# **1NC - Instability**

**Recent negotiations have deescalated the risk of conflict between regional powers.**

**Aguiar 24** --- (Paulo Aguiar [Paulo Aguiar earned a master's degree in International Relations from NOVA University Lisbon, specializing in Realism, Classical Geopolitics, and Strategy. As an aspiring professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights on Geopolitical Monitor and his own Substack, which is available at: https://horizontegeopolitico.substack.com/], 12-26-2024, "Ethiopia-Somalia Agreement: Turkey’s Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa", https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ethiopia-somalia-agreement-turkeys-rising-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa/) //doa1-16-2025 + master chen :)

**The Horn of Africa, long plagued by geopolitical tensions and territorial disputes,** **has witnessed a significant development with the recent agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia** to address Ethiopia’s maritime access. **Brokered by Turkey**, **this agreement is a cornerstone in de-escalating the** nearly **decade**-**long** **rivalry between the** two **nations** and signifies Ankara’s growing diplomatic clout in the region. However, the agreement’s ambiguities and the region’s complex dynamics underscore challenges that lie ahead. Historical Rivalries and Geopolitical Stakes Ethiopia’s search for reliable access to the sea has been a critical part of its national strategy ever since it became landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Losing its coastline profoundly impacted Ethiopia’s economy and security, forcing the country to rely heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade. While Djibouti has served as a crucial lifeline, this dependency also left Ethiopia vulnerable to higher costs, logistical bottlenecks, and geopolitical leverage in dealings with its smaller neighbor. Determined to reduce its reliance on Djibouti, Ethiopia began exploring alternative options. This pursuit took a dramatic turn in January 2024, when Addis Ababa signed an agreement with Somaliland, the self-declared independent region of Somalia. Somaliland, which has sought international recognition for decades, controls the strategic port of Berbera—a key asset along major global shipping routes. The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland suggested that Ethiopia might consider formally recognizing Somaliland in exchange for privileged access to the port. While this promised to diversify Ethiopia’s trade routes, it sparked a fierce backlash from Somalia, which sees Somaliland as an integral part of its sovereign territory. Mogadishu’s objections were swift and unequivocal. Somalia viewed the agreement as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and a dangerous precedent that could embolden separatist movements across the region. In response, Somalia ramped up its military preparedness and launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign, appealing to both regional partners and the international community to oppose Ethiopia’s actions. As tensions mounted, it became clear that a prolonged conflict would be disastrous—not just for Ethiopia and Somalia, but for the Horn of Africa as a whole. Such a conflict risked worsening humanitarian crises, destabilizing trade routes, and creating opportunities for extremist groups to exploit the chaos. Recognizing these risks, both nations eventually pivoted to de-escalation. Their efforts were bolstered by Turkey, which stepped in to mediate**. With longstanding ties to both countries, Turkey played a crucial role in bringing them to the negotiating table, helping to shift the focus from confrontation to dialogue.** The Ethiopia-Somalia agreement represents a critical step toward reducing tensions in the Horn of Africa, offering both nations a chance to focus on pressing domestic challenges. Turkey’s role as mediator highlights its growing influence in the region, while the agreement’s ambiguities and unresolved issues underscore the fragility of this peace. With regard to Ethiopia-Somalia relations, **the path forward hinges on successful** technical **negotiations and** sustained commitment to **dialogue**. For Turkey, the agreement cements its reputation as a capable mediator and positions Ankara as a dominant player in the Horn of Africa. Yet, the geopolitical chessboard remains fluid, with competing interests from Egypt, Somaliland, and other regional actors poised to shape the next chapter of this evolving story.

**However, Affirming divides Africa along alliance lines - inciting conflict and forcing existing aid programs out**

**Opalo 24** --- (Ken Opalo [Associate Professor at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.], 12-12-2024, "International recognition for Somaliland should be conditioned on concrete economic and political reforms", https://www.africanistperspective.com/p/international-recognition-for-somaliland?utm\_source=post-email-title&publication\_id=1252832&post\_id=152926334&utm\_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=53n3u5&triedRedirect=true&utm\_medium=email) //doa1-13-2025 + master chen :)

**The third negative consequence of recognizing Somaliland will be rising instability in the Horn. From a geopolitical standpoint, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Kenya will be the clear beneficiaries of such a change to the status quo. However, Somalia (and Puntland), Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia will likely not take this shift without a fight**. **Conflicts** along the disputed boundary with Puntland and intra-clan skirmishes within Somaliland **will escalate** (and gobble up more scarce resources). The rump Somalia will also be destabilized by nationalist furor over its dismemberment (with Al-Shabaab being a clear beneficiary). The apparent rapprochement between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa will most certainly collapse. In the face of these likely upheavals, **Somaliland’s international partners** won’t have much to offer. When the rubber meets the road, they**’ll** do just enough to **protect their interests** and ignore the rest of the chaos. And when that fails they’ll cut **and run.** Faced with the real risks outlined above, it would be beneficial if instead of recognition Somaliland would proceed as a de facto state as it consolidates its economy and politics. Such a path forward would still allow for it to engage foreign powers interested in its geostrategic offerings, but with the caveat that it’s ruling elites would not be entirely freed from relying on local businesses and communities as the main sources of legitimacy. Military bases and international logistical corridors could still be built. Investments in mining, telecoms, business services, and light manufacturing can still take place. Donor funds for education, healthcare, irrigation, water and sanitation, veterinary services for Somaliland’s vast herds, and governs reforms would still flow. The only difference is that all these interventions would be channeled via the current formal and informal institutions (with their checks and legitimation norms intact), and not a small group of state elites newly freed from their people and totally dependent on foreigners. Indeed, true friends of Somaliland would condition future recognition on concrete economic and political achievements accompanied by observable improvements in human welfare and freedoms.

**Specifically, recognizing Somaliland would catalyze instability in 3 key ways**

## **1] Terrorism**

**Al Shabaab is on the decline.**

**Kiage 24** --- (Nyaboga Kiage, [*investigation and Crime Reporter for @NationAfrica East and Central Africa largest English daily. Contributes for global publications. Manchester United fan*], 11-11-2024, "Al Shabaab activities in North Eastern on decline – Report", https://nairobinews.nation.africa/al-shabaab-activities-in-north-eastern-on-decline-report/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

**There has been a decline in** the activities of members of **the terrorist group Al Shabaab.** The decline has been seen in the vast northeastern region, where members of the militant group used to carry out a series of attacks on non-locals and the police. Horizon Analysts and Researchers Network (HARN), an organization that conducts research in the northeastern region, has linked the decline in such attacks to cooperation between security forces and local communities. The North Eastern region consists of Lamu, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties. “From September last year to August 2024, **there has been a significant improvement in the deterrence, interception, and disruption of** potential **terror**ist attacks as part of the fight against extremism and insurgency activities along the areas bordering Somalia compared to the same period last year,” the organization said in a statement. HARN said there had been **a 60 percent reduction in attacks** in the four countries. This, the organization said, had been made possible by a newfound camaraderie between locals and security agencies. It also said that propaganda material, which is also shared to recruit young people into the militia group, has also decreased on both online and offline platforms. **Even in Somalia**, HARN said **there had been a serious operation carried out by officers** attached to the Somali National Army (SNA) **targeting terrorists and terror-related activities**. According to the organization, the security services have been receiving timely information that is helping to counter the activities of the extremist group. These activities include disrupting planned attacks, countering insurgent propaganda, and pre-empting their new recruitment tactics. Kenya, especially the vast northeastern region and Wajir County in particular, has been a playground for the militants. However, things seem to have changed with almost weekly reports of attacks. The Al Shabaab attacks are not only synonymous with the Eastern region as the terror group has also caused havoc in other parts of the country including the capital Nairobi. At least 67 people died in the assault by al-Shabab in 2013 on the Westgate shopping complex in the capital. Four militants who carried out the attack were found dead in the shopping center’s rubble. The militants occupied the mall for four days, in one of the deadliest jihadi attacks in Kenya. In September 2020, a judge sentenced two men Hussein Hassan Mustafa and Mohammed Ahmed Abdi to 18 and 33 years in jail after they were found guilty of helping the Islamist militants attack the Westgate mall.

**Unfortunately, affirming increases Al Shabaab’s recruitment - as they will be able to recruit Somalis heavily opposed to somaliland independence**

**Zahran 24** --- (Motaz Zahran, [*Motaz Zahran is the current Ambassador of Egypt to the United States. He formerly served as the Assistant Foreign Minister and Chief of Cabinet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt. He was the Ambassador of Egypt to Canada, and had held numerous positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister, and previously as Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Middle East Peace Process, Palestine, Israel and Egypt’s relations with the United States of America. He had also served at the Embassy of Egypt in Washington DC (2007-2011), as a Political Counselor and Congressional Affairs Officer, and Chargé d’Affaires.*], 12-10-2024, "Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade", https://www.newsweek.com/stability-horn-africa-vital-global-trade-security-opinion-1998578) //doa12-18-2024 + master chen :)

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is of critical importance to global economic security due to the integrated nature of global supply chains. 12 percent of world trade flows through the Red Sea, and disruptions to this flow affect the global economy. **Any recognition of Somaliland as an independent state will result in** **dangerous repercussions**, including **exacerbating internal divisions between the various clans of Somaliland that support independence and others that seek to remain within the Somali federal state.** This is a staggering reminder of the danger of further fragmenting the country through reckless recognition agreements. Beyond Somalia, this recognition **is a slippery slope entailing a domino effect of separatist movements across the region igniting conflicts in pursuit of independence, leading to unimaginable chaos. Cairo has longstanding ties with Mogadishu** that date to before its independence in 1960. In this context, Egypt heeded Somalia's request to participate in the new peacekeeping mission AUSSOM, which was wholeheartedly welcomed by the African Union Peace and Security Council. Egypt's extended experience in peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere provides crucial support to the counterterrorism capabilities of the Somali armed forces and the concerted efforts of the Somali government and people to rebuild their country. In the broader regional context, and in addition to its **destabilizing actions in Somalia,** Ethiopia has not shown any fraction of a genuine political will to reach a deal on its dam on the River Nile. It refuses to address Egypt and Sudan's legitimate concerns and has blocked efforts to reach a compromise over 13 years of arduous negotiations. Ethiopia should commit to reaching a legally binding agreement based in international law that preserves all parties' water security while supporting Ethiopia's development goals. In Sudan, political stability is a prerequisite for lasting stability in the region. As such, Egypt continues to play a crucial role through its persistent efforts, along with the U.S., to shepherd the warring parties toward an immediate cease-fire that paves the way for full humanitarian access. Since fighting broke out in April 2023, more than one million Sudanese refugees have crossed into Egypt, fleeing the war and dire humanitarian crisis. We are proud to support refugees, and with sustained international support, we can continue to play a key role in delivering humanitarian aid and building concert over a political solution. There is clear alignment between U.S. and Egyptian interests in the Horn of Africa. These include counterterrorism, maritime security, and anti-piracy. Both strategic partners converge on the necessity of deploying diplomacy to promote peace, security, and stability. The Bright Star and Eagle Defender joint exercises between the U.S. and Egypt embody the security dimension of the bilateral relationship, while efforts to promote a political pathway in Sudan exemplify our joint and relentless diplomatic endeavors The eyes of the world are fixed on the rising tensions in the Middle East as Israel's war continues in Gaza and Syria falls back into chaos, dominating global news coverage. Yet the world cannot afford to overlook the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa posing a serious threat to both regional and international peace and security. For the past year, the Houthis have disrupted global commerce in one of the world's most crucial waterways, the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. Instability in the Horn of Africa was exacerbated following Ethiopia's decision to undermine the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia by signing an agreement with the region of Somaliland. **This enables the terrorist group Al-Shabab to recruit militants, spread their destructive ideology, and expand operations beyond Somalia's borders under the guise of preventing Somalia's disintegration**. Coordination between Al-Shabab and the Houthis will only add fuel to fire to engulf the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.

**Empirically, after Ethiopia’s agreement to recognize Somalia, Al-Shabaab resurged.**

**Hassan 24** — (Mohamed Olad Hassan [Mohamed Olad Hassan is a senior editor and writer with the VOA Somali service. Before joining VOA, he was a Mogadishu-based correspondent for, among others, the Associated Press and the BBC World Service. He has received the Speaker Abbot Award given by the British House of Commons and here in the United States has received the Louis M. Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism from Harvard University’s Nieman Foundation.], 10-4-2024, "Somalia-Ethiopia tensions escalate; UN urges diplomatic resolution", Voice of America, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-security-dilemma-ethiopia-tensions-dominate-discussions-on-au-peacekeeping/7811115.html, accessed 1-12-2025) //FK

"**Somalia would n**o**t consider Ethiopian troops to be part of the new mission unless it withdraws from the** illegal memorandum of understanding signed with [Somalia's breakaway region of] Somaliland earlier this year," Moalim said Thursday in an interview with VOA Somali. **The** controversial memorandum of understanding, also known as an **MoU**, has escalated tensions between the two neighboring nations, **granting** Ethiopia access to a 20-kilometer (12.4 mile) stretch of Red Sea coastline in return for potential **recognition of Somaliland's independence.** Al-Shabaab, as mentioned above, is already attempting to mobilize its supporters to violently stop the memorandum’s implementation. The group’s official statement rejecting the deal underscores its ideological hybridity. Al-Shabaab is a transnational Salafi-jihadist organization in its vision and ambitions and loyalty to al-Qaeda. But the group’s leadership is entirely Somali, and the group has historically capitalized on Somali nationalism and irredentism, particularly in opposition to Ethiopia’s military interventions, in order to build its social base within Somalia. Unsurprisingly, **al-Shabaab seems to see this moment as an opportunity in which the collective anger among the wider Somali populace can serve to breathe new life into the organization. The memorandum** therefore **may end up marking the most energetic period for al-Shabaab in years and act to accelerate the group’s long-plotted expansion into Ethiopia and Somaliland.** While the threats are all rhetorical for now, there remains a strong precedent to suggest that the group will take action. This level of mobilization suggests **the group retains the ability to recruit** and potentially enable acts of terror, despite the major military offensive against al-Shabaab since the fall of 2022. Al-Shabaab has already been able to make some gains on the ground in Somalia as a counter-offensive in central Somalia slowed and a planned major second front in southern Somalia was repeatedly delayed. As African Union forces continue to leave, al-Shabaab has gone on its own offensive, retaking many former African Union bases or assaulting waning bases still occupied. This growing momentum, coupled with popular Somali anger over the memorandum (as well as the current war in Gaza), offers al-Shabaab new opportunities to spread its violent message, recruit more widely, and encourage or inspire supporters to take up violence for its stated agendas. In other words, the memorandum could not come at a worse time in the fight against al-Shabaab.

**Overall, Al Shabaab’s attacks are devastating**

Acled 23 --- (Communications Acled, [*Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) is a disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping initiative. ACLED collects information on the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world. The ACLED team conducts analysis to describe and explore conflict trends.*] 10-20-2023, "Somalia: **Al-Shabaab Strikes** Back at Local Administrators", https://acleddata.com/2023/10/20/somalia-situation-update-october-2023-al-shabaab-strikes-back-at-local-administrators/) //doa1-1-2025 + master chen :)

VITAL TRENDS **From 9 September to 13 October 2023**, ACLED **record**s 279 political violence events and **1,752** reported **fatalities** in Somalia. Political violence has increased by over 80% in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states over the past 10 weeks – since the government officially launched Operation Black Lion against al-Shabaab on 6 August – compared to the 10 weeks prior.

Bakool region saw the highest number of reported fatalities, with over 800 recorded during the reporting period. Mudug region followed, with 400 reported fatalities. The government’s campaign against al-Shabaab centered in Galmudug state – which consists of Mudug and Galgaduud regions – where Somali forces and Habar Gedir militias took control of several locations.

The most common event type was battles, with 172 events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with 87 events. ACLED records 32 incidents of bombings by Somali and international forces – United States, Kenya, and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) – against al-Shabaab positions, with about 10 reportedly affecting civilians.

## **2] Civil War in Somaliland**

**Clan dynamics shape politics in Somaliland**

**Bade 23**--- (ZAKI BADE, 12-xx-2023, [*Ph.D in Sociology from Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University in Turkey. Zakarie is a Somali scholar with notable academic articles and research studies. Zakarie has expertise in multidisciplinary areas, including Project Management, Development Studies, Sociology, and Research.*], "THE IMPACT OF CLAN LEADERS ON SOMALILAND STATE SECURITY", https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zakarie-Abdi-Bade/publication/377060514\_International\_Journal\_of\_Social\_Sciences\_and\_Management\_Review\_THE\_IMPACT\_OF\_CLAN\_LEADERS\_ON\_SOMALILAND\_STATE\_SECURITY/links/65931a672468df72d3f0d12d/International-Journal-of-Social-Sciences-and-Management-Review-THE-IMPACT-OF-CLAN-LEADERS-ON-SOMALILAND-STATE-SECURITY.pdf) //doa1-2-2025 + master chen :)

**Somaliland**, a self-declared independent state in the Horn of Africa, **operates within a** complex socio-**political landscape deeply rooted in clan-based structures**. Clan affiliations are central to the region's political, social, and economic fabric. Clan leaders, influential figures within their respective clans, wield significant authority and play crucial roles in maintaining security, resolving conflicts, and providing essential governance functions. This study delves into the multifaceted dynamics of clan leaders in Somaliland's security context. It's noteworthy that the analysis is more in alignment with the "Fragile States Theory" than the "Constructivism Theory." The Fragile States Theory aptly describes the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by regions like Somaliland, characterized by weak governance, limited institutional capacity, and the absence of a strong central government. In this context, clan leaders emerge as key actors in maintaining order, bridging governance gaps, and addressing security issues due to the state's fragility. They navigate intricate clan networks and act as mediators and decision-makers, contributing significantly to societal stability. In contrast, while Constructivism Theory focuses on the role of ideational factors, norms, and identity in state behavior, it's not as directly applicable in explaining the specific role of clan leaders in Somaliland's security dynamics. The analysis concludes that the Fragile States Theory offers a more fitting framework for comprehending the dynamics in Somaliland and the vital role clan leaders play in security and governance, particularly within the context of a fragile state with limited formal government capacity

**Unfortunately, clans disagree over the question of independence**

**Mahmood 24** --- (Omar Mahmood, [*As the Senior Analyst for Eastern Africa, Omar conducts field research, provides written analysis, proposes policy recommendations and engages in advocacy efforts.*], 11-13-2024, "Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains", https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains) //doa1-2-2025 + master chen :)

**Somaliland held its** long-awaited presidential **election** in mid-November, ending in victory for the opposition and a swift concession by the incumbent. **The vote** and its aftermath **underlined Somaliland’s standing** as a consolidating democracy **with a reputation for political stability while the peaceful transfer of power marked a welcome outcome in the Horn of Africa**, where such handovers are a rare occurrence. That said, the run-up to the vote was far from smooth, due to rising internal tensions and an unresolved conflict in the east. The harassment of government critics and the concentration of political power in the hands of a single clan also fuel concerns as to the degree of openness in Somaliland’s political system. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Over the last three decades it has developed many of the trappings of a state, including its own currency, security forces and civilian administration in the capital, Hargeisa. Even so, Mogadishu rejects Somaliland’s independence and no country has recognised it. At the same time, its reputation for orderly polls and relatively consensual politics has come under strain recently, and disputes among politicians caused a two-year delay of the presidential vote. In the end, Somaliland’s institutions and political establishment largely withstood the stress test. The results saw Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro”, leader of the Waddani party, secure the presidency with 64 per cent of the vote, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye party. Approximately 53 per cent of registered voters turned out – lower than the previous presidential election in 2017, when 64 per cent of those registered voted. This was partly because polls did not take place in most of conflict-hit Sool and parts of Sanaag, both of which lie in the east. What are the main political divides in Somaliland? Voters largely cast their ballots along clan lines, revealing the continuing dominance of these loyalties in Somaliland while also raising doubts as to the diversity and fairness of political representation. **Politics in Somaliland is dominated by members of the Isaaq clan family.** A number of clans exist within the Isaaq, but three main ones – the Garhajis, Haber Jeclo and Haber Awal – have the greatest political prominence. Other, non-Isaaq clans reside in Somaliland’s western and eastern regions. In the western region of Awdal, members of the Dir clan family have long complained of marginalisation by the Isaaq. **In the east**, members of **the Darod clan family**, comprising Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans, **have** mostly **rejected** inclusion in **Somaliland, favouring** instead **a** closer **relationship with** Mogadishu or neighbouring Puntland, a semi-autonomous state in northern **Somalia** with which they share close clan ties. **These frictions were at the heart of the conflict that erupted** between the Somaliland administration and the Dhulbahante in Sool in 2023 (for more on this, see below). The past two Somaliland presidents ... were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. The past two Somaliland presidents – Bihi and his predecessor Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, or “Silanyo” – were swept to victory by a Haber Awal-Haber Jeclo clan alliance, under the Kulmiye party. This fractured in 2024, with many Haber Jeclo turning against the incumbent. Instead, they voted for Waddani and its candidate Cirro, complaining that Bihi favoured his Haber Awal clan when in power. Prominent members of the Haber Jeclo clan also argued they had suffered most from the conflict in Sool which erupted during Bihi’s presidency, given that their homelands are on the front lines and many prisoners of war captured by Dhulbahante militias hail from their clan. Alongside the presidential polls, Somaliland’s political organisations also contested elections to determine which of them would be permitted to compete as parties in future polls, with Somaliland’s political system licensing only three parties for up to ten years each. This system, in which political associations that want to become parties are subjected to a popular vote, is designed to avoid the proliferation of parties representing specific clans. Kulmiye and Waddani retained their official standing for the third and second time respectively. They are joined by a new party, Kaah, led by veteran politician Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, previously a member of Kulmiye. All three of these parties are headed by leaders from the Haber Jeclo – a first in Somaliland politics. What were the challenges leading up to the polls? The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullying its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. First, presidential and local council elections had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland’s three permitted parties expired in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. The agreement came after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well as a short-lived clan-based rebellion near the town of Burco, the region’s second-largest city, in mid-2023. Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland’s reputation for internal stability. **Members of Somaliland’s Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia** following years of insurgency against the country’s strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool’s population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. **The desire for independence is not shared by all communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this.** In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region’s administrative capital, in December 2022. Protesters gathered in the town after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which more than **150,000 civilians were displaced**, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia. Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting has not restarted since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the risk of the conflict reigniting remains. Outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland helped shape the outcome of the election. Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi’s moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu’s fight against Al-Shabaab militants.) **The reactions within Somaliland were more equivocal.** Some hailed it as a bold step towards securing independence. Others, however, criticised the lack of transparency, as well as the prospect of Ethiopia establishing a military installation on soil inhabited by ethnic Somalis, many of whom regard the country as a regional rival. Others viewed the agreement as no more than a ploy by Bihi to strengthen his flagging political prospects through an appeal to Somaliland nationalism.

**Thus, Recognition pushes tensions to the brink and incites a civil war**

**Batten 22** [Dr. Karl Von Batten, *senior government advisor and founder of the Von Batten-Montague-York, L.C. policy advocacy group*, 5-13-2022, Growing concern that the push for U.S. recognition of Somaliland will lead to civil war in Somaliland, https://foreignpolicynews.org/2022/05/13/growing-concern-that-the-push-for-u-s-recognition-of-somaliland-will-lead-to-civil-war-in-somaliland/] BZ

Unfortunately, history shows that well-intentioned U.S. foreign policies based on a simplistic understanding of internal dynamics in each country in Africa have resulted in more problems. The upheavals in Libya and South Sudan are recent examples of American and European good intentions turning into disasters. We Americans tend to look at things through the lens of good guys versus bad guys and freedom versus perceived oppression, enacting policies or government actions based on these conceptual viewpoints. In this way, the self-declared state of Somaliland appears to be the latest potential victim of U.S. good intentions.¶ There is a push by a group of highly respected individuals in Washington, D.C. for the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent country separate from Somalia. Joshua Meservey, a senior policy analyst for Africa and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation, is one of the finest minds when it comes to U.S. policies focused on Africa, and he is a strong advocate for U.S recognition of Somaliland as an independent country. On May 06, 2020, Joshua published a piece on the Heritage Foundation’s Daily Signal website titled “Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t ‘Neocolonial’ Plot. It’s Self-Determination.” In it, he said, “It is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019”[4]. Eritrean and South Sudanese independence movements both led to wars that, in part, are still being waged today[5][6]. Therefore, I do not think those are good examples to argue for Somaliland’s independence. Joshua is correct in that Somaliland did declare independence from Somalia in 1991. Nevertheless, what is missing from Joshua’s comment is that not all Somalis/Somalilanders in Somaliland are pro-secession from Somalia—many are against it. This dissent is why **there is strong opposition by many** Somalis/**Somalilanders** and Somaliland-Americans **against** U.S. **recognition of Somaliland**.¶ The opposition to U.S. recognition of Somaliland has little to do with independence from Somalia and everything to do with a **power struggle** between the clans. As with most African states with multiple tribes and clans, Somaliland is **not unified**. Somaliland is made up of five clans, namely the Isaak, the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi. The Isaak is the clan in power and pushing for independence. The four opposing **clans**—the Dhulbahante, the Isse, the Warsangali, and the Gadabuursi—**oppose** the U.S. **recognition** of Somaliland **because they know that will translate to financial and military aid to the** Somaliland **government**, which is **controlled by the Isaak clan. The fear** among the other clans **is that** U.S. **aid to the Somaliland government**, and therefore the Isaak clan, **will allow the Isaak** clan **to dominate the other clans and take control of their land**. Currently, the Somaliland government only has complete control over Isaak territory, where the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, is also located. However, the recently introduced House and Senate **Bills proposing the** U.S. **recognition of Somaliland** and the expansion of the U.S. military relationship with Somaliland **have increased political anxieties** in Somaliland. The opposing **clans** are **now openly discuss**ing the eventuality of a **civil war** against the Isaak clan. **All it takes** to start a war in Africa **is a few people** with Avtomat Kalashnikov (AK) 47s.¶ I urge caution when it comes to Somaliland. This is why I support the current U.S. policy that calls for the African Union, Somalia, and Somaliland to resolve the Somaliland issue amongst themselves—this is the right approach. It is up to Africans to decide their fate. The days of Americans and Europeans dictating or influencing the borders of sovereign African countries should be left in the last century. I am opposed **to** H.R. 7170, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act, and Section 5 of S.3861, the Somaliland Partnership Act. Two pieces of legislation that directly and indirectly violate Somalia’s sovereignty. U.S. foreign policy must be color blind; we as Americans cannot oppose Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty and then turn around and put forward legislation that violates the borders and sovereignty of an African state.¶ The one rule for Europe and a different rule for Africa has not gone unnoticed by Africans. Instead of pushing legislation and policies that will further divide the region and **lead to civil war**, the U.S. can play a constructive role in the Somaliland issue; we can help the African Union facilitate a national dialogue between the opposing clans, the Somali government, and the government of Somaliland. The U.S. can also help by assisting in developing a road map for peace that will ensure peace and prosperity for all Somalis. This is a logical way forward. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and South Sudan, when it comes to Somaliland, we cannot pretend that the deadly outcome of possible U.S. policy missteps is unknown.

## **3] Somali invasion**

**Affirming would force Somalia to reclaim Somaliland by force.**

**Hassan 24** [Abdillahi Hassan, Somali Journalist and Social Activist, 1-21-2024, Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia, Somaliland, https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/] leon + Aaron

Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity ¶ To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums. **However**, it is **crucial** to **understand** that **Somalia’s reaction** is rooted in its **perception** of **recent successes** to “**bring Somaliland** back to **the fold**”**. What infuriated Somalia the most is** in **not** **the prospect** of **Ethiopia getting** an **access** to the sea as **President Mohamud** himself **hinted** at **his openess** to that **possibility**. **Rather** it is the **sense** **of an opportunity** to **submit Somaliland** to its **will** **slipping away** from **their hands** with the **possibilities** that this **deal opens** for **Somaliland**. ¶ This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi’s administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu’s steps to capitalize on them. The president’s extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland’s army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the **Somalian government** abruptly **capitalized** on by **recognizing** the **administration** of **Las Anod** which claims **three regions** in **Somaliland** either **wholly** or **partially**. And finally, the **neglect** of **economic development** has finally **caught up** with the **country** and put **considerable strain** on its **strength**. ¶ In contrast to Muse’s setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year, securing debt relief, East Africa Community membership, and the lifting of a long-standing weapons import ban. ¶ These factors have emboldened Mogadishu’s administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland’s quest for independence on the negotiation table. ¶ **Bitter Confrontation** in **Djibouti** ¶ Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. Confronting Bihi on his “lack of legitimacy” and control over all of Somaliland’s territory, Somalia **further issued** a **clear threat** of **destabilization** in Somaliland’s **western regions** by exploiting **clan cleavages**. **Insult** was **added** to **injury** when **Mohamud** demanded that **president Bihi** represent only his **personal interests** and **those** of his immediate **kin group** as “**there** were **no thing** as **Somaliland** to **speak off**”. ¶ Later statements from Somalia’s Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi’s faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by “surrender to” Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. In fact, the **Somali side** was so **smug** about **their advantage** in **Djibouti** that **Minister Fiqi** announced that **it was** a “**historic milestone** for the **unification** of **the country**”. ¶ Indeed, the **over-reaction** from **Mogadishu** was **nothing more** than **frustration over** the **loss** of **perceived opportunity**. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. And **for that**, **they are willing to go to war**, not **against Ethiopia** as **Somalian officials** have **repeatedly stated**, but **against Somaliland**. Somalia is too weak **to maintain** confrontation with Ethiopia for prolonged time. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. There is great difference in the resources and capacities of the two nations at this juncture. Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, there is hardly any country that would pick Somalia over Ethiopia. ¶ Subterfuge and Subversion ¶ In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it’s Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia’s attack on multiple fronts. ¶ Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing “pro-union” politicians serving in Somalia’s parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland’s claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. ¶ However, **Somalia’s fury** over **Somaliland’s** self-**determination** as **manifested** in the **signing** of the **M**emorandum **o**f **U**nderstanding **does not** end **there**. What follows the **legalese arguments** is **concerted efforts** to **challenge** Somaliland’s **de facto** **sovereignty over** the **land**. This **takes** the **form** of **subversion**, **destabilization** and **attempts** to **break** the **consensus** of **Somaliland’s majority** on the **independence project**. ¶ The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu’s approach to the Somaliland question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the “members of Awdal community” to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. ¶ **As tensions escalate, the** long-deferred **confrontation between Somaliland and Somalia** over **self-determination** becomes inevitable, **risking** **wider regional involvement**. In this confrontation, **Somaliland suffers** from the **obvious disadvantage** of **being led** by a **divisive** and **quite incompetent** administration. However, as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland’s narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia.

**In the eyes of Somalia, the cost of inaction would outweigh any harm of attacking.**

**Somaliland Chronicle 24** [Somaliland Chronicle, [NO BIO!!] 1-8-2024, Somali President's Desperation Escalates: Issues Threats to Ethiopia and Somaliland over MoU, Takes Off for Eritrea, Somaliland Chronicle, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2024/01/08/somali-presidents-desperation-escalates-issues-threats-to-ethiopia-and-somaliland-over-mou-takes-off-for-eritrea/] tristan

In a recent speech, President Hassan Sh Mohamoud of the Federal Republic of **Somalia** **asserted** that his **country** is **ready** to **defend** its **sovereignty** using **every** available **means**. This declaration directly corresponds to the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia. The agreement encompasses the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base in the Red Sea, as well as the recognition of Somaliland as Africa’s 55th state and the initiation of significant economic cooperation between the two nations. ¶ “Do not push us. Do not push us into knocking on doors we have not knocked on before. We will defend our state, cooperate with anyone to defend it.” ¶ Hassan Sh Mohamoud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. ¶ The Somali government has issued multiple statements objecting the MoU and accusing Ethiopia on infringing on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to the Somali President’s hawkish and hinting of use of force to stop the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, other government **officials** including the spokesman for Somalia’s Ministry of Defense have threatened to **wage** **war** on **Somaliland** and Ethiopia. ¶ The potential Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland has sparked outrage from the *Somali President*. **Framing** it as an “**existential** **threat**” and rushing laws to void the memorandum of understanding between the two neighboring countries requires a closer look. Despite lacking international recognition, Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity since 1991, raising questions about the “true nature” of the **perceived** **threat** by the **Somali** **government** and its **allies**, including **Egypt** and **Djibouti**. The Somali government’s anxieties seem focused less on immediate territorial violation and more on the potential Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland. This **recognition** could effectively **erase** **Somalia’s** territorial **claim**, granting Somaliland the coveted 55th seat in the African Union, solidifying its independence and providing Ethiopia access to the strategic Red Sea.

**War is guaranteed as Somalia is backed by Turkey**

**Baez 24** --- (Kiran Baez, [*Atlantic Council's Turkiye Center | Defense Diplomacy and Energy Security around the Black Sea*], 6-18-2024, "Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them?", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/) //doa1-14-2025 + master chen :)

On June 17, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. It was the fourth high-level meeting between the two countries this year, and the pace of dialogue between Somalia and Turkey is set to increase, following two major agreements between **Turkey and Somalia signed** earlier this year—**a** comprehensive maritime and **defense agreement** signed in February and an oil and gas cooperation deal reached in March. These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa. On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) **establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s** maritime security and **law enforcement** for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, **Turkey will r**econstruct**, equip, and train the Somali Navy** while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration. Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

**For all scenarios, conflict kills thousands – past war proves.**

**Ahmed 99** Ismail Ahmed, [*Ismail Ibrahim Ahmed (Somali: Ismaciil Axmed, Arabic: إسماعيل أحمد) is a Somali-British entrepreneur and the founder and chairman of WorldRemit, a money transfer company, and director of the Sahan Foundation International.*] 1999, https://cja.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Heritage\_of\_war\_\_\_state\_collapse.pdf //wenzhuo

The impact of the **war in Somaliland** Loss of life and displacement of population The number of deaths in the northern towns has been estimated at around 100 000.23 Up to 50 000 people are believed to have lost their lives in the capital city, Hargeisa, as a result of summary executions, aerial bombardments and ground attacks carried out by government troops.24 Gersony, who conducted one of the ®rst investigations for the US State Department, maintains that the troops conducted **systematic attacks against** the **civilian** population.25 Some of the more brutal acts occurred in rural villages and were carried out by special troops known as the `Isaaq Exterminating Wing’ (Dabar-goynta Isaaqa) who were believed to have been recruited from among the Ogaden refugees. Targeting herders and farmers perceived as being af®liated with the SNM, they destroyed or poisoned wellsÐ vital for the pastoral economyÐ seized livestock and burned down entire villages to deprive the rural population of its basic means of livelihood. Loss of livelihoods Although the exact number of animals lost as a result of the war is still unknown, it is estimated that more then **half of** the country’ s total **livestock** population was **killed** either directly or indirectly. The troops also destroyed water sources by blowing up or draining water reservoirs. In some areas open wells were poisoned, while others were contaminated with corpses.26 The extensive planting of mines in rural areas was also partly responsible for animal losses. Another contributing factor was the distress sale of livestock by pastoralists. The war also disrupted the merchant-based network that transmitted remittances from Gulf states. **Crop production** was even more **devastated** by the war since all farmers were forced to abandon cultivation for the four years of con¯ ict. Social and economic costs The war **destroyed market centres** while mining of transport routes virtually shut down trade. This was accompanied by the **closure of the Berbera port** for animal exports from the second half of 1988 to 1991. An average of 1.2 million animals used to be exported per annum through Berbera.27 Because market exchange was 119 ISMAIL I AHMED & REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN central to the survival of rural households, the closure of Berbera port and the collapse of local markets for meat had a devastating effect, forcing many to dispose of large numbers of their animals. Ironically, the community insurance and transfer systems that had originally played important roles in the collective coping strategies of households triggered social crisis during the war. There was a sudden increase in the social obligations, forcing many households to sell their assets. The blood money payment, for instance, which played an important role in preventing and containing localised con¯ icts, also forced many households to liquidate some or all of their productive assets. Because neither the SNM nor the Ethiopian authorities controlled the refugee camps there was massive violence and lawlessness, caused in part by the proliferation of light weapons. As a result there were many deaths and injuries attributed to freelance bandits. The absence of central authority meant that these had to be settled through traditional means of compensation. Because of a fear that any internal con¯ ict would hinder their common struggle against the regime, the council of elders had constituted emergency laws demanding any outstanding blood money to be settled within a short period of time. Arrears in blood money payments forced many households to default on payments for the ®rst time, jeopardising the functioning of the whole system. A further social obligation which households had to meet during the war was contribution to the war effort. Two types of contributions were required from individual households: a male member was required to join the SNM forces, in addition to making a payment of one sheep (or its equivalent in cash) at least once a year. These obligations were strictly applied during the war. The crisis had a differential impact on men and women among the rural households. While comparatively less severe in the north than the south, the threat of physical violence contributed everywhere to a heightened sense of insecurity. There was a signi®cant increase in the number and type of tasks performed by women during the crisis. As men became increasingly involved in the community-level activities associated with the war, the burden of labour shifted to tasks such as queuing up for food rations, fetching water from distant sources and engaging in petty trading to supplement their incomes. Famine and loss of life and livelihoods Even after their defeat, the remnants of BarreÂ’s forces maintained a strong base in the inter-riverine region for nearly a year, destroying villages and crops. Animals were killed or stolen, forcing hundreds of farmers to ¯ ee to the regional capital Baidoa which later became the epicentre of the 1991±92 famine. With the exception of Mogadishu, this region suffered the most severe devastation. As a result, `the inter-riverine people were trapped between Aideed’s forces in the north, BarreÂ’ s in southwest, and Morgan’ sÐ BarreÂ’s son-in lawÐ in the south, in what became known as the ª triangle of deathº . Baidoa, the capital of the region became also known as the ª city of the walking deadº .’ 28 **At the height of the civil war** in 1991±92 a major drought hit the area, leading to a devastating famine which **killed** between 300 000 and **500 000** 29 and **affected** as many as **three million.** The large number of deaths resulted from 120 THE HERITAGE OF WAR AND STATE COLLAPSE IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND the outbreak of infectious diseases as thousands of people gathered in relief camps. Population displacement and economic costs The war in the south created a huge displacement of people, **uprooting** an estimated **1.7 million**, over one-third of the entire population in the south.30 As many as a quarter of a million people from rural areas poured into Mogadishu, where aid agencies had set up relief camps. As the war in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas intensi®ed, most of the city residents and internal refugees were displaced, again creating massive ¯ ows of moving populations. Heavy ®ghting along the surrounding state borders prevented most of them from ¯ eeing to Ethiopia and Kenya. The residual services and institutions that had survived the radical erosion of the late BarreÂyears collapsed in the ensuing civil war. **Key infrastructure**, essential for economic activities, such as water and power generators, re®neries, air and sea ports, telecommunications installations, bridges and parts of most tarmac road **were destroyed** or ceased to function because of non-maintenance which has been an endemic Somali problem even in peacetime. **Schools and hospitals were targeted** during the initial factional ®ghting in Mogadishu and surrounding areas. What was not destroyed in the war was looted and shipped to surrounding countries

Thus, to prevent instability, we negate.