# Fairmont Prep --- NDCAs --- Aff vs. Poly Prep

## 1AC

### 1AC---K

#### Boo! The counter-method is hauntology — vote AFF to endorse hauntology 👻

**Freccero 06** (Carla Freccero is Chair of the Department of Literature and Professor of Literature, History of Consciousness, and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. January 16 2006, “Queer/Early/Modern,” accessed 7/8/2022, pg. 75-80, <https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/search?q=%22queer/early/modern%22> // recut akang

Yet this intertwining of multiple brutal logics of erasure reappears again and again. The historical and political appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ as ‘‘known’’ cannot lay to rest the haunting that persistently destabilizes the anchors of identity and meaning. As Halberstam explains, if ‘‘haunting is an articulate discourse’’ and ‘‘a mode within which the ghost demands something like accountability,’’ then ‘‘**to tell a ghost story means being willing to be haunted’’** (73). This willingness to be haunted is an ethical relation to the world, motivated by a concern not only for the past but also for the future, for those who live on in the borderlands without a home. If the queer appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ has been melancholic—an attempt to deal with trauma, in a sense, by refusing it as such, turning it instead into knowledge, into productive organizing—it has also been colonizing. Both gestures, the melancholic and the colonizing, have worked to foreclose how ‘‘he,’’ as ghost, recurs in ways that are not so clear, and demands not a definition but the creation of a future where categorical definitions so dependent on gender and desire might prove affirmingly impossible and unnecessary. Using spectrality as a hypothesis, then, we might wonder what we would see and hear were we to remain open to ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ ’s ghostly returns. One such moment is the point at which one survivor, finding himself haunted, ‘‘listens’’ to the ghost and speaks its reminder. Matthew Shepard’s homophobically motivated murder occurred in 1998, four years after ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ was killed and the year a documentary of the events The Brandon Teena Story—was released; it also occurred four months after the torture and murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, for being African American. In a statement bordering on the wishes thus express themselves from beyond the grave. Tellingly, the ghostly performative ventriloquized by Mr. Shepard, as reported in the Washington Post, interrupts the logic of revenge and retribution animating the force of the law: In a dramatic and surprising end to the Matthew Shepard murder case, convicted killer Aaron J. McKinney, 22, today was sentenced to two life sentences for beating the gay University of Wyoming student to death last year. McKinney accepted a deal brokered by Shepard’s parents just as a jury was about to begin hearing testimony about whether he should be put to death.... His son, Shepard said, believed in the death penalty for certain crimes, and had called it justified in the racially motivated murder in Texas of James Byrd Jr., who was dragged to death behind a pickup truck in another hate crime that shocked the nation’s conscience. ‘‘Little did we know that the same response would come about involving Matt,’’ Shepard said. ‘‘I too believe in the death penalty,’’ he added. ‘‘I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney. However, this is the time to begin the healing process. To show mercy to someone who refused to show any mercy. ‘‘Mr. McKinney, I’m going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to do so, because of Matthew . . .’’18 Ghostly returns are thus a sign of trauma and its mourning.19 This trauma, Derrida argues, is a ‘‘politico-logic of trauma,’’ that ‘‘répond à l’injonction d’une justice qui, au-delà du droit, surgit dans le respect même de qui n’est pas, n’est plus ou n’est pas encore vivant, présentement vivant’’ (‘‘responds to the injunction of a justice which, beyond right or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or not yet, living, presently living’’).20 This mourning is not a form of nostalgia, a longing for what is gone, but a kind of mourning that is ‘‘en fait et en droit interminable, sans normalité possible, sans limite fiable, dans la réalité ou dans le concept, entre l’introjection et l’incorporation’’ (160; ‘‘in fact and by right interminable, without possible normality, without reliable limit, in its reality or in its concept, between introjection and incorporation,’’ 97).21 Thinking historicity through haunting thus combines both the seeming objectivity of events and the subjectivity of their affective afterlife. As Wendy Brown remarks of spectrality’s modality—what Derrida calls a ‘‘being-with specters’’ that is also ‘‘une politique de la mémoire, de l’héritage et des générations’’ (15; ‘‘a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations’’ [xviii–xix])—‘‘We inherit not ‘what really happened’ to the dead but what lives on from that happening, what is conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, how they claim us, and **how they haunt, plague, and inspirit our imaginations and visions for the future.**’’22 Ghostliness and homosexuality have a long history of association, most frequently referenced in the clichéd and homophobic phrase ‘‘the specter of homosexuality.’’ In its most virulent deployment, that specter is always lurking in an alley or behind a bush, waiting to pounce upon some unsuspecting innocents. When invoked more sympathetically, it hovers secretively around the edges of an otherwise perfectly straight and open—albeit presumably anxious—scene. Indeed, Derrida defines the specter in terms strikingly reminiscent of homosexual panic, the sense of a not-quite-visible contaminating near-presence that is also an anxious, often paranoid projection, the material immateriality I tracked through the term queer in chapter 2: Le spectre, comme son nom l’indique, c’est la fréquence d’une certaine visibilité. Mais la visibilité de l’invisible. Et la visibilité, par essence, ne se voit pas, c’est pourquoi elle reste . . . au-delà du phénomène ou de l’étant. Le spectre, c’est aussi, entre autres choses, ce qu’on imagine, ce qu’on croit voir et qu’on projette: sur un écran imaginaire, là où il n’y a rien à voir. Pas même l’écran, parfois, et un écran a toujours, au fond, au fond qu’il est, une structure, une structure d’apparition disparaissante. Mais voilà qu’on ne peut plus fermer l’oeil à guetter le retour. (Spectres de Marx, 165) The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, **is not seen, which is why it remains** . . . beyond the phenomenon, or beyond being. The specter is also, among other things, what one thinks one sees, and which one projects—on an imaginary screen where there is nothing to see. Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always has, at bottom, in the bottom or background that is, a structure of disappearing apparition. But now one can no longer get any shut-eye, being so intent to watch out for the return. (Specters of Marx, 101) Like the closet, whose very existence suggests the opening onto what is concealed, Derrida likens the specter to the screen whose structure is always already that of a disappearing appearance. The ghost is thus also structural. Terry Castle observes this phenomenon in relation to the ‘‘apparitional’’ history of the lesbian: ‘‘When it comes to lesbians . . . many people have trouble seeing what’s in front of them. The lesbian remains a kind of ‘ghost effect’ in the cinema world of modern life: elusive, vaporous, difficult to spot—even when she is there, in plain view, mortal and magnificent, at the center of the screen. Some may even deny that she exists at all.’’23 For those who live ‘‘on the other side’’ of the expression, ‘‘the specter of homosexuality,’’ those who might be said to be named, ‘‘ghosted’’ by that phrase, ghosts are neither scary nor menacing, however terrifying the prospect of being turned into one might be. For one may also reverse the perspective and understand the specter as that which sees without being seen, as what produces the sense of being seen, observed, surveilled.24 Hélène Cixous declared, concerning one famous gynephobic patriarchal figure of woman, ‘‘You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful and she’s laughing.’’25 To be a ghost among ghosts is to ‘‘see’’ the ghost not as a feared and fearful projection—the way Medusa cannot be directly seen by men—but perhaps as beautiful, though rarely laughing, for the specter is the form a certain unfinished mourning takes. Thus part of what it might mean to live with ghosts would be to understand oneself as ‘‘ghosted,’’ and to understand ‘‘learning to live’’ as something that takes place ‘‘between life and death’’ as the ‘‘non contemporaneity with itself of the living present.’’26 This would then be an approach to history—and to justice—that would neither ‘‘forget the dead’’ nor ‘‘successfully’’ mourn them.27 Exploring further the notion of haunting as the way history registers as affect in the social and psychic lives of beings, and the reciprocity of haunting and being haunted, Avery Gordon follows the figure of the ghost and the poetics of haunting in other contexts to understand the specificity of this way of coming to terms with historical trauma.28 Ghostly Matters looks to Toni Morrison’s Beloved to see how haunting conveys the traumatic effect and affect of the historical event on the subject and the social responsibility that is thereby entailed.29 Thus what Derrida analyzes in the work of Marx and philosophy, Gordon studies in a kind of embodied poetics, tracking how the ghost’s figurative ‘‘materialization’’ elicits, even as it emblematizes, traumatic repetition and working through.30 In that process of materialization, or poetic embodiment, Hamlet’s father undergoes a morphological transformation, from Danish king to African slave and from father to daughter; the ghostly exchange takes place not between a father and his son but between a daughter and her mother; and the ‘‘allegory’’ of haunting moves from Europe to America.31 Like Gordon, in what follows I track a transatlantic passage from an earlier moment and an earlier historical trauma as they haunt both within and outside of their own time. In Premodern Sexualities, Louise Fradenburg and I raised questions concerning the fantasmatic relationship that we, as scholars of the past and scholars working ‘‘queerly’’ in the history of sexuality, might affirm in relation to the past, ‘‘ours’’ or that of others, in the name of pleasure.32 It was an effort, in part, to honor the complex pleasure positivity of queer theory in its resistance to the heteronormatively disciplining discourses that came self-righteously to the fore when aids in the United States became associated with ‘‘homosexuals’’ and ‘‘promiscuity.’’ It was also a way of examining how desires and identifications—queer theory’s psychoanalytically inflected terminological legacies—are at work in historical scholars’ investments in the differences and similarities between the past and the present. Finally, it was a way of noting historiography’s own (self-)disciplining force, its ‘‘repudiations of pleasure and fantasy’’ in spite—or because—of its queer wishes (xvii); thus we argued for a queer historiography that would devote itself to a critical revalorization of the places and possibilities of pleasure within the serious and ‘‘ascetic’’ work of history. Insofar as queer historicism registers the affective investments of the present in the past, however, it harbors within itself not only pleasure, but also pain, a traumatic pain whose ethical insistence is to ‘‘live to tell’’ through complex and circuitous processes of working through. Thus we concluded the introduction with an ethically impelled wish: The past may not be the present, but it is sometimes in the present, haunting, even if only through our uncertain knowledges of it, **our hopes of surviving and living well**. The questions we are raising about the practice of history may help us understand better the living and dying of twentieth-century bodies and pleasures. And we hope that consideration of the ways in which historicisms are currently questioning sexuality, and sex studies questioning historicism, will work to affirm the pleasures of mortal creatures. (xxi) The past is in the present in the form of a haunting. This is what, among other things, doing a queer kind of history means, since it involves an openness to the possibility of being haunted, even inhabited, by ghosts. What is transmitted in the cohabitation of ghostly past and present is related to survival, to ‘‘living well,’’ and to the ‘‘pleasures of mortal creatures,’’ survivals and pleasures that have little to do with normative understandings of biological reproduction.

#### The AFF reframes the dead such that they become rallying points for political change and broadens the scope of which bodies do or don’t count.

Jessica **Auchter 16**, professor in the Social Science department at University of Tennessee, “Paying Attention to Dead Bodies: The Future of Security Studies?”, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, Volume 1(1), pp 37-39, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv005>, lenox

Security studies has, up until now, not taken **dead bodies** seriously. This is perhaps because security studies scholarship has privileged the idea of survival and has focused on generating knowledge and scholarship that **ensured survival** at multiple levels. National interest has often been intertwined with **survival of the state**; similarly, focuses on human rights and responsibilities are tied to the survival of **humanity**. Environmental degradation, for example, is deemed a threat to **human security** because degradation can threaten survival by changing weather patterns, exacerbating desertification, and affecting the supply of water and food. As Priya Dixit (2015, 113) has noted, “it is presumed that life—and a live body—is the main goal of security. Thus, dead bodies and death in general become ‘**out of place**.’” It is worth mentioning here that there is a difference between dead bodies and death. While we know that death is **inevitable**, we cannot **know it ourselves**. Dead bodies, on the other hand, are something we can **see** and choose to ignore, or they can become **rallying points** around specific issues.

This focus on survival and human life in security studies means that the dead are often represented as simply a **failure of the system**: the dead citizen means that the state is not **secure**, while the dead famine victim indicates a lack of attention to adequate standards of health. The hyper-visible dead body thrust onto the scene of global politics is often represented as a crisis of **responsibility**. The **Syrian child** who drowned and whose dead body washed up on a Turkish beach in early September 2015 became an iconic **representation** of the failure of the international community to deal with the violence in Syria and of the insecurity of the global refugee crisis. **This one image raised more outcry in Europe than any report** of the thousands of people drowning making similar crossings. In terms of representation, some deaths come to matter more than others, because some lives are deemed **more worthy** of securing than others. Taking dead bodies seriously in security studies, then, is about both corpses as **signifiers of insecurity** and the politics of how the dead are identified, classified, measured, represented, and managed. It is directly linked to questions of their agency.

Dead bodies have been under-theorized in security studies, but this is not for a lack of representation in global politics. Indeed, bodies are both measured and managed, as will be explored more thoroughly in later sections. Dead bodies appear in numerous ways, from soldier dead to health management to religious and cultural traditions to famous individual bodies that are hyper-visible such as Lenin and Ho Chi Minh. Dead bodies and body parts have been addressed in terms of their management by **international organizations** (MarlinBennett, Wilson, and Walton 2010; Auchter 2015), but their political implications have not been thoroughly explored. Similarly, studies within sociology and anthropology have addressed dead bodies, particularly the corpses of leaders in a communist and post-communist context (Verdery 1999; Giroux 2006; Casper and Moore 2009), and recent media attention has focused on controversy over the bodies of figures such as Osama bin Laden. But these studies have not focused on the question of how dead bodies matter for security: how we view our own material and physical security and insecurity, and how we deal with a world where conflict and disaster produce dead bodies as a matter of fact. At the same time, we are told by global human **security paradigms** that **policy** changes should be inaugurated to **minimize** these kinds of deaths, and by many foreign policy paradigms that specific deaths, like those of terrorists, **render the world more secure**. That is, when looking at dead bodies, the idea of security is often invoked in a variety of ways and toward varying ends.

Some of the increased attention to the dead body has come through the emergence of the human security paradigm. Human security has drawn attention to human rights violations, global health, economic inequality, human mobility, and environmental degradation as security concerns affecting the global community. As Caroline Thomas (2001, 161) has explained, “human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised.” The dead body itself poses important questions for how we conceptualize human dignity. If the very idea of human security implies the existence of a political community that privileges the security of the human at its heart, it must define which lives and deaths count as **politically qualified ones**, as lives worth protecting and as deaths worth **memorializing**. Life and security go **hand-in-hand**, as scholars of biopolitics have noted (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Grayson 2008). Nikolas Rose, for example, has argued that “the biological existence of human beings has become **political** in novel ways. The object, target and stake of this new ‘vital’ politics are human life itself” (Rose 2001, 1). However, these approaches to the politics of life have not fully addressed the politics of death, or the role dead bodies play in our understandings of security. Similarly, as Edward Newman (2010, 77) has noted, approaches to human security rarely examine **ontological or epistemological questions**: “human security arguments are generally ‘problem-solving.’ They do not generally engage in epistemological, ontological, or methodological debates.”

To address this lacuna, I focus on corpses as an analytical concept that can open up conversations among various approaches to security studies. Both human security and critical security studies have brought the question of agency to the fore, while in traditional security studies, dead bodies remain subjects of the key agents of global politics: states. Human security scholars have argued for paying increased attention to the individual human and to human beings more generally, to broaden the agent of security. Within critical security studies, scholars have argued that the agent of security should be defined even more broadly, and new materialist approaches have extended this beyond the human being (Salter 2015). The dead body offers a useful way of thinking about security because it raises questions for all of these approaches.

Indeed, bodies often serve as **symbols** of political order, where political transformation is symbolized by what is done to bodies, as in the expression “cutting off the head of the king,” pomp and circumstance regarding burial and reburial of political leaders, and even the idiom “body politic” (Verdery 1999). This focus on political leaders raises an important question: what are the basic contours of what makes a body fair game for security studies? Though the responses to this question can be varied, with some focusing on the corpses of political leaders, others dead soldiers, and yet others civilian dead, the point of the question is that how we define which bodies have security implications matters. How one answers this question can also gesture to one’s approach to security: conventional security studies focuses on war deaths almost exclusively and is less likely to consider deaths from other causes to be important. Human security studies is much more likely to draw attention to civilian deaths, and to deaths from causes such as hunger. Critical security studies draws attention to **everyday practices**, thus **broadening** which dead bodies matter. Why and how certain dead bodies become national symbols and others objects of private mourning tells us something about how political communities are defined by the dead they **determine memorializable** and grievable. These deaths are deemed political because these lives and bodies were considered to be the **purview of the state**. From the original Hobbesian notion that individuals give over their sovereignty to the state in exchange for protection, the body that is killed by violence or bad governance is a representation of the abrogation of the essential social and political contract that motivates the formation and existence of political community itself; these are the corpses addressed in this article.

More must be said on how we give meaning to the dead within these political communities: the corpse is important precisely because it is a component within cultural understandings and **identity constructions**. Dead bodies are personally and culturally significant to survivors: they are “**socially alive** but biologically dead” (Sledge 2007, 21). Tiffany Jenkins (2011, 107) similarly describes human remains as holding “a social category as a ‘person’ (human, body), but are also a ‘thing’ (remains, corpse, cadaver, skeleton).” Even in museums “human remains, irrespective of age, provenance, or kind, occupy a unique category distinct from all other museum objects. There is a qualitative distinction between human remains and artefacts” (DCMS 2003, 166).

It is the fact that the corpse once possessed the self-actualization we associate with qualified participation in a political community—agency—that gives it such a special status. That is, dead bodies are still “human” in many ways, and they have important **effects on the living**. Norman Cantor has traced what he refers to as “postmortem human dignity,” the social and legal protections for the corpse, and how it is not considered as property in terms of corpse management and disposal, precisely because of the “intimate association between a cadaver and its predecessor” (Cantor 2010, 4). He argues that the relationship between the living and the **cadaver** is both emotional and material: the corpse “represents the continuing **embodiment** of a particular human being,” is someone’s loved one, is the “vessel that held a unique person and is still the most tangible manifestation of its human predecessor,” and is also structurally identical to a living human being (Cantor 2010, 29–30). As a result of this, the dead body **blurs our traditional conceptions** of who may **count** as the agent of human security, because the corpse is considered **worthy of securing**: we tend to anthropomorphize the corpse by attributing feelings to it, and the corpse has rights in various legal systems to dignity and privacy and undisturbed rest (Cantor 2010, 43–64). Additionally, the idea that heroic soldiers do not leave the bodies of comrades behind, or the movement to repatriate the remains of those who have died in a foreign country, both speak to the idea that the corpse has legal and political status as well as affective status. Because the corpse is not a living person, but bears many of the political assignations a living person does, it **broadens the notion** of who **counts** as a qualified member of the political community, with access to the rights it entails.

#### The ROTJ is to vote for whichever team creates the best model for education regarding settler colonial structures and how to resolve them. We do not have to read a topical aff in this round so long as we create the best education regarding settler colonial structures. Debaters will eventually become policymakers, voters, petitioners and people who can create change in the real world; by creating the best education in round you create people best equipped to create real world change. Prefer it:

#### Takes into account their ROTB by creating non settler-based education and critically examining both teams as research objects that influence our perceptions of the world

#### “Embodying refusal” is incredibly vague and does not give any instruction as to how to weigh. Our judge instruction is better.

#### Even if, to embody refusal of settler logics, we must first understand the real experiences of Indigenous lives—anything else creates homogenization of experiences.

#### For context, Indigenous communities are hurt by nuclear energy

Lawrence 21 **-** Ainsley Lawrence, 6-11-2021, "How Nuclear Waste Impacts Marginalized Communities", Geopolitics, https://thegeopolitics.com/how-nuclear-waste-impacts-marginalized-communities/

Social equality groups pressed for reconsideration, stating that any fallout would only further widen the gaps generated by apartheid. But were they listened to? South Africa has moved ahead time and time again with plans to develop more nuclear reactors. Nuclear Power is Built in Low-Income Communities As a direct consequence of their being ignored, marginalized communities like those below the poverty level or with higher populations of minority groups tend to live closer to nuclear power plants. **According to Stanford University research, a larger percentage of African Americans lived within 50 miles of nuclear power plants than their white peers**. Infamously, Chernobyl represents exactly what happens to marginalized communities when a nuclear disaster occurs. The city’s many subsistence farmers found themselves suddenly without the means to make a living when the disaster occurred. As a result, they were forced to rely on government subsistence to make ends meet, and many have either returned or stayed in the region where housing is cheaper. Because the risks associated with nuclear power lower property values, lower-income families both already live in planned sites for nuclear development or come to live there after they’re built. T**his means when a disaster occurs, it is the poor who face more of the devastation.** Protections Aren’t for Everyone The leaks at the Savannah River nuclear site in the American South showcased just how racially and financially disparate the effects tend to be when dealing with dangerous nuclear waste. **From the evidence that emerged that black workers were frequently sent into high-radiation areas without the proper protection to the lack of job mobility experienced by the same**, historically marginalized workers and the larger black community in Savannah River took a disproportionate amount of the fallout. There were at least 30 cases of cancer and ailments associated with the Savannah River site in its earlier days, but the leaks of nuclear containments continue to give the community health concerns, especially when it comes to the availability of safe drinking water. Poor water quality can lead to illness and even death. When polluted with radiation, the effects of contaminated drinking water can be even worse. But Stanford research shows that ionizing radiation standards are designed more to protect adult males. For nuclear facility workers, even these standards can be waived, allowing facility owners to expose workers to as much as 50 times more radiation than is allowed for the common citizen. Often, these workers don’t even receive hazard pay. **Minority and low-income communities are at higher risk of the radiation pumped via nuclear waste into their communities because of their proximity.** At the same, these communities have statistically higher levels of women and children. **These risk factors, much like the reasons nuclear power plants are built in these areas in the first place, perpetuate racist and classist outcomes**. Facing these tragic problems, is there any hope that we can make clean nuclear energy safe for everyone?

#### Story the First (Neisus 17)

Neisius "Western Shoshone Nation Opposes Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository – Commodities, Conflict, and Cooperation", Winter 2017, <https://sites.evergreen.edu/ccc/warnuclear/shoshone-tribe-opposes-yucca-mountain-nuclear-repository/>

Taylor goes on to argue that Native Americans were targeted for this form of internal colonialism because their land was often in isolated areas and they had little political power. As a result, toxic waste (i.e. nuclear waste in the Western Shoshone case) was often dumped on Indigenous land (Taylor). **Corbin Harney, a Western Shoshone spiritual leader** and early environmental activist, **spoke about this as** part of his contribution to an **oral history** project sponsored by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas: And **why did they choose a place like Yucca Mountain to bury this nuclear rot? The only thing that we talk about . . . was . . . because they said, you’re a ward of the government. We’re going to take care of your land for you under trust. And that’s the reason why . . . they chose Indian land throughout the country to do whatever bad thing they wanted to do** (Harney). Western Shoshone activists have also argued that environmental racism was a factor in the decision to select Yucca Mountain. **As explained** by **Ian Zabarte, a** Western **Shoshone** activist and board member of the Native Community Action Council: F**rom our perspective the processes employed by the DOE is environmental racism designed to systematically dismantle the living lifeways of the Western Shoshone people in relation to our land . . . It’s not about the amount of radioactivity that would permeate the groundwater . . . The environmental racism lies in the very notion that it would be okay to put any radioactive material there at all** (Indian Country Today Media Network). There concerns were also noted by Ojibwe community organizer Winona LaDuke in her book All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life: The federal government is proposing to use Yucca Mountain, sacred to the Shoshone, as a dumpsite for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste. Over the last 45 years, there have been 1,000 atomic explosions on Western Shoshone land in Nevada, making the Western Shoshone the most bombed nation on Earth (LaDuke). **The selection of** the Yucca Mountain **site was probably also influenced by framing, which is a concept from psychology which suggests that people react and make choices depending on how the issue is presented.** The decision about the selection of a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain was widely covered by the media. **An analysis of this media coverage at the time indicated a strong preference for describing Yucca Mountain in very abstract terms using pronuclear, Cold War language. The more sacred aspects of the mountain that were important to the Western Shoshone Nation were almost imperceptible [in the coverage]** (Brock). To illustrate this point, the following are examples of descriptions of Yucca Mountain used by the media when reporting on the nuclear waste project (Brock). • Barren-seeming place; hellishly dry desert ridge (Washington Post) • Desolate; remote (North Jersey Media Group) • Volcanic heap; final resting place (Knight-Ridder) • Remote ridge; desolate ridge (St. Louis Post-Dispatch) • Ugly mountain ridge; nondescript ridge (Washington Post) • Desolate mountain ridge (Media News Group) • Desolate, barren, or remote ridge (New York Times) • Ancient volcanic ridge; arid ridge (Associated Press) The impact of colonialism, environmental racism and framing on the Yucca Mountain selection cannot be measured specifically, but indirect evidence suggests that each was a factor in the final decision.

#### Story the second.

Meyer 21 – Meyer, Melodie. "Fracking in Pueblo and Diné communities." UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 39 (2021): 89. https://escholarship.org/content/qt5d14z9dd/qt5d14z9dd.pdf?t=qq7qur

These strategies are essential to maintaining a healthy environment for Pueblo and Diné peoples and the future of all New Mexican communities. I. The Chaco Landscape: Place and People “**The ancient Pueblo people called the earth the Mother Creator of all things in this world . . . In the end we all originate from the depths of the earth.**”5 The significance of fracking on the Chaco landscape is best explained by first providing a description of the landscape’s history and its importance to indigenous peoples in the Southwest as a sacred place and a homeland. The Chaco landscape is located in the San Juan Basin, the large structural basin comprising Northern New Mexico and Southwestern Colorado.6 Archaeological research has revealed hundreds of ancient Pueblo settlements spanning beyond the Chaco Culture National Historical Park for over 60,000 square miles (roughly the size of the state of Georgia).7 Ancestral Pueblo people began living in the area as early as 490 A.D. and remained until 1400 A.D., until they migrated, likely due to drought.8 Beginning in the twelfth century, the area was also inhabited by Diné ancestors.9 For Pueblo people, land and story are inherently connected.10 **One cannot exist without the other, and both are necessary for the cultural survival of the Pueblo. Leslie Marmon Silko, a Pueblo of Laguna author, writes**: In A.D. 1100 the people at Chaco Canyon had built cities with apartment buildings of stone five stories high. Their sophistication as skywatchers was surpassed only by Mayan and Inca astronomers. Yet this vast complex of knowledge and belief, amassed for thousands of years, was never recorded in writing. Instead, **the ancient Pueblo people depended upon collective memory through successive generations to maintain and transmit an entire culture, a world view complete with proven strategies for survival**.11 Chaco Canyon was a ceremonial and economic hub for ancient indigenous peoples.12 As the place where knowledge of solar and lunar cycles evolved, it is both a metaphoric and literal part of many Pueblo migration narratives.13 Pueblo people ritually revisit both stories and landscapes. The Pueblo relationship and understanding of Chaco Canyon does not align with non-indigenous understandings of normative land use or ownership. Even though Pueblo people revisit Chaco Canyon both physically and in story, there is usually no visible evidence of Pueblo physical presence or disturbance.

## 2AC

### 2AC---A2: FW

#### No warrant why we should have to weigh hypothetical implementation or be topical in the framework. We’d say discussions of ethical and education implications come before it because it is a prerequisite to understanding any policy action.

Lee **Jones** is lecturer in International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London, BA Honors Univ of Warwick, MA in IR St Anthony’s, PhD IR Nuffield , Journal of Critical Globalization Studies Issue 1 **2009**

Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding – a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion. Furthermore, those funding ‘policy-relevant’ research already have predefined notions of what is ‘relevant’. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order. Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested à la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix. In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more ‘liberal’ credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nye’s work spans from After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheer-leading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administration’s ‘imperial ambition’ on the pragmatic grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led ‘liberal’ order. These scholars’ commitment to the continued ‘benign’ dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day ‘prince’; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd. At stake here is the fundamental distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory**,** which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problemsolvers, since policies seek precisely to – well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy. Indeed, the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders, corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1 Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very ‘policy relevant’ by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only ‘critical’ but also potentially ‘problem-solving’, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we consider the horrors that entails**.** At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their ‘research outputs’. They suggested a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital. There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics. ‘Policy relevance’, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as ‘irrelevant’, so the key question, as always, is ‘relevant to whom?’ Relevance to one’s research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be ‘policy-relevant’, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. (p. 127-30)

### 2AC---Alt Fails

#### The alt will always fail—only hauntology can solve

**SahagÚN 14** — (Ari SahagÚN, 7-20-2014, "Thoughts, questions, and responses to “Decolonization is not a metaphor” – Ari Sahagún", No Publication, https://arisahagun.org/thoughts-questions-and-responses-to-decolonization-is-not-a-metaphor/, accessed 4-5-2025) //ms

First: Understanding our “moves to innocence” is part of interrogating our privilege “Directly and indirectly benefiting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve.” (9)  Understanding our own privileges often brings up a lot of guilt associated with our part in oppression. As part of human nature, we want to alleviate this guilt – to get to a state of cognitive consonance – we want to feel better! Things like developing a critical consciousness (ahem) of privilege/oppression, donating money to a cause, dedicating your career to it, claiming a distant (perhaps not real) native ancestor, are actually “diversions, distractions, which relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility, and conceal the need to give up land or power or privilege.” (21)  These are what Tuck & Yang call “moves to innocence,” ways we can rid ourselves of this pesky thing called guilt.  “Settler moves to innocence are those **strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege**.” (10)  However, **these strategies don’t actually remedy** the thing we’re feeling bad about.  In particular, **we can see our moves to innocence, engage with them, and transform them:** “We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence…” (10)  In other words, **our guilt carries potential. Guilt is** actually **good in that it tells us that we know something’s wrong!** However, most of our strategies to alleviate guilt claim to be finite — I donated, I’ve done my part, now I can resume whatever I was doing — and don’t really address the wrong we feel. On the other hand, **the uncomfortable position of guilt is home to rich discussions, new ideas, and** hopefully, **transformation**. It reminds me of a quote I just read:  “Our job is not to make young women grateful. It is to make them ungrateful so they keep going. **Gratitude never radicalized anybody.”** – Susan B. Anthony  **Learning to embrace** these very real feelings that come with **privilege is important and necessary in moving toward decolonization.**

#### Their authors are uniquely bad when it comes to homogenization. Only hauntology solves.

1NC Tuck & Yang (Eve Tuck, Wayne Yang, 2012, [Tuck is Professor of Indigenous Studies @ NYU, PhD Urban Education @ CUNY, Founding Director @ Tkaronto CIRCLE Lab, Fmr. William T. Grant Scohlar; Yang is Professor @ UCSD, Ph.D in Social Studies @ UC Berkeley],  “Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity”, Education & Society Vol. 1 (1). \*\*brackets are original \*\* https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf //recut vy) //MD

A more nuanced move to innocence is the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization. Calling different groups ‘colonized’ without describing their relationship to settler colonialism is an equivocation, “the fallacy of using a word in different senses at different stages of the reasoning" (Etymonline, 2001). In particular, describing all struggles against imperialism as ‘decolonizing’ creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work, especially among people of color, queer people, and other groups minoritized by the settler nation-state. ‘We are all colonized,’ may be a true statement but is deceptively embracive and vague, its inference: ‘None of us are settlers.’ Equivocation, or calling everything by the same name, is a move towards innocence that is especially vogue in coalition politics among people of color. People of color who enter/are brought into the settler colonial nation-state also enter the triad ofrelations between settler-native-slave. We are referring here to the colonial pathways that are usually described as ‘immigration’ and how therefugee/immigrant/migrant is invited to be a settler in some scenarios, given the appropriate investments in whiteness, or is made an illegal, criminal presence in other scenarios. Ghetto colonialism, prisons, and under resourced compulsory schooling are specializations of settler colonialism in North America; they are produced by the collapsing of internal, external, and settler colonialisms, into new blended categories15. This triad of settler-native-slave and its selective collapsibility seems to be unique to settler colonial nations. For example, all Aleut people on the Aleutian Islands were collected and placed in internment camps for four years after the bombing of Dutch Harbor; the stated rationale was the protection of the people but another likely reason was that the U.S. Government feared the Aleuts would become allies with the Japanese and/or be difficult to differentiate from potential Japanese spies. White people who lived on the Aleutian Islands at that same time were not interned. Internment in abandoned warehouses and canneries in Southeast Alaska was the cause of significant numbers of death of children and elders, physical injury, and illness among Aleut people. Aleut internment during WWII is largely ignored as part of U.S. history. The shuffling of Indigenous people between Native, enslavable Other, and Orientalized Other16 shows how settler colonialism constructs and collapses its triad of categories. This colonizing trick explains why certain minoritiescan at times become model and quasi-assimilable (as exemplified by Asian settler colonialism, civil rights, model minority discourse, and the use of ‘hispanic’ as an ethnic category to mean both white and non-white) yet, in times of crisis, revert to the status of foreign contagions (as exemplified by Japanese Internment, Islamophobia, Chinese Exclusion, Red Scare, anti-Irish nativism, WWII antisemitism, and anti-Mexican-immigration). This is why ‘labor’ or ‘workers’ as an agential political class fails to activate the decolonizing project. “[S]hifting lines of the international division of labor” (Spivak, 1985, p. 84) bisect the very category of labor into caste-like bodies built for work on one hand and rewardable citizen-workers on theother. Some labor becomes settler, while excess labor becomes enslavable, criminal, murderable. The impossibility of fully becoming a white settler - in this case, white referring to an exceptionalized position with assumed rights to invulnerability and legal supremacy - as articulated by minority literature preoccupied with “glass ceilings” and “forever foreign” status and “myth of the model minority”, offers a strong critique of the myth of the democratic nationstate. However, its logical endpoint, the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism. Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler. For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not. “Following stolen resources” is a phrase that Wayne has encountered, used to describe Filipino overseas labor (over 10% of the population of the Philippines is working abroad) and other migrations from colony to metropole. This phrase is an important anti-colonial framing of a colonial situation. However an anti-colonial critique is not the same as a decolonizing framework; anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole. This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land. Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject. Equivocation is the vague equating of colonialisms that erases the sweeping scope of land as the basis of wealth, power, law in settler nation-states. Vocalizing a ‘muliticultural’ approach to oppressions, or remaining silent on settler colonialism while talking about colonialisms, or tacking on a gesture towards Indigenous people without addressing Indigenous sovereignty or rights, or forwarding a thesis on decolonization without regard to unsettling/deoccupying land, are equivocations. That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority / people of color / colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.

#### Homogenization prevents nuanced understandings of lives which is a prereq to change.