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**America's strategy in Taiwan has been a disaster and has only failed to solve the crisis**

Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation (Michael J. Mazzar, February 9, 2024, “The Looming Crisis in the South China Sea,” Foreign Affairs,<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/looming-crisis-south-china-sea>) Accessed 10/11/2024, DSL (recut 10.31.24 lcp)

**The Looming Crisis in the South China Sea To Avoid a Conflict With China, America Needs a Clearer Strategy** By Michael J. Mazarr February 9, 2024 A Philippine supply boat and a Chinese coast guard ship in the South China Sea, October 2023 A Philippine supply boat and a Chinese coast guard ship in the South China Sea, October 2023 Adrian Portu / Reuters Sign in and save to read later Print this article Send by email Share on Twitter Share on Facebook Share on LinkedIn Get a link Page url <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/looming-crisis-south-china-sea> Get Citation Request Reprint Permissions Download Article **As China increasingly threatens to use force against Taiwan, the United States is rightly focused on the dangers of conflict over the island**. But **there is an equal risk of crisis, confrontation, and even war over a different area—the South China Sea**. China is aggressively pursuing its claims throughout the sea, through which over $3 trillion in trade flows each year. Over the last decade, **Beijing has built military bases on a series of reclaimed islands** and **harassed other countries that claim rights in the sea.** Most recently, it has raised the risk of disaster by unsafely intercepting ships and aircraft belonging to the United States and its allies. Tensions are especially high between China and the Philippines in the long-running standoff over the Second Thomas Shoal. For years, the Philippines has maintained its claim to the submerged coral reef within its exclusive economic zone through a jury-rigged outpost—an aging tank landing ship, the Sierra Madre, that the Philippine navy ran aground on the shoal 25 years ago. **Over the last year, Chinese ships have used water cannons, lasers, and ramming to threaten Philippine resupply missions.** With the Sierra Madre now in danger of falling to pieces, the Philippines will soon need to rebuild the outpost, a step that Beijing has said it will not accept. In January, meanwhile, the Philippines announced plans to fortify as many as nine disputed maritime areas under its control. All this makes the risk of a direct military confrontation in the South China Sea higher than ever—and the United States has repeatedly promised to stand by the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. **If Beijing directly attacks Philippine ships, Washington would be compelled to respond**. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. Sign Up To make matters more complex, **any future South China Sea crisis is likely to highlight[ing] an obvious weakness in the United States’ larger strategy on China:** it embodies no clear vision of success. U.S. officials have said that they are not trying to engineer a Cold War–style transformation of the Chinese system, such as the end of Chinese Communist Party rule. A **comprehensive U.S. victory in a war with China is hardly possible**. As a result, Washington has been unable to define what success looks like and how U.S. strategy is designed to produce it. These shortcomings are likely to be front and center in a new crisis, as Washington would struggle to respond in a way that makes progress toward clear long-term objectives. In the near term, a military confrontation seems unlikely, in part because Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has been struggling to revive **China**’s stagnating economy and solidify political control at home, has shown a desire to ease tensions with the United States**. But ever more frequent maritime incidents and provocations in the South China Sea almost guarantee a crisis. When one occurs, it will mark an inflection point in U.S. strategy toward China.** Such an event will drive home the lesson that simply opposing Chinese power and ambitions—whether by stacking up barriers to Beijing’s capabilities and influence or shoring up deterrence—will not by itself underwrite a strategic relationship that can survive the coming decade. **In its broader strategy toward China, the United States must** compete vigorously, but it must also **lay the groundwork for a stable relationship with Beijing that can**, at some point, transition into a mutually respectful form of coexistence. This is the only credible medium-term outcome of the U.S.-Chinese rivalry short of war. For the United States, this means matching obstruction with bold multilateral approaches to regulate issues of dispute with China. A crisis in the South China Sea will provide a perilous but unmissable opportunity to move in such a direction. WAIT AND SEA It is easy to exaggerate China’s intent to dominate the world.

**History proves our argument true. The more we meddle, the more aggressive China gets.**

**Ni 22** [China Affairs Correspondent at The Guardian., Vincent Ni, “China halts US cooperation on range of issues after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit,” The Guardian, 08-06-2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/05/china-halts-us-cooperation-nancy-pelosi-taiwan>] Accessed 10/07/2024, DSL (recut 10.31.24 lcp)

Relations between the world’s two largest economies have **plummeted** into further uncertainty as **China halted ties with the US**on a **range of critical issues** – from talks on **the** **climate crisis** to dialogue between their **militaries** – **following the visit to Taiwan earlier this week by the US House speaker, Nancy Pelosi.** The declaration of the series of “**countermeasures” came as Beijing** for a second day **staged massive military drills** surrounding the island of Taiwan **and also announced sanctions against Pelosi and her direct family members for what it called her “vicious and provocative actions”.** Taiwan’s defence ministry said it had scrambled jets to warn away 49 Chinese aircraft in its air defence zone on Friday and a total of 68 Chinese military aircraft **and** 13 navy ships had conducted missions. The foreign ministry in Taipei also **reported it had detected [launched a] “massive” number of cyberattacks attempts against its website throughout Thursday and on Friday morning. With tensions running high in the Taiwan strait**, China on Friday said it was cancelling some efforts to keep communication channels open between Chinese and US military commanders. Those included attempts to coordinate air and sea operations to prevent unintentional flare-ups, for example, by warships operating close to each other at sea. Bilateral talks and collaborations on issues including the **climate** **emergency**, repatriation of illegal immigrants, counternarcotics and legal assistance in criminal matters **were suspended**. The White House said it had summoned China’s ambassador to Washington to **condemn** the “irresponsible” behaviour of Beijing over Taiwan. A **Chinese embassy official** in Washington **said the only way out of the crisis was for the** **US to “rectify its mistakes** and eliminate the grave impact of Pelosi’s visit.” Analysts say the **halt**ing of some of the bilateral **activities**– **especially those related to [the] military** – threatens to **break** what the White House calls “**guardrails**” between the two countries, which could prevent the situation from **spiralling** **out of control**. “These measures are going to decrease chances for the US and China to find a much needed modus vivendi,” said Zeno Leoni, a defence expert at King’s College London. “The two most powerful states are now unable to talk to one another – in a productive manner.”

**To end the cycle of US meddling and Chinese aggression, we affirm the resolution: The United States should substantially reduce its military support of Taiwan**

**Our sole contention is resolving tensions**

**Affirming solves the conflict in three ways**

**First, halting arms sales prevents Chinese aggression as Thrall 21 finds,**

A. Trevor Thrall, 8-17-2021, "New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan," Defense News, [https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-o n-taiwan/](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-o%20n-taiwan/) //dessie //recut rchen

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. **To avoid inflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan. This sale will not allow Taiwan to better defend itself in any clash with China.** It will, however, tell Taiwan that it’s OK to keep passing the buck to the United States for its defense. Moreover, a new sale of arms at this time is sure to inflame tensions between Beijing and Washington, increasing the risk of conflict and making it more difficult to make progress on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, trade and nuclear nonproliferation. No matter how many tanks, planes, missiles or howitzers Taiwan buys from the United States, few experts seriously believe that Taiwan is capable of defending itself on its own. Though a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be costly, absent a war between China and the U.S., Taiwan would surely succumb. **Beyond its obvious manpower advantages, China also enjoys overwhelming air and naval superiority that U.S. arms sales alone cannot reverse. China can blockade the island nation, airlift full-scale battle tanks onto the island and overpower Taiwan’s air defense systems.** A few more guns, missiles and planes cannot change this. **Despite inaccurate claims that weapons are helping Taiwan become capable of defending itself, decades of American arms sales and reassurances have convinced Taiwanese leaders that the United States is ultimately responsible for Taiwan’s security**. Taiwan’s defense spending has remained stuck at about 2 percent of its gross domestic product for years, a great deal of which it has spent on high-tech American weapons that will be of little value in case of a war. According to a report published by George Mason University for which the authors interviewed Taiwanese military officials, senior lawmakers, elected leaders, former government officials and defense scholars, the U.S. arms sales let “China know America would intervene on our behalf in a conflict.” In short, when it buys American weapons, Taiwan is simply making insurance payments to guarantee American intervention in response to a Chinese invasion. But while arms sales may have reassured Taiwan of ultimate U.S. reassurance, they have also angered and alienated Beijing. After the United States recognized mainland China in 1979, it pledged to refrain from **selling** the Taiwanese offensive **weaponry. But advanced fighter jets, missiles and planes are hardly purely defensive. Ironically, President Joe Biden used to understand this. In 1999, then-Sen. Biden stated that mandating arms sales to Taiwan would “be the equivalent of waving a red cape in front of Beijing.” China’s** concern over these increasingly sophisticated weapons sales is understandable. From President Barack Obama’s 2011 “pivot to Asia” to President Donald Trump’s trade war,

American concerns over a rising China have clearly been growing. In addition to selling Taiwan increasingly sophisticated weaponry, the Pentagon is deploying additional ships and planes in the areas surrounding China. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders worry that the U.S. and its allies are reviving the Cold War strategy of encircling their adversaries. **Attempts to deter China with an enhanced U.S. military presence and arms sales to Taiwan are having the opposite effect. China’s defense budget has doubled in the 10 years since Obama announced the pivot. [made] China is also matching increased U.S. air and naval deployments with more aggressive** maneuvers of its own.**Over the summer, China flew record numbers of warplanes through Taiwan-controlled airspace. And in response to this latest sale, China once again declared it would take countermeasures. Greater American military involvement and arms sales in the region raises the risk of a conflict** breaking out over Taiwan that drags the United States into a war with China — a war that would surely result in widespread death and destruction on all sides. Taiwan is in an unenviable position, but defending Taiwan at the risk of war with China is a bad gamble for both Taipei and Washington to take, especially as Taiwan would almost certainly be reduced to cinders in the process. Provoking China via arms sales also narrows the already constricted space in which the world’s most powerful nations can make progress on international trade, climate change and other global concerns. Both U.S. and Taiwanese security would be best served in a world where the U.S. and China avoided provocative military actions and sought openings for cooperation on issues of mutual benefit.

**Second, affirming brings Taiwan to the negotiating table. Taiwan as Ping Chen of the University of California explains that**

**Chen 17** (Ping-Kuei, assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, PhD from the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, \*Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego, and \*\*William L. Reed, Associate Professor of Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait,” October,<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>) recut roy (recut 10.31.24 lcp)

While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for claims about the prospects for **stability in the Taiwan Strait**. For instance, we believe it is likely that an end to arms sales would indeed **lead Taiwanese officials** to feel **less confident** about their bargaining power vis-à-vis the PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing: it is also plausible that, **in such a scenario,** Taiwan’s leaders would feel **they had no other choice but to negotiate** with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it isn’t obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for instance, that Taiwan would respond with **more accommodating policies** **that would remove Beijing’s incentives to consider military force**. In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the following section, we consider the topic more systematically.

**Finally, affirming revives local organizations that help negotiations**

**Currently, local organizations are struggling as Epstein 24 finds**

Adinda Khaerani **Epstein**, 10-02-20**24**, "ASEAN split over geopolitical challenges – GIS Reports", GIS Reports, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/asean-issues/>

**ASEAN still torn over security challenges** Illustration Epstein Adinda Adinda Khaerani Epstein Reading time: 10 min The Association of Southeast Asian Nations [or ASEAN] has been severely tested in recent years, and has failed to rise to the occasion. Saleumxay Kommasith Laos Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith at the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Sep. 4, 2023. Laos’ chairmanship of the organization in 2024 will likely do little to resolve the regional geopolitical quagmire. © Getty Images In a nutshell ASEAN’s divisions weaken its stance on regional security **Member states differ on responses to the Myanmar coup and China Effectiveness is hampered by the bloc’s non-binding diplomatic approach** The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (**ASEAN) is currently faced with several pressing issues: the ongoing civil unrest in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup, maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea,** and the broader United States-China rivalry. The bloc’s ability to effectively address these and other geopolitical challenges is about to be seriously tested, **especially given the diverging views of its member states.** ASEAN was established in 1967 by five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. It subsequently expanded with Brunei joining in 1983, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. In 2022, Timor-Leste was granted official observer status and “in-principle approval” to become a full member. The association seeks to foster peace and economic growth in the region. In recent years, given the complex regional dynamics, security has taken precedence over economic concerns. **ASEAN centrality, a concept stating that the group should be “the driving force behind the evolving regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific area,”** was designed to be an important feature of the bloc. The principle was first laid out in the 2008 ASEAN Charter, which states that the organization should be the primary instrument when dealing with external partners and that, to function effectively, the member states need to be united. Confronting Myanmar’s military regime In February 2021, Myanmar’s army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was detained along with other leaders of her National League for Democracy. The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing justified the detentions by citing fraudulent allegations during the general election. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s election commission rejected the military’s fraud allegations. The U.S.-based Carter Center, from which a total of 43 observers visited over 200 polling stations in 10 states and regions, also disputed his claim, stating that no major irregularities occurred on election day. Over 4,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in the crackdown following the coup. The crisis in Myanmar triggered international reactions, including from other ASEAN member states. The bloc has been chaired by four countries since the coup: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. None have been successful in resolving the crisis. Three years later, a consensus on how to proceed has proven elusive. The ASEAN founding members have brought up misgivings over the military takeover in Myanmar. Indonesia called for restraint and a dialogue to find solutions. Singapore adopted the same stance, voicing grave concern and hope that all parties involved would work toward a peaceful outcome. Malaysia and the Philippines have echoed these sentiments. In contrast, Thailand, through Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon flatly described the coup as an internal matter. Newer members generally share Bangkok’s sentiment. Five months after the coup, the divisions within ASEAN were made clear when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a return to democracy. Only six members voted in favor of the resolution: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Myanmar itself, which was represented by an ambassador from the overthrown civilian government. The then-ASEAN Chair Brunei, as well as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand all abstained. ASEAN’s differing political systems likely contributed to the split responses to Myanmar’s coup and the ongoing unrest. Only three members – Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – are considered to have democratic systems. Prior to its admission to ASEAN, Myanmar was under the oppressive military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) for decades. The U.S. and some European Union member states accused SLORC of human rights violations. ASEAN countries engaged with Myanmar in the hope that regional cooperative efforts and progressive exposure to the market economy would boost regional security and socioeconomic development. Despite objections from the U.S., Myanmar was ultimately admitted to the association. In April 2021, nine ASEAN member states and the head of the Myanmar junta, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on the Five-Point Consensus (FPC), which calls for an immediate cessation of violence in the country; constructive dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution; appointment of a special ASEAN envoy; and humanitarian assistance from the organization. However, the junta has neglected to implement the agreement and the nationwide crackdown on those opposed to military rule continues to this day. Unlike the West, which imposed sanctions on Myanmar, ASEAN leaders unanimously decided to maintain communication channels with the junta, carefully balancing engagement without legitimizing the military regime. In October 2021, the 10 member states had an emergency virtual meeting and decided to ban Myanmar from attending the that year’s ASEAN Summit, because the junta backtracked on allowing ASEAN’s special envoy to meet jailed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the military government’s lack of commitment to any substantive efforts made by ASEAN leaders, suspending the membership of Myanmar has not been raised. The group has no mechanism of expulsion, nor any specific mention about expelling its members when there is non-compliance of the bloc’s charter. Read more about ASEAN The future of Europe’s Southeast Asia engagement Philippine statecraft navigates Chinese aggression and the U.S. alliance South China Sea: Chinese encroachment unites neighbors Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was criticized by ASEAN fellow members Indonesia and Malaysia during his tenure as ASEAN chair in 2022. His visit to Myanmar undermined the group’s agreement to withhold recognition of the junta until it showed cooperation. As the ASEAN chair in 2023, Indonesia set up a special envoy’s office headed by its foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. This approach differed from that of the previous two chairs, Brunei and Cambodia, who appointed special envoys to Myanmar. Jakarta opted for quiet diplomacy, avoiding publicizing every diplomatic move and maintaining that Myanmar would have no representation at ASEAN meetings – except for non-political engagements – until progress was made on the FPC. However, the junta ignored Indonesia’s call for dialogue, and given ASEAN’s non-interference principle preventing punitive measures, no further action was taken. During Indonesia’s tenure as chair, Thailand and five other member states independently held talks with the military regime, which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore strongly opposed. Laos, which is chairing the organization in 2024, appointed a veteran diplomat, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, as envoy. He paid a visit to Myanmar to meet with the head of the ruling military council and other top officials in mid-January, like Cambodia’s playbook during its chairmanship in 2022. This inconsistency in dealing with the junta makes clear the bloc’s inability to present a united stance. ASEAN and the South China Sea As with the Myanmar crisis, **ASEAN members are similarly divided over Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. The hope is that the South China Sea Code of Conduct –** an agreement aimed at managing disputes by setting rules for activities like resource exploration and military exercises in the contested waters – will have more impact than the non-binding document signed by ASEAN and China in 2002**.** However, it is still unclear whether the document will be legally enforceable. Despite over two decades of negotiations, divisions within ASEAN remain. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, frequently involved in confrontations with China, want a binding agreement, while China-aligned nations, such as Cambodia and Laos, are more hesitant. With China claiming nearly the entire South China Sea, another issue is determining which geographical areas the Code of Conduct should cover and securing agreement from all parties involved. Recently, China and the Philippines clashed again near Sabina Shoal, located 630 miles from the Chinese coast. Both sides accused each other of ramming vessels, marking the fifth incident in a month. This escalation followed a recent de-escalation effort where both countries agreed to allow Manila to resupply its outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. China continues to pursue its claims aggressively in the disputed waters, openly disregarding a 2016 international tribunal ruling that invalidated its legal claims. Tensions have been rising since last year, raising concerns about the potential for a larger confrontation. Facts & figures Public opinion shifts in ASEAN countries Infographic of ASEAN public opinion A recent survey reveals significant changes in public opinion across Southeast Asia, with more than half of ASEAN respondents now favoring China over the U.S. as an ally for the first time since 2020. © GIS In a speech at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. condemned growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, indirectly referring to China. He warned that the death of a Filipino citizen through a deliberate act would be considered close to an act of war. Mr. Marcos hinted that Manila might invoke the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S., expressing confidence that the U.S. shares the same view. The agreement requires both nations to defend each other in the event of an attack by a third party. In 2012, for the first time since its founding, ASEAN foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communique due to Cambodia blocking consensus over tensions in the disputed waters. At the time, Cambodian leader Hun Sen argued that such issues should be addressed bilaterally, aligning with China’s preference. These fractures resurfaced during July’s post-ministerial meeting in Vientiane, where host nations Laos and Cambodia opposed wording in the communique that would condemn a Chinese coast guard vessel involved in a June collision with a Philippine resupply boat.

**Affirming brings these organizations back, Rahmadi 24 finds that**

Wawan **Rahmadi**, 5-15-20**24**, "Conflict Escalation in the South China Sea: Measuring the Direction of Indonesia's Maritime Policy", Modern Diplomacy,<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/05/15/conflict-escalation-in-the-south-china-sea-measuring-the-direction-of-indonesias-maritime-policy/>

Bilateral Relations as a Conflict Reducer **Conflicts in the South China Sea region are feared to have an impact on bilateral and regional relations between Indonesia and China.** Therefore, both China and Indonesia are trying to defuse the dispute over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) dispute in the Natuna Waters. This is done to maintain stability and good relations between the two countries and as a step to enhance international cooperation through cooperative and persuasive maritime diplomacy, in accordance with Indonesia’s Vision as the World Maritime Axis. Source: (Databoks 2023) Co-operative relations in almost all sectors mean that the two countries will seek peaceful means rather than conflict in order to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship. According to the author, a **diplomatic approach will benefit both parties more than militarisation**. Therefore, it is very important to close the space for intervention in the **form of military suppo**rt, joint exercises and political declarations from other parties (outside the region) that can complicate regional dynamics. **Demilitarization of the South China Sea issue will increase trust and cooperation among regional countries and thus contribute positively to resolving territorial and maritime disputes**. The use of the Navy should only be seen as an instrument of diplomacy, not as a force of war, in the context of the South China Sea dispute. This should be based on the application of international law governing territorial waters. The importance of sustained diplomatic efforts and the development of an inclusive and comprehensive maritime security strategy will be more effective in upholding Indonesia’s sovereignty in the South China Se**a.**

**This is the best way to end the conflict as Juliana Velasco of the University of Central Florida finds that**

**Velasco 13** Juliana Velasco; “Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace”; University of Central Florida; August 2013; [https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701 HYPERLINK "https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd"& HYPERLINK "https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd"context=etd](https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context=etd); // JL– grao recut (recut 10.31.24 lcp)

The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, **regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.** The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis. It also reinforces the theory in general. Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of the remaining variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, **[and] regional organizations are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement** that last five years and when controlling for outstanding issues, almost 3.5 times more likely**.** Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with 3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations, ranging from peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of peace agreements in keeping the peace**. Ranging from two to five times more likely to achieve the desired measure** (peace for five years)**, regional organizations outperform the United Nations**, individual states, and non-regional ad-hoc groups**.** From the results, it is also clear that incompatibility is important and territorial disputes are generally the most difficult to resolve. The reasons for this result are several. First, mandated in several regional organizations, as well as the UN, is the respect for sovereignty of member states. When faced with a territorial dispute, organizations are by default required to seek out an outcome that keeps the initial borders of the state.

**This has 3 impacts:**

**The first impact is conflict as Thrall 21 andGuibert 23 find:**

A. Trevor Thrall, 8-17-2021, "New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan," Defense News, [https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-o n-taiwan/](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/08/17/new-arms-sales-send-the-wrong-signal-o%20n-taiwan/) //dessie //recut rchen

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. **To avoid inflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan. This sale will not allow Taiwan to better defend itself in any clash with China.** It will, however, tell Taiwan that it’s OK to keep passing the buck to the United States for its defense. Moreover, a new **sale of arms** at this time **is sure to inflame tensions between Beijing and Washington, [first] increasing the risk of conflict and**  **making it more difficult to make progress on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, [and] trade** and nuclear nonproliferation. No matter how many tanks, planes, missiles or howitzers Taiwan buys from the United States, few experts seriously believe that Taiwan is capable of defending itself on its own. Though a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be costly, absent a war between China and the U.S., Taiwan would surely succumb. Beyond its obvious manpower advantages, China also enjoys overwhelming air and naval superiority that U.S. arms sales alone cannot reverse. China can blockade the island nation, airlift full-scale battle tanks onto the island and overpower Taiwan’s air defense systems. A few more guns, missiles and planes cannot change this. Despite inaccurate claims that weapons are helping Taiwan become capable of defending itself, decades of American arms sales and reassurances have convinced Taiwanese leaders that the United States is ultimately responsible for Taiwan’s security.

[Nathalie Guibert, "If it invaded Taiwan, China would suffer the same logistical failures…", 09/12/2023, archive.md, <https://archive.md/eB2Gi#selection-1809.0-1953.89>] // GFS LZ Speaking at the Aspen (Colorado) Security Forum on Wednesday, July 20, CIA director William Burns described what China is taking away from the Russian war in Ukraine: "I suspect the lesson that the Chinese leadership and military are drawing is that you’ve got to amass overwhelming force if you’re going to contemplate that [an operation against Taiwan] in the future." While China says it prefers "peaceful reunification," Mr. Burns agrees with the analysis of his military counterparts and said he believes **China "will use force** at some point to take control" of the democratic island. Beijing is convinced that Washington will defend the government of the Republic of China in Taipei. **The conflict could result in 500,000 deaths on both sides, according to the Pentagon**'s estimate. It remains to be seen how the Chinese Communist Party will use the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It should be noted that the Russian army's considerable logistical difficulties in Ukraine – with supply lines cut off and ships prevented from reaching the coast – are of concern to the PLA. Its challenge is to project across a 180-kilometer strait. Publicly available Chinese documents "describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan," according to the US Department of Defense 2021 Report to Congress on China. "The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW [electronic warfare]."

**Second is climate change**

**Climate change requires US-China cooperation.**

Oliver, Milman, 8-5-2022, What does the US-China row mean for climate change?, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/05/what-does-the-us-china-row-mean-for-climat> e-change-taiwan, 10-31-2024 //ahurjoon ��

While the extent of China’s withdrawal from climate discussions is still not clear, the move threatens to derail the often fragile cooperation between the world’s two largest carbon emitters, with only a few months to go before the crucial UN Cop27 in Egypt this autumn. Experts say **there is little hope of avoiding disastrous global heating without strong action by the US and China, which are together responsible for about 40% of greenhouse gas emissions.**The rupture in relations has occurred amid a summer of climate change-fuelled disasters, with record heatwaves and wildfires sweeping the US and Europe, punishingly high temperatures scorching India and China, and ruinous flooding affecting the US, south Asia and Africa.

**Absent action, we subject ourselves to nothing short of catastrophe.**

**Cassella 23** [Carly Cassella, 8-30-2023, "Scientists Warn 1 Billion People on Track to Die From Climate Change," ScienceAlert,

<https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-warn-1-billion-people-on-track-to-die-from-climate-change>] //clairec

The fossil fuels that humanity burns today will be a death sentence for many lives tomorrow. A recent review of 180 articles on the human death rate of climate change has settled on a deeply distressing number. Over the next century or so, conservative estimates suggest a**billion people could die from climate**catastrophes, possibly more. As with most predictions for the future, this one is based on several assumptions. One is a rough rule of thumb called the '1000-ton rule'. Under this framework,**every thousand tons of carbon that humanity burns is said to indirectly condemn a future person to death.** If the world reaches temperatures 2°C above the average global preindustrial temperature, which is **what we are on track for in the coming decades, then that's a lot of lives lost. For every 0.1 °C degree of warming from now on, the world could suffer roughly 100 million deaths**. "If you take the scientific consensus of the 1,000-ton rule seriously, and run the numbers, anthropogenic global warming equates to a**billion premature dead bodies over the next century**," explains energy specialist Joshua Pierce from the University of Western Ontario in Canada. "Obviously, we have to act. And we have to act fast." The human death rate from climate change is extremely tricky to calculate, even in the present day. The United Nations reports that every year, environmental factors take the lives of about 13 million people, and yet it's not clear how many of these deaths are directly or indirectly due to climate change. Some experts argue abnormal temperatures on their own may already claim as many as five million lives a year. Other estimates are much lower. Part of the problem is that the global effects of climate change are manifold. Crop failures, droughts, flooding, extreme weather, wildfires, and rising seas can all impact human lives in subtle and complex ways. Predicting the future death toll of these climate catastrophes is inherently imperfect work, but Pierce and his coauthor, Richard Parncutt from the University of Graz in Austria, think it's worth pursuing. They argue measuring emissions in terms of human lives makes the numbers easier for the public to digest, while also underlining how unacceptable our current inaction is.

**Third is the economy**

**Tensions hurt the global economy**

H.J. Mai, "Tracking the impact of U.S.-China tensions on global financial institutions", May 01, 2023, NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2023/05/01/1170862191/china-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-us-tensions#:~:text=In%20another%20report%2C%20the%20IMF,2%25%20decline%20in%20global%20output>.

He says the bank has strong relationships with Wall Street companies as well as with the U.S. Treasury Department. Contentious issues — from Taiwan, to Chinese spy balloons, to trade — have put both countries on a collision course in recent years. Other financial entities have raised concerns about the growing duopoly between Beijing and Washington. ASIA New Asian Development Bank Seen As Sign Of China's Growing Influence "**Investment funds are particularly sensitive to geopolitical tensions** and tend to reduce cross-border allocations, notably to countries with a diverging foreign policy outlook," according to a recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In another report, the IMF says, the ongoing **tensions between the world's two largest economies could lead to a 2% decline in global output.** With tensions between the two countries not expected to abate anytime soon, there's no guarantee that the AIIB won't be affected in the future, but Jin is confident that his bank has the necessary checks and balances in place to avoid such a scenario.

Lindsay **Maizland**, Council on Foreign Relations, 11-19-20**08** // Financial Crisis May Worsen Poverty in China, India // <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/financial-crisis-may-worsen-poverty-china-india>

By year’s end, the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 was starting to be felt in the developing world, with slowdowns expected in all emerging economies. These growth declines could have significant effects on the world’s poorest populations. The World Bank estimates that a **1 percent decline in** developing country **growth** rates **traps an additional 20 million people in poverty.** Concern centers on slowing growth in India and China, the world’s two most populous nations and the largest contributors to reductions in global poverty in the last two decades, according to many academic studies. Reduced economic growth in both countries could reverse poverty alleviation effordsts and even push more people into poverty, say some experts. The financial crisis has also likely made the achievement of the United Nations’ Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) on poverty--to halve the proportion of people in extreme poverty by 2015--more difficult.