## 1NC

### समर्थवाद

#### The AFF’s dream of investing in nuclear energy is a desire to fill the insatiable lack. They create experiences of impairment that structure the disability drive, cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

Mollow 15 [Anna Mollow is Jewish but not a Zionist. The Disability Drive. A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bb4c3bv/qt0bb4c3bv.pdf?t=otc2pz ] //Vik MD recut + anika recut

Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of **the Real internal to the Symbolic order**” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “**unnameable” death drive** (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “**sinthomosexuality” embodies disability** at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of **the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Rea**l” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but **paradoxically**, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also **threatens** the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically **blind**: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by **exposing “the sinthome as meaningless** knot” must effect a “**disfiguration**” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the **senselessness** of one‟s sinthome, it seems **we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t.** This is why I have proposed that the “**death drive**”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “**life not worth living**” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is **inevitably temporary,** and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that **makes that disabling turn**, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “**sources of fear and fascination** for able-bodied people, who **cannot bear to look** at the unruly sight before them but also **cannot bear not to look**” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “**disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for** **it**,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a **familiar cultural fantasy**: **cure ‟em** (as Dickens might hope) or **kill ‟em** (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.

#### Their politics are founded in reflective self pity emblematic of the disability drive. The disabled body is looked down upon to prop-up the anxious confidence of their desires. Just as their arguments relish the description of the miserable people they plan to help; their method of self-reflective ego-production necessitates their impacts and turns them.

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A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema**.** Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? 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Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won’t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim**.** It’s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity**.** Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic **(**73**).** When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we’re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we’re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one’s own ego onto the object of one’s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self. But in calling compassion a cover for narcissism, Edelman may inadvertently point to a connection between compassion and the drive. Freud’s theorization of narcissism, which is a precursor to his idea of the death drive, suggests that although some forms of narcissism can bolster the ego, other forms can do just the opposite. “On Narcissism” posits a distinction between what Freud calls “primary” and “secondary” narcissism; this distinction provides the basis for a contrast that I wish to draw between what could be called primary and secondary pity. To elucidate these two pities, let us look at the tale that Freud tells about two narcissisms. The story begins, as many Freudian narratives do, with the image of a child at its mother’s breast. Freud gives the name “primary narcissism” to the perfect autoerotic pleasure in which the child luxuriates. This pleasure takes place in the absence of a stable self, as the child does not yet conceive of itself as a distinct entity, undifferentiated from its external environment(87-88). It’s the best of times, but it can’t last: the child’s primary narcissism, Freud recounts, is exposed to numerous “disturbances,” ranging from the castration complex (in which boys fear losing the penis and girls, Freud assumes, wish that they had one) to parental discipline and criticism.120 But still, we keep seeking that lost, best time: because humans are “incapable of giving up a satisfaction” that we have “once enjoyed,” we continually try to return to the primary narcissism of childhood. We do this by engaging in secondary narcissism. All the familiar attitudes and behaviors that one tends to think of when one disparages someone as “narcissistic” fall into the category of what Freud defined as secondary narcissism: the puffed up ego, the feeling of superiority over others. But even secondary narcissism, with its many patent problems, does not only aim to aggrandize the ego**.** The impetus of secondary narcissism, after all, is to return to a state in which the ego as such does not exist. The child’s autoerotic enjoyment at its mother’s breast is pleasurable in part because the child is not yet a subject. As with the death drive’s impulsion to return to “an earlier state of things,” secondary narcissism draws the subject back toward a prior time when the ego did not exist(Beyond 45). Yet if primary narcissism is looked back upon as the best of times, it must, from the vantage point of a fully constituted ego, appear as the worst of times, too. To be drawn back to primary narcissism would be to imagine the abolition of one’s self. For this reason, even though secondary narcissism may threaten to break down the ego, it also entails a defense against the threat/pleasure of that breaking down**.** Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is**.** When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase**,** we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone**?** Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people’s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism’s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form**,”** the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject’s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject’s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one’s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud’s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud’s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I’d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable.However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you’re going through, it’s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That’s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We’re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I’d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing. 77 Then the tube entered one nostril, its gauge slight enough to pass through, down my throat and into my stomach. I couldn’t thrash or resist. I could only relent. To the pain, the discomfort, but most distressingly the feeling of powerlessness, of violation. It was in that moment, I think, that the weight of everything which had happened fell upon me, undeniably, and the knowledge of it crushed me. (23-24) “Too much to bear,” Guest writes. The word “unbearable” would indeed be an accurate descriptor of this passage: both the experience of violence that it narrates and also the retelling of that experience produce sensations that, as in Berlant and Edelman’s account of sexuality, one cannot bear but must nonetheless “struggle to bear” (back cover). Guest’s account of a nonconsensual administration of an unwanted medical treatment is especially difficult to bear because it gives the reader no recourse to secondary pity: the passage offers no “lesson” to be learned, no invitation to feel “inspired,” nothing to make one feel in any way okay about what has happened. The medical violence that Guest recounts seems particularly devastating because it is readable as sexual: it takes the form of forced penetration, and it results in a “feeling of powerlessness, of violation” that resonates with experiences recounted by survivors of sexual assault.

#### The reformist politics of the 1AC meant to provide “hope for saving the future” for generations to come relies on the project of rehabilitative futurism. Their ideal future is based the signifier of the fantasmatic child which is used to eradicate and “cure” disability—disability is a threat to be excluded from the political. Reject their political project – no imagined future people are relevant when violence on our real bodies is implied.

**Mollow 15** Anna. Mollow is Jewish but not a Zionist. (2015): The Disability Drive, A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bb4c3bv/qt0bb4c3bv.pdf?t=otc2pz //JG , MD recut

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future’s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart.109 Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the “innocent” Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability **(19).** For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists’ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You’re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman’s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a futureat all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability.Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.110

#### The attempt to “cure” the planet by with nuclear energy is an impossible project that reinvests in these notions of a complete and stable world. The logics of cure that attempt to “fix” fundamentally unstable entity’s like nature or the body, that violently repress the truth that this order never existed to begin with.

Watts Belser 20 [Julia Watts Belser. “Disability, Climate Change, and Environmental Violence: The Politics of Invisibility and the Horizon of Hope.” Disability Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4, Fall 2020, p. N.PAG. EBSCOhost, https://dsq-sds.org/index.php/dsq/article/view/6959/5805. Julia Watts Belser is Professor of Jewish Studies in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, as well as core faculty in Georgetown’s Disability Studies Program and a Senior Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Her research centers on gender, sexuality, and disability in rabbinic literature, as well as queer feminist Jewish ethics and theology. She directs Disability and Climate Change: A Public Archive Project, an initiative that an initiative that documents the wisdom and insights of disabled activists, artists, and first responders on the frontlines of climate crisis.]//nobody

Disability experience offers a vantage point from which to rethink hope, to release some of the desires that many of us hold in the face of an uncertain environmental future. Hope is often heralded as a powerful motivator for climate activism. Yet, as I see it, a recurring problem shapes dominant cultural scripts about hope: the notion that we "have hope" when we feel a sense of personal agency and control over our circumstances. To illustrate what I mean, consider psychologist Suzanne Moser's account of the role hope plays in catalyzing environmental responsibility and motivating collective action to address climate change. To be effective environmental actors, Moser argues, people need "a realistic assessment of the threat or diagnosis, a sense of personal control over their circumstances," as well as clear goals, strategies with which to reach those goals, and a sense that we are making progress in moving toward our goals. To that end, Moser urges climate communicators to "learn to better hold up a positive future," to emphasize that "concerted efforts" can still "make a positive difference." At the same time, she maintains, "fostering true hope is not erasing fears or doubts, but facing reality full on, while banking on promising strategies and uncertainty." [70] I cite Moser's discussion of hope not to single out her ideas for particular critique, but because her discussion illustrates an understanding of hope I find pervasive in popular culture: hope is linked to agency, control, and the notion of progress. But I confess: I am no longer sure this kind of hope is possible, when it comes to climate change. I am not convinced that a realistic assessment of the threat can coexist with a meaningful sense of control over the future**. Pinning hope on the possibility that we can stem the tides and somehow arrest loss is a fantasy, an illusion that threatens to shatter our hearts.** Instead, I want to ask a different set of questions, a set of questions I have learned through my own engagement with disability cultures, questions that flow also out of critical race studies and indigenous studies. What if we approached climate change with the bedrock recognition that the situation is bad, and that it will get worse? What if we acknowledged, truly, that the prognosis is difficult, that it does not lend itself to good news. While I believe we can and must work to mitigate some of the negative effects of climate change, I think **we must let go the increasingly facile question, "What are we going to do to stop it?"** and turn our efforts instead to a different question: How might we make climate disruption more survivable, less unjust? How might we remind ourselves that even alongside a diagnosis that paints the future in a difficult light, that life is still possible, that life can still be flush with pleasure and satisfaction, even when it is not when it is not the life we might have chosen, not the future we might have desired? Disability experience offers critical insights for navigating these questions, for affirming the possibilities that lie beyond conventional notions of "hope" that rest on a brighter future or a return to a beloved past. Consider Rabbi Elliot Kukla's assessment of chronic illness as "a long, slow detox from capitalist culture." [71] For Kukla, this move is not simply an embrace of life as meaningful beyond conventional measures of productivity or success, a call that has been widely recognized as a counter-cultural value emerging out of disability communities. [72] Kukla's self-understanding also entails a move away from the teleological, future-oriented discourse of "getting better" or its past-seeking counterpart: the dream of being "restored" to health**. While dominant culture commonly expects that people who are sick will invest all of their resources—physical, financial, emotional, spiritual—in striving for a better future or a return to an idealized past, Kukla describes how he gradually "stopped hoping to be well, or even pretending that I lived in that future-heavy land of hope anymore. I stopped trying to 'overcome' my body and started living a present-tense life in chronic illness."** [73] Kukla's account of his "present-tense life" represents a strong challenge to the prevailing cultural imperative to trust in a better future, what Jasbir Puar has called the "it gets better" narrative of neoliberal regimes. **[74] The incisive cultural critiques disability activists and theorists lodge against curative thinking have striking implications for climate change.** Take Eunjung Kim's insight that cultural investments in cure are often about "folding time:" making "the present disappear by replacing it with the normative past" while also flashing forward to an idyllic "normative future." This collective commitment to cure does not stay securely within the realm of biomedicine. "The drama of cure," Kim observes, "has expanded from the possibility of curing disability to attempting to "cure" environmental loss, defying the extinction of species and to "cure" the emotional experience of loss, defying mortality itself." [75] Eli Clare gives powerful voice to this yearning for a lost ecological past: Many of us mourn the vacant lots, woods, and swamps we played in as children, now transformed into landfills, strip malls, and parking lots. We fear the far-reaching impacts of climate change ... We long for the days when bison roamed the Great Plains and Chinook salmon swam upstream in the millions. We desire a return. [76] While the techniques of ecosystem restoration can sometimes bring renewed wholeness to certain lands, while they can in some ways offer an antidote to loss, Clare asks his readers to recognize that some "damage may be irreversible; some ecosystems, irreplaceable." [77] This **recognition that technologies of restoration have their limits is a refusal of the fantasy of human control over nature, a release of the idea that we can always "fix what has been broken."** [78] Here too, the curative impulse can be a kind of hubris, a belief that we can force our future to reflect a carefully curated image of a longed-for past. Disabled writers, by contrast, often articulate a relationship to time and place that is rooted in the complex present, a recognition that satisfaction and pleasure can be found amidst rather than beyond the realities of limits, loss, and uncertainty. Recounting the pains and pleasures of chronic illness, Piepzna-Samarasinha writes about the "hard beauty of this life, built around all the time I must spend resting." [79] She writes crip experience as an unflinching encounter with violence, oppression, and bodily limits—and also as a source of vibrant, particular joys. She describes "the secret bliss of bed," the place in which she spends many sick hours, "draped in pillows, red and plum sheets, surrounded by good art to look at, curtained by plum sari fabric. This is my place of power, the fulcrum, the place everything emerges from." [80] That secret bliss does not erase the difficulties and the discomforts of being ill; it does not displace pain, but exists alongside it. Kukla likewise describes the way the experience of being sick has heightened his awareness of the vivid, sensual pleasures of the present: "sunlight outside my bedroom window, my dog's velvety fur, a cool breeze in my garden, richly colored flowers." [81] The embrace of a complex present—the simultaneous coexistence of grief and beauty, satisfaction and loss—opens also to an embrace of futures in which such realities continue to intertwine. None of this overwrites the material reality of harm, of wrongs done to flesh and to elemental bodies. None of this eclipses the fact of violence, the truth that environmental privilege and climate irresponsibility tears into lives and loves, steals breath, sabotages futures. None of this erases anger, or grief, or guilt, or loss. But it makes room, in Therí Alyce Pickens' words, "for sense meanings other than abjection. Say, joy and pleasure." [82] Beyond the teleological push to redemption and repair, beyond the thrust to make a good future contingent on cure, there lies a different land, a different knowing: a recognition that even the fractured places, even the things we once named ruin, can still be limned with beauty, with vitality, with life.

#### The alternative is to analyze the disability drive shattering the fantasy of the ego. Anything else just displaces the lack onto other oppressed groups.

Mollow 15 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bb4c3bv/qt0bb4c3bv.pdf?t=otc2pz] //Vik

Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how **developing an understanding** of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ **misrecognitions** of the drive—may **facilitate transformations** in how we conceive of our **subjectivities**. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand **our “insides**,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “**outside**,” on the level of the social, **we relate to each other**. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice. If the drive won‟t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a **fantasy of overcoming** the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: **Panic**! Berate self! **Look for someone to blame**! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the **intolerable feeling** that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it **always has its keys in hand**. We are not done with the drive.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the methodology that’s most consistent with epistemological disablement---the only way to escape from the violence of the drive is to accept it.

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“How, then, might we begin to acknowledge our own determination by the drive? Any knowing of the drive that we might hope to achieve must, on account of the structural barriers that render the drive unthinkable, be an effort characterized by failure and incompletion—that is, we might say, by epistemological disablement. The term “epistemological disablement” will appear frequently in this dissertation, as I will argue that coming into close proximity with the disability drive produces states of cognitive and affective uncertainty, confusion, and incapacity that are akin to disability. In the works that I shall analyze, epistemological disablement will often be performed on a textual level, as theorists and narrators seem to lose control of what they want to say about disability. These moments of epistemological disablement are often disavowed by theorists and narrators and are instead projected onto disabled people. When this happens, disabled people’s impairments are depicted as the result of an insufficiency of self-knowledge that is assumed not to determine nondisabled subjects. I will challenge these characterizations of disabled people not only by arguing for the value of “cripistemologies” (that is, ways of knowing that arise from disabled people‟s lived experiences) but also by using drive theory to undermine belief in the possibility of a transparent and wholly knowable self, whether disabled or nondisabled.18 My two-pronged approach to the issue of epistemological disablement may seem to present a paradox: on the one hand, I am asserting that disabled people’s lived experiences generate important knowledge about disability; yet at the same time I am seeking to destabilize the very notion of self-knowledge. Let me be clear, then, that in undertaking this double endeavor I do not forward all-or-nothing claims either “for” or “against” the possibilities of self- knowledge. I will not assert that people cannot ever know anything reliable about themselves, but I will also not suggest that truth claims derived from personal knowledge about disability are infallible. Instead, this dissertation highlights the limits of complete self-knowledge for nondisabled and disabled subjects alike, while at the same time interrogating the social dynamics that give rise to imbalances in the distribution of epistemological authority to particular subjects on the basis of their perceived status as disabled or nondisabled.” (4)

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#### The impact frame of “extinction” is both incoherent and ableist---extinction is constructed around a fear of disability. There has never been a time where humanity was linked by a universal possession of life. Voting AFF latches onto the sacrificial and debilitating lineage of utilitarian ethics that itself causes “extinction” through cost-benefit analysis spurred by constructed ableism.

**Colebrook 18** [Claire Colebrook – Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University. “Lives Worth Living: Extinction, Persons, Disability” https://pennstate.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/lives-worth-living-extinction-persons-disability, DOA: 5/19/20] cgc

What is the relationship between extinction and disability? One of the ways in which we might think about disability and disability studies is as requiring an expansion of conditions of justice; this is how Martha Nussbaum has criticized **the liberal tradition of fairness and personhood**. We should, she argues, extend considerations of fairness to include those who care for others. If we think about a world that enables human capacities and flourishing, then we need to look beyond autonomous and self-defining individuals. Disability considerations would both enhance and **extend the range of political compassion**, enabling **a notion of persons** that is not merely that of **the abstract political subject**, but a being with **capacities** and **dignity**; capacities are richer and more varied than our narrow notion of person currently allows (2006). For Nussbaum we will live in a better world if we expand our notion of capacity and what counts as a flourishing human life. In what follows I want to reverse this relation, and rather than expand capacities and justice to allow for disability (with disability being the secondary consideration), I want to see disability as the primary or **transcendental condition** from which the supposedly “normal” person derives, and further to see the long history of **the “**normal” subject as directly intertwined with the accelerated extinction of humans and non-humans. If one considers the subject of capacities from which Nussbaum begins her critique – the liberal person, blessed with **reason, autonomy, “favorable” social conditions** and an **enlightened milieu of political deliberation** – one would **need** to recognize the long history of **enslavement** (of humans and non-humans), **exploitation**, **appropriation** and **colonization** that **made even the thought of the just society possible**. Disability is **not an added on concern** but is **precisely what orients, if silently, the problem of extinction**. One might say, that “human” existence is **constitutively disabled** (or, to follow Bernard Stiegler, that its default condition is **dependence** upon a broad network of **technologies and archives that have never been equally distributed** (Stiegler 1998, 122). **Further, the capacities that enable** the “able” person have cost**, and continue to cost,** the earth. Those lives that are (to borrow from Nick Bostrom [2013]) “technologically immature”, may perhaps not be lamentable and to be avoided at all costs, but perhaps offer a trajectory for life that is not necessarily that of extinction. Even though the specific concepts of extinction and disability are rarely explicitly linked the two concepts are inextricably intertwined in discussions of **what counts as a life worth living. Indeed**, the grand Socratic notion that the unexamined life is not worth living, is not only normative (which is almost unavoidable) but normalizing: to privilege the life of examination is to open up a history that will generate the individual, reflective, deliberative and rational subject, but to make a claim about a life not worth living is to hint at the long history that will extinguish, **eliminate**, **harness** and evaluate unworthy lives, and will do so precisely by way of capacity. Outside explicit work on extinction and outside the rich field of disability studies it is possible to find constant and complex linkages between the question of the worth of life (its capacity or ability) and whether such a life ought to exist. Many **such arguments are utilitarian**; and while utilitarianism might seem to be but one branch of (analytic) philosophy, part of my argument will be that as a conception of the liberal subject of capacity gains ascendency and takes on increasing value in neo-liberal arguments for autonomy, and as the planet faces accelerated and mass extinction, **a utilitarian logic becomes increasingly dominant**. Utilitarianism is a motif that will necessarily **haunt questions** of extinction and capacity: as resources and the capacity to survive become threatened **decisions will** need to **be made regarding the worth of life.** Precisely in this respect it is **utilitarianism** that has also articulated the **most offensive position** on disability. By offensive, here, I am not referring to an affect **or emotion**, but rather – as in the manner of a **military** **offensive – a direct** and **forthright targeting** of what has been set aside as “disabled. Here, it might seem that a utilitarian approach is partial, and that there are other ethical paradigms, which of course there are; but I want to argue that the extreme positions that **utilitarianism has** yielded**, bring** to **the fore what is implicit in a broader history of ethics focused on** personhood **and a life worth living**. One of the objections to calculations of utility would be by way of a deeper or inviolable conception of the person, but this too relies upon distinguishing between what counts as “utility” and what would warrant a mode of “dignity” beyond calculation. For Nussbaum, the key stakes of justice lie in considering what counts as a dignified life, where dignity includes capacities that extend beyond social utility and mutual advantage. Her claim is that dignity should be the basis for social entitlements, and that we attribute dignity not for rational and active powers, but for “our” animal fragility: “bodily need, including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and our sociability; it is one aspect of our dignity, then, rather than something to be contrasted with it” (2006, 160). This is perhaps why Nussbaum’s title refers to “species membership,” as though feeling and caring for one’s kind (which would, in part, include non-human animals) is not only a recognition of dignity, but dignifies one’s own life. To suffer, to be fragile is to possess a life worth living. Here, Nussbaum refers to the value and enhancement (beyond strict utility) of caring for others, and of having social relationships with those whose capacities are not those of the classic rational individual; her approach on capacities “includes the advantage of respecting the dignity of people with mental disabilities and developing their human potential, whether or not this potential is socially “useful” in the narrower sense. It includes, as well, the advantage of understanding humanity and its diversity that comes from associating with mentally disabled people on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity” (2006,147). Nussbaum presents her account as a broadening of theories of human justice by way of a more classical conception of the life worth living, one not reduced to narrow notions of mutual advantage. Even though her discourse and disciplinary terrain might appear to be strictly philosophical, the very mode of posing the question of what we owe to a life is really (ultimately) the question that presses itself upon human civilization now, and always. As “we” look to the future and the sixth great extinction event the question of who and what survives will be imposed upon us. **Utilitarian approaches** to this question are, as I have already suggested, offensive, but they are because they **disclose something offensive – or combative, violent, conquering – in the** philosophical **tradition of** dignified humanity and **the life worth living**. In this respect, disability is neither a recent nor a local concern: the very formation of the Greek polity is based on the exclusion of those with lesser capacities. Even though, as Lennard Davis (2013) has argued, the notion of the “normal” body is very recent and is quite different from earlier cultures’ conception of an ideal body that no actual member of the species achieves, the **exclusion** of those who do not possess the **proper potentiality** of political humanity has been **at the basis of the history of the Western polity**. When Nussbaum argues for an expanded sense of capacities she nevertheless, and necessarily, maintains the question of the life worth living. This classic philosophical question always and necessarily invokes ability, or, more accurately, disability, and this in two respects. Not only are subjects defined by way of powers (of reason, deliberation and empathy), those capacities in turn are enabled by a history of technologies and archives upon which “able” subjects are increasingly dependent. At the very least, **definitions of proper political persons rely upon quite specific capacities that, even in expanded scenarios are not all-inclusive**. More importantly, the quite specific concept of the **liberal, deliberative, rational and empathetic subject** depends upon **a history of “enlightenment”** that **disabled many lives**, either by way of **exclusion**, **colonialism**, **resource depletion**, or **expropriation**. In a world where not all lives matter to the same extent, the concept of disability is precisely what enables political inclusion, privilege and personhood. When Peter Singer argues, in a manner that appears to be exceptional, and exceptionally offensive that rationality and autonomy (and not species membership) are the capacities that would preclude us from being right in killing another human being, he is taking part in a far broader offensive that is definitive of the philosophical epoch oriented around the question of the life worth living. Not only is the question of the life worth living offensive (in its implicit generation of an unworthy life), the life worth living is a life of dependence and incapacity, generated through a history of enlightenment that is a history of appropriation, plundering, brigandry, excessive consumption and energy profligacy. Could we **have the able political subject of deliberation and reason without the planet-destructive history of industrialism and globalism** **that** at once **enables and disables** what has come to be known as **humanity**? **Could there have been a tradition of “the life worth living” without a global industry that generated unworthy and dis-abled lives**? And is not the question of the life worth living, the capable life, intertwined essentially with dependence and incapacity? **What I want to question here is whether such a question can have *any coherence at all* in an epoch of extinction**: **to ask about lives worth living is necessarily to be offensive, asserting some lives over others, and thereby waging violence (however slow) against some forms of life**. **If, as I would also argue, any epoch of thriving and fecundity takes place at the expense of some lives, then all ages are ages of extinction**. What makes our time – the sixth mass extinction – more intense is that questions that have always haunted political personhood are now becoming more explicit. The interrelated problem of **capacity** and **extinction** has not only determined the human lives that are deemed to be worth living, but has also generated the **liberal political person** whose autonomy, productivity, super-intelligence and heightened capacity for urbanity is the “Anthropos” of the Anthropocene, the “man” whose cost to the planet is too exorbitant to reckon (Luke 2015). When (today) **utilitarian arguments are explicitly offensive**, or make the claim that **some lives ought not be lived**, they **reveal the** offensive (**combative, polemical, violent, barbaric, sacrificial) nature of** what has called itself **civilization**. If this civilization, today, is **facing extinction** and therefore pressed – more than ever – to consider ways of “**weighing lives**,” it may either continue with ever more nuanced and expanded conceptions of the worth of life, or it may regard this question itself as an indictment of the very rationality it seeks to save. Phrased differently, we might say that the problem of disability runs to the very heart of the extinction-logic that enables the political tradition of the person. Both those who assume that the human species – because of certain capacities – has a prima facie right to survive, and those who calculate that human life as such is not worth living (for all their seeming extremity) are expressions of a broader logic of the proper potentiality of a highly normative conception of human flourishing. As an example of the prima facie “right to humanity,” I would cite Rebecca Newberger Goldstein’s defense of Sellars and philosophical progress. The rational image we have of ourselves, even when at odds with scientific evidence about the irrational causes of our behavior, will generate on ongoing history of coherence and inclusion, where the rational “we” extends itself to value others: Gregarious creatures that we are, our framework of making ourselves coherent to ourselves commits us to making ourselves coherent to others. Having reasons means being prepared to share them—though not necessarily with everyone. The progress in our moral reasoning has worked to widen both the kinds of reasons we offer and the group to whom we offer them. There can’t be a widening of the reasons we give in justifying our actions without a corresponding widening of the audience to which we’re prepared to give our reasons. Plato gave arguments for why Greeks, under the pressures of war, couldn’t treat other Greeks in abominable ways, pillaging and razing their cities and taking the vanquished as slaves. But his reasons didn’t, in principle, generalize to non-Greeks, which is tantamount to denying that non-Greeks were owed any reasons. Every increase in our moral coherence—recognizing the rights of the enslaved, the colonialized, the impoverished, the imprisoned, women, children, LGBTs, the handicapped ...—is simultaneously an expansion of those to whom we are prepared to offer reasons accounting for our behavior. The reasons by which we make our behavior coherent to ourselves changes together with our view of who has reasons coming to them. And this is progress, progress in increasing our coherence, which is philosophy’s special domain. In the case of manumission, women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, criminals’ rights, animal rights, the abolition of cruel and unusual punishment, the conduct of war—in fact, almost every progressive movement one can name—it was reasoned argument that first laid out the incoherence, demonstrating that the same logic underlying reasons to which we were already committed applied in a wider context. The project of rendering ourselves less inconsistent, initiated by the ancient Greeks, has left those ancient Greeks, even the best and brightest of them, far behind, just as our science has left their scientists far behind. This kind of progress, unlike scientific progress, tends to erase its own tracks as it is integrated into our manifest image and so becomes subsumed in the framework by which we conceive of ourselves (Newberger Goldstein 2014). For all its manifest worthiness the notion of a progressive “self-image” that gains in progressive global coherence, alongside scientific progress, sees its path of self-correction as improving with more and more human life taking part in the journey of development. One could make the rather obvious point that such a notion of “progress” by way of inclusion and ongoing “self-image” precludes other ways of thinking about human and non-human life that do not involve self-image (or some shared normative conception of “the human”); but in addition to the colonialist mentality of self-justification, one might ask about the price paid for such a history of philosophical progress. Would not other modes of life – such as those without an over-investment in “self-image” or “the” human – have generated a quite different history of the planet? Such a question cannot be asked if a certain mode of human reason is an unquestioned good. But just as the inflation of human personhood precludes asking the question of the loss and extinction of other lives with other capacities, certain arguments for the extinction and annihilation of part or all of humanity also assume the value of the person – a single life with its specific coherence, value and meaning. (Not only is such a notion historically and culturally specific, and tied to a highly normative conception of human self-awareness; it is also this self with an unquestioned right to the “good life” of reflection, reason and self-determination that has generated the Anthropocene.) When this prima facie right to life has been questioned it has, more often than not, been by way of the same norms of capacity, will, autonomy and personhood that supposedly make life worth living. David Benatar has argued that the human species as such should – after rational consideration -- decide that it ought not exist. If we were to calculate the pleasures and pains of human existence, then not only would we decide on non-existence as the best way to ensure the reduction of suffering; we would also realize that while there is an imperative to eliminate suffering there is no symmetrical imperative to bring persons into being to generate pleasures or well being. Benatar does not see a performative contradiction in being a will who decides that it is better not to exist as a willing being; once we come into being there is a rational reason to persist in our being and live as well as possible, but that does not entail that we should will other lives to come into being. Benatar's argument is an intensified form of an argument that has profound implications for disability (Benatar 2006). Peter Singer has argued that being human is not sufficient to justify a life worth living, and that the calculus of pain, suffering and living well should prompt us to choose the life of some animals -- who could enjoy lives free of suffering -- over the lives of some humans, whose quality of life would not count as living well. It is for this reason that Singer can at once argue that animals ought not be killed for human consumption, and that some forms of infanticide are legitimate. For Singer, it is the lack of rationality, autonomy and a certain appreciation of life (rather than being human) that renders life not worth living: “the fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings” (Singer 1993, 182). Singer expands on this point by considering a specific type of disability and what it precludes: “to have a child with Down syndrome is to have a very different experience from having a normal child. It can still be a warm and loving experience, but we must have lowered expectations of our child’s ability. We cannot expect a child with Down syndrome to play the guitar, to develop an appreciation of science fiction, to learn a foreign language, to chat with us about the latest Woody Allen movie, or to be a respectable athlete, basketballer or tennis player’’ (Singer 1994, 213). This degree of disability does not necessarily warrant infanticide or abortion, but what does count is development; the more capacity a being develops the less ethical it is to terminate a life. If parents choose to abort an “abnormal” fetus, then they do so at a stage prior to the development of the capacities that would make killing unethical; the same applies to infanticide. It is not species membership but capacity that counts. Both Benatar and Singer rely upon a strict utilitarianism; species and sentiment aside, one should decide on whether a life is worth living in general, where worthiness can (at the very least) be determined by an absence of suffering. In contrast with arguments that begin from the sanctity of the person, one begins with a calculus: a good life is a free self-determining life. If one accepts the premise of a life worth living then certain lives become candidates for non-being (for Singer this is the profoundly disabled, while for Benatar it is humanity as such). It seems that questions of utility, or of what counts as a life with a sufficient degree of pleasure (or meaningfulness, or autonomy) lead inevitably to questions of human non-being: are there some lives that simply should not be? One might respond to this by objecting that the calculus of decision presupposes that which it claims to have justified; the subject who is doing the calculating, who is deciding on what ought to survive and how lives ought to be weighed is – needless to say – a certain type of subject. This subject has the following capacities: a sense of ‘a’ life, a sense of capacity (with rationality and autonomy being of significant importance), a sense of ‘humanity’ as a global whole of which one is a member, and a manner of looking at life in terms of worthiness. One should not need too much training in anthropology, history or critical race studies to discern the highly specific nature of these capacities. This is not just to make a point about the poverty and brutality of Western reason and its normalizing gestures; it is also to say that many of the critiques of that same universal subject – such as those who argue for the worth of other lives, or those who value life as such for whatever reason – nevertheless take part in a rationing of life that is offensive. Here, I draw again on the necessarily offensive/combative character of any assessment of the worth of life. Even if the worth of life is defined by less strictly utilitarian categories such as “meaning” or “dignity” a certain capacity for calculus, for considering something like human life as such, and then the value of “a” life, allows for the claim that certain lives being extinguished, and enables a life of high-capacity (high-production, high reason, high technology) that has precipitated the sixth mass extinction. The calculations of Singer and Benatar are different in important ways and related in important ways. For Benatar, a lot depends on pleasure and pain not being symmetrical: even if most of my life were one of enjoyment, the non-being of enjoyment is not a loss, whereas the being of suffering is a loss. Not existing, and therefore the absence of pleasure is not a straightforward negative in the way that suffering is: when one is suffering it makes sense to want to eliminate suffering, to will suffering away. But it does not make the same sense, in a state of non-being, to will pleasure (and the existence it would require) into being. Singer, by contrast, is concerned with non-being not because he deems human life to be worthless but because – quite the contrary -- he accepts a certain worthiness of some modes of existence. There are some forms of human life that are so impoverished or incapacitated that “we” who exist and have developed reason are permitted not to bring them into being: “Shakespeare’s image of life as a voyage is consistent with the idea that the seriousness of taking life increases gradually, parallel with the gradual development of the child’s capacities that culminate in its life as a full person” (Singer 1996, 216). The unit of life by which we calculate who lives and who dies (what counts as suffering) begs the question: should we really be able to decide that some lives (ranging from all human life to disabled human lives) ought not exist? One could say, following Kant, that being able to make such a calculus -- being able to ask about what life ought to be -- destroys any unit that would allow lives to be weighed in relation to each other. Rather than have a measure that would negotiate who lives, one would value life precisely because it is without measure. Indeed, our lament or preliminary mourning for the possible extinction of humans would lie in the anticipated loss not of our species being but of the intelligence that enabled the thought of our species being. Even a cursory glance at “end of world” narratives reveals that what presents itself as the end of “the” world is really the end of the “rational” world of capable persons. Post-apocalyptic scenarios present humans wandering aimlessly in resource-deprived landscapes, subjected (once again) to tribalism, despotism and the loss of all “reason.” (As one recent example one might think of Mad Max: Fury Road [2015] where the remaining populace has become nothing more than a multitude focused on mere survival. One feature of “post”-apocalyptic cultural production is that there is a world after the end of the world, but it is no longer the world of liberal affluent personhood; “we” are suddenly “all” living in third world conditions.) One might say that what would be lost in the end of the world – or that what we fear when we contemplate human extinction – is not the loss of the world, or of life (for both would continue) but the loss of what has come to count as “rational” or “intelligent” life. It is not so much calculated as calculating life that is worthy of living on, and while there are some general preliminary mourning rituals for the sixth mass extinction, cultural production seems to be more concerned with the extinction of Western middle-class urban capitalist life. One can think here of the large number of “end of world” narratives that are really “end of Manhattan” plots, from The Day After Tomorrow (2004) and Cloverfield (2008) to the book and documentary The World Without Us (2007) that begins by describing New York going through a slow decay after humans are no longer there to maintain the altered landscape. So, yes, there is a broad perception of the looming extinction of more than human life, but it occurs in a context of an increasing focus on the loss of the only life worth saving, a life that is not calculable precisely because it is the life of the point of view of reason, where reason – in turn – is a highly specific (or species-defining) range of capacities. For Nick Bostrom (director of the “Future of Humanity Institute” at Oxford University) it is obvious, upon rational reflection, that the loss of intellectual life as such would be of a catastrophic order that far outweighs the tragedy of losing some or many humans. Bostrom follows Derek Parfitt in “demonstrating” that a loss of all rational human life, despite first assumptions, would be far far worse than losing nearly all rational life. Despite our first intuitions, events that appear to be profoundly catastrophic (like the Holocaust) are – ultimately – events from which “we” recover. What would be truly disastrous is a loss of rationality, rather than the loss of a very large number of humans. Bostrom calculates that all most of our efforts ought to be directed at the reduction of existential risk; minimizing the risk of the catastrophic loss of intelligence in general is a far greater priority (or ought to be) than - say -- reducing the risk of local catastrophes (such as the genocidal losses that humans have already sustained but which, on reflection, do not amount to that much of a loss in the scheme of things). So we might say that both for Benatar and for Bostrom, despite the seemingly opposed claims for human extinction (Benatar) or human survival at all costs (Bostrom), there is a prima facie value placed on human capacity defined as rationality of a certain mode: If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1016 human lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average con- temporary human life, which is so often marred by dis- ease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations) … If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilisations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realised. Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonisation and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives (Bostrom 2013, 18). This is what connects Bostrom's work on avoiding existential risk with his work on the importance of technological and cognitive enhancement: life is valuable because it is intelligent, and a maximally intelligent life is one that is pain-free, stupidity-free and death-free. If human life is worthy of existence only if it is pain-free or at least pain-free for the most part, then it follows that -- as Benatar argues -- the life that we have now is not worth living. Where Benatar and Bostrom differ is not over value -- both value life only in its maximally capable mode, as does Singer -- but in prediction: Bostrom sees human life at present as incapacitated, not yet technologically mature, and tragically subjected to a death and suffering that it ought -- rationally and upon reflection -- avoid. An extreme position, such as Benatar’s, that argues for willed extinction of the human species does at least follow from his premise that only a certain type of life is worth living. We might respond to such “reasoning” that we can, and should, avoid willed extinction (of ourselves, or of a version of ourselves, or others) by shifting ethical terrain. Liberalism in its best mode would not determine in advance what counts as a life worth living, and would therefore go so far as to include lives that were not only not super intelligent but also worthy, even if not capable of the high levels of reasoning that are demanded of autonomous political subjects. As we have already seen, Martha Nussbaum has argued that we ought to include those whose lives involve different capacities and needs, and accommodate those who must care for persons who would not meet the demands of traditional political subjects. One might even formulate a more nuanced mode of utilitarianism from such considerations: would a world in which “we” cared for those not able to care for themselves not be a more enjoyable world? Or would it not - at least -- suggest values other than those of enjoyment, such as the value of experiencing human dignity, love, compassion and care? If utilitarianism pushes us towards calculations of who ought to live, of whether life ought to be extinguished, and of weighing lives, then an expanded liberal conception of personhood would say that the very possibility of asking that question -- who should live? -- necessarily destroys calculus and pushes us to the question of how one ought to live, which in turn precludes the possibility of anyone having the expertise or measure of deciding on the being or non-being of other humans. What a relief. We have done away with the awful weighing of lives. We allow every person to decide what counts as being human. And for those not blessed with the power to decide, we also allow for those who must care for humans who don't quite meet the conditions of liberal personhood. **Get rid of ~~blindly~~ rationalized utilitarianism and you get rid of the specter of extinction.** Unfortunately, if some forms of rational calculus seem to foist the problem of human non-being before us, the problem of human non-being (or imminent extinction) **drags us back into utilitarianism**. This is very clear in more applied versions of utilitarianism and especially the discourse of health economics where distributions and doing good can be determined by calculating “**qalys**” (**quality adjusted life years**) or “**dalys**” (**disability adjusted life years**) [Murray 1996]; we might want to reject utilitarianism and health economics’ rationalizations, but I would suggest **that luxury of refusing calculus has always been a luxury for some**. Tim Mulgan (2011), in a thought experiment that writes the history of philosophy from the “broken world” of the future, argues that just as we look back with horror and puzzlement on Ancient Greece and its notions of philosopher kings and natural slaves, so **the future “broken world” of resource depletion will look back with wonder at the world of free liberal personhood that could proceed without calculation or “survival lotteries.” This world (of ours, today) will appear as a bizarre exception to a future world that inevitably confronts questions of who ought to survive**. **Not everyone can live, and not all lives are viable. If we are faced with a world of limited resources, where the life of the liberal person and favorable conditions is simply not sustainable, then however we might want to avoid it, we will be forced to ask about what counts as a viable life**. Mulgan's future broken world of **survival lotteries**, or a world in which some humans -- because of the sheer luck of the draw -- do not survive has not only **already arrived**: it has always been present. **Was there ever a time when the world came even *vaguely* close to** John Rawls’s “favorable conditions” where **justice** was the same **for all?** I would suggest, in a manner that differs from that of Benatar, that what has emerged as human, as man, is constitutively disabled, and that if there is anything like a sustainable life it is precisely the life that has been extinguished in the name of the valuably and capably (or super-intelligent) human. Rather, then, than reject utility and calculus because of the offensive it directs to those lives it deems to be incapable, disabled or unworthy, I would suggest that by its own calculus the “man” of liberal reason who both generates and refuses utility is maximally self-disabling. By the same token the figures of life that seem to demand non-being are perhaps the only forms of humanity that do not, by their own calculation, generate a calculus that leads inexorably to extinction. As a case study I would like to consider a case of extinction or genocide, where one group of humans decided that the human species could - possibly - benefit by eliminating one of its kind who was not quite of its kind. The use of the term genocide, or talking about the extinction of a race, has a recent and problematic history. One has to accept the concept of a genus of the human species in order to target distinct kinds of humans. A certain racial logic pertains both to targeted genocides, but also in more well-meaning claims that certain events of colonial violence are best thought of as events of genocide. In the case of the “last Tasmanian Aborigine,” there might seem to be some political value in identifying British colonialist strategy as a genocidal regime aiming to “breed out the color” of the Australian Aboriginal peoples. Mourning the loss of a people, and focusing on irrevocable loss might go some way to forcing contemporary Australians to realizing that the past is not the past, that **the drive towards the extinction of a people is not extinct**. In the conclusion of this chapter I want to question the genocidal logic that lies behind claims for lives worth living, and for human capacities that are distinct from species membership, while at the same time recognizing that the use of the term “genocide” for all its **assumptions that humans can be grouped into species and genus, is always an offensive (agonistic) strategy**. One thing that one has to deal with, or deal with to set aside in the discussion of genocide in Australia, is the kerfuffle that became known as the history wars. If you research online about the genocide or breeding out of the Aboriginal peoples, you will come across the highly informative website of Keith Windshuttle whose work is motivated by the desire to rid the Australian collective psyche of what he deems to be a pathological guilt and mourning (Windshuttle 2010). One of the motivating contexts for his work was the government report on the stolen generation, which detailed the ongoing strategy of removing Aboriginal children from their families. One way in which this strategy was understood was as an attempt to breed out color, and it is this notion that Windshuttle rejects: what occurred may have been lamentable and part of a broad strategy of colonialism but not genocide. If one wants to challenge Windshuttle’s account it would make sense to emphasize race, and not to say that deep down we are all human and therefore what took place was “merely” colonization. **If one does not recognize race one is blind to racial strategy, and if one does not recognize genocidal strategy then one does not recognize the ongoing specter of a particular type of assimilationist violence**. However, one further problem attends the strategy of claiming that genocidal intent was directed against Australian Aboriginal peoples: the mourning (by way of a highly languid television documentary) of the last Tasmanian not only displaces colonial violence to a different time and place, it also maintains the notion of “a” race that could be isolated and extinguished, and implicitly claims that there are now no persons who might claim land rights on the basis of being tied to the land. The “extinction” of “the” Tasmanian Aborigine is at once a cultural fantasy about a violent colonization that is well and truly in the past, and an erasure of other modalities of being human that “we” mourn as lost. On the one hand, non-indigenous Australians need the notion of Aboriginals who are tied to land by way of a timeless dreaming, rather than ownership or filiation: there must be, somewhere, a sense of space and time that is not that of managerial capitalism. And yet, it is precisely that thought of another humanity -- one that was sufficiently other to the point that it could be extinguished -- that allowed claims that Tasmanian Aborigines were extinct (and therefore no longer a burden for land rights claims). Once again it is a certain type or form of subject that can look at the array of human lives and claim that “a” race has become extinct; this purveying eye that has a command of history, anthropology, life and time both requires and erases any mode of “the human” other than its own capable kind. We seem to be poised, as liberal multiculturalism often is, between post-racial claims for a general humanity that does not need to be marked or set apart to achieve a right, and a politically astute account of the ways in which **white colonizing capitalism achieved its universality by erasing and exterminating others, and creating them as other by way of strategies of cultural erasure**. But I want to suggest that **this seemingly intractable and universal problem is a problem for a portion of humanity, and a portion that has the logic of extinction at its heart**. Let us go back to the first problem of who ought to live and why, or the question of how one ought to live, and what counts as a good life, or a life worth living. As I suggested, problems of extinction bring in, it seems, a form of utilitarianism: how do we manage the survival of life, maximizing life, and maximizing good life? At the same time, questions of utility seem to raise the specter of extinction: some lives might just not be worth living. But perhaps these questions are already racial, bound up with **the “man” of Western reason** who **is not a species**. From the Socratic elevation of the examined life, to the various forms of post-humanism that range from assuming that there is a prima facie value attached to the ongoing survival of thinking to the inclusion of non-humans as persons, **White Western man does not have a race**: but he does not have a race because he asks the question of the value of life, of what it means to live. He is at once **the only man to face extinction** -- for when we view contemporary cinema and television about the end of the world it is the end of this man (the man of libraries, familial man, post-racial man, the man of reason) who is threatened with extinction, or the world's end. **What we witness is not genocide, but the end of the world**. It is because this man has always asked about “the good life” -- even if that is a liberal life that has no good other than the asking of the question -- that he can be the victim of extinction. **Asking the question of the good life, of how “one” ought to live is both genocidal and extinction-generating.** Since its invasion Australia was deemed to be terra nullius partly on the basis of rampant opportunism, but also because a form of (indigenous) life was not recognized as properly human. Not only were indigenous Australians not property-owning, industrious and industrializing developers of the land with a techno-science oriented to the maximization of a life they identified as human, and thereby not deemed worthy of recognition, **the very logic of techno-science that could only recognize such cultures as minor and racial (distinct, enigmatic) would be the same planet-transforming “species” that now proclaims itself as author of the Anthropocene**. **The very possibility of utilitarian questions -- who ought to live, is this a life worth living, how might we live on maximally?-- is part of a logic of appropriation, extension, survival and calculus that divides species/genus questions. There are metaphysical questions -- about how “one” ought to live, and the life worth living -- and these are for man, who is not a species but a potentiality - a power of thinking and living that transcends any body**. And then there are genus questions, how “we” negotiate different claims for survival. It makes sense to mourn the extinction of “the” Aboriginal people, for those people have a race that might survive only by way of blood, language, culture and a distinct archive. To conclude, I would note first that what counts as **the individual of ability** -- where self and ability are mutually constitutive -- is at the heart of the “Anthropos” who **has precipitated** itself and others into **accelerated extinction. The self of technoscience can easily be tied to the pollution of the earth, but so can the universalizing self of liberal** and **utilitarian theory**: I **can kill, exterminate and save if I have the ability to think** beyond myself to the curious value of life as such, of **life that might be maximized and weighed.** The self of disability might appear to be secondary or parasitic concern, but I would argue the contrary: it is organic disability that requires a body to generate techne, stored energy and archives; the more this dependence is mastered, the more a disequilibrium opens up between those who render themselves productively and theoretically able and those who possess different abilities and disabilities. I am not just saying that had “we” not developed all those abilities that are definitive of the liberal subject the earth would be better off, as though human excellence came at a price to non-humans, I am saying that the very questions of how one ought to live, of the value and meaning of life, of weighing life, creates a specific terrain and orientation that is now reaching its limit. It is not, then, that **the self of liberalism and utilitarianism** needs to expand and include other modes of the self, to be more caring to those not blessed with the same abilities; that self **needs to be seen not as the basis of the species that must be saved, but as a genus tied inextricably to logics of extinction. One can only calculate the worth of living, at the expense or cost of other life, if one has a conception of life, and it is that general conception that is both historically and culturally odd, and that requires an anthropology**. How did some living beings constitute themselves as an ability to evaluate life? How is it possible for a being to ask about the value of one life as opposed to another life? How is it that the agonistics of life became a calculus? I want to point out not only that there are many modes of being human for whom the overall existence and extinction of the human is not a problem, but that **the modality for whom extinction of intellectual life is a problem, is a self of white, modern, calculative ability that is exceptional and not the default setting of the species - if there is such a thing.** Gilles Deleuze, writing on Foucault, points towards the specificity of the man-form, that comes into being by way of a certain type of question (Deleuze 1988). What allows something like “man” to emerge is that rather than see his being as an aspect of a complex whole that he knows with some degree of clarity and distinction, he comes to know himself clearly and distinctly, and then places what is other than himself -- nature, life, the biological or species being of the human -- in parentheses. We are distanced from that life, but that distance or absence of foundation, allows us to become self-legislating, contractual, formally rational subjects. Life does not tell us what to do, and we are not simple expressions of life; the human, or man as question, must now labor over whether all life makes a claim to be, or whether the being who asks that question -- a being liberated from mere life -- has some privilege: do we save the local, indigenous, immediate and unreflective; or, does the capacity to ask that question create every other form of life as one expression of anthropological calculating man? When philosophers dispute about a life worth living, arguing for or against whether a life is able enough to live, they are part of the same voice that can observe fragments of the human species as a genus, or a particular kind of a general species, over which a single voice might range. **End of the world narratives, and scenarios of catastrophic risk** - such as those of Nick Bostrom -- **contemplate** the **extinction of this “genus which is not one,”** and assume both that this would be **the catastrophe of all catastrophes**, and that humanity is necessarily defined by a certain concept of **personhood** that is irreducible to the human species. Indeed, it is ability -- in Bostrom's case, intelligence - that needs to be preserved; it is this life that would count as extinction as such, and not “merely” genocide. An anthropological and calculative “we” emerges by way of technologies **that generate and calculate the worth of “a” life, and this life is the life of a person: a being who is distinct from nature, and** who may even calculate something like their own right to life or **cost to the earth** by way of a carbon footprint, imagining that they might live on this earth but deftly erase any damage to their milieu. It is this same person, distinct by way of certain predicates, who might view and weigh other human non-persons as members of a genus, as instances of a way of life to be preserved, or not.

### C/I---Personal Thought

#### Counter-interpretation: debaters must defend an implementable change in personal thought.

#### We meet, they don’t. Vote neg:

#### 1] Education.

#### A] Most decisions people make are not government policies, but changes in personal thought. Outweighs on scope. Also on magnitude, because personal thought is a pre-req to political attitudes.

#### B] Their standard crowds out humanistic perspective and forces us to make technocratic poli-sci arguments that dismiss our thought as irrelevant.

#### 2] Fairness.

#### A] Their demands create time skew where we have to defend a hyperspecific policy which prevents us from explaining the k. Also an internal link to education because that prevents us from fully educating you on ableism.

#### B] Prep skew. We shouldn’t be punished for wanting to research ableism, as long as we link to the resolution. Under their model debate exclusively benefits traditional debaters that want to research policy action which makes it impossible for people with different interests to win. It’s also an independent education warrant, because it creates a model of debate with more diverse arguments discussed.

#### Cross apply their voters.

#### Cross apply these as disads to their interp.

### Defense---General

#### 1] We meet. The alt is incredibly specific---[EXPLAIN WHY]. They’ll argue policy-centric advocacies are less vague but force them to defend why---none of their standards connect to their specifics---means no abuse.

#### 2] We advocate an actor---[PEOPLE IN ROUND/THE JUDGE/YOU] is no more vague than the USFG.

#### 3] We meet. The [X] ev provides a highly nuanced explanation---they never explain how the aff is done which means they don’t meet the spirit of their standards.

#### 4] Vagueness is undefined and create moving goal posts---their interp proves they’ll argue we’re vague regardless to avoid engaging with our argument.

### Defense---Specific

#### SHIFTINESS is arbitrary and they massively recontextualize offense through perms and theory. You also flow and can tell if something is extended differently. Make them to give examples of shiftiness.

#### We control the best links to REAL WORLD EDUCATION per our framing ev---they decimate real world education with theory debates without any portability. AND the alt isn’t revolutionary---it’s just a decision to evaluate something in a new way.

## Links

#### Jayanti is ableist. Nueva is blue.

1AC Jayanti [Suriya; December 4; LL.M. in Energy & Environmental Law from KU Leuven, Ph.D. in Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources Law, energy policy expert, former U.S. diplomat; Time, “Nuclear Power Is the Only Solution,” https://time.com/6342343/nuclear-energy-climate-change/] rchen

Wedged between energy crises and climate change natural disasters, there is no longer the luxury of choice. The **industry** has **responded** by seeking **to** develop new technology that can assuage public **concerns** about safety. Some are designing micro reactors or SMRs. Others are working with new materials or techniques, such as replacing water in cooling systems with molten salt, or using boiling water instead of pressurized water to make the NPP more efficient. Still others are **working** on **new safety systems**, or fuel fabrication innovations, or new approaches to storage of nuclear materials. In the U.S., top tier research outfits like the Electric Power Research Institute are finding their expertise in demand all round the world, creating something resembling nuclear diplomacy. The U.S., U.K, Canada, and South Korea are leading the pack on investment in nuclear. The nuclear industry has been riding high on a wave of enthusiasm for a few years. In recognition of the cost savings of “going nuclear,” smart companies are already making plans to transition to nuclear power. This includes Microsoft, which announced in September that it will use nuclear plants to power its artificial intelligence operations. With electrification the foundation of any coherent energy transition plan and grids struggling to balance themselves with an abundance of non-dispatchable renewables, nuclear is increasingly acknowledged to be the solution. Just as apex science fiction writer Isaac Asimov fantasized in his 1940-50s Foundation books, nuclear energy may save humanity. And yet, recent headlines have revealed some major setbacks. Small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) company NuScale, once lauded as the leading SMR developer and despite receiving almost $2 billion in U.S. government support, has cancelled its flagship project due to rising costs and mismanagement. It is now facing investor lawsuits for fraud. TerraPower, Bill Gates’ SMR company, was delayed several years by the Russian invasion of Ukraine—Russia was the only country that produced the nuclear fuel needed for TerraPower’s SMR design. X-Energy has walked back its plans to go public. The U.K.’s Rolls Royce SMR is plagued by financial problems. France’s EDF is posting record low power outputs and financial status reports. Others are also delayed, struggling, or facing bankruptcy. Setbacks are normal for new technologies and emerging markets, but for nuclear power such bumps in the road have outsized potential to disrupt because many people are still hesitant or downright hostile to nuclear power. The Chornobyl, Fukushima Daiichi, and Three Mile Island catastrophes loom large in the imagination. “Meltdown” itself has entered idiom to mean falling apart rapidly and irrationally and beyond control. The world’s preoccupation with Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhye nuclear power plant (NPP), the largest in Europe, shows how gripped we can be by nuclear disasters. In keeping, a March 2023 Gallup poll found that although support for nuclear is increasing slowly, 44% of Americans still somewhat or strongly oppose it, down from 54% in 2016. Similar polls in Switzerland and the U.K. peg support for nuclear at just 49% and 24%, respectively. In Germany, despite still being in the middle of an energy crisis and desperate for additional power sources, 50% of people under 34 want nuclear power eradicated. With the exception of France, which is 69% nuclear, many of the developed world’s leading economies and governments have been too scared of nuclear power to allow it to flourish. Germany was so spooked by Fukushima it completely phased out its nuclear power program, finally turning off its last three (of an original 17) reactors on April 15, 2023. Belgium and Switzerland decided not to build new plants and to phase out those existing, although the 2021-2023 energy crisis has forced a reconsideration. In the U.S. the trigger was the March 28, 1979 partial meltdown of Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. No one died or even suffered negative health effects, in the aftermath dozens of planned NPPs were cancelled and almost nothing has been built in decades. Unfortunately, unencumbered by popular opinions against nuclear, the Western world’s great geostrategic rivals are years if not decades ahead. There are sixty nuclear projects in various stages of construction around the world, and 22 of them are in China; and 22 use Russian technology, and 18 use Chinese technology, or technology China stole from other countries and rebranded. Some European countries, notably Hungary and Serbia, and some NATO countries, such as Turkey, are planning new NPPs using Russian designs and supply chains. Ironically, and tragically, even all four of Ukraine’s NPPs are Russian VVER models, entirely reliant until quite recently on Russian fuel. And Russia controls much of nuclear supply chains.  The Western world ended up so far behind because of fear. Governments around the world are now struggling to catch up, slowed by still-high public opposition rates and regulatory regimes that institutionalized fear of nuclear into licensing and permitting processes. In countries that never had nuclear power, such as Poland and Egypt, opposition is not baked into law, and so they can paradoxically move faster than some countries with longstanding nuclear programs. In the U.S. the opposite is true; it keeps tripping over the fear-based regulatory regimes that govern its nuclear industry. Tasked by Congress in the 2019 Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act with liberalizing the licensing process to foster innovation and accelerate the commercialization of nuclear power, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2022 released draft rules and processes for consideration of new nuclear technologies that managed to take all the worst and most burdensome aspects of existing rules and, instead of reducing them, added some new hurdles and standards, some of which nuclear engineers say are scientifically impossible to meet. The draft is twice as long (1252 pages) as the one it was supposed to simplify. Many requirements, both old and new, shouldn’t apply to SMRs and other advanced nuclear designs. The result was decried by experts and companies as a complete failure that will continue to hobble the industry for decades, adding further time and expenses to the already billion-dollar licensing process. The Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry trade group, said the proposal will “increase complexity and regulatory burden without any increase in safety and reduce predictability and flexibility.” Meanwhile the U.S. is trying to export this same cumbersome nuclear regulatory regime, including to Saudi Arabia. Calling it the “gold standard” of nuclear regulation, the U.S. has refused to allow Saudi, much like it did with the United Arab Emirates, to use U.S. nuclear technology unless the Kingdom also adopts prescribed U.S. safety regulations. What a surprise that Saudi is actively considering Russian nuclear technologies instead.   Yet, the scientific reality is that the rising generation of nuclear innovation doesn’t need to be subjected to a crippling approval process—it is safe. The **risk profile of new reactors** and other technologies in development is **very low**. This is especially true relative to the risks of climate change fallout or, for example, the health risks of burning fossil fuels or inhaling combustion engine exhaust. And the **waste** from a new nuclear plant is **far less problematic than** that of spent **solar panels**, for example. The **nuclear renaissance is** not just more nuclear power, it’s also better, **cleaner, safer, more efficient**. SMRs, for example, are much safer than full sized NPPs. They have outputs of 50-300 MW depending on design, compared to 800-1600 MW for traditional NPPs. Microreactors, “pocket nukes” with 1-50 MW outputs, are even more resilient because simple physics means they are harder to damage and so it’s less likely that an accident could result in a radioactive release. Whereas seismic activity is a grave concern for large NPPs like Fukushima, smaller technologies soon to be built do not require the seismic cushions that were needed under previous plants to protect them from even the smallest earthquakes. Micros and SMRs can also be manufactured in a factory—that’s what the “modular” in small modular reactor means — allowing for standardization and systematized security measures, as well as sealed transport. And smaller amounts of radioactive fuel in smaller reactors mean less that could go wrong even in the case of an accident. One persistent concern opponents of nuclear power often voice is the risk of reactor cooling systems failing, but this not an issue with the new generation of nuclear designs. Fukushima Daiichi NPP’s water-based cooling system stopped when a tsunami disabled the electricity source powering the circulation. This is the same risk Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhye NPP is facing thanks to Russia bombing the dam that held the water that kept the plant’s water cooling system operating. In emerging advanced reactor technologies, however, this vulnerability is eliminated entirely. Many of the new designs have entirely reconsidered systems with passive safety features that maintain cooling without reliance on external power. Others use water in innovative ways. GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 SMR is designed for the water inside to boil, creating its own convection that in turn powers its own cooling circulation. This eliminates the need for an extensive circulation system of pipes and keeps all potentially contaminated water inside the plant. Some also use materials other than water, such as molten salts. Another common objection to nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive material. But new technological innovations are mostly eradicating the need to store spent fuel at all. New fuels have a lower enrichment level, which is less radioactive and thus safer. And there’s no such thing as nuclear waste unless the material is wasted. Canada’s Moltex, for example, is developing a fuel recycling “waste to stable salt” technology that repurposes spent fuel into new fuel, reducing waste by over 75% and cutting its radioactive half life to approximately 300 years, down from thousands. Moltex is also designing an SMR, the Stable Salt Reactor-Wasteburner, to run on the recycled fuel, which will cut down the transport of radioactive materials. Other technologies are reducing risk in parallel.   **Nuc**lear **energy** will **never be** absolutely, **perfect**ly, guaranteeably safe **because nothing is**. **Wind** turbines can fall over, and they can kill birds and negatively impact marine life. **Solar** panels produce significant volumes of toxic waste, and they take up space that impedes whatever is trying to live under them. Both wind and solar rely on minerals and manufacturing mostly controlled by China, and neither is entirely reliable as a power source. They’re also not dispatchable at times of peak electricity demand. **Hydropower** only works with abundant water, and droughts are eviscerating rivers across the world. **Coal** is **killing** our children and our **planet. So is oil**. So is **natural gas**. Geothermal, biofuels, hydrogen, et cetera—**these aren’t able to satisfy** even a fraction of the **demand** for energy.

#### Their language is problematic. That’s another link

Emily Rapp Black, 6-17-21 (Emily is an author for Newsweek), “Why Ableist Language Needs to Change | Opinion” Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/why-ableist-language-needs-change-opinion-1601290, accessed 4/4/2025 //anika

It was like losing a limb. I was crippled by fear. Do not tamper with, disable or destroy the smoke detector. How many times have you heard these phrases? Likely more than once, and probably not in the presence of a person who has actually lost a limb. As an amputee since the age of four, I am particularly attuned to how commonplace it is to hear ableist language describing everything from economies (a "crippling" shift in the markets), to emotional and mental states ("hobbled" by grief), none of which have much to do with the realities of losing a limb. Words—and how we use them—matter. They allow us to recognize humanity in one another; they guide us on what to think and how to behave. When someone claims to be so sad it's as if they've lost a limb, or are experiencing phantom limb sensations, this is misleading. Using disability as a metaphor for disaster or loss only intensifies misunderstandings of what disabled bodies are able to do, what they are capable of achieving.

### On IFRs

#### N/!. Alt causes fill-in for U.S. emissions cuts.

Dylan Loh 24. Nikkei staff writer. “China, India may miss emission goals despite green energy push: report.” 2/21/24. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/China-India-may-miss-emission-goals-despite-green-energy-push-report

SINGAPORE -- China and India may miss their national greenhouse gas emission goals by the end of the current decade, even as both are set to contribute heavily to Asia's green energy push in areas like hydrogen, a report released on Wednesday said. The report by Wood Mackenzie, an energy and natural resources consultancy, projected that China's emission intensity is on track to fall 63% between 2005 and 2030, below the government target of 65%, while India's will drop 30% in this period -- lower than its target of 45%. Emissions intensity tracks the total amount of greenhouse gasses like carbon dioxide, which contribute to global warming and climate change, released per unit of economic output activity. "Every country in the Asia-Pacific region is vastly different in terms of population growth, economic development, policy landscape, what natural resources they have," said Prakash Sharma, vice president for scenarios and technologies research at Wood Mackenzie. "More importantly, what they don't have will determine how they transition to a low-emissions pathway." The consultancy pointed out that renewable technologies that help mitigate the negative effects of climate change are capital intensive, but the financial landscape is less favorable for this, with high interest rates, global cost inflation and supply chain issues slowing the pace of change. Wood Mackenzie said only the European Union and the U.K. come close to meeting their 2030 emissions reduction targets, while Asia is struggling to meet the milestones set to curb the release of greenhouse gasses. The Paris Agreement reached at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference set a goal of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions to hold global temperature increase to less than 2 C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 C above pre-industrial levels. Wood Mackenzie's report on Wednesday warned that global emissions remain far from the 1.5 C pathway, and that "emissions must fall rapidly across all sectors to meet the long-term climate targets." To work towards the goal of reaching climate targets, it recommended initiatives such as expanding the charging network for electric vehicles, emerging technologies such low-carbon hydrogen, and long duration energy storage as part of the solution. In the Asia-Pacific, the consultancy noted bright prospects for EV adoption. The number of EVs in the region is projected to rise from 24 million cars today to 635 million units by 2050, with this exponential growth driven by the affordability of the vehicles and the availability of resources in the region. Wood Mackenzie has tipped the Asia-Pacific to be a hub for new energy technologies, with low-carbon sources of power projected to rise to 75% by 2050, from the supply of 35% of power generated today, while the share of wind and solar energy increases to over 54%. The rapid growth in renewables that the consultancy expects will be accompanied by the adoption of energy storage, hydrogen, small modular nuclear reactors and geothermal technologies to aid in the transition to cleaner power, it said, with nearly 50% of the world's new technology opportunities for low-carbon emission to be found in the Asia-Pacific by 2050. "Several markets have established goals of achieving net zero emissions, few countries are currently on track to meet them," said Roshna Nazar, a research analyst for energy transition at Wood Mackenzie. "Robust carbon pricing, tax incentives, and supportive regulatory regimes are needed to incentivise the transition and close the emissions gap."

### On Fusion

### AT: Fusion---Topshelf---Tech

#### NQ. Private industry investment makes fusion inevitable by 2028.

Clifford 23 [Catherine Clifford (climate innovation and technology reporter), 5-10-2023, “Microsoft agrees to buy electricity generated from Sam Altman-backed fusion company Helion in 2028”, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/10/microsoft-agrees-to-buy-power-from-sam-altman-backed-helion-in-2028.html (accessed 3-23-2025)] ME

Microsoft said Wednesday it has signed a power purchase agreement with nuclear fusion startup Helion Energy to buy electricity from it in 2028.¶ The deal is a notable vote of confidence for fusion, which is the way the sun makes power and holds promise of being able to generate nearly unlimited clean power, if it can be harnessed and commercialized on earth. For decades, fusion been lauded as the holy grail of clean energy — tantalizing because it’s limitless and clean, but always just out of reach.¶ As responding to climate change has become an increasingly urgent goal for companies and countries around the globe, investors have poured $5 billion into private fusion companies looking to turn that holy grail into electrons flowing through wires.¶ Microsoft’s agreement to buy electricity from Helion is the first time a fusion company has inked a deal to sell electricity, according to Andrew Holland, the CEO of the Fusion Industry Association.¶ “This is the first time that I know of that a company has a power purchase agreement signed,” Holland told CNBC. “No one has delivered electricity, and Helion’s goal of 2028 is aggressive, but they have a strong plan for how to get there.”¶ Helion was founded in 2013 and currently has about 150 employees, with headquarters in Everett, Wash. One of the early and most significant investors in Helion, Sam Altman, is also a founder of OpenAI, the artificial intelligence organization that developed the chat platform ChatGPT, in which Microsoft has invested many billions of dollars. Altman believes the two deals are equally important and correlated components of the future he sees for humanity.¶ “My vision of the future and why I love these two companies is that if we can drive the cost intelligence and the cost of energy way, way down, the quality of life for all of us will increase incredibly,” Altman told CNBC. “If we can make AI systems more and more powerful for less and less money — same thing we are trying to do with energy at Helion — I view these two projects as spiritually very aligned.”¶ If demand for and use of artificial intelligence continues to increase, then that will increase demand for energy, too.¶ The potential of fusion is “unbelievably huge,” Altman told CNBC. “If we can get this to work — if we can really deliver on the dream of abundant, cheap, safe, clean energy that will transform society. It’s why I’ve been so passionate about this project for so long.”¶ In 2021, Altman told CNBC he put $375 million into Helion. As of Tuesday, this is still his largest investment ever, Altman told CNBC. In total, Helion has raised raised $577 million.¶ Why Helion is announcing a 2028 goal now¶ As part of the power purchase agreement, Helion is expected to have its fusion generation device online by 2028 and to reach its target power generation of 50 megawatts or more within an agreed-upon one-year ramp up period. When the fusion device is fully up to speed producing 50 megawatts of energy, it will be able to power the equivalent of approximately 40,000 homes in Washington state.¶ While Helion’s deal with Microsoft is to get 50 megawatts online, the company eventually aims to produce a gigawatt of electricity, which is one billion watts, or 20 times the 50 megawatts it is selling to Microsoft.¶ Microsoft will pay for the megawatt hours of electricity as Helion delivers them to the grid.¶ “This is a real PPA, so there’s financial penalties if Helion can’t deliver power. So we’ve really put our skin in the game on this too — that we believe we can deliver this power and are committed to it with our own financial incentives,” David Kirtley, CEO at Helion, told CNBC.¶ Altman advocated for the two companies to work together, he told CNBC, but the deal is the result of work Helion has done independently. “It was not my doing,” he said.¶ Microsoft and Helion have been working together for years, Kirtley told CNBC. “The first visit we had from the Microsoft team was probably three of our prototypes ago, so many years ago. And then we’ve been working very closely with their data center technology team here in Redmond,” Kirtley said.¶ After all, Microsoft needs power and has aggressive climate goals. Microsoft has a goal to have 100% of its electricity consumption, 100% of the time, matched by zero-carbon energy purchases by 2030. Carbon-free energy includes hydro, nuclear and renewables for Microsoft, a Microsoft spokesperson told CNBC.

#### NL. Recent advances in fusion are still net negative and too unpopular and expensive.

Abadi 23 [Cameron Abadi (), 1-8-2023, "Adam Tooze: Why Nuclear Fusion Is Not the Holy Grail", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/08/adam-tooze-why-nuclear-fusion-is-not-the-holy-grail/ (archived: https://archive.ph/j8DTF) (accessed 3-27-2025)] recut ME

Last month in California, a nuclear reactor produced 3.15 megajoules of energy using only 2.05 megajoules of energy input. That surplus has been treated as a major breakthrough in the future of energy because it was produced through the process of nuclear fusion. Experts have talked for decades about nuclear fusion’s potential as a carbon neutral source of energy without any of nuclear energy’s toxic waste.¶ What were the economics behind this breakthrough technology? Might it provide a status boost to old-fashioned engineering relative to computer engineering? And what’s the path from laboratory success to industrial use? Those are a few of the questions that came up in my recent conversation with FP economics columnist Adam Tooze on the podcast we co-host, Ones and Tooze. What follows is an excerpt, edited for length and clarity.¶ For the full conversation, look for Ones and Tooze wherever you get your podcasts.¶ Cameron Abadi: This breakthrough was achieved by the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Could you describe the history of the NIF and its relationship to the U.S. government?¶ Adam Tooze: It’s a project that goes back originally to some really far-out thinking in the 1950s about uses that could be made of atomic bombs for the purposes of power generation. And the original idea was literally to organize a continuous stream of atomic explosions underground—you know, find some suitably stable caves, and explode several atomic bombs a day to keep a huge mass of water boiling to generate lots of steam. Anyway, that’s where it started.¶ But out of all of this, from the late 1960s onward, came more serious programs in fusion energy, which essentially focused on lasers. And that’s what this National Ignition Facility is—it is the ultimate fire lighter, right? Basically it’s a gigantic torch or something—the sort of effect that you generate as a Boy Scout or a Cub Scout or whatever, when you start a fire by concentrating the heat of the sun using a magnifying glass. So that’s essentially what we’re doing. And the stunning success of the current round of experiments announced by the U.S. Department of Energy to the public a few weeks ago now is that now for the first time ever, the amount of energy generated by the fusion reaction is larger than the amount of energy fired at it by the laser.¶ Of course, the amount of energy necessary to generate the laser beam is multiples larger—in the case of this laser beam, somewhere between 150 times larger than the amount that actually reaches the fuel materials. So this is still a powerfully net negative reaction that we have going on here; it uses more energy than it produces. But at least hypothetically, if you could increase the yield and reduce the energy demands of the lasers, you could end up with a process that actually generates power on a large scale. The total cost to date is in the order of, I think, about $3.5 billion.¶ CA: How long are we still from having fusion as a workable source of energy? What is the path generally from basic research to industrial use?¶ AT: I think the only honest answer to this in general is that we do not know the answer to this. You know, there was somebody talking to the New York Times and it really took me aback because this expert assumed that the answer was half a century away. And, you know, the optimism engendered by this extraordinary news from this lab suggested otherwise, but it could easily be many decades.¶ CA: The idea of fusion energy goes back almost a century, and it seems like the promise has always been that the big breakthrough is just one decade away. What accounts for this consistent obsession with this particular source of energy? What makes this still-undeveloped energy source so much more attractive than, say, the renewable energy sources we already have?¶ AT: I think, fundamentally, because it’s gee whiz, final frontier, extraordinary stuff. And the physics involved are mind-blowing; the engineering is crazy and so much more exciting than just a solar panel sitting beat up in a field somewhere or on a roof or a windmill slowly turning.¶ And I think commitments to this kind of technology—like fusion, like the development of atomic power—are essential. I don’t think we should back away from them at all. We should absolutely have strong, viable, energetic, practical, fundamental energy research programs in all of these areas. We cannot afford to rule out any technology at this point given the desperation of our situation faced with the climate crisis. And in fact, we should recognize that the overwhelming majority of fundamental energy research funding in the last half century has gone to atomic power rather than renewables. I mean, if you look at the national funding levels from the 1970s onward, it’s overwhelmingly tilted toward high-energy physics because it’s super sexy for physicists. It’s directly related to the military industrial complex, and so the synergies are there. It’s also very expensive; it requires a lot of capital investment, so the engineering companies like getting in on this. You know, as much as this National Ignition Facility is a public project, the $3.5 billion were mainly not spent on scientists. It was mainly spent on extremely complex raw materials and labor necessary to build the facilities, and much of that goes to the private sector. So there was a huge private sector stake in these kinds of projects.¶ But having said all of that, our experience both at the level of economics and at the level of politics with this particular set of technologies—those to do with nuclear power, fission, and fusion—over the last 50 years has been sobering. And on the whole, they appear at this point to be both massively unpopular technologies and, in some cases, hugely politicized technologies as well as incredibly expensive in terms of capital costs—not in terms of operating them but in terms of capital cost to build them. And so, a realistic energy strategy that addresses a crisis where we need to make huge strides in the next 20 to 30 years should not rule those technologies out, but it should realistically gauge how much contribution they can make. And in both Europe and the United States, there is evidently a case for maintaining the existing capacity, but it’s pretty difficult to see what the case is for investing in new capacity when the costs are as explosively uneconomic.¶ So that is why I find it difficult to make the case for either conventional atomic power or fusion power as an immediately practical or relevant answer to the issues facing Western countries in the chase for a solution to the problem of the energy transition and decarbonization. And we are lucky, extraordinarily lucky, that renewable technologies have come on as quickly as they have. We should double down on this. We should invest even more.