## Link

1. We dont link our argument about nuclear does not pertain to any economic beenfits but rather just that china views it as heg
   1. They’ll try to tell you that the off is an indictment of affirming but their links talk about nuclear energy as a whole
2. Their arg does link, their argument is the preservation of oil, which definitely sacr bodies ftoo
   1. Their impact is literally econ decline = great power war

Das

1. **First is Judge Complacency DA: Their rotb incentivizes all change to remain in round- assuming that the movement finishes with a ballot for THE AFF OR NEG is what saps them in the first place- it sends a message to the judge that this single action is enough, which destroys momentum for movements**
2. Second is axing allies: Their method destroys coalitions because institutional indictment pits people against each other.
3. **Ceding the political – the K destroys political engagement and creates a vacuum filled by right-wing elites**

**Boggs ’97** Carl Boggs, 1997 (National University, Los Angeles, The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century America, <http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/international.olde/mias/readings07/10.pdf>.)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved - perhaps even unrecognized - only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impo-tence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num-bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites - an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec-tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

1. **Backlash –** Protests tied to the ballot trigger backlash -- binary outcome of round eliminates compromise and generates resentment which precludes possibility of change

**Weigh on probablity:** This empirically caused things like the Policy Research League (PRL), white judges purposefully reducing speaker points of POC (point inflation project), segregation b/w tournaments that allow prog args and those tat don’t. This recreates violence against marginalized groups

**C1: india**

**ndia wants to invest in nuclear but requires significant US exports**

**Arasu 25**

Sibi Arasu, [Sibi Arasu is a climate journalist for The Associated Press (AP). Prior he worked as a freelance journalist covering environmental issues for over a decade.], 2-11-2025, "India wants to embrace nuclear power. To do it, it’ll need a lot of time and money", Seattle Times, <https://www.seattletimes.com/business/india-wants-to-embrace-nuclear-power-to-do-it-itll-need-a-lot-of-time-and-money/> //jwilly

BENGALURU, India (AP) — India wants more nuclear power, has pledged over $2 billion toward research and will change laws to boost investment to do it.

The pledges were made by India’s finance minister earlier this month as part of a plan to expand electricity generation and reduce emissions. Nuclear power is a way to make electricity that doesn’t emit planet-warming gases, although it does create radioactive waste. India is one of the world’s biggest emitters of planet-heating gases and over 75% of its power is still generated by burning fossil fuels, mostly coal. India wants to install 100 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2047 — enough to power nearly 60 million Indian homes a year.

**Energy experts** say that for the world to move away from carbon-polluting fuels like coal, oil and gas, sources like nuclear that don’t rely on the sun and the wind — which aren’t always available — are needed. But some **are skeptical about India’s ambitions as the country’s nuclear sector is still very small**, and negative public perceptions about the industry remain.

To grow the sector, Shayak Sengupta, a senior research associate at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, said the new Trump administration’s desire to reconfigure trade could be beneficial. India’s nuclear growth plan provides “ample opportunity” for U.S. exports, as the nuclear power sector there is much more mature, and companies are working on developments in the technology, like smaller and cheaper nuclear reactors. India is also investing in small reactors.

**Unfortunately, current US nuclear production does not meet demand – aff solves by increasing funds and catalyzing private sector involvement**

**IEA 25**

IEA, 1-16-2025, "A new era for nuclear energy beckons as projects, policies and investments increase", <https://www.iea.org/news/a-new-era-for-nuclear-energy-beckons-as-projects-policies-and-investments-increase> //jwilly

As the world’s second-largest source of low-emissions electricity after hydropower, nuclear power today produces just under 10% of global electricity supply. The increasing use of electricity – to power everything from industry and air conditioning to electric vehicles and data centres amid the rise of artificial intelligence – is accelerating the growth in power demand, which is set to rise six times as fast as overall energy consumption in the coming decades, based on today’s policy settings. New generation capacity from a range of technologies will be needed to keep pace with the rapid demand growth, including those that can provide firm and flexible output such as nuclear.

Most of the existing nuclear power fleet today is in advanced economies, but many of those plants were built decades ago. Meanwhile, the global map for nuclear is changing, with the majority of projects under construction in China, which is on course to overtake both the United States and Europe in installed nuclear capacity by 2030. Russia is also a major player in the nuclear technology landscape. Of the 52 reactors that have started construction worldwide since 2017, 25 are of Chinese design and another 23 are of Russian design. Similarly, the report shows how the production and enrichment of uranium, the fuel that goes into nuclear reactors, are highly concentrated.

“Today, more than 99% of the enrichment capacity takes place in four supplier countries, with Russia accounting for 40% of global capacity, the single largest share,” Dr Birol said. “Highly concentrated markets for nuclear technologies, as well as for uranium production and enrichment, represent a risk factor for the future and underscore the need for greater diversity in supply chains.”

Innovations in nuclear technologies are helping to drive momentum behind new projects, the report finds. SMRs, a type of smaller scale nuclear power plants that are quicker to build with greater scope for cost reductions, are drawing increasing interest from the private sector. The report highlights how the introduction of SMRs could lead to lower financing costs. With the right support, SMR installations could reach 80 GW by 2040, accounting for 10% of overall nuclear capacity globally. However, the success of the technology and speed of adoption will hinge on the industry’s ability to bring down costs by 2040 to a similar level to those of large-scale hydropower and offshore wind projects.

A new era for nuclear energy will require a lot of investment. **In a rapid growth scenario for nuclear, annual investment would need to double** to USD 120 billion already **by 2030**. Given the scale of the infrastructure investment required, the rollout of new nuclear projects cannot rely exclusively on public finances. IEA analysis shows that ensuring the predictability of future cash flows is key to bringing down financing costs and attracting private capital to the nuclear sector. The report highlights that the private sector is increasingly viewing nuclear energy as an investible energy source with the promise of firm, competitive, clean power that can serve energy-intensive operations 24/7. Notably, big names in the technology sector are signing power purchase agreements with developers to provide electricity for data centres and artificial intelligence.

To take advantage of the opportunities that nuclear power offers, governments must be prepared to provide the strategic vision alongside stable regulatory frameworks that will give the private sector confidence to invest. The report details how incentives and **public finance more broadly can unlock the investment needed to deliver greater clean and reliable power from nuclear**.

**New Trump-Modi deal and 123 agreement ensures investment spills over to India**

**Arndt 25**

Steven Arndt, [Steven A. Arndt is an internationally recognized expert in the field of nuclear engineering with experience in nuclear power plant simulation, severe accident analysis and nuclear power plant instrumentation and control. In his 40 years in the nuclear industry Dr. Arndt has worked as a researcher, educator, consultant, and regulator including extensive experience in Russia and Ukraine leading the United States support programs to the states of the former Soviet Union following the Chernobyl accident and as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's response to the Fukushima accident.], 3-4-2025, "U.S., India make new nuclear plans", NuclearNewswire, <https://www.ans.org/news/article-6770/us-india-make-new-nuclear-plans/> // jwilly

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with President Trump last week and agreed to a new initiative to drive “transformative change across key pillars of cooperation” between the two countries.

The U.S.-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century initiative includes nuclear, and the two leaders announced plans to build U.S.-designed nuclear reactors in India, according to a joint statement released by the White House. To help facilitate the joint work, Indian lawmakers are considering amendments to India’s Atomic Energy Act of 1962, which bars private investments in India's nuclear power plants.

Reuters reported on February 17 that India plans to increase its nuclear power capacity by 30 GW over the next 20 years—triple the amount that state-run NTPC (formerly National Thermal Power Corporation) previously announced. The projects are expected to cost $62 billion.

A closer look: NTPC is seeking land for its ambitious nuclear plans, but local resistance is expected. The company is in the process of seeking early approvals for land in eight states, Reuters added, and is in talks with small modular reactors developers, including American-based companies.

India’s 22 operating reactors have the capacity to generate 6,780 MWe, according to India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In February 2024, Kakrapar Unit 4 became India’s newest nuclear power plant to become operational. It connected to the grid on the heels of the Kakrapar-3, which entered commercial operation in June 2023.

Partnering with the U.S.: In addition to energy security, the wide-ranging U.S.-India Compact for the 21st Century initiative spells out collaboration on defense, trade and investment, technology and innovation, and “people to people” cooperation.

Modi and Trump also committed to leaning into the 123 Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation the nations signed in 2008.

The leaders agreed that energy security is fundamental to economic growth, social well-being, and technical innovation in both countries by ensuring energy affordability, reliability, and availability in stable energy markets, Reuters reported. As the United States and India are both top producers and consumers in driving the global energy landscape, Trump and Modi recommitted to the U.S.-India Energy Security Partnership, including in oil, gas, and civil nuclear energy.

**US DoS ND**

United States Department of State, "123 Agreements", <https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/123-agreements> // jwilly

What is a 123 Agreement?

Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation or **123 Agreements** – named after Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 – establish a **legal**ly binding **framework** for significant peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and its partners, providing a foundation for long-term, strategic civil nuclear partnerships globally. U.S. law generally requires a 123 Agreement to be in force before licensing significant exports of U.S.-origin nuclear material (e.g., nuclear reactor fuel) and equipment (e.g. nuclear reactors and major components) **to a**nother **partner**.

What do 123 Agreements require of the United States and the cooperating partner?

In addition to facilitating nuclear cooperation, 123 Agreements are at their core intended to advance shared nuclear nonproliferation and security objectives between the United States and its partners. As such, Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act establishes nine nonproliferation criteria that all conforming 123 Agreements must contain. This includes legal obligations for U.S. partners to maintain strong standards with regard to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as well as the physical security of nuclear material transferred subject to the agreement. 123 Agreements also ensure that the United States maintains consent rights over the retransfer or enrichment and reprocessing of U.S. obligated material supplied to another partner and that material or equipment transferred is not used for a nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose.

The Department of State leads the negotiations of all 123 Agreements, with technical assistance and concurrence from the Department of Energy, and in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Once negotiated, the President approves the signing of a 123 Agreement which he or she then submits to Congress for review. Following the review period, a 123 Agreement can be brought into force, so long as a joint resolution of disapproval has not been enacted.

#### **Fuel partnerships key to India’s heg over China, independently boosts funds and fuels non-prolif**

**Ahn 23** [Alan Ahn is the Deputy Director for Nuclear. Josh Freed is the Senior Vice President for the Climate and Energy Program. Ryan Norman is a Senior Policy Advisor for Clean Energy Finance @ the Climate and Energy Program. Rowen Price is a Policy Advisor for Nuclear Energy (all @ Third Way), 11-7-2023, Third Way, No Publication, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/nuclear-fuel-is-a-national-security-imperative] colon + jwilly \*ellipses r og\*

Building out our **nuclear fuel infrastructure** is a pressing and urgent issue given our significant **dependence on uranium** fuel from **Russia**. Russia’s use of energy exports as a **geopolitical weapon** is well-documented—the country has historically used the threat of **supply cutoffs** to influence client states and make them more **pliant to Russian** interests. Continued reliance on Russian nuclear fuel is, as a result, a threat to the sovereignty of the US and democracies around the world.

**<<text condensed none omitted>>**

Energy security is itself a national security issue, but the national security implications of nuclear fuel go well beyond that. Third Way is currently collaborating with partners and subject matter experts on a white paper, exploring the diverse ramifications that a reliable and strong nuclear fuel supply chain has for our defense, national security, geopolitical, and nonproliferation interests. Here are Third Way’s initial takes on the white paper effort thus far: **Nuclear fuel is…** …typically framed as a domestic energy and commercial issue. However, a healthy nuclear fuel sector (or lack thereof) has profound impacts on our foreign policy and national security goals. **Not Just an Investment for Security of Supply, but an Investment for our Security** Exporting American technology is crucial to our civil nuclear leadership internationally, and the global deployment of nuclear energy will be vital to meeting our climate goals. But allowing uranium enrichment technology to spread widely would significantly increase nuclear security and weapons proliferation risks. Strengthening international confidence in reliable nuclear fuel supply is not just an energy security issue, it serves as a linchpin to US policies in countering the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to produce weapons-usable material. As the US works to reduce its reliance on Russian fuel, the buildout of nuclear fuel infrastructure should be sufficiently flexible to meet not only domestic needs, but also the needs of our allies and partners around the world. Accordingly, nuclear fuel exports both generate revenue and strengthen international peace and stability by mitigating proliferation risks. A substantial down payment into the nuclear fuel supply chain is, therefore, more than an investment in our economic and industrial objectives. It’s a true investment in maintaining and strengthening US national security. Increasingly Vital to our Global Leadership and Presence in Nuclear Energy US competitiveness in the global civil nuclear market is as much a national security priority as it is a commercial one. Our international leadership and presence in nuclear energy is essential so that we can set the highest standards on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation around the world.

**<<line breaks continue>>**

The federal government has already invested **billions of dollars** into the development and deployment of innovative US **advanced reactor tech**nologies, including significant forward funding for the DOE Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) Pathway 1 demonstrations (X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower’s Natrium) in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. Both Pathway 1 projects, as well as many other designs supported by ARDP, will require high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) as fuel–commercial supply of which is currently dominated by Russia.

The innovative features of these advanced reactors represent a **potential competitive edge** for the US in the international reactor market. But reactor designs with **uncertainties around fuel** supply will clearly be **less competitive** overseas, and the general lack of commercial HALEU infrastructure outside of Russia currently puts US advanced reactor technology at a disadvantage. Case in point: of the six technologies recently selected for the Great British Nuclear Small Modular Reactor (SMR) competition, not a single HALEU-fueled reactor design was chosen.

While US global leadership in nuclear energy is broadly important to our national security, at a more granular level, new and emerging competitors are now offering technologies, components, and materials that are outside the purview of US export controls—meaning that such transactions do not require US export licenses, bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with the US, etc.

Under these circumstances, a robust nuclear fuel supply chain not only supports the competitiveness of American reactors, but through enabling the export of competitive US nuclear fuel services and products, can help generate new avenues to reestablish our market presence and authority over **international nuclear trade** and commerce. This would be a *win-win* for both our commercial and national security interests.

**Crucial to Leveling** the Playing Field Against **Russia and China**

Our competition against Russian and Chinese state-owned nuclear enterprises has particularly heightened national security implications for many reasons. Both Russia and China have a track record of weaponizing energy exports to project geopolitical influence, and there are major concerns about their capacity and willingness to serve as responsible stewards of international civil nuclear norms and practices—Russia’s unprecedented actions around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in Ukraine provide a very recent and terrifying example of Russian recklessness and negligence around civilian nuclear facilities and infrastructure.

Compounding these worries is the fact that both of these countries have been highly aggressive in engaging and courting international nuclear energy markets. Third Way and Energy for Growth Hub recently released a map of US, Russian, and Chinese nuclear cooperation agreements, showing that both Russia and China lead the US in the number of “hard” MOUs—bilateral agreements with sales of actual hardware, materials, or services attached. Russia and China had hard MOUs with 45 and 13 different nations, respectively, while the US only concluded 12 such agreements.

In large part, Russia and China’s competitive edge comes from their **all-in-one export packages**. These often include training, financing, construction, operation, decommissioning, and other concessions, with fuel supply often a part of these comprehensive offers. For some countries, there is **significant allure** in the **fuel** provisions, ensuring a steady and **reliable supply** of nuclear fuel, often for the entire lifespan of the reactor. Russia provides official commitments*guaranteeing fuel for the life of exported reactors*, sometimes with additional agreements to take back spent fuel. Similarly, **China** is supplying all of the fuel needs for the reactors it exported to Pakistan, and while the **primary focus** now is addressing growing **domestic** demand, their **ambitious efforts** to expand fuel cycle infrastructure mean that they will be in a position to offer **comparable assurances** to international customers in the **future**. These types of offers on fuel supply can be **particularly attractive** for new nuclear states and embarking nations, as they **simplify the process** of starting nuclear energy programs.

**<<text condensed none omitted>>**

Building out nuclear fuel production capacity at home is an important step towards evening the odds. **A robust domestic nuclear fuel sector can support critical defense capabilities and the readiness of our strategic forces.** Unobligated uranium—meaning uranium fuel produced domestically using only US technology—is required for critical defense applications, some of which (including the production of tritium and naval reactor fuel) have a direct bearing on the readiness of US strategic forces. A US commercial nuclear fuel supply chain can be a source of unobligated material, thereby supporting US strategic readiness and, by extension, the credibility and reliability of America’s extended defense and deterrence commitments abroad. Why We Must Act Recent debates around the possibility of US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation have broadly highlighted both the importance of and challenges in implementing effective barriers to the proliferation of sensitive technologies, including uranium enrichment. With geopolitical turmoil and conflicts emerging in various parts of the world, it is more important than ever for the United States to fully embrace its role as a force for global peace and stability. A part of this charge is to ensure that nuclear technology and materials are not misused and remain under effective and rigorous control throughout the world. Our leverage in upholding and negotiating—both bilaterally and multilaterally—the highest global standards for security and nonproliferation, including effective measures to contain the spread of enrichment and other sensitive technologies, hinges on the different factors outlined above: Our ability to assure countries of reliable nuclear fuel supply; Our commercial presence and competitiveness in the global nuclear market, particularly against China and Russia; And the strength and credibility of our extended deterrence commitments to our international friends and allies. Without nuclear fuel, the proverbial rug will be pulled out from under all of these, threatening to collapse our international leverage and influence on these matters like a deck of cards. And as Russia’s brutal campaign of aggression against Ukraine rages on and tensions escalate in the Middle East, reinforcing the firmness of our overseas commitments and maintaining strong nonproliferation principles will be essential so that these crises do not destabilize further. Answering the Call: Policy and Legislative Recommendations There is no way around it: the most immediate task in front of policymakers and lawmakers is authorizing, sufficiently funding, and rapidly implementing federal programs to kickstart the buildout of nuclear fuel infrastructure—in particular, the expansion of uranium conversion and enrichment capacity, given that they represent the key bottlenecks in the nuclear fuel supply chain. Legislation: Passing supportive legislation like the Nuclear Fuel Security Act (NFSA) would provide firm Congressional direction and authorities for the federal government to move forward on nuclear fuel programs. NFSA provisions were included in the Senate FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Maintaining these provisions in conferencing is consistent with the overall security and defense objectives of NDAA. (Updated 2/8/24—The National Fuel Security Act passed as part of the FY24 NDAA 310-118 in the House and 87-13 in the Senate. It was signed into law on December 22, 2023.) Funding: Adequate funding is required so that federal offtake agreements with fuel producers are sufficient to incentivize investments into infrastructure expansion and buildout. Third Way and other NGOs have aligned on the need for $2 to $3.5 billion in additional upfront appropriations as necessary to achieve meaningful progress. National Security Supplemental: The White House submitted a supplemental funding request that included $2.2 billion for nuclear fuel. The Senate has moved to increase the request to $2.7B and include this provision in the emergency national security supplemental package. Considering the national security ramifications of nuclear fuel, including such funding in a security-related supplemental appropriations bill is wholly justified. Now, Congress must coalesce on a path forward and appropriate this funding as soon as possible. Implementation: With funding and authorities secured, the federal government must expeditiously issue requests for proposals (RFPs) and start the procurement process for fuel as soon as possible. (Updated 2/8/24—The Department of Energy released an RFP on January 9, 2024 to procure enrichment services for fuel production. Proposals are due by March 8, and final awards will likely be issued toward the end of the year.)  
**<<line breaks continue>>**

The US can also pursue **enhanced multinational partnerships** on the nuclear fuel supply chain, in accordance with a broad agreement with the **UK**, **Canada**, **Japan**, and **France** that was reached during the Nuclear Energy Forum at the G7 meeting in Sapporo. A multinational approach to building out nuclear fuel infrastructure could increase available funding through **pooled investment.** Moreover, diverse international partners and stakeholders in such an endeavor can **increase both transparency and inclusion**, potentially **mak**ing the security and **nonprolif**eration benefits more **sustainable.** Such a solution highlights, again, the strong alignment between commercial and national security priorities on nuclear fuel.

**Nuclear gives India heg**

**Rodriguez 22**

Rodriguez, Eric, [Eric Rodriguez is a problem solver who delivers solutions and drives positive change by developing strategic relationships and building dynamic teams. Academic background in communications, public administration, and urban sustainability, and diplomacy and international relations in European, Asian, and African environments. Private sector experience in consulting, management, and business development business. Public sector experience in local state government. International Soft Power experience in academia and relationship-building in South-Eastern Europe.], "The Eastern Atomic Rise: Defining Nuclear Hegemony in a Multi-lateral World" (2022).

Capstone Collection. 3258.

<https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/capstones/3258> //jw 4/4/25 3:29pm CST in the Northland Christian School cafeteria next to his bright and talented debate partner Michi Synn

On a global scale, nuclear energy is “already playing a role in energy geopolitics”, (U.S. Senate, 2019) characterized by the “decline of U.S. nuclear export competitiveness” (Nakano, 2020) over the last two decades while Russia and China have been aggressively pursuing nuclear exports. Sallee (2021) notes that with minimal uranium production, an aging nuclear reactor fleet, and diminishing technological and professional capacity, the U.S. “has relinquished its competitive global position as the world leader in nuclear energy to Russian and Chinese state-owned enterprises.” According to Mazarr et al. (2018) of the RAND Corporation, Russia’s “energy diplomacy” of supplying technology and nuclear fuel, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a strong emphasis on nuclear energy exports, are evidence not only of Russia and China’s emergence as key players in the energy landscape but also a renewed global focus on nuclear energy. Sallee argues that the U.S.’s withdrawal from the global nuclear energy market has created a power vacuum in which rivals such as Russia and China are in a capacity to fill, with alarming implications for foreign policy. Poneman et al. are more blunt, declaring that the U.S. “has lost its leadership – and is on the precipice of losing it permanently.”

The potential of nuclear energy to help combat climate change and mitigate the challenge of what is likely to be a global energy crisis (Gilbert et al., 2021; Helman, 2022; Horowitz, 2021; Zakaria, 2021), and China and Russia’s move to fill the power vacuum left by the western retreat from this sector represent a critical dimension of the dramatically shifting geopolitical landscape. Therefore, within the theoretical framework of a renewed competition for geopolitical dominance between nuclear states driven by a global energy crisis, this paper aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on nuclear energy by answering the question: “What is Nuclear Hegemony?” and developing a working definition that can be used in future research. It is hoped that this definition will assist in gauging how emerging dominant states will leverage their nuclear prowess over their allies and competitors, how that power will be accepted and challenged by other states, and how the interaction of these actors will shape international relations.

POSITIONALITY

The underlying foundation and motivation for this paper are that while the world must transition away from fossil fuels, the current capacity of renewable energy to meet global energy needs, especially as the current instability in Ukraine constrains natural gas flows to Europe, is insufficient. Therefore, incorporating nuclear energy is crucial for combating climate change and achieving greater security.

My positionality is inspired by Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose discussion on nuclear energy I attended at the Annual Graduate Institute Alumni Reunion in Geneva in 2021. At that discussion, Director General Rossi emphasized that while nuclear energy will not solve the current climate crisis, it is an integral part of a practical energy diversification strategy to reduce carbon emissions.

The European energy crisis, driven by diminished Russian natural gas supplies amidst the Ukraine conflict, and observing, close-up, the need for reliable, affordable, and adaptable low-carbon energy solutions while studying in Africa further solidified my conviction that nuclear power will become an increasingly important source of global energy. My intent here is not to necessarily advocate for or against nuclear energy. However, the ways in which the trajectory of hegemonic influence and power in global nuclear energy governance are being influenced by Russia and China’s advances in nuclear technology absent western capacity and leadership are of great interest to me.

**Solving Chinese perceptions of a weak India is key to peace along the border**

Husain Haqqani and Aparna **Pande** 7-10-**21.** Haqqani is the director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. and was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. Pande (Ph.D) is director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute. "India has a long way to go in confronting China". The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/562397-india-has-a-long-way-to-go-in-confronting-china

India’s decision to move additional troops to its border with China bolsters its ability to protect itself against Chinese aggression. It is a belated response to China’s actions , when the Chinese army ill-prepared Indian soldiers and occupied several square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh region to build roads and fortify military encampments. The hope of some Indian policymakers to resolve the matter diplomatically has not so far been fulfilled. Several rounds of military and diplomatic negotiations since April 2020, when the Chinese incursions started, have yielded little result. Any willingness on India’s part to deal forcefully with China would be welcomed in the U.S., where successive administrations have sought to integrate India into America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Several years of an India-U.S. entente cordiale has been premised on India standing up to China. **After all, with a population of more than one billion, India is the only country with enough manpower to match that of China. China sees India as a potential rival and covets parts of Indian territory.** China 15,000 miles of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin section of Ladakh after war in 1962. **China’s desire for influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region challenges India in its backyard, setting off for the same sphere of influence. But China’s phenomenal economic growth, coupled with India’s inability to keep pace, has hampered India’s ability to respond to China strategically.** Even now the moving of troops to Ladakh is a tactical maneuver not backed by a clear strategic plan. **On occasions since 2012, China has indulged in salami-slicing along the largely un-demarcated India-China border. India’s response each time has been limited to diplomatic negotiations with limited military pushback. There is a co-relation between relative economic strength and China’s willingness to flex its muscle. Between 1988, when India and China signed a series of agreements to restore relations, and 2012, the border between India and China remained by and large quiet. During that period, the size of the two countries’ economies was not huge.** In 1990, India’s GDP stood at $320 billion and China’s GDP at $413 billion. By 2012, China’s GDP had grown to $8.5 trillion, seven times larger than India’s $1.2 trillion economy. The in China’s policy after 2012, encouraging its troops to use force against India along the border, coincided with the rise in China’s military and economic power and its impact on the relative balance of power with India. Like many in the West, India during the 1990s had bought into the view that deeper economic and diplomatic engagement with communist China would help maintain peace between the two Asian giants. But the India-China border dispute could not remain on the back burner as China became more aggressive in the wake of growing economic and military power. India can no longer rely solely on diplomacy to deal with China. It will soon have to build and deploy hard power to deter the Chinese. The recent deployment along the Ladakh border could mark the beginning of that process. With the latest addition, 200,000 of India’s more than a million strong army now face China along the 2,167-mile border. By way of comparison, 600,000 Indian troops are positioned along the 2,065-mile, fully fenced and fully demarcated border with Pakistan. It is inconceivable that any attempt by Pakistan to take territory would go unretaliated by India. While India’s attempts over the last year have been to convince China, primarily through diplomatic engagements, to return the border to status quo ante, most and experts argue that China has no interest in resolving the border dispute with India. India has for far too long acquiesced to Chinese aggression without sufficient retaliatory military action. India may not seek to provoke China into an all-out war, but it needs to find a sweet spot between ignoring and provoking. The United States and its allies, too, would like India to act like a major power in not taking Chinese provocations lightly. Western democracies and Japan have viewed India as an ideal partner and future ally in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India has consistently been a democracy, shares pluralist values with the United States, and its embrace of free market reforms since 1992 have created an opening for expanded economic ties. India also shares America’s concerns about China’s rising power. In developing a pivot to Asia or an Indo-Pacific policy, successive U.S. administrations have assumed that a shared concern about China makes India a natural American ally. India-U.S. relations were referred to as the “ partnership of the 21st century” under President Obama. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy spoke of India as a “leading global power” and a strong “strategic and defense partner.” The Biden administration’s 2021 “Interim National Security guidance” has described the “deepening partnership” with India as being critical to America’s “vital national interests.” But the Indo-Pacific policies of both the Trump and Biden administrations have focused on maritime security, ignoring India’s challenge from China on the continental landmass. **China views India as an inward-looking democracy that has yet to focus on economic growth or military prowess. Only an expansion in India’s economy and military capability would convince China’s leaders to view it differently.** Moreover, the two decades of celebrating convergence of democratic values and voicing of strategic concerns by Washington and Delhi now needs to be followed up with specific steps to counter Chinese hard power with Indian muscle.

**Absent action war is inevitable and goes nuclear**

**Tata 24’**  
Samir Tata, 3-6-2024, "War Clouds Over the Indian Horizon?", No Publication,  
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/war-clouds-over-indian-horizon> //DS + fehmi + Michi Synn’s Partner

While wars elsewhere hold the world’s attention, **a new conflict may be on the cards along the Line of Actual Control between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.** India is in China’s crosshairs. As the Russia–Ukraine War in Eastern Europe and the Israel–Gaza War in West Asia enter their respective endgames, the inevitable question that arises is: ‘Where will the next war be?’ If Taiwan comes to mind, think again. **The second China–India War will most likely be fought in Eastern Ladakh in India’s far northwest region sometime between 2025 and 2030.** Eastern Ladakh refers to the area of the Indian union territory of Ladakh currently under the administrative control of the Government of India that lies east of the Indus River and west of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates it from the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, held by Beijing since the first China-India War of 1962. **Eastern Ladakh is of critical geostrategic importance for China and India from the perspective of each country’s vital national interests. The driver for China is energy security, while for India it is territorial integrity. The 2025–2030 timeframe represents the optimum window of opportunity for China and the maximum period of vulnerability for India, reflecting the significant asymmetric balance of power in favour of China.** Absent a modus vivendi between these two nuclear-armed adversaries, **conventional war (and the spectre of nuclear war) will be impossible to avoid.** Through Chinese Spectacles **Beijing views Eastern Ladakh through the lens of energy security. China’s political, economic and military power is inextricably intertwined with its energy security, given its heavy dependence on oil and gas imports. Eastern Ladakh is the only pathway from which a hostile power can launch an attack to invade and occupy Kashgar, China’s crucial energy entrepot in the far Western province of Xinjiang. A vital pillar of China’s energy security is the planned land-based pipeline connecting Iran’s oil and gas fields to Kashgar, transiting through Pakistan via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).** As the US Department of Defense (DoD) notes in its 2023 annual report on China, ‘through … projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it [China] seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca’. The planned route of CPEC runs from the port city of Gwadar near the Pakistan–Iran border through the key city of Gilgit in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (also claimed by India) to the Khunjerab Pass, which is the sole transit point connecting Pakistan with China’s Kashgar terminus. It is likely to take at least a decade to complete the energy pipeline, by which time the DoD’s report suggests that China will no longer be dependent on maritime routes for its energy imports. The harsh reality India faces is that for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an asymmetric balance of power in favour of China **If China’s energy security is to rely on land-based oil and gas pipelines connecting friendly energy producers to China, the pipelines must be outside the effective military reach of hostile powers. According to the DoD’s China report, the critical first phase of Beijing’s three-phase military modernisation programme is expected to be completed by 2027.** From a military perspective, the most logical land route to seize Kashgar would be to march an expeditionary force along the road which runs from Kargil, on the Line of Control with Pakistan near the west bank of the Indus River in the Indian union territory of Ladakh, and cross into Pakistan-held Kashmir, proceeding via Skardu to Gilgit and then following the road connecting Gilgit to the Khunjerab Pass. Essentially, the invasion route would run through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, over which India claims sovereignty as the area was part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir when it acceded to India in October 1947. **The only way China can prevent such a possible attack would be to pre-emptively wrest control of a strategically significant portion of Eastern Ladakh from India and to annex the seized territory and incorporate it into Aksai Chin. China’s success in encroaching on Indian-held positions along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh in May–June 2020, which incrementally nudged the LAC westward, is a preview of Beijing’s intentions.**

**Extinction!**

**Starr 15**

Starr 15, 2-28-2015, "Steven Starr: Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting to Happen," No Publication, <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> ,

[Stephen Starr is a journalist and author who lived in Damascus, and elsewhere in Syria, from 2007 to 2012. From the Syrian capital he began working first as an editor at Syria Times and then as a freelance reporter. Until February 2012 he reported Syria's popular uprising from inside the country.]

accessed 10-07-2023 // JZ

**A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would** be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would **be a mass extinction event that ends human history.** There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. Nuclear war fought with US & Russian strategic nuclear arsenals would leave Earth uninhabitable; Radioactive fallout from bombs, ruined nuclear power plants, and destruction of ozone layer **The world’s leading climatologists** now **tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a** large **nuclear war**, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, **would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food.** Their findings make it clear that not only **humans**, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life **would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making.** The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. **Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere.** **Millions of tons of smoke would destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades.** Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed n

## 2ac

They link – it’s not 15 secs of speech

**Matthews 25** [Owen Matthews, Degree in Modern History at Oxford University, 3-13-2025, The Russian economy is on the **brink of collapse** and Putin knows it, The Independent, https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/russia-economy-putin-ukraine-war-deal-talks-trump-b2714371.html, Willie T.] \*\*edited for objectionable language\*\*

How close is Russia’s economy to collapse? As Donald Trump’s negotiators open direct talks with the Kremlin, Kyiv’s European allies hope that a final push on sanctions against Russia could be Ukraine’s last – and best – hope of victory. Mr Trump has warned that the US could impose a “devastating” financial blow on Russia if Putin refuses to accept the ceasefire agreement. “There are things you can do that wouldn’t be pleasant in a financial sense. I can do things financially,” he said in the Oval Office.

Putin intended his full-scale invasion of Ukraine to be a three-day operation that would force regime change in Kyiv. Neither Putin nor his military or economic planners anticipated a grinding war that now soaks up over **40 per cent of Kremlin spending**.

Nor did they expect Europe to impose serious sanctions, and even less did they anticipate the destruction of three of the four Gazprom gas pipelines under the Baltic Sea that before the war supplied over 30 per cent of Europe’s gas.

The result in Russia has been **rampant inflation**, currently running at over 9 per cent, crippling **[staggering] interest rates** of 21 per cent and runaway price hikes on staple goods that far **outpace the headline inflation rate** and have hit ordinary Russians hard.

Last summer the price of **eggs jumped by 42 per cent**, **bananas by 48 per cent, tomatoes by 39.5 per cent and potatoes by 25 per cent**. The Russian ruble has lost over **half of its value** since Putin first invaded Crimea in 2014, and over $600bn of the Kremlin’s foreign currency reserves have been frozen in Western banks.

More than **1,000 Western businesses** – including Ikea and McDonald’s – pulled out, as did Western car manufacturers. Imports of Western goods – especially technology – are now **expensively routed through sanctions-busting neighbours** like Kazakhstan and Georgia. And last month Russian utility companies hiked prices for electricity by up to **250 per cent.**

“Everyone drives Chinese cars these days, but there are no spare parts,” says Alexandra, 39, a former journalist who lives in Moscow and whose ex-husband is fighting in Ukraine. “The only foreign cars you buy are right-hand-drive [from Japan]. Anyone with a mortgage is paying crazy interest. People complain how expensive everything has become.”

Russia spent more on its military in 2024 than the rest of Europe combined, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ latest Military Balance report – a staggering $462bn, if adjusted for purchasing power. The Kremlin’s spending splurge on its war effort has produced some winners, notably the 1.5 million troops currently serving in Putin’s army who are paid up to $2,500 a month to fight – four times the average salary in Russia’s most impoverished provinces.

Massive losses on the battlefield have **worsened labour shortages**, with a record-low unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent. Factories are **running at capacity and beyond**. Russia’s economy has “reached the **limits of its productive capacity** while demand continues to be stimulated,” Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina warned the Russian parliament in November, predicting a fatal combination of economic stagnation and inflation known as “stagflation”.

For the first three years of the war, the Kremlin’s war spending fuelled GDP growth which peaked at a staggering 5.4 per cent in early 2024. But 2025 will be the year that growth flatlines, experts predict.’’

The Kremlin has been able to afford its spending spree thanks, mostly, to India and China, which have continued to import Russian oil in record quantities. The EU has in theory capped the price that customers can pay for Russian Urals crude at $60 a barrel – somewhat below the current market price of $67. But so-called “attestation fraud” – such as making up the difference in fake transportation and other costs – makes the rules easy to bend.

Natural gas has **never been sanctioned** by the EU at all – and until 1 January of this year, 13 per cent of Europe’s piped gas was still being shipped from Russia through Ukrainian pipelines to Slovakia and Hungary.

Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia’s war economy that near-**nonexistent European sanctions have failed to achieve**

Southern Europe **continues to import** millions of cubic meters of Russian gas via Turkey. And despite its posturing, Europe still sources more than 15 per cent of its liquefied natural gas or LNG from Russia – with some 17.8m tonnes of LNG docking in European ports in 2024, **up by more than 2 million tonnes from the year before**, according to analysts Rystad Energy.

In fact the only really effective “sanctions” on the Russian energy sector – which accounts for over **two-thirds of government revenues** – have been in the form of Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, pumping stations and storage facilities. Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia’s war economy that European “sanctions” have failed to achieve.

International pressure has made it harder, but not impossible, for the Russian war machine to obtain important components such as semiconductors. And sanctions have certainly “achieved the crucial goal of leaving Russia’s economy highly unstable in the medium to long term”, according to Oliver Ruth of London’s Royal United Services Institute.

The current crazy levels of expenditure are unsustainable, so Putin has a strong economic incentive to bring his war to an end. Ukraine’s economy is also under attack.

But on the flip side, even as Russia’s economy slips into stagflation Ukraine’s economy is doing far worse. Concerted Russian assaults, damage to vital energy infrastructure and mass emigration have inflicted catastrophic damage of up to 40 per cent of the country’s pre-war GDP. Kyiv’s budget payments to millions of soldiers and state employees are currently being paid by the EU. Without those subsidies – the lion’s share of the €60bn in direct financial support so far sent by Brussels – Ukraine’s government finances would instantly collapse.

Ukraine’s European allies hoped that sanctions would force Putin into taking an early off ramp and bring his **economy crashing down**. That hasn’t yet happened yet – largely because Europe has been unable to kick its addiction to Russian gas, and the US did not want to risk a global **oil price spike by cutting off Russian exports.**

But while they have **not brought Putin to his knees**, they have made the war disastrous for Russia. As Moscow and Washington begin talks in Riyadh, and European leaders hold their own emergency meeting, keeping up economic pressure on Putin is the real weapon that they still have left in their arsenal.