## 1 off counter method

#### Boo! The counter-method is hauntology — vote AFF to endorse hauntology 👻

Freccero 06 (Carla Freccero is Chair of the Department of Literature and Professor of Literature, History of Consciousness, and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. January 16 2006, “Queer/Early/Modern,” accessed 7/8/2022, pg. 75-80, <https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/search?q=%22queer/early/modern%22> // recut akang

Yet this intertwining of multiple brutal logics of erasure reappears again and again. The historical and political appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ as ‘‘known’’ cannot lay to rest the haunting that persistently destabilizes the anchors of identity and meaning. As Halberstam explains, if ‘‘haunting is an articulate discourse’’ and ‘‘a mode within which the ghost demands something like accountability,’’ then ‘‘to tell a ghost story means being willing to be haunted’’ (73). This willingness to be haunted is an ethical relation to the world, motivated by a concern not only for the past but also for the future, for those who live on in the borderlands without a home. If the queer appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ has been melancholic—an attempt to deal with trauma, in a sense, by refusing it as such, turning it instead into knowledge, into productive organizing—it has also been colonizing. Both gestures, the melancholic and the colonizing, have worked to foreclose how ‘‘he,’’ as ghost, recurs in ways that are not so clear, and demands not a definition but the creation of a future where categorical definitions so dependent on gender and desire might prove affirmingly impossible and unnecessary. Using spectrality as a hypothesis, then, we might wonder what we would see and hear were we to remain open to ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ ’s ghostly returns. One such moment is the point at which one survivor, finding himself haunted, ‘‘listens’’ to the ghost and speaks its reminder. Matthew Shepard’s homophobically motivated murder occurred in 1998, four years after ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ was killed and the year a documentary of the events The Brandon Teena Story—was released; it also occurred four months after the torture and murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, for being African American. In a statement bordering on the wishes thus express themselves from beyond the grave. Tellingly, the ghostly performative ventriloquized by Mr. Shepard, as reported in the Washington Post, interrupts the logic of revenge and retribution animating the force of the law: In a dramatic and surprising end to the Matthew Shepard murder case, convicted killer Aaron J. McKinney, 22, today was sentenced to two life sentences for beating the gay University of Wyoming student to death last year. McKinney accepted a deal brokered by Shepard’s parents just as a jury was about to begin hearing testimony about whether he should be put to death.... His son, Shepard said, believed in the death penalty for certain crimes, and had called it justified in the racially motivated murder in Texas of James Byrd Jr., who was dragged to death behind a pickup truck in another hate crime that shocked the nation’s conscience. ‘‘Little did we know that the same response would come about involving Matt,’’ Shepard said. ‘‘I too believe in the death penalty,’’ he added. ‘‘I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney. However, this is the time to begin the healing process. To show mercy to someone who refused to show any mercy. ‘‘Mr. McKinney, I’m going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to do so, because of Matthew . . .’’18 Ghostly returns are thus a sign of trauma and its mourning.19 This trauma, Derrida argues, is a ‘‘politico-logic of trauma,’’ that ‘‘répond à l’injonction d’une justice qui, au-delà du droit, surgit dans le respect même de qui n’est pas, n’est plus ou n’est pas encore vivant, présentement vivant’’ (‘‘responds to the injunction of a justice which, beyond right or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or not yet, living, presently living’’).20 This mourning is not a form of nostalgia, a longing for what is gone, but a kind of mourning that is ‘‘en fait et en droit interminable, sans normalité possible, sans limite fiable, dans la réalité ou dans le concept, entre l’introjection et l’incorporation’’ (160; ‘‘in fact and by right interminable, without possible normality, without reliable limit, in its reality or in its concept, between introjection and incorporation,’’ 97).21 Thinking historicity through haunting thus combines both the seeming objectivity of events and the subjectivity of their affective afterlife. As Wendy Brown remarks of spectrality’s modality—what Derrida calls a ‘‘being-with specters’’ that is also ‘‘une politique de la mémoire, de l’héritage et des générations’’ (15; ‘‘a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations’’ [xviii–xix])—‘‘We inherit not ‘what really happened’ to the dead but what lives on from that happening, what is conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, how they claim us, and how they haunt, plague, and inspirit our imaginations and visions for the future.’’22 Ghostliness and homosexuality have a long history of association, most frequently referenced in the clichéd and homophobic phrase ‘‘the specter of homosexuality.’’ In its most virulent deployment, that specter is always lurking in an alley or behind a bush, waiting to pounce upon some unsuspecting innocents. When invoked more sympathetically, it hovers secretively around the edges of an otherwise perfectly straight and open—albeit presumably anxious—scene. Indeed, Derrida defines the specter in terms strikingly reminiscent of homosexual panic, the sense of a not-quite-visible contaminating near-presence that is also an anxious, often paranoid projection, the material immateriality I tracked through the term queer in chapter 2: Le spectre, comme son nom l’indique, c’est la fréquence d’une certaine visibilité. Mais la visibilité de l’invisible. Et la visibilité, par essence, ne se voit pas, c’est pourquoi elle reste . . . au-delà du phénomène ou de l’étant. Le spectre, c’est aussi, entre autres choses, ce qu’on imagine, ce qu’on croit voir et qu’on projette: sur un écran imaginaire, là où il n’y a rien à voir. Pas même l’écran, parfois, et un écran a toujours, au fond, au fond qu’il est, une structure, une structure d’apparition disparaissante. Mais voilà qu’on ne peut plus fermer l’oeil à guetter le retour. (Spectres de Marx, 165) The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains . . . beyond the phenomenon, or beyond being. The specter is also, among other things, what one thinks one sees, and which one projects—on an imaginary screen where there is nothing to see. Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always has, at bottom, in the bottom or background that is, a structure of disappearing apparition. But now one can no longer get any shut-eye, being so intent to watch out for the return. (Specters of Marx, 101) Like the closet, whose very existence suggests the opening onto what is concealed, Derrida likens the specter to the screen whose structure is always already that of a disappearing appearance. The ghost is thus also structural. Terry Castle observes this phenomenon in relation to the ‘‘apparitional’’ history of the lesbian: ‘‘When it comes to lesbians . . . many people have trouble seeing what’s in front of them. The lesbian remains a kind of ‘ghost effect’ in the cinema world of modern life: elusive, vaporous, difficult to spot—even when she is there, in plain view, mortal and magnificent, at the center of the screen. Some may even deny that she exists at all.’’23 For those who live ‘‘on the other side’’ of the expression, ‘‘the specter of homosexuality,’’ those who might be said to be named, ‘‘ghosted’’ by that phrase, ghosts are neither scary nor menacing, however terrifying the prospect of being turned into one might be. For one may also reverse the perspective and understand the specter as that which sees without being seen, as what produces the sense of being seen, observed, surveilled.24 Hélène Cixous declared, concerning one famous gynephobic patriarchal figure of woman, ‘‘You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful and she’s laughing.’’25 To be a ghost among ghosts is to ‘‘see’’ the ghost not as a feared and fearful projection—the way Medusa cannot be directly seen by men—but perhaps as beautiful, though rarely laughing, for the specter is the form a certain unfinished mourning takes. Thus part of what it might mean to live with ghosts would be to understand oneself as ‘‘ghosted,’’ and to understand ‘‘learning to live’’ as something that takes place ‘‘between life and death’’ as the ‘‘non contemporaneity with itself of the living present.’’26 This would then be an approach to history—and to justice—that would neither ‘‘forget the dead’’ nor ‘‘successfully’’ mourn them.27 Exploring further the notion of haunting as the way history registers as affect in the social and psychic lives of beings, and the reciprocity of haunting and being haunted, Avery Gordon follows the figure of the ghost and the poetics of haunting in other contexts to understand the specificity of this way of coming to terms with historical trauma.28 Ghostly Matters looks to Toni Morrison’s Beloved to see how haunting conveys the traumatic effect and affect of the historical event on the subject and the social responsibility that is thereby entailed.29 Thus what Derrida analyzes in the work of Marx and philosophy, Gordon studies in a kind of embodied poetics, tracking how the ghost’s figurative ‘‘materialization’’ elicits, even as it emblematizes, traumatic repetition and working through.30 In that process of materialization, or poetic embodiment, Hamlet’s father undergoes a morphological transformation, from Danish king to African slave and from father to daughter; the ghostly exchange takes place not between a father and his son but between a daughter and her mother; and the ‘‘allegory’’ of haunting moves from Europe to America.31 Like Gordon, in what follows I track a transatlantic passage from an earlier moment and an earlier historical trauma as they haunt both within and outside of their own time. In Premodern Sexualities, Louise Fradenburg and I raised questions concerning the fantasmatic relationship that we, as scholars of the past and scholars working ‘‘queerly’’ in the history of sexuality, might affirm in relation to the past, ‘‘ours’’ or that of others, in the name of pleasure.32 It was an effort, in part, to honor the complex pleasure positivity of queer theory in its resistance to the heteronormatively disciplining discourses that came self-righteously to the fore when aids in the United States became associated with ‘‘homosexuals’’ and ‘‘promiscuity.’’ It was also a way of examining how desires and identifications—queer theory’s psychoanalytically inflected terminological legacies—are at work in historical scholars’ investments in the differences and similarities between the past and the present. Finally, it was a way of noting historiography’s own (self-)disciplining force, its ‘‘repudiations of pleasure and fantasy’’ in spite—or because—of its queer wishes (xvii); thus we argued for a queer historiography that would devote itself to a critical revalorization of the places and possibilities of pleasure within the serious and ‘‘ascetic’’ work of history. Insofar as queer historicism registers the affective investments of the present in the past, however, it harbors within itself not only pleasure, but also pain, a traumatic pain whose ethical insistence is to ‘‘live to tell’’ through complex and circuitous processes of working through. Thus we concluded the introduction with an ethically impelled wish: The past may not be the present, but it is sometimes in the present, haunting, even if only through our uncertain knowledges of it, our hopes of surviving and living well. The questions we are raising about the practice of history may help us understand better the living and dying of twentieth-century bodies and pleasures. And we hope that consideration of the ways in which historicisms are currently questioning sexuality, and sex studies questioning historicism, will work to affirm the pleasures of mortal creatures. (xxi) The past is in the present in the form of a haunting. This is what, among other things, doing a queer kind of history means, since it involves an openness to the possibility of being haunted, even inhabited, by ghosts. What is transmitted in the cohabitation of ghostly past and present is related to survival, to ‘‘living well,’’ and to the ‘‘pleasures of mortal creatures,’’ survivals and pleasures that have little to do with normative understandings of biological reproduction.

#### The AFF reframes the dead such that they become rallying points for political change and broadens the scope of which bodies do or don’t count.

Jessica Auchter 16, professor in the Social Science department at University of Tennessee, “Paying Attention to Dead Bodies: The Future of Security Studies?”, Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 1(1), pp 37-39, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogv005>, lenox

Security studies has, up until now, not taken dead bodies seriously. This is perhaps because security studies scholarship has privileged the idea of survival and has focused on generating knowledge and scholarship that ensured survival at multiple levels. National interest has often been intertwined with survival of the state; similarly, focuses on human rights and responsibilities are tied to the survival of humanity. Environmental degradation, for example, is deemed a threat to human security because degradation can threaten survival by changing weather patterns, exacerbating desertification, and affecting the supply of water and food. As Priya Dixit (2015, 113) has noted, “it is presumed that life—and a live body—is the main goal of security. Thus, dead bodies and death in general become ‘out of place.’” It is worth mentioning here that there is a difference between dead bodies and death. While we know that death is inevitable, we cannot know it ourselves. Dead bodies, on the other hand, are something we can see and choose to ignore, or they can become rallying points around specific issues.

This focus on survival and human life in security studies means that the dead are often represented as simply a failure of the system: the dead citizen means that the state is not secure, while the dead famine victim indicates a lack of attention to adequate standards of health. The hyper-visible dead body thrust onto the scene of global politics is often represented as a crisis of responsibility. The Syrian child who drowned and whose dead body washed up on a Turkish beach in early September 2015 became an iconic representation of the failure of the international community to deal with the violence in Syria and of the insecurity of the global refugee crisis. This one image raised more outcry in Europe than any report of the thousands of people drowning making similar crossings. In terms of representation, some deaths come to matter more than others, because some lives are deemed more worthy of securing than others. Taking dead bodies seriously in security studies, then, is about both corpses as signifiers of insecurity and the politics of how the dead are identified, classified, measured, represented, and managed. It is directly linked to questions of their agency.

Dead bodies have been under-theorized in security studies, but this is not for a lack of representation in global politics. Indeed, bodies are both measured and managed, as will be explored more thoroughly in later sections. Dead bodies appear in numerous ways, from soldier dead to health management to religious and cultural traditions to famous individual bodies that are hyper-visible such as Lenin and Ho Chi Minh. Dead bodies and body parts have been addressed in terms of their management by international organizations (MarlinBennett, Wilson, and Walton 2010; Auchter 2015), but their political implications have not been thoroughly explored. Similarly, studies within sociology and anthropology have addressed dead bodies, particularly the corpses of leaders in a communist and post-communist context (Verdery 1999; Giroux 2006; Casper and Moore 2009), and recent media attention has focused on controversy over the bodies of figures such as Osama bin Laden. But these studies have not focused on the question of how dead bodies matter for security: how we view our own material and physical security and insecurity, and how we deal with a world where conflict and disaster produce dead bodies as a matter of fact. At the same time, we are told by global human security paradigms that policy changes should be inaugurated to minimize these kinds of deaths, and by many foreign policy paradigms that specific deaths, like those of terrorists, render the world more secure. That is, when looking at dead bodies, the idea of security is often invoked in a variety of ways and toward varying ends.

Some of the increased attention to the dead body has come through the emergence of the human security paradigm. Human security has drawn attention to human rights violations, global health, economic inequality, human mobility, and environmental degradation as security concerns affecting the global community. As Caroline Thomas (2001, 161) has explained, “human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised.” The dead body itself poses important questions for how we conceptualize human dignity. If the very idea of human security implies the existence of a political community that privileges the security of the human at its heart, it must define which lives and deaths count as politically qualified ones, as lives worth protecting and as deaths worth memorializing. Life and security go hand-in-hand, as scholars of biopolitics have noted (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008; Grayson 2008). Nikolas Rose, for example, has argued that “the biological existence of human beings has become political in novel ways. The object, target and stake of this new ‘vital’ politics are human life itself” (Rose 2001, 1). However, these approaches to the politics of life have not fully addressed the politics of death, or the role dead bodies play in our understandings of security. Similarly, as Edward Newman (2010, 77) has noted, approaches to human security rarely examine ontological or epistemological questions: “human security arguments are generally ‘problem-solving.’ They do not generally engage in epistemological, ontological, or methodological debates.”

To address this lacuna, I focus on corpses as an analytical concept that can open up conversations among various approaches to security studies. Both human security and critical security studies have brought the question of agency to the fore, while in traditional security studies, dead bodies remain subjects of the key agents of global politics: states. Human security scholars have argued for paying increased attention to the individual human and to human beings more generally, to broaden the agent of security. Within critical security studies, scholars have argued that the agent of security should be defined even more broadly, and new materialist approaches have extended this beyond the human being (Salter 2015). The dead body offers a useful way of thinking about security because it raises questions for all of these approaches.

Indeed, bodies often serve as symbols of political order, where political transformation is symbolized by what is done to bodies, as in the expression “cutting off the head of the king,” pomp and circumstance regarding burial and reburial of political leaders, and even the idiom “body politic” (Verdery 1999). This focus on political leaders raises an important question: what are the basic contours of what makes a body fair game for security studies? Though the responses to this question can be varied, with some focusing on the corpses of political leaders, others dead soldiers, and yet others civilian dead, the point of the question is that how we define which bodies have security implications matters. How one answers this question can also gesture to one’s approach to security: conventional security studies focuses on war deaths almost exclusively and is less likely to consider deaths from other causes to be important. Human security studies is much more likely to draw attention to civilian deaths, and to deaths from causes such as hunger. Critical security studies draws attention to everyday practices, thus broadening which dead bodies matter. Why and how certain dead bodies become national symbols and others objects of private mourning tells us something about how political communities are defined by the dead they determine memorializable and grievable. These deaths are deemed political because these lives and bodies were considered to be the purview of the state. From the original Hobbesian notion that individuals give over their sovereignty to the state in exchange for protection, the body that is killed by violence or bad governance is a representation of the abrogation of the essential social and political contract that motivates the formation and existence of political community itself; these are the corpses addressed in this article.

More must be said on how we give meaning to the dead within these political communities: the corpse is important precisely because it is a component within cultural understandings and identity constructions. Dead bodies are personally and culturally significant to survivors: they are “socially alive but biologically dead” (Sledge 2007, 21). Tiffany Jenkins (2011, 107) similarly describes human remains as holding “a social category as a ‘person’ (human, body), but are also a ‘thing’ (remains, corpse, cadaver, skeleton).” Even in museums “human remains, irrespective of age, provenance, or kind, occupy a unique category distinct from all other museum objects. There is a qualitative distinction between human remains and artefacts” (DCMS 2003, 166).

It is the fact that the corpse once possessed the self-actualization we associate with qualified participation in a political community—agency—that gives it such a special status. That is, dead bodies are still “human” in many ways, and they have important effects on the living. Norman Cantor has traced what he refers to as “postmortem human dignity,” the social and legal protections for the corpse, and how it is not considered as property in terms of corpse management and disposal, precisely because of the “intimate association between a cadaver and its predecessor” (Cantor 2010, 4). He argues that the relationship between the living and the cadaver is both emotional and material: the corpse “represents the continuing embodiment of a particular human being,” is someone’s loved one, is the “vessel that held a unique person and is still the most tangible manifestation of its human predecessor,” and is also structurally identical to a living human being (Cantor 2010, 29–30). As a result of this, the dead body blurs our traditional conceptions of who may count as the agent of human security, because the corpse is considered worthy of securing: we tend to anthropomorphize the corpse by attributing feelings to it, and the corpse has rights in various legal systems to dignity and privacy and undisturbed rest (Cantor 2010, 43–64). Additionally, the idea that heroic soldiers do not leave the bodies of comrades behind, or the movement to repatriate the remains of those who have died in a foreign country, both speak to the idea that the corpse has legal and political status as well as affective status. Because the corpse is not a living person, but bears many of the political assignations a living person does, it broadens the notion of who counts as a qualified member of the political community, with access to the rights it entails.