# Cards

## 1AC --- Overview

#### Located within the Horn of Africa,

**Wilson 24** [Eliot Wilson, freelance writer on politics and international affairs and opinion contributor @ The Hill, 2-12-2024, Recognize Somaliland as an independent nation, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4463184-recognize-somaliland-as-an-independent-nation/] BZ

The Republic of Somaliland, in the north of Somalia, **declared independence** from the central government in 1991. But the state from which it sought to secede was of no great antiquity, having been formed after independence from colonial rulers only in 1960. Before that, the territory which now claims its autonomy as Somaliland was a British possession starting in 1884, while the rest of the country had existed as Somalia Italia since 1908. ¶ The United States should carefully examine the prospect of recognizing Somaliland. **80** percent of the population is made up of the Isaaq clan, making it **ethnically distinct** from Somalia. Despite lack of international recognition, it has created a reasonably **free and democratic society** over the past 30 years, with **presidential elections** in 2003, 2010 and 2017, and is due to go to the polls again this November. International observers in 2017 noted that “Somaliland’s success in establishing a viable political system that **combines customary structures with the representative electoral mechanisms** of the nation-state has been impressive.”¶ Somaliland still faces challenges of corruption, economic and political marginalization, and violence against women. But over the same 33-year period, Somalia, which asserts its sovereignty, has been in **freefall, beset by internal violence and weak political institutions**.¶ Freedom House, which produces an annual assessment of political freedoms and civil liberties, last year rated Somaliland as “partly free” with a score of 44 out of 100. Somalia was declared “unfree” with just 8 of 100. For context, the United States only managed 76 of 100. ¶ These two small jurisdictions, with a combined population of around 18 million, are important to the United States because of their strategic location. The West has been brutally reminded of the importance of freedom of navigation by the attacks on shipping by Houthi militants in Yemen, on the northern shore of the Gulf of Aden. Somaliland and Somalia are to the south, watching over access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and thence to the Red Sea, which accounts for 12 percent of global trade and a third of global container traffic. ¶ Somaliland remains poor. If rated separately, it is the **18th-poorest country** in the world; but one 2023 study named Somalia as the poorest of all. Somaliland is **limited** by its lack of international recognition: it is **ineligible for loans** from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and **excluded from international markets and global trading** networks. ¶ In 2021, Somaliland saw the opening of a major port facility at Berbera operated by Emirati logistics giant DP World. Last March, the government created a special Berbera Economic Zone by the port to encourage trade and investment. Where Somaliland has developed private enterprise it has been dynamic and highly entrepreneurial. In terms of education and research, the University of Hargeisa has established links with Harvard, University College London and King’s College London. It is Somaliland’s very efforts towards development that sparked Rep. Omar’s remarks. On Jan. 1, the Somaliland government concluded a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia to lease access to the open sea for the Ethiopian Navy in return for a share in Ethiopian Airlines. Ethiopia lost its coastal access when Eritrea seceded in 2003 and currently pays fees to use port facilities in Djibouti. Inevitably, Somalia has objected, as have Eritrea and Egypt. ¶ The U.S. special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Michael Hammer, has maintained the administration’s line on the integrity of Somalia, where the U.S. has spent $3.25 billion in assistance since 2006. By any metric, current U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa is failing. Yet the shipping lanes just off the horn are now one of the central focuses of America’s military and diplomatic efforts. If Donald Trump takes back the presidency in November, it is hard to imagine he will apply a magnifying lens to the intricacies of U.S. posture; he sees foreign policy only in the most startling of primary colors, and has no instinctive affinity for free trade or global supply chains. ¶ President Biden has a year, come what may. It is time to make radical changes, to stop using the interests of a **failed shell of a state** as the fulcrum of U.S. policy. Somaliland has made astonishing economic and political progress over the past 30 years without the benefit of statehood — and now deserves a modest helping hand.

#### Indeed, Somaliland, which has been independent since 1991, operates as a state in all ways except its status.

**Idaan 24** [Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, senior lecturer @ universities in Somaliland who specializes in international relations in the Horn of Africa with master’s degrees in international law and international relations, 7-4-2024, A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/04/a-legal-and-diplomatic-analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/] BZ \*\*edited for objectionable language\*\*

Legal Criteria for Statehood: An Analysis of Somaliland’s Status Against the Montevideo Convention The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, dating back to 1933, is recognized as one of the most crucial bases of international law. In it, four criteria for statehood are recognized: a **permanent population**; a **defined territory**; an **effective government**; and the **capacity to enter into relations with other states**. The subsequent section examines Somaliland against such criteria in law in depth, placing its re-emergence as a state within a legal context. Permanent Population: Stability in Demographic Characteristics Even though it does not enjoy international recognition, Somaliland has a **resident population estimated at 3.5 million** people. This population largely consists of ethnic Somalis who **share one language, culture, and historical heritage**. In other words, there exists quite a **high degree of social cohesion a**nd most of it is on automobiles. Such population stability also can be justified by the fact that the country holds census activities, functions voter registrations, and is actively involved in democratic elections regularly. Somaliland’s population is one strong indicator of the country’s stability and permanence. Its people are demographically consistent. **Population censuses are held constantly** to provide an accurate state of the demographics for formulation and governance. **Voter registrations are also carried out with utmost care** so that the electoral process is representative enough of the population. All these parameters ensure the permanent population criterion stipulated by the Montevideo Convention is strengthened. Further, the participation of the working population of Somaliland in free and fair democratic exercises, such as presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, demonstrates behavioral relevance and engagement in the management and activities of their nation; the active citizenship legitimizes the administration and further represents a population that is settled, not transitory in any way, and deeply devoted and dedicated to the exercise and the overall nation-state-building process. Territoriality: Acquired Frontiers and Functional Space It can be noted that the territory of Somaliland corresponds to that of the former British Somaliland protectorate, which became independent on 26 June 1960, and voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland the following day, on 1 July 1960, forming the Somali Republic. After declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland established **firm administrative** control over its historical boundaries, and **internal stability was achieved**. The determinate territory criterion is significant in statehood as it provides the geographical extent to which a state has to exercise its sovereignty. Somaliland remains **true to the boundaries of its colonial history** in which it got its independence, thereby having a **well-defined territory** with **clear and recognizable demarcation by the international community**. Further underlining historical continuity is the putting in place of mechanisms controlling its borders and administrative regions which help in effective governance and security within its territorial limits. The Somaliland government **has put proper border control** in place to monitor and regulate human and goods movements, making the borders secure and sovereign. Administrative regions are well-demarcated and served with local structures that provide easy administration and public service provision. This is esteemed by the presence of security forces that have been deployed in every corner of this country in line with the maintenance of law and order, meaning that this country in reference, to Somaliland, has proper administration over its defined territory. Functional Government: Democratic Institutions and Governance Structures Somaliland has an operational government that exercises effective control. It has democratic institutions in place, has held periodic elections, and maintains law and order through the traditional and modern governance structures in place. The government follows a constitution that came after a national referendum of 2001, which underlines the separation of powers, the rule of law, and human rights. The effective government criterion is one of the basic principles of statehood that sums up having the possibility to exercise authority but also provide governance over the defined territory. In its case, Somaliland has effectively maintained a robust democratic government with the structures set, well established, and fully functional. The government comprises the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Each has its independence and, therefore, works independently but interdependently to offer governance over its people. It means that elections are held into office regularly and power is transferred peacefully through a process that is carried out with the will of the citizens. Elections, which indicate transparency and inclusiveness, allow citizens to participate in the process of electing their leaders. The government, for instance, practices the rule of law through its legal and just set-up. This is where justice can be strong and exercise accountability. The government of Somaliland is also heavily involved in the provision of public services, such as health, education, and national development structures, for the betterment and progress of the state’s inhabitants. The government system is closely in control of law and order through law enforcement and security forces that assist the government in curbing threats to the nation at the national and international levels. Coordination between the traditional and modern governance systems further enhances the legitimacy and popular acceptance of the government system. Diplomatic Relations and Constraints: Ability to Engage in any Relationship with Other Somaliland **maintains informal relations** with many countries and international organizations. It has **representative offices** in some countries, for example, in the UK, Ethiopia, and the US, and takes part in some international forums such as the African Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. However, this engagement is limited by its unrecognized status, which blocks its capacity as a signatory to some treaties and full participation in world diplomatic and economic fora. First and foremost, the ability to enter into relations with other states is one of the chief criteria for statehood, which indicates the ability of a given state to **conduct international diplomacy and cooperation**. Though not formally recognized, Somaliland **has already shown the capacit**y to establish and maintain diplomatic relations. This could be evidenced by representative offices in different countries, which is a strong indication of its proactiveness in diplomacy and building international relationships. Earlier, the participation of Somaliland in international fora, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, **testifies to its mental preparedness and ability** to partake in regional development and cooperation. As modest as these relations are, it is a demonstration of Somaliland’s brilliance in diplomacy and towards the rest of the states and international communities. Somaliland has hosted international delegations as well as participated in bilateral and multilateral discussions on security, trade, and development matters and, in the process, demonstrated its capacity for diplomacy. But lack of formal recognition puts up insurmountable hurdles in the way of Somaliland by the international community. Without recognition, Somaliland cannot be a part of agreements and treaties, international memberships, or active participation in the global economy and political systems. With due inevitability, such a constraint limits its capacity to attract international assistance and resources towards its sustainable development and security concerns. Such proactive diplomacy of Somaliland proves that, despite all of these, it is capable of maintaining international relations. By constantly exploring channels of engagement and cooperation, Somaliland takes a stand that it is a responsible and able member of the international community. This persistence in diplomacy highlights Somaliland’s commitment to the elements of statehood that are stipulated by the Montevideo Convention amidst formidable impediments. Somaliland provides for all of the criteria of the Montevideo Convention on statehood, having a defined population that resides on its territory, an effective government, and the capacity to conduct relations with other states. Undoubtedly, these are the elements that will give a strong legal base for their statehood argument, even though there are political and diplomatic obstacles that hinder its recognition. In the light of the above stated, Somaliland proves that it is **legitimate** and, therefore, capable of becoming a sovereign State, a full subject of international order.

#### However, despite its impressive track record, a lack of official recognition hinders progress.

**Ferragamo 24** [Mariel Ferragamo, Daily News Brief editor @ CFR with a focus on Africa and global health, 1-25-2024, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state] BZ

What is Somaliland’s case for independence? ¶ The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a sovereign democratic state: it holds **free and fair elections**, **has its own currency and security** forces, and **issues its own passports**. It also says that its independence claim is **consistent** with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders are predominantly from the **Isaaq clan**, and thus **ethnically distinctive** from other Somalis. ¶ The territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region. “From the Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument,” Bronwyn Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying to break off from Somalia, which **hasn’t been a functioning country in decades.**” Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland’s freedom index at “partly free,” scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally “not free” status, and the fourteenth-lowest worldwide However, Somaliland’s score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on opposition protestors when its parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election. ¶ What is its financial situation? ¶ A weak economy and limited opportunities for foreign trade and investment have stifled the government’s capacity to provide services to its approximately four million residents. Somaliland has a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $2 billion, most of which it receives in remittances from Somalilanders working abroad. The area’s **unemployment remains very high,** particularly for youth, and officials worry about a potential “**brain drain**” phenomenon, with educated people migrating in search of opportunities elsewhere. Its main exports are livestock and animal products, which it ships to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as to Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman. Its GDP per capita, in the hundreds of dollars, is **one of the lowest in the world**. If it were to gain independence, Somaliland would become the **eighteenth-poorest country** today. Somalia, meanwhile, is the world’s fifth-poorest. ¶ Meanwhile, the government is **ineligible for loans** from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally recognized state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017 election victory, said that Somaliland’s **exclusion from international markets** “compounds the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic economy puts decades of political progress at risk. ¶ Somaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite opposition from the federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark deal with DP World of Dubai, part of the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of Berbera, a joint venture expected to produce millions of dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Landlocked Ethiopia joined the port development project two years later, aiming to expand its access to the sea. ¶ In January 2024, Somaliland sparked another diplomatic row with Somalia when it agreed to lease Ethiopia rights to twelve kilometers (twenty miles) of coastline and access to Berbera for commercial and military purposes for fifty years in exchange for its formal recognition and part ownership of Ethiopia Airlines, the national carrier.

## 1AC --- Economic Development

#### Somaliland will never achieve its full potential without recognition.

**Idaan 24** [Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, senior lecturer @ universities in Somaliland who specializes in international relations in the Horn of Africa with master’s degrees in international law and international relations, 7-4-2024, A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition, Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/04/a-legal-and-diplomatic-analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/] BZ \*\*edited for objectionable language\*\*

Economic Hurdles: International Markets and Investment¶ A lack of recognition grossly limits access to international financial systems and foreign investment by Somaliland. Without formal recognition, Somaliland is **unable to fully participate in global economic** forums and, in turn, hampers its social-economic development. Non-access to such financial institutions of the world that would facilitate the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund means **it cannot make any agreements regarding funding and loans for developmental purposes.**¶ Such an economic isolation almost **nullifies the bright scope for growth and development** for Somaliland. In the face of such **uncertainty regarding business deals** with [unrecognized] illegal states, foreign investors feel quite discouraged. This, in turn, highly restricts the economic development of the region. Such economic marginalization is not only damaging its development prospects, rather it refrains it from also moving forward as a proper, self-sustained state in the eyes of the world.

#### This economic development is critical to poverty reduction.

**Adams 03** [Richard H. Adams, economics researcher @ the World Bank, 2-xx-2003, Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Findings from a New Data Set, World bank, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pt/168041468761746890/pdf/multi0page.pdf] BZ

It is possible to test this relationship by using equation (4) to estimate elasticities of poverty with respect to growth. The results are shown in Table 6 (a) and (b). Three sets of findings are noteworthy. First, measuring growth by the survey mean, Table 6(a) shows that virtually all of the regression coefficients for the three types of poverty measures - headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap -- are negative and highly significant at the I percent level. When growth is measured by GDP per capita (Table 6 (b)), far fewer of the poverty coefficients (6 of 12 coefficients) are significant and only three of them are significant at the 1 percent level. These differing results suggest that when growth is measured by the survey mean, economic growth does reduce poverty; however, when growth is measured by GDP per capita, the statistical relationship between growth and poverty is less clear. Second, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the point estimate for the growth elasticity of poverty for the headcount ratio for the full sample is quite high (-5.745). This high point estimate is probably due to the inclusion of so many intervals from the countries of Europe and Central Asia.'6 In fact, when the intervals from Europe and Central Asia are excluded, the point estimate for the headcount ratio becomes -2.592, which is very close to the one estimated (-2.12) by Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) on a smaller set of countries. In other words, when the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are excluded, a 10-percentage point increase in growth (measured by the survey mean) in this data set can be expected to produce **a 25.9** percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day). Third, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the data show that growth has a greater impact on the more sensitive measures of poverty. In Table 6 (a) the growth elasticities for both the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap measure are higher than that for the simple headcount ratio. While a 10-percentage point increase in growth can be expected to lead to a 25.9 percent decline in the headcount index, it will lead to a **30.4** percent fall in the poverty gap and a 33.9 percent decrease in the squared poverty gap. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the data clearly show that growth reduces poverty faster for more sensitive poverty measures¶ Since Eastern Europe and Central Asia had such a poor poverty record, it is useful to see if the preceding results are robust when data from this region are excluded from low income and lower middle income countries. Table 7 (a) and (b) thus re-estimate the growth elasticities of poverty for these sets of countries when data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia are excluded. The results mirror those of the previous table. Measuring growth by the survey mean, Table 7 (a) shows that virtually all of the regression coefficients for the three types of poverty measures are negative and highly significant. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the point estimate for the headcount ratio of poverty for the full sample (-2.592) is very close to those estimated for low income (-2.523) and lower middle income countries (-2.752). Finally, as in the preceding table, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the growth elasticities for both the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap measure are higher than that for the simple headcount ratio. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the data show that economic growth reduces poverty faster for more sensitive poverty measures. It should be emphasized that all of these estimated growth elasticities are averages. In other words, there is considerable variation between countries and over time in the extent to which poverty responds to economic growth. As noted.by Ravallion (1997), one of the more important factors affecting how poverty responds to growth is the level of initial inequality in a country. The impact of this variable on poverty can be examined by dividing the full sample into two groups of countries - low-income inequality countries (initial Gini below 40.0) and high-income inequality countries (initial Gini above 40.0) - and re-estimating the regressions in Table 6a using survey mean income (consumption). The results for the poverty headcount measure show that countries with a low initial Gini have a growth elasticity of poverty between -5.672 (t-ratio of -3.42) and -6.077 (t = -4.48), while those with a high initial Gini have a much lower growth elasticity of poverty, between -2.438 (t = -1.46) and -3.272 (t = -3.48). In other words, with a given rate of economic growth, low inequality countries will be about twice as effective in reducing the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day) than high inequality countries.¶ 7. Conclusion ¶ This paper has analyzed a new household data set to address the key question: "To what extent does economic growth reduce poverty in the low-income countries of the world?" The basic finding is that economic growth represents an important means for reducing poverty in the developing world. This **finding is robust** for the two definitions of growth used in this study. When economic growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), there is a strong, statistical link between growth and poverty reduction. When economic growth is measured by GDP per capita, the statistical relationship between growth and poverty reduction is still present, albeit not quite as strong. ¶ Why is economic growth so important in reducing poverty? The answer to this question has been broached at several points in this analysis. Economic growth reduces poverty because first and foremost growth has little impact on income inequality. Income distributions do not generally change much over time. Analysis of the **50 countries** and the 101 intervals included in the data set shows that income inequality rises on **average less than 1.0 percent** per year. Moreover, econometric analysis shows that economic growth has no statistical effect on income distribution: inequality may rise, fall or remain steady with growth.¶ Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth - in the sense of rising incomes - has the general effect **of raising incomes for all members of society, including the poor**. As noted above, in many developing countries poverty, as measured by the $1 per person per day standard, tends to be "shallow" in the sense that many people are clustered right below (and above) the poverty line. Thus, even a modest rate of economic growth has the effect of "lifting" people out of poverty. Poor people are capable of using economic growth - especially labor-intensive economic growth which provides more jobs -- to "work" themselves out of poverty¶ Table 8 underscores these relationships by summarizing the results of recent empirical studies regarding the growth elasticity of poverty. When growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), the point estimates of the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth are remarkably uniform: from a low of -2.12 in Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998), to a mid-range of -2.59 in this study (excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia), to a high of -3.12 in Ravallion and Chen (1997). In other words, on average, a 10 -percentage point increase in economic growth (measured by the survey mean) can be expected to produce between a 21.2 and 31.2 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day). Economic growth reduces poverty in the developing countries of the world because average incomes of the poor tend to rise proportionately with those of the rest of the population.¶ The fact that economic growth is so critical in reducing poverty highlights the need to accelerate economic growth throughout the developing world. Present rates of economic growth in the developing world are simply too low to make a meaningful dent in poverty. As measured by per capita GDP, the average rate of growth for the 50 low income and lower middle income countries in this paper was 2.66 percent per year. As measured by mean survey income (consumption), the average rate of growth in these 50 countries was even lower: a slightly negative -0.90 percent per year (Table 3). In the future, these rates of economic growth need to be significantly increased. In particular, more work needs to be done on identifying the elements used for achieving successful high rates of economic growth and poverty reduction in certain regions of the developing world (e.g., East Asia and South Asia), and applying the lessons of this work to the continuing growth and poverty needs in other areas, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

#### Critically,

**World Bank 15** [No Author, 1-xx-2015, SOMALILAND Poverty Profile and Overview of Living Conditions, World Bank, https://www.somalilandcsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Somaliland-Poverty-Profile..pdf] BZ

More than **1 in 3** people in rural Somaliland and more than 1 in 4 people in urban Somaliland are living in poverty. Rural poverty is more prevalent and deeper than urban poverty. In rural Somaliland 24% of households live in extreme poverty —defined as consuming less than the cost of meeting basic foodneeds. In the absence of Purchasing Power Parity estimates for Somaliland it is difficult to compare the level of poverty with neighboring countries, but using a similar method of estimation Ethiopia’s rate of urban poverty is similar to the rate of poverty in urban Somaliland whilst poverty in rural Somaliland is much higher than in rural Ethiopia. ¶ 4. Although rates of deprivation are high, some households have fared well in Somaliland in recent years and measures of inequality are high. Inequality in Somaliland **is among the highest in the region** with relatively high rates of inequality recorded in **both rural and urban Somaliland**. Additionally, inequality in access to basic services such as maternal health care and education suggests that, **without intervention, these levels of inequality are likely to be sustained in future generation**s. ¶ 5. Children born into poor household are **less likely to receive medical care** that may be required at birth, they are **less likely to live in households with running water and good sanitation**, and they are much **less likely to attend school**. This report shows that the poverty of ones parents is highly correlated with the opportunities available to a child in Somaliland. Poverty is strongly negatively correlated with access to child health and education. These findings suggest that the necessary focus of the government on peace building and nation development and limited donor support has resulted 7 in inadequate delivery of basic services and very unequal access to services and wellbeing. Addressing this is the challenge facing Somaliland.¶ 6. Households in Somaliland face deprivations on many dimensions, particularly in rural areas, which points to the need for a comprehensive approach to addressing poverty. More than two-thirds of poor households in urban areas have a child who is not in school, or do not have access to an improved water source, or do not have access to external sources of information. However, households in rural Somaliland are three times more likely to be deprived in multiple dimensions at once. The acute nature of rural poverty in combination with the existence of deprivation on a greater number of dimensions makes rural poverty harder to address. Addressing poverty will require investments in education and improved health care in addition to investments to improve productive opportunities for poor households

#### Devastatingly,

**Muller 23** [Paul S. Muller, medical professor @ UT, 4-20-2023, NEJM Journal Watch: Summaries of and commentary on original medical and scientific articles from key medical journals, NEJM, https://www.jwatch.org/na56040/2023/04/20/poverty-leading-cause-death-us]

Current poverty is associated with 42% excess risk for death. Cumulative poverty (i.e., 10 continuous years of poverty) is associated with **71% excess risk for death**. Survival of people in poverty diverges from those not in poverty at age 40. Divergence peaks at age 70 and diminishes thereafter. In 2019, among people who were 15 or older, cumulative poverty was the **fourth leading cause of death** (296,000 deaths), behind heart disease, cancer, and smoking, and ahead of dementia and obesity. Current poverty was the seventh leading cause (183,000 deaths), ahead of accidents, chronic lung disease, stroke, suicide, and homicide.

## 1AC --- Food Aid

#### Climate shocks are generating a food emergency in Somaliland.

**RW 24** [No Author, 9-12-2024, Somaliland: Nourishing vulnerable rural and displaced communities, Relief Web, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somaliland-nourishing-vulnerable-rural-and-displaced-communities] BZ

As a result of **climate-related shocks**, several districts in Somaliland continue to face high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, with women and children worst affected. According to recent IPC data, the food security situation in most of Somaliland can be characterised as ‘stressed’ or level 2, with pockets of level 3 – crisis situation - in Togdheer region. Like the acute food security situation, the acute malnutrition situation is **projected to continue to worsen** until June of this year, with a growing number of areas that are projected to experience Phase 3 – serious malnutrition. ¶ Children are particularly affected by malnutrition throughout the country. Over **1.7 million children** under the age of 5 need treatment. Among those, almost half a million are experiencing severe acute malnutrition and are at risk of acute wasting. Acute wasting is a condition where children experience rapid weight loss and malnutrition, often resulting in a dangerously low weight for their age and height. This condition can have severe consequences on their physical and cognitive development, leaving them vulnerable to illness and even death if not addressed promptly. While levels of wasting have improved in some parts of Somalia, they are **projected to deteriorate** from the current Alert to Serious phase among Burao IDPs, who are one of the target groups of this project. ¶ With the support of the French Embassy, Acted, in partnership with Candlelight and Barwaaqo Volunteer Organization BVO, is implementing a one-year project titled “Nourishing Communities: Restoring Resilience Through Enhanced Food and Nutrition Security for Vulnerable Rural and Displaced Crisis-Affected Communities in Somaliland” from October 2023 to September 2024. ¶ The project aims to increase resilience though improved food security and nutrition outcomes for vulnerable, displaced, and rural populations in crisis affected areas in Somalia. The beneficiaries amount to 5,120 households (30,720 individuals) dispersed throughout 18 IDP sites and rural communities in Burco District (Togdheer Region), and Caynaba and Laas Canood (Sool Region).

#### However, current food aid to Somaliland is lacking, with recognition being critical.

**Beaubien 17** [Jason Beaubien, staff writer @ NPR with a focus on global politics and current events, 5-29-2017, Somaliland Wants To Make One Thing Clear: It Is NOT Somalia, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/30/530703639/somaliland-wants-to-make-one-thing-clear-it-is-not-somalia] BZ

Somaliland is being hit by a regional food crisis that the U.N. has described as one of the **largest humanitarian emergencies since 1945**. More than a million of Somaliland's four million people are at risk of starvation yet relief has been slow to come.¶ "We are being treated unfairly," Shire says seated in a conference room of a consulting firm in downtown Washington, D.C. He's in town lobbying American lawmakers for what has become his perpetual cause — official recognition of Somaliland as a nation. "You know by **lumping Somalia and Somaliland together**, it is slowing down the delivery of assistance."¶ Somaliland declared its independence from the failed state of Somalia in 1991, but the world ... for the most part ... has ignored the declaration. The similar names are rooted in colonial history: Somaliland became known as British Somaliland in the 19th century, while the southern region was Italian Somaliland.¶ "We have a functioning democracy. We have our own army. We have our own police. We have our own coast guard. You know, we have our own border police. We have fulfilled all the conditions of a sovereign state," Shire says as he ticks through why Somaliland is its own nation. And there's more. Somaliland has its own currency. It regularly holds elections.¶ "The only thing that's missing is the sovereign recognition," he says.¶ Bronwyn Bruton, the director of programs and studies at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, says the international community has been uninterested in recognizing Somaliland as a new nation for several reasons.¶ Quite frankly, she says, the first is apathy. Somaliland doesn't have oil or other resources to make other players on the international stage care about it.¶ Second, she explains, is the belief that recognizing Somaliland would undermine international efforts to get a functioning government in Mogadishu, which Somaliland broke away from.¶ "The international community led by the United States and Britain has put a lot of time and effort into trying to build a government in Mogadishu," Bruton says. "And it's perceived that if Somaliland were to be granted its separation it would reflect poorly on that nascent government."¶ Finally the African Union doesn't want to encourage independence movements in other restive regions around the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says lack of recognition is impeding what has already been a slow international response to the food crisis in Somaliland. Aid from international agencies is being **coordinated and routed through war-ravaged Mogadishu** — the Somali capital **900 miles to the south**.¶ "It is affecting us in many ways," Shire says. "We are not present in the forums in which these [aid efforts] are discussed. We **cannot access bilateral aid**. We **cannot get loans**. **We cannot attract international investors**."¶ Because it's not officially a country **Somaliland isn't eligible for loans that the World Bank makes to poor nations**. It **can't get in on other assistance programs** that are traditionally delivered to governments.¶ Somaliland broke away from Somalia to keep from getting sucked down as Somalia disintegrated in to a failed state in the 1990's. It lacked any central government from 1991 to 2006. Pirates took to terrorizing ships in its waterway. Islamist militants set up shop. Somalia is still one of the world's most dangerous countries for international aid groups to work in.¶ And Somaliland continues to be tarnished by its former partner's woes.¶ When aid groups consider working in Somaliland, officials at their head offices in Europe or the U.S. often treat the project as if it's occurring in Mogadishu.¶ "For example a U.S. NGO will go to the State Department website," Shire says. "They look at the traveler advice [for Somalia] and they would be dissuaded by what they see on the screen. This really does not reflect what's on the ground in Somaliland."¶ Africa specialist Bruton says Shire's frustration is justified. Somaliland, she says, has created a relatively stable enclave in a turbulent part of the Horn of Africa.¶ "Somaliland gets a ton of good press for being stable and kind of a peaceful island in a sea of violence that is Somalia," Bruton says. "The reality is that unlike southern Somalia, where you have a lot of violence, Somaliland is essentially a single clan territory. And so what's happening is it's being run as a traditional clan democracy." This has its drawbacks if you aren't part of the dominant clan, she points out, but one of the upsides is stability.¶ "Somalilanders have made an excellent case that because they were a British rather than an Italian colony, they were never really part of Somalia and so they have a right to be separate," Bruton says. The two colonies merged after they each won their independence from the Europeans in 1960. But she says African nations worry that Somaliland secession from the rest of Somalia sets a dangerous precedent on the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says what's dangerous for Somalilanders right now is to stay in international limbo. The lack of recognition is impeding international relief, he emphasizes, and stymying development.¶ Bruton at the Atlantic Council says he definitely has a point: "Somaliland is effectively being held hostage to the chaos in southern Somalia, Which is grossly unfair."

#### This food aid is key to combating famine and building long term sustainability.

**Gautam 18** [Yograj Gautam, geographer and food studies researcher @ the University of Bergen, 12-26-2018, “Food aid is killing Himalayan farms”. Debunking the false dependency narrative in Karnali, Nepal, World Development, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X18304297#s0025] BZ

Irrespective of the prevalent narratives, empirical studies show heterogeneous impacts of food aid. Although some studies note negative nutritional impacts of changing food habits induced by food aid flows (see Maxwell, 1995, Barrett and Maxwell, 2005), other studies find food aid to have **positive effects** on food consumption and nutrition at **national and international scales** (Lentz and Barrett, 2013, Schubert, 1981). Even at a local scale, food aid has evidently assisted food-deficit poor households to meet the deficit (Bishokarma, 2012), to increase dietary diversity by enabling them to save money and buy additional food (Bukusuba, Kikafunda, & Whitehead, 2007), and to reduce child undernutrition, which is a significant challenge facing low-income countries (Quisumbing, 2003). There is also evidence for food aid working as an effective **safety net**, for example by enabling poor households to avoid distress destocking of low value assets in the face of livelihood shocks (Tusiime, Renard, & Smets, 2013). Food aid impacts on local production and market are also mixed. Although food aid led to a decrease in local production in Uganda indicating a negative impact (Ferrière & Suwa-Eisenmann, 2015), it neither depressed prices nor had a significant negative impact on local production in Swaziland and Ethiopia (Abdulai et al., 2005, Mabuza et al., 2009). In the same line, a recent study that analyzed the impact of a large scale social protection program on local grain price in Ethiopia found that cash transfer has no effect on food price. Although food transfers led to a reduction in local grain price, the effect was trivially small (Hoddinott, Stifel, Hirvonen, & Minten, 2018). These results suggest place and context specific impacts of food aid.¶ Subsistence farmers in developing countries are increasingly being vulnerable to food insecurity due to emerging multiple environmental and socio-economic risks (Gautam and Andersen, 2017b, Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011, McCubbin et al., 2015, Morton, 2007, Tschakert, 2007). In this context, ample evidence exists signifying the role of various support programs in serving as effective safety net and also enabling the poor populations to undertake activities to sustainably improve their livelihoods (Banerjee et al., 2015, Fisher et al., 2017, Hidrobo et al., 2018). Arguably, this evidence can be used as a policy lesson to utilize food aid as a resource to safeguard the basic needs of the vulnerable populations in the face of these emerging risks. Policies, however, do not always directly draw on evidence provided by research (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Robust knowledge regarding the dynamics, uncertainties and complexities inherent with development issues is not always available for policymakers for decision making. In this context, they find policy guidance in development narratives, which simplify the complexity by depicting some realities (and neglecting others) and generalizing the (partial) picture to the whole (Roe, 1991). By brushing-off evidences that contrast them, such narratives maintain a particular way of addressing a problem (Adger et al., 2001, Cornwall and Brock, 2005, Escobar, 2011). Arguably, characterizing food aid as detrimental to long term food security, dependency narratives can create political barriers to integrate such potentially promising programs into food security policies. In addition, highlighting a simplified framework to explain the problem of food insecurity, such narratives may also sideline the importance of examining the dynamic and multiple factors that affect farmers’ wellbeing and ignore their real needs and priorities.¶ This paper contributes to this important issue in development studies by empirically examining the effects of food aid on food security and livelihoods of rural farming communities in Nepal. Drawing on a study conducted in the district of Humla in Karnali zone, it first assesses the role rice transfers under food aid has on decreasing food deficit of the recipient households. It analyzes the disincentive impacts and in particular the alleged ‘dependency’ in terms of food aid impacts on local crop diversity, crop production, and dietary pattern especially in terms of the role of aid transfers in replacing traditional crops/diets. Results show that food aid has had **positive contribution to food consumption** during periods of food shortage, more so in the context of emerging multiple challenges to local agriculture. Despite the free/concessional food transfers, the local farming system not only **maintains traditional crops**, recent **agricultural innovation has actually increased crop diversity**. The local diet pattern is highly diverse and well embedded with locally produced grains, which discredits the alleged changes in food habits. Following on from this, we present a critique to prevalent dependency narrative that conceptualizes food aid as detrimental to local food security. Such conceptualizations are currently occupying policy discussion that advocate for the elimination or reduction of food aid. We caution that such a policy move will not only directly affect many poor farmers’ food access, it will also leave an increased number of Himalayan farmers vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition in the face of emerging climatic and socioeconomic changes challenging local livelihoods.

#### Moreover, affirming would enable funding for climate adaptation, solving the root cause of hunger.

**Moe 24** [Louise Wiuff Moe, associate professor @ Roskilde University, 2024, TOWARDS A ‘PEACE CONTINUUM’ APPROACH TO CLIMATE SECURITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA, Danish Institute for International Studies, https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/23571007/Towards\_a\_peace\_continuum\_approach\_to\_climate\_security\_DIIS\_WP\_2024\_01.pdf, leon + Willie T.]

The most climate change-exposed populations in the region are often also among the most politically marginalised, feeding into climate concerns taking a secondary position – for donors as well as governments in the regions – as other priorities, including those related to conflict dynamics, take precedence (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). In Ethiopia, for example, areas of acute food insecurity in Tigray, Somali and Afar regions overlap with a high occurrence of conflict also involving the Ethiopian forces, and with pastoralists being particularly exposed due to the confluence of climate effects and political as well as socioeconomic marginalisation (Sax et al., 2023). Djibouti’s political dynamics, with an overlay of external competition over military bases, also divert attention away from climate and environmental concerns. And in Sudan, the ongoing war undercuts conditions for addressing pressing climate issues and related impacts such as the recent locust outbreaks (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Meanwhile, in Somalia, prolonged armed conflict, counterterrorism priorities and the series of ineffective central governments have left very limited sustained attention on climate change (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). **Somaliland**, **in turn**, has **progressed** in developing **policy frameworks** and **priorities** in the **field** of **climate change**, and also has a **long-established** Ministry of **Environment** and **Climate Change** but the **absence** of **international recognition** renders **Somaliland** ineligible to **engage** in formal **international forums**, and leaves it with **very limited** capacity and **funds** to implement policies (Musse, 2023).2 ¶ This dynamic, of conflict and political fragmentation feeding into climate vulnerability and leaving less capacities to address it, is reinforced by ‘the rule of thumb’ that ‘donors tend to favour safer places’ (Gaston et al., 2023). Due to donor risk aversion, related to for example physical insecurity, high costs, risks of politization and project disruptions, contexts shaped by conflict and fragility generally receive particularly limited external support for climate adaptation and finance. Also, in terms of international projects specifically targeting climate security support, the Horn of Africa has received a remarkably low number even in comparison to other conflict-affected regions, such as the Sahel where terrorism and migration have been high concerns on the international agenda (see numbers presented in Gaston et al. 2023: 15). Accordingly, the Horn of Africa paradigmatically illustrates a recurring pattern: regions grappling with the compound challenges of conflict, political fragmentation and climate change – thereby being particularly in need of support – often receive disproportionately limited external donor engagement and targeted climate finance.¶ In stepping up such engagement, existing grounded knowledge, efforts and priorities needs to be supported and leveraged. This will necessitate adopting more flexible yet strategic and grounded approaches. There are enormous challenges facing such support, given the multitude of conflicting agendas, alliances and politics involved, both globally and within the regional African context. Nonetheless, within this complexity, there are also areas of converging interests and ongoing efforts, offering opportunities for engagement and partnerships.¶ The subsequent sub-sections explore specific opportunities and cases, drawing insights from expert interviews with officials from the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Welthungerhilfe. Additionally, it incorporates insights and case studies based on climate adaptation research in the region.¶ Regional efforts of advancing the climate security agenda¶ Despite their limited resources, as well as internal divisions and divergent agendas among member states, regional organisations play a central role in advancing and shaping a climate security agenda attuned to the region’s specific needs (which often cut across national borders). Moreover, they can serve to provide a level of continuity, sustaining efforts amid challenges like conflict and war dynamics that may hinder national initiatives. Consequently, they offer important potential entry points for establishing partnerships.¶ The **AU** has demonstrated **significant leadership** on the **climate change** agenda. For example, on the very **same day** where **UNSC** did not **reach consensus** for a **climate security** resolution (see part one, above), the AU **Peace** and **Security Council** was able to **speak** with **one voice**, **issuing** a **communique** that **emphasised** the need for ‘a **climate-sensitive** planning **dimension** in **peacekeeping** and **postconflict reconstruction** and **development efforts**’ and moreover highlighted the significance of early warning on climate (in)security (AU Communique 2021, 3; see also Mattheis et al. 2023). The AU also promptly responded to the crisis of food insecurity that hit Africa, and the Horn in particular, in the context of droughts combining with hiking food prices related to Russia’s war in Ukraine (Mattheis et al., 2023: 19).¶ Regarding institutionalisation, **climate change** has been a **cross-cutting** theme in the **African Peace** and **Security Architecture** (2016-2020 Roadmap) since 2016. In 2022, a process was initiated to develop a Common African Position on Climate Security, demonstrating a strong consensus to advance climate security as a core agenda, and recognising that effective responses to climate (in)security require coordinated and context-specific African approaches (Interview, AU official, August 2023). In initiating steps towards a Common African Position, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission identified 15 key messages – based on wider consultations – that were feeding into inputs at Cop27 and Cop28, including advocacy for the Loss and Damage Fund.¶ Another core process informing the development of a Common African Position has been the AU-guided undertaking of an Africa Continental Climate Security Risk Assessment (highlighted in the abovementioned Communique), placing emphasis on the need of more grounded knowledge and insights into the context specific drivers and interconnections between climate, (in)security and peace (personal communication, AU official, August 2023).¶ At the **sub-regional** level, **IGAD**, in **close collaboration** with the **AU**, is at the **forefront** of **advancing** a **climate security** agenda **centred** on the specific **regional needs**. IGAD, formed in 1996, grew out of an intergovernmental initiative in 1986 focused on addressing and reducing the impacts of droughts and natural disasters in the region. The **organisation** thereby has **longstanding** and deep **contextual knowledge** on the **impacts** of **environmental** and **climate change** and has **consistently** sought to **advance** related **institutional knowledge** and **response capacity**. In 2003 the Drought Monitoring Centre-Nairobi (DCMN) was adopted as a specialised IGAD institution, and advanced into the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). In 2022 IGAD set up a Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, to be integrated within ICPAC.¶ Exemplifying IGAD’s responsiveness to specific regional concerns, the **organisation** has shown **significant initiative** in **addressing** the particular **needs** of **pastoralists**, a **vital** yet **marginalised livelihood** in the **Horn** and **East Africa**, especially **vulnerable** to the **impacts** of **climate change**. In response to drought induced challenges affecting pastoral livelihoods and mobility patterns, **IGAD** established the **IGAD Centre** for **Pastoral Areas** and **Livestock Development** (ICPALD) in 2011. This initiative, aligned with the recognition of pastoralism’s importance among IGAD member states, **aims** to enhance **rangeland management** in **crossborder** areas of **Ethiopia**, **South Sudan**, **Sudan** and **Uganda**; an **approach** that contrasts **donor biases** favouring **crop production** (Interview, Welthungerhilfe Area Manager in Somaliland, August 2023) and policies aiming at restricting migration. In 2021, IGAD Council of Ministers adopted the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance, that focuses on supporting and regulating safe cross-border mobility and use of common rangelands by pastoralists. The **protocol** represents a **proactive approach** to **climate change** adaptation **linked** with **migration** and **mobility**, specifically **addressing** the **interrelated dynamics** of **climate change**, **livelihood insecurity** and **conflict dynamics** (in particular conflicts related to land access). The focus is on demonstrating how providing **adequate support** for **pastoralists** and related **environmental resource** management – in this case **land**, **pasture** and **water** – can **contribute** to **maintaining peace** (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Additionally, IGAD’s 2023 Sustainable Ecosystem Management (SEM) project3 aligns with similar aims of the protocol, addressing critical pastoral challenges in a region facing a drought crisis. These **efforts** and **frameworks** have been **strengthened** through **support** and **collaboration** between **IGAD** and **international organisations**, such as the UN, the European Union (EU) and the International Organization for Migration, as well as through bilateral assistance.

#### Otherwise, millions are at risk of death.

**Ross 24** [Steven Ross, Public health reporter @ US News, 1-29-2024, Food Insecurity Tied to Shorter Life, Early Death, US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2024-01-29/study-food-insecurity-tied-to-shorter-life-early-death, Willie T.]

People who experience food insecurity are at greater risk of **dying prematurely** and living a shorter life after age 50, researchers say, underscoring how a fairly prevalent problem can impact individual health. The federal government says food insecurity refers to “limited or uncertain access to adequate food” – an economic and social condition that can lead to hunger. In an analysis published Monday in JAMA Internal Medicine, researchers found 78.4% of more than 57,400 U.S. adults included in the study were fully food secure, compared with 8.5% who had marginal food security, 7.4% who had low levels of food security and 5.6% who experienced very low food security. Researchers also found estimated life expectancy at age 50 was 32.5 years among individuals with full food security, compared with 29.9 years among adults with marginal food security, 30 years among those with low food security and 28 years among individuals with very low food security. That means adults with very low food security lived 4.5 years less once they turned 50 than those with full food security, and researchers said about half of the lost life expectancy could be attributed to deaths from cardiovascular disease and cancer. The analysis, based on survey data from 1999 to 2018, additionally found an association between **even marginal food security** and a **50% higher risk** of premature mortality, defined as a death occurring before a person turns 80. “The present findings may have a great public health implication,” researchers wrote. “Our results suggest that in addition to encouraging people to improve their lifestyle and cardiovascular health, improving food security may also be a way to curb the stagnant life expectancy of U.S. residents.” The new findings come on the heels of provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing average life expectancy in the U.S. rebounded in 2022 by a little over a year following two straight declines, fueled largely by a drop in mortality tied to COVID-19. Overall life expectancy at birth rose from 76.4 years in 2021 to 77.5 years in 2022. By gender, the new study found women with very low food security lived an average of 5.8 years less at age 50 compared with women with full food security. Men with very low food security, meanwhile, had a life expectancy three years shorter than men with full food security at that age threshold.

## Extra:

#### Affirming unlocks Somaliland’s economy.

**Al-Ghwell 24** [Hafed Al-Ghwell , senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative @ the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins, 12-14-2024, Somaliland and its case for statehood, Arab News, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2583075] BZ

Nevertheless, acknowledging Somaliland’s de facto statehood is a step that would validate its aspirations and contributions toward a more stable region. This recognition would affirm the global community’s commitment to stability and self-determination over archaic border adherence, setting a new standard for addressing similar geopolitical realities.¶ Somaliland’s quest for recognition carries a range of potential benefits and pitfalls. On the plus side, international recognition would **solidify its sovereignty**, allowing for **increased foreign investment and development assistance** which would **catalyze economic growth and improve infrastructure**. Recognizing statehood would also offer Somaliland the opportunity to join **international organizations**, further embedding it into the global diplomatic and economic system. However, pitfalls include the risk of heightened regional instability, as recognition might prompt a severe backlash from Somalia, which considers Somaliland an integral part of its territory. Recognition could also set a precedent for other separatist movements around Africa and beyond, potentially reigniting dormant territorial disputes, which might deter some countries from supporting Somaliland’s bid.