# King RR R1---Strake MS vs CCA WS

## 1NC

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#### Modern governance sustains itself through the necropolitical logic of the sacrifice zone. Progress demands drafting bodies into zones of non-being to preserve violent order.

Adebisi ’19 [Foluke Ifejola; December 17; Associate Professor at the Law School, University of Bristol whose scholarship focuses on decolonial thought in legal education; Foluke Africa, “Why I Say ‘Decolonisation is Impossible,’” https://folukeafrica.com/why-i-say-decolonisation-is-impossible/]

The epistemic world is predicated on two major lies. The first lie is that a majority of the people of the world and thus their knowledges and histories are inferior to the rest of the world. The second lie, allied to the first, is that humanity and specifically the supposedly superior portion of humanity is more important than everything else on this planet. The earth we walk on, the air we breathe, the seas, oceans, mountains, birds, animals, fishes, insects. And so I suggest again, maybe a little more strongly, that post-truth is not a recent arrival, but it is exceeding its original territory. Nevertheless, the disappearance of shared objective standards of truth, did not begin with the last shower of rain, but has always been washed away in bodies of water with forgotten names and forgotten histories and a million bodies hidden under them.

Decolonisation and Truth

Decolonisation is often perceived as a means to uncover these histories, but one of the pitfalls of its praxis in higher education is a fundamental misconception of what it requires, both in theory and in practice. It is often confused with any social justice endeavour, or as someone said to me recently, with ‘just being nice to people.’ The four main things decolonisation is confused with are, representation, inclusion, diversity and equality. If you have practiced and/or theorised in these areas, it quickly becomes clear that without critical thought, representation can become toxic and tokenistic, people could be included into spaces that are not safe for them, spaces historically and repeatedly designed to harm and exclude them. Diversity is a fact of life that cannot be promoted without explaining why it has been demoted. General statements of equality often ignore the process of othering and set an unequal normative standard of equality. In all of these schemes we focus on what we are fighting for, rather than what we are fighting against. All our lofty sounding words and good intentions pave the way to hell for groups who are almost routinely left out of our institutions. Notwithstanding that this hell we have paved the way for may be inside or outside of said institutions. The way is paved. The hell exists.

Decolonisation, I suggest, is something conceptually different. Tshepo Madlingozi, says decolonisation is always a disruptive phenomenon, Frantz Fanon calls it a violent process. Tuck and Yang describe decolonisation as nothing else but an undoing of colonisation. Joel Modiri in the video below defines it thus, ‘Decolonisation is an insatiable reparatory demand, an insurrectionary utterance, that always exceeds the temporality and scene of its enunciation. It entails nothing less than an endless fracturing of the world colonialism created.’

 ‘…an endless fracturing of the world colonialism created.’ What then is this world that colonialism created? And was this world not done away with at the end of empire? This is where people confuse the passing away of political colonial structures with the permanence of the colonial logics that drove the process and continue to drive and structure our institutions and our world. There are two overarching logics that I refer to here. One is the commodification of space and nature, the other is the commodification of humanity and variably valued labour. Built on these overarching logics is the mostly racial and gendered categorisation and hierarchization of peoples into those who labour and those who benefit from that labour. This system is given legitimisation by drafting people (the wretched/damned of the earth) into what Fanon calls the zone of non-being, according to Grosfoguel, this is below the line of the human. Hickel calls this zone the sacrifice zone. As Achille Mbembe’s work on the practice of necropolitics explains, political power is deployed globally to decide ‘who may live and who must die…’ in service of maintaining the world colonisation created.

Or as George Sefa Dei and Chizoba Imoka describe ‘To colonize … One has to equate the purpose of life to material acquisitions, affirm their personhood only through their ability to dominate/bully others, shrink their mental capacity so as not to respect/understand human diversity and rationalize a wide range of unfettered violence.’

Thus we must never forget that this categorisation of humanity always, always, always serves the purpose of marking for death and marking for life. Marking for visibility and marking for erasure and silence. Dispossession always serves the purpose of accumulation. ‘who may live and who must die…’

Therefore, and I reiterate very strongly, we cannot decolonise while relying on colonial logics of commodification of labour and space. This commodification is everywhere in UK HE. We have REF, TEF, KEF and the NSS. We have a varied assortment of university rankings… they all rely on logics of linking value to productivity, while also ignoring institutional racism, sexism, ableism, homophobia etc. These refusals to see, refusals to change, mean that we have strapped ourselves to a machine designed to destroy us. But we live in hope that before it does, at least it feeds us, sustains us for a while, unlike the poor benighted souls in the sacrifice zone, the wretched and damned of the earth, trampled under the wheels of the machine and then cast into the river with its forgotten names, its waters closing over their heads as they drift off into the silence. We do not remember their names. For most of them we never knew they names, never bothered to say those names. Too difficult to pronounce. Their bodies and their realities were too dissonant and distant, too foreign to fit into the normative frames of disciplines that did not consider the wretched and damned human at the dawn of the discipline’s inception. Now the discipline is complete, the canon closed and all it can do is fire out at a dying world.

#### ****Nuclear energy is a eugenic fantasy of control---a system that glorifies productivity, creates the sustainability crisis, and renders disabled bodies disposable in service of economic efficiency. It doesn’t preserve life; it selects who is worth preserving.****

Wolbring ’11 [Gregor Wolbring; Associate Professor, University of Calgary’s Cumming School of Medicine, Program in Community Rehabilitation and Disability Studies, expert in ableism and disability ethics. 2011, " Ableism and Energy Security and Insecurity ", Hein Online, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/selt5&div=4&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=ZVZ2k34VRAwAAAAA:dpmBG2o3Dvaw32oXCMpbpf\_OhA388yBmxIM3kSaXvmGIRvIHJfS-c6r-zWFkmcrECyqoxFtL7xc&collection=journals] mac

Introduction:

"Energy is fundamental to the quality of our lives. Nowadays, we are very dependent on an abundant and uninterrupted supply of energy for living and working. It is a key ingredient in all sectors of modern economies"(European Commission 2009). Energy security based on access, affordability, and quality is an essential driver for development (Pandey 2009). The European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and Transport highlighted in 2006 two ways to deal with energy insecurity: "reducing energy demand by changing consumption patterns or using energy in a "greener", more diverse and more efficient manner" (European Commission Directorate-General for Research Directorate Energy 2006). The European Community is not alone in feeling that their energy security is threatened (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2006;Cohen 2006;Institute for the Analysis of Global Security 2004;Glenn, Gordon, and Florescu Elizabeth 2009). The fear of energy insecurity is also exploited. In a recent financial times article with the title "Total warns of Energy insecurity" one reads that: "Total, the French oil group, has warned politicians that they risk accelerating an oil supply crunch if they enact environmental policies that deter investment in oil and gas before enough viable alternatives are available"(Hoyos 2009). In developed countries, most of the discourses are around how to keep one's level of energy security and one's level of consumption and way of living. However, for many individuals energy insecurity is part of their daily life. According to the World Energy Outlook report by the International Energy Agency, some 1.6 billion people - one-quarter of the world population - have no access to electricity. In the absence of vigorous new policies, 1.4 billion people will still lack electricity in 2030 (World Bank 2005).

So what to do? The Ethics of Energy report by the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology states, "It is calculated that an amount of energy roughly equivalent to 7 per cent of the world's current electricity production could cover basic human needs. In an age of apparently advanced technological and management skills, we have failed in this relatively modest challenge" (Kimmins 2001). "How do we balance short-term social costs, borne largely by the poor, the disadvantaged and the developing nations (costs that may in the immediate future increase the disparities between rich and poor) against the long-term benefits of moving to a more sustainable society and protecting the global environment?" (Kimmins 2001). An ethical matrix is employed by various people (Beauchamp and Childress 1979;Mepham 2000) to visualize different angles and competing interests in a given discourse. This paper submits an ethical matrix for energy as a tool to visualize the different angles and competing interests in the energy discourse.

Furthermore, the author introduces the angle of favouritism for abilities and ableism as a new analytical lens through which one can analyse the energy discourse and look for governance options and solutions. One aspect that shapes behaviors in the energy discourse is that individuals, households, communities, groups, sectors, regions, countries and cultures cherish and promote certain abilities while viewing other abilities as non-essential or even undesirable (favoritism of abilities)(Wolbring 2008a). A step beyond the dynamic of favoring certain abilities is the dynamic of ableism where one not only cherishes certain abilities but where one sees certain abilities in oneself or others as essential. The list of abilities one can cherish is endless, with abilities added to the list all the time. Ableism leads to an ability-based and ability-justified understanding of oneself, one's body and one's relationship with others of one's species, other species and one's environment.

The purpose of this paper is to a) highlight how ableisms and local and global favoritism for certain abilities affect energy security and insecurity discourses and b) investigate the impact of existing ableisms on the development of ethical frameworks for the energy issue and vice versa. , This paper suggests the fields of abilities and ableism ethics, governance, foresight and studies as new fields of academic and non-academic inquiry as additional analysis and governance tools to deal with existing and to come energy challenges.

The Energy Security Situation:

Energy security concerns are not viewed merely in terms of ensuring a sustained supply but in the wider context of energy being an essential driver for development-based on access, affordability, and quality. (European Commission 2009) Many countries from Europe to the USA, China, India, as well as lowincome countries feel energy insecure. (European Commission 2009;European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and Transport 2006;Cohen 2006;The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2006) Most of the energy security and insecurity discourses in developed countries are around oil, gas and coal and about becoming independent of oil without having to give up the energy consumption level one is accustomed to and jeopardizing energy security. For 1.6 billion people, especially in low income countries, energy insecurity and lack of energy is part of their daily life (International Energy Agency 2009). On average, the poorest 2.5 billion people in the world use only 0.2 TOE (tonnes of oil equivalent) per capita annually while the billion richest people use five TOE per capita per year, which is 25 times more. In terms of electricity consumption, the richest 20 per cent uses 75 per cent of all electricity while the poorest 20 per cent uses less than 3 per cent (World Energy Council, 2000 cited in Rosario 2002)"(Gaye 2007) For Africa, the State of the Future 2008 states "the region will need to spend $563 billion over the next 25 years to increase generation capacity by 270 gigawatts and avoid a power crisis." According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, in order to avoid catastrophic consequences of climate change urgent technology development and deployment at unprecedented rates are needed: from renewables to carbon capture and storage (CCS), **nuclear power**, low carbon fuels, and end-use efficiency. (International Energy Agency 2008) De-carbonizing the global energy system will require additional investment of US$3.6 trillion in power plants and US$5.7 trillion in energy efficiency over the period 2010-2030. These additional investments correspond to 0.6% of GDP per year, but bring fuel cost savings to consumers of the order of US$ 6 trillion. (International Energy Agency 2008)

The State of the future 2008 (Glenn, Gordon, and Florescu Elizabeth 2008) and 2009 (Glenn, Gordon, and Florescu Elizabeth 2009) highlight many examples of energy solutions from among others Africa, the USA and China. Achieving energy security varies between countries and within countries, usually depending upon the state of development and the availability of indigenous energy supplies. (World Bank 2005)

The industrialized, net-energy importing countries' priorities to generate energy security are

\* Avoid disruption of energy supplies;

\* Diversification of energy supply sources;

\* Security concerns for energy infrastructure;

\* Technological solutions to reduce dependence on imported supplies. (World Bank 2005)

For mid- to low-income net energy importers the ability to meet growing demand for energy from imported sources may occur by

\*Securing capital and financing for investment in resource development and infrastructure;

\* Meeting people's basic energy needs and creating effective demand for energy services. (World Bank 2005) For major hydrocarbon exporting countries, market strategies include

\* Long term markets at reasonable prices

\* Diversification of export markets for energy resources;

\* Securing capital and financing for investment in resource development and infrastructure. (World Bank 2005)

\*With so many different views on energy security and insecurity, so many players with divergent agenda's and needs, how do we solve energy security and insecurity issues and deal with competing interests? Can ethic theories and discourses give some guidance to the energy discourses?

What is Ableism

The term ableism evolved from the civil rights movements in the United States and Britain during the 1960s and 1970s (Encyclopedia of Disability 2006) to question and highlight the expectations towards certain body abilities and the prejudice and discrimination persons experienced whose body structure and ability functioning was labelled as 'impaired'. The disabled people rights discourse and scholars of the academic field of disability studies question the assumption of deficiency intrinsic to non-normative body abilities and the favoritism for normative species-typical body abilities (Carlson 2001;Finkelstein 1996;Mitchell and Snyder 1997;Olyan 2009;Rose 2003;Schipper 2006;Fiona A.K.Campbell 2001;Carlson 2001;Overboe 2007).

However, the favoritism for abilities and ableism is a much broader phenomenon. Every person cherishes certain abilities and finds others nonessential. The list of abilities one can cherish is endless with abilities added to the list all the time. The capability approach, the ability-to-do approach was developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Sudhir Anand (for many articles on this topic see (Human Development and Capability Association 2010). Nussbaum generated a list of 10 essential capabilities (Nussbaum 2000) whereby capability in the end is the ability to act, to have access to and to have the opportunity. A social policy frame identifies certain abilities as essential that people should have the right to act on, and so exhibits certain forms of ableisms. The cherishing of abilities happens on the level of individuals as well as on the level of households, communities, groups, sectors, regions, countries and cultures (Wolbring 2008a) and has changed over time and will continue to change. Favoring certain abilities often morphs into ableism where one not only cherishes certain abilities but where one sees certain abilities in oneself or others as essential. Ableism leads to an ability-based and ability-justified understanding of oneself, one's body and one's relationship with others of one's species, other species and one's environment (Wolbring 2008a). Ableism as such is not negative it just highlights that one favours certain abilities and sees them as essential. One could choose to cherish the ability to maintain equity for one's members and members of a society could see this as positive. However, certain ableisms have historically been used and still are used by various social groups to justify their elevated level of rights and status in relation to other social groups, other species, and the environment (Wolbring 2008a;Wolbring 2008b;Wolbring 2008c). Certain ableisms are used to justify racism, sexism, cast-ism, ageism and speciesism(Wolbring 2008a;Wolbring 2008b;Wolbring 2008c). Ableism used in a negative way often leads to disablism, (Miller, Parker, and Gillinson 2004) the lack of accommodation for the needs of people and other biological structures who are seen to not have certain abilities; the unwillingness to adapt to the needs of others.

Ethics of Energy Security

The Ethics of Energy report by the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology covered the reality of energy poverty and energy inequity that often does not allow for the fulfilment of basic needs such as nutrition, warmth and light (Kimmins 2001). However, how do we deal with this energy inequity? How do we deal with competing interests? According to the Ethics and Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific research program of UNESCO Bangkok WGI: Universalism and Environmental Values, "when we think about energy choices and environmental challenges, and the ethics on science and engineering, we have to ask three important questions for convenience and global action:

Is there a set of universal ethics agreeable to the entire human race?

Can a set of universal ethics work across the many communities?

If not, what is an alternative to ethical universalism that can be applied when dealing with global challenges such as environmental degradation and climate change?" (Jasdev Singh Rai\* and Members of EETAP Working Group I (\*chair) 2009)

The ethical matrix is one methodology used to visualize key stakeholders in a given discourse and to link the discourse and its stakeholders to some basic ethical values. It was first employed in medical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 1979) and since then used for various topics (Mepham 1996;Mepham 2003;Mepham 2000;Beekman et al. 2006;Cotton 2009;Food Ethics Council 2009;Kaiser and Forsberg 200l;Whiting 2004;Brom et al. 2006). The matrix has normally three columns: Well Being, Autonomy, and Fairness.

Taking the basic three aspects of existing ethical matrices the author submits in Table I an ethical matrix for energy

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This ethical matrix introduced here is not a result of any consultative process but a thought product of the author. This matrix uses three main values evident in Western ethics discourses, which are the ethics categories of the original matrix. However, different cultures and societies differ in their values and weigh the needs of stakeholders differently. The UNESCO Bangkok energy ethics-working group I highlights the difficulty if not impossibility of a universal ethics and strategy. (Jasdev Singh Rai\* and Members of EETAP Working Group I (\*chair) 2009) One might have to generate different ethical matrices for different cultures and societies. The above ethical matrix highlights further that many different groups have a stake in the direction and outcome of the energy security discourse. Many of these stakeholders have competing ability interests in today's world and the different ability interests have to be reconciled to a certain extend. One could make an argument that different values and irreconcilable, competing ability interests were two main reasons why the 2009 Copenhagen summit (COP15) in the eyes of many failed and did not deliver a global breakthrough. The adherence to different ableisms by different groups led to competing ability interests in Copenhagen that could not be resolved. The author submits that this arena of unresolved competing ability interests is one reason why there continues to be so little progress on the international level in the area of climate change and energy security.

Energy Security, Energy Ethics and Ableism:

The UNESCO Working group one states:

"Environmental values in the different regions of the world are ideally drawn from a diversity of rich philosophical and religious heritages. However, to what extent can common ground be found among the various traditions within a United Nations (UN) system that promotes the principle of universal values through dialogue among different civilisations? Is it important or appropriate to seek universal values, or should there be more focus on establishing a framework for pluralist environmental values? Are there common values across cultures that can constitute the foundation for building and promoting a more sustainable economic growth, preserving biodiversity and preventing the environment from deteriorating further?"

"If we can agree upon international values such as principles of environmental ethics, then we can include these principles into economic models in order to develop policy that may better protect these values." (Jasdev Singh Rai\* and Members of EETAP Working Group I (\*chair) 2009)

Whether we can agree on universal values depends partly on who favours what abilities and what forms of ableism different stakeholder' s exhibit.

What abilities one favours and what ableisms one exhibits defines the human-nature relationship which in turn has an impact on which strategies and priorities are envisioned and employed for gaining energy security and avoiding energy insecurity. There are two main schools of thought on the relationship of humans with nature (anthropocentrism and bio/ecocentrism) each favouring different abilities.

Anthropocentrism and Ableism

Anthropocentrism sees humans at the center of the Earth and even the Universe. Consequently, nature is considered disposable to whatever degree humans require, no matter what their needs. In contrast, the needs of nature are never considered. "The political theories that organized Western societies since the birth of the nation-state in the 17th century are centered on the well-being of the human species with the well-nigh exclusion of the well-being of other life forms and of the Earth's life-support systems" (Verhagen 2008). This anthropocentric view of the human-nature relationship is a form of ableism. One could say that the biosphere, the ecosystem and Nature experience disablism intrinsic to this form of ableism, which sees nature as being at the disposal of human needs. Anthropocentric environmental protection fights pollution, resource depletion and now climate change with the goal of preserving a particular human way of living, which today is often driven by favouring the ability to consume, the ability to outperform others, and the ability to generate a high Gross Domestic Product. To be wrapped up in GDP-ism, consumerism and competitiveness-ism leads to a perception of needs and required actions. For today's energy and climate discourse these three -isms precondition people to look for more 'eco-friendly' energy sources so long as these sources fulfill the isms of GDP-ism, consumerism and competitiveness-ism. While sources of eco-friendly energy may reduce the deleterious impact on nature, the motivation for doing so has little to do in most cases with providing for nature's needs but with the realization that the 'old' ways of treating nature threaten GDP-ism, consumerism and competitiveness-ism. At the same time one searches for techno-tools such as geoengineering that can help to alleviate the impact of GDP-ism, consumerism and competitiveness-ism on nature without having to abandon GDP-ism, consumerism and competitiveness- 1sm.

Biocentric/ecocentric and Ableism

The biocentric/ecocentric position is another form of ableism that places the biosphere--the whole ecosystem--at the center of a person's way of life, thought and feeling. It represents a partnership model between humans and nature. It cherishes a form of ableism that favours the ability of humans and nature to live in harmony. Biocentric/ecocentric driven environmental protection focuses on sustainability of lifestyle exhibited by humans using sustainability indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP), the Happy Planet Index (HPI), the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the Economic Living Standard Index (ELSI), and the National Wellbeing Index (NWI), which is published in a variety of countries. Korea publishes a comprehensive statistical yearbook, which includes 492 social indicators in 13 areas highlighting sustainability instead of consumability, and competitiveness. China initiated the Green GDP which includes the cost of neglecting nature as part of the GDP but regrettably, when the numbers showed high costs associated with the bad treatment of nature China discontinued this measure (Nature 2007). However, India has stated an interest in developing a Green GDP by 2015 (Reuters India 2009).

The biocentric/ecocentric school of thought promotes a political orientation known as, biocracylecocracy. Essentially, biocracy is a political system in which not only humans vote, but so do other living beings or Earth systems (Berry 1990). An ecocentric perspective would include in this vote the whole of the ecosystem. According to Verhagen: "evidence of an emerging biocracy in the modem Western world is legislation about endangered species and the representation of other life forms during political assemblies when persons or organizations become spokespersons and keepers of rivers, forests etc" (Verhagen 2008). Ecuador could be construed as the first country that is a legal biocracy and ecocracy. Articles 71-74 of its new constitution describe the relationship of humans to nature. Articles 71-74 can be interpreted as giving rights to the 'entity' nature. Provided below is a translation. The numbering and order of Articles has been edited to make the translation adhere to the Spanish original] (Revkin 2008)

"Art. 71. Nature or Pachamama [a goddess revered by the indigenous people of the Andes -- "Mother Earth"], where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. Every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognitions of rights for nature before public authorities. The application and interpretation of these rights will comply with the principles established in the Constitution. The State will provide incentive for natural and juridical persons, as well as collectives, to protect nature; it will promote respect towards all the elements that form an ecosystem.

Art. 72. Nature has the right to an integral restoration. This integral restoration is independent of the obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the people and the collectives that depend on the natural systems. In the cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including the ones caused by the exploitation on non-renewable natural resources, the State will establish the most efficient mechanisms for the restoration, and will adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate the harmful environmental consequences.

Art. 73. The State will apply measures of precaution and restriction in all the activities that can lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration of the natural cycles. The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that can alter in a definitive way the national genetic patrimony is prohibited.

Art. 74. Persons, people, communities and nationalities will have the right to benefit from the environment and form natural wealth that will allow wellbeing. Environmental services will not be subject to appropriation; its production, provision, use and exploitation, will be regulated by the State."

It furthermore sets a hierarchy between different needs whereby the ability for food and water security is given higher priorities than energy security:

Art. 15 - The State shall promote, in the public and private sector, the use of environmentally clean technologies and clean alternative energy. Energy sovereignty will not be achieved at the expense of food sovereignty, or affect the right to water (Environmental law alliance worldwide 2010)

Conclusion

Energy security is a critical global issue. Energy Security is essential for many other goals. Reaching global energy security depends on global strategy and vision, which should especially take into account the people who already experience energy insecurity. The Bangkok office of UNESCO is coordinating a broad research program into the ethics of climate change in Asia and the Pacific (up to October 2009 the title was ethics of energy in Asia and the Pacific). UNESCO recently looked at the advisability of preparing a draft Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles in Relation to Climate Change which would also cover energy issues (UNESCO 2009a;UNESCO 2009b).

"The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 - form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions" (United Nations 2005). All 189 United Nations Member States have pledged to meet the goals by the year 2015. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is quoted on the MDG website as saying: "Time is short. We must seize this historic moment to act responsibly and decisively for the common good" (United Nations 2005). In a recent UN document one finds the acknowledgment that energy security is essential for all MDG goals (UNDP et al. 2007).

In 2001-02 the Millennium Project in collaboration with the Foresight and Governance Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Study conducted a survey to generate an international outlook on what goals might be desirable to achieve and what is seen as politically achievable by 2050 (Glenn, Gordon, and Florescu Elizabeth 2008). Most of the 44 identified goals (such as ending water shortages, water pollution and hunger) are directly affected by the existence of energy security or indirectly affected because whether energy security exists or not changes the political and societal culture in such a way that the list of goals would change as would the sentiment of which goals are achievable.

However, despite the pervasive importance of energy security so far, no global consensus has emerged as to how far and with which tools to address energy inequity. Techno solutions to energy security proposed are stalled or pushed forward in many places depending on how they impact consumerism and competitiveness. If a form of Ableism that favors productivity, consumerism and competitiveness is the main driver for envisioning and directing solutions for energy security one can expect product developments that further this form of Ableism.

Whether one follows an anthropocentric or biocentric view leads to different policies. Ableisms such as GDP-ism (the ability to produce), consumerism (the ability to consume whatever one wants), competitiveness-ism (the ability to out-compete others) very likely favour anthropocentric over biocentric views as long as they do not impede the very isms seen as essential. The ability to live in harmony with one's surroundings for example might favour the biocentric or ecocentric view. What ability one favours also has direct implications for energy security.

The author submits that the development of effective global policies related to energy that will meet local needs and increase global energy security might be furthered if one analyses the energy discourse through the lens of the fields of ableism ethics, ableism studies, ableism governance and ableism foresight (Wolbring 2008a).

#### The alternative is an orientation towards disability justice. Grassroots battles are efficacious in the face of perpetual war AND debility, which makes the NEG a prerequisite.

Pitters ’22 [Destiny Pitters; writer, scholar, and advocate for decolonization and abolition. 09-07-2022, "Disability and war", Briarpatch, https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/disability-and-war]

In the face of this, the disability justice movement in the Global North must work to oppose war, militarism, imperial violence, and debilitation. Puar gives the example of the Abolition and Disability Justice Collective which, she says, “recognizes the connected carceral infrastructures, that settler colonialism here supports settler colonialism there.” In 2021, as Israeli airstrikes landed in the Gaza Strip, the group released a statement of solidarity with Palestine, writing that “Israeli settler colonization is a disability justice issue that underscores the urgency of abolition and its internationalist dimensions.”

We have been taught to see war as a conflict that comes to a head through physical, chemical, or nuclear altercation in a country far away. In actuality, we are part of the constant cycle of war and militarism – be it police brutality, colonial occupation, or military expansion under the guise of “humanitarian intervention.” This is what some scholars have called “perpetual war”: the constant growth of military powers, meant to sustain endless fights against nebulous enemies such as “terrorism.”

“One of the things that the War on Terror has really shown us is that war doesn’t ever need to end – it’s actually something that’s sustainable, and it’s profitable,” Puar tells me. “War isn’t a simple relationship between one side and the other, but a multiplayer, proxied [event] that has numerous economic and ideological and political relations embedded in it. […] What it means to focus on maiming along with killing means actually to understand war differently, in some sense – because it’s a kind of ongoing bodily assault.”

Resisting war, militarism, imperial violence and debilitation must begin at the grassroots level. Here, many disability justice, anti-war, and penal abolitionist organizers are already fighting against the military-industrial complex and advocating for peace and community-based safety. Supporters of disability justice displace the need for police and military by practising unarmed civilian protection, from Minnesota to South Sudan; campaigning to defund, demilitarize, and abolish the police; protesting against weapons deals and manufacturers; calling for reinvestments in social services and health care; and advocating for returns to Indigenous models of justice, among other things.

In Puar’s words, it is a fantasy “that resistance can be located, stripped, and emptied,” whether from the land or the body. The world that disability justice advocates aim to create centers co-operation, community, and the dignity of those most marginalized – a world that cannot be achieved through the endlessly violent cycle of war.

#### The role of the judge is to interrupt debates disabling environment. Prioritize epistemic orientations that refuse debate as a space of militarized education and productivity---that’s key to challenge ableism and eugenic violence.

Castrodale ’15 [Mark; 2015; Ph.D., professor of social sciences at the University of Sheffield; Gendered Militarism in Canada, “A Critical Discussion on Disabled Subjects Examining Ableist and Militarist Discourses in Education,” Ch. 5 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289253007\_A\_critical\_discussion\_on\_disabled\_subjects\_Examining\_ableist\_and\_militarist\_discourses\_in\_education]

Drawing on the works of Foucault (1984, 1994, 1995, 2003), one sees that gendered and disabled bodies are constituted discursively through webs of knowledge-power relations, and subjects may also work to constitute themselves. Examination of the intersection of gender and disability may shed new light on the ways in which bodies are constituted in various educational sites in potentially disempowering and empowering ways. In Discipline and Punish Foucault (1995) discusses disciplinary tactics and the “ vast science of war ” (p. 168) that applies to “ the general foundation of all military practice, from the control and exercise of individual bodies to the use of forces specific to the most complex multiplicities ” (p. 167).. Military knowledges represent a body of knowledge of how to know, move, coerce, discipline, and govern people (Foucault, 1995). Foucault demonstrates military knowledge as a foundation of tactics, procedures, manoeuvres, exercises , and functions, which may be used to regulate and shape entire societies, thereby extending into educational realms.

According to Foucault (1995), discipline entails a series of calculated measures, methods , and techniques aimed at observing, knowing, ranking, and rendering bodies useful and docile. For Foucault , a disciplined docile body may be corrected, controlled, and regulated as an “ object and target of power, ” where in every society individuals are subjected to “constraints, prohibitions, or obligations” (p. 136). Discipline increases the forces of the body in terms of socio-economic utility and decreases forces of resistance to encourage obedience (Foucault, 1995). All bodies may be enhanced. The perfect body, in military terms, is mouldable, moveable, and trainable (Foucault, 1995).

Militarization entails seeking advantages, advancing a position, finding tactical opportunities, and developing new technologies. Coordinating bodies that are unpredictable and unruly becomes troublesome. Militaries have been interested and invested in bodies, in making bodies perform certain spatio-temporally coordinated tasks (Foucault, 1995). For militaristic purposes bodies are trained, observed, organized, located, fixed, coordinated together or independently, and moved in rhythmic timings and particular places. Foucault describes this ideal soldier as a male

who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valour...the soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit. (p. 135)

Soldiers’ bodies thus represent mouldable bodies that can be trained in the service of their country; they are oxymoronically disposable and indispensable citizens (see Taber, Chapter 4 of this volume, for a discussion of the latter).

Disabled bodies are often characterized as deviant, labelled and sorted according to biomedical , psychological disciplinary fields of knowledges (Murray, 2007), understood as imperfect, faulty, fat, weak, penetrable, and leaky (Shildrick, 1997). The disabled body is seen as deficient, abnormal, and in need of fixing. Disability is associated with dependence, and the disabled body often represents an “entity to be conquered” (Batts & Andrews, 2011, p. 558). Urla and Terry (1995) assert that “scientific and popular modes of representing bodies are never innocent but always tie bodies to larger systems of knowledge production and, indeed, to social and material inequality ” (p. 3).

Unpacking the constitution of all bodies entails critically thinking about the biomedical gaze (Foucault, 2003), dividing practices, hierarchical rankings, and normalizing judgments (Foucault, 1995), the materiality of bodies (Butler, 1993), the carnal politics of embodiment, and theorizing relating to the intersection of disability, gender, sexuality, race, and class. According to Goodley (2011), “a body or mind that is disabled is also one that is raced, gendered, trans/nationally sited, aged, sexualised and classed” (p. 33). Seeking to improve bodies deemed to be weak and fragile, military operations have developed bio-robotic, technological inventions such as the exoskeleton , which may enhance balance, speed , agility, and efficiency of movement and increase load -carrying capacity (Bogue, 2009). Not only do these technologies support direct military objectives, but they extend into the civilian arena, improving and rehabilitating disabled bodies often to move further and function faster in accordance with able-bodied norms. All bodies may be blended with bio- medical , militarized technologies to render them more useful and productive.

CDS offers avenues to critically examine military technologies in relation to how they shape the mattering of bodies. Technologies relating to augmentation and enhancement are of particular military interest. The ways in which bodies are moulded to fit and function with new technologies create hybrid bodies and perhaps new cyborg-body identities (Harraway, 1991). As an example, the prosthetic limbs of the model and athlete Aimee Mullins are imbued with aesthetic form and function. Thompson (2004) comments on how she “counters the insistent narrative that one must overcome impairment rather than incorporating it into one’s life and self, even perhaps as a benefit.…Mullins uses her conformity with beauty standards to assert her disability’s violation of those very standards. As legless and beautiful, she is an embodied paradox, asserting an inherently disruptive potential” (p. 97).

Thus, socio-cultural standards of beauty and ability are tied to norms of gendered performativity, connected in a nexus of function and form, aesthetic norms and norms surrounding movement, and ability in various spaces and contexts. To transgress these norms is to violate the “ideal” of “able-bodied” and the “ways of being, or moving, that…approximate more closely to the bodily actions and practices of ‘able-bodied’ people” (Price & Shildrick, 2002, p. 67).

As militarized technologies, ideals, standards, and values enter educational realms and inform pedagogical practices, it is essential to critically evaluate new educational technologies, examining how they relate to the ways in which teachers and learners are constituted. Such technologies may reflect normalized, gendered, and able-bodied ideals and reinforce dominant ways of thinking and being in the world. For Falk (2008), all pedagogies may represent military pedagogies because education is a strategic weapon that shapes individuals’ subjectivities as nation-states vie for power. As such, “education doesn’t win hearts and minds. Education makes them” (p. 2).

### 1NC

#### Russia’s economy is at the brink---oil is Putin’s lifeline.

**Matthews 25** [Owen Matthews, Degree in Modern History at Oxford University, 3-13-2025, The Russian economy is on the **brink of collapse** and Putin knows it, The Independent, https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/russia-economy-putin-ukraine-war-deal-talks-trump-b2714371.html, Willie T.] \*\*edited for objectionable language\*\*

How close is Russia’s economy to collapse? As Donald Trump’s negotiators open direct talks with the Kremlin, Kyiv’s European allies hope that a final push on sanctions against Russia could be Ukraine’s last – and best – hope of victory. Mr Trump has warned that the US could impose a “devastating” financial blow on Russia if Putin refuses to accept the ceasefire agreement. “There are things you can do that wouldn’t be pleasant in a financial sense. I can do things financially,” he said in the Oval Office.

Putin intended his full-scale invasion of Ukraine to be a three-day operation that would force regime change in Kyiv. Neither Putin nor his military or economic planners anticipated a grinding war that now soaks up over **40 per cent of Kremlin spending**.

Nor did they expect Europe to impose serious sanctions, and even less did they anticipate the destruction of three of the four Gazprom gas pipelines under the Baltic Sea that before the war supplied over 30 per cent of Europe’s gas.

The result in Russia has been **rampant inflation**, currently running at over 9 per cent, crippling **[staggering] interest rates** of 21 per cent and runaway price hikes on staple goods that far **outpace the headline inflation rate** and have hit ordinary Russians hard.

Last summer the price of **eggs jumped by 42 per cent**, **bananas by 48 per cent, tomatoes by 39.5 per cent and potatoes by 25 per cent**. The Russian ruble has lost over **half of its value** since Putin first invaded Crimea in 2014, and over $600bn of the Kremlin’s foreign currency reserves have been frozen in Western banks.

More than **1,000 Western businesses** – including Ikea and McDonald’s – pulled out, as did Western car manufacturers. Imports of Western goods – especially technology – are now **expensively routed through sanctions-busting neighbours** like Kazakhstan and Georgia. And last month Russian utility companies hiked prices for electricity by up to **250 per cent.**

“Everyone drives Chinese cars these days, but there are no spare parts,” says Alexandra, 39, a former journalist who lives in Moscow and whose ex-husband is fighting in Ukraine. “The only foreign cars you buy are right-hand-drive [from Japan]. Anyone with a mortgage is paying crazy interest. People complain how expensive everything has become.”

Russia spent more on its military in 2024 than the rest of Europe combined, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ latest Military Balance report – a staggering $462bn, if adjusted for purchasing power. The Kremlin’s spending splurge on its war effort has produced some winners, notably the 1.5 million troops currently serving in Putin’s army who are paid up to $2,500 a month to fight – four times the average salary in Russia’s most impoverished provinces.

Massive losses on the battlefield have **worsened labour shortages**, with a record-low unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent. Factories are **running at capacity and beyond**. Russia’s economy has “reached the **limits of its productive capacity** while demand continues to be stimulated,” Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina warned the Russian parliament in November, predicting a fatal combination of economic stagnation and inflation known as “stagflation”.

For the first three years of the war, the Kremlin’s war spending fuelled GDP growth which peaked at a staggering 5.4 per cent in early 2024. But 2025 will be the year that growth flatlines, experts predict.

The Kremlin has been able to afford its spending spree thanks, mostly, to India and China, which have continued to import Russian oil in record quantities. The EU has in theory capped the price that customers can pay for Russian Urals crude at $60 a barrel – somewhat below the current market price of $67. But so-called “attestation fraud” – such as making up the difference in fake transportation and other costs – makes the rules easy to bend.

Natural gas has **never been sanctioned** by the EU at all – and until 1 January of this year, 13 per cent of Europe’s piped gas was still being shipped from Russia through Ukrainian pipelines to Slovakia and Hungary.

Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia’s war economy that near-**nonexistent European sanctions have failed to achieve**

Southern Europe **continues to import** millions of cubic meters of Russian gas via Turkey. And despite its posturing, Europe still sources more than 15 per cent of its liquefied natural gas or LNG from Russia – with some 17.8m tonnes of LNG docking in European ports in 2024, **up by more than 2 million tonnes from the year before**, according to analysts Rystad Energy.

In fact the only really effective “sanctions” on the Russian energy sector – which accounts for over **two-thirds of government revenues** – have been in the form of Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, pumping stations and storage facilities. Ukrainian fire and fury are currently doing damage to Russia’s war economy that European “sanctions” have failed to achieve.

International pressure has made it harder, but not impossible, for the Russian war machine to obtain important components such as semiconductors. And sanctions have certainly “achieved the crucial goal of leaving Russia’s economy highly unstable in the medium to long term”, according to Oliver Ruth of London’s Royal United Services Institute.

The current crazy levels of expenditure are unsustainable, so Putin has a strong economic incentive to bring his war to an end. Ukraine’s economy is also under attack.

But on the flip side, even as Russia’s economy slips into stagflation Ukraine’s economy is doing far worse. Concerted Russian assaults, damage to vital energy infrastructure and mass emigration have inflicted catastrophic damage of up to 40 per cent of the country’s pre-war GDP. Kyiv’s budget payments to millions of soldiers and state employees are currently being paid by the EU. Without those subsidies – the lion’s share of the €60bn in direct financial support so far sent by Brussels – Ukraine’s government finances would instantly collapse.

Ukraine’s European allies hoped that sanctions would force Putin into taking an early off ramp and bring his **economy crashing down**. That hasn’t yet happened yet – largely because Europe has been unable to kick its addiction to Russian gas, and the US did not want to risk a global **oil price spike by cutting off Russian exports.**

But while they have **not brought Putin to his knees**, they have made the war disastrous for Russia. As Moscow and Washington begin talks in Riyadh, and European leaders hold their own emergency meeting, keeping up economic pressure on Putin is the real weapon that they still have left in their arsenal.

#### Affirming collapses state stability.

**Proedrou 23** [Filippos; Senior Lecturer in Global Political Economy @ the University of South Wales, PhD in IR from the University of Thrace; November 10; Elgar; “Chapter 27: The global energy transition and Russian structural power: scenarios and strategic options,” https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781800370432/book-part-9781800370432-35.xml; DOA: 3-21-2025] tristan

Lower fossil-induced profits will test the current rent-based social contract (Scholten et al., 2019, p. 190). **Shrinking** budget **revenues** will **decelerate** the country’s **fiscal** **capacity** to **maintain** the **wealth** and the **welfare** level of the Russian population (Henderson & Mitrova, 2020, p. 110). The ensuing likely **removal** of gas **subsidies** and **cuts** to **healthcare**, **education** and **social** **services** have the potential to **destabilize** the **regime**. This will be so especially in the resource-producing regions, which are going to be hit the hardest by the progressive divestment from the fossil industry. One could counterargue that Russia retains strong fiscal capacity and has managed to successfully support its budget in cases of low oil prices. Hence, one should not anticipate such drastic deterioration of the social contract in Russia. Nevertheless, and while Russia will manage to offset some of these repercussions at least for some time, the pace and **scale** of the **revenue** **decrease** caused by the global energy transition is **expected** to be very **severe**. More importantly, **unlike** the **case** of **low** oil **prices** that at some point **rebound** in **normal** boom-and-bust **cycles**, the trend of the **global** **energy** **transition** will be exactly towards **lower** oil and gas quantities exported and lower prices (Coffin et al., 2021), thus bringing the **Russian** **economy** to its **knees**. Such **developments** are likely to **increase** the **infighting** between the **Russian** **elites** as the **consolidated** **power** of incumbents **weakens**, thus opening up a **window** of **opportunity** for **contenders** (Øverland, 2021). This, at the same time, can **intensify** (a sense of) non-governability and **instability**, and precipitate/invite **insurrections** and **separatist** **movements**, as separatist factions may **perceive** **Russian** **impoverishment** and **economic** **hardship** as the **opening** of a **grand** **opportunity** for achieving longstanding **political** **goals**. The precedent of Chechnya in an impoverished and largely unproductive Russia in the 1990s (Aliyev, 2013) may offer insight into the likely internal political problems Russia may face once the global energy transition dilutes a substantial chunk of Russia’s budget and spending capacity. **Regional** **nationalism** in, among others, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Urals and the Far East (exposing the populations to Chinese influence and encroachment) renders **secessionist** **tendencies** a **real** **danger** to Russian integrity. The shifting of budgetary priorities to meet the war economy goals, in conjunction with anticipated progressively **lower** energy-borne **revenues**, resistance to mobilization of the part of the population for war needs and frustration with the war constitute a context more conducive to **political** **turmoil**, resistance and **pressures** to the **regime** (Lieven, 2022).

#### Perception triggers financial shocks.

**Baltvilks 22** [Witajewski; Expert @ the Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses @ the Polish National Centre for Emission Management; April 26; euractiv; “How the green paradox and climatepolicy can become Putin’s nightmare,” https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/how-the-green-paradox-and-climate-policy-can-become-putins-nightmare/; DOA: 3-21-2025] tristan

**Russia’s** **invasion** of Ukraine **pushed** global **oil** and **gas** **prices** even **higher** than they stood in 2021 because of the Russian **export** **restriction**. Many experts believe that further sanctions on Russia, including the gradual isolation of Russia in the sphere of global trade, would **keep** oil and gas **prices** **high** in the medium term.

Ironically, **high** global **prices** **imply** that many Asian **countries** are more likely to **purchase** Putin’s **oil**, especially if it is **offered** at a **lower** **price**. Should this happen, Putin’s oil revenues will remain high, and sanctions by G7 countries will not achieve their primary goal.

This risk can be avoided if sanctions are complemented by a firm climate policy.

The ability of climate policy to influence the oil market and oil prices is illustrated in the so-called green paradox. The green paradox is a hypothetical scenario in which the **announcement** of a rigid **climate** **policy** becomes a **signal** for **oil** **producers** that the **demand** for oil will **end** **soon**, motivating them to **sell** as **much** as they **can** as soon as they can.

**Flooding** the **market** with oil **depresses** its **price** and **incentivises** **consumers** to **use** **more**. If this were to happen, emissions would increase, **rendering** the climate **policy** **ineffective**. The green paradox is particularly relevant in the context of oil markets, but the mechanisms of the paradox can also apply to natural gas and coal.

Until recently, the green paradox was a problem for climate change economists, but the one who should be most concerned is, in fact, Vladimir Putin. The green paradox has the potential to turn radical climate policy into a weapon against Putin’s regime. It is especially important because Russia, the second-largest worldwide gas producer and the third-largest oil producer, currently uses fossil fuels as a weapon against the West for the purpose of pacification.

A **clear** and credible **commitment** by the largest economies in the world to halve the consumption of oil over the next two decades would be a **clear** **signal** to all oil producers that their **resources** will soon **lose** **value**. **No** **producer** with low extraction costs will **keep** its **reserves** for the **future** — they will **attempt** to **pump** their **oil** into the market as long as it **exists**.

**Low**-**cost** oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will, at least partly, **crowd** **out** the more **expensive** **product** from **Russia**, Venezuela and Iran. Even if that crowding out is not complete, the low oil price will **render** these countries’ **oil** **revenues** **negligible**. In Russia, where **oil** **rents** constitute more than **9% of** the nation’s **GDP** (**36%** of public-sector **revenue**), this will unavoidably **complicate** the **financial** **landscape** of the regime.

#### Nuclear is unique.

**Adams 13** [Rod Adams; Reporter for the American Nuclear Society; 12-10-2013; "Do oil and gas suppliers worry about nuclear energy development?"; Nuclear Newswire; https://www.ans.org/news/article-1481/do-oil-and-gas-suppliers-worry-about-nuclear/; accessed 03-04-2025] leon

That is the most important take away for attendees at the OPEC Embargo +40 summit held in Washington DC on October 16. Unfortunately, the meeting sponsors avoided acknowledging that nuclear energy is the **alternative** energy source that **most worries** established **hydrocarbon suppliers**. Nuclear has held that position since the early 1960s, when General Electric first won a head-to-head competition against coal to sell the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant.

Nuclear energy is **reliable**, virtually **emission-free**, and uses a **widely distributed**, **abundant** fuel source that is **no longer subject to influence** by the same producers that manipulate other fuel prices. Its cheap, clean heat can help turn coal, natural gas, and plants (vegetation) into liquid fuels that can be drop-in replacements for petroleum-based fuels.

#### Decline causes great power war.

**Kaplan 16** [Robert D. Kaplan; American author, Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security; March/April 2016; "Eurasia’s Coming Anarchy"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-02-15/eurasias-coming-anarchy; access at https://archive.ph/YfaTO; accessed 03-29-2025] doobz

Not coincidentally, these military **adventures have accompanied** the sharp reversal of Russian economic power. In 2014, the price of oil collapsed, the countries of central and eastern Europe continued to wean themselves off Russian gas, slow global growth further reduced the appetite for Russian hydrocarbons and other natural resources, and the West levied damaging sanctions on Moscow. The result has been a full-blown economic crisis, with the ruble losing roughly half of its value against the U.S. dollar since 2014. That year, Russian GDP growth fell to nearly zero, and by the third quarter of 2015, the economy was shrinking by more than four percent. In the first eight months of 2015, capital investment declined by six percent and the volume of construction fell by eight percent.

Russia’s economic problems run deep, leaving its leaders with few easy options for fixing them. For decades, Russia has **relied on natural resource production** and a manufacturing sector that makes **consumer goods** for the domestic market (since few foreigners want to buy Russia’s nonmilitary products). Despite some pockets of ostentatious wealth, the service sector has remained **underdeveloped**. Because Putin and his camarilla never built civil institutions or a truly free market, the corrupt, gangster-led economy of Russia today exhibits eerie similarities to the old Soviet one.

Back in the 1980s, when that economy was hit by a crisis, Mikhail Gorbachev responded by opening up the political system—only to be rewarded with anarchy and the collapse of Russia’s empire. Putin learned this lesson well and is determined to do the opposite: keep the political system closed while distracting the masses with displays of Russian power in the near abroad. Putin is a former intelligence agent, not a former apparatchik. Thus, although he nurses historical grudges concerning Russia’s place in the world, he is not deceiving himself about Russia’s internal problems. As the Russian economy decays further, Putin **surely knows** that for the sake of **domestic approval**, his foreign policy must become more creative and calculating, even deceptively conciliatory at moments. Over time, expect him to find new ways to undermine NATO and the EU, even as he claims to be helping the West fight the Islamic State, or ISIS. For the **more chaos** he can generate **abroad**, the **more valuable** the autocratic **stability** he provides at home will **appear**. Russians may know in the abstract that a freer society is preferable, but they fear the risks of such a transition.

Try as he might, however, Putin will not be able to shelter his regime from the fallout of economic collapse. Desperation will spawn infighting among a ruling elite that has grown used to sharing generous spoils. Given the absence of strong institutions, as well as the brittle and highly centralized nature of the regime, a **coup** like the one that toppled Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 cannot be **ruled out**; Russia remains Soviet in its style of governance. The country has experienced the crumbling of autocracy followed by chaos before (as during and after the 1917 revolutions), and it’s possible that enough turmoil could cause Russia to fragment yet again. The heavily Muslim North Caucasus, along with areas of Russia’s Siberian and Far Eastern districts, distant from the center and burdened by bloody politics, may begin loosening their ties to Moscow in the event of instability inside the Kremlin itself. The result could be Yugoslavia lite: **violence and separatism** that begin in one place and spread **elsewhere**. As Moscow loses control, the **global jihadist movement could take advantage** of the vacuum and come to Russia’s outlying regions and to Central Asia.

Bad as this sounds, things could still get worse. Back in 1991, the Polish intellectual Adam Michnik predicted that future leaders in Russia and eastern Europe would fill the gap left by the collapse of communism with “a coarse and primitive nationalism.” Putin has adopted just such a **nationalism** in recent years. He has slyly backed separatist movements in Abkhazia, the Donbas, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, creating deniable conflicts that result in warlord-run statelets. In the years ahead, he may well choose to provoke more of these so-called frozen conflicts, but this time in **NATO Baltic member states** (which have sizable Russian populations and which Moscow still considers lost provinces). Meanwhile, Putin will try to play on Europe’s need for Russian support in Syria to force Europe to acknowledge his annexation of Crimea and his de facto rule over eastern Ukraine.

#### Extinction!

**Clare 23** [Stephen Clare; Effective Altruism writer and existential risks researcher; June 2023; "Great power war"; 80000 Hours; https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/great-power-conflict/; accessed 12-05-2024, BZ + Willie T. + sumzom]

A modern great power war could see **nuclear weapons**, **bioweapons**, **autonomous weapons**, and other destructive **new** technologies deployed on an unprecedented scale.

It would probably be the most destructive event in history, shattering our world. It could even threaten us with **extinction**.

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We’ve come perilously close to just this kind of catastrophe before.¶ On October 27, 1962 — near the peak of the Cuban Missile Crisis — an American U-2 reconnaissance plane set out on a routine mission to the Arctic to collect data on Soviet nuclear tests. But, while flying near the North Pole, with the stars obscured by the northern lights, the pilot made a navigation error and strayed into Soviet airspace.1¶ Soviet commanders sent fighter jets to intercept the American plane. The jets were picked up by American radar operators and nuclear-armed F-102 fighters took off to protect the U-2.¶ Fortunately, the reconnaissance pilot realised his error with enough time to correct course before the Soviet and American fighters met. But the intrusion enraged Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who was already on high alert amidst the crisis in Cuba.¶ “What is this, a provocation?” Khrushchev wrote to US President John F. Kennedy. “One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time when everything has been put into combat readiness.”¶ If the U-2’s path had strayed further west, or the Soviet fighters had been fast enough to intercept it, this incident could have played out quite differently. Both the United States and the USSR had thousands of nuclear missiles ready to fire. Instead of a nearly-forgotten anecdote, the U-2 incident could have been a trigger for war, like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

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**Competition** among the world’s most powerful countries shapes our world today. And whether it’s through future incidents like the lost U-2, or something else entirely, it’s plausible that it could **escalate** and lead to a major, devastating war.

Is there anything you can do to help avoid such a terrible outcome? It is, of course, difficult to imagine how any one individual can hope to influence such world-historical events. Even the **most powerful** world leaders often **fail to predict** the global consequences of their decisions.

But I think the **likelihood** and **severity** of great power war makes this among the **most pressing problems** of our time — and that some solutions could be impactful enough that working on them may be one of the highest-impact things to do with your career.

By taking action, I think we can create a future where the threat of great power war is a distant memory rather than an ever-present danger.

Summary

Economic **growth** and **technological progress** have **bolstered** the arsenals of the world’s most powerful countries. That means the next war between them could be far worse than World War II, the deadliest conflict humanity has yet experienced.

Could such a war actually occur? We can’t rule out the possibility. Technical **accidents** or diplomatic **misunderstandings** could spark a conflict that **quickly escalates**. Or international **tension** could cause leaders to decide they’re **better off fighting than negotiating**.

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It seems hard to make progress on this problem. It’s also less neglected than some of the problems that we think are most pressing. There are certain issues, like making nuclear weapons or military artificial intelligence systems safer, which seem promising — although it may be more impactful to work on reducing risks from AI, bioweapons or nuclear weapons directly. You might also be able to reduce the chances of misunderstandings and miscalculations by developing expertise in one of the most important bilateral relationships (such as that between the United States and China).¶ Finally, by making conflict less likely, reducing competitive pressures on the development of dangerous technology, and improving international cooperation, you might be helping to reduce other risks, like the chance of future pandemics.¶ Our overall view¶ Recommended¶ Working on this issue seems to be among the best ways of improving the long-term future we know of, but all else equal, we think it’s less pressing than our highest priority areas (primarily because it seems less neglected and harder to solve).¶ Scale ¶ There’s a significant chance that a new great power war occurs this century.¶ Although the world’s most powerful countries haven’t fought directly since World War II, war has been a constant throughout human history. There have been numerous close calls, and several issues could cause diplomatic disputes in the years to come.¶ These considerations, along with forecasts and statistical models, lead me to think there’s about a one-in-three chance that a new great power war breaks out in roughly the next 30 years.¶ Few wars cause more than a million casualties and the next great power war would probably be smaller than that. However, there’s some chance it could escalate massively. Today the great powers have much larger economies, more powerful weapons, and bigger military budgets than they did in the past. An all-out war could kill far more people than even World War II, the worst war we’ve yet experienced.¶ Could it become an existentially threatening war — one that could cause human extinction or significantly damage the prospects of the long-term future? It’s very difficult to say. But my best current guess is that the chance of an existential catastrophe due to war in the next century is somewhere between 0.05% and 2%.¶ Neglectedness ¶ War is a lot less neglected than some of our other top problems. There are thousands of people in governments, think tanks, and universities already working on this problem. But some solutions or approaches remain neglected. One particularly promising approach is to develop expertise at the intersection of international conflict and another of our top problems. Experts who understand both geopolitical dynamics and risks from advanced artificial intelligence, for example, are sorely needed.¶ Solvability ¶ Reducing the risk of great power war seems very difficult. But there are specific technical problems that can be solved to make weapons systems safer or less likely to trigger catastrophic outcomes. And in the best case, working on this problem can have a leverage effect, making the development of several dangerous technologies safer by improving international cooperation and making them less likely to be deployed in war.¶ At the end of this profile, I suggest five issues which I’d be particularly excited to see people work on. These are:¶ Developing expertise in the riskiest bilateral relationships¶ Learning how to manage international crises quickly and effectively and ensuring the systems to do so are properly maintained¶ Doing research to improve particularly important foreign policies, like strategies for sanctions and deterrence¶ Improving how nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are governed at the international level¶ Improving how such weapons are controlled at the national level¶ Profile depth¶ In-depth ¶ This is one of many profiles we've written to help people find the most pressing problems they can solve with their careers. Learn more about how we compare different problems, see how we try to score them numerically, and see how this problem compares to the others we've considered so far.¶ Why might preventing great power war be an especially pressing problem?¶ A modern great power war — an all-out conflict between the world’s most powerful countries — could be the worst thing to ever happen to humanity.¶ Historically, such wars have been exceptionally destructive. Sixty-six million people died in World War II, likely the deadliest catastrophe humanity has experienced so far.¶ Since World War II, the global population and world economy have continued to grow, nuclear weapons have proliferated, and military technology has continued to advance. This means the next world war could be even worse, just as World War II was much deadlier than World War I.¶ It’s not guaranteed that such a war will break out. And if it does, it may not escalate to such a terrible extent. But the chance can’t be ignored. In fact, there are reasons to think that the odds of World War III breaking out this century are worryingly high.¶ A modern great power war would be devastating for people alive today. But its effects could also persist long into the future. That’s because there is a substantial chance that this century proves to be particularly important. Technologies with the potential to cause a global catastrophe or radically reshape society are likely to be invented. How we choose to develop and deploy them could impact huge numbers of our descendants. And these choices would be affected by the outcomes of a major war.¶ To be more specific, there are three main ways great power conflict could affect the long-term future:¶ High international tension could increase other risks. Great power tensions could make the world more dangerous even if they don’t lead to war. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the USSR never came into direct conflict but invested in bioweapons research and built up nuclear arsenals. This dynamic could return, with tension between great powers fueling races to develop and build new weapons, raising the risk of a disaster even before shots are fired.¶ War could cause an existential catastrophe. If war does break out, it could escalate dramatically, with modern weapons (nuclear weapons, bioweapons, autonomous weapons, or other future technologies) deployed at unprecedented scale. The resulting destruction could irreparably damage humanity’s prospects.¶ War could reshape international institutions and power balances. While such a catastrophic war is possible, it seems extremely unlikely. But even a less deadly war, such as another conflict on the scale of World War II, could have very long-lasting effects. For example, it could reshape international institutions and the global balance of power. In a pivotal century, different institutional arrangements and geopolitical balances could cause humanity to follow different long-term trajectories.¶ The rest of this profile explores exactly how pressing a problem great power conflict is. In summary:¶ Great power relations have become more tense. (More.)¶ Partly as a result, a war is more likely than you might think. It’s reasonable to put the probability of such a conflict in the coming decades somewhere between 10% and 50%. (More.)¶ If war breaks out, it would probably be hard to control escalation. The chance that it would become large enough to be an existential risk cannot be dismissed. (More.)¶ This makes great power war one of the biggest threats our species currently faces. (More.)¶ It seems hard to make progress on solving such a difficult problem (more) — but there are many things you can try if you want to help (more).¶ International tension has risen and makes other problems worse¶ Imagine we had a thermometer-like device which, instead of measuring temperature, measured the level of international tension.2 This ‘tension metre’ would max out during periods of all-out global war, like World War II. And it would be relatively low when the great powers3 were peaceful and cooperative. For much of the post-Napoleonic 1800s, for example, the powerful European nations instituted the Concert of Europe and mostly upheld a continental peace. The years following the fall of the USSR also seem like a time of relative calm, when the tension metre would have been quite low.4¶ How much more worried would you be about the coming decades if you knew the tension metre would be very high than if you knew it would be low? Probably quite a lot. In the worst case, of course, the great powers could come into direct conflict. But even if it doesn’t lead to war, a high level of tension between great powers could accelerate the development of new strategic technologies, make it harder to solve global problems like climate change, and undermine international institutions.¶ During the Cold War, for instance, the United States and USSR avoided coming into direct conflict. But the tension metre would still have been pretty high. This led to some dangerous events:¶ A nuclear arms race. The number of nuclear warheads in the world grew from just 300 in 1950 to over 64,000 in 1986.¶ The development of new bioweapons. Despite signing the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the search for military advantages motivated Soviet decision makers to continue investing in bioweapon development for decades. Although never used in combat, biological agents were accidentally released from research facilities, resulting in dozens of deaths and threatening to cause a pandemic.5¶ Nuclear close calls. Military accidents and false alarms happened regularly, and top decision makers were more likely to interpret these events hostilely when tensions were high. On several occasions it seems the decision about whether or not to start a nuclear war came down to individuals acting under stress and with limited time.¶ This makes international tension an existential risk factor. It’s connected to a number of other problems, which means reducing the level of international tension would lower the total amount of existential risk we face.¶ The level of tension today¶ Recently, international tension seems to have once again been rising. To highlight some of the most salient examples:¶ China-United States relations have deteriorated, leading to harsh diplomatic rhetoric and protectionist trade policies that aim to reduce the countries’ economic interdependence.¶ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has killed about a hundred thousand people so far, raised the risk of nuclear war, and sent United States-Russia relations to their lowest point since the Cold War.¶ Chinese and Indian soldiers fought deadly skirmishes along their countries’ disputed border in 2020–21.¶ These dynamics raise an important question: how much more dangerous is the world given this higher tension than it would be in a world of low tension?¶ I think the answer is quite a bit more dangerous — for several reasons. First, international tension seems likely to make technological progress more dangerous. There’s a good chance that, in the coming decades, humanity will make some major technological breakthroughs. We’ve discussed, for example, why one might worry about the effects of advanced artificial intelligence systems or biotechnology. The level of tension could strongly affect how these technologies are developed and governed. Tense relations could, for example, cause countries to neglect safety concerns in order to develop technology faster.6¶ Second, great power relations will strongly influence how nations do, or do not, cooperate to solve other global collective action problems. For example, in 2022, China withdrew from bilateral negotiations with the United States over climate action in protest of what it perceived as American diplomatic aggression in Taiwan. That same year, efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention were reportedly hampered by the Russian delegation after their country’s invasion of Ukraine raised tensions with the United States and other western countries.¶ And third, if relations deteriorate severely, the great powers could fight a war.¶ How likely is a war?¶ Wars are destructive and risky for all countries involved. Modern weapons, especially nuclear warheads, make starting a great power war today seem like a suicidal undertaking.¶ But factors like the prevalence of war throughout history, the chance that leaders make mistakes, conflicting ideologies, and commitment problems, make me think that conflict could break out anyway.¶ On balance, I think such an event is somewhat unlikely but hardly unthinkable. To quantify this: I put the chance we experience some kind of war between great powers before 2050 at about one-in-three.7¶ War has occurred regularly in the past¶ One reason to think a war is quite likely is that such conflicts have been so common in the past. Over the past 500 years, about two great power wars have occurred per century.8¶ Naively, this would mean that every year there’s a 2% chance such a war occurs, implying the chance of experiencing at least one great power war over the next 80 years — roughly until the end of the century — is about 80%.9¶ This is a very simple model. In reality, the risk is not constant over time and independent across years. But it shows that if past trends simply continue, the outcome is likely to be very bad.¶ Has great power war become less likely?¶ One of the most important criticisms of this model is that it assumes the risk is constant over time. Some researchers have argued instead that, especially since the end of World War II, major conflicts have become much less likely due to:¶ Nuclear deterrence: Nuclear weapons are so powerful and destructive that it’s just too costly for nuclear-armed countries to start wars against each other.10¶ Democratisation: Democracies have almost never gone to war against each other, perhaps because democracies are more interconnected and their leaders are under more public pressure to peacefully resolve disputes with each other.11 The proportion of countries that are democratic has increased from under 10% in 1945 to about 50% today.¶ Strong economic growth and global trade: Global economic growth accelerated following World War II and the value of global exports grew by a factor of almost 30 between 1950 and 2014. Since war disrupts economies and international trade, strong growth raises the costs of fighting.12¶ The spread of international institutions: Multilateral bodies like the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council promote diplomatic dialogue and facilitate coordination to punish transgressors.13¶ It is true that we are living through an unusually long period of great power peace. It’s been about 80 years since World War II. We just saw that a simple model using the historical frequency of great power wars suggests there was only a 20% chance of going that long without at least one more war breaking out. This is some evidence in favour of the idea that wars have become significantly less common.¶ At the same time, we shouldn’t feel too optimistic.¶ The numerous close calls during the Cold War suggest we were somewhat lucky to avoid a major war in that time. And a 20% chance of observing 80 years of peace is not that low.14 Structural changes might have dramatically reduced the likelihood of war. Or perhaps we’ve just been lucky. It could even be that technological advances have made war less likely to break out, but more deadly when it occurs, leaving the overall effect on the level of risk ambiguous. It just hasn’t been long enough to support a decisive view.15¶ So while the recent historical trend is somewhat encouraging, we don’t have nearly enough data to be confident that great power war is a thing of the past. To better predict the likelihood of future conflict, we should also consider distinctive features of our modern world.16¶ One might think that a modern great power war would simply be so destructive that no state leader would ever choose to start one. And some researchers do think that the destruction such a war would wreak globally makes it less likely to occur. But it would be hard to find anyone who claims this dynamic has driven the risk to zero.¶ First, a war could be started by accident.¶ Second, sometimes even prudent leaders may struggle to avoid a slide towards war.¶ We could blunder into war¶ An accidental war can occur if one side mistakes some event as an aggressive action by an adversary.¶ This happened several times during the Cold War. The earlier example of the wayward American reconnaissance plane shows how routine military exercises carry some escalation risk. Similarly, throughout history, nervous pilots and captains have caused serious incidents by attacking civilian planes and ships.17 Nuclear weapons allow for massive retaliatory strikes to be launched quickly — potentially too quickly to allow for such situations to be explained and de-escalated.¶ It is perhaps more likely, though, that an accidental war could be triggered by a technological malfunction. Faulty computers and satellites have previously triggered nuclear close calls. As monitoring systems have become more reliable, the rate at which such accidents have occurred has been going down. But it would be overconfident to think that technological malfunctions have become impossible.¶ Future technological changes will likely raise new challenges for nuclear weapon control. There may be pressure to integrate artificial intelligence systems into nuclear command and control to allow for faster data processing and decision making. And AI systems are known to behave unexpectedly when deployed in new environments.18¶ New technologies will also create new accident risks of their own, even if they’re not connected to nuclear weapon systems. Although these risks are hard to predict, they seem significant. I’ll say more about how such technologies — including AI, nuclear, biological, and autonomous weapons — are likely to increase war risks later.¶ Leaders could choose war¶ All that said, most wars have not started by accident. If another great power war does break out in the coming decades, it is more likely to be an intentional decision made by a national leader.¶ Explaining why someone might make such a costly, destructive, unpredictable, and risky decision has been called “the central puzzle about war.” It has motivated researchers to search for “rationalist” explanations for war. In his 2022 book Why We Fight, for example, economist Chris Blattman proposes five basic explanations: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions.19¶ Blattman's Five (Rationalist) Explanations for War¶ This section discusses how great power tensions may escalate to war in the next few decades. It focuses on three potential conflicts in particular: war between the US and China, between the US and Russia, and between China and India. These are discussed because each of these countries are among the world’s largest economies and military spenders, and seem particularly likely to fight. At the end, I briefly touch on other potential large conflicts.¶ Projected real GDP of the US, China, India and Russia according to a 2022 Goldman Sachs analysis Source: Author’s figure using data from: Kevin Daly and Tadas Gedminas, “Global Economics Paper The Path to 2075 — Slower Global Growth, But Convergence Remains Intact,” Global Economics Paper (Goldman Sachs, December 6, 2022), https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/gs-research/the-path-to-2075-slower-global-growth-but-convergence-remains-intact/report.pdf.¶ United States-China¶ The most worrying possibility is war between the United States and China. They are easily the world’s largest economies. They spend by far the most on their militaries. Their diplomatic relations are tense and have recently worsened. And their relationship has several of the characteristics that Blattman identifies as causes of war.¶ At the core of the United States-China relationship is a commitment problem.¶ China’s economy is growing faster than the United States’. By some metrics, it is already larger.20 If its differential growth continues, the gap will continue to widen between it and the United States. While economic power is not the sole determinant of military power, it is a key factor.21¶ The United States and China may be able to strike a fair deal today. But as China continues to grow faster, that deal may come to seem unbalanced. Historically, such commitment problems seem to have made these kinds of transition periods particularly dangerous.22¶ In practice, the United States and China may find it hard to agree on rules to guide their interactions, such as how to run international institutions or govern areas of the world where their interests overlap.¶ The most obvious issue which could tip the United States-China relationship from tension into war is a conflict over Taiwan. Taiwan’s location and technology industries are valuable for both great powers.¶ This issue is further complicated by intangible incentives.¶ For the United States, it is also a conflict over democratic ideals and the United States’ reputation for defending its allies.¶ For China, it is also a conflict about territorial integrity and addressing what are seen as past injustices.¶ Still, forecasts suggest that while a conflict is certainly possible, it is far from inevitable. As of 8 June 2023, one aggregated forecast23 gives a 17% chance of a United States-China war breaking out before 2035.24¶ A related aggregated forecast of the chance that at least 100 deaths occur in conflict between China and Taiwan by 2050 gives it, as of 8 June 2023, a much higher 68% chance of occurring.25¶ United States-Russia¶ Russia is the United States’ other major geopolitical rival.¶ Unlike China, Russia is not a rival in economic terms: even after adjusting for purchasing power, its economy is only about one-fifth the size of the United States’.¶ However, Russia devotes a substantial fraction of its economy to its military. Crucially, it has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. And Russian leadership has shown a willingness to project power beyond their country’s borders.¶ Country Military spending in 2021 (2020 USD, PPP adjusted)¶ United States 801 billion¶ China 293 billion¶ India 76.6 billion¶ United Kingdom 68.4 billion¶ Russia 65.9 billion¶ Top five countries by estimated military spending, 2021. Source: SIPRI¶ Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the dangers of renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States-led West. The war has already been hugely destructive: the largest war in Europe since World War II, with hundreds of thousands of casualties already and no end to the conflict in sight. And it could get much worse. Most notably, Russian officials have repeatedly refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons.¶ Unchecked interests and intangible incentives are again at play here. Vladimir Putin leads a highly-centralised government. He has spoken about how his desire to rebuild Russia’s reputation played in his decision to invade Ukraine.¶ Given their ideological differences and history of rivalry, it is reasonable to expect that the United States and Russia will continue to experience dangerous disagreements in the future. As of 8 June 2023, an aggregated forecast gives a 20% chance that the United States and Russia will fight a war involving at least 1,000 battle deaths before 2050.¶ China-India¶ India is already the world’s third-largest economy. If national growth rates remain roughly constant, the size of the Indian economy will surpass that of the United States’ sometime this century. India also has nuclear weapons and is already the world’s third-largest military spender (albeit at a much lower level than China or the United States).¶ One reason to worry that China and India could fight a war is that they already dispute territory along their border. Countries that share a border, especially when it is disputed, are more likely to go to war than countries that do not. By one count, 88% of the wars that occurred between 1816 and 1980 began as wars between neighbours.26¶ In fact, China and India already fought a brief but violent border war in 1962. Deadly skirmishes have continued since, resulting in deaths as recently as 2020.¶ Forecasters agree that a China-India conflict seems relatively (though not absolutely) likely. An aggregated forecast gives a 19% chance of war before 2035.¶ Other dangerous conflicts¶ These three conflicts — United States-China, United States-Russia, and China-India — are not the only possible great power wars that could occur. Other potential conflicts could also pose existential risk, either because they drive dangerous arms races or see widespread deployment of dangerous weapons.¶ We should keep in mind India-Pakistan as a particularly likely conflict between nuclear-armed states and China-Russia as a potential, though unlikely, conflict between great powers with a disputed border and history of war. Plus, new great powers may emerge or current great powers may fade in the years to come.¶ While I think we should prioritise the three potential conflicts I’ve highlighted above, the future is highly uncertain. We should monitor geopolitical changes and be open to changing our priorities in the future.¶ Overall predictions¶ Below is a table listing relevant predictions from the forecasting platform Metaculus, including the number of predictions made, as of 10 March 2023. Note the different timescales and resolution criteria for each question; they may not be intuitively comparable.¶ Prediction Resolution criteria Number of predictions Metaculus prediction¶ World war by 2151 Either:¶ A war killing >0.5% of global population, involving >50% of countries totalling >50% of global population from at least 4 continents.¶ Or:¶ A war killing at least >1% of global population, involving >10% of countries totalling >25% of global population¶ 561 52%¶ World War III before 2050 Involving countries >30% of world GDP OR >50% of world population¶ AND¶ >10M deaths¶ 1640 20%¶ Global thermonuclear war by 2070 EITHER:¶ 3 countries each detonate at least 10 nuclear warheads of at least 10 kt yield outside of their territory¶ OR¶ 2 countries each detonate at least 50 nuclear warheads of at least 10 kt outside of their territory¶ 337 11%¶ When will be the next great power war? Any two of the top 10 nations by military spending are at war¶ “At war” definition:¶ EITHER¶ Formal declaration¶ OR¶ Territory occupied AND at least 250 casualties¶ OR¶ Media sources describe them as “at war”¶ 25th percentile: 2031¶ Median: 2048¶ 75th percentile: 2088¶ Never (not before 2200): 8%¶ No non-test nuclear detonations before 2035 No nuclear detonation other than controlled test¶ [Note the negation in the question. It resolves negatively if a warhead is detonated]¶ 321 69%¶ At least 1 nuclear detonation in war by 2050 Resolves according to credible media reports 476 31%¶ I have previously independently estimated the likelihood of seeing a World War III-like conflict this century. My calculation first adjusts historical base rates to allow for the possibility that major wars have become somewhat less likely, and uses the adjusted base rate to calculate the probability of seeing a war between now and 2100.¶ This method gives a 45% chance of seeing a major great power war in the next 77 years. If the probability is constant over time then the cumulative probability between now and 2050 would be 22%. This is aligned with the Metaculus predictions above.¶ We can also ask experts what they think. Unfortunately, there are surprisingly few expert predictions about the likelihood of major conflict. One survey was conducted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. The numbers were relatively aligned with the Metaculus forecasts, though slightly more pessimistic. However, it seems a mistake to put too much stock in this survey (see footnote).27¶ We now have at least a rough sense of a great power war’s probability. But how bad could it get if it occurred?¶ A new great power war could be devastating¶ At the time, the mechanised slaughter of World War I was a shocking step-change in the potential severity of warfare. But its severity was surpassed just 20 years later by the outbreak of World War II, which killed more than twice as many people.¶ A modern great power war could be even worse.¶ How bad have wars been in the past?¶ The graph below shows how common wars of various sizes are, according to the Correlates of War’s Interstate War dataset.28¶ The x-axis here represents war size in terms of the logarithm of the number of battle deaths. The y-axis represents the logarithm of the proportion of wars in the dataset that are at least that large.¶ Using logarithms means that each step to the right in the graph represents a war not one unit larger, but 10 times larger. And each step up represents a war that is not one unit more likely, but 10 times more likely.¶ Cumulative frequency distribution of severity of interstate wars, 1816-2007 Source: Author’s figure. See the data here. Data source: Correlates of War Interwar dataset, v4.029¶ What the graph shows is that wars have a heavy tail. Most wars remain relatively small. But a few escalate greatly and become much worse than average.¶ Of the 95 wars in the latest version of the database, the median battle death count is 8,000. But the heavy tail means the average is 334,000 battle deaths. And the worst war, World War II, had almost 17 million battle deaths.30¶ The number of battle deaths is only one way to measure the badness of wars. We could also consider the proportion of the population of the countries involved who were killed in battle. By this measure, the worst war since 1816 was not World War II. Instead, it’s the Paraguayan War of 1864–70. In that war, 30 soldiers died for every 1,000 citizens of the countries involved. It’s even worse if we also consider civilian deaths; while estimates are very uncertain, it’s plausible that about half of the men in Paraguay, or around a quarter of the entire population, was killed.31¶ What if instead we compared wars by the proportion of the global population killed? World War II is again the worst conflict since 1816 on this measure, having killed about 3% of the global population. Going further back in time, though, we can find worse wars. Ghengis Khan’s conquests likely killed about 9.5% of people in the world at the time.¶ The heavy tail means that some wars will be shockingly large.32 The scale of World War I and World War II took people by surprise, including the leaders who initiated it.¶ It’s also hard to know exactly how big wars could get. We haven’t seen many really large wars. So while we know there’s a heavy tail of potential outcomes, we don’t know what that tail looks like.¶ That said, there are a few reasons to think that wars much worse than World War II are possible:¶ We’re statistically unlikely to have brushed up against the end of the tail, even if the tail has an upper bound.¶ Other wars have been deadlier on a per-capita basis. So unless wars involving countries with larger populations are systematically less intense, we should expect to see more intense wars involving as many people as World War II.¶ Economic growth and technological progress are continually increasing humanity’s war-making capacity. This means that, once a war has started, we’re at greater risk of extremely bad outcomes than we were in the past.¶ So how bad could it get?¶ How bad could a modern great power war be?¶ Over time, two related factors have greatly increased humanity’s capacity to make war. 33¶ First, scientific progress has led to the invention of more powerful weapons and improved military efficiency.¶ Second, economic growth has allowed states to build larger armies and arsenals.¶ Since World War II, the world economy has grown by a factor of more than 10 in real terms; the number of nuclear weapons in the world has grown from basically none to more than 9,000, and we’ve invented drones, missiles, satellites, and advanced planes, ships, and submarines.

Ghengis Khan’s conquests killed about 10% of the world, but this took place over the course of two decades. Today that proportion may be killed in a matter of hours.

First, nuclear weapons could be used.

Today there are around 10,000 nuclear warheads globally.34 At the peak of nuclear competition between the United States and the USSR, though, there were 64,000. If arms control agreements break down and competition resurges among two or even three great powers, nuclear arsenals could expand. In fact, China’s arsenal is very likely to grow — though by how much remains uncertain.

Many of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the great powers today are at least 10 times more powerful than the atomic bombs used in World War II.35 Should these weapons be used, the consequences would be catastrophic.

By any measure, such a war would be by far the **most destructive**, dangerous event in human history, with the potential to cause billions of deaths.

The probability that it would, on its own, lead to humanity’s **extinction** or unrecoverable collapse, is contested. But there seems to be some possibility — whether through a **famine** caused by **nuclear winter**, or by **reducing** humanity’s resilience enough that something else, like a **catastrophic pandemic**, would be far more likely to reach **extinction**-levels (read more in our problem profile on nuclear war).

**Nuclear weapons** are **complemented** and **amplified** by a **variety** of other **modern military** technologies, including **improved missiles**, **planes**, **submarines**, and **satellites**. They are **also not** the only **military technology** with the **potential** to cause a **global catastrophe** — **bioweapons**, too, have the potential to cause massive harm through accidents or unexpected effects.

### 1NC

#### Poland wants nukes BUT lacks capacity.

**Naughtie 25** [Andrew Naughtie, BSc in Sociology @ the University of Bristol & MA in Social Sciences from UChicago, 3-21-2025, Could another European country develop its own nuclear weapons?, EuroNews, https://www.euronews.com/2025/03/21/could-another-european-country-develop-its-own-nuclear-weapons, Willie T.]

Building up a nuclear deterrent from scratch is **no easy feat**, but with the US distancing itself from Europe, the idea has **started to resurface.**

“Poland **must pursue** the most advanced capabilities, including **nuclear** and modern unconventional weapons,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told his country’s parliament earlier this month. “This is a serious race — a race for security, not for war.”

Coming as the Trump administration signalled it is **essentially pulling back** from protecting Europe, Tusk's statement seemed to suggest a potential **lurch toward nuclear weapons** proliferation in Europe — something at odds with decades of European policy.

While questions remain over the US' ongoing commitment to its role as Europe’s nuclear security guarantor, **China is expanding** its nuclear arsenal. And **Russia**, which maintains the world’s largest stockpile of warheads, **repeatedly invokes the threat of using them** to warn NATO and the EU against getting directly militarily involved in Ukraine.

The overall picture raises two difficult questions. How can Europe maintain a continent-wide nuclear deterrent? And is there a possibility that other countries will join the nuclear club?

Although some European states have some of the elements required to develop independent nuclear weapons capability, experts say the chances of another European state going nuclear are **slim.**

Starting from scratch

According to Fabian Rene Hoffmann, a research fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, even if one of Europe’s NATO powers were keen to develop its own nuclear weapons rather than simply hosting them, it would find itself at a standing start.

“The major issue European countries are facing is that they either **don’t deploy the civilian nuclear infrastructure** to launch a nuclear weapons programme, or, if they have civilian nuclear infrastructure, that it is highly ‘proliferation-resistant’,” he told Euronews.

“For example, Finland and Sweden only have light-water reactors, which are not suitable for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. In addition, neither of those countries have chemical reprocessing plants that are needed for separating wanted from unwanted isotopes in fissile material production."

#### They’ve turned to American company Westinghouse.

**Hayden 22** [Jones Hayden, Energy & Climate Correspondent @ Politico, 10-29-2022, Poland picks Westinghouse to build its first nuclear plant, POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-picks-westinghouse-to-build-its-first-nuclear-power-plant/, Willie T.]

Poland awarded a contract to build its first nuclear power plant to a **U.S. bid** as the country seeks to burn less coal and increase its energy independence.

The government in Warsaw chose **Westinghouse** for the nuclear project, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said late Friday in a tweet praising the U.S. company’s “reliable, safe technology.”

“A strong Poland-U.S. alliance guarantees the success of our joint initiatives,” Morawiecki said.

#### America’s provided funding BUT only more allows completion.

**Brodacki 25** [Dominik Brodacki, analyses the energy and fuels sector + co-author of the PI Energy briefing + expert at the Ignacy Lukasiewicz Institute for Energy Policy since 2016 + lawyer for Polish and foreign companies + Author of scientific publications, reports and market analyses, including on energy policy, energy law, nuclear power, offshore wind energy and district heating sector + Graduated in Law and European Studies from the University of Warsaw, 2025, Nuclear Energy in Poland: Assessment of Readiness for the Construction of the First Nuclear Power Plant, Baker McKenzie, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/locations/poland/nuclear-energy-in-poland/baker-mckenzie-polityka-insight-report-nuclear-energy-in-poland-2025\_eng.pdf, Willie T.]

The above also makes it difficult to precisely determine the final cost of building NPP1 (despite the indicative amount of PLN 192 billion given by the Council of Ministers in its notification to the EC). This is because it depends, among other things, on the outcome of the power plant design process (which will determine the specific solutions to be applied), discussions with the EC and the detailed provisions of the EPC contract. As a result, it is not possible at this stage to make a final decision on the detailed method of financing the investment.

**None of the nuclear projects** under construction in Poland has fully secured financing.

The investment in NPP1 is the most advanced in this respect – as mentioned above, its implementation is to be supported by public funds, including in the form of a direct capital injection into the NPP of around PLN 60.2 billion.

In February 2025, the Parliament adopted an amendment to the Special Nuclear Act, according to which state aid will be transferred to PEJ in the form of a capital increase by the State Treasury in exchange for shares in the company. Of this amount, PEJ is to receive for the preparation and implementation of the construction of NPP1 and accompanying investments, as well as its current operations: PLN 4.6 billion in 2025, PLN 11 billion in 2026, PLN 14 billion in 2027, PLN 13 billion in 2028, PLN 11 billion in 2029 and PLN 6.6 billion in 2030.

It is known that their disbursement will be possible only after the EC approval following the notification of the support programme for the construction and operation of NPP1.

Approximately 70% of the construction costs of NPP1 will be covered by **external financing**, of which two-thirds will be provided by export credit agencies and the rest by commercial financial institutions. PEJ has secured declarations (in the form of letters of intent) of financial commitment for approximately PLN 95 billion from, among others: the **Export-Import Bank of the United States** (EXIM), **U.S. International Development Finance Corporation**, Bpifrance Assurance Export, Sfil and Export Development Canada. Taking into account the aforementioned capital injection of around PLN 60.2 billion, there are still **tens of billions missing** to cover the estimated project budget (around PLN 192 billion).

#### Empirically, US investment in Westinghouse got the project started.

**Kraev 21** [Kamen Kraev, senior editor and secretary-general at NucNet, 9-24-2021, Poland/US Wants To Speed Up Westinghouse AP1000 Study, Says Energy Secretary Granholm, NucNet, https://www.nucnet.org/news/us-wants-to-speed-up-westinghouse-ap1000-study-says-energy-secretary-granholm-9-5-2021, Willie T.]

The US government wants to accelerate its support for a front-end engineering and design study for the deployment of **US-made** AP1000 reactor technology in Poland, US energy secretary Jennifer Granholm said.  
  
In July, **US-based Westinghouse** Electric Company and Bechtel Corporation announced the start of the study, which will provide Poland’s Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe (PEJ) – the company responsible for managing the country’s **first nuclear power project** – with layout plans for the **location** of a first nuclear power station, together with a **licensing** plan, project **schedule** and **cost** estimate.  
  
The **US Trade and Development Agency** has released a grant to fund the study.

“US industry and government have come together at a **critical juncture** in the development of Poland’s nuclear energy programme,” Ms Granholm said during a press conference in Warsaw.

#### Competition decks prolif safeguards.

**Gilinsky 20** [Victor Gilinsky, former Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of NPEC, 5-15-2020, "“Bad Business: Pushing US Nuclear Exports,” The American Interest – NPEC", Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, https://npolicy.org/bad-business-pushing-us-nuclear-exports-the-american-interest/] //dg

The nuclear industry and the Department of Energy (DOE) want to raid our wallets…again. This time, it’s not to save the planet, but supposedly to give industry a fighting chance against rising Russian and Chinese civilian nuclear export competition.

As Victor Gilinsky and I warn in “The Nuclear Industry at the Feeding Trough,” posted by The American Interest, the American taxpayer shouldn’t buy this.

First, the Russian and Chinese nuclear industry is not as healthy or as influential as claimed. Second, the nuclear industry’s pleas (most recently trumpeted in DOE’s nuclear strategy report, “Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Energy Advantage”) presume an American commercial nuclear industry that no longer exists. Westinghouse, General Electric, and Combustion Engineering have sold themselves out to foreign partners and holding companies. US nuclear exports are no longer significant. Also, US nuclear electricity is now more expensive than gas-fired electricity, hydroelectric, and renewables.

Finally, **what the industry is demanding** in regulations to promote **exports** — a **relaxed** approach to nuclear **nonproliferation controls** — **will** actually **undermine** America’s **national security.**

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AUTHOR: Henry Sokolski and Victor Gilinsky

Bad Business: Pushing US Nuclear Exports

By Henry Sokolski and Victor Gilinsky

The nuclear lobby is playing the national security card in trying to justify federal handouts. It’s a con.

We are getting used to brazen coronavirus claims for federal largess, but it’s hard to beat the claims coming from the nuclear industry. Even before the pandemic hit, it had for the most part given up competing for new power plant sales in the domestic and international energy marketplace and instead was wrapping itself in the flag and declaring itself essential to U.S. national security, and therefore deserving of generous federal support.

This approach has the full backing of the Trump Energy Department, and has been dutifully rolled out as part of the broader scramble for federal relief funds unleashed by the coronavirus crisis. As Energy Secretary Danny Ray Brouillette made clear to radio talk show host Hugh Hewitt in an April 28 interview:

We’ve lost our leadership both on the technology side and on the market side… to the Russians and the Chinese. And why does that matter? Well, obviously it matters, because we are, we were the world leader not only in the development of nuclear technology, but in the export of this technology around the world. And we lost that, and it leads to a national defense issue.

**And, indeed, DOE’s web site announces: “Nuclear power is intrinsically tied to National Security.”** Among the ways DOE plans to restore American nuclear energy leadership are “minimizing commercial fleet fiscal vulnerabilities [DOE-speak for subsidizing],” and “leveling the playing field against state-owned enterprises.”

**The implication is that other countries are not competing fairly, as if they snuck around us to jump the line. Now, to cope with this, we have to sweeten the deals we offer to get the sales.** And as a thriving nuclear sector is **supposedly** a necessary condition for gaining foreign sales, **we have to prop up domestic nuclear plants, too.**

If nothing else, **there is a stunning lack of self-awareness in this view.** Yes, the United States pioneered the light water reactor technology used around the world. But, as a result of U.S. business decisions, in part reflecting the unfavorable economics of nuclear power in the United States but also poor management, we effectively no longer have any reactor manufacturers.

Combustion Engineering, a company with 28,000 employees, a pressurized water reactor manufacturer, sold itself in 1989 to the European firm ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. The great Westinghouse firm, once the world leader on pressurized water reactors, blundered financially into becoming a subsidiary of the CBS Corporation. In 1995, CBS sold it to British Nuclear Fuels Limited. BNFL in turn sold Westinghouse nuclear activities to Toshiba in 2006.

Westinghouse, by then a shell of its former self, performed so miserably in constructing the last large reactors to be built in the United States in South Carolina and Georgia that it went bankrupt and almost took Toshiba down, too. The South Carolina owners canceled their two plants, and the remaining two in Georgia will cost nearly $30 billion, double the original contract price. After this experience, it is hard to see any future sales of large reactors in the United States.

General Electric used to build boiling water reactors, but it only offers sales abroad as a junior partner to Japan’s Hitachi Corporation. Its reputation is anyway tarnished because it designed the plants that failed during the 2011 Fukushima accident. In short, U.S. nuclear plant manufacturing capabilities are much diminished, and the domestic market just isn’t there. And it isn’t there because nuclear economics are extremely unfavorable.

Currently, the US still has 95 power reactors online, supplying a bit less than 20 percent of America’s electrical demand. They are on average 39 years old. Only two plants, the ones in Georgia, are now under construction and they are expected to be the last large ones to be built for some time.

That hasn’t fazed the nuclear faithful both in and out of government. **They still think,** as their predecessors thought sixty years ago, that **nuclear power is the technology of the future. They paint a picture of our putative arch-enemies, Russia and China, selling nuclear power plants and locking up nuclear relationships with numerous states, including important friendly states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey,** relationships that will last for the rest of the century. We will be frozen out and will thereby lose influence throughout the world. **But it’s still not too late if we follow the advice of the Energy Department, the nuclear industry, and a gaggle of consultants looking to cash in.**

**What is it we have to do? The battles in Washington turn on so-called agreements for cooperation with potential customers that are prerequisites for sales of major reactors and components. The main issue concerns whether we will accept customers that also want to acquire acquires auxiliary facilities that can be used to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the fuels that are also the explosives used in nuclear weapons. The only position consistent with non-proliferation, halting the spread of nuclear weapons, is “no.”**

But the **nuclear enthusiasts** say that’s too strict, that others have more accommodating terms, and that if we sell with **looser terms**, we’ll have more influence. They have their eye especially on Saudi Arabia, a country that at one point said, implausibly, it was going to build 16 nuclear power plants. They don’t seem to pay attention to the other thing the Saudis said—**the crown prince’s statement that if Iran was going to get a bomb, he was going to get one, too, and fast.**

I**t’s not just the Trump** crowd that opposes tightening security rules over nuclear exports (in the name, they say, of security). President **Obama’s** Energy Secretary, Ernest Moniz, has been arguing that subsidizing domestic nuclear power and encouraging nuclear sales without especially tight security restrictions—restrictions that go by the rubric of “gold standard”—are in the interests of U.S. nuclear security, and even support the deterrence value of our nuclear weapons.

All this is a bit much. **Do we really think that Russia, with a GNP below that of Italy, is capable of freezing us out of the world? Does it have the financial capacity to offer generous terms on many projects? Will they ever be completed?**

**Nuclear power is just one U.S. export technology**, and not exactly the most promising. For example, the U.S. exported $136 billion in aircraft last year; U.S. nuclear exports for the same period could only be measured in millions of dollars. **China is building a comparatively large number of nuclear plants but nuclear power supplies less than five percent of its electrical demand** and is only projected to account for seven percent by 2040. **Any large accident will turn this program off**.

#### It’s used for hegemonic expansion---incites Russian fears and conflict.

**Ramana 24** [M.V. Ramana, Professor @ University of British Columbia’s School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, 8-2-2024, Eastern Europe’s purchase of US nuclear reactors is primarily about military ties, not climate change, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2024/08/eastern-europes-purchase-of-us-nuclear-reactors-is-primarily-about-military-ties-not-climate-change/, Willie T.]

US officials see the purchase of military equipment as one of the many ways the United States can bring Poland closer in geopolitical terms. Another is to have them buy US nuclear reactors.

In its “**Integrated Country Strategy**” for Poland from June 2022, the US State Department’s top **two mission goals** were stated to involve **military** engagement and adoption of new **energy** technology, **including nuclear power**. The document praises the “potential partnership with the United States to develop large-scale nuclear power plants with US technology” because it “could result in over $18 billion dollars in US exports and strategically tie our two countries even more tightly together over the coming century.” It should be **clear who would profit** most at the expense of the Polish public.

The United States has **historically** tried to use nuclear development to **expand its empire and influence**. During the Cold War, US nuclear power companies “had a **specific agenda** to promote the advancement of nuclear technology in non-communist countries,” which was one reason they **exported nuclear reactors to South Korea.**

By all evidence, the focus on nuclear energy in Eastern Europe appears not to be driven mainly by climate change but by old-fashioned **geopolitics in significant proportion**. Were the urgency of climate change really driving investment in nuclear energy, Poland should have considered purchasing reactors also from Russia or China. In fact, over the past decade, Russia has **dominated the export market** for nuclear power plants and China has **built more nuclear plants** than any other country.

Why it matters. The **geopolitical framing** of imports of nuclear energy is a problem, especially in Eastern Europe where there is an active war in neighboring Ukraine. Building up military forces using US technology and expanding US military presence in the region, even possibly basing nuclear weapons in Poland, may increase the likelihood of a **catastrophic war** between **Russia and NATO**. Such a war would be compounded by the potential for radioactive contamination from deliberate or inadvertent attacks on nuclear reactors, as illustrated by the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine, which Russia has occupied since March 2022 and used as a source of leverage.

Such **geopolitical games** also make dealing with climate change much more difficult. A geopolitical view, by its very nature, conceives of problems essentially as a **zero-sum competition:** Countries will avoid cooperating with each other. But as happened with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the **lack of cooperation** will undermine the chances of quickly reducing global emissions.

The analyst and disarmament activist Andrew Lichterman recently explained that anyone interested in a more fair, peaceful, and ecologically sustainable global society should avoid using “the conceptual frame of geopolitics” which “is limited to the imperatives of holding and deploying power in what is portrayed as an endless, inevitable struggle for dominance among the world’s most powerful states.”

**Investments** in nuclear power in Eastern Europe hide **geopolitical and military motivations** behind a **smoke screen** of fighting climate change. When these motivations result in the massive acquisition of military equipment, manufacturing and operating them will increase carbon dioxide emissions. Worse, military buildups will also increase the risk of conflict, potentially leading to a **catastrophic war** that could **involve nuclear weapons.**

#### Steps to prolif cause pre-emption.

**Hoffmann 24** [Fabian Hoffmann, Doctoral Research Fellow @ the University of Oslo, 1-29-2024, The Future of the Zeitenwende: Scenario 5—Poland Becomes a Nuclear Power, International Politik Quarterly, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/future-zeitenwende-scenario-5-poland-becomes-nuclear-power, Willie T.]

Similarly, given that Polish nuclear proliferation might occur in the context of a crumbling nuclear order where non-proliferation norms have already been drastically undermined by several other instances of nuclear proliferation, any outcry based on the normative implications of Polish nuclear proliferation may be limited.

Finally, **active steps** by Poland toward a nuclear deterrent may temporarily destabilize the European security environment, due to heightened pressures on the Russian side for military operations aimed at **preempting** a Polish nuclear arsenal. Once Poland has acquired nuclear weapons, Poland’s nuclear deterrent may serve to reinforce European deterrence. This being said, the exact dynamics that a Polish nuclear acquisition might induce into Europe’s security architecture are impossible to predict from today’s point of view.

#### NATO-Russia war goes nuclear.

**Kulesa 18** [Lukasz Kulesa; Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the Royal United Services Institute; 02-01-2018; "Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability"; JSTOR; https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17437; accessed 11-14-2024] leon

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?

Once a conflict was **under way**, the “**fog of war**” and **rising unpredictability** would **inevitably** set in, **complicating** the **implementation** of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The **actual** dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are **extremely difficult** to predict. **Simulations** and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.

Still, Russian **military theorists** and practitioners seem to **assume** that a **conflict** with **NATO** can be **managed** and **controlled** in a way that would bring it to a **swift end** consistent with **Russian aims**. The Russian **theory** of **victory** would seek to **exploit weak points** in an Alliance **war effort**. Based on the **conviction** that **democracies** are **weak** and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may **assume** that its threats of **horizontal** or **vertical escalation** could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring **home** the **notion** that it has much **higher stakes** in the **conflict** (regime survival) than a majority of the **NATO members** involved, and thus will be **ready** to **push** the **boundaries** of the conflict **further**. It would most likely try to **test** and **exploit** potential **divisions** within the Alliance, combining **selective diplomacy** and **activation** of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.

**Any** NATO-Russia conflict would **inevitably** have a **nuclear dimension**. The role of **nuclear weapons** as a tool for **escalation control** for Russia has been thoroughly **debated** by **experts**, but when and how Russia **might use** (and not merely showcase or activate) **nuclear weapons** in a conflict remains an **open question**. Beyond catch phrases such as “**escalate** to **de-escalate**” or “escalate to win” there are a **wider range** of **options** for Russian **nuclear weapon** use. For example, a single **nuclear warning shot** could be **lethal** or **non-lethal**. It could be **directed** against a purely **military target** or a military-civilian one. **Detonation** could be **configured** for an **EMP effect**. A “**false flag**” attack is also **conceivable**. These **options** might be used to **signal escalation** and could **significantly complicate** NATO’s responses.

Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is **less clear** how far the **Alliance** would be **willing** to **escalate** the **conflict** to achieve these goals, and what **mechanisms** and means it would **use** while **trying** to **maintain** some degree of **control** over the conflict.

The **goals** and methods of **waging** a **conflict** with **Russia** would probably have to be **limited** in order to **avoid** a massive **nuclear exchange**. **Such limitations** would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put **too much restraint** on **NATO’s operations**: the Russian **regime’s stability** may ultimately need to be **threatened** in order to **force the leadership** into **terminating** the **conflict**. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.

With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.

Relying on concepts of **escalation control** and on lessons from the **Cold War** confrontation might be **misleading**. The **circumstances** in which a **Russia-NATO** conflict would **play out** would be **radically different** from the **20th century** screenplay. Moreover, instead of **gradual** (linear) escalation or **salami tactics** escalation, it is **possible** to **imagine** surprizing “**leap frog**” escalation, possibly connected with actions in **different domains** (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

Conflict termination

Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely **not survive** the **first hours** of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of **underestimating** the **resolve** of the **other side** to **prevail** in a conflict and the other side’s **willingness** to commit the necessary resources and **endure** the **costs**, **especially** once **both** sides **start committing** their **political capital** and resources and the casualties accumulate.

## 2NC

### Framework---2NC

#### Interpretation: interpret the process of eugenics by questioning the 1AC’s ideological and ontological commitments

#### 3. COMPULSARY HEROSIM---Ignoring ableist epistemologies to “save people” turns debate into an affective space of overcoming that prevents structural and interpersonal violence in debate.

DeVolder ’13 [Beth; 2013; University of British Columbia, Interdisciplinary Studies Graduate Program, Graduate Student; Feminist Media Studies, “Overcoming the Overcoming Story: A case of ‘Compulsory Heroism,’” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14680777.2013.805588?casa\_token=-Qhpt5VN5YUAAAAA:aUzafjR-0kHSqmts1mWinY4\_WwE0nZ7Dy4FAnKPfel7sr7kvCnl1v6PdJrIIRH31pSieFZGyq5Q92A]

Second, heroism is compulsory in that it inherently resists critique. There is a "halo effect" allied with discourses of hope, heroism and inspiration: to invoke them "is to gain by association" (J. Elliot 2005, p. 29). They serve like "rituals" of a "secular religion" (Paul K. Longmore 2009; Joseph P. Shapiro 1993). The call to heroism is so naturalized, and assumed to be for the greater good, that opportunity for critique is effectively foreclosed.

Furthermore, audiences, individuals and organizations are emotionally invested in the overcoming narrative. Overcoming stories are positioned as antidotes to bad news stories; they "refill the tank so to speak" (CMH 2009). Audiences and donors feel "nobly uplifted even ethically superior for 'supporting' a cause" (Charles Riley 2005, p. 71). They speak of individuals finding meaning and purpose in life. As fundraising tools in the volunteer sector, they foster a sense of community and civic engagement. They also raise a lot of money for organizations that could not maintain their services without charitable dollars. In other words, they do socially productive work.

Additionally, helping professionals are personally invested in another way. I have come to the conclusion that the production of overcoming individuals lies at the very heart of the whole rehabilitation complex and has since its inception. Consider this from the 1944 US presidential address: "I will tell you of the plans for vocational training to equip the disabled to overcome the handicaps of their injuries" {The New York Times 1944); or this from Howard A. Rusk MD, the man who has been called 'The Father of Rehabilitation":

The most important medical aspect in the rehabilitation of a handicapped man is the measure ofthe desire he has to overcome his misfortune. Doctors, therapists, educators and other professional personnel are essential to any rehabilitation program, but the actual tedious, hard work of overcoming handicaps can be done only by the patient himself. {The New York Times 1946)

Successful rehabilitation demands an overcoming story.

Critique of the overcoming narrative, therefore, is largely dismissed. Nonetheless, there are effects of compulsive heroism that are not so benign. These also need to be acknowledged and addressed, and will be in the subsequent seetions of this essay. It is my aim, following Samantha King, to demonstrate that, "such renderings rely on the erasure of power relations that undergird charitable works" and, in this way, I hope "to confront the deeply class-structured, racialized, and gendered deployment" of the overcoming story (2006, p. xxx).

Third, heroism is compulsory because it is an effect and strategy of normalization. While at first this may seem contradictory (aren't heroes supposed to be extraordinary?), it reveals the contradiction inherent in positioning individuals as "everyday heroes." In essence, a person is deemed heroic "by virtue of his or her ability to perform feats normally not considered possible for people [like them] or by virtue of the person living a 'regular' life in spite of [their disability, gender, class, race]" (Silva & Howe 2012, p. 175; substitutions mine).^

Heroism is compulsory in the sense that there is only an illusion of choice:

Nearly everyone wants to be normal. And who can blame them, if the alternative is being abnormal, or deviant, or not being one ofthe rest of us? Put in those terms, there doesn't seem to be a choice at all. (Michael Warner cited in Mcruer 2006, p. 7)

Compulsory heroism, then, like compulsory heterosexism and compulsory ablebodiedness, is intimately related to the construction of the "normal." I understand compulsory heroism, in the present context, as the main social role available, not only to persons with disability, but also to anyone facing "adversity." As such, it serves as a standard; a dividing practice that determines who has the courage to come "back," and who, by extension, remains outside.^ This has implications for us all.

Fourth, compulsory heroism as the climax of the overcoming narrative displaces other stories. Gilmore's comments regarding neoconfessional mémoires are germane here:

Embedded within the neoconfessional form is an inegalitarian if dynamic relation of judgment that limits redemption to specific storylines, and thereby powerfully norms the voices that currently crowd the public sphere despite the appearance of diversity and multiplicity. (2010, p. 660)

I want to underline that I understand discourse as a site of struggle (Sara Mills 1997) and norms as ever-contested ground (Judith Butler 1993). Therefore, there are two issues in tension: one concerns the effects of homogenization (when stories are squeezed to fit the form and the norm), and the other addresses points of eruption (when individual stories in their complexity simply cannot be contained, and overflow the normative narrative template). Before I discuss homogenization, I want to stress that there are many times in the CTCB award winner stories, where despite^ the pressure to keep to form, instances of contestation, complexity and diversity seep out.\* While homogenization is at work, it is not always or completely successful.

The effects of homogenization are numerous and are widely discussed by scholars who take up a critique of normalization. Suffice it here to offer a partial list. Compulsory heroism, in its normalizing work, strips persons of their individuality (Silva & Howe 2012). It erases complex experience (Ellen L Barton 2001), and simplifies complex social issues (Gilmore 2010). Therefore, knowledge is lost (Wendell 1996). The overcoming narrative is so entrenched in our collective cultural imaginary that many people cannot even imagine a different storyline. This limits and restricts the resources we could collectively draw upon and the possibilities we could collectively envision. "Blind hands see, deaf eyes listen, or mouths paint and write and touch-type" (Tobin Siebers 2008). Moreover, we need these possibilities because there are many times when overcoming is simply not possible (Rita Struhkamp 2005). Compulsory heroism robs us of a legitimized space to grieve, and to get mad, and to bear witness to stigma (which is discrimination) and institutional violence in all of its guises (Geoffrey Reaume 2012). Compulsory heroism obscures social contexts, social histories and material realities (Gilmore 2010), like the present realities of declining supports and differential access to resources (Douglas 2010). It co-opts discourses of empowerment (for instance, discourses of survivorship or recovery) (King 2006) for financial and/or political ends. And this is only a partial list.

Fifth, and finally, there is a sense in which compulsory heroism can be considered compulsive heroism: we need to tell the story over and over again. Since the norm is always in danger of being disrupted, it has to be continually established, performed and reinforced (Butler 1993; Mcruer 2006). Complexity, lack of closure and fear of the unknown evoke crisis, and personal and cultural anxiety (see for example. Lisa Blackman 2010; Imogen Tyler 2008). Concerning disability specifically see Bill Hughes 2009; Margrit Shildrick 2005). Our challenge is to interrupt its iteration (Gilmore 2010), to work the weakness of the norm (Butler 1993) and to open up a space for an influx of stories, knowledges and perspectives that we cannot even begin to imagine.

#### You-link-you-lose is true---it holds violent academics hostage and accountable.

Castrodale ’18 [Mark Anthony; 2018; Ph.D., professor of social sciences at the University of Sheffield; Manifestor for the Future of Critical Disability Studies, “Disabling militarism: Theorising anti-militarism, dis/ability and dis/placement,” p. 68-74 https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351053341-7/disabling-militarism-mark-anthony-castrodale]

There is a need to examine how (in)sane and dis/abled subjectivities are (re)crafted through academically disciplined scholarship. The military-industrial-academic complex is a profitable enterprise and universities have now come to exist as ‘hypermodern militarized knowledge factories’ (Armitage, 2005, p. 219), now resembling a military character, promoting military capability and preparedness. Moreover, universities are sites implicated in defence contracts, engineering weaponry, communication technologies, robotics, biotechnologies – all operationalised to support a perpetual war-ready military mentality (ibid.).

Within the military–industrial–academic complex all disciplinary knowledges are implicated. ‘What could once only be imagined in science fiction is now increasingly coming to fruition: drones can be flown by thought in human brains: pharmaceuticals can help you forget traumatic experience, or produce feelings of trust to encourage confession in interrogation’ (Howell, 2016, p. 1). Militarised knowledge–truth regimes are central to life–death struggles in the bio-political management of life itself and imaginings of (post)humanity (Braidotti, 2013) and posthuman ways of war (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015). Drawing on Howell (2016), we must ‘grapple with the complexity of ethical questions about the contemporary relationship between war and science … When war efforts shapes funding priorities, multiple disciplines including medicine, are shaped by these military priorities’ (Howell, 2016, p. 17).

Academic scholarship is mediated through a militarised ethic and funding regimes. Koopman (2016) cautions that the very nature of the knowledges we produce may become weaponised. Koopman (ibid.) attests that geographers need to contest militarised co-option and collusion of their scholarship. Similarly, anthropological research has been mobilised for military-oriented applications (Price, 2011). Research outcomes are influenced by the militarisation of university science (Johnson, 2015).

The psy-sciences are militarily instrumentalised with damaging (a/e)ffects (Howell, 2016; Jaffee, 2016). Direct linkages between psy-sciences and military–academic knowledge applications abound. Notable recent work by Efrat Gold (2016) titled By any other name: An exploration of academic development of torture and its links to the military and psychiatry details unethical academic military psy-science that recruited university students (who were offered payment) as research subjects exposed to torturous sensory deprivation, isolation, restraint and immobilisation. As Howell (2016, p. 3) attests, ‘war is not only a destructive force, but also a productive one’. Diagnostic labels such as soldier heart, nostalgia, shell-shock, PTSD, traumatic brain injuries and polytrauma share common war–biomedical improvisations of origin (ibid.). ‘Trauma is being radically reconfigured as a neurological problem, a brain problem, and more generally as an injury’ (Howell, 2016). PTSD is depoliticised through the championing of ‘medico-technological interventions’ (Jaffee, 2016, p. 2) which stifle and placate imagination for political activism and normalise ‘conditions of perpetual war’ (ibid). It therefore bears repeating that, due to the immense physical and psychological harms, ‘Critical disability studies scholars cannot be silent about the disabling effects of imperialist wars’ (ibid., p. 7).

War, science, technology and society coalesce. The knowledge we produce is not innocent. We must collectively refute militarised research which hijack free pacifist intellectual thought, narrowing what can be thought and said by constructively aligning scholarship and funding regimes in ways which hold academics hostage to state-corporate colluded militarised imperatives.

#### Voting AFF is violent capitalistic nationalism that cements conflict in and out of debate. A framework that centers disability pedagogy is best for debate.

Walters ’18 [Shannon; December 2018; Ph.D., associate professor at Temple University; College Composition and Communication, “Muscular Drooping and Sentimental Brooding,” vol. 70 https://www.jstor.org/stable/26772561?seq=1]

This pedagogy resists existing midcentury approaches to education, which, according to Burke, are primarily “means of preparing students for market” in which courses with humanistic emphases focus on helping “students ‘get ahead’ as individuals” and vocational courses “perfect technical ability” (271). Burke believes that this goal-driven aim, in which “the serious student enters school hoping to increase his powers, to equip himself in the competition for ‘success,’ to make the ‘contacts’ that get him a better-paying job,” leads directly to competitive, ambitious drives and “nationalistic emphases in general” (270–71). In a climate rife with competition, with nothing to counter unanimity and “somnambulist[ic]” “automatic responses,” these “national ‘differences’ may become national ‘conflicts’” (270, 272). Rather than ambition and competition being a healthy symbol of American strength, Burke ironically positions “ambition as a disease,” a perspective he forwards in “Linguistic Approaches” (272) and Attitudes toward History (258). This attitude suggests that nonnormative perspectives on bodies and minds are crucial to understanding Burke’s pedagogy and theories of symbolic action, albeit in complicated ways. Burke depends on ableist comparisons to position ambition as a disease while simultaneously questioning the value of ambition.

Burke’s nonnormative approach, integral to his larger pedagogical theory, shares important perspectives with current theorists in disability studies who take as their primary objective unsettling accepted assumptions regarding “normal” and “abnormal” and “able” and “disabled” (Davis; Linton). In fact, the connection between pedagogy and war in Burke’s linguistic approach to education is incomplete without thoroughly understanding how disability functions in Burke’s pedagogy and theory. This understanding has critical implications regarding the role of composition in our current context of war and can also advance and be revised by current disability studies pedagogy. Reaching beyond simple alliances between disability studies and Burkean pedagogy, in what follows I both recover Burke as a rhetorical theorist and teacher crucial for disability pedagogy and use current critical disability studies to inform Burkean pedagogy. By exploring Burke’s pedagogy from disability perspectives, I situate both disability studies pedagogy and Burkean pedagogy as mutually informing each other, revising positions and advancing critical conversations about language, bodies, pedagogy, and composition.1

The “serious” student that Burke describes as primed for conflict is an implicitly “able” student—one understood to be powerful, independent, strong, well-equipped, and well-connected. As an alternative to this implicitly able student—one shaped by a competitive and ambitious environment—Burke offers a different model of student. This student “droops” and “broods,” which I argue shows Burke to be an educator who values disability, understanding it as generative for learning and changing. Burkean pedagogical practices of drooping and brooding share, advance, and can be critically modified by crip time, which I situate as productively challenging accepted norms in classrooms regarding how bodies and minds “should” perform. After applying a disability studies perspective to Burke’s pedagogy and contextualizing pedagogical conversations in Burke’s time and our own, I define Burke’s linguistic approach to education as presenting a crip method for valuing disability and resisting an ableist model for composition students. I show that this concern is especially exigent in our current global context, which shares with Burke the feeling of war that is “always threatening” (272). Exploring frequent associations currently made between mental disability, particularly madness, and international conflict, especially terrorism, I show that focusing on disability is as crucial today as it was in Burke’s time to understand composition pedagogy’s role globally. Throughout, I position Burke as forwarding a proto-disability studies pedagogy that is a valuable resource for current disability pedagogy and necessary for composition teachers to be critically mindful of today. Burke’s proto-disability pedagogy, in turn, can be critically revised by disability theories attentive to the underpinnings of ableism in some of Burke’s language about bodies, including his notions of perfection in pedagogy and use of disability metaphor.

Disability Studies Perspectives on Burke’s Pedagogy

Understanding Burke’s linguistic approach to education in relation to disability pedagogy in the current context of war extends recent efforts by scholars to apply Burke’s pedagogy to contemporary issues and composition pedagogies. Jessica Enoch understands “Linguistic Approaches” as a “pedagogy of critical reflection that speaks not only to [Burke’s] 1955 world but also to our own” (273). Using a critically reflective approach, she advocates that “students today should learn to reflect on the language used to move people to action and war” and to “understand how terms like evil, terrorist [and] freedom” are used (291). Scott Wible contextualizes “Linguistic Approaches” in relation to Burke’s pedagogical methods at Bennington College, demonstrating fundamental connections between Burke’s teaching and scholarship, particularly for showing to students “unexpressed assumptions that propel so much human activity toward competition and, ultimately, physical and social destruction” (259). The stakes of this continuing conversation are high. Referencing A Grammar of Motives, which, as Wible shows, closely connects to “Linguistic Approaches,” M. Elizabeth Weiser writes that “today the issues on the world scene are strikingly similar to those being debated during the original construction of dramatism and (soon afterward) identification: how best to respond to totalitarianism, extremism, [and] the necessary certainty of war” (xiv). Exploring Burke from a disability studies perspective furthers this ongoing conversation at the intersection of war, pedagogy and symbol use.

#### 1. Structural unfairness.

Castrodale ’18 [Mark Anthony; 2018; Ph.D., professor of social sciences at the University of Sheffield; Manifestor for the Future of Critical Disability Studies, “Disabling militarism: Theorising anti-militarism, dis/ability and dis/placement,” p. 66-68 https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351053341-7/disabling-militarism-mark-anthony-castrodale]

Disability represents a discursive-matter of interest well situated in the military-industrial-academia nexus. Critical disability and Mad studies scholars often examine disability as the social oppression of impaired persons where there is no single way of knowing or understanding disability (Taylor, 2004) nor madness (see LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume, 2013). These fields represent areas that root disablement not in individuals but in disabling environments and socio-political-economic structures (Castrodale, 2015). Similarly, Mad studies centres its discussions on the examination of psy-violence, the oppression of consumers, survivors, ex-patients (c/s/x), and how sanism negatively impacts the lives of Mad/crazy people (Beresford and Russo, 2016; Costa, 2014; LeFrançois, Menzies, and Reaume, 2013; Reville and Church, 2012; Russo and Beresford, 2015). Mad studies and self-identifying Mad subjects are reclaiming the term mad from its pejorative roots (Costa, 2014).

Dis/abled subjectivities are mediated by socio-spatialities (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2010) and alienated through unequal geographies (Soja, 2010). As Soja (ibid., p. 105) states, ‘space is filled with politics and privileges … justice and injustice, oppressive power and the possibility for emancipation’. A radical rethinking of socio-spatial-temporal norms requires an intersectional focus, a sustained look at power-knowledge embodiment-materiality and space (Foucault, 1984). Within the military–industrial–academic nexus, how do Mad and dis/abled subjects matter, that is, how do they materialise and have meaning (see Butler, 1993)?

Fitting is contingent and contextual – people fit in accordance with socio-spatial-temporal norms. We are enmeshed in our geographies. For Garland-Thomson (2011, p. 592), therefore:

The concept of misfit emphasizes the particularity of varying lived embodiments and avoids a theoretical generic disabled body that can dematerialize if social and architectural barriers no longer disabled it … the concept of misfitting as a shifting spatial and perpetually temporal relationship confers agency and value on disabled subjects at risk of social devaluation by highlighting adapt-ability, resourcefulness, and subjugated knowledge as potential effects of misfitting.

Mis/fitting attends to ‘how the particularities of embodiment interact with the environment in its broadest sense, to include both its spatial and temporal aspects’ (Garland-Thomson, 2011, p. 591). Mad and dis/abled subjects are thereby intelligibly–materially understood as mis/fitting subjects in relation to ableist/sanist socio-spatial-temporal ideals.

Fit is relevant when unpacking able-sane socio-spatial privilege. ‘Finding one’s fit entails negotiating spatial-temporal norms, rethinking the material-embodiment-space nexus, and unpacking institutional power-knowledge webs enabling and constraining different spaces, embodiments, and fits’ (Castrodale, 2015, p. 374). This troubles how our contingent fleshiness becomes measured in relation to the Western dominant normate aesthetics of a man who is white, able-bodied, athletic, thin, and proportioned (Garland-Thomson, 1997). ‘Environmental fit makes nondisabled people less aware of their own embodied privilege’ (Hamraie, 2013, np). Able-bodied sane normative privilege is thus a reduction/absence of mis/fitting socio-spatial violent friction that wears on bodies and minds. Ableist/sanist friction productively works to grind misfitting people into a conformist sane, abled-bodied shape.

As an example of new fitting military–civilian technologies, a prosthetics limb may have a range of motion beyond that of congenital limbs. As Cohen (2012) attests, ‘prosthetic incorporations call attention to the limits and boundaries of our bodies and the broader contexts to which they are connected’. Prosthetic advances expose our human parts as lacking, as less capable and hardy than our potential cyborg futurities (Haraway, 1991). As technologies of fit, prosthetics have socio-cultural significance, lubricating the body-function-spatiality-context mismatch, easing the body–space fit (see also Garland-Thomson, 2011). Prosthetics may also be transgressive.

Militarised spatio-temporal regimes materially shape dis/abled subjects’ embodied materiality and play a constitutive role in discursively mediating who fits, and who is deemed to embody all that is unfit (ibid.). Fitness relates to a biomedical gaze, regimes of truths, observations, calculations and exercises (Foucault, 2006). As Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2016, p. 6) attest, ‘Dis/ability usefully disarms, disrupts and disturbs normative, taken-for-granted, deeply societally engrained assumptions about what it means to be human …’. Our conceptions of a hyper-masculine, able-bodied, strong, fit, autonomous soldier rest on the uber-able soldier subject. Discourses of fitness pervade militaristic ideology. Those devalued and deemed unfit are in need of exercise regimes and training to adjust their deficient selves. ‘Not all bodies are granted the status of persons (let alone of human)’ (Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016, p. 7). Ideals of hyper-masculine able-bodied soldiers are cast as brave warriors, as opposed to frail feminised disabled subjects (Castrodale, 2015). Constitutions of devalued humans are evoked as a rationale as to why they rightfully may be harmed or perish.

Garland-Thomson’s (2011) concept of mis/fitting is useful as an explanatory theory of how Mad and disabled subjects experience socio-spatial alienation, violence and injustice. Spaces may be purposefully designed to exclude misfitting persons, whose conducts are misaligned with dominant socio-spatial norms, from actively participating in certain environments (Hamraie, 2013). Within such a socio-spatial dialectic (Lefebvre, 1991), our subjectivities are mediated by space and we (re)act back to agentically craft spaces.

### AT: Clash

#### That solves better!

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As noted by feminist disability scholar, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2002, 20), a body becomes disabled when it is “out of sync” with its physical, social, cultural, and political environments, when it “misfits”. Misfitting occurs “when the environment does not sustain the shape and function of the body that enters it” (Garland-Thomson, 2011, 594). Contrary to stereotypes of disability as weakness, misfitting on a regular basis necessitates adaptability, resourcefulness and creativity in navigating and building relationships within the world. These skills are “often underdeveloped in those whose bodies fit smoothly into the prevailing, sustaining environment” (Garland-Thomson, 2011, 604). Indeed, “anticipatory scheduling” is often practised by disabled people to manage day-to-day uncertainties, of both body and world (Kafer, 2013). Expanding on this work, Arseli Dokumacı (2023, 5) reflects on the artful, micro-acts of survival that are improvised and mastered by disabled people to “bring into being the worlds that are not already available to them” in conditions of constraint or “shrinkage”. Shrinkage can occur in myriad ways; from bodily experiences of pain and body-environment misfits to the debilitation caused by conflict, brutality and the “colonialist, extractivist depletion of the world’s offerings” (2023, 9).

Although integral to adaptive capacity, these skills of anticipation, contingency planning, resourcefulness, ingenuity, and living within limits are still largely overlooked within climate adaptation scholarship, policy and practice. Beyond a “cautionary tale” of environmental harm, the knowledges and experiences of disabled people can inform new strategies for coping with experiences of climate disruption and uncertainty, for reconfiguring a sense of home and curating meaningful lives in seemingly unfamiliar, uncontrollable and fragile landscapes (Watts Belser, 2020). In the words of feminist scholar, Sara Ahmed (2017, 180):

We can value what is deemed broken; we can appreciate those bodies, those things, that are deemed to have bits and pieces missing. Breaking need not be understood only as the loss of the integrity of something, but as the acquisition of something else, whatever that else might be.