# 1NC

## OFF

### 1NC

**The negative need not rejoin non-topical advocacies.**

#### 1 — “RESOLVED” requires a legislative instrument.

LSA ’05 [Louisiana State Legislature; 2005; Governing body of the state of Louisiana; Louisiana State Legislature, “Legislative Glossary,” https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx]

Resolution

A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Abandoning the topic under-limits and denies a role for the negative — debate is innately competitive, which creates an incentive for teams to retreat from controversy and forces the neg to first characterize the aff and then debate it, which eliminates the benefits of detailed prep and research.

#### Vote NEG for FAIRNESS and CLASH. competition is the only ballot-intrinsic impact and controls every aspect of Seven Lakes’ performance in this debate. They also rely on fair assessments of who deserved the ballot, and would negate their own aff in a heartbeat. It turns the case. Their solvency mechanism presupposes the game’s existence. Absent a role for the negative, nothing distinguishes debate from other academic forums. Topical stasis produces iterative and in-depth strategies that are a prerequisite to debate’s pedagogical value. Debating over predictable controversies and robustly defending your advocacy against well-prepared criticism is the only way to understand the nuances and complexities of global treaties.

#### Our interpretation does not exclude their scholarship —

#### 1 — T IS NOT EXCLUSIONARY. it says that the negative need not rejoin non-topical advocacies, not that they must read a topical plan. That means that they can read this exact 1ac without a topical plan as long as we get the ballot because they were unfair and have not met their burden of proving the resolution true.

#### 2 — EXCLUSION IS IMPOSSIBLE. the explosion of critical 1acs despite losing to topicality proves that a negative ballot cannot result in exclusion. It’s empirically denied by every round they have lost reading this 1ac. Anything else makes your ballot a violent practice because each time you cast it, you are telling the losing team that they do not belong or are not good enough, which multiplies psychological violence.

#### 3 — CONTENT NOT PEOPLE. we would also exclude policy cases that we have read on previous topics, such as space, fracking, and the death penalty, but that does not mean that those topics are unimportant or should never be discussed.

#### 4 — T IS NOT UNIQUE. None of their offense is intrinsic to it. T relies on the same logic of disagreement as any other position. DAs and critiques all disagree with the 1ac’s central advocacy.

#### 5 — EVERY DA LINKS TO THEM. they’ve adhered to other norms, such as speech times, and would never let me give a 10-minute 2nr even if it was more educational.

#### 6 — STATE. Even if the state is exclusionary, you don’t get to be procedurally unfair and exclude us to rectify that---it means that we can’t test their method and the game doesn’t work.

#### 7---it’s directly responsive to their role of the ballot and controls our ability to respond to their weighing arguments, so it must come first

#### 8---procedural and structural fairness are distinct. Only your ballot can solve procedural fairness, so it far more ballot-proximate AND it determines our ability to respond to their arguments about structural unfairness.

#### External offense is impossible and your ballot cannot solve and the role of the ballot is to vote for the desirability of a topical advocacy —

#### 1 — NO SUBJECTIVITY SHIFT. Individual debates are content neutral.

#### A — ALT CAUSES. friends, family, religion, and the next 80 years outweigh.

#### B — EMPIRICALLY DISPROVEN. every round they have won or lost reading this 1ac disproves the idea that norms will change because of your ballot.

#### C — BLOCKS CHANGE, NOT PEOPLE. if we lose, we will internalize the decision as a technical error and update our T blocks. Arguments are divorced from beliefs.

#### D — SWITCH SIDE DEBATE. it structurally solves, we negate what we said on the other side, which prevents us from forming attachments to certain arguments.

#### E — INHERENCY. Scholars already wrote the literature. [XXX] made their paper, and the 1AC cited them — the 1AC doesn’t engage in any new or unique academic production.

#### F — DEBATE. none of their evidence is specific to it. You should have a high bar for them to explain solvency when it’s all based on metaphors to other activities. Tabroom and ending the round solves; anything else forces doubling down which is worse.

#### 2 — BURDENS. view voting neg as a PIC out of competition. It does not cast judgement on the truth of arguments themselves. You can affirm the 1ac’s politics on an individual level while voting negative. Your ballot is a referendum on who did the better debating.

#### 3 — EXPOSURE. their offense is premised off of the mere exposure to the 1ac. the Wiki, email chains, reading it in this round, and forwarding speech docs solve.

#### 4 — ANTAGONISM. it straight turns their offense, the only way people change their minds is through nuanced engagement. Unpredictability via their interpretation makes that impossible, so we’ll research how to beat their K and conclude it’s false.

#### 5 — GUILT ASSUSASION. do not view voting affirmative as having the revolutionary potential to solve material violence because it cannot and is a form of handwashing that might make you feel good and create the aesthetic appearance of action, but is wholly insufficient to combat the material conditions that millions suffer daily.

#### They cannot weigh the case against topicality, and it comes before AFF theory —

#### 1 — PRIOR QUESTION. topicality asks whether the 1ac should have been read, anything we did was reactive abuse.

#### COMPETING INTERPS.

#### 1 — MODELS. T is a question of the desirability of their model; they need to delineate a counter-model that justifies the inclusion of their aff, which promotes better substantive debates about debate.

## ON

### AT: Ontology---1NC

#### 1. Neuroscience proves malleability.

Masland '20 [Richard Masland; Contributing Columnist to Quantum Magazine; 03-24-2020; "The Brain Reshapes Our Malleable Senses to Fit the World"; Quantum Magazine; https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-brain-reshapes-our-malleable-senses-to-fit-the-world-20200324/; accessed 03-25-2025] leon

Yet with modern methodologies, **neuroscientists have conclusively proved that the circuits of the brain neurons do physically change**. **Our senses are malleable because** the **sensory centers of the brain rewire themselves to strike a useful balance between the capacities of** the **available neural resources and the demands put on them** by incoming sensory impressions. Studies of this phenomenon are revealing that some sensory areas have innate tendencies toward certain functions, but they show just as powerfully the plasticity of the developing brain.

#### 2. The <<insert thesis>> is not inevitable---a confluence of statistical factors prove racial progress is possible and occurring.

Hochschild 17 (Jennifer L. Hochschild , Professor of Government, African and African American Studies, and the Chair of the Department of Government (Harvard University), Chair in American Law and Governance at the Library of Congress, President of the American Political Science Association, “Left Pessimism and Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, March 15th, p. 6-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716004102> \*\*modified to allow for more humanizing frames)

Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas? It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.” The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between ~~blacks’~~ [black people’s] and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. ~~Blacks~~ [Black people] are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly. Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to political scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20 Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people’s] are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people] are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class ~~blacks~~ [black people] were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21 In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations; one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23 Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24 This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice. Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic? That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25 One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27 And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

### Case---1NC

#### Debate does not shape subjectivities. Competitive argumentation creates echo chambers, turning their offense.

Novaes ’23 [Catarina; February; Professor and University Research Chair in the Department of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam; Aristotelian Society, “Can arguments change minds?” https://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Dutilh-Novaes-draft.pdf[

However, a wealth of empirical and anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that arguments are in fact not very efficient tools to change minds (Gordon-Smith, 2019) (McIntyre, 2021). For example, the well-documented phenomenon of polarization (Isenberg, 1986) (Sunstein, 2002) suggests that, when exposed to arguments supporting positions different from their prior views, people in fact often (though perhaps not always) become even more convinced of their prior views rather than being swayed by arguments (Olsson, 2013). Frequently, argumentative encounters look rather like games where participants want to score ‘points’ (Cohen, 1995) (Dutilh Novaes, 2021) rather than engage in painstaking consideration of different views for the sake of epistemic improvement.

What to make of these radically different assessments of the mind-changing potential of arguments? To address this issue, it seems that we need to look beyond the content and quality of arguments alone: we must also take into account the broader contexts in which they occur, in particular the propagation of messages across attention networks, and the choices that epistemic agents must make between alternative potential sources of content and information. These choices are very much influenced by perceptions of reliability and trustworthiness, which means that the source of the argument may be even more decisive than its content or quality when it comes to how persuasive it will be for a given person. (In this respect, argumentation would be more akin to testimony than one might expect, as I argued elsewhere (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b).) In a nutshell: arguments may well be able to change minds, but only under conducive, favorable socio-epistemic conditions.

<<TEXT CONDENSED, NONE OMMITTED>>

In this paper, I deploy a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange that I’ve been developing over the past years (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b) to (hopefully) shed light on the mechanisms involved in these processes, and on the conditions under which arguments can change minds. I start with the ‘optimistic’ view on the power of argumentation to change minds, in particular in John Stuart Mill’s formulation, and its shortcomings as discussed in the literature (at least as an accurate description of the phenomena in question). I then offer a brief description of the three-tiered model and of its relevance for the issue at hand. In Part 4, I discuss two real-life examples of people who had epistemic breakthroughs which involved at least to some extent engagement with arguments, but only against the background of favorable socio-epistemic conditions. I part 5, I clarify a few pending issues. I then close with some concluding remarks.2. The Millian conception of argumentation and its limitations Mill is one of the main exponents of the view that interpersonal argumentative situations involving people who truly disagree with each other have the potential to change minds (primarily for the better, he thinks). 3 In On Liberty (1859) (Mill, 1999), he notes that, when our ideas are challenged by those who disagree with us, we are forced to evaluate critically our own beliefs. 2 I understand the quality of an argument as pertaining to familiar criteria for argument quality such as validity and soundness. (Argument quality can also be defined probabilistically.) 3 I have defended this view myself (Dutilh Novaes, 2020a) but with the important caveat that the beneficial epistemic effect of interpersonal argumentation will come about only against the background of specific circumstances that ensure good faith exchange of ideas (for example, within a community of mathematicians). See below for a discussion of circumstances where argumentative exchanges reliably lead to epistemic improvement. 3 [Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. (Mill, 1999) (p. 41) This process is often described as a free exchange of ideas, and according to Mill, it is beneficial even when we are right and our interlocutors are wrong. The expected result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenges, will be better justified than those held before such encounters. As Mill puts it, “both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.” (Mill, 1999) (p. 83) Dissenters thus force us to stay epistemically alert instead of becoming too comfortable with existing, entrenched beliefs—what Mill describes as ‘dead dogma’. But for this process to be successful, dissenters must be permitted to voice their opinions and criticism freely, and indeed Mill’s forceful defense of free speech is one of his most celebrated positions. One of his main arguments for free speech is epistemic: he emphasizes the role played by the free exchange of ideas in facilitating the growth of knowledge in a society. The more dissenting views and arguments in favor or against each of them are exchanged, the more likely it is that the ‘better’ ones will prevail (Halliday & McCabe, 2019). However, it is not sufficient that dissenters be given the opportunity to voice their opinions freely; it is also of crucial importance that receivers of these opinions and arguments be willing to engage in good faith and with an open mind.4 Mill pays much attention to the structural conditions for the free exchange of ideas (in particular, that there should be no state-sanctioned censorship of any kind), but he does not seem to take sufficiently into account our welldocumented tendencies to avoid engaging with dissenting views altogether, or to explain away contrary evidence so as to preserve prior beliefs (a point that will be further discussed shortly). More recently, Alvin Goldman articulated a similar account of the social epistemology of argumentation (Goldman, 1994) (Goldman, 2004). The starting point for Goldman is the recognition of a situation of epistemic division of labor, where different members of an epistemic community know different things, and so can benefit from exchanging these epistemic resources with each other. Moreover, given our inescapable fallibility, these exchanges with other knowers may help expose our own mistaken beliefs (as also noted by Mill). A third feature of our socioepistemic situation is that people sometimes have incentives to deceive and mislead, so a certain 4 There is also the important issue (to be discussed shortly) of whether dissenting voices will attract attention at all, for example if they belong to marginalized groups. 4 amount of epistemic vigilance is needed. It is against these background conditions that argumentation becomes a valuable tool in the pursuit of truth and avoidance of error, according to Goldman. Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the promotion of truthful speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. […] Norms of good argumentation are part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through sincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman, 1994) (p. 30) But does argumentation indeed reliably succeed in promoting truth and avoiding error in social epistemic contexts, as suggested by Mill and Goldman? Do we readily revise our beliefs when exposed to (good) arguments that contradict them? Do we really “gradually yield to fact and argument”, as claimed by Mill? It seems that Mill and Goldman are overly optimistic regarding the power of arguments to change minds. In fact, argumentation appears to be a rather inefficient way to change minds in many real-life situations (Gordon-Smith, 2019).

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The truth is that people typically avoid revising their views about firmly entrenched beliefs (a point famously made by Quine (Quine, 1951)). When confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend either to ignore the evidence, explain it away (as we know from the literature on confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998)), or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable. 5 These tendencies are exemplified by so-called science deniers such as flat-earthers (McIntyre, 2021), but also in scientific practice where entrenched paradigms often resist a fair amount of counter-evidence before a ‘scientific revolution’ takes place (Kuhn & Hacking, 2012). In particular, arguments that threaten core beliefs, feelings of belonging, and identities (e.g., political beliefs) seem to trigger various forms of motivated reasoning whereby one ignores or rejects those arguments without engaging substantially with their content (Taber & Lodge, 2006) (Kahan, 2017). Engaging (or not) in argumentation is often a means to express and cement social identities rather than to come closer to the truth (Talisse, 2019) (Hannon, 2019)

Moreover, when choosing among a vast supply of options, there is a tendency to gravitate towards content and sources that confirm one’s existing opinions, in so-called ‘echo chambers’ and ‘epistemic bubbles’ (Nguyen, 2020). Conversations with like-minded people may reinforce prior beliefs and even drive people to more extreme versions of those beliefs (Olsson, 2013). This means that the mere availability of dissenting opinions is not sufficient to ensure that knowers remain epistemically alert and consider all sides of a question. There is always the option of ignoring (i.e., not engaging with) these dissenters and the substance of their arguments, especially if they are perceived as untrustworthy (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b). This is the familiar phenomenon of polarization: instead of bringing parties closer together, argumentation and deliberation may have the opposite effect of drawing them further apart (Sunstein, 2002).

Another obstacle is the fact that the absence of government-sanctioned censure (as proposed by Mill) is no guarantee that all relevant voices will be truly heard. Dissenting views defended by marginalized social groups will tend to attract less attention than those with powerful proponents; the so-called free exchange of ideas is one were power differentials significantly affect the spread and uptake of views. This is the familiar problem of inclusion in democratic societies (Young, 2000), which has serious political as well as epistemic consequences. More often than not, it is not the force or quality of an argument alone that determines its uptake; the social position of its proponents is a decisive factor in how much it will spread and be viewed as persuasive.

To be sure, there are some contexts where the exchange of reasons in argumentative interactions does seem to lead reliably to people changing their minds and to epistemic improvement (Mercier, 2018) (Dutilh Novaes, 2020a) (Chapters 8 and 9).6 The literature on group problem-solving has established that, for what are referred to as ‘intellective problems’, that is, those that have a unique answer within a given theoretical framework (e.g., a mathematical or logical problem), group discussion among peers has a clear beneficial, truth-conducive effect (Laughlin, 2011). Indeed, in specialized contexts such as in science or mathematics, argumentative ‘friction’ is a quintessential way to produce knowledge (Longino, 1990) (Lakatos, 1976). But this is less obviously the case for so-called ‘judgmental problems’, that is, those pertaining to values and judgments that do not have a straightforward ‘right’ answer (Laughlin, 2011). Importantly, in real-life situations, we are more often confronted with judgmental than with intellective problems, and for the former there is no conclusive evidence that argumentation reliably leads to better outcomes. In fact, many of them are instances of deep disagreements (Fogelin, 1985) that may not be amenable to being solved by means of reasoning and argumentation

These observations suggest that we are not ‘proper Millians’ when it comes to argumentation and dissent. The epistemic alertness that Mill believed would be the natural, almost automatic consequence of being exposed to dissenting opinions and arguments often fails to come about.

The Millian account is thus descriptively inaccurate, or at the very least incomplete. One may retort that the Millian account is still normatively correct; but given that it appears to be highly idealized, it is arguably not suitable to offer prescriptive recommendations (in the sense of (Bell et al., 1988)) for concrete human agents.7 Instead, we need a more realistic approach to the (social) epistemology of argumentation, one which takes into account not only the cognitive limitations of individual knowers but also the social complexities of these processes.

We’ve just seen that the free exchange of ideas is hindered by various factors such as structural power relations and cognitive and social tendencies, so much so that there is no guarantee that wrong opinions and practices will “gradually yield to fact and argument”. To address some of the limitations of the Millian conception of argumentation, I’ve been developing a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange, which presents a more realistic account of epistemic exchange through argumentation by considering the costs, obstacles, and risks of engaging in argumentative exchanges (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b). While it is a model of social epistemic processes in general, the key idea is that argumentation truly consists in an exchange, where resources flow in both directions (from arguer to receiver but also from receiver to arguer), and thus is a specific kind of epistemic exchange.

This model was inspired by a theoretical framework known as Social Exchange Theory (SET) (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b). This is a framework developed by sociologists and social psychologists that seeks to explain human social behavior in terms of processes of exchange, involving costs and rewards, and against the background of social networks and power structures (Cook, 2013). It was originally developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the influence of research in economics (rational choice theory), psychology (behaviorism), and anthropological work by Malinowski, Mauss, and Lévi-Strauss. SET is an influential and empirically robust framework, which has been used to investigate a wide range of social phenomena (such as romantic relationships, business interactions, trust in public institutions, among many others). In particular, and relevant for our purposes, it has been extensively used to investigate interpersonal communication (Roloff, 2015). The SET models are neither purely descriptive—as they rely on certain idealized assumptions such as that agents seek to maximize rewards and minimize costs—nor purely normative, given that they incorporate experimental findings as well as extensive observational data. Moreover, SET combines a first-person perspective, which explains and predicts choices that individuals make between different potential exchange partners, with a third-person perspective, which focuses on structural features of these exchange networks.

The three-tiered model of epistemic exchange adapts insights and results from SET to exchanges that are specifically epistemic, that is, when epistemic resources such as knowledge, evidence, information etc. are involved (possibly alongside other kinds of resources).8 The model allows for a meticulous account of the conditions under which successful epistemic exchange may occur or fail to occur. Crucially, there seem to be two preliminary stages that determine whether specific agents will be in a position to engage in fruitful epistemic exchange: the networksthat determine which sources and which epistemic resources an agent is exposed to; and the contrastive choices that agents must make regarding which contents and sources to engage with (among those she is exposed to). Thus seen, the three stages for epistemic exchange are:

Attention/exposure. The first stage consists in establishing whether people are potential exchange partners of each other, given the relevant opportunity structures for epistemic engagement within a network. In simpler terms: who is in an agent’s network of potential contacts? Who is in a position to attract the attention of others? It may be that potential lines of communication are cut, say in the case of structural censorship or epistemic bubbles. But it may also be that so many signals are being broadcast that many different sources are competing for the receiver’s attention (Gershberg & Illing, 2022), in a socalled ‘attention economy’ (Franck, 2019).

Choosing whom to engage with. The next level comprises the choices that agents make against the background of possibilities for exchange, as determined by the relevant opportunity structures. Typically, there will be a number of options for a given agent—for example, the various newspapers that I can read on any given day, among those that I have access to. Given limitations of time and attention, contrastive choices will have to be made. Among those sources that have caught my initial attention, who do I view as worthy of consideration as an exchange partner? At this point, considerations of trustworthiness (Hawley, 2019) and expertise (Goldman, 2018) come into play, as well as the perceived value of the content being offered by different potential exchange partners. In particular, trusting someone will often entail not trusting someone else, especially when their respective messages conflict (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b).

Engagement with content. It is only at a third stage that engagement with content properly speaking should occur; this is when the actual epistemic exchange takes place. At this point, the receiver will reflectively (and perhaps critically) engage with the argument being offered, seeking to understand its substance and evaluate its cogency. In case of a positive evaluation, this may lead to a change in view for the receiver (though even at this stage the receiver may still balk at revising her beliefs). It may also lead to a mutually beneficial exchange where both arguer and addressee improve their respective epistemic stances, as posited by Mill, and in some cases even go on to create new epistemic resources together (as in Lakatos’ ‘proofs and refutations’ model of mathematical practice (Lakatos, 1976)).

Figures 1 to 3 represent the three tiers. 10 For simplicity, a main agent is depicted with other agent around her, but the model in fact focuses on complex networks of agents who are interconnected to different degrees. The topologies of such networks crucially determine how these socio-epistemic processes come to unfold.

Millian conceptions of argumentation tend to focus primarily on tier 3—the ‘force’ of an argument alone should suffice to change minds—and to downplay some of the structural obstacles to a truly free and equal exchange of ideas.12 Indeed, stages 1 and 2 crucially determine if and when someone will seriously engage with the epistemic resources being offered by someone else at all. Just as the original SET models, the three-tiered model is neither purely normative nor purely descriptive. It is not purely normative because it does not consider ideal or idealized agents: instead, it considers agents with limited cognitive resources, and who are susceptible to what Levy describes as ‘bad beliefs’ (Levy, 2021). Moreover, the model is empirically robust as it draws on decades of SET’s experimental and observational findings pertaining to exchanges more generally. However, the model is not purely descriptive or predictive either, as it seeks to explain the mechanisms that lead different people to engage in epistemic exchanges with some sources but not with others; this is done on the basis of a few foundational principles such as reciprocity and fairness, and by highlighting in particular the roles of attention and trust in such processes. As such, the model is perhaps best understood as an explanatory model, in the sense that it seeks to represent some of the causes of the target phenomenon and the mechanisms responsible for bringing it about (Ivani & Dutilh Novaes, 2022). (It may also lead to prescriptive recommendations on how to facilitate certain types of epistemic exchanges.

The three-tiered model offers an explanation for why arguments often fail to change minds, as it highlights some of the necessary conditions for this to occur. First, a suitable relation of attention and exposure must emerge between sender and receiver—which is far from obvious, especially in highly saturated informational environments such as the ones we currently inhabit (Gershberg & Illing, 2022). Secondly, a knower must make choices regarding whom to engage with, among the different possibilities: this is where considerations of trustworthiness—understood as related to both competence and benevolence (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b) (Dutilh Novaes, 2023)—arise. If I already suspect that a given source does not hold benevolent attitudes towards me, should I really spend my precious time and energy engaging with their arguments? Maybe not (Köymen & Dutilh Novaes, forthcoming). For example, the refusal to engage with scientific arguments supporting the efficacy and safety of vaccines on the part of so-called ‘anti-vaxxers’ is often justified by the (not entirely unreasonable) suspicion that spurious interests are involved (e.g., the ‘evil Big Pharma’ narrative (Dutilh Novaes, 2020b) (Ivani & Dutilh Novaes, 2022)). Finally, the exchange itself requires that agents with very diverse epistemic backgrounds find enough common ground and suitable means of communication rather than talking past each other, which is far from obvious especially in situations of ideological/political disagreement (Talisse, 2019). If the (potential) exchange fails at any of these three levels, then arguments will not prompt a change of mind.

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### C) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

#### D) Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### That moots the value of their performance –

#### A) Impact calc – only weigh impacts they can draw a causal connection to with solvency – systems of power aren’t offense against framework because they don’t have an internal-link to how the aff solves that

#### B) Structural changes only arise from the shifting of group interests – not academic discourse.

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ACADEMIC INJUSTICE DISCOURSE Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government.” Empirical law is constantly changing and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These theorists, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice. That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium, so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws.11 This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose. Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. But even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests. After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 Academic political discourse has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied and older academic tradition, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness. Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks, with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world; there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to another or between subdisciplines in the same field. The audience is other academics and students. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work. The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality. The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala, where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents. Those who do not write and speak cabalistically may subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to that theory is immediately self-flattering, but it lacks reliable empirical support.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this: I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17 Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless even very good academic political discourse about justice and injustice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life. This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts. Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that expressing and airing views in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also have immediate practical results. It is not evident how there could be such results, when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument. As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors. Public expression also serves to, represent and create collective atmospheres of belief, attitude, and opinion. These atmospheres are implicitly known by a majority of people in the culture, even though such knowledge is difficult to validate. Ambiguities cannot be resolved by recourse to public opinion polls, because understanding the results of those polls requires creative interpretive skills that draw on what is already known about relevant atmospheres. For example, suppose that more blacks than whites believe that white privilege is real and that O.J. Simpson was innocent, or that more whites than blacks believe that white American police officers are not, in general, racially biased. Are the views of whites evidence of racial bias or racial oblivion? Are the views of blacks evidence of racial preference or paranoia? Moreover, such polls almost always have a large racial overlap of opinion: If 29 percent of blacks compared to 71 percent of whites believe X, then 71 percent of blacks and 29 percent of whites do not believe X. Does this mean that the percentages of each group that does not contribute to the discrepancy in belief recorded in the polls are in some degree of agreement? Experiments in social psychology could be designed to answer such questions and others like them, but it is important to decide beforehand why the data is important and what it does and does not indicate. For instance, testing the claim that white privilege is a reality of contemporary life requires some prior definition of what is meant by “white privilege,” which can range from injustice to social courtesies. In a widely discussed 2013 experiment conducted in Queensland, Australia, economists Redzo Mujcic and Paul Frijters found that the majority of free bus rides, based on conductor generosity, were dispensed to whites, with blacks least likely to receive this courtesy, compared to all other racial groups among commuters. Journalist Britni Danielle, writing for a general audience on Yahoo News, touted this study as evidence that “white privilege is real,” without distinguishing between an amenity such as a free bus ride and recognition of one’s rights by not being subject to arbitrary stops and frisks by police officers.19 Conservatives reading Mujcic and Frijter’s study might say that the bus driver may have been acting rationally based on past experience with unruly black passengers. From a progressive perspective, more specifics would need to be introduced to defend the claim that this study revealed white privilege, such as controls for the apparent social class and gender of passengers, as well as the preexisting racial climate among bus commuters in Queensland, as well as the broader racial atmosphere throughout Australia in 2013. The 2015 Academy Awards What is racial atmosphere and climate? A US example that is also global could help clarify these vague ideas, provided that it is understood beforehand that in this context, as in most public references to "race," ‘racial” means “pertaining to racism.” From beginning to end, the 2015 Academy Awards ceremony hit racist notes that slid by unchecked, because it was an occasion of celebration. Neil Patrick Harris, the host, began with what might have been a critical remark about the lack of racial diversity among audience members and award winners: “Tonight we honor Hollywood’s best and whitest, sorry, bright est.” For those who were uncomfortable with the lack of robust racial diversity among audience members and award winners, his remark might have validated their unease. But those who would have been uncomfortable with more racial diversity may have been heard “best and whitest” as support for their social values. (The discourse of white privilege as a critique of contemporary anti-nonwhite racism is, as indicated, that kind of double-edged sword.) Midway through the ceremony, Patricia Arquette called for people of color and members of the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) community to support legislation for equal pay for women and to commit themselves to supporting women, thereby overlooking the women who were either or both people of color and members of the LGВТ community. This kind of oversight may perhaps be excused by Arquette’s ignorance of what academics have been for decades analyzing as “intersectionality.” But Sean Penn’s remark at the grand finale awarding for Best Picture to Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, the Mexican director of Birdman, was simply, explicitly, racist: "Who gave this son of a bitch a green card?” Inarritu later brushed off the insult by saying he found it "hilarious,” because “Sean and I have that kind of brutal relationship. I think it was very funny.”20 Inarritu attempt at a “save” for Penn does not address the impact of Penn’s insult on other Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including those without green cards who struggle to remain employed in the face of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. (That such a moment of maximum recognition was brought so low by a racist crack is not unusual in US culture, where the nastiest forms of racist insult are often let loose on people of color who have succeeded.) As a spectacle watched by almost thirty-four million, the 2015 Oscars, despite ratings lower than recent years, was a global public event.21 Symbolically, it has no peer for the display of beauty, talent, and artistic creativity. Its subtext inevitably has implications about current American race relations, which influence their future. The racial implications of the Oscars replays in millions of minds at countless other public celebrations and entertainment venues, as well as in private interactions (for a year at least). Such spectacles are forms of public discourse and what they represent or fail to represent about US racial demographics and the attitude of the dominant white group creates or augments a specific racial climate that in 2015 is part of a more general racial atmosphere of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At the 2015 Academy Awards, for many critical observers, the issue or subject pertaining to race (insofar as it is understood that subjects of race are subjects of racism), was recognition.22 The beauty, talent, and artistic creativity of people of color was not fully recognized. Some people of color did get awards and some audience members were people of color, so recognition, along with diversity, was not completely absent. But there appeared to be insufficient racial diversity for audience and award winners to be considered racially integrated. And that appearance was symbolic. However, the symbolic meaning is ambiguous: Were there people of color who were deserving of awards but did not get them because they were people of color? Is race a factor in who I becomes a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences? In the future, will the racial makeup of award winners become more or less representative of their proportions in the motion picture industry? If the proportion of people of color in the motion picture industry is not proportional to their presence in the population at large, why is that? The answers to these questions are undetermined in the symbolic spectacle of the 2015 Academy Awards. The observer does not know if recognition of the achievements of people of color in the movie industry will improve, stay the same, or get worse, and she does not know how to find out. The racial (i.e., in regards to racism) climate of the Academy Awards is cloudy, subject to many different interpretations, some of them conflicting. It is an epistemologically unstable racial climate, because people of color do not know what the weather is in that climate, as a basis for prediction, and neither do they know how to find out. The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad. This judgment is a general principle that leaves the nature of racism undefined throughout the atmosphere and most of the climates and subclimates of race. The overriding shared judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge for nonwhites, because it does not protect them from either First Amendment-protected racist expressions or actions that turn out to be indirectly racist. Energetic self-aware racist whites can try to evade the judgment that they are racist through coded language for racial difference, and the use of intermediate activities and traits as subjects of direct action. That is, something other than race, which nonetheless does a good job of picking out members of a specific racial group, can be used instead of the race of that group to maintain prejudice and legitimize discrimination. The term “racial climate” has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race, small cuts, insults, and slights that can have a cumulative effect of individual harm.24 In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as ignorance of black history and contemporary racism or discrimination in career advancement.25 The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a general predisposition of white people to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors for what is unknown about race relations and attitudes; they capture the vagueness and unpredictability of racial prejudice and discrimination that occur in a society where nonwhites remain disadvantaged, even though there is formal equality. This “vague weather” aspect of atmosphere and climate is an epistemological condition of indecision that may or may not constitute a lasting crisis, although some syndromes of political injustice should be viewed as crises. A crisis is a period of indecision and uncertainty that requires a resolution before life can go on. Will blacks and other people of color achieve more equality with whites, or is the United States—and with it the world, because US racism is exported with business practices, tour-ism, and entertainment products—on the brink of a new era of explicitlу direct oppression of people of color? Are most white Americans, whose race-neutral economic and social activities have racist effects on nonwhites, genuinely ignorant of how the system in which they operate works, or are they secretly but knowingly hearts-and-minds not clear that this indeterminate aspect of present racial atmosphere and climates must be resolved now. We do not know if life can go on if it is not resolved or what it means for life to go on, or not. We do not even know if the putative crisis can be resolved at this time, because there is as yet no systematic and sustained, impassioned, liberatory dis- course for our condition of ambiguity, a time with a black president and police killing with impunity of unarmed black youth, a time of voting rights for everyone but new restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect African Americans.26 Except for what academics write and say and how important they think their discourse is (among themselves), American discourse of racial liberation is at a standstill. And insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience and no reliable means for it to affect the real world, that standstill remains at the disposal of history, where history is understood to be the unpredictable result of contingent events. However, if academic oppositional political discourse can be related to a longer historical trend, a more coherent and optimistic picture might emerge. Cornel West's ideas about the American black prophetic tradition appears to be a relation to such a trend.

#### C) Changing political subjectivity can’t solve, they underestimate the flexibility of the state

Asef Bayat 13, Sociology Prof @ University of Illinois, Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, pp. 41-45

The dearth of conventional collective action— in par tic u lar, contentious protests among the subaltern groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the developing countries, together with a disillusionment with dominant socialist parties, pushed many radical observers to “discover” and highlight different types of activism, however small- scale, local, or even individualistic. Such a quest, meanwhile, both contributed to and benefi ted from the upsurge of theoretical perspectives, during the 1980s, associated with poststructuralism that made micropolitics and “everyday resistance” a popular idea. James Scott’s departure, during the 1980s, from a structuralist position in studying the behavior of the peasantry in Asia to a more ethnographic method of focusing on individual reactions of peasants contributed considerably to this paradigm shift .27 In the meantime, Foucault’s “decentered” notion of power, together with a revival of neo- Gramscian politics of culture (hegemony), served as a key theoretical backing for micropolitics, and thus the “re sis tance” perspective. The notion of “re sis tance” came to stress that power and counterpower were not in binary opposition, but in a decoupled, complex, ambivalent, and perpetual “dance of control.”28 It based itself on the Foucauldian idea that “wherever there is power there is re sis tance,” although the latter consisted largely of small- scale, everyday, tiny activities that the agents could aff ord to articulate given their po liti cal constraints. Such a perception of re sis tance penetrated not only peasant studies, but a variety of fi elds, including labor studies, identity politics, ethnicity, women’s studies, education, and studies of the urban subaltern. Thus, multiple researchers discussed how relating stories about miracles “gives voice to pop u lar re sis tance”29; how disenfranchised women resisted patriarchy by relating folktales and songs or by pretending to be possessed or crazy;30 how reviving extended family among the urban pop u lar classes represented an “avenue of po liti cal participation.”31 The relationships between the Filipino bar girls and western men were discussed not simply in terms of total domination, but in a complex and contingent fashion;32 and the veiling of the Muslim working woman has been represented not in simple terms of submission, but in ambivalent terms of protest and co- optation— hence, an “accommodating protest.”33 Indeed, on occasions, both veiling and unveiling were simultaneously considered as a symbol of re sis tance. Undoubtedly, such an attempt to grant agency to the subjects that until then were depicted as “passive poor,” “submissive women,” “apo liti cal peasant,” and “oppressed worker” was a positive development. The re sis tance paradigm helps to uncover the complexity of power relations in society in general, and the politics of the subaltern in par tic u lar. It tells us that we may not expect a universalized form of struggle; that totalizing pictures oft en distort variations in people’s perceptions about change; that local should be recognized as a signifi cant site of struggle as well as a unit of analysis; that or ga nized collective action may not be possible everywhere, and thus alternative forms of struggles must be discovered and acknowledged; that or ganized protest as such may not necessarily be privileged in the situations where suppression rules. The value of a more fl exible, small- scale, and unbureaucratic activism should, therefore, be acknowledged.34 These are some of the issues that critiques of poststructuralist advocates of “re sis tance” ignore.35 Yet a number of conceptual and political problems also emerge from this paradigm. The immediate trouble is how to conceptualize re sis tance, and its relation to power, domination, and submission. James Scott seems to be clear about what he means by the term: Class re sis tance includes any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à- vis these superordinate classes.36 [emphasis added] However, the phrase “any act” blocks delineating between qualitatively diverse forms of activities that Scott lists. Are we not to distinguish between large- scale collective action and individual acts, say, of tax dodging? Do reciting poetry in private, however subversive- sounding, and engaging in armed struggle have identical value? Should we not expect unequal aff ectivity and implications from such diff erent acts? Scott was aware of this, and so agreed with those who had made distinctions between diff erent types of resistance— for example, “real re sis tance” refers to “or ga nized, systematic, pre- planned or selfl ess practices with revolutionary consequences,” and “token re sis tance” points to unor ga nized incidental acts without any revolutionary consequences, and which are accommodated in the power structure.37 Yet he insisted that the “token re sis tance” is no less real than the “real re sis tance.” Scott’s followers, however, continued to make further distinctions. Nathan Brown, in studying peasant politics in Egypt, for instance, identifi es three forms of politics: atomistic (politics of individuals and small groups with obscure content), communal (a group eff ort to disrupt the system, by slowing down production and the like), and revolt ( just short of revolution to negate the system).38 Beyond this, many resistance writers tend to confuse an awareness about oppression with acts of resistance against it. The fact that poor women sing songs about their plight or ridicule men in their private gatherings indicates their understanding of gender dynamics. This does not mean, however, that they are involved in acts of resistance; neither are the miracle stories of the poor urbanites who imagine the saints to come and punish the strong. Such an understanding of “resistance” fails to capture the extremely complex interplay of conflict and consent, and ideas and action, operating within systems of power. Indeed, the link between consciousness and action remains a major sociological dilemma.39 Scott makes it clear that re sis tance is an intentional act. In Weberian tradition, he takes the meaning of action as a crucial element. This intentionality, while signifi cant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual and collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond. In Cairo or Tehran, for example, many poor families illegally tap into electricity and running water from the municipality despite their awareness of their behavior’s illegality. Yet they do not steal urban ser vices in order to express their defi ance vis-à- vis the authorities. Rather, they do it because they feel the necessity of those ser vices for a decent life, because they fi nd no other way to acquire them. But these very mundane acts when continued lead to signifi cant changes in the urban structure, in social policy, and in the actors’ own lives. Hence, the signifi cance of the unintended consequences of agents’ daily activities. In fact, many authors in the re sis tance paradigm have simply abandoned intent and meaning, focusing instead eclectically on both intended and unintended practices as manifestations of “re sis tance.” There is still a further question. Does re sis tance mean defending an already achieved gain (in Scott’s terms, denying claims made by dominant groups over the subordinate ones) or making fresh demands (to “advance its own claims”), what I like to call “encroachment”? In much of the re sis tance literature, this distinction is missing. Although one might imagine moments of overlap, the two strategies, however, lead to diff erent po liti cal consequences; this is so in par tic u lar when we view them in relation to the strategies of dominant power. The issue was so crucial that Lenin devoted his entire What Is to Be Done? to discussing the implications of these two strategies, albeit in diff erent terms of “economism/trade unionism” vs. “social demo cratic/party politics.” What ever one may think about a Leninist/vanguardist paradigm, it was one that corresponded to a par tic u lar theory of the state and power (a capitalist state to be seized by a mass movement led by the working- class party); in addition, it was clear where this strategy wanted to take the working class (to establish a socialist state). Now, what is the perception of the state in the “resistance” paradigm? What is the strategic aim in this perspective? Where does the resistance paradigm want to take its agents/subjects, beyond “prevent[ing] the worst and promis[ing] something better”?40 Much of the literature of re sis tance is based upon a notion of power that Foucault has articulated, that power is everywhere, that it “circulates” and is never “localized here and there, never in anybody’s hands.” 41 Such a formulation is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the ordinary and in recognizing their agency. Yet this “decentered” notion of power, shared by many poststructuralist “re sis tance” writers, underestimates state power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to see that although power circulates, it does so unevenly— in some places it is far weightier, more concentrated, and “thicker,” so to speak, than in others. In other words, like it or not, the state does matter, and one needs to take that into account when discussing the potential of urban subaltern activism. Although Foucault insists that re sis tance is real when it occurs outside of and in de pen dent of the systems of power, the perception of power that informs the “re sis tance” literature leaves little room for an analysis of the state as a system of power. It is, therefore, not accidental that a theory of the state and, therefore, an analysis of the possibility of co- optation, are absent in almost all accounts of “resistance.” Consequently, the cherished acts of resistance float around aimlessly in an unknown, uncertain, and ambivalent universe of power relations, with the end result an unsettled, tense accommodation with the existing power arrangement. Lack of a clear concept of resistance, moreover, often leads writers in this genre to overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result is that almost any act of the subjects potentially becomes one of “resistance.” Determined to discover the “inevitable” acts of resistance, many poststructuralist writers often come to “replace their subject.”42 While they attempt to challenge the essentialism of such perspectives as “passive poor,” “submissive Muslim women,” and “inactive masses,” they tend, however, to fall into the trap of essentialism in reverse— by reading too much into ordinary behaviors, interpreting them as necessarily conscious or contentious acts of defi ance. This is so because they overlook the crucial fact that these practices occur mostly within the prevailing systems of power. For example, some of the lower class’s activities in the Middle East that some authors read as “re sis tance,” “intimate politics” of defi ance, or “avenues of participation” may actually contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the state.43 The fact that people are able to help themselves and extend their networks surely shows their daily activism and struggles. However, by doing so the actors may hardly win any space from the state (or other sources of power, like capital and patriarchy)— they are not necessarily challenging domination. In fact, governments often encourage self- help and local initiatives so long as they do not turn oppositional. They do so in order to shift some of their burdens of social welfare provision and responsibilities onto the individual citizens. The proliferation of many NGOs in the global South is a good indicator of this. In short, much of the re sis tance literature confuses what one might consider coping strategies (when the survival of the agents is secured at the cost of themselves or that of fellow humans) and effective participation or subversion of domination. There is a last question. If the poor are always able to resist in many ways (by discourse or actions, individual or collective, overt or covert) the systems of domination, then what is the need to assist them? If they are already po litically able citizens, why should we expect the state or any other agency to empower them? Misreading the behavior of the poor may, in fact, frustrate our moral responsibility toward the vulnerable. As Michael Brown rightly notes, when you “elevate the small injuries of childhood to the same moral status as suff ering of truly oppressed,” you are committing “a savage leveling that diminishes rather than intensifi es our sensitivities to injustice.” 44

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#### Using the state does not endorse its legitimacy.

**Newman ’10** — Saul; Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths. 2010; U of London; Theory & Event; Volume 13; Issue 2

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: **making certain demands** on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an **end to draconian policing** – is one of the **basic strategies** of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does **not necessarily mean working within the state** or **reaffirming its legitimacy**. On the contrary, demands are made from a position **outside the political order**, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly **call into question the legitimacy** and even the **sovereignty of the state** by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

#### 6. Their performance undermines intrinsic motivation—outweighs for real change

**Kohn 93 –** Alfie Kohn, MA in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago, BA from Brown University, internally quoting Edward L. Deci, Professor of Psychology and Gowen Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Rochester, No Contest: The Case Against Competition, p. 59-60

<http://library.lol/main/4908B4EA053BD2ADF8D7D872161B7CC6>

The idea that trying **to do well** and **trying to do better than others** may work at cross-purposes can be understood in the context of an issue addressed by motivational theorists. We do best at the tasks we enjoy. An outside or extrinsic motivator (money, grades, the trappings of competitive success) simply cannot take the place of an activity we find rewarding in itself. "While extrinsic motivation may affect performance," wrote Margaret Clifford, "performance is dependent upon learning, which in turn is primarily dependent upon intrinsic motivation." More specifically, "a **significant performance-increase** on a highly complex task **will** be **depend**ent**upon intrinsic motivation**."59 In fact, even people who are judged to be high in achievement motivation do not perform well unless extrinsic motivation has been minimized, as several studies have shown.60

Competition works just as any other extrinsic motivator does. As Edward Deci, one of the leading students of this topic, has written, "The reward for extrinsically motivated behavior is something that is separate from and follows the behavior. **With competitive activities, the reward is typically 'winning' (that is, beating the other person or the other team), so the reward is** actually **extrinsic** to the activity itself."51 This has been corroborated by subjective reports: people who are more competitive regard themselves as being extrinsically motivated.62 Like any other extrinsic motivator, competition cannot produce the kind of results that flow from enjoying the activity itself.

But this tells only half the story. As research by Deci and others has shown, the use of **extrinsic motivators actually tends to undermine intrinsic motivation and** thus **adversely affect performance in the long run**. The introduction of, say, monetary reward will edge out intrinsic satisfaction; once this **reward is withdrawn**, the activity may well **cease** even though no reward at all was necessary for its performance earlier. Money "may work to 'buy off one's intrinsic motivation for an activity. And this decreased motivation appears (from the results of the field experiment) to be more than just a temporary phenomenon."63 **Extrinsic motivators**, in other words, **are not only ineffective but corrosive. They eat away at the kind of motivation that *does* produce results**.

**This** effect **has been shown specifically with competition**. In a 1981 study, eighty undergraduates worked on a spatial relations puzzle. Some of them were asked to try to solve it more quickly than the penons sitting next to them, while others did not have to compete. The subjects then sat alone (but clandestinely observed) for a few minutes in a room that contained a similar puzzle. The time they voluntarily spent working on it, together with a self-report on how interested they had been in solving the puzzle, constituted the measure of intrinsic interest. As predicted, the students who had been competing were less intrinsically motivated than those who had originally worked on the puzzle in a noncompetitive environment. It was concluded that