreover, the Sahara’s strong solar radiation makes it ideal for the generation of green hydrogen (for example, in Morocco) that can be transported to Europe using the current oil and gas pipeline between the two continents. Hence, Africa has the potential to become a **major global exporter** of green energy. Second, Africa is home to abundant mineral reserves, including key resources used in battery technologies, such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel. These minerals are essential for the production of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) and energy-storage systems. Africa’s role in global battery technology lies in responsibly extracting and processing these minerals, potentially becoming a significant supplier to the growing EV and green-energy storage markets. Third, considering that Africa’s population is expected to double by 2050, meeting this rapidly rising energy demand from renewable sources is crucial in addressing global climate challenges. Many parts of Africa still lack access to electricity. As seen in Figure 10, electricity access is nearly universal in all regions of the world, only 56 percent of Africans have some sort of access to electricity. This means that about 600 million Africans lack access; in other words, 80 percent of the total 750 million people who don’t have access to electricity in the world are in Africa. Africa has the great opportunity to leapfrog the technology in electricity generation and distribution—just as it leapfrogged landlines in many parts of the continent and embraced mobile/digital communication—and tap into its immense potential for renewable electricity generation, alongside off-grid and mini-grid solutions, as the path forward for expanding access to electricity for its rapidly growing population. The same is true for Africa’s transportation industry, as the continent can address its growing demand for private and public transportation through EVs. These will drastically reduce Africa’s greenhouse-gas emissions in the growing electricity and transportation industries, making Africa a global leader in providing its population with access to affordable and renewable energy, which is articulated as Goal 7 of the SDGs. Although Africa’s share of global emissions is projected to increase from around 4 percent in 2023 to 11 percent in 2050, any African contributions to reducing global emissions without significantly harming its growth projections will be welcomed by the global community. Ivory Coast, Senegal, Uganda, Togo, and Cameroon, as well as six cities in South Africa, have already made great strides on this front. It is important to highlight here that while Africa is only a small contributor to global emissions, the continent has started taking important initiatives for the green transition. Starting with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and extending to the 2016 Paris Agreement (COP21), a significant number of African nations have embraced and ratified environmental pacts. The proliferation of consciousness-raising campaigns is evident, and exemplified by initiatives like the African Union’s Agenda 2063, conservation funds such as the Blue Fund, the Desert to Power project by the African Development Bank, and the Great Green Wall endeavor aimed at cultivating vegetation across the Sahel region. Various countries are actively engaged in this movement. Burkina Faso, for instance, is home to the largest solar-power facility in West Africa, while President Macky Sall’s Green Emerging Senegal Plan is driving eco-friendly strategies in Senegal. In Ethiopia, nearly 100 percent of the nation’s electricity is sourced from renewable resources (96 percent from hydropower). In short, by leveraging its renewable energy resources, promoting local manufacturing and innovation, and actively participating in global collaborations, Africa can contribute to the advancement of green energy and battery technology worldwide, and position itself as a key player in the global shift toward clean, and renewable energy sources. This will contribute significantly to the global sustainable-development agenda, enhance energy access, and reduce carbon emissions—all of which are key ingredients for a global recovery. Trade and connectivity: Africa is surrounded by seas and oceans on all sides, making it easy to trade with most of its economies. Of the fifty-four countries in the continent, thirty-eight have access to open waters. The remaining landlocked economies can access open waters through at least one neighboring country. Given Africa’s geographical position and its potential as a **trading hub**, leveraging its strategic location can enhance its participation in global trade, **strengthen economic ties** with other regions, and drive overall economic growth and development. Africa’s location holds strategic importance in global trade for several reasons. First, the continent is geographically positioned as a gateway between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, linking multiple regions, such as the Middle East and Europe. This location allows for efficient trade routes and connectivity between Africa, Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East. Second, Africa is home to important maritime trade routes. Its coastal regions, including the Gulf of Guinea, the Red Sea, and the Cape of Good Hope, serve as critical maritime trade routes. These routes are crucial for shipping goods between continents, facilitating international trade and commerce. Also, Africa’s proximity to the Suez Canal is of significant advantage. Annually, 12 percent of the world’s trade is carried through this canal. The Suez Canal, located in Egypt, connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, providing a vital shortcut for maritime trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa. This access greatly reduces shipping distances and the cost for goods passing through the region. Third, and related to the above, is Africa’s abundant natural wealth. As highlighted earlier, Africa is immensely rich in natural resources, and its strategic location facilitates the export of these resources to various markets worldwide, driving economic activities and trade partnerships. Efforts are under way to establish and expand trade corridors within Africa. Projects like the Trans-Saharan Highway, Trans-African Railway, African Integrated High-Speed Railway Network, Niger-Benin crude pipeline, and other infrastructure developments aim to enhance intra-African trade and improve connectivity, fostering regional integration and expanding Africa’s role in global trade. On the policy front, too, **venues for regional integration are being explored**. For example, efforts toward regional integration, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), aim to establish a **single market** across the continent. This initiative can enhance intra-African trade, increase investment flows, and create a more favorable business environment, positioning Africa as a key player in global trade. Conclusion Vietnam, despite its limited access to natural and energy resources compared to Africa, has experienced an impressive sevenfold increase in its GDP over the past thirty years (from $45 billion in 1990 to $332 billion in 2021). **If Africa can achieve similar growth rates in the next three decades, it has the potential to contribute a staggering $20 trillion to the global economy in 2050**. This is not unrealistic. Africa managed to triple its GDP, from $900 billion to $2.7 trillion, between 1990 and 2021. Moreover, during the same period, Ethiopia’s GDP increased by 7.6 times—more than the increase in Vietnam—while the economies of Ghana, Tanzania, and Egypt grew by five, 4.6, and 3.7 times, respectively. By leveraging the heterogeneity among its fifty-four economies, Africa can build upon this performance through fostering greater regional trade and labor-market integration, increasing climate resilience, and better integrating its labor and commodity markets in the global supply chain. Through such coordinated policies, Africa has the potential to grow at an average annual rate of 5–7 percent in the next three decades—resulting in an African economy that is 4–7 times larger by 2050. This could result in a **global economic boom** led by a generation of ambitious young Africans ready to innovate, produce, and consume. **No other region in the world** possesses the same **potential** **for growth**. To achieve its potential and contribute to a robust global rebound, Africa needs a **concentrated “Big Push”** financial and technical investment in its physical and social infrastructure and labor markets. The case of physical infrastructure is of particular importance. Over the past two decades, Africa stands out as the sole region where road density has experienced a notable decline. Approximately 43 percent of the continent’s roads have been paved, but South Africa accounts for 30 percent of the total. Also, as seen in Table 1, 44 percent of Africans lack access to electricity, 73 percent lack access to safely managed drinking water and sanitation services, 58 percent do not use the internet, and 98 percent don’t have access to broadband services. Hence, Africa’s existing **infrastructure gap** is the **main bottleneck** for unlocking its immense economic potential. Massive **investments** in transportation, electricity, water, sanitation, and communication infrastructure are needed for the continent to seize its position in the global economy and act as its engine of growth. According to the African Development Bank, the annual investment gap in Africa’s infrastructure is around $100 billion. Moreover, many African countries need help with developing their **governance, financial, and legal institutions**. The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) can play a crucial role in supporting Africa to get the “Big Push” it needs. A more active, focused, and multifaceted long-term engagement of the **World Bank**, **IMF**, and yes, **WTO** in Africa’s development will help crowd inthe much-needed **institutional and private-sector investment** in the region’s physical, social, financial, and legal infrastructure. Some critically important areas for BWIs to revisit are debt relief/restructuring, assisting with climate adaptation and resilience efforts, **supporting overall governance capacity** of African economies, promoting private-public-partnerships in physical and social infrastructure investment, **accelerating African regional integration**, prioritizing Africa’s integration into the global economy and supply chains, and **reinforcing multilateralism and international cooperation**. It is through such coordinated programs and policies that BWIs can support African economies seize the opportunity to jumpstart their economies and contribute to a sustained economic growth in the continent for decades to come, with of course significant ripple effects on revitalizing global growth.

#### Coop’s high now but tensions empirically deck it.

**Ryder 24** [Hannah Ryder, senior associate @ the Africa Program, 3-26-2024, Is the African Union Evolving in the Right Direction?, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/african-union-evolving-right-direction] JH

The **economic** **agenda** of the **AU** (then OAU) was, in early days, well **developed** and **strong**. For instance, in 1984, 1985, and 1986, the AU (then OAU) **convened** meetings of African leaders to determine their views and best practice on debt **negotiations** and **management**. However, the economic agenda slowly fell off, especially after a global debt cancellation program (known as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - HIPC) was initiated in 1996 by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). African economic policy was no longer primarily determined from within the continent. Meanwhile, **other** **issues** such as **security** began to **dominate** the **agenda** of the **AU**. ¶ Fast forward 24 years, the AU transforming the G20 into the G21 certainly highlighted the potential of a stronger African voice in the global economic landscape. It was no coincidence that 2023 was the same year the AU had put economic issues back on the **top of its agenda**, with a focus on implementing its landmark trade initiative—the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), operational since 2021. As of 2023, Africa's GDP stands at an estimated $3.1 trillion, making it the eighth largest economy globally, with a population of 1.3 billion—similar to China and India. The continent is expected to experience substantial economic growth, with the IMF forecasting a GDP growth rate of 3.8 percent for 2024, outpacing the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, a significant share of global growth will be **driven by Africa** in the coming years, emphasizing the crucial role of the continent in the prosperity of other G21 partners. Not only this, with excellent demographics and renewable energy potential, the African continent is ideally placed to be the world’s **next manufacturing hub** after China. Africa's economic potential cannot be ignored; it is fundamental to the prosperity of all. ¶ What was clear from this year’s AU summit was that African leaders realize this—and four particular outcomes demonstrated that. ¶ AU leaders agreed that instead of trade, for the forthcoming year, education will be their primary theme. The focus makes sense given Africa’s large youth population and the need to upgrade and leapfrog systems in this new digital age. There is significant potential for African countries to learn from each other on what works, while ensuring, for example, that African curriculums are tailored to African needs. It is estimated that Africans speak over 1,000 and possibly 2,000 languages, meaning most Africans are bilingual, many trilingual. This is a huge asset, but it is also a challenge for education systems borrowed from monolingual former colonizers. This year, African leaders should try to lean into these challenges.¶ African leaders agreed how they will be represented at the G20, now G21. This was not a simple question—the European Union similarly had to review its representation when it became part of the G20. As the 2024 rotating AU presidency will be led by Mauritania (taking over from Comoros), Mauritanian leadership will clearly have a prominent role alongside representatives of the African Union Commission and African knowledge partners that will provide crucial policy-related secretariat support. It was also agreed that financial resources for the AU’s participation in the G21 would come from African member states and African financial organisations only, so as to preserve independence. Given that G20 Finance Ministers will have their first meeting of 2024 in late February, these decisions were very timely. A key question for the AU to determine now is what main issues the AU will want to encourage the G21 to consider, as well as the AU’s redlines on G20 issues. ¶ At the 2024 AU summit, African leaders coordinated around new **reforms of the international financial system**. Development Reimagined published a policy brief ahead of the summit on key economic and financial issues for the AU, many of which were these mentioned by leaders. For instance, the brief’s proposal for G21 members to target various forms of finance toward African financial institutions such as the African Development Bank and Afreximbank was echoed by President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana, AU champion for financial institutions, highlighting trust in homegrown entities. He also made a proposal that all African countries should hold at least 30 percent of their foreign reserves in domestic financial institutions, to enhance Africa's fiscal autonomy. ¶ E. Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, emphasized the urgency for reforms in the global financial architecture. He restated the commitment by African leaders to grow their economies, create jobs for the youthful population, and provide more business opportunities for African businesses, noting the unfairness in risk profiles attributed to African economies, including by credit rating agencies. This echoed the brief’s proposal for G21 members to reform the IMF/World Bank’s debt sustainability analysis. ¶ Last but not least, on the sidelines of the AU summit, a new alliance known as the “Africa Club” was launched, which brought together five African-owned, African-controlled Multilateral Financial Institutions established by treaty. These institutions can be expected to use the new alliance to develop clear and unified positions on key issues and discuss innovative ways they can contribute to African growth, economic development, and integration. ¶ The recent AU summit marked a crucial milestone, with Africa's economic agenda gaining **renewed focus**. President William Ruto, in his new role as the AU champion for institutional reforms, even presented a proposal for a yearly African Economic Summit to be hosted on the continent, just as was done back in 1984. Ruto emphasized the importance of holding such discussions on African soil, stating, "It is fair, it is better if we can discuss it here at home, fashioned in the way we think best it should be." He envisaged that stakeholders from around the globe, including governments, corporations, and philanthropists, could even be invited to contribute their perspectives and insights. The fact is African governments have always been **determined** to shape the continent’s economic future and engage with the global community on their own terms. With the AU increasingly focusing on **development rather than just security,** and with a new proposed annual African Economic Summit, it looks like this might be happening, once again. But will it stick? Only time will tell. Deft **management of foreign relations will be needed** to ensure history does not repeat itself.

#### Beyond the AU, Turkish Mediation forged Ethiopia-Somalia relations that solve conflict and the economy --- tensions threaten coop across the board.

**Ayele 24** [Theodros Ayele, Journalist and Deputy CEO @ the Missing Communication Consultancy, 12-13-2024, A New Dawn for the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia and Somalia Forge Agreement with Turkish Mediation,Capital Newspaper, https://capitalethiopia.com/2024/12/13/a-new-dawn-for-the-horn-of-africa-ethiopia-and-somalia-forge-agreement-with-turkish-mediation/] tristan

In a significant diplomatic breakthrough, **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** have **reached** an **agreement** **facilitated** by **Turkish** **mediation**, marking a **pivotal** **moment** in the quest for **stability** in the Horn of **Africa**. This region has long been characterized by a complex tapestry of ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and historical grievances, particularly between Ethiopia and Somalia. The two nations have faced numerous conflicts over the years, including the infamous Ogaden War in the late 1970s, which was rooted in territorial disputes and sparked a prolonged struggle that left a deep-seated legacy of mistrust.¶ The Horn of Africa has seen various power dynamics at play, with external actors frequently influencing local conflicts. In recent years, Ethiopia has been embroiled in its own internal challenges, particularly with the Tigray conflict, which has drawn international attention and concern regarding human rights abuses and stability in the region. Meanwhile, Somalia has been grappling with the consequences of decades of civil war, insurgency from militant groups like Al-Shabaab, and the struggles of establishing a functional government. Against this backdrop, the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia signifies a turning point. Turkey’s involvement as a mediator is particularly noteworthy, reflecting its strategic interest in expanding its diplomatic footprint in Africa. Over the past decade, Turkey has increased its engagement in the continent, focusing on economic partnerships, humanitarian aid, and military cooperation. The Turkish government has positioned itself as a bridge-builder, promoting dialogue and collaboration among African nations. This development not only underscores Turkey’s growing influence in the region but also highlights a commitment to resolving conflicts through dialogue rather than military confrontation. By facilitating this agreement, Turkey aims to solidify its role as a key player in African diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts, showcasing a model of collaboration that prioritizes dialogue over aggression. The success of this mediation could serve as a template for resolving other conflicts in the region, emphasizing the importance of negotiation and mutual understanding in achieving lasting peace. The agreement, celebrated by both nations, reflects a mutual desire to enhance cooperation and address longstanding issues that have historically strained their relationship. For Ethiopia and Somalia, these issues have often centered around border disputes, economic competition, and differing political ideologies. The two countries have a complex history marked by periods of tension and conflict, particularly over the Ogaden region, which has been a source of contention for decades. By reaching this agreement, both nations acknowledge the importance of prioritizing diplomacy over discord, signaling a willingness to work together for the greater good of their populations. The commitment to cooperation is particularly significant in light of the broader regional challenges both countries face. Ethiopia has been working to stabilize its internal situation while managing relationships with its neighbors, and Somalia has been striving to rebuild after years of civil strife and insecurity. This agreement represents a shared understanding that collaboration can yield benefits, such as enhanced trade relations, joint security initiatives, and coordinated efforts to combat extremist groups that threaten both nations. ¶ The **mediation** by Turkey demonstrates its role as a **key** **player** in the **region**, capable of fostering **dialogue** and **understanding** among **neighboring** **countries**. Turkey’s proactive stance in facilitating this agreement highlights its diplomatic ambitions in Africa, positioning itself as a mediator in conflicts that have historically been influenced by external powers. By stepping into this role, Turkey not only strengthens its ties with Ethiopia and Somalia but also enhances its credibility as a peace broker in the Horn of Africa.¶ This mediation effort underscores Turkey’s broader strategy of engaging with African nations through a lens of partnership and development. By promoting dialogue and cooperation, Turkey aims to build **long**-**lasting** **relationships** based on mutual respect and shared interests, moving away from traditional power dynamics that often characterized foreign involvement in Africa. As a result, Turkey’s role in this agreement could **pave** the **way** for future **collaborations** among African **nations**, fostering a sense of **solidarity** and regional **stability** that transcends historical grievances.¶ However, the critical question remains: will the deal hold? The future of this agreement hinges on the commitment of both Ethiopia and Somalia to uphold the terms outlined. Trust is a fragile commodity in international relations, especially between nations with a history of conflict, and both parties must demonstrate genuine dedication to the agreement for it to endure. This involves not only adhering to the specific terms but also fostering an environment of mutual respect and understanding. Effective communication will be paramount in this process. Both nations must establish transparent channels of dialogue that allow for open discussions about any issues that may arise. This continuous interaction can help to mitigate misunderstandings and prevent escalation of tensions that could jeopardize the agreement. It will also be important for both governments to engage with their respective populations, ensuring that citizens understand the benefits of the agreement and support their leaders in pursuing cooperative strategies. Ongoing dialogue should not be limited to government officials. Involving civil society, local communities, and regional stakeholders can enrich the conversation and provide valuable insights into the practical implications of the agreement. By fostering a broader base of support, the likelihood of sustaining the deal increases, as it becomes a collective effort rather than a top-down directive. Additionally, both nations will need to collaboratively address any emerging challenges that may test the agreement. This could include dealing with security threats, managing border disputes, or addressing economic inequalities. A responsive approach to these challenges, characterized by joint problem-solving and flexibility, will be essential for maintaining the integrity of the agreement. The role of external actors and regional organizations may also influence the durability of the deal. Support from the international community, whether through diplomatic backing or economic assistance, can reinforce the commitment of Ethiopia and Somalia to uphold their agreement. Conversely, any perceived interference or favoritism could create further tensions, underscoring the need for a balanced approach in external engagement. While the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia holds promise for a more cooperative future, its success will ultimately depend on the unwavering commitment of both nations to uphold the terms, engage in effective communication, and collaboratively navigate the challenges ahead. The path to lasting peace is rarely straightforward, and both countries must be prepared to invest the necessary effort and resources to ensure that this agreement translates into a stable and prosperous reality for their peoples. Experts suggest that the longevity of the deal will depend on several factors, including political will, the dynamics within the region, and the involvement of external actors. Political will is perhaps the most crucial element; both Ethiopia and Somalia must demonstrate a sincere commitment to the agreement, prioritizing collaboration over nationalistic sentiments or internal political pressures. Leaders in both countries must be prepared to make difficult decisions that may not always align with their domestic agendas but are essential for fostering a stable and cooperative relationship. The regional dynamics also play a significant role in shaping the future of this agreement. The Horn of Africa is a complex geopolitical landscape, characterized by a web of alliances, rivalries, and historical grievances. Changes in leadership, shifts in power balances, or new conflicts in neighboring countries can influence the stability of the agreement. For instance, if tensions were to escalate between Ethiopia and another neighbor, it could strain the resources and focus of the Ethiopian government, thereby impacting its commitment to the deal with Somalia. Conversely, a more stable regional environment could bolster both nations’ efforts to maintain their agreement. The involvement of external actors is another critical factor. International stakeholders, including foreign governments and regional organizations, can either support or complicate the situation. Positive engagement from external actors, such as providing diplomatic support, facilitating dialogue, or offering economic incentives, can enhance the commitment of Ethiopia and Somalia to uphold the agreement. However, any perception of bias or interference from external parties can lead to distrust and complicate relations, potentially undermining the progress made. Continuous engagement and trust-building measures will be necessary to maintain momentum and prevent misunderstandings that could derail progress. This requires both nations to invest in regular communication and collaborative initiatives, such as joint economic projects or security partnerships, that reinforce their interdependence. Building trust is a gradual process, and it will take time for both sides to fully embrace the spirit of cooperation, particularly given their historical context. Moreover, establishing mechanisms for conflict resolution within the framework of the agreement will be essential. These mechanisms should allow both parties to address grievances and disputes constructively, without resorting to hostility. By creating a reliable process for managing conflicts, Ethiopia and Somalia can demonstrate their commitment to the agreement and build confidence in their ability to navigate challenges together. The longevity of the deal between Ethiopia and Somalia hinges on a delicate interplay of political will, regional dynamics, and external involvement. By fostering continuous engagement and implementing robust trust-building measures, both nations can create a resilient framework that supports lasting peace and cooperation, ultimately benefiting not only themselves but the broader Horn of Africa region. As the situation develops, Egypt’s role could also become increasingly significant. Given its historical position as a dominant player in the Nile Basin, Egypt has a vested interest in the dynamics between Ethiopia and Somalia. Should Ethiopia and Somalia find common ground through their recent agreement, Egypt could leverage this newfound cooperation to foster further collaboration among the three nations, particularly in discussions surrounding shared resources like the Nile River, which is crucial for all three countries. The Nile River has long been a contentious issue, especially with Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which has raised concerns in Egypt about water security and access. If Ethiopia and Somalia can stabilize their relationship, Egypt may see an opportunity to engage in constructive dialogue regarding water management and resource sharing that benefits all parties involved. By promoting joint initiatives focused on sustainable water use, agriculture, and energy production, Egypt could help to mitigate tensions and foster a collaborative regional approach to resource management. Additionally, Egypt may act as a mediator in future disputes, promoting regional stability in a historically complex geopolitical landscape. With its extensive diplomatic experience and established relationships across the Horn of Africa, Egypt is well-positioned to facilitate dialogue between Ethiopia and Somalia should new challenges arise. The Egyptian government has traditionally played a role in regional diplomacy and has the capacity to bring different actors to the negotiation table, ensuring that any emerging issues are addressed promptly and effectively. Egypt’s involvement could also extend to regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which are designed to promote peace and security in Africa. By collaborating with these organizations, Egypt can amplify its efforts to support the peace process and work towards a more stable and interconnected region. This engagement would not only enhance Egypt’s standing in the region but also contribute to a broader narrative of cooperation and unity among African nations. Egypt’s role could also encompass economic dimensions, as it seeks to enhance trade ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia. By fostering economic collaboration, Egypt can create a more interconnected regional economy that benefits all parties, reducing the likelihood of conflict over resources and promoting mutual prosperity. As Ethiopia and Somalia navigate their new agreement, Egypt’s role could evolve into a crucial stabilizing force in the region. By encouraging further cooperation on shared resources, acting as a mediator in disputes, and promoting economic collaboration, Egypt can contribute significantly to fostering lasting peace and stability in a historically complex geopolitical landscape. This proactive engagement could pave the way for a more cohesive Horn of Africa, where nations work together to address common challenges and seize opportunities for growth and development. Meanwhile, the reaction of Somaliland, a self-declared independent region, remains to be seen. Somaliland has pursued a path of self-governance since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, yet it has not gained widespread international recognition. The agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia could be perceived by Somaliland as a potential threat to its quest for international recognition and autonomy. If Ethiopia and Somalia successfully strengthen their bilateral ties and engage in collaborative initiatives, Somaliland might fear that it will be sidelined in regional discussions and negotiations, further complicating its aspirations for recognition as a sovereign state. This perspective is rooted in the historical context of Somaliland’s struggle for legitimacy. The region has established its own institutions, maintained relative stability, and engaged in efforts to secure international support. However, the agreement between its neighbors could shift the focus of diplomatic efforts away from Somaliland, potentially diminishing its leverage in seeking recognition and support from the international community. The fear of being marginalized could lead to apprehension among Somaliland’s leadership and population regarding the evolving dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Conversely, the deal may present an opportunity for Somaliland to engage constructively with both Ethiopia and Somalia, thereby strengthening its position in regional politics. If Somaliland can navigate the new landscape effectively, it could leverage its unique status as a stable and relatively peaceful region in contrast to the challenges facing Somalia. By proactively reaching out to both Ethiopia and Somalia, Somaliland could position itself as a valuable partner in regional initiatives, particularly in areas such as trade, security, and counter-terrorism efforts. Engaging constructively could also allow Somaliland to demonstrate its commitment to regional stability, potentially garnering goodwill and support from both Ethiopia and Somalia. By participating in joint projects or dialogue initiatives, Somaliland may be able to assert its relevance in the region and advocate for its interests in a way that aligns with the broader goals of cooperation and peace established by the agreement. Ultimately, Somaliland’s response to the Ethiopia-Somalia agreement will likely depend on how its leaders assess the implications for their pursuit of recognition and autonomy. If they view the agreement as a threat, they may adopt a more defensive posture, seeking to assert their independence more forcefully. However, if they recognize the potential for constructive engagement, they may seize the opportunity to strengthen their diplomatic ties and enhance their standing in regional politics, ultimately working towards their long-term aspirations while contributing to a more stable Horn of Africa.¶ Overall, this agreement represents a **hopeful** **step** towards **peace** and **cooperation** in the Horn of **Africa**. The significance of this development cannot be understated, as it marks a shift from a history of conflict and rivalry towards a more **collaborative** **approach**. This agreement embodies a recognition by both Ethiopia and Somalia of the need to address their mutual concerns and challenges through dialogue rather than confrontation. It reflects a shared commitment to stability, which is essential for the prosperity of both nations and the broader region.¶ Ongoing engagement and careful **management** of **relationships** will be **crucial** in **ensuring** that this newfound **momentum** translates into lasting **stability** for the region. The initial enthusiasm surrounding the agreement must be built upon with sustained efforts to foster trust and cooperation. This involves not only the implementation of the terms agreed upon but also the establishment of mechanisms for continuous dialogue and conflict resolution. Both nations will need to remain vigilant and proactive in addressing any emerging tensions or misunderstandings that could threaten the progress made.¶ The success of this agreement will require engagement with a variety of stakeholders, including civil society, local communities, and regional organizations. By involving these groups in the peace process, both Ethiopia and Somalia can create a more inclusive approach that enhances the legitimacy and acceptance of the agreement among their populations. This grassroots involvement is vital for building broad-based support and ensuring that the peace initiatives resonate with the needs and aspirations of the people they serve.¶ As the world watches, the actions taken by these nations will resonate beyond their borders, influencing the broader geopolitical landscape of East Africa. The **stability** achieved through this agreement could **serve** as a **model** for **conflict** **resolution** in other areas of the **continent**, inspiring neighboring countries to pursue similar paths of **dialogue** and **cooperation**. Conversely, any **setbacks** or failures could **undermine** **confidence** in diplomatic processes and **exacerbate** existing **tensions** in the region.¶ The international community will closely monitor this development, with potential implications for foreign policy and engagement strategies in East Africa. Countries and organizations invested in the region, whether for economic, security, or humanitarian reasons, will be keen to see how Ethiopia and Somalia navigate their new relationship. Positive outcomes may lead to increased support and investment from external actors, while negative developments could result in a reevaluation of strategies and alliances.¶ While the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia is a promising step towards peace, its success hinges on ongoing engagement, careful management of relationships, and inclusive dialogue. The implications of this agreement extend beyond the immediate context, potentially **reshaping** the **geopolitical** **dynamics** of the Horn of **Africa** and influencing **broader** patterns of **cooperation** and conflict **resolution** across the continent. The world is watching closely, and the actions taken by these nations will have **lasting** **consequences** for regional stability and prosperity.¶ As the agreement unfolds, the international community is keenly observing the implications it may have not only for Ethiopia and Somalia but also for the surrounding nations. The Horn of Africa has long been a region marked by conflict and instability, and the success of this agreement could serve as a model for conflict resolution in other parts of the continent. The involvement of Turkey in mediating this agreement is particularly noteworthy. Traditionally, the Horn of Africa has seen influence from powers such as the United States and the European Union, which have historically dominated the region’s diplomatic landscape. These Western powers often approached the region from a geopolitical perspective, emphasizing security concerns, counterterrorism efforts, and humanitarian aid. However, Turkey’s active role in this recent agreement signals a shift in the balance of diplomatic engagement in the region, introducing new dynamics that could reshape traditional alliances and interactions. Turkey’s increasing visibility in the Horn of Africa is part of a broader strategy to expand its influence across the African continent. By positioning itself as a mediator in the Ethiopia-Somalia agreement, Turkey demonstrates its commitment to fostering dialogue and promoting stability in a region that has long been plagued by conflict. Analysts suggest that Turkey’s approach, characterized by a focus on economic partnerships and development aid alongside diplomatic efforts, may offer a fresh perspective that resonates well with local leaders. This multifaceted strategy allows Turkey to engage with countries on various levels, addressing not only political issues but also the economic and social challenges that these nations face. Turkey’s emphasis on building economic ties can be particularly appealing to local leaders who are eager to attract investment and stimulate growth. By offering development assistance and promoting trade relationships, Turkey positions itself as a partner that prioritizes the needs and aspirations of the region’s countries. This contrasts with more traditional diplomatic approaches that may focus solely on security and political alignment, potentially alienating local populations. Turkey’s engagement in the Horn of Africa is also marked by a commitment to cultural diplomacy. Through initiatives such as educational programs, cultural exchanges, and humanitarian assistance, Turkey seeks to build goodwill and foster connections with local communities. This holistic approach not only enhances Turkey’s image but also establishes a foundation for deeper diplomatic relationships based on mutual respect and understanding. As Turkey becomes more involved in mediating conflicts and facilitating agreements, it could potentially act as a counterbalance to the influence of traditional Western powers. This diversification of diplomatic engagement may empower local leaders to pursue a more independent foreign policy, reducing reliance on established powers and allowing for a broader range of partnerships. Turkey’s involvement in mediating the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia marks a significant development in the Horn of Africa’s diplomatic landscape. By offering a fresh perspective that prioritizes economic partnerships, development aid, and cultural diplomacy, Turkey is positioning itself as a key player in the region. This shift not only reflects changing geopolitical dynamics but also highlights the potential for new alliances and cooperative efforts that can contribute to lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. The agreement opens avenues for economic cooperation that could benefit both nations significantly. Enhanced trade relations stand out as a primary area where Ethiopia and Somalia can capitalize on their geographical proximity and shared interests. By reducing trade barriers and establishing favorable tariffs, both countries could increase the flow of goods and services, creating opportunities for businesses and entrepreneurs. This could lead to the development of new markets, allowing local producers in both countries to access each other’s goods, thus stimulating economic growth and increasing consumer choices.¶ **Joint** **infrastructure** projects represent another **promising** area of **collaboration**. The Horn of Africa has long faced infrastructure challenges that hinder economic development. By **pooling** **resources** and **expertise**, Ethiopia and Somalia could **undertake** **projects** that **improve** **transportation** networks, such as **roads** and **railways**, and enhance **energy** **infrastructure**, such as **electricity** **generation** and **distribution**. Improved **infrastructure** would not only facilitate **trade** between the two nations but also **attract** foreign **investment**, as better connectivity and reliable energy sources are crucial for investors looking to enter the market. Furthermore, these projects could create **jobs** and improve access to essential services, directly benefiting local communities.¶ Collaborative security measures are also likely to emerge as a key focus area as both Ethiopia and Somalia confront common security threats, including terrorism and piracy. By working together on security initiatives, both nations could **enhance** their **capabilities** to address these challenges and create a safer environment for economic activities. Joint training exercises, **intelligence** **sharing**, and coordinated **law** **enforcement** efforts can lead to a more stable security landscape, which is essential for fostering economic growth and **attracting** **investment**.¶ The potential benefits of this cooperation extend beyond Ethiopia and Somalia, creating a ripple effect that positively impacts neighboring countries. Improved **trade** **routes** and **infrastructure** can **facilitate** regional **commerce**, allowing other **countries** in the Horn of Africa to **participate** in the growing **economic** **landscape**. For example, landlocked countries like Ethiopia could gain easier access to Somali ports, enhancing their export capabilities and **reducing** transportation **costs**. This interconnectedness could foster a sense of **regional** **unity**, as nations collaborate to address common challenges and capitalize on shared opportunities.¶ As **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** **strengthen** their **economic** ties, they may set a **precedent** for **other** **countries** in the region to **follow** **suit**. This could encourage a broader trend of **regional** **integration**, where countries prioritize **collaboration** over **competition**, ultimately contributing to a more **stable** and **prosperous** Horn of **Africa**. Regional organizations may play a crucial role in facilitating this integration by providing platforms for dialogue, cooperation, and joint initiatives. The agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia not only opens avenues for direct economic cooperation between the two nations but also holds the potential to enhance regional stability and unity. Through enhanced trade relations, joint **infrastructure** **projects**, and collaborative **security** measures, both countries can **lift** their **economic** **prospects** and set the stage for a more **interconnected** and **prosperous** Horn of **Africa**. This cooperation could redefine the region’s economic landscape, fostering a spirit of **collaboration** that **benefits** **all** **nations** involved.¶ However, **challenges** **remain**. The underlying issues that have historically fueled tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, including territorial disputes and resource allocation, must be addressed through ongoing dialogue. These issues are deeply rooted in the complex histories and political dynamics of both nations, and ignoring them could undermine the progress made through the recent agreement. **Territorial** **disputes**, particularly around contested borders, have long been a **source** of **friction**. There are areas where both nations claim sovereignty, and without a concerted effort to delineate and respect these boundaries, the potential for conflict remains. Engaging in transparent discussions about territorial claims and finding mutually acceptable solutions will be essential to prevent misunderstandings and grievances that could escalate into larger confrontations.¶ Resource allocation is another critical issue that needs attention. Both Ethiopia and Somalia face significant challenges related to water, land, and energy resources. For instance, the management of the Nile River and its tributaries is a contentious topic, as both countries depend on this vital resource for agriculture and hydropower. Similarly, access to arable land and grazing rights can create tensions, especially in border regions where communities may straddle both nations. Ensuring equitable resource distribution and establishing cooperative management strategies will be crucial in addressing the needs and rights of both populations, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict.¶ Additionally, there is a risk that if these **concerns** are **not** adequately **managed**, they could **resurface** and **threaten** the **fragile** **peace** that has been **established**. Historical grievances, if left unaddressed, can fester and lead to renewed hostilities, **undermining** the **trust** that is **essential** for long-term **collaboration**. Both nations must commit to ongoing dialogue that not only addresses current challenges but also seeks to heal past wounds. This may involve reconciliation initiatives, community engagement, and confidence-building measures that foster mutual understanding and respect.¶ The role of **external** **stakeholders**, including regional organizations and international partners, can also be **pivotal** in supporting this dialogue. By facilitating discussions and providing mediation when necessary, these actors can help both countries navigate their complex relationship and address the underlying issues that pose risks to peace. Moreover, the involvement of external partners can offer technical assistance and resources to help manage disputes over resources and promote sustainable development in contested areas. While the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia marks a significant step towards peace, the persistent challenges of territorial disputes and resource allocation must be addressed through continuous dialogue and engagement. Failure to manage these underlying issues could jeopardize the fragile peace that has been established, potentially leading to renewed tensions and conflict. A proactive approach that prioritizes reconciliation, equitable resource management, and external support will be essential to ensure lasting stability and cooperation in the region.¶ The role of external actors cannot be underestimated. Countries like the United States, China, and regional **organizations** such as the **African** **Union** will likely have **vested** **interests** in the outcome of this agreement. Their **involvement** is **critical** due to the strategic **significance** of the Horn of **Africa**, which is not only a region rich in resources but also a pivotal area for trade routes and security considerations. For instance, the U.S. has historically been concerned with counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and stability in Ethiopia, while China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects throughout the region as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.¶ The **actions** of these external **players** can either **support** the **peace** **process** or **complicate** it, depending on how their **interests** **align** with those of Ethiopia, **Somalia**, and the broader **region**. If these countries approach the agreement with a collaborative mindset, offering diplomatic support, investment, and development aid, they could significantly bolster the efforts of both nations to maintain peace and foster cooperation. For example, the U.S. could provide technical assistance in governance and security, while China could invest in infrastructure that supports economic growth and connectivity.¶ Conversely, if **external** **actors** pursue their **agendas** without **considering** the local **context**, their involvement could **exacerbate** **tensions** rather than alleviate them. For instance, competing interests among these powers could lead to a situation where **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** feel **pressured** to **align** with **one** **side**, creating **divisions** that **undermine** the spirit of **cooperation**. Additionally, if the actions of **external** **actors** are perceived as **biased** or **detrimental** to the **interests** of either **nation**, it could **erode** **trust** and **jeopardize** the fragile **peace** **established** by the agreement.¶ The agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, facilitated by Turkish mediation, heralds a promising era of dialogue and cooperation. However, the path forward will require sustained effort and commitment from all parties involved. Turkey’s role as a mediator is particularly noteworthy, as it brings a fresh perspective and a focus on economic partnerships that may resonate with local leaders. Nevertheless, the success of this initiative hinges on the willingness of Ethiopia and Somalia to engage in continuous dialogue, manage their underlying issues, and build trust over time.

#### Decline causes great power war.

**Brands 21** [Hal Brands, professor @ John Hopkins University and senior fellow @ the American Enterprise Institute, 5-14-2017, China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/] tristan

Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to **keep the public happy**. Economic underperformance **weakens the country against its rivals**. Fearing **upheaval**, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver **desperately** to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. **Expansion** seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic **resources and markets**, making **nationalism** a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats. ¶ Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and **imperial expansion** during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a **deep slump** at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century. ¶ A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances. Facing a severe, post-2008 economic slowdown, Russian President Vladimir Putin i**nvaded two neighboring countries**, sought to create a new Eurasian economic bloc, staked Moscow’s claim to a resource-rich Arctic, and steered Russia deeper into dictatorship. Even democratic France engaged in anxious aggrandizement after the end of its postwar economic expansion in the 1970s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops to its former colonies and **undertaking a dozen military interventions** over the next two decades. ¶ All of these cases were complicated, yet the pattern is clear. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the **fear** of decline serves up a powerful motive for rasher, more urgent expansion. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. In fact, some of history’s most gruesome wars have come when revisionist powers concluded their **path to glory was about to be blocked**.