They say we link to the squo, no the ciccia evidence says that the we that we understand these issues is a pre-requisite to the way policy is implemented which meanas failing epistemology causes failing policy, moreover, our Ashri evidence says that at every stage, imperialist projects seep into spaces and destrioy the climate movement if they are not rejected. They are making this too complicated, if we prove that the aff is racist, you should reject it and not make racism worse.

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# Renewables Fail

1. ​​**The transition is pretty much over and empirical ev shows their concerns aren’t that serious**

**Atkinson and Gulli ’25** (Will Atkinson [S.M., Technology and Policy Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology A.B., Geosciences, Princeton University.], Chiara Gulli [MSc, Energy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven MSc, Energy Innovation, Electrical Engineering, Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan BSc, Energy Engineering, Politecnico di Milano.], “The Energy Transition in 2025: What to Watch For,” Rocky Mountain Institute, 1-08-2025, https://rmi.org/the-energy-transition-in-2025-what-to-watch-for/)//Shwillett  
As we enter a new year, the race between tipping points is clearer than ever. 2024 was likely the hottest year on record, raising the risk of earth system tipping points if we fail to speed up solutions.¶ But despite warnings of a slowdown, **solutions** continue to **race** forward. As **cleantech** becomes **cheaper** than ever, **2024** saw **record uptake** in **renewable** **energy**, electric vehicles (**EVs**), and **more**. These **positive tipping points** are happening **worldwide** — with major progress in **China** and the **Global South**. Let’s review what that means for the year ahead.¶ **Costs** **falling** **fast**. Solar module prices fell 35 percent to 9 cents per watt; EV batteries are now below $100/kWh and often at cost parity with their fossil-fueled competition.¶ Cleantech growing **globally**. Solar additions grew to 600 GW, EV sales climbed 25 percent, and battery storage additions nearly doubled.¶ Changing perception. IEA **forecasts** have **improved** for cleantech and **fallen** for fossil fuels several years in a row.¶ New year, new progress? Energy efficiency and methane are the two fastest ways to cut warming, but also the two furthest off track.¶ From ambition to action. With national climate plans due in February, it is time to include all sectors, pollutants, and solutions — and then hit the ground running. <<<FIGURE OMITTED>>>¶ With falling costs, be ready for a cleantech **revolution**¶ After 2024, clean energy is cheaper than ever. Global solar module prices fell 35 percent to less than 9 cents/kWh. EV batteries saw their **best price decline** in seven years, dropping ~**30–50 percent** for cathodes and 20 percent for the full battery to below $100/kWh. EVs are now at cost-of-ownership parity in the United States and purchase price parity in China — with that milestone expected around now for Europe, in 2026 for the United States, and in 2027 for India’s two- and four-wheelers.¶ Thankfully, lower cost does not mean lower quality. Take batteries: the average cell in 2024 used less than half as much nickel and cobalt as a decade ago, and **new** **technologies** could **double energy densities** in the next five years. As we see improving **safety**, **charge** time, and **longevity**, **uptake** will follow and drive **down** **cost** in a **virtuous cycle**. <<<FIGURE OMITTED>>>¶ Adoption is going global¶ Cleantech uptake is more widespread than ever. Renewable energy additions grew 17 percent with a record ~600 GW of solar, ~125 GW of wind, and near-doubling of grid storage installations to ~170 GWh in 2024. Renewables now **outpace** fossil electricity **investment** by **10 to 1**, with more investment in solar than all other power sources combined. As a result, renewables are poised to overtake coal as the leading power source in 2025.¶ This progress is truly global. As a share of electricity, **solar** and **wind** is **scaling twice as fast** in the Global **South** as in the Global **North**. Countries like Pakistan and Namibia have used Chinese solar exports to nearly double their total electricity capacity in just two years.¶ Meanwhile, **EV** growth rose **25 percent** (and faster for trucks), with more than 16 million vehicles sold in 2024 — driven by China, which has electrified more than half of its new cars since July. Last year started with unfounded fears of a major EV sales drop — but this is the cycle every year, as all car sales tend to be lower in Q1. Naysayers may point to a similar drop in Q1 2025, but the expected annual growth is larger than ever. <<<FIGURE OMITTED>>>¶ Advancing policy from pledges to progress¶ **New** national **pledges** can **accelerate** change. Led by the EU, countries on five continents **redoubled** their **commitments** to a 1.5oC-aligned emissions path, while the UK pledged an 81 percent reduction by 2035 and Mexico committed to net zero by 2050. All G20 nations now have net-zero goals that could help limit warming to well below 2oC, if realized.¶ Governments are also taking direct action to transition away from fossil fuels. Indonesia has announced plans to switch fully to renewables in the next 15 years — retiring all coal, oil, and gas power plants despite coal’s current dominance. And Ethiopia became the first nation to ban imports of non-electric cars, citing efforts to clean the air and save billions of dollars in annual oil imports.¶ Next year will be crucial. With national climate plans due in February, it is a key opportunity to include all sectors, pollutants, and solutions like energy efficiency. Then, the focus turns to implementation — including for nature, with the next UN climate conference in Brazil.¶ Global outlooks get more **bullish**¶ Are we doing enough to meet the 2030 targets? It depends — but, based on the latest trends, progress-as-usual would meet the 2023 goal to triple renewable energy capacity, as well as the 2024 goal for a six-fold increase in grid energy storage. And from vehicles to heat pumps to industry, annual **electrification** progress **doubled** in the past year — a **key step** for the energy **efficiency** pledge and its many benefits.¶ Fossil fuel **emissions** appeared to rise 0.8 percent to 37.4 GtCO2 in 2024, but **multiple analyses** show that they may well **peak** and **decline** in **2025**. **Half the world** or more has **passed** **peak** **demand** for residential gas and gasoline, and **more than half** of countries are **5+ years past the peak** for fossil electricity.¶ As a result, leading outlooks such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) have once again raised their forecasts for renewable energy and electrification, while lowering their forecasts for fossil fuels, emissions, and carbon capture. Time will tell if they do the same in 2025.

#### **Nuclear energy detracts from renewables and fails---defaults, construction, outages, and regulation—assumes new reactors**

**Haywood et al. ’23** (Luke Haywood [Luke Haywood is head of climate and energy at the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) in Brussels and guest researcher at the Mercator Research Centre on Global Commons and Climate Change and at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), institutions where he previously held postdoc positions. He holds a PhD from the Paris School of Economics.], Marion Leroutier [Marion Leroutier is a post-doctoral researcher at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), based at Misum, a multidisciplinary research center on sustainability and also affiliated with SSE’s Department of Economics. She will join ENSAE and CREST as a tenure-track assistant professor in September 2024.], Robert Pietzcker [Robert Pietzcker is a senior scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) with a background in physics and economics. He leads the National Energy Transitions Team (together with Falko Ueckerdt) in the Energy Systems group of Research Department 3.] “Why investing in new nuclear plants is bad for the climate,” Joule Commentary, 8-16-2023, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542435123002799)//Shwillett  
There has been a strong **push** to promote **increased** **investments** in new nuclear power as a strategy to decarbonize economies, especially in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). The **evidence** **base** for these initiatives is **poor**. Investments in new nuclear power plants are **bad** for the **climate** due to **high** **costs** and **long** **construction** times. Given the **urgency** of climate change mitigation, which requires reducing emissions from the EU electricity grid to almost zero in the 2030s (Pietzcker et al.1 ), preference should be given to the **cheapest** technology that can be deployed **fastest**. On both **costs** and **speed**, **renewable** energy sources **beat** nuclear. **Every** **euro** invested in new nuclear plants thus **delays** **decarbonization** compared to investments in renewable power. In a decarbonizing world, delays increase CO2 emissions.¶ Our thoughts focus on new nuclear power plants (not phasing out existing plants) in the US and Europe. In Europe, new nuclear power plants are planned or seriously discussed in France, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We do not focus on China, where government-set electricity prices and subsidized capital costs make it more difficult to contrast the profitability of different types of energy sources.¶ Nuclear energy is expensive The **cost** **overruns** on recent nuclear projects are **dramatic**. In an **international** **comparative** **assessment** of construction cost overruns for electricity infrastructure, Sovacool et al.2 find that nuclear reactors are the investment type with the most frequent and largest cost overruns, alongside hydroelectric dams. **97%** of the 180 nuclear reactor investment projects included in their analysis **suffered** cost **overruns**, with an average **cost** **increase** of **117%** per project. More recently, the current estimate of the construction costs of the French Flamanville project stands at V13.2 billion up from an initial V3.3 billion (figures that do not even include financing costs, which the French audit office estimated at V4.2 billion up from an initial V1.2 billion) and those of the recently opened Finish Olkiluoto at V11 billion instead of V3 billion. ‘‘Construction costs are high enough that it becomes difficult to make an economic argument for nuclear,’’ Davis3 finds. Similarly, Wealer et al.4 conclude that ‘‘**investing** into a Gen III/III+ nuclear power plant ... would very likely generate **significant** **losses**.’’¶ Why is nuclear so costly? Construction costs are driven by **safety**. Nuclear **accidents** remain a **possibility**—and damages may be global. Rangel and Le´ veˆ que5 note that huge damages occurring at ‘‘low and uncertain probability’’ make it difficult to determine whether safety investments are cost-effective. The nuclear plants built **relatively** **quickly** in previous decades had **lower** **safety** requirements. Policy makers’ preferences for safety makes sense given that nuclear power plant operators’ private insurance coverage is typically very limited.¶ Beyond construction costs, the cost of capital is a critical parameter for evaluating the viability of nuclear power. First, the very long construction times and delays generate particularly large financing costs for a given interest rate. Portugal-Pereira et al.6 report an escalation of capital costs worldwide due to increasing construction delays for the last generation of nuclear reactors constructed since the 2010s. The French court of auditors estimates that the cost of the French nuclear power plant Flamanville will increase from V13.2 billion to V20 billion once financing costs and delays are taken into account. Second, the **historically** **high** risk of default translates into **higher** **interest** **rates**. These two factors make the profitability of nuclear projects very dependent on financing conditions.¶ Finding an economic rationale for continued investment in new nuclear requires optimism regarding costs. The French grid operator RTE (Re´ seau de Transport d’E´ lectricite´ ) finds a power system including nuclear to be slightly cheaper than a system based purely on renewables in 2050. In their calculations, RTE assumes capital costs for new nuclear plants to be less than two-thirds of the estimated costs of the European pressurized reactor (EPR) plants in Finland and France. This optimism about cost reductions is contrary to experience of cost evolution for past nuclear reactor series in many countries of the world (PortugalPereira et al.6 ). Costs are **not** **projected** to come down very much even for the six new reactors planned to be built by 2035 (estimated to cost V52 billion in total, or V8.6 billion per reactor). The most recent EPR construction, Sizewell C in the United Kingdom, is also one of the most expensive projects at around V23 billion (£20 billion). This **pattern** of **increasing** **costs** over time has generated some interest in the literature (Lovering et al.7 and Eash-Gates et al.8 ). Most of the candidate explanations (in particular, increased safety regulations) do **not** provide **grounds** for **optimism** for the **future**. In a wide-ranging review of different technologies, Meng et al.9 find nuclear power to be a ‘‘notable exception’’ where progress is overestimated with actual costs consistently higher than expected. Small modular reactors (**SMRs**) may not be an exception: their advantages in terms of lower complexity may **not** **translate** into sound economics given **lower** **energy** **production**. Glaser et al.10 note that even **optimistic** **estimates** require many **hundreds** of reactors to be built before electricity produced is **cost** **competitive** compared with larger reactor designs. The potential of **modularity** to reduce costs **appears** **limited** in practice.¶ Nuclear power is not cost-competitive with renewables Despite poor profitability, nuclear power is advanced as a good investment to fight climate change. However, today, the challenge for nuclear profitability does not come from coal or gas but from renewables. It is hard to overstate how strongly the costs of renewables have decreased (see Figure 1). Few publications have anticipated these cost decreases, and public debate is often based on outdated cost assumptions.¶ Baseload and flexibility While renewables may have become a lot cheaper, it is sometimes argued that current electricity market design does not value security of supply. Nuclear, the argument goes, provides stable baseload electricity that is a valuable contribution to a generating mix. This raises two questions: first, can nuclear reliably produce baseload?¶ Second, how valuable is baseload? Regarding the first question: nuclear is not entirely reliable. This was evident in France in late autumn of 2022: although the EU was in a period of limited electricity supply with frequent electricity price spikes above 3V/kWh, around **half** of France’s 56 reactors were **unavailable** due to **planned** and **unplanned** **outages**. Climate change is likely to increase episodes of **extreme** **heat**, **low** **river** **flows**, and associated problems of **cooling** nuclear power plants at short notice (Ahmad11). More importantly, regarding the second question, **flexibility** rather than baseload production is **required** to balance an electricity system based on renewables. However, **ramping**-**up** a nuclear power plant is **slow**. Also, the cost composition of nuclear power does not fit the role of backup technology for power systems with high shares of wind and solar. Such systems will have low electricity prices for a large part of the year and very **high** **electricity** **prices** for a few to several hundred hours of the year, leading to **uncertain** and strongly **varying** revenues for a backup technology. Such a revenue profile is best suited for a technology with low capital costs and high variable costs—in a year with high demand, revenues will be higher, thus covering higher variable costs, and vice versa. Nuclear costs are mostly up front, so the technology is best suited for stable and predictable revenue streams. While renewables’ production is variable, their **generation** can be **matched** to demand by storing renewable electricity in the form of **hydrogen**, using **batteries** or pumped **hydro**. Bloomberg reports that the price of battery storage has fallen from $1,220 to $132 per kWh between 2010 and 2021. Beyond batteries, demand- and supply-side grid flexibility technologies can complement variable renewable energy sources at generally lower cost than fossil-fuel backup or bulk storage—consumers may also help reduce system costs by adapting their electricity consumption to the availability of renewable energy. Shirizadeh et al.12 find that costs of storing variable renewable electricity production appear manageable, with storage costs of less than 15% of total costs associated with a fully renewable electricity grid for France. Pietzcker et al.1 find that new nuclear constructions would not decrease the costs of achieving EU climate targets. Shirizadeh and Quirion13 find that a 100% renewable system is very cost-effective for France. Shirizadeh et al.12 note that while the optimal combination of different renewable generation technologies depends strongly on the cost parameters for these different technologies, the resulting cost of the renewable mix is fairly robust.¶ Taking into account wider economic impacts does not favor nuclear The business case for nuclear may be poor, but in a world in which the damage done to the climate is not reflected by markets sufficiently, can climate benefits not counter high costs?¶ First, the relatively low carbon emissions caused by operating new nuclear power plants are similar to those caused by wind and solar energy— hydro and bioenergy carbon footprints may be larger.¶ Second, adding non-market benefits to the equation implies that non-market costs should also be considered. This is not easy: how should we account for nuclear waste? Nuclear waste is the unresolved problem of the nuclear industry. Cheap **long**-**term** **storage** for anthropogenic **radioactive** substances is **elusive** despite worldwide, decades-old efforts. In absence of any proven low-cost permanent storage technology, nuclear waste will have to be retreated regularly and stored in facilities above the ground. Costs would arise for many thousands of years. The importance of costs and benefits for future generations in today’s decisions has been a controversial topic for climate change policy, and it appears even more relevant for nuclear waste. Krall et al.14 argue that SMRs may actually ‘‘exacerbate the challenges of nuclear waste management.’’¶ Third, uranium mining causes **pollution** and **radioactive** **exposure**. As a report of the EU’s Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks notes, ‘‘almost 100% of the total eco-toxicity and human toxicity impacts over the whole nuclear life cycle is connected to mining and milling ... While mining and milling is regulated [within the EU], 90% of what the EU need globally comes from 7 countries (none in Europe).’’ In Niger, for example, the systematic neglect of health and safety procedures in countries producing uranium for EU consumption persists despite evidence of ‘‘grave environmental impacts and rampant institutional failures.’’15¶ Finally, the continued development of nuclear energy could contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of nuclear power plants being targeted in armed conflict, a permanent risk in Ukraine today¶ Building new nuclear **takes** **time** **we** **do** **not** **have** The business case and economics may be poor, but in light of the very real threat of climate catastrophe, should we not invest in all alternatives to fossil fuels? The problem is that building nuclear plants is slow and delivery is uncertain. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Energy Agency— organizations promoting the use of nuclear energy—assume **construction** times of around **one** **decade**,13 whereas renewables can come online in a **fraction** of that time. Given **lags** in **planning** and **regulatory** approval, any new nuclear plants would come online **too** **late** to help **decarbonize** our economies on time. However, even this time frame appears optimistic: all recent nuclear new-builds in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have been seriously delayed—Olkiluoto took 16 years instead of five, while Flamanville is over 11 years behind schedule. The 5th and 6th EPR plants offer a similarly bleak picture: plans to build Hinkley Point C were first announced in 2008, with an aim of going online in the early 2020s. Grid connection is now planned for 2026. For Sizewell C, community consultation began in 2012, the planning application was submitted in 2020, and the reactor is expected to become operational in 2032. Given these **time** **horizons**, **delays**, and associated cost **overruns**, investments in nuclear power appear to be very **dangerous** **bets** in light of the need to quickly reduce EU power sector emissions by 2030 and to close to zero before 2040 in line with climate objectives. Finally, Granger et al.16 investigate various SMR technologies and fail to see how any could make a ‘‘significant contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation by the middle of this century.’’¶ Conclusion: In solving the climate crisis, new nuclear is a costly and dangerous distraction With ample time, it may be possible to build nuclear power to the highest safety standards and remain economical even taking into account costs of storing nuclear waste for thousands of years. However, building nuclear plants takes many years of planning and construction and is costly, while the **climate** **crisis** demands **urgency** and requires such large investments that **cost** **efficiency** is of key importance. Relying on nuclear new-builds to achieve the EU climate targets is **virtually** **impossible**: even under very optimistic assumptions, new nuclear in France will only start providing low-emission electricity in 2035—too late for the much faster reductions of power sector emissions required by the EU climate targets. And what would happen if there is further delay, as was the case for all recent nuclear constructions in OECD countries? In a decarbonizing world, delays in nuclear constructions translate to **increased** **emissions**. If governments and economic actors believe that nuclear power will come online at a certain date, they will not make alternative plans, and without alternative plans, the current carbonintensive electricity system will remain in place—rendering climate **targets** **unachievable**.

1. **Only sustained investment into fossil fuels resolves financial and climate concerns**

**Kimball 24** (Spencer Kimball [Energy Reporter for CBS], “Big oil is racing to scale up carbon capture to slash emissions but the challenges are immense,” CNBC, 4-6-2024, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/04/06/big-oil-is-racing-to-scale-up-carbon-capture-to-slash-emissions.html)//Shwillett  
**Cement** is one of the most **widely-used** products **globally**, second only to drinking water, and is responsible for about 7% of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions alone, according to the United Nations. **Cement** and **steel** together represent about **14%** of global **emissions**, according to the U.N.¶ “Right now, these types of industries have **no way** to effectively **decarbonize** to net zero **without** carbon capture,” Majkut said. “If they want to produce cement, there will be CO2 emissions simply because of the materials that are being used.”¶ With carbon storage already a mature commercial business, **SLB** is trying to tackle the **capture** side, which presents one of the major hurdles to scaling up the technology due to its high cost, according to Majkut. The solvent that would be used to **catch** carbon dioxide molecules at the Mississippi mill promises to **lower** the **energy** **requirements** of the capture process and make it more **cost** **effective**, he said.¶ “We’re quite comfortable that in the next **12 to 24 months**, we will be coming to market with actually that chemistry as part of our core offering and develop what we call process design packages,” Majkut said.¶ SLB CEO Olivier Le Peuch has said **carbon capture** and storage will play a **leading role** in the company’s **annual revenue targets** of $3 billion by 2030 and $10 billion by 2040 for its new energy portfolio.¶ SLB this month announced a nearly $400 million **investment** in Aker Carbon Capture, a pure-play carbon capture company based in Norway, in an effort to **accelerate** **deployment** of the technology at commercial **scale**.¶ Competitor Baker Hughes is developing direct air capture technology after acquiring a company called Mosaic Materials in 2022. Baker Hughes has not disclosed the value of the deal.¶ The technology aims to catch low concentration carbon dioxide emissions, which **are** harder to capture, directly from the atmosphere as well as from industrial plants. Baker Hughes anticipates the technology will most likely come to market by the end of 2026.¶ Baker Hughes is targeting up to $7 billion in orders by 2030 for its new energy portfolio, which includes carbon capture and storage technology. The company is forecasting a total market for its new energy business of between $60 billion and $70 billion by the end of the decade.¶ “By 2030, I do believe we’re going to start to see these technologies start to become reasonably **competitive**,” said Alessandro Bresciani, senior vice president of climate technologies at Baker Hughes.¶ Chevron, Exxon building Gulf Coast hubs¶ The Gulf Coast of the United States, home to enormous oil and gas and other industrial **plants**, is emerging as a **center** **of carbon capture and storage** investments in the U.S.¶ Jeff Gustavson, vice president of lower carbon energies at Chevron, said the region has the potential to quickly increase use of the technology because of favorable geology for storage located close to high concentration emissions that are easier to capture at a lower cost. Some 100 million tons of carbon dioxide are emitted annually from Houston through to Port Arthur, Texas, Gustavson said.¶ Chevron and Exxon are targeting $10 billion and more than $20 billion, respectively, of spending on emissions-reducing technologies that include carbon capture and storage in major projects under development along the Gulf Coast.¶ **Exxon** over the past two years has entered **agreements** to capture carbon emissions from ammonia and fertilizer producer **CF Industries** and steelmaker **Nucor**, both in Louisiana, and industrial gas producer Linde in Beaumont, Texas. The country’s largest oil company is targeting a start-up date for a carbon capture and storage system at CF Industries in the first half of 2025.¶ Dan Ammann, president of low carbon solutions at Exxon, said those three contracts combined promise to remove **5 million tons of emissions annually** — the equivalent of converting 2 million gas-powered cars to electric vehicles.¶ Exxon completed its acquisition of the carbon-dioxide pipeline operator Denbury for $5 billion in late 2023. The deal gave Exxon more than 900 miles of pipeline stretching through Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas that are located near at least 10 storage sites in the region.¶ “It gives us sort of **instantaneous scale**, instantaneous **reach**, across this huge source of emissions along the Gulf Coast,” Ammann said of the Denbury acquisition. “It gives us the ability to develop **storage** all along that pipeline as well.”

# US Modeling

1. **Trump is a massive alt cause**

**Shah 2-18** (Simone, Shah [Reporter at Time and attended Barnard College], “Here Are All of Trump’s Major Moves to Dismantle Climate Action,” Time Magazine, 2-18-2025, https://time.com/7258269/trump-climate-policies-executive-orders/)//Shwillett  
During his first weeks in office, President Donald **Trump** implemented a **slew** of actions and **executive** **orders** that stand to have **wide**-**reaching** impacts on climate policies.¶ During Trump’s first term, the administration put climate on the back burner—**rolling** **back** more than **125** environmental rules and policies. When former-President Joe Biden took office, he led the U.S. forward on climate action, signing the Inflation Reduction Act, the largest federal climate change investment in American history.¶ Now, the Trump Administration stands to **dismantle** much of the **momentum** it has inherited—**curbing** **progress** to reduce fossil fuel emissions, the largest contributor to climate change, just as the world surpassed 1.5°C of warming in 2024—the hottest year on record.¶ Columbia University’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s “Climate Backtracker,” has logged more than **45** **efforts** to scale back or **eliminate** federal climate **mitigation** and **adaptation** measures since the administration took office at the end of **January**—ranging from **boosting** fossil-fuel **production** to withdrawing the U.S. from the **Paris** **Climate** **Accords**. ¶ Here are some of the major ways the Trump Administration is undoing climate action. ¶ Withdrawing From Paris Accords¶One of the administration’s first moves on the first day of Trump’s presidency, was to begin the process of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement. The pact, which was signed by nearly 200 countries in 2015, aimed to curb long-term global warming to 2.7°F (2°C) above pre-industrial levels or keep temperatures below 3.6°F (1.5°C) above pre-industrial levels. The move did not come as a surprise—during his first administration, Trump also withdrew the U.S. from the agreement, though Biden rejoined upon taking office. ¶ “In recent years, the United States has purported to join international agreements and initiatives that do not reflect our country’s values or our contributions to the pursuit of economic and environmental objectives,” President Trump said in an executive order. “Moreover, these agreements steer American taxpayer dollars to countries that do not require, or merit, financial assistance in the interests of the American people.”¶ The move **weakens** the U.S. position and **reliability** when it comes to **international** climate negotiations. In a November interview with the *Guardian*, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres likened a potential U.S. withdrawal to losing a limb or organ. “The Paris Agreement can survive, but people sometimes can lose important organs or lose the legs and survive. But we don’t want a crippled Paris Agreement. We want a real Paris Agreement,” he said. ¶ Evaluating FEMA ¶ The president signed an executive order on Jan. 24 calling for an assessment of the effectiveness of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the nation’s main arm for disaster recovery. While visiting Hurricane Helene victims in North Carolina on Jan. 24, he proposed “getting rid” of FEMA, a move that could impact the country’s ability to recover from extreme weather events that are becoming more intense and frequent due to climate change. The appointed council, which will include the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, will have one year to evaluate “the existing ability of FEMA to capably and impartially address disasters occurring within the United States.”¶ Ramping up Oil and Gas Production¶ On Feb. 14, Trump signed an executive order to create a new “National Energy Dominance Council,” aimed at **increasing** the country’s **oil** and **gas** **production**. Trump’s “drill, baby, drill” approach is meant to lower energy prices and increase supply of fossil fuels. The country’s oil and gas production, however, already reached record highs under the Biden Administration, according to the Center for American Progress.And some experts have warned the moves may actually harm some refineries and raise gas prices.¶ EPA Cuts¶ The Trump Administration and its newly created Department of Governmental Efficiency (DOGE) proposed **sweeping** cuts to many federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (**EPA**). At the beginning of February, the agency told more than 1,000 “probationary” employees, those who had been working for the agency for less than a year, that they could be fired immediately, according to *NBC News*. The agency has since “terminated” nearly 400 employees, according to *The Hill.* ¶ The reduction of staff could impact the organization's **speed** and **ability** to respond to crises—like tackling environmental health risks or implementing **regulations**.

2. Tariffs independently mean no one models the U.S. because they view us in adversarial terms.

# Solvency

1. Integral reactors have never been used on a wide scale which proves either its ineffective, experimental, or no one likes it, their own Blees evidence says that politics have killed projects which means it isn’t normal means.
2. Private companies that lobby the government want SMRs because of AI, google, amazon, and microsoft are all investment — their initial high cost makes them too risky

#### **3. Decreasing US production magnifies upstream emissions AND price swings increase global production**

**Gross ’18** (Samantha Gross [Samantha Gross is the director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative and a fellow in Foreign Policy. Her work is focused on the intersection of energy, environment, and policy, including climate policy and international cooperation, the transition to net-zero emissions energy system, energy geopolitics, and global energy markets.], “Reducing US oil demand, not production, is the way forward for the climate,” Brookings, 8-22-2018, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reducing-us-oil-demand-not-production-is-the-way-forward-for-the-climate/)//Shwillett  
The case for continuing U.S. oil production while working to reduce demand¶ Eliminating **domestic** oil production without an equally ambitious focus on demand will just **increase** U.S. **imports**, rather than reduce consumption. This could result in unintended consequences and **worse** results for the economy and **climate**.¶ Oil production **standards** in many countries are **less** **stringent** than those in the United States, in terms of local pollution as well as greenhouse gas emissions from the production process. Many foreign sources of oil inherently require **more** **energy** in their production, resulting in greater emissions of GHGs and other pollutants than production here in the United States. Importing more fuel would also increase the distances of oil transportation, increasing associated GHG emissions.¶ **Upstream** **emissions** from oil — those that occur in production, transportation, and refining — vary greatly across sources of crude oil. (Although the majority of emissions from all sources of oil come from its combustion, not its production.) The highest 10% of production in terms of upstream GHG emissions has emissions more than four times those of the lowest 10%.**29** Mature oil fields and those that produce heavier oil tend to have higher upstream GHG emissions. Flaring is also a key driver of emissions, as discussed below.**30** These distinctions are small when one considers the challenge of deep decarbonization, but as the world strives to reduce emissions overall, using the lowest-emissions sources of crude oil can **help** during the **transition**.¶ U.S. crude oil production is in the lowest quartile of upstream greenhouse gas emissions, and some large sources of U.S. crude oil, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Permian,**31** are particularly low emitters.¶ The United States could, therefore, lose the economic advantages of its oil production without reducing global GHG emissions. In fact, such an outcome could **actually** **increase** global emissions, depending on how replacement fuels are produced, and the emissions released in transporting them to the United States. We must remember that climate change is a global problem and that the measure that matters is global GHG emissions. Any “solution” that reduces U.S. emissions but increases global emissions is no solution at all.¶ One could argue that reducing U.S. oil production would increase global oil prices and thus decrease oil’s use globally. This might be true for a short while, but the global oil market has a **history** of strong **price** **swings**, as high prices bring out **more** **production** that sends prices crashing down again. It’s unlikely that decreased U.S. production would keep prices high enough for **long** **enough** to significantly **decrease** global **demand**. Remember that oil is **plentiful**, **fungible**, and **available** in many areas around the world. **Less** **stringent** **regulatory** and permitting **regimes** in many places make oil development easier than it is in the United States, and some of the **OPEC** countries in the Middle East keep **spare** **capacity** in reserve to help manage prices and make up for **shortfalls** in supply. Canceling new **U.S.** oil projects will **not** be **enough** to turn the ship on global oil demand. Additionally, policies that are clearly designed to raise fuel prices would be a huge political challenge in the United States and cause the most harm to those least able to afford the higher prices.¶ The U.S. oil industry is also a significant contributor to the economy. Brookings has estimated that in 2019, the fossil fuel industry directly employed nearly 1.7 million people in the United States.**32** The wages from these jobs indirectly support other jobs in the economy. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that the U.S. trade deficit in 2019 was $305 billion lower than it would have been without U.S. oil and gas production.**33** These economic benefits do not mean that the industry should run forever — the economic harm caused by unchecked climate change would surely overwhelm the industry’s contribution to the economy. But the economic benefits do argue for continuing to produce as long as there is demand in the United States, and for considering how to wind down the industry in a way that preserves jobs, as discussed later in this document.

#### 4. **Green paradox increases emissions**

**Champion ’21** (Marc Champion [Senior reporter for international affairs at Bloomberg; citing Andreas Goldthau, Professor of Public Policy at Central European University, Hungary, and a study by U.K. think tank Carbon Tracker.], "What Countries Will Fight Over When Green Energy Dominates," Bloomberg, 3-16-2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-03-16/what-countries-will-fight-over-when-green-energy-dominates)//Shwillett  
In November, Johnson’s U.K. will host the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, where countries will negotiate the rules for the road ahead. Leaders want to make sure everyone else is doing their fair share to cut emissions, and that their countries don't lose out.¶ That fear could lead to what German economist Hans-Werner Sinn has called the “**green paradox**.” He argues the transition could prompt oil producers—especially those with high extraction costs or shallow reserves—to start **pump**ing **as fast as they can** while demand lasts. The increased supply would **boost** carbon **emissions** and also **lower the price** of **crude**, making it **more competitive with renewables** and **slowing** the move to cleaner energy.¶ Cheap oil could also decimate the budgets of fragile regimes before they have time to find other sources of revenue. A February [study](https://archive.ph/o/USsgK/https:/carbontracker.org/reports/petrostates-energy-transition-report/) by U.K. think tank Carbon Tracker found that 40 fossil-fuel dependent governments would suffer an average 51% drop in oil and gas revenues if global climate targets are met. That could destabilize governments and leave the likes of Nigeria or Iraq unable to afford security to deal with threats from terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Islamic State.