# Žižek v3.0

#### The world as we know it does not exist; our social reality is not complete because there will always be a gap between what there is and what we can explain. We create our own social realities to avoid the uncomfortable truth that our world is structurally incomplete, I.E. Q-anon, pizzagate, 2020 election fraud claims are all fake realities created to hide from the things our mind can’t or won’t explain. The social order only exists because we assume it does, not because we’ve interacted with it.

**Edkins ‘3** [Jenny Edkins '3, Lecturer International Politics @ U. of Whales-Aberystwyth, ask for the book (yes, I have the physical book), Trauma and the Memory of Politics, pgs. 11-14]

In the psychoanalytic account the subject is formed around a lack, and in the face of trauma. We become who we are by finding our place within the social order and family structures into which we are born. That social order is produced in symbolic terms, through language. Language does not just name things that are already there in the world. Language divides up the world in particular ways to produce for every social grouping what it calls 'reality'. Each language - each symbolic or social order has its own way of doing this. Crucially, none of these are complete; none of them can find a place for everything. This is a logical limitation, not a question of a symbolic or social order being insufficiently developed. Completeness or closure is impossible. There is always, inevitably, something that is missed out, something that cannot be symbolised, and this is one part of what psychoanalytic theory calls 'the real'. In its birth into the symbolic or social order, into language, the subject is formed around, and through a veiling of, that which cannot be symbolised the traumatic real. The real is traumatic, and has to be hidden or forgotten, because it is a threat to the imaginary completeness of the subject. The 'subject' only exists in as far as the person finds their place within the social or symbolic order. But no place that the person occupies as a mother, friend, consumer, activist can fully express what that person is. There is always something more. Again, this is not a question of people not fitting into the roles available for them and a call for more person-friendly societies. Nor does it concern multiple or fragmented identities in a postmodern world. It is a matter of a structural impossibility. If someone is, say, a political activist, there is always the immediate question of whether they are sufficiently involved to count as an activist: don't activists have to be more committed, to take part in more than just demonstrations, shouldn't they stand for office? On the other hand, are they perhaps more than an activist does that description do justice to what they are, to their role in the party? There is always an excess, a surplus, in one direction or the other. However, we choose on the whole to ignore this – to forget this impossibility, and to act as if completeness and closure were possible. We hide the traumatic real, and stick with the fantasy of what we call social reality. As i have argued elsewhere, the political is that which enjoins us not to forget the traumatic real but rather to acknowledge the constituted and provisional nature of what we call social reality. Politics refers to the sphere of activity and institutions that is called 'politics' as opposed to 'economics' or 'society'. Politics is part of what we call social reality. It exists within the agendas and frameworks that are already accepted within the social order. The political, in its 'properly traumatic dimension', on the other hand, concerns the real. It refers to events in which politics of the first sort and its institutions are brought into being. This can be the day-to-day production and reproduction of the social and symbolic order. This continual process has to take place; the social order is not natural, it doesn't exist unless it is produced continually. The political also takes place at moments when major upheavals occur that replace a preceding social and legal system and set up a new order in its place. At such points, the symbolism and ideology that conceal[ed] the fragile and contingent nature of authority collapse altogether and there is a brief interregnum before the new order imposes a different form of concealment. the way that time figures in the psychoanalytic account is interesting. A certain non-linearity is evident: time no longer moves unproblematically from past through present to future. In a sense, subjects only retrospectively become what they already are - they only ever will have been. And the social order too shares this retroactive constitution. The subject and the social order in which the subject finds a place are both in a continual process of becoming. Neither exists as a fixed entity in the present moment, as the common-sense view in western culture might lead us to expect. Both are always in the process of formation. This is because the two are so intimately related. The person is formed, not through a process of interaction with the social order (since that would mean thinking of the social as already there), but by imagining or supposing that the social order exists. This supposing by the individual is what brings the social into being. We have to imagine that others will respond to us before we speak, but it is only our speaking, of course, that enables them to respond. But supposing that the social exists does not only produce the social order, it also, simultaneously, brings the individual into existence too. When our speaking elicits a response, we recognise ourselves as subjects in that response. This recognition is belated when viewed through the lens of a linear temporality: it is not at the moment we decide to speak that we see who we are, but only a moment later, when we get a response. The response tells us not who we are now, since we are no longer that - we have already changed. It tells us who we were, at the moment when we spoke. This is the sense in which we never are, we only ever will hazy been. Like the distant stars, whose past we know from the light that has taken millions of years to reach us but whose present we can only guess at, we can only know what we were, not what we are. And even that is also a guess, of course. In a similar way, when we listen to a sentence being spoken, we can predict what is being said, but we cannot be sure we were right until the sentence is completed and over. Some forms of speech - rhetoric and jokes for example - play on that unpredictability. The uncertainty and unpredictability that this involves can be unsettling. In the rational west, we tend to seek[s] certainty and security above all. We don't like not knowing. So we pretend that we do. Or that if we don't we could, given sufficient scientific research effort and enough money. We forget the uncertainties involved and adopt a view that what we call social reality - which slavoj žižek calls social fantasy -- is basically knowable. We adopt an ontology – a view of being and the nature of things - that depends on a progressive linear notion of time. Things can 'be' in our modern western sense only in the context of this temporality. They 'are' because they have a history in time, but they are at the same time separate from that history. But central to this solution to doubt is forgetting, as we have seen. The fantasy is only convincing if, once it has been put in place, we can forget that it is a fantasy. What we are forgetting some would say deliberately - is the real, that which cannot he symbolised, and that which is produced as an excess or surplus by any attempt at symbolisation. We do not remember the trauma that lies at the root of subjectivity, the lack or gap that remains, even within what we call social reality. This position leads to a depoliticisation. We forget that a complete, non-antagonistic society is impossible. We strive for completion and closure, often at any price. There are a number of ways in which this is done, according to žižek.'' the first is communitarian attempts to produce a close homogeneous society arche-politics. Political struggle disappears because everyone agrees on everything. 'The second, most common in the liberal west, žižek calls para-politics. Here the political is replaced by politics. Standardised competition takes place between accepted political parties according to pre-set rules, the prize being a turn at executive control of the state bureaucracy. Politics has become policing or managerial control. In the third meta-politics, political conflict is seen as a shadow theatre, with the important events taking place in another scene, that of economic processes. Politics should be cancelled when economic processes have worked themselves out (as scientific materialism predicts) and matters can he decided by rational debate and the collective will. Finally, we have ultra-politics, where political struggle becomes warfare, and the military are called in. There is no common ground for debate and politics is militarised. If we are to resist such attempts to 'gentrify' or depoliticise the political we have to recall the constituted, provisional and historically contingent nature of every social order, of every ontology. This position, which žižek calls 'traversing the fantasy', 'tarrying with the negative' or fidelity to the ontological crack in the universe, is uncomfortable." it involves an acceptance of the lack of trauma at the centre of the subject and the non-existence of any complete, closed social order.

#### Ideology allows for the constant tweaking of the symbolically constructed social order to avoid encountering the trauma of our imperfect society. This allows for the elevation of things into impossibility to avoid encountering them indefinetly, thus making them truly impossible.

**Daly ‘4** [Glyn Daly '4, Professor International Studies @ Northampton U., https://joaocamillopenna.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/c5beic5beek-glyn-daly-conversations-with.pdf, Conversations with Žižek, pgs. 10-12]

It s in the light of this more subtle perspective on the real that žižek has also revised his approach to the question of ideology. In the sublime object of ideology, žižek developed his famous inversion of the classical 'false consciousness' thesis. Thus ideology does not conceal or distort an underlying reality (human nature, social interests etc.) But rather reality itself cannot be reproduced without ideological mystification (žižek, 1989: 28). What ideology offers is the symbolic construction of reality – the ultimate fantasy – as a way to escape the traumatic effects of the real. Reality is always a 'virtual' take on the real; virtualization that can never fully overcome the real or achieve homeostasis. In the language of laclau and mouffe, this means that society as an integrated unity is universally impossible precisely because of the constitutive excess of the real qua the unmasterable negativity upon which every positivization finally depends. And it is here that ideology performs its supreme conjuring trick. What ideology aims at is a fantasmatic re-staging of the encounter with the real in such a way that the impossibility of society is translated into the theft of society by some historical other. In nazi ideology, for example, it is the contingent figure of the jew who is made directly responsible for the theft sabotage of social harmony – thereby concealing the traumatic fact that social harmony never existed and that it is an inherent impossibility (1989: 125-7; 1993: 203-4). By imputing the status of the real to a particular other, the dream of holistic fulfilment – through the elimination, expulsion or suppression of the other – is thereby sustained. More recently, however, žižek has developed a new twist to this perspective. Ideology not only constructs a certain image of fulfilment (plato's city of reason, the aryan community, multiculturalist harmony etc.), it also endeavours to regulate[s] a certain distance from. On the one hand we have the ideological fantasy of being reconciled with the thing (of total fulfilment), but, on the other, with the built-in proviso that we do not come too close to it. The (lacanian) reason for this is clear: if you come too close to the thing then it either shatters/evaporates (like the frescoes in fellini's roma) or it provokes unbearable anxiety and psychical disintegration. Crucial here is the status of the category of the impossible. For žižek impossibility is not the kind of neutral category that we tend to find in laclau and mouffe (as in their impossibility-of-society thesis) where it tends to connote a basic constitutive frontier of antagonism. Like the immanent markers of the real, impossibility gets caught up in ideology and is configured in such a way that it both structures reality and determines the coordinates of what is actually possible. As žižek argues in this book, beyond the prima facie ideological operation of translating impossibility into an external obstacle there is a further deeper stage to the operation: that is, the 'very **elevation of something into impossibility as a means of postponing or avoiding encountering it**'. Ideology is the impossible dream not simply in terms of overcoming impossibility but in terms of sustaining that impossibility in an acceptable way. That is to say, the idea of overcoming is sustained as a deferred moment of reconciliation without having to go through the pain of overcoming as such. The central issue is one of proximity; of maintaining a critical distance by keeping the thing in focus (like the image on a screen) but without coming so close that it begins to distort and decompose. A typical example would be that of someone who fantasizes about an ideal object (a sexual partner, promotion, retirement etc.) And when they actually encounter the object, they are confronted with the real of their fantasy; the object loses its ideality. The (ideological) trick, therefore, is to keep the object at a certain distance in order to sustain the satisfaction derived from the fantasy 'if only i had x i could fulfil my dream'. Ideology regulates this fantasmatic distance in order to, as it were, avoid the real in the impossible: i.e. The traumatic aspects involved in any real (impossible) change. This allows for a more nuanced reading of ideologies. Let us take the case of an international crisis: the so-called 'liberation of kuwait' during the i990s gulf conflict. Here the ideological discourse tended to operate along the following lines: 'we must achieve the liberation of kuwait . . . While recognizing that any true liberation (i.e. Abolishing kuwait's feudal dynasty and setting up democratic structures) is currently impossible.'

#### Capitalism is the ultimate form of this constant tweaking and avoidance to keep focus on subjective violence and ignore the OBJECTIVE violence going on behind the scenes. This ideological abstraction allows for the control of countries by shifting focus from one humanitarian SOS to another without caring about the real humans harmed by these abstract ideas. Capitalism is not an economic system; it’s an ideological abstraction that can be manipulated to justify infinite suffering capitalism directly causes; for there was no capitalist manifesto.

**Žižek ‘8** [Slavoj Žižek '8, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, https://aordet.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/zizek-z-violence-2008.pdf, Violence, pgs. 10-15]

Opposing all forms of violence, from direct, physical violence (mass murder, terror) to ideological violence (racism, incitement, sexual discrimination), seems to be the main preoccupation of the tolerant liberal attitude that predominates today. An SOS call sustains such talk, drowning out all other approaches: everything else can and has to wait . . . Is there not something suspicious, indeed symptomatic, about this focus on subjective violence – that violence which is enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds? Doesn’t it desperately try to distract our attention from the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view other forms of violence and thus actively participating in them? According to a well-known anecdote, a German officer visited Picasso in his Paris studio during the Second World War. There he saw Guernica and, shocked at the modernist “chaos” of the painting, asked Picasso: “Did you do this?” Picasso calmly replied: “No, you did this!” Today, many a liberal[s], when faced with violent outbursts such as the recent looting in the suburbs of Paris, asks the few remaining leftists who still count on a radical social transformation: “Isn’t it you who did this? Is this what you want?” And we should reply, like Picasso: “No, you did this! This is the true result of your politics!” There is an old joke about a husband who returns home earlier than usual from work and finds his wife in bed with another man. The surprised wife exclaims: “Why have you come back early?” The husband furiously snaps back: “What are you doing in bed with another man?” The wife calmly replies: “I asked you a question first–don’t try to squeeze out of it by changing the topic!” 4 The same goes for violence: the task is precisely to change the topic, to move from the desperate humanitarian SOS call to stop violence to the analysis of that other SOS, the complex interaction of the three modes of violence: subjective, objective, and symbolic. The lesson is thus that one should resist the fascination of subjective violence, of violence enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds: subjective violence is just the most visible of the three. The notion of objective violence needs to be thoroughly historicised: it took on a new shape with capitalism. Marx described the mad, self-enhancing circulation of capital, whose solipsistic path of parthenogenesis reaches its apogee in today’s meta-reflexive speculations on futures. It is far too simplistic to claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path disregarding any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction and that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources capital’s circulation is based and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this “abstraction” is not only in our financial speculators’ misperception of social reality, but that it is “real” in the precise sense of determining the structure of the material social processes: the fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by the “solipsistic” speculative dance of capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in blessed indifference to how its movement will affect social reality. So Marx’s point is not primarily to reduce this second dimension to the first one, that is, to demonstrate how the theological mad dance of commodities arises out of the antagonisms of “real life.” Rather his point is that one cannot properly grasp the first (the social reality of material production and social interaction) without the second: it is the self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital that runs the show, that provides the key to real-life developments and catastrophes. Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than any direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” intentions, but is purely “objective,” systemic, anonymous. Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: “reality” is the social reality of the actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real is the inexorable “abstract,” spectral logic of capital that determines what goes on in social reality. One can experience this gap in a palpable way when one visits a country where life is obviously in shambles. We see a lot of ecological decay and human misery. However, the economist’s report that one reads afterwards informs us that the country’s economic situation is “financially sound” – reality doesn’t matter, what matters is the situation of capital . . .Is this not truer than ever today? Do phenomena usually designated as those of virtual capitalism (the futures trade and similar abstract financial speculations) not point towards the reign of the “real abstraction” at its purest, far more radical than in Marx’s time? In short, the highest form of ideology does not reside in getting caught in ideological spectrality, forgetting about its foundation in real people and their relations, but precisely in overlooking this Real of spectrality and in pretending directly to address “real people with their real worries.” Visitors to the London Stock Exchange get a free leaflet which explains that the stock market is not about mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and their products. This really is ideology at its purest. Hegel’s fundamental rule is that “objective” excess– the direct reign of abstract universality which imposes its law mechanically and with utter disregard for the concerned subject caught in its web – is always supplemented by “subjective” excess– the irregular, arbitrary exercise of whims. An exemplary case of this interdependence is provided by Etienne Balibar, who distinguishes two opposite but complementary modes of excessive violence: the “ultra-objective” or systemic violence that is inherent in the social conditions of global capitalism, which involve the “automatic” creation of excluded and dispensable individuals from the homeless to the unemployed, and the “ultra- subjective” violence of newly emerging ethnic and/or religious, in short racist, “fundamentalisms.” 5 Our blindness to the results of systemic violence is perhaps most clearly perceptible in debates about communist crimes. Responsibility for communist crimes is easy to allocate: we are dealing with subjective evil, with agents who did wrong. We can even identify the ideological sources of the crimes – totalitarian ideology, The Communist Manifesto, Rousseau, even Plato. But when one draws attention to the millions who died as the result of capitalist globalisation, from the tragedy of Mexico in the sixteenth century through to the Belgian Congo holocaust a century ago, responsibility is largely denied. All this seems just to have happened as the result of an “objective” process, which nobody planned and executed and for which there was no “Capitalist Manifesto.” (The one who came closest to writing it was Ayn Rand.) 6 The fact that the Belgian king Leopold II who presided over the Congo holocaust was a great humanitarian and proclaimed a saint by the Pope cannot be dismissed as a mere case of ideological hypocrisy and cynicism. Subjectively, he may well have been a sincere humanitarian, even modestly counteracting the catastrophic consequences of the vast economic project which was the ruthless exploitation of the natural resources of the Congo over which he presided. The country was his personal fiefdom! The ultimate irony is that even most of the profits from this endeavour were for the benefit of the Belgian people, for public works, museums, and so on. King Leopold was surely the precursor of today’s “liberal communists,”

#### Capitalism is the root cause of militarism, nuclear war, and environmental destruction. Guarantees extinction.

Handel and Derber 23 [Peter Handel, a freelance writer, interviewing Charles Derber, a professor of sociology at Boston College and the author of 26 books on politics, democracy, war, corporations, capitalism, and climate change. “We Must Reckon With the Most Dangerous System of Extinction Humans Ever Created”, Truthout, 12-30-2023, https://truthout.org/articles/we-must-reckon-with-the-most-dangerous-system-of-extinction-humans-ever-created/]

Peter Handel: In your new book, Dying for Capitalism, you write “a ‘triangle of extinction’ that connects capitalism, environmental death and war creates an emergency that humanity-as-a-whole has never faced before.” How are these things interlinked? Charles Derber: Americans are normalizing what is truly the greatest emergency ever faced by humanity — one threatening to doom all life species. In an earlier 2010 book, Greed to Green, I argued that President Obama should declare a national emergency to stop impending climate extinction and wake up Americans. Obama did not declare the emergency, and millions of Americans didn’t wake up. Dying for Capitalism shows the existential threat has grown faster than I had imagined. This is not simply because of the acceleration of climate tipping points but the escalating risk of nuclear war arising from an increasingly unstable and militarized international and American world order. Witness not just Ukraine after U.S.-driven NATO expansion to the Russian border but the bipartisan new Cold War with China and today’s erupting wars in the Middle East. As people are dying for capitalism in the sense that they want ever more of it, they are also literally dying for the consequences of craving a literal death system. The “triangle of extinction” exposes what many on the left have suspected but never fully understood. U.S. capitalism fuels both climate change and militarism for five core reasons: 1) elevating profit over all other aims; 2) commitment to unfettered economic growth; 3) expanding to control markets and resources domestically and internationally; 4) producing commodities for sale on the market rather than public goods; and 5) concentrating political power among corporate elites, notably the military-industrial complex and the carbon-industrial complex. All of these forces lead capitalist elites and the market to ignore the existential risks and treat them as what economists call “externalities” — which include the ultimate costs externalized from producers and paid by the general public. How climate and military threats fuel each other is a major neglected subject. Ironically, the Pentagon itself annually reports that climate change is the biggest national security threat, with environmental disasters and sea rise driving people from endangered residences toward inhabitable land. Such migrations — along with intensifying floods, droughts and extreme temperatures — set up violent competition among people desperate for land and resources. Moreover, many U.S. wars have been fought to secure more oil. Protecting the U.S. right to create climate change is thus fueling “forever” wars. The Pentagon also does not tell us that it is the world’s biggest institutional creator of carbon emissions. While climate change drives war, militarism drives climate change. This is not just about the obvious environmental destruction wrought by war. The modern military is a monster carbon producer, with massive carbon burned every day in training and wartime military flights; in fueling huge naval carriers, submarines and tanks; in producing planes and munitions; and in running more than a thousand military bases. Most of us realize that the fossil fuel industry makes massive amounts of money while destroying the environment, but you show how the development of the fossil fuel industry is inextricable from the advent of modern capitalism. Tell us about this. While fossil fuels were central to capitalist development, it didn’t have to be that way. Early industrial capitalism could have developed without fossil fuels. Indeed, 19th century British factories initially used water-powered steam engines but shifted away toward coal and oil. This had less to do with technological efficiency than social and political factors. Owners were worried that water would be viewed as part of the commons and subject to public controls or appropriation, threatening profits. Coal and oil were less likely to be viewed as part of the commons, since they were not as historically central to public use and well-being as water. The long historical shift from coal toward oil was also driven by social and political interests rather than technological advantages. Coal miners were rebellious at an early stage, mobilized by communities formed working under adverse and dangerous conditions. Fear of unions helped shift industrial capitalism in the late 19th and 20th centuries toward oil. Oil became the central energy source of U.S. 20th century capitalism largely because of wars, especially World War I and World War II. Tank warfare and the new importance of planes in World War I was a major catalyst for the 20th century shift toward oil. World War II sealed the deal. Enormous amounts of oil were needed to power the planes and produce the arms to win this huge conflagration. And U.S. interests in both securing and selling oil in Asia were a major factor fueling U.S. interest in war in the Pacific. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has set the Doomsday Clock at 90 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been. Why has the risk of nuclear catastrophe become so heightened? The Bulletin issued a statement saying the change was “largely but not exclusively” due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They also now connect nuclear doomsday with environmental doomsday, noting that climate change and other environmental-linked threats such as COVID-19 played a role in resetting the clock. They are pulling the curtain back to reveal some of the “triangle of extinction.” The Doomsday Clock is an important symbol, recognized around the world as a crucial indicator of potential imminent extinction. Founded in Chicago after the U.S. development of the nuclear bomb — a subject popularized in the film Oppenheimer — the Bulletin’s scientists, despite their major contributions, have their own limitations. They are not political economists or social theorists, and their U.S. roots have shaped their thinking. This may explain why they have not portrayed the full “triangle of extinction,” nor focused on the unique U.S. role in supercharging the race to extinction. This goes beyond their relative lack of attention to the historical role of the U.S. and NATO in leading up to the Ukraine war. They have not offered a strong critique of the extinction risks inherent in building U.S. hegemony throughout the nuclear era. Nor have they highlighted the U.S. role in catalyzing Middle Eastern wars for oil and now heating up the new Cold War with both Russia and China, as well as playing a role in the current Israel-Hamas-Iran-U.S. military crisis, all intensifying extinction perils. Nor does the Bulletin highlight how capitalist economies, and especially U.S. militarized capitalism, are crucial structural extinction forces. We hope that the Bulletin’s scientists will read Dying for Capitalism. If the nuclear scientists were to discuss the need to transform U.S. militarized capitalism, it would expose more of the “triangle of extinction,” and help mobilize both scientists and the public.

#### Embracing violence is the only way to close the distance between ourselves and the abstract ‘other’ that is suffering and being hidden from us by the illusive dance of capital. Self-beating breaks our masochistic attachment to our master as well as closes the gap between fantasy and reality allowing us to see the world for how it is. Only once we lose everything, are we free to do anything.

**Žižek ‘4** [Slavoj Žižek '4, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, https://kabirabud.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/slavoj\_zizek\_repeating\_leninbookfi-org.pdf, Revolution at the Gates, pgs. 250-253]

The thing to do, therefore, is not aggressively to protect the safety of our sphere, but to shake ourselves out of the fantasy of the sphere – how? David fincher’s fight club (1999), an extraordinary achievement for hollywood, tackles this deadlock head-on. The film’s insomniac hero (superbly played by edward norton) follows his doctor’s advice and, in order to discover what true suffering is, joins a support group for victims of testicular cancer.107 he soon discovers, however, how such practice of love for one’s neighbour relies on a false subjective position (of voyeurist compassion), and soon gets involved in a much more radical exercise. On a flight, he meets tyler (brad pitt), a charismatic young man who shows him the futility of a life filled with failure and empty consumer culture, and offers him a solution: why don’t they fight, beating each other to pulp? Gradually, a whole movement develops out of this idea: secret after-hours boxing matches are held in the basements of bars all over the country. The movement quickly gets politicized, organizing terrorist attacks against big corporations…in the middle of the film there is an almost unbearably painful scene, reminiscent of the most bizarre david lynch moments, which serves as a kind of clue to the surprising final twist: in order to blackmail his boss into paying him for not working, the narrator throws himself around the man’s office, beating himself bloody before security staff arrive; in front of his embarrassed boss, the narrator thus enacts on himself the boss’s aggressivity towards him. After-wards, the narrator muses in a voice-over: “for some reason, i thought of my first fight – with tyler.” This first fight between the narrator and tyler, which takes place in a parking lot outside a bar, is watched by five young men who laugh and exchange glances in wondrous amusement: because the fight is being watched by people who do not know the participants, we are led to believe that what we are seeing is what they are seeing: that is, a fight between two men. It isn’t until the end that we are shown that they were watching the narrator throw himself around the parking lot, beating himself up.108 towards the end of the film, we thus learn that the narrator did not know that he had been leading a second life until the evidence became so overwhelming that he could no longer deny the fact: tyler has no existence outside the narrator’s mind; when other characters interact with him, they are really interacting with the narrator, who has taken on the tyler persona. However, it is obviously not sufficient to read the scene of norton beating himself in front of his boss as an indication of tyler’s nonexistence – the unbearably painful and embarrassing effect of the scene bears witness to the fact that it discloses (stages) a certain disavowed fantasmatic truth. In the novel on which fight club is based, this scene is written as an exchange between what is really going on (norton is beating himself up in front of his boss) and norton’s fantasy (the boss is beating up tyler): at the projectionist union office, tyler had laughed after the union president punched him. The one punch knocked tyler out of his chair, and tyler sat against the wall, laughing. “go ahead, you can’t kill me,” tyler was laughing. “you stupid fuck. Beat the crap out of me, but you can’t kill me.” … “i am trash,” tyler said. “i am trash and shit and crazy to you and this whole fucking world.”.. His honor short the wingtip into tyler’s kidneys after tyler curled into a ball, but tyler was still laughing. “get it out,” tyler said. “trust me. You’ll feel a lot better. You’ll feel great.” … I am standing at the head of the manager’s desk when i say, what? You don’t like the idea of this? And without flinching, still looking at the manager, i roundhouse the fist at the centrifugal force end of my arm and slam fresh blood out of the cracked scabs in my nose … Blood gets on the carpet and i reach up and grip monster handprints of blood on the edge of the hotel manager’s desk and say, please, help me, but i start to giggle.… You have so much, and i have nothing. And i start to climb my blood up the pinstriped legs of the manager of the pressman hotel who is leaning back, hard, with his hands on the windowsill behind him an even his thin lips retreating from his teeth.… There’s a struggle as the manager screams and tries to get his hands away from me and my blood and my crushed nose, the filth sticking to the blood on both of us, and right then at our most excellent moment, the security guards decide to walk in.109 what does this self-beating stand[s] for ? On the first approach, it is clear that its fundamental function is to reach out and re-establish[es] the connection with the real other – to suspend the fundamental abstraction and coldness of capitalist subjectivity, best exemplified by the figure of the lone monadic individual who, alone in front of the pc screen communicates with the entire world. In contrast to the humanitarian compoassion which enables us to retain our distance towards the other, the very violence of the fight signals the abolition of this distance. Although this strategy is risky and ambiguous (it can easily regress into a proto-fascist macho logic of violent male bonding), this risk has to be taken – there is no other direct way out of the closure of capitalist subjectivity. The first lesson of fight club is thus that we cannot go directly from capitalist to revolutionary subjectivity: the abstraction, the foreclosure of others, the blindness to the other’s suffering and pain, has first to be broken in a gesture of taking the risk and reaching directly out to the suffering other – a gesture which, since it shatters the very kernel of our identity, cannot fail to appear extremely violent. However, there is another dimension at work in self-beating: the subject’s scatological (excremental) identification, which is equivalent to adopting the position of the proletarian who has nothing to lose. The pure subject emerges only through this experience of radical self-degradation, when i allow/provoke the other to beat the crap out of me, emptying me of all substantial content, of all symbolic support which could confer a modicum of dignity on me. So when norton beats himself up in front of his boss, his message to the boss is: “i know you want to beat me, but you see, your desire to beat me is also my desire, so if you were to beat me, you would be fulfilling the role of the servant of my perverse masochistic desire. But you’re too much of a coward to act out your desire, so I’ll do it for you – here it is, you’ve got what you really wanted. Why are you so embarrassed? Aren’t you ready to accept it?”110 the gap between fantasy and reality is crucial here: the boss, of course, would never actually have beaten norton up, he was merely fantasizing about doing it, and the painful effect of norton’s self-beating hinges on the very act that he stages the content of the secret fantasy his boss would never be able to actualize. Paradoxically, such a staging is the first act of liberation: by means of it, the servant’s masochistic libidinal attachment to his master is brought to light, and the servant thus acquires a minimal distance towards it. Even on a purely formal level, the fact of beating oneself up reveals the simple fact that the master is superfluous: “who needs you to terrorize me? I can do it myself!” So it is only through first beating up (hitting) oneself that one becomes free: the true goal of this beating is to beat out that in me which attaches me to the master. When, towards the end, norton shoots at himself (surviving the shot, in fact killing only “tyler in himself”, his double), he thereby also liberates himself from the dual mirror-relationship of beating: in this culmination of self-aggression, it’s logic cancels itself; norton will no longer have to beat himself – now he will be able to beat the true enemy (the system).111 and, incidentally, the same strategy is occasionally used in political demonstrations: when a crowd is stopped by the police, who are ready to beat them, the way to bring about a shocking reversal of the situation is fort he individuals in the crowd to start beating each other.

#### Violence in the form of nuclear meltdowns shatters our sphere of safety and allows for a direct confrontation with the ecological crisis. Our avoidance of the ecological crisis conforms to the ideological social order and shields us from seeing the trauma of our imperfect world.

**Žižek ’91** [Slavoj Žižek '91, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, https://www.academia.edu/4091731/21073374\_Zizek\_Slavoj\_Looking\_Awry\_An\_Introduction\_to\_Jaques\_Lacan\_Through\_Popular\_Culture, Looking Awry, pgs. 24-25]

Is not the ultimate form of the "answer of the real" confronting all of us today in the ecological crisis? Is not the disturbed, derailed course of nature an "answer of the real" to human praxis, to the human encroachment upon nature, "mediated" and organized by the symbolic order? The radical character of the ecological crisis is not to be underestimated. The crisis is radical not only because of its effective danger, i.e. It is not just that what is at stake is the very survival of humankind. What is at stake is our most unquestionable presuppositions, the very horizon of ourmeaning, our everyday understanding of "nature" as a regular, rhythmic process. To use the terms of the late wittgenstein, the ecological crisis bites into "objective certainty"-into the domain of self-evident certitudes about which, within our established "form of life," it is simply meaningless to have doubts. Hence our unwillingness to take the ecological crisis completely seriously; hence the fact that the typical, predominant reaction to it still consists in a variation on the famous disavowal, "i know very well (that things are deadly serious, that what is at stake is our very survival), but just the same ... (i don't really believe it, i'm not really prepared to integrate it into my symbolic universe, and thatf is why i continue to act as if ecology is of no lasting consequence for my everyday life)." hence also the fact that the typical reaction of those who do take the ecological crisis seriously is—on the level of the libidinal economy—obsessional. Wherein lies the kernel of the obsessional's economy? The obsessional participat[ing]es in frenzied activity, he works feverishly all the time—why? To avoid some uncommon catastrophe that would take place if his activity were to stop; his frenetic activity is based on the ultimatum, "if i don't do this (the compulsive ritual), some unspeakably horrible x will take place." in lacanian terms, this x can be specified as the barred other, i.e., the lack in the other, the inconsistency of the symbolic order; in this case, it refers to the disturbance of the established rhythm of nature. We must be active all the time so that it does not come to light that "the other does not exist" (lacan). The third reaction to the ecological crisis is to take it as an "answer of the real," as a sign bearing a certain message. Aids operates this way in the eyes of the "moral majority," who read it as a divine punishment for our sinful life. From this perspective, the ecological crisis appears as a "punishment" for our ruthless exploitation of nature, for the fact that we have treated nature as a stack of disposable objects and materials, not as a partner in dialogue or the foundation of our being. The lesson drawn by those who react in this way is that we must cease our derailed, perverted way of life and begin to live as part of nature, accommodating ourselves to its rhythms, taking root in it. What can a lacanian approach tell us about the ecological crisis? Simply that we must learn to accept the real of the ecological crisis in its senseless actuality, without charging it with some message or meaning. In this sense, we could read the three above-described reactions to the ecological crisis--"i know very well, but just the same ... "; obsessive activity; grasping it as a sign bearing some hidden meaning as three forms of avoiding an encounter with the real: a fetishistic split, an acknowledgment of the fact of the crisis that neutralizes its symbolic efficacy; the neurotic transformation of the crisis into a traumatic kernel; a psychotic projection of meaning into the real itself. The fact that the first reaction presents a fetishistic disavowal of the real of the crisis is self-evident. What is not so obvious is that the other two reactions also hinder an adequate response to the crisis. For, if we grasp the ecological crisis as a traumatic kernel to be kept at a distance by obsessive activity, or as the bearer of a message, a call to find new roots in nature, we blind ourselves in both cases to the irreducible gap separating the real from the modes of its symbolization. The only proper attitude is that which fully assumes this gap as something that defines our very condition humaine, without endeavoring to suspend it through fetishistic disavowal, to keep it concealed through obsessive activity, or to reduce the gap between the real and the symbolic by projecting a (symbolic) message into the real. The fact that [hu]man is a speaking being means precisely that [it]he is, so to speak, constitutively "derailed," marked by an irreducible fissure that the symbolic edifice attempts in vain to repair. From time to time, this fissure erupts in some spectacular form, reminding us of the frailty of the symbolic edifice – the latest went by the name of chernobyl. The radiation from chernobyl represented the intrusion of a radical contingency. It was as if the "normal" enchainment of cause and effect were for a moment suspended – nobody knew what its exact consequences would be. The experts themselves admitted that any determination of the "threshold of danger" was arbitrary; public opinion oscillated between panicked anticipation of future catastrophes and acceptance that there was no cause for alarm. It is precisely this indifference to its mode of symbolization that locates the radiation in the dimension of the real. No matter what we say about it, it continues to expand, to reduce us to the role of impotent witnesses

#### This confrontation with the ecological crisis allows for us to directly confront capitalism. The ecology of fear moves markets and drives capitalism; by disproving ecology as something can be confronted, we therefore disprove capitalism as something that can be dismantled.

Žižek ‘7 [Slavoj Žižek '7, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, “Censorship Today: Violence, or Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses,” http://www.lacan.com/zizecology1.htm, http://www.lacan.com/zizecology2.htm]

No wonder, then, that the by far predominant version of ecology is the ecology of fear, fear of a catastrophe - human-made or natural - that may deeply perturb, destroy even, the human civilization, fear that pushes us to plan measures that would protect our safety. This ecology of fear has all the chances of developing into the predominant form of ideology of global capitalism, a new opium for the masses replacing the declining religion: it takes over the old religion's fundamental function, that of putting on an unquestionable authority which can impose limits. The lesson this ecology is constantly hammering is our finitude: we are not cartesian subjects extracted from reality, we are finite beings embedded in a bio-sphere which vastly transgresses our horizon. In our exploitation of natural resources, we are borrowing from the future, so one should treat our earth with respect, as something ultimately sacred, something that should not be unveiled totally, that should and will forever remain a mystery, a power we should trust, not dominate. While we cannot gain full mastery over our bio-sphere, it is unfortunately in our power to derail it, to disturb its balance so that it will run amok, swiping us away in the process. This is why, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended[ly] consequence of triggering a catastrophe. It is this distrust which makes ecology the ideal candidate for hegemonic ideology, since it echoes the anti-totalitarian post-political distrust of large collective acts. This distrust unites religious leaders and environmentalists - for both, there is something of a transgression, of entering a prohibited domain, in this idea of creating a new form of life from scratch, from the zero-point. And this brings us back to the notion of ecology as the new opium for the masses; the underlying message is again a deeply conservative one - any change can only be the change for the worst - here is a nice quote from the time magazine on this topic: behind much of the resistance to the notion of synthetic life is the intuition that nature (or god) created the best of possible worlds. Charles darwin believed that the myriad designs of nature's creations are perfectly honed to do whatever they are meant to do - be it animals that see, hear, sing, swim or fly, or plants that feed on the sun's rays, exuding bright floral colours to attract pollinators. This reference to darwin is deeply misleading: the ultimate lesson of darwinism is the exact opposite, namely that nature tinkers and improvises, with great losses and catastrophes accompanying every limited success - is the fact that 90 percent of the human genome is 'junk dna' with no clear function not the ultimate proof of it? Consequently, the first lesson to be drawn is the one repeatedly made by stephen jay gould: the utter contingency of our existence. There is no evolution: catastrophes, broken equilibriums, are part of natural history; at numerous points in the past, life could have turned into an entirely different direction. The main source of our energy (oil) is the result of a past catastrophe of unimaginable dimensions. One should thus learn to accept the utter groundlessness of our existence: there is no firm foundation, a place of retreat, on which one can safely count. "nature doesn't exist": "nature" qua the domain of balanced reproduction, of organic deployment into which humanity intervenes with its hubris, brutally throwing off the rails its circular motion, is man's fantasy; nature is already in itself "second nature," its balance is always secondary, an attempt to negotiate a "habit" that would restore some order after catastrophic interruptions. With regard to this inherent instability of nature, the most consequent was the proposal of a german ecological scientist back in 1970s: since nature is changing constantly and the conditions on earth will render the survival of humanity impossible in a couple of centuries, the collective goal of humanity should be not to adapt itself to nature, but to intervene into the earth ecology even more forcefully with the aim to freeze the earth's change, so that its ecology will remain basically the same, thus enabling humanity's survival. This extreme proposal renders visible the truth of ecology.

## F/2 Robinson 10

#### Zizek 8 is on fuego, this is just a humanitarian SOS to distract from objective violence which goes conceded.

#### Philosophy’s obsession with difference and the indeterminacy and play of symbols prevents a solidified and coherent understanding of capitalism. It trades off with meaningful analysis of the way capitalism has ordered society, stifling resistance.

**Zavarzadeh ‘95** (Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, post-ality: Marxism and postmodernism, post-ality the (dis)simulations of cybercapitalism, https://www.academia.edu/112300313/Post\_ality\_The\_dis\_simulations\_of\_cybercapitalism)

Post-ality is the ensemble of all practices that, as a totality, obscure the production practices of capitalism—which is based on the extraction of surplus labor (the source of accumulation of capital)—by announcing the arrival of a new society which is post-production, post-labor, post-ideology, post-white and post-capitalist. Post-ality, in other words, is a regime of class struggle against the workers that posits a structural change, a rupture, in capitalism: one that severs the past of capitalism from what is regards to be its radically different and "new" present (which unlike its past is now free from exploitation). In doing so, post-ality attempts to solve—in the theoretical imaginary—the historical and material contradictions of capitalism caused by the social division of labor. There is therefore a great urgency among the ideologists of the ruling class to discredit any effort to theorize post-ality (as I am doing here) because such theorization produces knowledge of contemporary capitalism and the strategies that are used to justify it. **This discrediting of theories about post-ality takes many forms**—as might be expected in the capitalist knowledge industry in which theorists compete for a living with each other in meeting the needs of the agents of capital for ever newer concepts. The **most popular form** now of deconstructing "totality" in order to obscure the working of capitalism is one that questions the very possibility of any "totality" by pointing to the epistemological aporias of the theory of concepts (concept = totality). The strategy, in other words, is to dismantle the frames of intelligibility that make the articulation of such "totalities" as post-ality(and what it justifies, namely 'capitalism") possible. "Totality" is ostensibly put in question, by such theorists of the ruling class as Derridaand deMan, on epistemological grounds. According to them, all conceptsare effects of tropes (Paul deMan, Allegories of Reading 144-47), and as such, they are language constructs. Moreover, since language is a "field ... of play' (Writing and Difference 289, emphasis in the original), all concepts are said to be simply unstable, differential networks of "infinite substitutions" of signs and not an articulation of the real.Thus, there is always "something missing" from concepts—the something that "excludes totalization" (Writing and Difference 289). However, these ludic arguments about the playfulness that deprives the concept of its truth ("totality"), exclude themselves from the laws of play and place their own truth (totalizing against totalizing) beyond the differential volatility of substitutions. These ludic theories also forget that play is always a movement of parts within a structure of conflicts and contradictions and these contradictions are effects of class difference and class antagonisms. (This is the line of argument that I will follow throughout my text since I am not interested in simply performing reflexive and deconstructive readings that bring down an argument by putting its founding threads in question.) Thus the very playfulness of play (making sense of playfulness) is a historical effect whose meaning is determined by the social relations of production. What is received as the playfulness of the trope—a lively metaphor— in, for example, Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins and the Foundations of inequality among Men (1754) is a "dead metaphor" in the discourses of Euroamerican Depression 11930's). This historicity of the "playfulness" (its non-self-evidence) necessitates that DeMan and other readers constantly annotate Rousseau's "dead metaphors" to give them "life" and make the "playfulness" of their "play" receivable by readers situated in an entirely different historical situation and material conditions- If metaphors in and of themselves were playful (that is if language was autonomous), there would be no need for annotation. The fact that there is such a need and furthermore that there are fierce contestations over what kind of annotations are appropriate is itself part of the logic of interpretation which is determined by the historical level of class struggle. if "language is about language" as deMan argues (153), the playfulness of the trope should be immanent; an always already of the language confronting itself as a result of the transocial laws of signification. But as deMan's annotation of Rousseau shows, playfulness in a text has to be marked and the marking varies from one period to period another according to the level of class struggle- the struggle, in short, over what is seen to be the "legitimate" ratio of surplus labor. The marking of a text, then, is always class struggle carried on in the tropics of language. DeMan 's notion that "all language is about language" (153) is not only a "totalization" but also a part of a class theory of language that posits language as a closed arrangement of signs and reduces all social differences that mobilize signs as interior semiotic differences ("difference within") in which language "confronts itself" and escapes history. However, the totalizations of the ruling class, as I will discuss throughout this essay, are never seen as "tolalizations" but as the transhistorical truth of life itself. The epistemological questioning of "totality," which serves as the basis for rejecting post ality as a concept, is an ideological alibi to dismantle the theoretical foundation of a coherent knowledge of capitalism as a "totality"—that is, as a systematic and complex set of interconnected economic, cultural, political and theoretical practices. Derrida's idea of differance(the founding concept of detotalizing) informs the entire project of postmarxism in which the very notion of society as a totality is decentered and in place of a collective subject of revolution is placed the decentralized, detotalized and differential "hegemony" of a loose coalition, This "war on totality" (Iyoutard, The Post nodern Condition 82), thus, is not limited to poststructuralist writers but increasingly becomes the project of a generalized "left." For instance, following the announcement that the first issue of 'Transformation would focus on the question of the "Post-al," one "left" writer responded, in a letter to me, with a troping discrediting of the concept, saying that the "Post" meant "mail" and concluded that "hence'hyper-post-ality'=(?) too many stamps on the envelope, 'post-al (Flexi)workplace'=all-night sorting office?" One is hard-pressed to find a difference between the leftist discrediting of concepts and the poststructuralist deconstruction—both **marginalize** the concepts necessary to grasp capitalism as a totality (the laws of motion of capital). The institutionalized "left" is equally invested in the erasure of concepts and the dispersion of the social totality into an ensemble of the heterogeneous and incommensurate experiences of 'agent' its 'social movements," When the "rigorous" arguments of the philosopher on behalf of capital fails, the State jokester takes over and defends the rule of swage labor through "phrases" and "puns" --although in the "with" writings of such pun(kisters as Lacan, Derrida, Butler, Ulmer ... the epistemological and the joke are sutured into the post-al paralogy. <3-4>

## F/2 Cede the political

#### Were the aff, we don’t have an alt and we don’t cede the political. We endorce violence to fix our political system.

1. we cant know what a post capitalist world looks like bveacsue its so engrained. This is just elevation into impossibility to make it impossible per daly 3.

## On the framing

#### We concede to the interp, we havent proven to be unethical.

#### We have an a-priori ethical obligation to reject capitalism. There may be some things worse than death, but you will never know because capitalism makes its victims anonymous.

**Zizek and Daly 4**

(Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16, https://joaocamillopenna.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/c5beic5beek-glyn-daly-conversations-with.pdf)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### If we prove that cap is the root cause of settler colonialism than we win under this framework because we outweigh as we solve for set col and cap which turns all their offense.

#### Turn – The negative’s limitation of ethical concern to a select group of people is hypocritical, counterproductive, and negates our ethical responsibility to all humans. Prefer the Affirmative’s ethical confrontation of the global capitalist system.

## On the K proper

#### The neg’s project of preserving Native culture merely preserves capitalism – “difference” as such is already subordinated to capital’s global homogeneity, turning case.

**Žižek ‘97** [Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 1997, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.” https://www.ercbgd.org.rs/images/stories/multi-kulti-biblioteka/ZIZEK%20SLAVOJ%20MULTICULTURALIS%20OR%20THE%20CULTURAL%20LOGIC%20MULTINATIONAL%20CAPITALISM.pdf]

And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for today’s capitalist who still clings to some particular cultural heritage, identifying it as the secret source of his success—Japanese executives participating in tea ceremonies or obeying the bushido code—or for the inverse case of the Western journalist in search of the particular secret of the Japanese success: this very reference to a particular cultural formula is a screen for the universal anonymity of Capital. The true horror does not reside in the particular content hidden beneath the universality of global Capital, but rather in the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global machine blindly running its course, that there is effectively no particular Secret Agent who animates it. The horror is not the (particular living) ghost in the (dead universal) machine, but the (dead universal) machine in the very heart of each (particular living) ghost. The conclusion to be drawn is thus that the problematic of multiculturalism—the hybrid coexistence of diverse cultural life-worlds—which imposes itself today is the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system: it bears witness to the unprecedented homogenization of the contemporary world. It is effectively as if, since the horizon of social imagination no longer allows us to entertain the idea of an eventual demise of capitalism—since, as we might put it, everybody silently accepts that capitalism is here to stay—critical energy has found a substitute outlet in fighting for cultural differences which leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact. So we are fighting our pc battles for the rights of ethnic minorities, of gays and lesbians, of different life-styles, and so on, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march—and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is doing the ultimate service to the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in a typical postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as world system tends to give rise to the accusation of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’ and other crimes. The structure here is that of a symptom. When one is dealing with a universal structuring principle, one always automatically assumes that—in principle, precisely—it is possible to apply this principle to all its potential elements, and that the empirical non-realization of the principle is merely a matter of contingent circumstances. A symptom, however, is an element which—although the non-realization of the universal principle in it appears to hinge on contingent circumstances—has to remain an exception, that is, the point of suspension of the universal principle: if the universal principle were to apply also to this point, the universal system itself would disintegrate. As is well known, in the paragraphs on civil society in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel demonstrated how the large class of ‘rabble’ (PÖebel) in modern civil society is not an accidental result of social mismanagement, inadequate government measures or economic bad luck: the inherent structural dynamics of civil society necessarily give rise to a class which is excluded from the benefits of civil society, a class deprived of elementary human rights and therefore also delivered of duties towards society, an element within civil society which negates its universal principle, a kind of ‘un-Reason inherent to Reason itself’—in short, its symptom. Do we not witness the same phenomenon today, and in even stronger shape, with the growth of an underclass excluded, sometimes for generations, from the benefits of affluent liberal-democratic society? Today’s ‘exceptions’—the homeless, the ghettoized, the permanently unemployed—are the symptom of the late capitalist universal system, a growing and permanent reminder of how the immanent logic of late capitalism works: the proper capitalist utopia is that, through appropriate measures (for progressive liberals, affirmative action; for conservatives, a return to self-reliance and family values), this ‘exception’ could be—in the long term and in principle, at least—abolished. And is not a homologous utopia at work in the notion of a ‘rainbow coalition’: in the idea that, at some utopian future moment, all ‘progressive’ struggles—for gay and lesbian rights, for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, the ecological struggle, the feminist struggle, and so on—will be united in the common ‘chain of equivalences’? Again, this necessity of failure is structural: the point is not simply that, because of the empirical complexity of the situation, all particular ‘progressive’ fights will never be united, that ‘wrong’ chains of equivalences will always occur—say, the enchainment of the fight for African-American ethnic identity with patriarchal and homophobic ideology—but rather that emergencies of ‘wrong’ enchainments are grounded in the very structuring principle of today’s ‘progressive’ politics of establishing ‘chains of equivalences’: the very domain of the multitude of particular struggles with their continuously shifting displacements and condensations is sustained by the ‘repression’ of the key role of economic struggle—the leftist politics of the ‘chains of equivalences’ among the plurality of struggles is strictly correlative to the silent abandonment of the analysis of capitalism as a global economic system and to the acceptance of capitalist economic relations as the unquestionable framework. [24] The falsity of elitist multiculturalist liberalism thus resides in the tension between content and form which characterized already the first great ideological project of tolerant universalism, that of freemasonry: the doctrine of freemasonry (the universal brotherhood of all men based on the light of Reason) clearly clashes with its form of expression and organization (a secret society with its rituals of initiation)—the very form of expression and articulation of freemasonry belies its positive doctrine. In a strictly homologous way, the contemporary ‘politically correct’ liberal attitude which perceives itself as surpassing the limitations of its ethnic identity (‘citizen of the world’ without anchors in any particular ethnic community), functions, within its own society, as a narrow elitist upper-middle-class circle clearly opposing itself to the majority of common people, despised for being caught in their narrow ethnic or community confines.

#### Their attempt to respect Natives backfires – it manifests self-referential racism as Otherization from the empty global perspective of capital, turning case. The aff is the perfection of capitalism.

**Žižek ‘97** [Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 1997, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.” https://www.ercbgd.org.rs/images/stories/multi-kulti-biblioteka/ZIZEK%20SLAVOJ%20MULTICULTURALIS%20OR%20THE%20CULTURAL%20LOGIC%20MULTINATIONAL%20CAPITALISM.pdf]

How, then, does the universe of Capital relate to the form of Nation-State in our era of global capitalism? Perhaps, this relationship is best designated as ‘auto-colonization’: with the direct multinational functioning of Capital, we are no longer dealing with the standard opposition between metropolis and colonized countries; a global company as it were cuts its umbilical cord with its mother-nation and treats its country of origins as simply another territory to be colonized. This is what disturbs so much the patriotically oriented right-wing populists, from Le Pen to Buchanan: the fact that the new multinationals have towards the French or American local population exactly the same attitude as towards the population of Mexico, Brazil or Taiwan. Is there not a kind of poetic justice in this self-referential turn? Today’s global capitalism is thus again a kind of ‘negation of negation’, after national capitalism and its internationalist/colonialist phase. At the beginning (ideally, of course), there is capitalism within the confines of a Nation-State, with the accompanying international trade (exchange between sovereign Nation-States); what follows is the relationship of colonization in which the colonizing country subordinates and exploits (economically, politically, culturally) the colonized country; the final moment of this process is the paradox of colonization in which there are only colonies, no colonizing countries—the colonizing power is no longer a Nation-State but directly the global company. In the long term, we shall all not only wear Banana Republic shirts but also live in banana republics. And, of course, the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats each local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people—as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied and ‘respected’. That is to say, the relationship between traditional imperialist colonialism and global capitalist self-colonization is exactly the same as the relationship between Western cultural imperialism and multiculturalism: in the same way that global capitalism involves the paradox of colonization without the colonizing Nation-State metropole, multi-culturalism involves patronizing Eurocentrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roots in one’s own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’—it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position. Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he doesn’t oppose to the Other the particular values of his own culture), but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures—the multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority.

#### The root cause of settler-colonialism is capital expansion- the desire to ‘control’ and ‘own’ land is rooted in capitalist notions of profit-above-all

**Woroniak and Camfield, 13** (Monique Woroniak is a librarian who works, writes and does Indigenous solidarity work in Winnipeg. David Camfield is one of the editors of New Socialist Webzine. Both authors acknowledge that they reside on Treaty One territory and the traditional lands of the Red River Métis, “Choosing Not to Look Away: Confronting Colonialism in Canada”, , 1/27/13)

Canada has "no history of colonialism." So said Stephen Harper in 2009. Today the Idle No More movement is shouting down this lie through actions both creative and courageous. In its place, it is telling Canadians at large what some of us have always known: that the country we live in was founded as -- and continues to be -- a colonial-settler state. Colonialism involves one society seeking to conquer another and then rule over it. European countries worked to conquer the Americas, Africa and most of Asia between the end of the 1400s and the 1800s. In the beginning, the goal was usually to gain access to resources -- including gold, silver, furs and fish -- that could give a boost to the feudal societies that existed in most of Europe at that time. As capitalism developed, it spread a new way of organizing how goods and services were produced which focused on profit at all costs. The needs of humans and of the natural world with its land, air and water, were given little to no consideration under this new system. In a short amount of time Europe's appetite for the natural resources found in the lands it would colonize grew enormously. Colonialism after capitalism "Land. If you understand nothing else about the history of Indians in North America, you need to understand that the question that really matters is the question of land." Thomas King (Cherokee), The Inconvenient Indian (2012) Two main types of colonialism grew out of capitalism's hunger for profit: colonialism based on exploitation of labour, and settler colonialism. In most colonies, a small number of Europeans ruled over much larger Indigenous populations. In order to make profits from a colony, Europeans needed the labour of the people they had conquered. In these kinds of situations, the goal of the colonizers was to take wealth produced by the work of miners, farmers and, as time went on, sometimes factory workers. One good example of this was the work that farmers in India in the 1800s did to grow cotton, which was then shipped to Britain to be processed in factories and sold at a large profit. Colonialism in Canada was different. Here it took the form of settler colonialism (other states with this type of colonialism include the USA, Australia and Israel). Settler colonialism took place where European settlers settled permanently on Indigenous lands, aggressively seized those lands from Indigenous peoples and eventually greatly outnumbered Indigenous populations. The land grab: Settler-colonialism in Canada Unlike the kind of colonialism experienced in places such as India, the main goal of settler colonialism was not to take advantage of the labour of Indigenous peoples. Instead, it was to displace Indigenous peoples from their lands, break and bury the cultures that grew out of relationships with those lands, and, ultimately, eliminate Indigenous societies so that settlers could establish themselves. In Canada, the society that settlers established became capitalist and created an economy that continues to exploit people for their labour and the land for its many resources. Respect for life and the relationships between living beings and the natural world is not important to the capitalist Canadian colonial-settler state. Under this system the land is treated not as something that humans should live in a respectful relationship with, but simply as a resource to exploit (much like the owner of a company demanding workers produce as much wealth for him as possible).

#### The negative’s struggle is just a facet of the struggle against capitalism – only total social change through its confrontation can ever solve for their ism

**Žižek ‘89** [Slavoj Zizek 1989, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, “The Sublime Object of Ideology,” https://altexploit.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/slavoj-zizek-the-sublime-object-of-ideology-second-edition-the-essential-zizek-2009.pdf]

It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular question without solving them all – that is, without solving the fundamental quesiton which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a ‘normal’, pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battlers (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of omen, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on).Marxists are using all their skill and adroitness of argument to convince the participants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation… The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society.

#### Our Act opens up the space of a revolutionary subjectivity – voting aff affirms the immanent presence of revolution – the only thing stopping it is the belief that it's not here. We should debate as if the revolution is already at hand.

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher in Sociology @ U. of Ljubljana and Visiting Professor @ Columbia U., Princeton, and The New School, 2004, Revolution at the Gates: Zizek on Lenin, https://kabirabud.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/slavoj\_zizek\_repeating\_leninbookfi-org.pdf, the 1917 Writings, pgs.259-260

As Deleuze saw very clearly, we cannot provide in advance an unambiguous criterion which will allow us to distinguish "false" violent outburst from the "miracle" of the authentic revolutionary breakthrough. The ambiguity is irreducible here, since the "miracle" can occur only through the repetition of previous failures. And this is also why violence is a necessary ingredient of a revolutionary political act. That is to say: what is the criterion of a political act proper? Success as such clearly does not count, even if we define it in the dialectical terms of Merleau-Ponty: as the wager that the future will retroactively redeem our present horrible acts (this is how Merleau-Ponty, in Humanism and Terror, provided one of the more intelligent justifications of the Stalinist terror: retroactively, it will become justified if its final outcome is true freedom);129 neither does reference to some abstract-universal ethical norm. The only criterion is the absolutely inherent one: that of the enacted utopia. In a genuine revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as a distant promise which justifies present violence – it is rather as if in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between the present and the future, we are – as if by Grace – briefly allowed to act as if the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, there to be seized. Revolution is experienced not as a present hardship we have to endure for the sake of the happiness and freedom of future generations, but as the present hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow – in it, we are already free even as we fight for freedom; we are already happy even as we fight for happiness, no matter how difficult the circumstances. Revolution is not a Merleau-Pontyan wager, an act suspended in the futur anterieur, to be legitimized or de-legitimized by the long-term outcome of present acts; it is, as it were, its own ontological proof, an immediate index of its own truth.

#### This gives us instant solvency on both cap and set col by allowing to debate like these systems have already been dismantled because anything else allows for solvency to be caught in impossibility preventing solvency on both k’s.

#### They don’t do any weighing that Natives being ghosts is actually worse than death so it’s a really simple magnitude and scope weigh for extinction vs natives being ghosts.

## On the ROTB

#### If we win that cap is the root cause of natives then if we break down cap we get solvency and link to the ROTB.