**1NC**

**We Negate.**

**C1) South Korea**

**US assurances are credible now --- Moon has backed down from nukes.**

**Gowe 24** [Chris Gowe, masters candidate majoring in International Cooperation at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies, 4-25-2024, The Washington Declaration One Year On: What Is The State Of Deterrence?, Foreign Analysis, <https://foreignanalysis.com/the-washington-declaration-one-year-on-what-is-the-state-of-deterrence/>, Willie T.]

One year ago on April 26th 2023, the United States and Republic of Korea released the **Washington Declaration**, a landmark joint statement which commemorates the 70th anniversary of the U.S. ROK alliance and **reaffirms** the security **partnership** between the two allies. In the statement, the **ROK expressed** its **full confidence in** the **U.S. nuclear umbrella** and its continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. For its part, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to extended deterrence and to exercising the “full range” of U.S. capabilities in response to a DPRK nuclear attack. The statement **emerged** at a key time **when anxieties were mounting** **over No**rth **Ko**rea’s intensifying nuclear **threats** and amid an evolving security environment on the Korean Peninsula. One key development was North Korea’s adoption of a first use nuclear doctrine. In a law passed on September 8th 2022, North Korea formalized its possession of nuclear weapons (with Kim Jong Un stating that its nuclear status “has now become irreversible”) and laid out circumstances under which it would use nuclear force. The two conditions under which nuclear weapons can be used were identified as 1) in case of an impending attack on strategic assets including leadership; and 2) in case of a need for “taking initiative in war.” The use cases outlined amounted to giving the DPRK a green light for nuclear first use against a non-nuclear weapon state and to launch nuclear weapons preemptively. The DPRK also launched more than 30 ballistic missiles in the year 2022 and continued launching at a similar pace in the months leading up to Yoon’s State Visit, the diplomatic summit which resulted in the declaration. Public opinion of South Koreans at the time also demonstrated that an ever increasing majority of people favor domestic nuclear armament. A 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs revealed that upwards of 70% of South Koreans wanted their country to develop its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. is firmly opposed to nuclear armament for South Korea given the security dilemma and nuclear domino implications for the Northeast Asian region, as well as the major challenge it would pose to the NPT-based global nonproliferation regime. It was against this backdrop of increased tension on the peninsula and concerns over the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that the US and ROK came together to produce the Washington Declaration. Aside from reaffirming commitments, the declaration also announced the creation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a regularly convening bilateral consultation mechanism that focuses on nuclear and strategic planning issues. While it falls short of something like nuclear sharing which the U.S. engages in with NATO countries, the NCG more concretely integrates South Korea into U.S. planning and decision-making for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula that might necessitate nuclear use. The U.S. also pledged to more visibly deploy nuclear capable assets to the region in order to directly telegraph its commitment to deterrence. In exchange, South Korea under the Yoon government **agreed to not pursue** its own nuclear weapons. In the year since the Washington Declaration was announced, how has the alliance been fairing towards putting into action the goals and ideals set out in the statement? The NCG met twice in 2023, once in July in South Korea and once in December in the United States. The July 2023 meeting coincided with a visit of the USS Kentucky, an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, to the port in Busan. At the inaugural NCG meeting, the U.S. further reaffirmed and strengthened its extended deterrence commitment to the ROK. Both sides established a “range of workstreams” through which the NCG would bolster nuclear deterrence and response capabilities between the two allies. This includes 1) mechanisms for security in information sharing; 2) nuclear consult and crisis communication processes; 3) coordination on training, planning, simulations; and 4) joint planning of South Korean conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations (CNI). The commitment to further quarterly meetings of the NCG was also reiterated. The second NCG meeting convened in December 2023 in Washington D.C. In a statement, both sides reported a deepening of cooperation on deterrence between the U.S. and ROK via the NCG working Group workstreams, including on U.S.-ROK conventional and nuclear integration, strategic communication, and risk reduction practices. The NCG Principals discussed **future plans to demonstrate strengthened deterrence** through further strategic asset deployment, building on the ballistic missile submarine visit, strategic bomber flyover, and ICBM test launch joint observation from earlier that year. So far, the follow-up to the Washington Declaration has seemed to meet the expectations set in the document. Both sides are taking clear steps to **shore up cooperation** on extended deterrence and South Korea has been integrated into information sharing and decision making in numerous concrete ways. Crucially, the Washington Declaration and follow-up measures have helped to **calm the stressors** leading South Korea to float the idea of an independent nuclear capability or redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, arguments that had more often slipped into the mainstream discourse previously. The NCG has helped to address a key credibility issue that existed with U.S. extended deterrence by providing South Korea with a say into planning rather than offering up the nuclear umbrella under “take it or leave it” terms. Further work via the NCG should do more to eliminate the credibility gap by ensuring that both sides feel that planning and implementation is being done in a joint manner. Additionally, securing a firm commitment from the ROK to rely on U.S. extended deterrence and not pursue its own nuclear capability was a major achievement of the Washington Declaration towards upholding NPT norms, and it raises another barrier against Seoul attempting to toy with that course of action in the future. South Korea also wins from this by bolstering the impression that it is a responsible member of the international community in spite of strong domestic pressures, something that will be increasingly important as it tries to live up to the “global pivotal state” vision.

**Affirming flips this --- SoKo fears they’re abandoned and the nuclear umbrella collapses.**

**Herzinger 21** [Blake Herzinger, research fellow at the United States Studies Centre in Sydney, “Abandoning Taiwan Makes Zero Moral or Strategic Sense”, FP, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/taiwan-policy-us-china-abandon/> //akang]

Glaser claims the United States must rank its interests and estimate China’s capability to threaten them. In East Asia, South Korea and Japan make his cut. “The prospects for defending these interests remain good,” he wrote. Japan’s distance from China would save it from successful amphibious invasion, Glaser said, while South Korea might have a tougher time but would “likely prevail with U.S. help.” That these countries are “large, rich, and strategically located” make them candidates worth saving. Glaser goes so far as to say Japan lies outside the Chinese A2/AD threat and could be “resupplied” along its eastern coastline. Except Glaser is wrong. Japan and South Korea lie smack in the middle of China’s A2/AD envelope even if measuring ranges from bases hundreds of miles into the country’s interior. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force operates a host of ballistic missiles capable of striking stationary targets across the Korean Peninsula and Japanese archipelago. Its new DF-26 ballistic missile is assessed to have an operational range of up to 2,500 miles, capable in theory of striking a moving aircraft carrier and nicknamed by Chinese sources as “the Guam killer.” The rest of Asia and northern approaches to Australia are also covered by these same missiles. Which of them should the United States abandon next? Glaser turns next to Taiwan. Only 110 miles from the Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Glaser stated, is more vulnerable to Chinese conventional forces. He admits that ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan are sound, but arguments regarding U.S. security interests are questionable. First, Glaser believes if United States abandons Taiwan, Japan and South Korea would “no doubt understand” that Taiwan was less important than them and the risk was very high. “**Letting go” of Taiwan**, he said, “should **suggest** little, if anything, about the strength of **Washington**’s commitment to Tokyo and Seoul.” How could that possibly be considered the truth? **Abandoning** a 70-year **commitment to** Taiwan’s continued freedom in the face of risk the author himself deems “small” could not possibly be viewed positively by Tokyo and **Seoul**. Instead, it would **beg the question of** Washington’s **price for its freedom as well**. Japan’s Senkaku Islands, vigorously disputed by China, would certainly be next on the menu. It is ludicrous to postulate that **abandoning Taiwan would** not **raise fears of abandonment** among Washington’s other Asian allies. **It could** just as easily **bring down the** entire hub-and-spoke **system of alliances** that U.S. policy relies on in the region. Glaser assures us there is little cause for concern if China takes Taiwan. Chinese ballistic missile submarines, despite enjoying clear access to the Pacific Ocean, would pose no new threat because the **U.S. nuclear deterrent** would remain effective. Its other conventional forces and attack submarines would pose no meaningfully increased threat because the United States could just deploy anti-submarine warfare assets—such as its own submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and surveillance ships—to “reduce the ability of Chinese submarines to leave Taiwan.” That assertion is not a credible one. Some of Glaser’s assertions about defending Japan are true under the status quo, as Thomas Shugart of the Center for a New American Security noted, but would quickly ring hollow once the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) set up shop in Taiwan. Stretching **from the Korean Peninsula** through the Japanese islands and Taiwan and ending in Southeast Asia, the first **island** chain **is** a **key** element **in defense** considerations for U.S. allies and U.S. forces in the Pacific Ocean. A quick glance at a map should make clear that gifting Taiwan to China breaks that chain and places China in control of one side of the Bashi Channel, a critical strategic chokepoint for PLA Navy forces to access the Philippine Sea from their current bases. If China controls Taiwan, it controls the maritime space surrounding Taiwan as well as existing Taiwanese military infrastructure. That makes it, in fact, much easier for Chinese submarines to leave Taiwan, and the PLA Air Force would naturally move into Taiwan’s existing air bases. The idea that a new barrier could easily be thrown up is fantasy. Simple math says U.S. forces, presumably the Seventh Fleet, **could not maintain** sufficient **assets** of the type required to make that happen. **And** in the event of a war, they **would be** **crushed** by the same A2/AD that Glaser threatens at the outset—only now those missiles and aircraft would be based in Taiwan. Not to worry though, Glaser tells us, because once the United States is no longer committed to protecting Taiwan, the odds of war with China will drop! Peace in our time, as it were. But the assumption that China’s territorial ambitions would be sated by offering up Taipei as a sacrificial lamb is not only fictitious but counterfactual. Beijing’s raft of territorial and boundary disputes elsewhere—India, Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines—would look only too easy to resolve by coercive means once Washington proves willing place Taiwan on the table. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s nationalist regime would be emboldened, not satisfied, by conceding Taiwan. And given that occupation of Taiwan would put Japan’s southernmost islands within 140 miles of the People’s Liberation Army, it’s not difficult to see where Beijing might consider pushing next. Shugart even points out that U.S. forces seriously considered using Taiwan as the jumping off point for seizing the Ryukyu Islands during World War II before ultimately choosing the route through Luzon in the Philippines.

**Absent assurances, SoKo proliferates.**

**Hong 22** [Taehwa Hong – MPhil candidate in Politics and International Studies University of Cambridge, “The Case Against the No First Use Policy”,<https://stanfordreview.org/the-case-against-the-no-first-use-policy/> //ECM]

The US must reject NFU and continue to maintain a first-use option for nuclear weapons; the rationale for keeping the first-use option remains clear and relevant. America’s nuclear weapons help allies deter conventional aggression by their much more powerful adversaries. During the Cold War, Washington’s strategic ambiguity over first-use was intended to prevent Soviet and Chinese tanks from rolling across Europe and Asia. NATO has steadfastly opposed NFU since it adopted “Flexible Response” in 1967. **So**uth **Ko**rea and Japan **relinquished nuclear weapons** development **trusting America’s** nuclear **umbrella**—the coverage of the umbrella, until now, was assumed to include conventional invasion. In the era of Great Power Competition with Beijing and Moscow, the situation is not so different. Nuclear weapons’ greatest strength comes from the deterrence they entail, **not their physical impact on a** battlefield. Keeping the first-use option deters the outbreak of a conventional war, the devastating impact of which would not be justified by the mere fact that nuclear weapons were not deployed. Granted, some argue that the prospect of a US first-strike could force the aggressor to escalate the conflict, which otherwise would have remained conventional, into a nuclear war. **However**, in such a drastic scenario, what difference would it make whether the United States uses nuclear weapons first, or waits for the enemy’s nuclear attack before delivering its own? Deterrence comes first. Previous US administrations, Democrats and Republicans, all opted for strategic ambiguity for that reason. My country, South Korea, is under constant threat from North Korea’s **nuclear, chemical,** **biological** **and conventional weapons**. The strongest deterrence against all types of war is the unwavering pledge that North Korean aggression will be met with the end of the North Korean regime, by all means possible including a nuclear strike. Strategic ambiguity ironically grants a sense of certainty by deterring an enemy that fears obliteration. The US limits South Korea’s uranium enrichment; it also holds wartime operational control of the US-ROK allied forces. Many South Koreans do not dispute these temporary holds on our national sovereignty as they are inevitable compromises for an ironclad alliance. But we do expect reciprocity when it comes to extended deterrence. The same goes for Japan. Tokyo renounced the right to go to war after WWII, and has shied away from developing full-fledged offensive capabilities. How can America request that Japan step up its security role in the Indo-Pacific, **if it is planning to partially fold its nuclear umbrella**? How would European countries react to American NFU when the Russians are developing hypersonic missiles, which can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads? **What about America’s Middle Eastern partners** which live under the threat of Iranian aggression? I am not claiming that Washington should change nuclear policy just to align with Korean interests. South Korea is not the center of the world. Indeed, US nuclear policy should align with the American Grand Strategy—but that’s precisely why America should not declare NFU. As President Biden himself has repeatedly asserted, **alliance management is** at the **core of** the **US Grand Strategy**. **In an international security environment where America is no longer the omnipresent “global policeman,” abandonment remains a chief concern for US allies whose security depends on Washington’s commitment**s. US **allies**, especially those who suspect they are not on the priority theater in the Great Power Competition, **fear abandonment more than entrapment** into unwanted conflicts with America’s adversaries. Even **if** the **US seeks to reassure** them **by detaching** the broader collective **security commitments** from NFU, **the fear will** simply **aggravate**. I appreciate the noble cause behind NFU. President Obama also sought it, only to face protests from allies and his own cabinet members. NFU was part of a broader “Nuclear Free World” initiative, accompanied by calls for nuclear arms control and the first visit to Hiroshima by an American president. With the US spearheading such discussions, President Obama hoped to herald an era of a “Nuclear Free World.” Perhaps President Biden shares his aspirations, and for good reason. In an ideal world, we would not have to worry about a nuclear apocalypse, which will always remain a possibility as long as the nine nuclear powers reject wholesale denuclearization. However, NFU cannot be a step towards a “Nuclear-Free World.” In fact, it **could** **precipitate** unwarranted **nuclear** **prolif**eration. **The urge for** an independently **nuclear So**uth **Ko**rea **already** **exists** **among Koreans**. During South Korea’s 2021 presidential primary, the conservatives **openly** **call**ed **for nuclear armament, should the** US nuclear **umbrella fail**. Leading Korean politicians have also called for Washington’s reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula, a rejection of which would amplify demands of our own nuclear weapons program. An op-ed in the Washington Post advocating for arming South Korea with nuclear weapons was popular in Seoul, although few in Washington share this view. A NFU declaration by the United States **would embolden US allies to pursue their own nuclear armament**. If one country does somehow develop nuclear weapons, it would certainly not be the last one to do so. A domino of nuclear proliferation would kickstart across different regions. A South Korean nuclear program would lead to Japan and Taiwan pursuing their own, which would in turn provoke China into an additional build-up. Watching the developments in East Asia, Saudi Arabia might quickly “import” nuclear weapons from Pakistan. And the contagious nuclear arms race would continue. This would mark the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as we know it. China and North Korea have already declared NFU. Beijing declared NFU in 1964, when it first developed nuclear weapons. North Korea made the announcement during the 7th Party Congress in 2016. What kind of moral satisfaction is the Biden administration hoping to get out of NFU, when it’s clear that their pledges don’t amount to much? Perhaps President Biden is wondering why the US does not declare NFU when even China and North Korea already have. Think again. Pyongyang’s NFU pledge is virtually as trustworthy as its pledge to denuclearize. Even if the North Koreans do not actually launch nuclear missiles in a war, it could seek to leverage a nuclear-loaded Intercontinental Ballistic Missile targeting the US mainland into eliciting Washington’s concessions. In that scenario, what good is NFU? China declared NFU in 1964 because it did not want to enter an unwinnable nuclear arms race. Over the last few years, Beijing has repeatedly blackmailed the US, Japan, and Australia with a “nuclear response” to their “provocations.” Most importantly, China has been aggrandizing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. It would be naive to believe these efforts are purely to stock up second-strike capabilities, and not for a more credible first-strike threat. President Biden declared that “America is Back” after four years of Trump. However, US credibility was severely dented this summer as a result of the Afghanistan withdrawal, which the administration justified by citing the pivot to Asia. NFU was surely not the recalibration US allies imagined when receiving that reasoning. The increasingly likely prospect of two-front conflicts in Taiwan and Ukraine are undermining confidence in US-led collective security. If President **Biden truly wishes to reconsolidate US global leadership** and focus on issues of utmost importance, he should reject the allure of No First Use or Sole Purpose.

**AND Taiwan’s protection is perceived as key to containing China --- self-protection efforts drive prolif.**

**Feith 16** [David Feith, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs & editorial writer for The Wall Street Journal in Hong Kong, 1-21-2016, A Troubling U.S. Silence on Taiwan, WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-troubling-u-s-silence-on-taiwan-1453403957>, Willie T.]

Then there’s Hong Kong, where Beijing promised to respect civil liberties and thereby create a model for Taiwan, too, to come under its sovereignty. With Beijing’s promises of democracy now broken and mainland agents accused of abducting government critics off Hong Kong streets, it’s no wonder Taiwanese back politicians who pledge to preserve their distance from Beijing. Studying a map reveals other aspects of **Taiwan’s importance**. Taiwan sits at the **center** of the Western **Pacific’s** “first island chain,” which stretches from Indonesia in the south to Japan in the north, bounding China’s coast and **limiting Beijing’s** ability to threaten the open ocean militarily. Chinese control of Taiwan would mean Chinese submarines based on the island’s east coast, with **free access** up and down the Pacific. U.S. **allies** such as Japan **consider Taiwan essential to** their **own security**. The **erosion of** U.S. **attention** to Taiwan—and certainly the abandonment of Taiwan that some American scholars propose—**could** shatter U.S. alliances in Asia, with grave regional security **consequence**s such as Japan and **South Korea going nuclear.** So the election of Tsai Ing-wen would be a good moment for Taiwan to regain America’s attention. Chinese attempts to bully Taipei’s new government economically, diplomatically or militarily may soon force the U.S. to pay great attention to some crisis, but that only underscores the issue’s importance now. Something for presidential hopefuls to consider as they traverse Iowa and New Hampshire.

**Nuclear development triggers pre-emptive strikes.**

**Milne 23** [Carline Milne, Research Staff Member in the Strategy, Forces & Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), 2-28-2023, Alternative Futures: ROK Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, Korean Economic Institute of America, <https://keia.org/the-peninsula/alternative-futures-rok-nuclear-weapons-and-the-u-s-rok-alliance/>, Willie T.]

First, **a So**uth **Ko**rean **nuc**lear **arsenal** would introduce several **new drivers** of **nuc**lear escalation **on** or **around** the Peninsula and – with the DPRK reportedly close to acquiring ballistic missiles with intercontinental reach, if it has not done so already – for the continental United States. These include a **heightened temptation for No**rth **Ko**rea **to execute** a **preemptive attack against** the **So**uth **Ko**rean **program in** its **infancy, eliminating** Seoul’s new **capability before it** present**s too complicated** a target set; games of **nuc**lear **brinkmanship** between two relatively **novice** nuclear powers; and an exacerbation of the **messaging** dynamics and chances of **misperception**, complicated enough between two nuclear powers, let alone three or four given China’s potential involvement.

**NoKo’s weak army means conflict turns nuclear.**

**Kelly 23** [Robert Kelly, professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University, 11-21-2023, Why North Korea may use nuclear weapons first, and why current US policy toward Pyongyang is unsustainable, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/why-north-korea-may-use-nuclear-weapons-first-and-why-current-us-policy-toward-pyongyang-is-unsustainable/>, Willie T.]

**No**rth **Ko**rea **has** **large incentives** **to use a** tactical **nuc**lear weapon—or several of them—**early in** another **conflict on the** Korean **peninsula**. Deciding how to respond to this is probably the most important contemporary debate inside the US-South Korea alliance. A negotiated bargain that controls North Korean weapons of mass destruction would, of course, be the ideal way to avoid such a conflict, but any such deal seems highly unlikely. The most likely window for a breakthrough came during the overlapping “dovish” presidencies of American President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-In. But it has closed. For a brief moment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un faced the most negotiation-interested leaders in the history of his country’s primary geopolitical opponents– the US and South Korea. Trump particularly was a unique American president regarding North Korea– willing to meet Kim repeatedly without preconditions. Tragically, Kim missed this Trump-Moon opportunity in 2018-2020. He offered only one deal to Trump, and it was so balance-negative for the allies that Trump had to reject it. So the North Korea debate in the democratic world—particularly in South Korea, the United States, and Japan—has reverted to traditional, hawkish approaches. If North Korea will not bargain—or, more specifically, if it will only propose lopsided deals—then the allies must consider military responses to the possibility of North Korean first-use. There are three reasons that North Korea will likely use nuclear weapons first if war erupts on the Korean peninsula: Operationally, Pyongyang will face an intense “**use-it-or-lose-it**” dilemma regarding its weapons of mass destruction as soon as a war starts. Strategically, **its conventional military is** quite **inferior to** the **forces** ranged **against it.** And grand strategically, any serious conflict between the two Koreas will quickly become existential for the North.

**Nuclear war causes extinction, Starr 15**

Steven Starr, 10/14/15, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human

Extinction"https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/

“While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, **a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.** Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]”

**C2) Markets**

**Lee ‘24 reports**

Yian Lee, 10-31-2024, "Taiwan’s Economy Expands More Than Expected in Third Quarter," Bloomberg, <https://archive.ph/bKoni>, accessed 11-6-2024 //RP

**Taiwan’s economy grew more than expected in the third quarter**, a sign the **chips the archipelago makes remain in high demand due to the AI boom**. **Gross domestic product expanded by 3.97% on-year in the period**, the statistics bureau in Taipei said in a statement on Thursday. **That outpaced the 3.4% median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists.** Consumer spending rose 1.92%, the lowest figure since March 2022. **Demand for AI tech and information communication products remained strong**, the bureau said, adding that salary increases and wealth effects of the rising stock market also helped in the quarter. Taiwan has benefited from global demand for the semiconductors and servers that its companies make, tech that is crucial to advances in artificial intelligence. Earlier this month, shares of the archipelago’s biggest company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., hit a record high after the chipmaker topped quarterly estimates and raised its target for 2024 revenue growth, easing concern about the sustainability of an AI hardware boom. “It is perhaps not surprising to see that exports and investments are still in the driving seat led by AI demand,” said Michelle Lam, Greater China economist at Societe Generale SA. “There seems to be some softer momentum in consumption than we have expected but it’s still healthy.”

**Davidson ‘24 finds**

Helen Davidson, 7-19-2024, "How Taiwan secured semiconductor supremacy – and why it won’t give it up",

[https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/19/taiwan-semiconductor-industry-booming//EE doa11/05/24](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/19/taiwan-semiconductor-industry-booming//EE%20doa11/05/24)

There’s little to support Trump’s suggestion that Taiwan took what belonged to the US. But what is undeniable is that **Taiwan does dominate almost 100% of the most advanced end of the global chip industry.** Taiwan produces about **90% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors**, mostly through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co Ltd (TSMC), the world’s largest producer and a major Apple and Nvidia supplier. “Taiwan simply outcompeted other countries,” says Raymond Kuo, a political scientist at the Rand Corporation.

**Affirming decks the market in two key ways**

**First, is Market Panic**

**Affirming creates market panic. Johnstone ‘23 writes**

Jude Blanchette, Gerard Dipippo, and Christopher B. Johnstone, 12-13-2023, "Scared Strait: Understanding the Economic and Financial Impacts of a Taiwan Crisis," No Publication,

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/scared-strait-understanding-economic-and-financial-impacts-taiwan-crisis>, accessed 11-5-2024 //RP

Novel and unpredicted scenarios drive volatility. **More fluid and severe market activity follows events that depart from baseline expectations or novel situations** where financial firms and MNCs anticipate severe financial disruptions—**even those that fall short of extreme scenarios such as a blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Markets might react well in advance of actual physical disruptions or shortages, and if uncertainty were high enough, might shift into “flight to safety” mode even if some experts believed that de-escalation was likely.** Even for firms with a more accurate understanding of this de-escalation,**their behavior would be influenced by the perceived costs of being late to exit.** Consider, for example, a possible collision between a Chinese and Taiwan fighter jet, a scenario that has a higher probability than more extreme scenarios. Even assuming such a scenario would be resolved diplomatically, as was the case in the 2001 collision between a PLA interceptor and a U.S. Navy signals intelligence aircraft, **negative market reactions would occur almost immediately. In such a scenario, negative market reactions would occur almost immediately**. **“Fast money” hedge funds would be among the first to react, potentially selling off large portions of their China and Taiwan exposure and proactively dumping their holdings of Chinese companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges in anticipation of sanctions.** MNCs with dependencies in China, would see a noticeable market sell-off as investors anticipate a possible continuation or expansion of the crisis. **All of this might occur in the opening hours of an early-stage crisis before it even becomes clear if it will escalate. Uncertainty about the United States reaction also drives volatility. Uncertainty about U.S. actions in a developing crisis, including military responses, would likely amplify early market reactions**. Perceptions of differing responses to the crisis in other key capitals, such as Japan and Australia—or **perceptions that other U.S. allies assess a lower risk of conflict or are unsupportive of the U.S. response—would exacerbate this uncertainty.**

**This cascades globally, Zapata warrants**

Zapata, "Global Economic Ramifications of Chinese Blockade on Taiwan", Vision of Humanity, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/assessing-the-global-economic-ramifications-of-a-chinese-blockade-on> taiwan///EEdoa11/05/24

The escalating tensions between Taiwan and China have the potential to impact not only the two nations but also the global economy and supply chains. As tensions escalate between Taiwan and China, the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) has delved into the **uncertainties**surrounding the **effects** of this conflict on **GDP and global supply chain demands**in the recently published Global Peace Index (GPI). Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), remains an independent state, while China, referred to as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), seeks reunification, perceiving Taiwan as part of its territory. Although the PRC claims to pursue reunification through peaceful means, tensions persist on both sides, causing concern among the international

community. China’s military prowess, which surpasses Taiwan’s capabilities has prompted scrutiny of its potential military strategies, raising doubts about peaceful intentions. The power play and military build-up China’s display of military might and intimidation tactics has contributed to the rising tensions. Despite asserting a commitment to peaceful reunification, China’s military expenditure has been increasing, with significant investments in defence weapons and military growth. In contrast, Taiwan faces financial constraints and lacks comparable resources to counterbalance China’s power. The international community is closely monitoring China’s actions, as incidents like the recent Chinese military aircrafts that flew into the territorial area of Taiwan raise further concerns about potential conflicts. Estimated economic impact According to the IEP, a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in a staggering estimated loss of USD 2.7 trillion within the first year. However, this figure is considered conservative, suggesting that the actual economic impact could be even more substantial. The blockade would have a profound effect on numerous Southeast Asian countries, causing significant disruptions across their economies. Specifically, IEP estimates a 2.8% decline in global economic output, almost double the loss experienced during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. China’s economy would shrink by an estimated 7%, while Taiwan’s economy would face a devastating contraction of almost 40%. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and global supply chains Taiwan holds a prominent position in the global semiconductor industry, manufacturing chips that serve as vital components in various technologies, ranging from mobile phones to computers and even AI-powered weapons. In fact, Taiwan is a global leader in semiconductor production, boasting a 20% share of the total global capacity. Moreover, it holds a staggering 37% of the world’s logic semiconductors production capacity and an astonishing 92% of the world’s advanced logic semiconductors production capacity. This dominance makes Taiwan a crucial player in global trade for computers, electronics, and electrical equipment. China and several East Asian countries, including South Korea and Japan, heavily rely on imports of computer and electronic components from Taiwan. For example, the share of trade with Taiwan in this sector ranges from 10% for the Philippines to 21% for China. That is why a blockade on Taiwan would severely disrupt global supply chains, impacting industries that rely on complex electronics. IEP estimates that the blockade would result in a 2.8% decline in global economic output within the first year, with China and Taiwan combined experiencing a loss of $1.6 trillion in output. Thi**s loss would not only be confined to the two countries but would also be strongly felt in other parts of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia and Oceania. Countries in these regions, such as Australia, Laos, and Vietnam, would suffer economic losses ranging from 3% to 6%.** The escalating tensions between Taiwan and China have the potential to impact not only the two nations but also the global economy and supply chains. IEP’s estimates highlight the significant economic losses that could ensue from a Chinese blockade on Taiwan, underscoring the need for diplomatic efforts and peaceful resolutions to mitigate the potential consequences. The world watches with concern as the delicate balance in this region teeters, hoping for a peaceful resolution that safeguards stability and economic prosperity for all parties involved. The reliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and its crucial role in global supply chains make it imperative to address the potential consequences of a Chinese blockade. The significance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry extends far beyond its borders. **Major economies, including the United States, heavily depend on Taiwan** for the supply of semiconductors. Prominent tech companies like Apple rely on Taiwanese manufacturers to meet the demands of their products. However, if a blockade were to occur, it would disrupt the global supply chain for computers, electronics, and electrical equipment, which collectively account for a significant portion of international trade. China and Taiwan combined dominate the global trade in these sectors, with a 31% share in computers and electronics and a 23% share in electrical equipment. A Chinese blockade on Taiwan would have far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The estimated economic losses, already substantial, would likely be even more significant than initially predicted. **The disruption to global supply chains, particularly in the vital semiconductor industry, would have cascading effects on various sectors and industries worldwide. It is essential for all parties involved to seek diplomatic resolutions and peaceful means of addressing the tensions between Taiwan and China to preserve stability, economic prosperity, and the interconnectedness of the global economy.**

**Second is Coercion**

**Kim ‘22 finds**

Lami Kim, , The National Interest, "Should the United States Defend or Ditch Taiwan? | The National Interest," 06/03/22,

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-united-states-defend-or-ditch-taiwan-202772//EEdoa11/05/> 24In addition, reunification with Taiwan would help China carve out a sphere of influence in Asia. **If Washington failed to defend Taiwan, the United States’ credibility as a reliable ally would evaporate, leaving countries in the region no option but to bandwagon to the side of China.** Already today, countries in the region, including the United States’ allies and partners, are wary of siding too closely with the United States’ efforts to contain China in order not to irk their most important economic partner. For example, South Korea pledged not to expand American missile defense systems, the 2017 deployment of which prompted severe economic sanctions by China. Even Japan, the United States’ most reliable ally in the region, has avoided hosting the U.S. intermediate-range missiles aimed at countering China’s A2/AD strategy. **Failing to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression would cause the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies to lose faith in the U.S. will and/or capability to follow through on its security guarantees. Lacking U.S. support, allies would decide their efforts to balance against China are futile, and become more willing to acquiesce to Chinese demands, for example expelling U.S. troops out of their countries. These reverberations would mark the change of command of the**

**Western Pacific from the United States to China.**¶ Once China kicks the United States out of Asia and carves out a region of strategic influence, China would pose a further direct threat to the United States. Some may argue that China’s ambitions are not global, but regional, in which case the United States and China could co-exist by peacefully respecting each other’s spheres of influence. However, it is difficult to identify a state’s intentions. Even if we could, intentions can change over time. The United States did not intend to become a global hegemon when it started to rise, but here it is. If China’s ambition is now or later becomes a global hegemon, allowing it to roam freely in the Western Pacific would enhance China’s capability to project power outside the region. Eventually, China may pose a direct threat to the U.S. mainland, and the United States’ global position.

**That gives China free reign to blockade or coerce Taiwan. Collins ‘23 finds**

Collins 23[Gabriel Collins, , Baker Institute, "Silicon Hegemon: Could China Take Over Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry Without Invading? | Baker Institute," 09/27/23,

<https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/silicon-hegemon-could-china-take-over-taiwans-semiconducto> r-industry-without-invading#\_ftn1] EA..RecutEEdoa11/05/24

In October 2022, [1] the United States imposed restrictions[2] on the sale of high-performance semiconductors to China in defense of American strategic technology and national security interests. The export controls cover advanced chips as well as machinery and human assistance for manufacturing them.[3] Semiconductor chips are perhaps the most strategic resource of the present era, offering power computing capabilities that confer overall technological and economic advantage and could be used in advanced military applications such as autonomous aircraft.[4] As such, these export controls signal a decisive U.S. turn that Beijing assumes is designed to hamper its technological progress.¶ Taiwan is at the center of this great power collision given that it produces 60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced chips.[5] Despite tremendous investment and effort, China has yet to master development and production of the most advanced chips; here Taiwan remains the world’s “OPEC++” in its dominance, followed by South Korea in a secondary position. The self-governing island, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) views as a breakaway province, is also a prime political prize coveted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which insists that “reunification” must be fulfilled.[**6] Strategic pressures are acute, as General Secretary Xi Jinping commands a set of national capabilities far exceeding those any of his predecessors enjoyed since the PRC’s 1949 founding. China now fields the largest military ground, maritime, aviation, and rocket forces in the Indo-Pacific region, and its leaders appear increasingly confident in their country’s coercive capabilities.[7] In addition, Xi is working to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the PRC’s main military force, through his Centennial Military Building Goal of 2027. The goal is seemingly designed to give Xi multiple tools — backed by the credible threat of force — to coerce Taiwan into submitting to the CCP’s unification vision.[8]¶** All this means that increasingly, analysts, planners, and policymakers in the U.S. and its allies and partners must now contemplate scenarios and countermeasures that many previously thought unthinkable.[9] Critically among them:¶ Could **Beijing take control of Taiwan’s world-leading semiconductor base without actually going to war?[1]¶** If so, how might it do so?¶ What measures can the U.S. and its allies and partners take to forestall such a catastrophic outcome?¶ Semiconductor Strategy: Coercion Contingencies Short of War¶ Xi appears determined to bring Taiwan under the political control of the PRC. But **instead of undertaking a great power war, he prefers to use the PRC’s “three warfares” strategy, a multifront approach that weaponizes public opinion, psychology, and the law. The aim is to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and its will to resist.¶ To achieve what Beijing terms “reunification” with the least escalation possible, the PRC might:¶ Increasingly surround Taiwan with air, naval, and even missile operations, and attempt to, over time, weaken the responding Taiwanese forces.¶ Harass, interfere with, or embargo the cargos of civilian and government or military vessels and aircraft in the international waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan.¶** In a more escalatory case, blockade or seize one or more of Taiwan’s outlying features and islands.¶ This last scenario raises difficult questions of probability and significance. The Kinmen and Matsu islands are very close to PRC shores, while the Pratas

and Itu Aba islands are distant from mainland Taiwan. All of these islands are so small and geographically vulnerable that PRC planners could be tempted to concentrate overwhelming force against them. However, even a successful PRC seizure of any of these tiny islands could come at great cost: Beijing would lose the element of surprise, and Taiwanese and foreign opposition would be mobilized in ways that could greatly undermine PRC efforts to take control of Taiwan’s main island and the capital city Taipei, its ultimate political goal. It is difficult to predict Beijing’s calculations with any degree of certainty. Yet we are now at the point where such thorny scenarios demand close examination.

**Disruption is devastating, Walters ‘23 finds**

Riley Walters 7-11-2023, Losing Taiwan’s Semiconductors Would Devastate the US Economy, <https://www.hudson.org/technology/losing-taiwan-semiconductor-would-devastate-us-economy-riley-w> alters, Narwhal //RecutEEdoa11/06/24The process to make semiconductors is long and complex. By some measures, a chip product could cross up to 70 borders before ever finding its way to a consumer. While American companies have developed some of the most advanced methods for designing semiconductors, the most advanced manufacturing capabilities right now exist in Taiwan and South Korea — with most chips coming out of Taiwan. If the U.S. were no longer able to access Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, it would have a devastating impact on the U.S. economy. According to a new study, losing access to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would have a negative impact on the U.S. economy greater than either the global financial crisis of 2008 or the COVID lockdown of 2020. **A significant disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry could affect as much as $1.6 trillion, or roughly 8%**, **of America’**s **annua**l **g**r**oss domestic product** — hurting industries like personal electronics, automotives and telecommunications. And even this estimate may be low, considering how our lives, from farming to health care, are increasingly reliant on new technologies that require more advanced chips.**Nearly one in five semiconductors used for exports comes out of Taiwan**. **Taiwanese companies account for nearly 75% of manufacturing of the most advanced chips in the world.** As the pandemic lockdown showed us, if there’s a disruption to the industries that rely on a continuous flow of semiconductors, large swaths of the **economy can suffer from a domino effect of delays**, loss of sales, and factory shutdowns.

**All these scenarios cascade and go nuclear.**

**Weidokal 24,** MBA in International Strategy and Economics @ University of South Carolina and the Economics University of Vienna; founder of International Strategic Analysis, former Visiting Professor @ Baldwin Wallace University; 31 endorsements on LinkedIn. (Michael, “Chapter Fifteen: Implications

for the Future,” in The Coming Decline: A World Without Economic Growth, Published by International Strategic Analysis, KU Libraries)

**As we look ahead, one cannot help but wonder if this threat of long-term economic stagnation and decline will not be the catalyst for major conflicts in the future. For one, such economic troubles could fuel political radicalism, as it did in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, rising levels of protectionism and nationalism could lead to far worse trade disputes than we have seen in recent years, something that could also turn an economic dispute into a military conflict. Finally, the battle for control of strategic resources such as oil, water, land or rare-earth elements could intensify as economic growth slows, resulting in conflicts over the control of these resources. There are many examples of potential conflicts between large economic powers that could erupt in the years and decades ahead, particularly if economic growth continues to slow over the longer-term. For example, tensions between the world’s two superpowers, the United States and China, have risen**

**steadily in recent years, due in part to US concerns about China’s rising economic and military power. As there are a large number of flashpoints that could bring these two giant powers into conflict (Taiwan, North Korea, South China Sea, etc.), the likelihood of a superpower conflict is now greater than it has been at any time since the early 1980s. This is not the only potential great power conflict that the world faces today. For example, tensions between the United States and Russia have also been rising as the latter seeks to regain some of the geopolitical importance and influence that it lost in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The growing rivalry between China and India is another flashpoint that has the potential to erupt into a conflict between two major economic powers, particularly in light of the numerous border disputes between those two Asian giants. In fact, there are a number of potential conflicts involving two or more major economies that could erupt in the near-future, any of which would not only be influenced by economic factors, but would also have a major impact on the economies of the combatants, as well as on the global economy as a whole.**

**US-China war goes nuclear**

**Beres-21** (Louis Rene Beres, 3-10-2021, [Professor Emeritus of IR @ Purdue, Fmr. Research Fellow @ Princeton Center of International Studies + World Law Fund, Fmr. Chair @ Project Daniel, M.A. + Ph.D. @ Princeton, B.A. @ Queens College], “Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” Jurist. <https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/03/louis-rene-us-nuclear-policy-biden/> //recut vy // Recut MW 🧌)

A further analytic distinction is needed here between inadvertent nuclear war and accidental nuclear war. By definition, an **accidental** **nuclear war** would be **inadvertent**, but **reciprocally**, an **inadvertent nuclear war need not** always **be accidental**. False warnings, for example, which could be spawned by mechanical, electrical or computer malfunction (or by hacking) would not signify the origins of inadvertent nuclear war. Conceptually, they would fit under the more clarifying narratives of accidental nuclear war. Most worrisome, in such concerns, would be avoiding nuclear war caused by miscalculation. **In striving for** “**escalation dominance**,” **competitive nuclear powers caught up with multiple bewildering complexities** in **extremis atomicum could** sometime **find themselves embroiled** in an **inadvertent nuclear exchange**. Ominously, **any such unendurable outcome** could **arise suddenly** and **irremediably**, though neither side had actually wanted such a war. Summing up such scenarios, in facing off against each other, even under optimal assumptions of mutual rationality, both President Biden and President Kim Jung Un would have to concern themselves with **all possible miscalculations, errors** in **information**, **[and] unauthorized uses** **of strategic** **weapons**, **mechanical** or **computer** **malfunctions**, and **myriad assorted nuances** of cyber-defense/cyber-war. In other words, even if both Biden and Kim were abundantly capable, humane and focused – a generous assumption, to be sure – northeast Asia might still **descend** **rapidly** **toward** some form or other of **uncontrollable nuclear conflagration**. If this **dire prospect were not sobering enough**, it is also **reasonable to expect** that the **corresponding erasure** of a **once-universal nuclear taboo** would **heighten the likelihood** of **nuclear risk-taking** and **conflict in other parts** of the **globe**, especially southwest Asia (e.g., Pakistan and India) and the Middle East (e.g., Israel and Iran).

**CROSS AP STARR 15!!!!!!!!! NUCLEAR WAR CAUSES EXTINCTION**

**C3) Taiwanese Proliferation**

**U.S. taiwan security relations remain strong. Blanchard ‘24**

Ben Blanchard, 9-18-2024, "Taiwan deepening security cooperation with US, other 'allies'," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/taiwan-deepening-security-cooperation-with-us-other-allies-2024-09-19/>, accessed 10-2-2024 //RP

TAIPEI, Sept 19 (Reuters) - **Taiwan's combat effectiveness has improved thanks to its deepening security partnership with the United States and other friends and "allies" but this is kept deliberately low key**, the island's defence minister said. Democratically governed Taiwan, which is claimed by China as its own territory, does not have treaty based defence relations with Washington or any of its allies, though **the United States is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself and military officials from both sides do conduct visits and training**. Beijing frequently erupts with anger at any hint of countries having military ties with Taiwan, and has repeatedly sanctioned U.S. arms companies for selling weapons to Taipei. Speaking to reporters on Wednesday in comments embargoed until Thursday, Defence Minister Wellington Koo made rare comments about those relations, given their sensitivity. "In the past few years, **Taiwan, the United States and other friends and allies have continuously strengthened security partnerships and continued to expand and deepen military cooperation**," he said. "This has contributed to the improvement of the national military's combat effectiveness and regional peace and stability." C**ooperation focuses on "substantively improving" combat effectiveness rather than just "formality", Koo said. "The Defence Ministry has never publicised this foreign military cooperation with great fanfare**. This is to take into account the international situation and respect for our friends and allies; it is also to avoid unnecessary interference," he added, in a veiled reference to China. Beijing, which has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control, has been staging regular exercises around the island for five years. China held "punishment" war games around Taiwan in late May shortly after Lai Ching-te took office as president in anger at what Beijing viewed as "separatist" content in his inauguration speech. Lai has repeatedly offered talks with China but been rebuffed. He says only Taiwan's people can decide their future.

**The aff forces taiwan to proliferate, Mizokami ‘24 warrants**

Kyle Mizokami, 2-26-2024, "China's Greatest Fear Almost Came True: Taiwan Armed with Nuclear Weapons," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-greatest-fear-almost-came-true-taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-2> 09656, accessed 10-1-2024 //RP

Taiwan’s nuclear program goes back to 1964, when **the People’s Republic of China tested its first nuclear device. The test was not exactly a surprise to outside observers, but it was still Taiwan’s nightmare come true**. Chinese and Taiwanese air and naval forces occasionally skirmished, and it threatened to turn into all-out war. Suddenly Taipei was confronted with the possibility that such a war could turn nuclear. Even just one nuclear device detonated on an island the size of Maryland would have devastating consequences for the civilian population. **From Taiwan’s perspective, a nuclear arsenal would be the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty*.* Even if the United States split with the country, as it eventually did, Taiwanese nukes would keep the Chinese People’s Liberation Army at bay, a deterrent not only against Chinese nuclear power, but against conventional forces as well.** In hindsight, this would have had a good chance of success, as North Korea’s own procurement of nuclear weapons has made the United States and South Korea reluctant to retaliate over the country’s various military provocations**.The Taiwanese bomb program began in 1967, using the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology’s Institute for Nuclear Energy Research as a cover. In 1969, Canada sold the country a heavy-water nuclear research reactor as a prelude to what it hoped were commercial energy-producing reactor sales**—none too soon, as the Trudeau government recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970. **The reactor, known as the Taiwan Research Reactor, went critical in 1973, and Taiwan set about creating a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.**

**Fitzpatrick ‘16 finds**

Mark Fitzpatrick, 02-05-2016, "Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," No Publication, <https://sci-hub.ru/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19445571.2015.1146023>, accessed 10-2-2024 //RP

Like Japan and South Korea, **Taiwan is often considered to be a latent nuclear power, possessing the technological basis for developing nuclear weapons**. Like South Korea, **Taiwan twice went down the weapons path in a post-war period of authoritarian rule and deep security anxieties.** Today, the authoritarianism is gone but**the reasons for anxiety remain. Taiwan faces a potential existential threat unparalleled anywhere else in the world, and its weakness relative to the Chinese mainland increases by the day.** Yet non-proliferation norms are strong. **A resumed nuclear weapons pursuit cannot be ruled out if the implicit US defence commitment were to wane and the positive shift in cross-Strait relations were to change dramatically.** Neither condition is likely for the foreseeable future. **Although a negative political shift in cross-Strait relations may be in the offing, it is not likely to change things so dramatically that it will reverse Taiwan’s non-proliferation status.** History **Taiwan’s secret nuclear-weapons programme apparently started in late 1964, in response to the nuclear weapons test Taiwan** chapter three Downloaded by [Universite Laval] at 19:48 16 May 2016 128 | Asia’s latent nuclear powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that October. During the previous decade, Taiwan had begun to build a civilian nuclear infrastructure, thanks to participation in the US Atoms for Peace programme. **Shocked by Beijing’s test and angered by Washington’s refusal to follow their advice to bomb the PRC nuclear facilities, Taiwan’s leaders initiated a covert weapons project**. Based on a US$140 million proposal by the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), the military’s main research and development centre, the code-named ‘Hsin Chu Programme’ was begun at the newly established Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER),

co-located with CSIST.1 **Taiwan did not consider its weapons programme a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it signed in 1968. Its logic was that the NPT authorised weapons possession by the states that had exploded them prior to treaty entry into force, as Beijing had done in 1964, and since the Kuomintang government considered itself the legitimate government of all China, it was not bound by the NPT restrictions on non-nuclear weapons states.**2 In 1969, INER purchased a Canadian 40MWt heavy-water moderated research reactor, which became operational in 1973. An ideal facility for producing weapons-grade plutonium, this was the same model of reactor that India used to produce plutonium for its first nuclear test in 1974. If operated at capacity, the Taiwan research reactor could have produced 10kg or more of plutonium per year, enough for up to two weapons.3 Procuring equipment from abroad, INER also built a heavy-water production plant, a fuel-fabrication plant and a hot-cell facility for research and experiments on plutonium separation, which began operating in 1975 or 1976. INER was unable to obtain equipment to build a larger reprocessing facility, although a small reprocessing plant was obtained from a Downloaded by [Universite Laval] at 19:48 16 May 2016 Taiwan | 129 French firm. This ‘Plutonium Fuel Chemistry Laboratory’ was capable of producing plutonium metal.4 Taiwan officials had considered nuclear weapons well before the PRC test. In a 1975 speech to the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliamentary body, president Chiang Ching-kuo said that research on nuclear weapons had started in 1958 (when PRC nuclear-weapons work was well under way). He added that, although he had advocated weapons development at that time, his father and president Chiang Kai-shek declined on grounds that use of such weapons would ‘hurt our fellow compatriots’.5 In 1961, during artillery battles with the mainland near Quemoy, the Taiwan military reportedly considered trying to obtain US nuclear weapons.6 Beginning in 1958, the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons at Tainan Air Force Base on the southwest coast. They were withdrawn in 1974 in accordance with a pledge that president Richard Nixon made during, or shortly after, his 1972 visit to Beijing.7 Taiwan’s nuclear development efforts initially took the US intelligence community by surprise. By the early 1970s, however, the US had become suspicious and taken steps to block Taiwan’s efforts to procure a plutonium-reprocessing facility. In addition to intelligence assets, Washington had unusual access to Taiwan’s nuclear programme because in 1972, after Taiwan’s departure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other UN-related bodies, the US took over custodial rights to enforce safeguards in Taiwan under a trilateral agreement. In 1974, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that ‘Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option clearly in mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device after five years or so…’8

**Additionally, it hurts ally perceptions, Collins ‘24 finds**

Gabriel Collins, 7-30-24, “Annexation of Taiwan: A Defeat From Which the US and Its Allies Could Not Retreat”, Baker Institute for Public Policy,

<https://www.bakerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/CES-Collins-China%20Taiwan%20Annexatio> n %20Paper-FINAL-073024.pdf //bmiy //recut rchen//RecutEEdoa11/06/24

**Being able to sustain the effort is critical** because the consequences of failure are so significant. **The United States could walk away from long-term deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq with some reputational damage but limited** damage in the way of economic harm, alliance disruption, technological loss, or nuclear **proliferation risks**. **In the Cold War, the United States was able to do the same when it pulled out of Vietnam. However, Taiwan is very different**. A coerced **t**ake**o**ver of Taiwan would **not** alleviate Sino-American tensions but instead would likely supercharge them. Moreover,**failing to support Taiwan would create an unprecedented crisis of confidence among American allies in Asia and Europe.** They would be confronted with the unsettling prospect of the United States failing to protect a polity that, despite lacking formal alliance status, is a steadfast ally in all but name. The adverse consequences examined in this paper should command the attention of American policymakers, prompting a redoubling of efforts to deter Xi from attempting such a catastrophic gambit in the first place. A coercive takeover of Taiwan resulting from American inaction or ineffective response would prompt serious global questioning of U.S. commitments to the security of allies and the defense of democracy. Moreover, it would bolster autocratic regimes in the ongoing worldwide contest of systems. The impact would likely usher in a major global regression, undermining the liberal, rules-based order that has underpinned so much improvement in the human condition over the past 80 years. Beijing’s emphasis on repression over opportunity and prosperity — already evident in its actions such as the internment of Uighurs, suffocation of Hong Kong, and unparalleled domestic surveillance — would extend further on a worldwide scale if it 84 were to succeed in coercively annexing Taiwan. This expansion would **affect nations across the Global South and OECD, including rising powers like India and Indonesia, as**

**well as longstanding American allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand**. Equally important, the consequences would boomerang back to the PRC itself, constricting future prospects for nearly 1.5 billion people. This decline in well-being would elevate the likelihood of conflict and impede future development. Ultimately, the adverse effects would be felt universally, with some nations facing catastrophic consequences. Moreover, with Taiwan serving as a key hub for semiconductor production, a PRC strengthened by conquest would hold sway over the majority of the world’s best microchips. Advanced semiconductor technology plays a crucial role in global progress, and inferior substitutes would simply not meet individual or societal needs, either in America or around the world. Furthermore, if the PRC succeeded in coercively annexing Taiwan, Beijing would almost certainly impose economic and trade realignments that could hamstring America’s position and power. It would also exert **immense pressure on** U.S. **allies and** the broader alliance network, **eroding the credibility of U.S. commitments** and destabilizing alliances. Consequently, the**United States would be at risk of losing the forward basing and access crucial for its global power projection, allowing PRC forces to expand to fill the vacuum**. Taiwan’s fall**would precipitate** profound **nuclear proliferation** risks. **The prospect of nuclear proliferation among untrusting or former allies looms large, potentially unleashing torrents of instability**. Given the catastrophic potential of such proliferation, it is imperative that it be prevented at all costs. Armed with this stark realization and recognizing the other vital stakes that hang in the balance, policymakers must urgently shore up deterrence before it fails.327 Indeed, U.S. policymakers must redouble their efforts to deter Xi’s ambitions and prevent such disastrous consequences from ever materializing in the first place.

**Taiwan could proliferate quickly. Lowther ‘20**

Adam Lowther, 12-24-2020, "Would a nuclear-armed Taiwan deter China?," Strategist,

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/would-a-nuclear-armed-taiwan-deter-china/>, accessed 10-2-2024 //RP However, **as the PLA rachets up pressure on Taiwan to reunify, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, and her successor will likely find themselves in a position where they must take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the continued independence of a free and democratic Taiwan—either in coordination with the US or independently.** Taiwan’s leaders sensed the urgency to develop their own nuclear capability once already because of the normalising of relations between the US and the PRC. During the 1970s, Taiwan produced plutonium for its indigenous weapons program. While plutonium production was halted because of American pressure in 1976, the military government in Taiwan continued with its secret nuclear weapons program until the 1980s, which included a successful nuclear reaction. **Taiwan is already a latent nuclear power. The move to nuclear weapons would not take long given its current materials and technical capacity. Taiwan already has two operational nuclear power plants on opposite ends of the island that could produce plutonium. It could use a ‘Japan option’ of enriching its radioactive materials for weaponisation in a short timeframe.** Would a nuclear-armed Taiwan deter the PRC from an invasion? The use of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-armed Taiwan would certainly make an already difficult invasion for Xi and the PLA more costly. History suggests that once Taiwan has nuclear weapons, the PRC will become much less aggressive towards it—making the development of nuclear weapons more attractive. **Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party, despite its tense relations with the mainland, represents the anti-nuclear movement within Taiwan. However, views change when survival is at stake. It is not a bridge too far to suggest that a reluctant Biden administration and an aggressive Xi might lead Taiwan to see the utility of a nuclear arsenal.**

**Wadsworth ‘19 contextualizes**

Kelly **Wadsworth 19**, Non-Resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, PhD Student in International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, MBA and MA in International Studies (Korea Studies) at the University of Washington, Former Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, BA in International Relations and East Asia from the University of California, Davis, “Should Japan Adopt Conventional Missile Strike Capabilities?”, Asia Policy, Volume 14, Number 2, April 2019, p. 83-87, Accessed 10-21-2024, ARC (recut lcp 10.29.24)

American proponents of Japan obtaining a conventional missile strike capability interviewed for this research argued that the United States could use a more capable ally in the region to address the threat posed by heightened Chinese naval activity. While that prospect might be a tempting short-term fix to offset the U.S. Department of Defense budget cuts over the last decade,the long-term interests of the

United States in maintaining regional stability should also be considered. In addition to the negative reactions of Beijing and Seoul, a Japanese offensive strike capability could **decrease regional confidence** in the **credibility of U.S. power** in Asia. As noted above, some experts argue that if Japan strengthens its offensive capability, such a move might be **interpreted** by neighbors reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a **sign** that Tokyo is **losing confidence** in the **U**nited **S**tates’ credibility.71 This could **start a chain reaction** that causes more U.S. allies to **hedge** with China or to **develop their own strike capabilities**, further **increasing instability** in Asia. China. China would likely be the most vocal in its disapproval of a Japanese conventional missile strike capability, potentially offering not just harsh words but also harsh actions that could further **decrease regional stability** in an **already tense** security environment. China expressed dissent when Japan considered a preemptive strike option against the North Korean threat in 2006, arguing that the move was “extremely irresponsible” and would severely interfere with international diplomatic efforts, aggravating tensions in Northeast Asia.72 Over ten years later,the regional environment is **even more tense** as a result of North Korea’s acquisition of **nuclear weapons** and China’s **island reclamation** efforts in the **E**ast and **S**outh **C**hina **S**eas. Support from Washington for Tokyo’s armament would likely fuel Beijing’s narrative that an aggressive and hegemonic United States is fixated on containing China and would be used to justify China’s own increased militarization. It would likely also end any chance of dialogue between Washington and Beijing on facilitating peaceful resolutions to regional **territorial disputes**. Brad Roberts points out that adopting strike capability would assist Japan in cases where its interests do not align with those of the United States, as in potential gray-zone conflicts. 73 However,the ensuing heightened mistrust between the alliance partners and China may work to increase the likelihood of a **gray-zone conflict**—such as the 2010 collision of Japanese and Chinese boats in disputed territory—possibly **escalating** into **war**. In addition, if Japan had a conventional missile strike capability that could be used to “preempt” a perceived imminent attack from China, Beijing would in turn be more likely to consider preemption of Japanese strike abilities, causing a **premature escalation** of the crisis that would undoubtedly **draw in the United States**. South Korea. Despite significant progress on U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation in recent years, Japan-ROK military relations remain increasingly tense, a situation that could **easily spiral out of control** if Japan adopted an offensive capability.74 When Japan, sparked by North Korea’s provocations in 2006, publicly debated the legality of a “preemptive strike” option, South Korean officials bluntly expressed their negative opinion of Japan’s intentions. A spokesperson for the Blue House secretariat, for example, remarked, “We have been alerted by this display of Japan’s inclination to aggression,” and that Japan was using the crisis “as an excuse to beef up their military.”75 South Koreans demonstrated a similar sentiment after Tokyo’s 2014 CSD proposal, with a 2015 poll showing that the majority of the public (56.9%) perceived Japan as “militaristic,” up 3.8 percentage points from the previous year.76 If Tokyo were to push forward with the discussion of adopting a conventional missile strike capability, South Korean public opinion would likely become even more unfavorable toward Japan. At a time when enhanced trilateral **coop**eration is **important to deter the evolving threats** in the region, Japan advancing legislation to allow for conventional missile strike capabilities would likely **derail those efforts**, especially if labeled “preemptive.” Such a move could even push Seoul to **hedge** with Beijing, as the ROK is increasingly reluctant to join any initiative perceived to be aimed at containing China.77 With China as South Korea’s largest trading partner and the United States as its greatest security ally, the ROK is not eager to choose between the two sides. Southeast Asia.

**Independently, Pax ‘17 finds**

Paxchristiusa, 6/11/15, "Prayer-Study-Action on Banning Nuclear Weapons by the Pax Christi Anti-Racism Team," Pax Christi USA,

<https://paxchristiusa.org/2017/06/01/prayer-study-action-on-banning-nuclear-weapons-by-the-pax-chris> ti-anti-racism-team///EEdoa12/17/23

**The increase of nuclear arsenals also included extensive nuclear “testing” in the Pacific islands, where the majority are people of color, including the Bikini Atoll of the Marshall Islands.** They were called “tests,” but the Pacific islanders experienced radiation poisoning, injuries, and the loss of their ancestral homes. Like the “Kibakusha” – the people of Japan who survived the hellfire of the atomic bomb – the Pacific Islanders have been tireless prophets in the movement to end nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear weapons are the most volatile weapons of mass destruction that have ever existed, and their use cannot be limited to combatants. They kill massively, destroying everything in their expansive range, and leave irreversible injuries to the humans, creatures, and creation that survive.** Yet ironically, while other, less-destructive (though still horrific) weapons, including chemical and biological weapons, are illegal**, there is no such legal prohibition against nuclear weapons.** The Non-Proliferation Treaty Has Not Achieved Nuclear Disarmament In 1968, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons resulted in the adoption of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT,) ratified in 1970. Under the NPT, the nations with nuclear weapons agreed to disarm if nations without nuclear arsenals agreed to never acquire them. However, there was no timetable for disarmament set, and nearly 50 years later there are 14,900 nuclear weapons in existence. The US has 6800 and Russia has 7000, and nuclear nations continue to substantially invest in “modernizing” their arsenals, which really means enhancing the mobility, deliverability, accuracy, and lethal character of their weapons. Often, **deterrence is suggested as a logical reason for amassing nuclear weapons; that is, the threat of mutually-assured destruction keeps any country from ever pushing the nuclear button. This is nonsense. Deterrence is a myth, and the risk of power-hungry and vengeful heads of state being in charge of nuclear arsenals, accidental nuclear war due to faulty intelligence, nuclear malfunctions, or the risk of theft by non-state actors of nuclear capability are too deadly to chance.**

**That causes extinction -- cross apply starr**