# Fairmont Prep PJ -- NDCAs -- Aff vs. Poly Prep

1NC--- setcol

1AC--- Th- vague alts, transition

2NR--- setcol

2AR--- case turn

WLL \*\*Deng sat

## 

## 

## 

## 

## 

## 

## 

## 1NC

### FRAMING

**The aff should be evaluated as a hypothetical policy action endorsed by the state and weighed against the status quo.**

**Three reasons to prefer:**

**1. Ethicality – Their reps critique the very policy action we’re already taking, so evaluating it as a hypothetical makes their reps meaningful.**

**2. Link discussion – Hypothetical implementation still allows us to disrupt settler or colonial logic by engaging the aff’s links and their consequences. Their links \*require\* us to imagine implementation.**

**3. Policy education – Debate teaches real-world policy impact analysis; our model preserves that.**

**Defending the state is key. Only through the state do movements achieve material goals. They can critique it, but we must still affirm policy change as a path forward. Case reading is an independent benefit to our model — it affirms the value of real action.**

#### Anti-statism performs an ethical and existential failure by abandoning the ethical pursuit of revolutionary power through the nation-state.

Dale, 23—Lecturer in English at the Australian National University (Amelia, “Nothing’s More Precious Than a Hole in the Ground,” Australian Humanities Review 71 (May 2023),<https://australianhumanitiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/AHR71_06_Dale.pdf> ]

A Western turn away from internationalism and towards critiques of power cannot be traced back to a single point: one cannot place it simply as a result of, say, the New Left insurgencies, Foucault or indeed fractures within or around the Soviet or Sino-Soviet projects. In our time a *great contradiction* has arisen between ethical minoritarianism, in itself not a bad thing, and any notion of commanding the *machinery of state* through which some, but not all, of these ethical conundrums can be resolved. To frame the climate crisis through the lens of *individual* or even *generational* guilt and argue it should be addressed through an *ethics of care* risks *obscuring* both its material and historical *foundations* and its potential *remedies*. John Frow, writing on the ‘agents’ that hold some power over the ‘transmission of a world’ laments that they are ‘nation states, political parties, … and only in the last instance a citizenry with a stake in a future world’ (26). Yet it is *vital* at this juncture that we *do not abandon* the idea of a *nation* with a responsibility for its citizenry, or a political party with responsibility for the *future*. The globe is *not solely constituted* by multi-party democracies held hostage to fossil capital with a disenfranchised and economically privileged citizenry. In those other nations—marginalised and blacklisted as they might be by Northern centres of capital and imperial power—there are *models worth considering*.

A hostility to states and nations, while understandable in the specific Australian sub-imperialist context, *does not hold up* to theoretical scrutiny if our horizon is equality: global, intergenerational and otherwise. Samir Amin, for instance, notes how an ‘“*anti-state*” strategy’ unites *perfectly* with the capitalist’s strategy to *reduce* actions by the state to *redistribute wealth* and *regulate corporations*, and instead *reduce* the state’s role to its *policing* functions (27). At this late stage of ecological catastrophe, the *mass extinctions* and *depredations* of our *planet* under capitalism demand, as an *ethical imperative*, *large-scale changes* that can be *only* enacted on the level of the *state* and *international blocs* with sufficient *organisational capacity* and *drive* to bring such changes to fruition. Likewise, a total *antagonism* to ‘*nation*’ *does not get us anywhere*. Expressions of Australian nationalism typically operate along state-sanctioned lines and celebrate invasion, colonisation and genocide. This is because Australia is not Indigenous-led, and because it remains, in real economic and political terms, shackled to an old empire (Britain) and dependent on the new one (the United States). However, to have a *wider view*, informed by the *histories* of anti-imperialism and decolonisation in *Asia*, *Africa* and *Latin America*, is to be aware of the *crucial role* of national liberation movements in successful struggles against colonial rule. Nation can be the *only thing* that stands between a group of people and their exploitation by imperialist powers. Nations can be *revolutionary*, such as the national liberation fronts in *Southern Africa*, nations can be *Indigenous*, as with *First Nations*. A discourse without sufficient nuance on the question of nation *ignores* how, in contemporary geopolitics, it is on the level of *nation* that military and economic imperialist endeavours are met with the *most significant resistance*. Being unequivocally against nation, to quote Amin, ‘encourages the *acceptance* of the role of the *U*nited *S*tates as *military superpower* and *world policeman*’ (27).

Unfortunately, the fall of the USSR and historical mistakes of socialism have encouraged, generally speaking, a drawing inward among Western leftists, towards *individual ethics* and away from the *ethical pursuit of power*. The turn of the left away from international solidarity and towards capitalism and compromise can be read sociologically. Radhika Desai notes how the major parties of the left within bourgeois capitalist states are today commandeered by a professional managerial class of neoliberal converts, whereas their counterparts in earlier eras had been socialists and Marxists. The result is a left that mistakenly ‘attributes the prosperity of the major capitalist powers to capitalism’s productive vigour, not their imperialism, and refuses to contemplate how to organise production in socialist societies and how to do so against the inevitable opposition of imperialism’s remaining bastions’ (Desai). Comprehending the *textures* of imperialism is *key* here. If we view the world *solely* through a lens cut by the *US imperial core*, we will be blind to [*ignore*] geopolitical material forces and context, we will not see [know] what empire *does* nor will we comprehend the *alternatives* outside it. If we *actually want transformation* within Australia and the centres of imperial capital it subordinates itself to, it is *imperative* to look and learn from *alternative models* being practiced in the world. At the very least we can learn *what not to do*, and recognise the *vast difficulties* of the challenge ahead. For the sake of the *planet* and our *species* we need to ask: what is it that we can learn from countries that in their post-revolutionary phases have not only built barricades of resistance to the US world order, but also made significant achievements at home? Is intergenerational justice possible *without* geopolitical materialism?

#### We must teach debaters that the state is not a static object but a process from which change can be created. Voting Fairmont and endorsing the defense of the state thus creates the best education in round to dismantle settler colonialist systems.

#### We don’t need to extend case to win offense off this – mere willingness to introduce the state and defend it is a body for legislative solutions is a prerequisite to any real-world change per the warrants above. The full rejection of it by assigning the aff the status of a research project removes any chance of applicable knowledge of the government.

#### Empirically, it is a matter of giving policy based education. The issue is not that people aren’t talking about these issues; its a matter of creating policy makers willing to listen and that only happens when you teach debaters how to make policy.

#### Indigenous groups have been able to work with the government on nuclear waste issues

Bryan 25 [Susan Montoya Bryan, Supervisory Correspondent in New Mexico @ AP News, Jan.-29-2025, Shipments of uranium ore can resume under agreement reached with the Navajo Nation, AP News,<https://apnews.com/article/uranium-mine-navajo-grand-canyon-nuclear-power-e7051867b6e46218caa780ee3b803539>, // KNDIVA]

Shipments of uranium ore from a revived mining operation just south of the Grand Canyon are expected to resume in February after the Navajo Nation reached a **settlement** with the mining company, clearing the way for trucks to transport the ore across the largest Native American reservation in the U.S.

The agreement announced Wednesday settles a dispute that erupted last summer when Energy Fuels Inc. began trucking ore from the Pinyon Plain Mine to a mill site in Utah. Navajo authorities attempted to put up roadblocks but the trucks already had left tribal roadways.

The dust-up spurred negotiations with the company and led the Navajo Nation to adopt emergency legislation to **strengthen regulations** for **transporting** radioactive material **across tribal lands.** The Navajo Nation and tribes elsewhere in Arizona, New Mexico and Utah have a long, sordid history of disease, death and contamination linked to mining that took place during World War II and the Cold War.

Energy Fuels’ President and CEO Mark Chalmers acknowledged those longstanding impacts in highlighting the importance of the settlement.

“This has understandably caused mistrust toward the U.S. government and energy companies,” Chalmers said, adding that he was honored to be able to work with the tribe to address the concerns and ensure transportation will be done safely and respectfully.

Energy Fuels already must meet standards spelled out by federal agencies when transporting uranium ore. The measures outlined in the agreement with the Navajo Nation provide **additional layers of protection**, company officials said.

The agreement also includes a pledge by Energy Fuels to help transport up to **10,000 tons** of waste material from abandoned mines that are relics of the federal government’s past uranium programs.

In addition to allowing the Navajo Nation to monitor and inspect transport trucks, there are provisions for financial compensation for improving safety and protecting the environment, said Stephen B. Etsitty, head of the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency.

Shipments from the mine are expected to resume in February. They will be **limited to specific routes and times** of day, and no shipments will happen when the tribe is participating in **cultural celebrations** or other public events.

The tribe also is requiring the company to have clear **emergency response procedures** in place, provide **adequate notice** and ensure drivers have **additional qualifications** and training.

The trucks will be covered to prevent any dust from escaping along the route, and there are provisions for escorts and blessings as the tribe sees fit.

#### Yucca Mountain court hearings prove change

Andy Kriha, 3-5-2025, "Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Nuclear Waste Storage Cases", HK Law<https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2025/03/supreme-court-hears-oral-argument-in-nuclear-waste-storage-cases>

**The U.S. Supreme Court on March 5**, 2025, **heard** oral **argument** **in** two **cases related to** the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) authority to license **temporary** spent **fuel storage facilities** that are not co-located with a licensed reactor. The cases, which the Supreme Court has consolidated into a single case, are appeals from a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision holding that the NRC exceeded its statutory authority by **licensing a temporary away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facility** to be operated by Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) in Andrews County, Texas. The decision breaks from rulings by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and Tenth Circuit, each of which previously held that the NRC has authority to license such facilities under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), notwithstanding the lack of any express authority in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Further, prior to reaching the merits of the case, the Fifth Circuit held that the parties challenging the license had authority to do so under an ultra vires exception (or judicially created exception) to the Hobbs Act. Two of the parties – private parties with interests in land near the proposed storage facility – attempted to intervene in the licensing proceeding but were denied by the NRC, and the denial was held up on judicial appeal. The third party, the state of Texas, submitted letters to the NRC registering its objections to the facility but never attempted to intervene in the proceeding. The Fifth Circuit, again breaking from four other circuits, held that failure to become a party to the licensing proceeding is not a barrier to a judicial challenge where the agency action is attacked as exceeding its power. As described further below, in oral argument, the Supreme Court indicated it may also be considering whether the NRC has statutory authority to implement its current regulations determining the circumstances under which parties may intervene in licensing proceedings. Hobbs Act The exclusive statutory basis for jurisdiction for courts to review challenges to licenses issued under the AEA is the Hobbs Act, which limits judicial review to a "party aggrieved" by the agency proceeding. At oral argument, ISP and the NRC (petitioners) argued that "party" has a specific meaning in this context and refers only to an actual party to the NRC licensing proceeding. The private party challengers and Texas (respondents) argue instead that a plain language meaning of "party aggrieved" is any person who is injured by the agency's decision or, alternatively, at most requires the party to have participated in the proceeding in some fashion, such as submitting comments during public comment periods. The Supreme Court spent little time on this argument at oral argument, opting to probe deeper on the aspects of the question discussed below. Although the arguments above were addressed to some extent by concurring opinions to the Fifth Circuit's denial of en banc rehearing, the controlling Fifth Circuit decision expressly declined to address these arguments. Instead, the Fifth Circuit relied on an ultra vires exception to the Hobbs Act that allows nonparties to an agency proceeding to challenge an action on the basis that it exceeds the agency's statutory authority or is unconstitutional. Four other circuit courts – the Second, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh – have declined to recognize the Fifth Circuit's ultra vires exception, including a Tenth Circuit decision resulting from the ISP licensing proceeding that denied a challenge by the state of New Mexico. At oral argument, the Supreme Court directly asked respondents about their view on the Fifth Circuit's ultra vires exception. Respondents did not directly speak to the Fifth Circuit's ultra vires reasoning but repeated that they would be a party under the Hobbs Act's requirements. The Court seemed to question both sides on this issue exhaustively, and it is not entirely clear how the justices intend to rule. It is possible that this could end in a split decision. Lastly, at oral argument, the Court raised an additional question that could allow it to grant respondents standing in the current case without deciding the Hobbs Act question. That question is whether the NRC has statutory authority to impose "contention admissibility" requirements on would-be intervenors to licensing proceedings. Under its current rules, the NRC requires parties that seek to intervene to show not only that they may be injured by the proposed agency action but also demonstrate that the claims they raise meet several criteria, such as identifying specific evidence of the validity of the claims and a demonstration that the claim is material to the findings the NRC must make to support its licensing decision. Notably, Justice Clarence Thomas voiced skepticism of NRC's ability to limit parties that can intervene using its contention admissibility rules when there is no apparent express statutory authorization to limit access beyond traditional notions of standing. However, the petitioners emphasized that the question of whether the private party challengers are parties themselves may not be a question properly before the Court, since they chose not to utilize proper avenues for relief after the D.C. Circuit upheld the NRC's denial of their status as a party. The petitioners argued that this question has not been appropriately raised in the current case and, thus, it would be improper for the Supreme Court to decide it at this time. The respondents agreed there is no statutory authority for the NRC's rules but argued that deciding that question was not necessary because they nonetheless have standing to bring the present case. As of now, it is unclear how the Court intends to rule on this question, but it is important to note that a ruling invalidating the NRC's admissible contention rules would significantly broaden the pool of people who can be entered as parties during the licensing process, adding time and expense to licensing proceedings. The NRC's Licensing Authority Assuming the Supreme Court holds that the respondents are allowed to challenge the license, the Court will then need to decide if the NRC actually has authority to issue temporary away-from-reactor spent fuel storage licenses. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Court focused a significant portion of its questioning on this aspect of the case, perhaps indicating that the Court believes it is likely to reach the merits. The respondents argued that the NWPA specifically prohibited the NRC from licensing private parties to license interim storage of off-site spent nuclear waste. NRC's argument relied heavily on the legislative history of the AEA and the NWPA, asserting that the NWPA's provisions on federal storage of nuclear waste were meant as an incentive and do not explicitly bar the NRC from licensing away-from-reactor storage sites. The Court probed the NRC on whether its current licensing proposals could be considered "interim," absent a clear plan from Congress or the federal government to create a permanent storage facility in the future. The NRC asserted that under its current structure, these would still be considered interim facilities. Ultimately, the NRC argued that nothing in the AEA or the NWPA explicitly prohibits the NRC from licensing private interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. The Court inquired heavily into the reasoning of both parties' arguments, so it is not entirely clear how it intends to rule. Resolving these questions will not be easy for the Court. This case presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, whether the NWPA establishes a storage scheme to the exclusion of AEA authority and/or whether the text of the AEA can be interpreted to allow this type of licensing. These questions are not directly answered by the text and will require application of canons of interpretation that cut in different directions and, potentially, some evaluation of the intent of Congress when passing the NWPA. The current iteration of the Court has been reluctant to look to sources such as legislative history to resolve questions of congressional intent, making the task that much more difficult. Implications and Next Steps The Court will render its decision by the end of the current term, which will likely be the end of June 2025 but may extend into early July. The Court's decision could have significant implications for the NRC's authority, as well as future interpretation of the NWPA and the AEA. First, if the Court determines that the NRC's contention admissibility rules are extra-statutory, this would likely lower the barriers to entry for parties seeking to intervene in licensing proceedings at the agency, adding time and expense for license applicants to defend their applications. Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to the forgoing, if the Court determines that the Hobbs Act does not bar non-parties to the licensing proceeding from challenging the final agency licensing decision, additional parties could bring judicial suit after conclusion of the agency licensing proceeding, adding additional uncertainty and expense for license applicants at the back end of the process. If the Court reaches the merits and determines that the NRC does not have authority to license temporary away-from-reactor waste storage, the decision would have significant implications for both existing and future reactors and storage facilities. Most immediately, it would call into question the existing licenses of storage facilities located where a reactor once stood but has since been dismantled. Although **Justice Thomas suggested that these facilities could be carved out of any decision**, it is difficult to identify statutory authority for such a result. Further down the road, the decision would present problems for existing reactors that have limited storage space available and for proposed reactors at sites such as industrial facilities and data centers that may not have space or desire to host nuclear waste. Such a result would perhaps demand congressional intervention. For more information or questions, please contact the authors.

## VAGUE ALTS BAD

**Interpretation:** Critical alts must be specific, solvent actions implemented by a single actor. The alt must have a solvency advocate that explains the implementation of the policy, and cannot fiat a rejection, mindset shift, or just accepting redefinitions

**Violation: Their alt is “decolonization”**

**Standards:**

**1 – Shiftiness:**

**Vague alts kill stasis – they can rearticulate in backhalf, wrecking strat. Novices lose most – they don’t know what to ask, and crossfire checks fail since you can’t clarify what you don’t understand. Vague responses now, new alt later.**

**2 – Real World Education:**

**Revolutions need clarity. Without it, movements implode from infighting or cooptation. No clear alt = no praxis = no value to the K.**

**3 – Strat Skew:**

**If I don’t know how the alt functions, I can’t link turn or read solvency deficits. Turns the K – real world change dies when tactics are vague. Outweighs – fiat isn’t real.**

**4 – Reciprocity:**

**No concrete alt = no way to disprove their world. “Reject capitalism” can’t be turned, but they can still turn the aff – that breaks fairness.**

**a) Only fix is utopian fiat, which collapses the K – if both sides fiat, I outweigh and win post-fiat.**

**Voters:**

Education — It’s the reason why schools fund debate and the only portable skill.

Fairness - Debate is a game and there is no point in playing an unfair game.

**Drop the debater**

**First, Sets norms through negative reinforcement so people can avoid violating while gaining access to run the shell.**

**Second, we are at a structural disadvantage from an educational and fairness standpoint.**

**Default to Competing Interps:**

* **a) Only way to generate theory offense – forces fair affs or you lose the shell.**
* **b) Reasonability = judge intervention – every judge has a diff threshold, kills predictability and fairness.**

**No RVIs:**

* **1) RVIs kill real theory – fear of RVI collapse stops abuse checks, lets unfair strats go uncalled.**
* **2) RVIs skew time – abusive teams run strong case knowing you have to frontline and answer RVI.**

**The ROTB in this round is thus to vote for whoever does the better debating off the flow, meaning look to weighing then linking in offense PREF OUR ROTB 3 warrants:**

1. **More inclusive- we can't link since their ROTB is beyond vague. How do you reject hegemonic masculinity?**
2. **We subsume theirs, no reason why they can’t do any of their offense under ours**
3. **Allows for discourse around more strategies solving the best issue, if they care about the issue in their K it should be who best solves it, not just their method**

### Contention 1 is Transition

#### Clean energy transition is inevitable but must be faster.

**Worland 21** [Justin Worland, Senior Correspondent @ Time & BA in History from Harvard University, 7-15-2021, The Energy Transition Is in Full Swing. It’s Not Happening Fast Enough, TIME, https://time.com/6106341/green-energy-transition-iea/, Willie T.]

Even if you follow these things closely, it can be hard to understand where the world’s fight against climate change stands. On the one hand, news abounds of the clean energy revolution, as wind farms and solar panels pop up in communities across the globe and automakers promise to go electric. On the other hand, scientists continue to warn that fossil fuels have placed the planet and everyone who lives on it on an unavoidable collision course with catastrophe.

A new report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) published Wednesday explains the dynamic in sharp detail: the world has begun a **momentous shift** in how we power the economy that will touch virtually every corner of human society, with investment in oil and gas slowing and spending on clean energy rising. But it’s **not happening fast enough** to avoid dangerous levels of warming.

“A new global energy economy is emerging,” IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol tells TIME. But when it comes to the necessary levels of investment in clean energy, there is “a **gross mismatch.”**

The IEA’s annual World Energy Outlook is designed to inform policymakers about the state of global energy markets as well as the emerging trends expected to define energy in the years to come. Its origins are undeniably wonky, but this year’s report takes on new significance with climate change on the rise in public consciousness and on the international stage. The agency released the 2021 report a month early to help inform talks among the delegates who will gather in Glasgow, Scotland, in early November for the biggest United Nations climate summit in years.

Perhaps nothing is more urgent than the report’s key message that countries need to dramatically accelerate their efforts to cut emissions for the world to have any hope of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, the level at which scientists say we might expect to see widespread catastrophic effects of climate change. Current pledges from countries to cut emissions only reduce carbon pollution by 20% of what’s necessary to avoid reaching that marker, according to the report’s analysis.

The report offers no shortage of solutions to make up the gap. Climate politics can often end up mired in debates about controversial topics like carbon capture and nuclear energy, but the report highlights four straightforward areas that would address the problem: electrification, energy efficiency, tackling methane emissions and advancing innovation. To make all of those happen, the world needs to grow annual investment in clean energy by close to $4 trillion by the end of the decade, according to the report. “Finance is the **missing ingredient** to accelerate,” says Birol.

Looming energy crises

The analytical work that underpins the report began long before the energy crunch gripping Europe and China and threatens to spread across the globe. Nonetheless, the report warns that the energy crisis—which the IEA attributes to a rise in energy demand amid the economic recovery from the pandemic, among other things—may presage **future energy crises** that could occur if governments fail to plan carefully.

At the heart of the agency’s concern is an underinvestment in clean energy. Investment in oil and gas has stalled in a way that is consistent with **limiting warming** to 1.5°C. At the same time, spending on clean energy infrastructure remains **far below** what it needs to be, creating the possibility of **volatility** and supply disruptions much like the world is facing today. “The longer this mismatch persists, the greater the risk for increased volatility,” says Birol. “**What we need is very clear**: to increase investment in clean energy technologies.”

Even as investment in oil and gas has slowed, the IEA warns that the economic recovery from the worst of the COVID-related downturn has failed to live up to the promises of a “green recovery” that was commonly touted as governments spent trillions to help prop up their economies in 2020. Just 2% of $16 trillion spent by countries around the world on COVID economic support was spent on clean energy, according to the report. As a result, the world is now experiencing the second largest uptick in carbon emissions in history, in large part as a result of growth of coal use to power the economic recovery. “We are now witnessing an unsustainable recovery,” says Birol.

#### Indeed,

**Weise 24** [Zia Weise, senior reporter covering climate policy @ POLITICO & B.A. in journalism from Kingston University, 11-6-2024, Climate world absorbs a reality they’d hoped to avoid: Trump is back, POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/climate-world-diplomats-donald-trump-victory-clean-energy-fossil-fuels-greenhouse-emissions/, Willie T. + sumzom]

The morning of his victory, however, officials and climate campaigners talked down Trump’s likely impact on plans to slow greenhouse gas emissions, hoping to calm nervous clean technology markets and present the transition as a **fait accompli***.*

“Those investing in clean energy are already enjoying huge wins in terms of jobs and wealth, and cheaper, more secure energy. This is because the global energy transition is **inevitable** and gathering pace, making it among the **greatest economic opportunities** of our age,” said United Nations climate chief Simon Stiell.

The challenge is that the world **isn’t moving quickly enough** to prevent dangerous global warming, and any slowdown from the world’s **second-largest emitter** — itself a major driver of the global shift to clean energy — is bound to throw a wrench into global climate efforts.

Trump hinted at what was coming in his victory speech early Wednesday morning, touting America’s abundant supplies of “liquid gold.” Addressing Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the environmental lawyer who appears likely to bring his unorthodox views on healthcare to the heart of a Trump administration, Trump said: “Bobby, leave the oil to me.”

**Only nuclear energy solves --- investment is key.**

**Grossi 24** [Rafael Mariano Grossi, PhD in History, International Relations and International Politics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1-17-2024, 5 reasons we must embrace nuclear energy in the fight against climate change, World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/01/nuclear-energy-transistion-climate-change/]

Globally, nuclear energy is also playing a **key role** in the transition to net zero. Fears about nuclear are slowly giving way to fact-based understanding. This year, for the first time, the document agreed at COP backed nuclear energy investment among low-emissions technologies.

One of nuclear’s key attributes is its energy intensity. A **thimble**-sized pellet of uranium produces as much energy as almost **3 barrels** of oil, more than 350 cubic metres of natural gas and about half a tonne of coal.

5 reasons we cannot ignore nuclear energy

Nuclear power, which has 20,000 reactor years of experience across the world, has five distinct advantages.

1. From cradle to grave, nuclear energy has the **lowest carbon footprint** and needs **fewer materials** and less land than other electricity source. For example, to produce one unit of energy, **solar** needs more than **17 times as much material and 46 times as much land.**

2. **Uranium in the earth's crust and oceans is more abundant** than gold, platinum and other rare metals. It is going to take us about 100 to 150 years to get through the uranium resources we deem economically recoverable today.

3. Nuclear power **doesn’t rely on the weather**. Well-run nuclear power plants, including for example those in the US, operate at least **two to three times as reliably** for two to three times as many years as intermittent low-carbon sources. As a flexible baseload for wind and solar that provides more energy when it is needed and less when it is not, nuclear power plants displace coal and enable renewables.

4. Each year, nuclear power plants produce a quarter of the world’s low-carbon electricity, saving many lives that would otherwise be cut short by the lethal pollution fossil fuels pump into the air. Nuclear energy is about as safe as solar. It is far safer than coal, gas and oil, and safer than almost every other alternative energy source.

5. It is true that spent fuel is highly radioactive and emits heat. But it is also relatively compact, and extremely carefully managed and regulated. Nuclear energy generation is so efficient that the amount of all spent fuel ever produced would — in theory — fit into 42 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Today, it is carefully stored in pools and dry storage systems or recycled. Countries like Finland and Sweden are close to putting into place deep geological repositories to dispose of spent fuel. France is also progressing in the implementation of a deep geological repository for high-level waste from spent fuel recycling.

Nuclear is one of the safest, cleanest, **least environmentally burdensome** and — ultimately, over the lifetime of a nuclear power plant — one of the cheapest sources of energy available.

But for all of nuclear energy’s positive attributes, there are hurdles to overcome. The accidents at Chernobyl and at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station left long shadows of mistrust and **underinvestment**. The upfront cost of building a nuclear power plant is considerable and budget overruns and long delays have made it more difficult to **gain support for new construction**.

Three levers to catalyze investment in nuclear energy

Three main levers will need to be pulled if we are to triple today’s investment levels and build the nuclear capacity that will help get us to net zero.

Lever 1: Nuclear must be acknowledged for what it is: a reliable, scalable, safe and highly affordable low-carbon source of energy. It must be treated that way when it comes to investment incentives. Today’s energy markets are not the same as those of the 1970s and 1980s. Nuclear needs private investment, even in markets where governments still take on much of the financing. Governments need to shoulder the **risk of the high capital costs at the start**. But that alone is not enough. They need to attract private financing through assured revenues and an enabling investment environment over the longer term. That means levelling the playing field nationally and internationally, including by changing the policies preventing investment in nuclear energy by many key international financial institutions and development banks.

#### Repurposing ensures fast deployment.

**Abdussami 24** [Muhammad R. Abdussami, M.A. in Nuclear Engineering from Ontario Tech University & PhD from University of Michigan, June 2024, Investigation of potential sites for coal-to-nuclear energy transitions in the United States, Energy Reports, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484724002993, Willie T.]

1.2. Literature review

The U.S. government has undertaken various initiatives to assess the potential for coal-to-nuclear (C2N) transitions at coal sites across the country. Hansen et al. drafted an extensive report for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that examined key factors influencing viable transitions for a hypothetical coal plant, considered the techno-economic aspects of C2N conversions, and evaluated the potential effects on local communities during this transition (Hansen et al., 2022). Similarly, Griffith et al. investigated different nuclear reactor technologies and provided **valuable insights** into the considerations for siting and replacing coal plants with nuclear alternatives (Griffith, 2021). A few technical studies have also been carried out in the field of C2N transitions. One investigation (“Gone with the Steam How new nuclear, 2021) discovered that repurposing coal plants with advanced reactors could offer economic advantages and benefits for host communities compared to renewable energy generation. A technical report published by NuScale SMR technology highlighted the capability of NuScale SMR technology to **repurpose retired coal plants** while **ensuring the economic stability** of communities and workers (“An Ideal Solution for Repurposing U.S, 2021). Bartela et al. conducted a case study on a 460 MWe supercritical coal-fired plant in Poland, demonstrating the techno-economic benefits of replacing it with a nuclear reactor incorporating thermal energy storage (Bartela et al., 2022), (Bartela et al., 2021). Furthermore, Lukowicz et al. performed a techno-economic analysis on the same Polish coal plant, proposing the replacement of the plant's steam cycle with a small-scale modular Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) (Łukowicz et al., 2023). Simonian et al. evaluate the potential of C2N transition at the Limestone coal plant in Texas, comparing small modular, high-temperature gas-cooled, and molten salt nuclear reactor technologies. Each technology's pros and cons are weighed against cost, risk, and C2N integration complexity. The study concludes no one-size-fits-all solution exists for C2N transitions, and specific nuclear designs and transition schemes must be carefully considered for each project based on technical specifications and feasibility (Simonian and Kimber, 2023). Notably, although these studies focused on specific candidate coal plants, comprehensive siting analyses for C2N transitions were not addressed.

The potential for advanced nuclear reactors to replace coal plants has been discussed in (“Coal-to-Nuclear Transitions, 2024), **emphasizing their compatibility** with variable renewable technologies and their capability to provide both electricity and process heat. The document (“Coal-to-Nuclear Transitions, 2024) examines economic impacts, job creation, and revenue benefits in host communities, noting **significant increases in employment and income** following a coal-to-nuclear transition. It discusses workforce requirements, educational needs, and training for transitioning workers, outlining the overlap and distinct roles between coal and nuclear plants. Policy and funding aspects, including **tax incentives** and loans, are also addressed, with a focus on achieving net-zero emissions targets by 2050 and supporting disadvantaged communities. The document emphasizes the critical role of utilities in managing transitions and presents a comprehensive outlook on infrastructure reuse and community engagement strategies for successful coal-to-nuclear conversions. In another paper, the advantages of repurposing existing site infrastructure, including transmission infrastructure, environmental permits, and water usage rights, have been examined. Repowering coal plant sites with nuclear power offers **clean, reliable, and dispatchable energy**, addressing the twin challenges of decommissioning and transitioning to low-carbon energy sources. The paper guides utilities through the key considerations and steps involved in evaluating and repurposing coal plant sites for advanced nuclear generation, focusing on the potential to retain jobs, tax bases, and community support.

In contrast to the technoeconomic analyses described above, the siting of advanced nuclear reactors within operating or retired CPPs has received relatively little attention in the literature. Belles et al. conducted an analysis using the Oak Ridge Siting Analysis for Power Generation Expansion (OR-SAGE) tool to evaluate the suitability of 13 coal power plants in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) service territory for the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors (Belles et al., 2013). A similar approach was adopted in another study (Belles et al., 2021), where OR-SAGE was utilized to assess the retrofitting of advanced nuclear reactors in existing or retired coal plants. Furthermore, Omitaomu et al. employed the OR-SAGE tool to investigate the siting of advanced nuclear reactors across the contiguous United States (Omitaomu et al., 2022). In a separate study, Toth et al. employed the Advanced Nuclear Site Locator (ANSL) tool to evaluate 304 coal sites in the U.S., identifying **79** potentially feasible sites for coal-to-nuclear transitions (Toth et al., 2021). However, they reported that state-level policies could pose challenges to the demonstration of advanced nuclear reactors. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment of all coal plants in the United States, encompassing operational and retired facilities, is necessary to gain an understanding of the most suitable coal sites for transitioning to nuclear power. While the existing literature provides some valuable insights into the siting potential of advanced nuclear reactors in coal plants, the number of studies on this subject remains limited.

1.3. Contribution

This paper aims to assess the feasibility of converting each operational coal site to nuclear power using a tool called Siting Tool for Advanced Nuclear Development (STAND). The studied coal plants are classified into two different groups (Group-01 and Group-02) based on their capacity. Since advanced nuclear reactors are divided into various classes, such as micro-reactors, medium-scale reactors, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), it is necessary to categorize coal plants accordingly to match their capacity for a smooth transition to nuclear power. Categorization will also help in presenting the research findings and data clearly, considering the substantial amount of data involved in the analysis. To conduct this analysis, our first step was to gather information on all operational coal sites in the U.S. until January 2023. The operational coal sites are the focus of this study to **take advantage** of the existing Balance of Plant (BOP) equipment, such as transmission lines and power system protection components, which can **reduce construction time and costs**. Analyzing operational coal plants will also guide policymakers, state-level governments, and energy modelers in determining the prioritization of coal plant retirements. Furthermore, we limit our study to operational coal sites in the U.S. as many retired coal sites lack the necessary technical infrastructure for an attractive coal-to-nuclear transition. Next, we classify all operational coal sites into two clusters based on their nameplate capacity. The CPPs located in non-contiguous states (e.g., Alaska and Hawaii) are not considered due to the lack of sufficient data in STAND. Each cluster is then individually simulated in STAND using selected attribute values, as mentioned in Section 2, specifically in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3. Section 3 discusses the clustering of CPPs. Section 4 provides additional information about the STAND tool. Section 5 presents the results of the study, while Section 6 concludes the study with discussion. This paper presents a comprehensive approach for utilizing STAND in evaluating the feasibility of transitioning from coal to nuclear energy across the U.S. The detailed results and investigation will provide a clear idea on which factors one should consider for a particular region/area to C2N transitions.

#### Climate change is existential.

**Nogue 23** [Sandra; Lecturer in Paleoenvironmental Science @ the University of Southampton; 3-23-2023; OUP Academic; “Catastrophic climate change and the collapse of human societies,” https://academic.oup.com/nsr/article/10/6/nwad082/7085016; DOA: 3-24-2025] nikhil \*\*brackets in original\*\*

The scientific community has focused the agenda of studies of climate change on lower-end warming and simple risk analyses, because more realistic complex assessments of risk are more difficult, the benchmark of the international targets is the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to <2°C, and the culture of climate science is to try to avoid alarmism [1]. Current fires, prolonged droughts, floods and heat waves, together with the consequent **food insecurity**, **civil unrest** and **migrations**, however, are opening the eyes not only of most scientists but also of most people all over the world to the need for considering, at least, the potential catastrophic effects of the collapse of ecosystems and society due to the current **emergency** of climate change.

The projections for the climate of the coming decades are, as we all know, worrying. The worst-case scenarios in the 2022 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report project temperatures by the next century that last occurred in the Early Eocene, reversing 50 million years of cooler climates within two centuries. The Pliocene and Eocene provide the best analogues for near-future climates [2]. Climates like those of the Pliocene are likely to prevail as soon as **2030** and unmitigated scenarios of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) will produce climates like those of the **Eocene** for the coming decades. This situation is particularly alarming because human societies are locally adapted to a specific climatic niche with a mean annual temperature of ∼13°C [3]. We can thus logically expect that current and future warming may **easily overwhelm** societal adaptive capacity.

These climate projections could be even more detrimental if models would not neglect, as they currently do, **feedback in the carbon cycle** and potential **tipping points** that could generate higher GHG concentrations [4]. Examples include the apparent slowing of dampening feedbacks such as the natural carbon-sink capacity [5,6], the loss of carbon due to increasing frequencies and intensities of fire at northern latitudes [7], **droughts and fires** in the Amazon [8] or the thawing of Arctic permafrost that releases methane and CO2 [9]. This feedback is also likely not proportional to warming, as is sometimes assumed. Instead, abrupt and/or irreversible changes may be triggered at a temperature threshold [7]. Particularly worrying is a ‘tipping cascade’ in which **multiple tipping elements** interact in such a way that tipping one threshold increases the likelihood of **tipping another** [4,10].

Climate change also interacts with **other anthropogenic stressors** such as changes in **land use**, loss of **biod**iversity, **nutrient imbalances**, **pollution** and an **overuse** of available resources that are crossing the planetary safety boundary limits and operating as a possible **catastrophic** mix. This mix may exacerbate society vulnerabilities and cause multiple indirect stresses such as economic damage, loss of land and water, and food insecurity that can merge into system-wide synchronous failures. These cascading effects are not only biophysical or biogeochemical, but they also affect human society, generating **conflicts**, **political instability**, systemic financial risks, the spread of **infectious diseases** and the **risk of spillover**. For example, there is evidence that the 2007−10 drought contributed to the conflict in Syria [11].

Anthropogenic climate change interacting with these other stressors could thus cause a global catastrophe, in a **worldwide societal collapse**. Kemp et al. [1] have reminded us that although we have reasons to suspect it, such potential collapsing futures are rarely studied and poorly understood. The closest research is the search for evidence of tipping dynamics and estimating thresholds, timescales and impacts of potential tipping points [4]. We advocate for considering them while using the available knowledge acquired from historical and prehistorical examples of local and regional collapses, transformations and resilience of human societies also driven by climate and unsustainable use of resources (Fig. 1).

## 

## 2NC

### 

### K

#### Their authors are uniquely bad when it comes to homogenization of Indigenous experiences.

**1NC Tuck & Yang (Eve Tuck, Wayne Yang, 2012, [Tuck is Professor of Indigenous Studies @ NYU, PhD Urban Education @ CUNY, Founding Director @ Tkaronto CIRCLE Lab, Fmr. William T. Grant Scohlar; Yang is Professor @ UCSD, Ph.D in Social Studies @ UC Berkeley],  “Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity”, Education & Society Vol. 1 (1). \*\*brackets are original \*\* https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf //recut vy) //MD**

**A more nuanced move to innocence is the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization. Calling different groups ‘colonized’ without describing their relationship to settler colonialism is an equivocation, “the fallacy of using a word in different senses at different stages of the reasoning" (Etymonline, 2001). In particular, describing all struggles against imperialism as ‘decolonizing’ creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work, especially among people of color, queer people, and other groups minoritized by the settler nation-state. ‘We are all colonized,’ may be a true statement but is deceptively embracive and vague, its inference: ‘None of us are settlers.’ Equivocation, or calling everything by the same name, is a move towards innocence that is especially vogue in coalition politics among people of color. People of color who enter/are brought into the settler colonial nation-state also enter the triad ofrelations between settler-native-slave. We are referring here to the colonial pathways that are usually described as ‘immigration’ and how therefugee/immigrant/migrant is invited to be a settler in some scenarios, given the appropriate investments in whiteness, or is made an illegal, criminal presence in other scenarios. Ghetto colonialism, prisons, and under resourced compulsory schooling are specializations of settler colonialism in North America; they are produced by the collapsing of internal, external, and settler colonialisms, into new blended categories15. This triad of settler-native-slave and its selective collapsibility seems to be unique to settler colonial nations. For example, all Aleut people on the Aleutian Islands were collected and placed in internment camps for four years after the bombing of Dutch Harbor; the stated rationale was the protection of the people but another likely reason was that the U.S. Government feared the Aleuts would become allies with the Japanese and/or be difficult to differentiate from potential Japanese spies. White people who lived on the Aleutian Islands at that same time were not interned. Internment in abandoned warehouses and canneries in Southeast Alaska was the cause of significant numbers of death of children and elders, physical injury, and illness among Aleut people. Aleut internment during WWII is largely ignored as part of U.S. history. The shuffling of Indigenous people between Native, enslavable Other, and Orientalized Other16 shows how settler colonialism constructs and collapses its triad of categories. This colonizing trick explains why certain minoritiescan at times become model and quasi-assimilable (as exemplified by Asian settler colonialism, civil rights, model minority discourse, and the use of ‘hispanic’ as an ethnic category to mean both white and non-white) yet, in times of crisis, revert to the status of foreign contagions (as exemplified by Japanese Internment, Islamophobia, Chinese Exclusion, Red Scare, anti-Irish nativism, WWII antisemitism, and anti-Mexican-immigration). This is why ‘labor’ or ‘workers’ as an agential political class fails to activate the decolonizing project. “[S]hifting lines of the international division of labor” (Spivak, 1985, p. 84) bisect the very category of labor into caste-like bodies built for work on one hand and rewardable citizen-workers on theother. Some labor becomes settler, while excess labor becomes enslavable, criminal, murderable. The impossibility of fully becoming a white settler - in this case, white referring to an exceptionalized position with assumed rights to invulnerability and legal supremacy - as articulated by minority literature preoccupied with “glass ceilings” and “forever foreign” status and “myth of the model minority”, offers a strong critique of the myth of the democratic nationstate. However, its logical endpoint, the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism. Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler. For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not. “Following stolen resources” is a phrase that Wayne has encountered, used to describe Filipino overseas labor (over 10% of the population of the Philippines is working abroad) and other migrations from colony to metropole. This phrase is an important anti-colonial framing of a colonial situation. However an anti-colonial critique is not the same as a decolonizing framework; anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole. This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land. Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject. Equivocation is the vague equating of colonialisms that erases the sweeping scope of land as the basis of wealth, power, law in settler nation-states. Vocalizing a ‘muliticultural’ approach to oppressions, or remaining silent on settler colonialism while talking about colonialisms, or tacking on a gesture towards Indigenous people without addressing Indigenous sovereignty or rights, or forwarding a thesis on decolonization without regard to unsettling/deoccupying land, are equivocations. That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority / people of color / colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.**

#### Homogenization prevents nuanced understandings of lives which is a prereq to change.

#### 

**​​Decolonization is not a metaphor. Their usage of settler colonialism to win ballots but perpetuation of environmental degradation, violence, etc. as they live on stolen land is an active appropriation of Indigenous struggle that is worse than the status quo.**

**Tuck & Yang 12 “Decolonization is not a metaphor” Eve Tuck State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40 HCH //ag**

**Alongside this work, we have been thinking about what decolonization means, what it wants and requires. One trend we have noticed, with growing apprehension, is the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives. Decolonization, which we assert is a distinct project from other civil and human rights-based social justice projects, is far too often subsumed into the directives of these projects, with no regard for how decolonization wants something different than those forms of justice. Settler scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms, seemingly to signal both an awareness of the significance of Indigenous and decolonizing theorizations of schooling and educational research, and to include Indigenous peoples on the list of considerations - as an additional special (ethnic) group or class. At a conference on educational research, it is not uncommon to hear speakers refer, almost casually, to the need to “decolonize our schools,” or use “decolonizing methods,” or “decolonize student thinking.” Yet, we have observed a startling number of these discussions make no mention of Indigenous peoples, our/their1 struggles for the recognition of our/their sovereignty, or the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization. Further, there is often little recognition given to the immediate context of settler colonialism on the North American lands where many of these conferences take place. Of course, dressing up in the language of decolonization is not as offensive as “Navajo print” underwear sold at a clothing chain store (Gaynor, 2012) and other appropriations of Indigenous cultures and materials that occur so frequently. Yet, this kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization. It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change. On the occasion of the inaugural issue of Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, we want to be sure to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor. When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks. The easy absorption, adoption, and transposing of decolonization is yet another form of settler appropriation. When we write about decolonization, we are not offering it as a metaphor; it is not an approximation of other experiences of oppression. Decolonization is not a swappable term for other things we want to do to improve our societies and schools. Decolonization doesn’t have a synonym.**