**We negate.**

# **1NC - Terror**

**Al Shabaab is on the decline**

**Kiage 24** --- (Nyaboga Kiage, 11-11-2024, "Al Shabaab activities in North Eastern on decline – Report", https://nairobinews.nation.africa/al-shabaab-activities-in-north-eastern-on-decline-report/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

**There has been a decline in** the activities of members of **the terrorist group Al Shabaab.** The decline has been seen in the vast northeastern region, where members of the militant group used to carry out a series of attacks on non-locals and the police. Horizon Analysts and Researchers Network (HARN), an organization that conducts research in the northeastern region, has linked the decline in such attacks to cooperation between security forces and local communities. The North Eastern region consists of Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties. “From September last year to August 2024, **there has been a significant improvement in the deterrence, interception, and disruption of** potential **terror**ist attacks as part of the fight against extremism **and** insurgency activities along the areas bordering Somalia compared to the same period last year,” the organization said in a statement. HARN said there had been **a 60 percent reduction in attacks** in the four countries. This, the organization said, had been made possible by a newfound camaraderie between locals and security agencies. It also said that propaganda material, which is also shared to recruit young people into the militia group, has also decreased on both online and offline platforms. **Even in Somalia**, HARN said **there had been a serious operation carried out by officers** attached to the Somali National Army (SNA) **targeting terrorists and terror-related activities**. According to the organization, the security services have been receiving timely information that is helping to counter the activities of the extremist group. These activities include disrupting planned attacks, countering insurgent propaganda, and pre-empting their new recruitment tactics. Kenya, especially the vast northeastern region and Wajir County in particular, has been a playground for the militants. However, things seem to have changed with almost weekly reports of attacks. The Al Shabaab attacks are not only synonymous with the Eastern region as the terror group has also caused havoc in other parts of the country including the capital Nairobi. At least 67 people died in the assault by al-Shabab in 2013 on the Westgate shopping complex in the capital. Four militants who carried out the attack were found dead in the shopping center’s rubble. The militants occupied the mall for four days, in one of the deadliest jihadi attacks in Kenya. In September 2020, a judge sentenced two men Hussein Hassan Mustafa and Mohammed Ahmed Abdi to 18 and 33 years in jail after they were found guilty of helping the Islamist militants attack the Westgate mall.

**Unfortunately, affirming increases Al Shabaab’s recruitment**

Zahran 24 --- (Motaz Zahran, 12-10-2024, "Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade", https://www.newsweek.com/stability-horn-africa-vital-global-trade-security-opinion-1998578) //doa12-18-2024 + master chen :)

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is of critical importance to global economic security due to the integrated nature of global supply chains. 12 percent of world trade flows through the Red Sea, and disruptions to this flow affect the global economy. **Any recognition of Somaliland as an independent state will result in** **dangerous repercussions**, including **exacerbating internal divisions between the various clans of Somaliland that support independence and others that seek to remain within the Somali federal state.** This is a staggering reminder of the danger of further fragmenting the country through reckless recognition agreements. Beyond Somalia, this recognition **is a slippery slope entailing a domino effect of separatist movements across the region igniting conflicts in pursuit of independence, leading to unimaginable chaos. Cairo has longstanding ties with Mogadishu** that date to before its independence in 1960. In this context, Egypt heeded Somalia's request to participate in the new peacekeeping mission AUSSOM, which was wholeheartedly welcomed by the African Union Peace and Security Council. Egypt's extended experience in peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere provides crucial support to the counterterrorism capabilities of the Somali armed forces and the concerted efforts of the Somali government and people to rebuild their country. In the broader regional context, and in addition to its **destabilizing actions in Somalia,** Ethiopia has not shown any fraction of a genuine political will to reach a deal on its dam on the River Nile. It refuses to address Egypt and Sudan's legitimate concerns and has blocked efforts to reach a compromise over 13 years of arduous negotiations. Ethiopia should commit to reaching a legally binding agreement based in international law that preserves all parties' water security while supporting Ethiopia's development goals. In Sudan, political stability is a prerequisite for lasting stability in the region. As such, Egypt continues to play a crucial role through its persistent efforts, along with the U.S., to shepherd the warring parties toward an immediate cease-fire that paves the way for full humanitarian access. Since fighting broke out in April 2023, more than one million Sudanese refugees have crossed into Egypt, fleeing the war and dire humanitarian crisis. We are proud to support refugees, and with sustained international support, we can continue to play a key role in delivering humanitarian aid and building concert over a political solution. There is clear alignment between U.S. and Egyptian interests in the Horn of Africa. These include counterterrorism, maritime security, and anti-piracy. Both strategic partners converge on the necessity of deploying diplomacy to promote peace, security, and stability. The Bright Star and Eagle Defender joint exercises between the U.S. and Egypt embody the security dimension of the bilateral relationship, while efforts to promote a political pathway in Sudan exemplify our joint and relentless diplomatic endeavors The eyes of the world are fixed on the rising tensions in the Middle East as Israel's war continues in Gaza and Syria falls back into chaos, dominating global news coverage. Yet the world cannot afford to overlook the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa posing a serious threat to both regional and international peace and security. For the past year, the Houthis have disrupted global commerce in one of the world's most crucial waterways, the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Instability in the Horn of Africa was exacerbated following Ethiopia's decision to undermine the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia by signing an agreement with the region of Somaliland. **This enables the terrorist group Al-Shabab to recruit militants, spread their destructive ideology, and expand operations beyond Somalia's borders under the guise of preventing Somalia's disintegration**. Coordination between Al-Shabab and the Houthis will only add fuel to fire to engulf the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.

**Empirically, when the MOU – Ethiopia’s promise to eventually recognize Somaliland – was created, Al Shabaab called for jihad**

Weiss 24 --- (Caleb Weiss, 1-1-2024, "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink", https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/) //doa12-18-2024 + master chen :)

Given the inability of either Somalia or Somaliland to mount a conventional military challenge, it is far more likely that, should this brewing conflict persist, it will take the form of a multisided proxy conflict — not a historically unknown scenario in the region. Given the brittleness of both Somalia and Somaliland as well as Ethiopia (which is presently fighting multiple large-scale insurgencies), this scenario is hardly more reassuring than the prospects of a conventional war. One central question in it all is what role al-Shabaab will play. Al-Shabaab’s Potential Responses **Al-Shabaab**, as mentioned above, **is** already **attempting to mobilize** its **supporters to violently stop** the memorandum’s **implementation**. The group’s official statement rejecting the deal underscores its ideological hybridity. Al-Shabaab is a transnational Salafi-jihadist organization in its vision and ambitions and loyalty to al-Qaeda. But th**e group’s leadership is entirely Somali**, and the group has historically **capitalized on Somali nationalism** and irredentism, particularly in opposition to Ethiopia’s military interventions, in order to build its social base within Somalia. Unsurprisingly, al-Shabaab seems to see this moment as an opportunity in which the collective anger among the wider Somali populace can serve to breathe new life into the organization. The memorandum therefore may end up marking the most energetic period for al-Shabaab in years and act to accelerate the group’s long-plotted expansion into Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Al-Shabaab’**s robust propaganda machine** has made numerous statements since the memorandum was announced. Many of its top leaders, including Ali Mohamud Rage, Jama Abdisalam, and Mahad Karate, have publicly spoken out against the memorandum. Al-Shabaab’s central leadership has also released an official statement condemning it, adding that combating the deal is a religious obligation **and** that all Somalis must “liberate” their country from the Ethiopian invaders. On the ground, it has organized protests throughout the territory it holds from southern to central Somalia, in which it publicly **called for jihad against the memorandum’s implementation. While the threats are all rhetorical for now,** there remains a strong precedent to suggest that **the group will take action.** This level of mobilization suggests the group retains the ability to recruit and potentially enable acts of terror, despite the major military offensive against al-Shabaab since the fall of 2022. Al-Shabaab has already been able to make some gains on the ground in Somalia as a counter-offensive in central Somalia slowed and a planned major second front in southern Somalia was repeatedly delayed. As African Union forces continue to leave, al-Shabaab has gone on its own offensive, retaking many former African Union bases or assaulting waning bases still occupied. This growing momentum, coupled with popular Somali anger over the memorandum (as well as the current war in Gaza), offers al-Shabaab new opportunities to spread its violent message, recruit more widely, and encourage or inspire supporters to take up violence for its stated agendas. In other words, the memorandum could not come at a worse time in the fight against al-Shabaab. Worse yet, there remains real concern that al-Shabaab could expand its terror campaign internationally. As noted above, al-Shabaab’s leadership has openly called for jihad against the memorandum’s implementation, which puts both Ethiopia and Somaliland within the group’s crosshairs. These threats are not unfounded. For instance, Ethiopia has long been a stated target for Somali jihadis, dating back to the mid-1990s. Indeed, this is what caused Ethiopia to launch its first invasion of Somalia to combat the militants in 1996. With the rise of al-Shabaab in the mid-2000s, Ethiopia again invaded Somalia to combat the group. Since that period, Ethiopia has been a major focus of al-Shabaab’s propaganda, which has culminated in several bombing attempts, and even al-Shabaab’s own multiday invasions of Ethiopia in 2022. Some al-Shabaab fighters even reached the mountains surrounding Moyale in southern Ethiopia, where they have reportedly maintained camps since. More recently, in 2023, following the destruction of mosques in Addis Ababa, al-Shabaab released a separate series of statements calling on Muslims to attack the state as a response. Ethiopia, for its part, has also routinely announced the arrests of al-Shabaab members plotting attacks on its soil over the years. If the aforementioned al-Shabaab invasions of Ethiopia were meant to help “erect its black flag” within the country, recent calls for jihad over the memorandum only serve to revive and rejuvenate that desire. Indeed, knowledgeable sources in Somalia with whom the authors have spoken have reported that al-Shabaab is looking to escalate operations in Ethiopia in the coming months. More complicated is al-Shabaab’s threat to Somaliland. **Somaliland has been relatively safe from al-Shabaab’s violence since a series of coordinated bombings in the capital of Hargeisa in 2008**. This is not to say that al-Shabaab is not active within Somaliland, but most of its activity is relegated to the eastern region of Sanaag, much of which is outside Hargeisa’s control. For instance, in 2019, al-Shabaab said it briefly occupied a village just outside the regional capital of Ceerigaabo. A year later, the group captured several other villages near the coastal city of Las Qoray. And in 2022, al-Shabaab conducted a suicide bombing just outside of Las Qoray. Even in areas actually within Hargeisa’s control, th**e al-Shabaab threat is present.** As Somaliland officials told one of the authors on a research trip in 2021, al-Shabaab actively maintains sleeper and support cells in many Somaliland cities, including Hargeisa, Burco, and even the port city of Berbera, where the memorandum itself would be implemented. Though it remains more difficult for al-Shabaab to operate in Somaliland, that it maintains cells throughout the proclaimed state, including in Berbera, is a cause for concern. Similarly, al-Shabaab managed to dispatch a small team of fighters to eastern Somaliland in March 2023 amid the eruption of the Las Anod conflict in an effort to establish a small bridgehead there, although the fighters likely left without succeeding. Somaliland officials, as well as outside analysts and policymakers, should not be complacent and mistake relative peace in Somaliland as evidence that al-Shabaab cannot or will not attempt to operationalize its cells there.

**Al Shabaab’s attacks are devastating**

Acled 23 --- (Communications Acled, 10-20-2023, "Somalia: **Al-Shabaab Strikes** Back at Local Administrators", https://acleddata.com/2023/10/20/somalia-situation-update-october-2023-al-shabaab-strikes-back-at-local-administrators/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

**From 9 September to 13 October 2023**, ACLED **record**s 279 political violence events and **1,752** reported **fatalities** in Somalia. Political violence has increased by over 80% in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states over the past 10 weeks – since the government officially launched Operation Black Lion against al-Shabaab on 6 August – compared to the 10 weeks prior.

Bakool region saw the highest number of reported fatalities, with over 800 recorded during the reporting period. Mudug region followed, with 400 reported fatalities. The government’s campaign against al-Shabaab centered in Galmudug state – which consists of Mudug and Galgaduud regions – where Somali forces and Habar Gedir militias took control of several locations.

The most common event type was battles, with 172 events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with 87 events. ACLED records 32 incidents of bombings by Somali and international forces – United States, Kenya, and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) – against al-Shabaab positions, with about 10 reportedly affecting civilians.

**This creates instability across the region**

**Al-Aqidi** **24** [Dalia Al-Aqidi, 12-17-2024, Defeating Al-Shabab should be a global priority, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2229356] tristan + BZ

Al-Shabab **militants** have **escalated** their terrorist **activities** in response to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s pledge to fight and defeat the radical movement and cut off its financial sources. When Mohamud was elected in 2022, he declared an “all-out war” on the radical group by adopting a new security strategy with regional and international support.¶ The recent escalation reminds the international community that the **war** on **terrorism** is **far** from **over** and sparks renewed concerns about an **expansion** of the movement’s **activity** in the **Horn** of **Africa**.¶ From a mosque in the country’s capital, Mogadishu, the determined president called on young Somalis, who, as he said, were brainwashed by the radicals, to surrender to the security forces. He pleaded with the militants to denounce the terrorist ideology before it is too late.¶ **Al-Shabab** has always **aim**ed **to extend** its **operations** **beyond** the borders of **Somalia to destabilize the whole region. It has carried out** **terrorist** **attacks in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia**. In 2020, Al-Shabab killed three Americans at a Kenyan military base used by US forces.**¶** Following the defeat of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and the failure of its ideological mission, it is **natural** for **Al**-**Qaeda** and its **affiliate** terrorist **organizations** to think about a **geographical** **area** that would be **easier** to **terrorize** and control.¶ The world is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, inflation, energy sources and several other challenges, but the UN Security Council remains concerned about the continued presence of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa.¶ But the **Somali** **government** **cannot** **confront** and defeat Al-Shabab **alone** — it needs a **global** **commitment** to continue supporting the war-torn country.

**More broadly, Al Shabab undermines Somali Governance creating instability in Somalia**

O’Hanlon 23 --- (Michael E. O’Hanlon, James Steinberg, 1-27-2023, "Somalia's challenges in 2023", https://www.brookings.edu/articles/somalias-challenges-in-2023/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

Frustrated with U.S. drone strike restrictions in Somalia and resentful of the continual U.S. and international weapons embargo, the Somali government has allegedly begun buying and deploying Turkish drones on the battlefield (though the Somali government denies it). But like Danab, drones don’t resolve the holding challenge. The Somalian government is aware of the problem. It has sought the return of 5,000 Somali troops sent to Eritrea for training during the Farmaajo years, but has had little success due to logistical and legal challenges and the diplomatic maneuvers of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. Instead, improved relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Mogadishu have produced a new deal for the UAE to train well over 10,000 Somali soldiers and police officers. Shrouded in secrecy, the deal would eviscerate the vestiges of the so-called Somalian national security architecture worked out between Mogadishu, FMS, and the international community in 2017. The unsettled relations between Mogadishu and FMS, and among Somalia’s key clans — the dominant vector of politics and daily life — could easily become explosive. Mohamud allegedly plans to appease state presidents by offering to delay state elections, arbitrarily extending the incumbents’ rule by two years. But that will not sit well with local opposition clans and politicians. Delays in elections in Somaliland, a more stable Somalian region long seeking independence and not reconciled to a mere FMS status, already set off a local crisis. **At the core of Somalia’s instability is bad governance.** Arbitrarily extending what often amounts to exclusionary and unaccountable rule ensures that such dysfunction will persist. Clan and political rivalries haven’t gone away. Like in previous Somalian governments, relations between the president and the prime minister, who represent different clans, remain fraught, though nowhere as bad as during the Farmaajo years. Mohamud came back to power promising the Hawiye clans, intensely dissatisfied with Farmaajo’s rule, to prioritize their interests — including by improving security against al-Shabaab’s taxation in Mogadishu and Benadir. Yet with the Hiraan-Hirshabelle-Galmudug offensives, Mohamud doesn’t have enough forces to protect the center. Predictably, al-Shabaab responded to the rural offensives by mounting deadly urban terrorist strikes in Mogadishu and other cities, including the deadliest attack since 2017. Apart from the human horror, such attacks undermine Mohamud’s security assurances to the Hawiye. The United States would like to see yet another battlefront open — in southern Juba. Concerned about its porous border with Somalia and long propping up Juba’s strongman president, Ahmed Madobe, the Kenyan government would welcome this. But the front would trigger complex Mogadishu-Juba politics, including over deployments of local and federal forces. What kind of governance will follow in retaken areas is also crucial. Somalia’s entrenched patterns revolve around poor governance, inter-clan conflict, and marginalization. **Al-Shabaab’s** resilience and **entrenchment comes from its adroitness at taking advantage of corrupt governance** and clan rivalries, **exploiting** clan **disputes**, and offering support to marginalized clans. Somalia’s clan militias also have a long history of predation on local communities, generating deep resentments. Yet insufficient planning has gone into preventing renewed misgovernance by militias, clan elders, and state and national politicians and government officials in the liberated areas. Eschewing large rural offensives for now, al-Shabaab is waiting for the uprisings to go sour, anticipating that renewed clan rivalries will provide reentry points. Bringing in acceptable governance and easing local tensions should become a core 2023 priority. But it will be difficult, requiring bargaining with clan elders, communities, and state politicians, as well as local dispute resolution mechanisms. Finally, there is the large unresolved issue of negotiating with al-Shabaab. The International Crisis Group strongly called for it months ago; the Somalian government has wobbled; and the United States remains opposed. But beginning dialogue does not mean making a final problematic deal, à la the 2020 deal with the Taliban. Instead, the start could be to negotiate humanitarian access, so hundreds of thousands of Somalis in al-Shabaab-controlled areas don’t die this year. Al-Shabaab has frequently, though not always, rejected negotiations with the Somalian government. In early January 2023 it denied asking for and engaging in negotiations. Large, visible, formal negotiations are unlikely to take off quickly or produce a good deal rapidly. But at minimum, NGOs and elders should not be hampered and punished for attempting to negotiate humanitarian access and perhaps local deals.

**Indeed,**

Rollins 23 --- (Kay Rollins, [*Kay Rollins is a staff writer for the HIR. She is interested in national security, great power conflict, and authoritarianism. She is a sophomore concentrating in Government with a minor in History.*] 3-27-2023, "No Justice, No Peace: Al-Shabaab's Court System", https://hir.harvard.edu/no-justice-no-peace-al-shabaabs-court-system/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

Described as “the most failed state,” Somalia lacks a unified government. Since the collapse of Mohamed Siad’s authoritarian regime in 1991, Somalia has struggled to establish a government. Although nominally run by President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, who served as chief executive from 2012-2017, and was reelected in a much-delayed election in May 2022, much of the country isn’t under government control: Al Shabaab controls nearly 70% of South and Central Somalia. In the areas under its control, Al Shabaab conducts all the basic functions of a normal government: it taxes residents, offers security, and even provides welfare to needy populations. **Through taxation, Al Shabaab brings in some 15 million dollars a mont**h–almost as much as the legitimate Somali government. Somalia’s actual government, meanwhile, is consistently rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and relies heavily on international assistance to survive. The minister of Hirshabelle put it bluntly: “We have two governments. … They control more and generate more funds than us”. Utilizing a combination of Xeer, the traditional legal system in Somalia, and Sharia law, a form of Islamic law, Al Shabaab has established a network of courts across the country. These “shadow courts” handle a wide variety of disputes. Somali researcher Hussein Yusuf Ali notes that Al Shabaab responds to a variety of needs for justice, especially arguments over natural resources, commercial disagreements, and accusations of clan discrimination. Land disputes are also frequently handled by Al Shabaab: one resident of Baido estimates that “80% of land disputes are taken to Al Shabaab and perhaps 20% go to formal courts.” Al Shabaab courts even handle issues of extortion, clan discrimination, corruption, and unlawful arrests, meaning Al Shabaab may prosecute government and law enforcement agents as well as civilians. Even in areas officially controlled by the government, Somalia’s justice system is as dysfunctional as the government itself. Corrupt, fractured, and lacking the power to enforce its decisions, the judicial system rarely provides justice. The US State department described Somalia’s justice system as one where “impunity generally remained the norm,” and decisions are heavily influenced by clan based politics and corruption. To fill this vacuum, **Al Shabaab has become an arbiter of justice**–not necessarily because the public actually supports the terrorist group, but because there is no other option. Aweys Sheikh Abdullah, who was a judge in the Banadir regional court from 2016-2018 told reporters that people turn to Al Shabaab because courts involve a “long process which can take years without the case proceeding, backlog resulting from lack of enough judges at the court and costly legal fees.”

If this strategy sounds familiar, that’s because it is: the practice of welfare as warfare is a tried and true means for terrorist groups to gain support and legitimacy. The Taliban employed this model for years, running a similar Sharia based court system in Afghanistan. One expert described Al Shabaab as a junior varsity version of the Taliban: like the Taliban, Al Shabaab operates courts, collects taxes, and provides aid to the public. This justice system, which legitimized the Taliban in the eyes of the public and gave the terrorist group valuable experience in running a country, likely helped contribute to the Taliban victory in Afghanistan in August 2021. Also like the Taliban, **Al Shabaab is pairing its legal efforts with a targeted propaganda campaign meant to make the government seem weak and ineffective.** In 2021, **Al Shabaab released a six part documentary about the failures of the Somali president,** advocating for Sharia as a solution. Unlike typical terrorist propaganda, Al Shabaab’s documentary, which it marketed as “objective,” focuses on political problems rather than only radical ideology. Since then, another 12 part documentary about the problems of the Somali constitution has been released. **Without a functioning judicial system, Al Shabaab’s claims that the government is ineffective are more easily accepted across Somalia.** The mere existence of a parallel legal system in Somalia, especially one run by a group who explicitly hopes to overthrow the existing government, shows that the Somali state is unable to uphold rule of law. Al Shabaab courts have become more brazen too. The courts sometimes work directly with clans and elders, and are overturning already decided government cases. Al Shabaab even warns those under its control from stepping foot in government courts, threatening civilians that do so. Ultimately, Somalia is trapped in a dangerous cycle: an illegitimate government is the but-for cause of Al Shabaab’s courts. Yet Al Shabaab’s courts also contribute to the perception of illegitimacy, while helping to resolve legitimate concerns that the government has not adequately handled.

# **1NC - Civil War**

**Clan dynamics shape politics in Somaliland**

**Bade 23**--- (ZAKI BADE, 12-xx-2023, "THE IMPACT OF CLAN LEADERS ON SOMALILAND STATE SECURITY", https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zakarie-Abdi-Bade/publication/377060514\_International\_Journal\_of\_Social\_Sciences\_and\_Management\_Review\_THE\_IMPACT\_OF\_CLAN\_LEADERS\_ON\_SOMALILAND\_STATE\_SECURITY/links/65931a672468df72d3f0d12d/International-Journal-of-Social-Sciences-and-Management-Review-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLAN-LEADERS-ON-SOMALILAND-STATE-SECURITY.pdf) //doa1-2-2025 + master chen :)

**Somaliland**, a self-declared independent state in the Horn of Africa, **operates within a** complex socio-**political landscape deeply rooted in clan-based structures**. Clan affiliations are central to the region's political, social, and economic fabric. Clan leaders, influential figures within their respective clans, wield significant authority and play crucial roles in maintaining security, resolving conflicts, and providing essential governance functions. This study delves into the multifaceted dynamics of clan leaders in Somaliland's security context. It's noteworthy that the analysis is more in alignment with the "Fragile States Theory" than the "Constructivism Theory." The Fragile States Theory aptly describes the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by regions like Somaliland, characterized by weak governance, limited institutional capacity, and the absence of a strong central government. In this context, clan leaders emerge as key actors in maintaining order, bridging governance gaps, and addressing security issues due to the state's fragility. They navigate intricate clan networks and act as mediators and decision-makers, contributing significantly to societal stability. In contrast, while Constructivism Theory focuses on the role of ideational factors, norms, and identity in state behavior, it's not as directly applicable in explaining the specific role of clan leaders in Somaliland's security dynamics. The analysis concludes that the Fragile States Theory offers a more fitting framework for comprehending the dynamics in Somaliland and the vital role clan leaders play in security and governance, particularly within the context of a fragile state with limited formal government capacity

**Clan tensions are the most likely source of conflict. The most recent conflict over sovereignty proves.**

Mahmood 24 --- (Omar Mahmood, 11-13-2024, "Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains", https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains) //doa1-2-2025 + master chen :)

**Somaliland held its** long-awaited presidential **election** in mid-November, ending in victory for the opposition and a swift concession by the incumbent. **The vote** and its aftermath **underlined Somaliland’s standing** as a consolidating democracy **with a reputation for political stability while the peaceful transfer of power marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa**, where such handovers are a rare occurrence. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognised it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote. In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 per cent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 per cent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017, when 64 per cent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east. What are the main political divides in Somaliland? Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation. **Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family.** A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalisation by the Isaaq. **In the east**, members of **the Darod clan family**, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, **have** mostly **rejected** inclusion in **Somaliland, favouring** instead **a** closer **relationship with** Mogadishu or neighbouring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern **Somalia** with which they share close clan ties. **These frictions were at the heart of the conflict that erupted** between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below). The past two Somaliland presidents ... were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Silanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favoured his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan. Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organisations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics. What were the challenges leading up to the polls? The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023. Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. **Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia** following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. **The desire for independence is not shared by all communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this.** In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than **150,000 civilians were displaced**, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting has not restarted since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the risk of the conflict reigniting remains. Outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland helped shape the outcome of the election. Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.) **The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal.** Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticised the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism.

**Fortunately, the recent election has quelled tensions and relations are mending**

Mahmood 24 --- (Omar Mahmood, 11-13-2024, "Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains", https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains) //doa1-2-2025 + master chen :)

**Somaliland held its** long-awaited presidential **election** in mid-November, ending in victory for the opposition and a swift concession by the incumbent. **The vote** and its aftermath **underlined Somaliland’s standing** as a consolidating democracy **with a reputation for political stability while the peaceful transfer of power marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa**, where such handovers are a rare occurrence. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognised it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote. In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 per cent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 per cent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017, when 64 per cent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east. What are the main political divides in Somaliland? Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation. **Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family.** A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalisation by the Isaaq. **In the east**, members of **the Darod clan family**, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, **have** mostly **rejected** inclusion in **Somaliland, favouring** instead a closer **relationship with** Mogadishu or neighbouring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern **Somalia** with which they share close clan ties. **These frictions were at the heart of the conflict that erupted** between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below). The past two Somaliland presidents ... were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Silanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favoured his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan. Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organisations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics. What were the challenges leading up to the polls? The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023. Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. **Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia** following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. **The desire for independence is not shared by all communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this.** In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than **150,000 civilians were displaced**, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting has not restarted since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the risk of the conflict reigniting remains. Outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland helped shape the outcome of the election. Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.) **The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal.** Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticised the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism.

With Ethiopia facing concerted diplomatic pushback, the deal has as of yet had no meaningful effect in practice. But it remains a source of contention – particularly in the Horn of Africa – and the mere existence of the memorandum of understanding contributed to a tense pre-electoral environment. None of these controversies, however, managed to override the smooth conduct of elections, demonstrating Somaliland leaders’ commitment to the ballot box and sustaining the progress that the region has made toward developing democratic institutions. The National Electoral Commission and Supreme Court in particular showed leadership and independence during the electoral process. Bihi’s administration, meanwhile, successfully oversaw logistical challenges and refrained from manipulating the vote. What should be the incoming administration’s domestic priorities? The conclusion of the elections is an opportunity for Somaliland to move on from an electoral process that concluded peacefully while also exposing the extent of its divisions. Somaliland’s new leadership faces a clutch of major challenges. Its domestic politics are increasingly fractious; the relationship with the Dhulbahante clan (and the frozen conflict in Sool) remains tense; and the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia continues to stir diplomatic bickering. Meanwhile, electoral democracy itself could face a new threat as the benefits of holding political power and the costs of losing it rise due to mounting foreign investment in Somaliland, giving top government officials far greater economic sway and access to financial resources. Important economic developments include the 2016 arrangement for the DP World logistics company, based in the United Arab Emirates, to manage and expand Somaliland’s main port of Berbera. This will allow Somaliland to profit from an important trade route linking states in the Horn of Africa to **the** Gulf of Aden and Red Sea shipping lanes.But for now, successful polls, an**d a smooth transfer of power, will** go some way to **cooling** domestic **political tensions and redress**ing the reputational damage Somaliland suffered as a result of the delayed polls and **conflict** in Sool. Incoming President Cirro – a long-time opposition leader who was speaker of Somaliland’s lower house from 2005 to 2017 – should take the opportunity to prioritise dialogue and de-escalation, moving on from the aggressive and antagonistic approaches that have prevailed over the last few years in Somaliland. **To minimise post-election tensions, the incoming administration should demonstrate its commitment to governing on behalf of all Somalilanders, rather than just the communities that form its clan-based coalition**. A first step would be to ensure that ministerial appointments in the new administration reflect a wide range of clans, not simply those that are most politically dominant, while also including more women’s voices to counter the marked gender bias in Somaliland’s political establishment. The new administration should also work to respect civil liberties and reverse recent efforts to curb these, a trend that has been manifested in the rising number of arrests of journalists and opposition politicians, including the detention of a member of parliament during the pre-electoral period. Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority.

Long overdue reforms to the political system should be another priority. One important step would be to devise a new way to select representatives to the Guurti, the parliament’s upper house. Its current members were picked in the late 1990s and have long since exceeded their original six-year mandate. Many clan elders who were initially chosen have died and their successors, who mostly inherited the roles, often lack a similar level of public influence or interest in reaching compromise with political rivals. Not unlike the Guurti, mandate extensions are common across Somaliland – all branches of elected government (presidency, parliament, local councils) have previously seen terms of office extended. The new administration could beef up its democratic credentials by sticking to constitutionally-mandated term limits. More broadly, the new administration should also seek ways to boost the inclusiveness of Somaliland’s political system. This will not be easy. Dialogue with communities that feel underrepresented, particularly non-Isaaq communities like the Gadabursi and Issa in the west and the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli in the east, is critically important. The Dhulbahante have effectively abandoned the Somaliland project, and prefer to see themselves as part of Somalia. Talks between both sides on the subject of releasing prisoners of war would be a sensible first step to avoid a resumption of conflict between the Dhulbahante and the Somaliland government, and could pave the way to more substantive discussions on their future relationship. In recent weeks, clan conflict has also flared in Erigabo, capital of Sanaag region, which had been a model of civic tranquillity despite the city’s diverse population. Dialogue sponsored by the new government could help calm tensions before they escalate further.How should the government approach its foreign relations Two key issues are set to dominate Somaliland’s foreign relations: the status of the memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia, and Somaliland’s ties with Mogadishu. **Relations between Somaliland and the Somali government had been improving prior to the signing of the memorandum**. Toning down bellicose rhetoric deployed by both sides since the deal with Ethiopia was announced in January 2024 could help the two governments get back on the road to dialogue. There is a potential window of opportunity ahead of Somalia’s next elections in May 2026, in part because Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may want to demonstrate progress on the Somaliland issue before his mandate expires.

**However, recognition ignites tensions**

**Norman 23** — (Jethro Norman [*Jethro Norman is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. His research and fieldwork has focused on East Africa (Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan), with expertise in humanitarianism, security, conflict and development. Jethro’s current research covers the politics of humanitarian assistance, trade and development in the Somali territories, with a particular interest in the role of the Somali diaspora.*], 6-20-2023, "Foreign aid and conflict in Somaliland", ROAPE, https://roape.net/2023/06/20/foreign-aid-and-conflict-in-somaliland/, accessed 12-26-2024) //FK

In its three-decade search for international recognition, Somaliland has long lamented a lack of international funding. Academics have suggested that, contrary to the conventional wisdom of the World Bank, the absenceof international aid at the crucial moment of Somaliland’s political formation may be a key reason for its success. Whilst this may have been true for Somaliland’s early years, it is no longer the case. Emboldened by promises of peace and stability, international partners including the US, the United Kingdom, the EU, the UAE and Taiwan have all announced various infrastructure, trade and military cooperation initiatives and increased their diplomatic presence in the capital, Hargeisa. The multi-million-dollar investment by UAE’s DP World is transforming Berbera port into a 1 million container trade hub that is anticipated to reshape the regional economy. There has also been deepening security ties. The United Kingdom has funded and trained a controversial elite police unit, whilst Washington has been interested in establishing a new military base in Berbera. **This dizzying gush of international engagement** intended to stabilise Somaliland **has** however **had destabilising consequences for the whole region.** Firstly, it has renewed **hopes of Somaliland becoming internationally recognised** as an independent state, dramatically ra**is**ing the stakes, and **intensifying competition amongst political elites over control.** The political crisis that emerged in summer of 2022 over delayed elections highlighted this increasingly fractious internal competition. In anti-government demonstrations in Hargeisa in August 2022, five civilians were killed in clashes with security forces, a grim harbinger of what was to come in Las Anod. If the increased stakes of statehood have resulted in competition in the centre of the region, then it has done the opposite in the peripheries: uniting peripheral communities against Somaliland. Much of the recent infrastructural development is concentrated in the centre. The Berbera corridor for example, cuts a neat line of economic opportunity from Berbera, through Hargeisa, and into Ethiopia. This is an important dimension of the conflict in Las Anod. The declaration to re-join Somalia made by traditional leaders in Las Anod decried an ‘economic embargo’ imposed by Somaliland designed to restrict the presence of international development agencies in the eastern regions. It is not only in Las Anod that resistance to the Somaliland state has grown. Over the last decade, movements to establish counter-administrations have emerged in three out of Somaliland’s six districts, including in the otherwise peaceful western region of Awdal.

**This incites a civil war**

**Batten 22** [Dr. Karl Von Batten, *senior government advisor and founder of the Von Batten-Montague-York, L.C. policy advocacy group*, 5-13-2022, Growing concern that the push for U.S. recognition of Somaliland will lead to civil war in Somaliland, https://foreignpolicynews.org/2022/05/13/growing-concern-that-the-push-for-u-s-recognition-of-somaliland-will-lead-to-civil-war-in-somaliland/] BZ

Unfortunately, history shows that well-intentioned U.S. foreign policies based on a simplistic understanding of internal dynamics in each country in Africa have resulted in more problems. The upheavals in Libya and South Sudan are recent examples of American and European good intentions turning into disasters. We Americans tend to look at things through the lens of good guys versus bad guys and freedom versus perceived oppression, enacting policies or government actions based on these conceptual viewpoints. In this way, the self-declared state of Somaliland appears to be the latest potential victim of U.S. good intentions.¶ There is a push by a group of highly respected individuals in Washington, D.C. for the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent country separate from Somalia. Joshua Meservey, a senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, is one of the finest minds when it comes to U.S. policies focused on Africa, and he is a strong advocate for U.S recognition of Somaliland as an independent country. On May 06, 2020, Joshua published a piece on the Heritage Foundation’s Daily Signal website titled “Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t ‘Neocolonial’ Plot. It’s Self-Determination.” In it, he said, “It is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019”[4]. Eritrean and South Sudanese independence movements both led to wars that, in part, are still being waged today[5][6]. Therefore, I do not think those are good examples to argue for Somaliland’s independence. Joshua is correct in that Somaliland did declare independence from Somalia in 1991. Nevertheless, what is missing from Joshua’s comment is that not all Somalis/Somalilanders in Somaliland are pro-secession from Somalia—many are against it. This dissent is why **there is strong opposition by many** Somalis/**Somalilanders** and Somaliland-Americans **against** U.S. **recognition of Somaliland**.¶ The opposition to U.S. recognition of Somaliland has little to do with independence from Somalia and everything to do with a **power struggle** between the clans. As with most African states with multiple tribes and clans, Somaliland is **not unified**. Somaliland is made up of five clans, namely the Isaak, the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi. The Isaak is the clan in power and pushing for independence. The four opposing **clans**—the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi—**oppose** the U.S. **recognition** of Somaliland **because they know that will translate to financial and military aid to the** Somaliland **government**, which is **controlled by the Isaak clan. The fear** among the other clans **is that** U.S. **aid to the Somaliland government**, and therefore the Isaak clan, **will allow the Isaak** clan **to dominate the other clans and take control of their land**. Currently, the Somaliland government only has complete control over Isaak territory, where the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, is also located. However, the recently introduced House and Senate **Bills proposing the** U.S. **recognition of Somaliland** and the expansion of the U.S. military relationship with Somaliland **have increased political anxieties** in Somaliland. The opposing **clans** are **now openly discuss**ing the eventuality of a **civil war** against the Isaak clan. **All it takes** to start a war in Africa **is a few people** with Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) 47s.¶ I urge caution when it comes to Somaliland. This is why I support the current U.S. policy that calls for the African Union, Somalia, and Somaliland to resolve the Somaliland issue amongst themselves—this is the right approach. It is up to Africans to decide their fate. The days of Americans and Europeans dictating or influencing the borders of sovereign African countries should be left in the last century. I am opposed **to** H.R. 7170, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act, and Section 5 of S.3861, the Somaliland Partnership Act. Two pieces of legislation that directly and indirectly violate Somalia’s sovereignty. U.S. foreign policy must be color blind; we as Americans cannot oppose Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty and then turn around and put forward legislation that violates the borders and sovereignty of an African state.¶ The one rule for Europe and a different rule for Africa has not gone unnoticed by Africans. Instead of pushing legislation and policies that will further divide the region and **lead to civil war**, the U.S. can play a constructive role in the Somaliland issue; we can help the African Union facilitate a national dialogue between the opposing clans, the Somali government, and the government of Somaliland. The U.S. can also help by assisting in developing a road map for peace that will ensure peace and prosperity for all Somalis. This is a logical way forward. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and South Sudan, when it comes to Somaliland, we cannot pretend that the deadly outcome of possible U.S. policy missteps is unknown.

**Civil War wreaks havoc - South Sudan proves**

**CPA 24** — (Center for Preventative Action [*The CPA helps policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world. CPA accomplishes this by commissioning in-depth reports, convening meetings of experts, and consulting representatives of governments, international organizations, civil society groups, corporations, and the media. It informs the general public about threats to international peace and security by providing a reliable and regularly updated online source of information about ongoing conflicts. It is a branch of the Council on Foreign Relations, a renowned and reliable think tank on global issues.*], 7-11-2024, "Instability in South Sudan", Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/

conflict/civil-war-south-sudan, accessed 1/1/25) // DP

**Despite repeated attempts at peace agreements and cease-fires in 2015, 2017, and 2018, political violence and instability have persisted between government forces and** **opposition factions in South Sudan**. After nearly five years of civil war, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar—the heads of the two main opposing political coalitions—participated in negotiations in June 2018, resulting in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The peace deal led to a cease-fire and the formation of a unity government, but implementation of the agreement has been slow, and **violence has persisted**. In 2024, additional peacekeepers and urgent forces were deployed to hotspots in South Sudan after an escalation in inter-communal violence led to an increase in civilian deaths, abductions, and displacements. Meanwhile, South Sudan continues to suffer from one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, magnified by the worsening effects of climate change, macroeconomic shocks, and spillover from the nearby civil war in Sudan. Long-delayed elections are scheduled for December 2024. However, many fear the country is unprepared to hold free and fair elections and have advocated for their postponement. Background In December 2013, following a political struggle between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar that led to Machar’s removal as vice president, violence erupted between presidential guard soldiers from the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan. Soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group aligned with Kiir, and those from the Nuer ethnic group supported Machar. Amid the chaos, Kiir announced that Machar had attempted a coup, and violence spread quickly to Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. From the outbreak of conflict, armed groups targeted civilians along ethnic lines, committed rape and sexual violence, destroyed property, looted villages, and recruited children into their ranks. Under the threat of international sanctions and following several rounds of negotiations supported by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kiir signed a peace agreement with Machar in August 2015. As the first step toward ending the civil war, Machar returned to Juba in April 2016 and was again sworn in as vice president after spending more than two years outside the country. Soon after his return, violence broke out between government forces and opposition factions, once more displacing tens of thousands of people. Machar fled the country and was eventually detained in South Africa. In 2017 and 2018, a series of cease-fires were negotiated and subsequently violated between the two sides and other factions. After almost five years of civil war, Kiir and Machar participated in negotiations mediated by Uganda and Sudan in June 2018. Later that month, Kiir and Machar signed the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement for a cease-fire and a pledge to negotiate a power-sharing agreement to end the war. Despite sporadic violations over the ensuing weeks, Kiir and Machar signed a final cease-fire and power-sharing agreement in August 2018. This agreement was followed by a peace agreement to end the civil war signed by the government, Machar’s opposition party, and several other rebel factions. The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan included a new power-sharing structure and reinstated Machar as vice president. Kiir and Machar formed a unity government in 2020 after delaying the original deadline twice. In late October 2018, Machar returned to South Sudan for a nationwide peace celebration to mark the end of the civil war. However, reports of continued attacks and violations, coupled with the collapse of multiple previous peace deals, highlighted concerns that the fragile peace may not hold. Although official casualties are difficult to confirm, one April 2018 study estimated that **nearly four hundred thousand people were killed during** the **five years of war, and an additional almost four million were internally displaced or fled the country**. In late December 2013, the UN Security Council authorized a rapid deployment of about 6,000 security forces, in addition to the 7,600 peacekeepers already in the country, to aid in state-building efforts. In May 2014, the Security Council voted in a rare move to shift the mission’s mandate from state-building to civilian protection, authorizing UN troops to use force. Since reprioritizing protection, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan has faced extreme challenges due to the deterioration of the security situation and its complex relationship with the government of the Republic of South Sudan. The UN authorized the deployment of an additional four thousand peacekeepers as part of a regional protection force in 2016, although their arrival was delayed until August 2017. **Violence also prevented farmers from planting or harvesting crops, causing food shortages nationwide**. In July 2014, the UN Security Council declared South Sudan’s food crisis the “worst in the world.” **Famine was declared** in South Sudan during the first few months of 2017, **with nearly five million people at risk from food insecurity**. Critical food shortages have continued since then, with the number of people facing food insecurity surpassing peak civil war levels.Recent Developments In reaction to overwhelming violence against civilians in the civil war, the UN peacekeeping mission in the country (UNMISS) established large-scale camps meant to protect civilians from ongoing violence. UNMISS began to scale back personnel at these civilian protection sites in the fall of 2020 in favor of responding more flexibly to violence in the country, raising questions about the return of refugees and government provision of security across the country. Since the end of the civil war, increasing intercommunal violence and attacks, the threat of the peace process unraveling, and dire humanitarian conditions across large swaths of South Sudan have placed renewed urgency on improving security and meeting basic protection needs for South Sudan’s civilians. The situation worsened in April 2023 when fighting erupted in neighboring Sudan, sending an exodus of refugees, including many South Sudanese, fleeing southward to South Sudan. Violent clashes and hunger have afflicted overcrowded camps, and the government and aid organizations in South Sudan lack the resources to meet humanitarian needs. **In 2023, more than 7.7 million people, or two-thirds of the population, faced severe food insecurity**—the worst hunger crisis the country has ever faced. Moreover, the UN also extended sanctions on South Sudan through 2024, citing human rights violations. Years after President Salva Kiir and former opposition leader Riek Machar formed a unity government in 2020, there has been slow progress in implementing the 2018 peace agreement [PDF]. Many issues remain unaddressed, including security arrangements, institutional reforms, and electoral preparations. Although the unity government remains intact, security sector reforms have languished as skeptical parties do not trust each other and hold back their best fighters in anticipation of a possible return to fighting. Implementation of the 2018 peace agreement was initially scheduled for February 2023, but the government has since extended the transitional period to February 2025. Long-delayed national elections are set for December 2024. President Salva Kiir has declared his intention to run in what he claims will be a free and fair race. However, a persistent rift between Kiir and Machar, the leaders of the largest civil war factions, has raised fears that violence could flare up in the lead-up to elections. Meanwhile, **an armed insurgency** [PDF] **in the south of the country**, led by Thomas Cirillo and his National Salvation Front (NSF), **poses a severe threat to civilians and further endangers the peace** process.

# **2NC**

Lay round — no evidence read