**Doubles vs Dougherty Valley MC**

We affirm

**US aid isn’t creating stability in the Indopacific rather other factors are pacifying China.**

**For example, China’s economy is terrible right now - that’s Xi’s first priority**

**Wang 24** --- (Tao Wang *[Tao Wang is a Hallsworth research fellow @ Manchester China Institute @ the University of Manchester]*, 3-21-2024, "China’s Public Wants to Make a Living, Not War", https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/21/china-taiwan-public-opinion-war-economy-unification/) //EC

“Wake up,” one Weibo user wrote in opposition to the broader online calls for forceful unification. “Stop dreaming,” another echoed. The defiant voices are becoming a common reaction to the suggested use of military force to an extent rarely seen, given the massive culture of censorship on Chinese social media.

A clear reason for this change is China’s economic slowdown. While Taiwan went to the polls in 2024, **China** was **grappling with a youth unemployment rate above 20 percent, a housing market crisis with sales down by 45 percent, and a stock market in free fall that lost $6 trillion in just three years**, the likes of which haven’t been seen in almost a decade. News about Taiwanese elections failed to arouse the same nationalistic reactions among the preoccupied Chinese public that had occurred in the previous two contests.

Instead, the 2024 elections triggered a flood of complaints: “Sort out our own economy, what a mess.” a Shanghai resident said angrily. “Look at our stock market,” an apparently frustrated investor from Hunan grieved, “It’d be better to keep the status quo, and leave Taiwanese alone.” The gloomy economy has made some commenters question the underlying justification for war: “With **low-income people making less than** 1,000 yuan a month ($140), and the national insurance tax going up, huge medical bills, and unaffordable apartments, why do you want forceful unification? I don’t get it.”

**As a result, no matter the circumstances, invasion would be the worst idea for Beijing - destroying legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the world**

**Roy 24** — (Denny Roy, 4-17-2024, "Why China remains unlikely to invade Taiwan", No Publication, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-remains-unlikely-invade-taiwan) //FK

We cannot know Xi’s priorities with certainty. Nevertheless, from what we can observe, an elective war against Taiwan is hardly a compelling proposition for Xi’s government. Even with China’s massive arsenal of modern warships, combat aircraft and missiles, **Beijing is nowhere near the level of superiority that would guarantee a successful invasion given the probability of US and Japanese military resistance.** Xi would need to worry about more than ferrying enough forces and their supplies across the Strait through the gauntlet of Taiwanese, US and Japanese ships, missiles, submarines, mines and drones. A cross-Strait **war would disrupt regional economic activity, threatening the livelihoods of millions of Chinese. The resulting social turmoil could endanger Xi’s rule.** A Chinese blockade of Taiwan’s ports would be less risky, but would have disadvantages. Taiwan’s government may choose to resist. Beijing’s action would stimulate increased anti-China cooperation around the world; China could expect to suffer sanctions over a long period. And the United States would have ample time to surge forces into the region to assist Taiwan. Beijing’s attempts to intimidate the US government into abandoning support for Taiwan have failed. Helping Taiwan to defend itself remains bipartisan US policy, even supported by Republican Party politicians who want to stop arming Ukraine. Despite the longstanding US policy of “strategic ambiguity”, President Joe Biden has publicly stated four times that US forces would intervene in Taiwan’s defence. **Xi doesn’t** necessarily **need to solve the Taiwan problem** during his tenure **to earn a legacy** in Chinese history. **Xi has three huge domestic projects.** The first is restoring the primacy and authority of **the Communist Party**, which prior to Xi’s tenure as general secretary had suffered a decline in prestige due to rampant corruption, decentralised governance and the empowerment of civil society. The second is what Xi sees as **ideological purification**, including cleansing China of “Western” ideas **and** values. Third, Xi must oversee the transition of **China’s economy** from reliance on exports and investment in infrastructure to a new model that can maintain robust growth and advance China from a middle-income to a high-income country. Success in these projects would be enough to secure glory for Xi, who already enjoys a section in the Party’s constitution honouring “Xi Jinping Thought.”

# 1AC - Tradeoff

**Traditional arms sales are unsustainable - US weapons are hopelessly backlogged.**

**Giltner 24** --- (Eric Gomez and Benjamin Giltner, 9-3-2024, "Taiwan Arms Backlog, August 2024 Update", https://www.cato.org/blog/taiwan-arms-backlog-august-2024-update) //EC

**August 2024 was a very active month for arms sales with 22 new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases announced.** However, the Taiwan arms sales backlog was unchanged from last month with no new sales announced or deliveries completed. **Taiwan is waiting for $20.5 billion of US weapons.** Although none of the new FMS cases directly affect the Taiwan arms backlog, it is worth taking a look at how these sales overlap with the sales that Taiwan is awaiting.

Figures 1 and 2 show how the backlog is divided between munitions, asymmetric capabilities, and traditional capabilities. Table 1 shows an itemized list of backlogged capabilities. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s archive of major arms sales announcements, which goes back to April 2008, August 2024 was the busiest month for new FMS cases. Of the 22 sales announcements, 10 overlap with **the** Taiwan **backlog**. Table 2 shows all the August 2024 sales, with check marks indicating sales that overlap with capabilities that have been sold but not delivered to Taiwan. **The** dollar **value** of the 22 August FMS cases **comes to $32.6 billion.** The United States has seen a significant increase in FMS cases since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. According to the Department of Defense, “In fiscal year 2023, the US did more than $80 billion in business through the foreign military sales system. That is a record.” In fiscal year 2022 this figure was $51.9 billion. Conflicts in Europe and the Middle East and growing concerns about China’s military power are prompting this rapid increase in FMS. Foreign countries want to buy US weapons, and Washington is happy to oblige.

However, surging demand for US weapons may not be good news for Taiwan, at least not immediately. The US defense industrial base has started increasing its production capacity across many highly sought-after weapons. But it will be several years until these expansions are complete**. Demand for** US **weapons currently outpaces supply,** and this will remain the case until the late 2020s for several key capabilities. Taiwan has already had to deal with the effects of this supply-and-demand mismatch. In 2022, Taipei cancelled a purchase of Paladin self-propelled howitzers due to production delays. Taiwan has also contended with delays for deliveries of TOW-2B anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, both of which have been sent to Ukraine in large numbers. The United States has used different legal mechanisms for providing weapons to Ukraine, and weapons sent to Ukraine do not necessarily or automatically lead to Taiwan arms delays. However, the defense industrial base must simultaneously replenish US stockpiles and fulfill new FMS cases while also supplying regular US military demand, and a growing number of new FMS cases are for weapons that haven’t been delivered to Taiwan yet. Taiwan should start receiving several large arms packages in the next one to two years. However, these timelines could slip given the competing demands on the US defense industrial base that are exacerbated by a record-high FMS caseload. Ultimately, the pace of US weapons deliveries to Taiwan, especially before expanded industrial supply can catch up with increased demand, will be a useful tool to measure US foreign policy priorities. If moving Taiwan toward an asymmetric self-defense strategy is indeed a top US priority, then Taiwan should not see delays for high-demand capabilities, especially in FMS cases announced before the 2022 surge of new cases. Unfortunately, Taiwan’s recent experience suggests that it does not enjoy such pride of place.

**Critically, future aid to Taiwan will only continue to pile up**

**Hayes-23** [Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, 11-5-2023,Rupert Anthony Wingfield-Hayes is a British journalist and currently the BBC's Asia Correspondent based in Taipei. He was previously the BBC's Tokyo correspondent for ten years after postings as correspondent in Beijing, Moscow and the Middle East. "The US is quietly arming Taiwan to the teeth", No Publication, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67282107] // teddy choe

When**US** President Joe Biden **recently signed off on a $80m** (£64.6m) **grant to Taiwan** for the purchase of American **military equipment,** China said it "deplores and opposes" what Washington had done.

**To** the casual observer it didn't appear a steep sum. It was less than the cost of a single modern fighter jet. **Taiwan** already has on order more than $14bn worth of US military equipment. Does a miserly $80m more matter?

While fury is Beijing's default response to any military support for Taiwan, this time something was different.

**The $80m** is not a loan. It **comes from American taxpayers. For the first time** in more than 40 years, **America is using its own money** to send weapons to a place it officially doesn't recognise. This is happening **under** a programme called foreign military finance (**FMF**).

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine last year, FMF has been used to send around $4bn of military aid to Kyiv.

It has been used to send billions more to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and Egypt and so on. But until now it has only ever been given to countries or organisations recognised by the United Nations. Taiwan is not.

After the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, it continued to sell weapons to the island under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. The key was to sell just enough weapons so Taiwan could defend itself against possible Chinese attack, but not so many that they would destabilise relations between Washington and Beijing. For decades, the US has relied on this so-called strategic ambiguity to do business with China, while remaining Taiwan's staunchest ally.

But in the last decade the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tipped dramatically in China's favour. The old formula no longer works. Washington insists its policy has not changed but, in crucial ways, it has. The US State Department hi'as been quick to deny FMF implies any recognition of Taiwan. Taiwan, a self-governed island, faces the threat of annexation from China

But in Taipei it's apparent that America is redefining its relationship with the island, especially so given the urgency with which Washington is pushing Taiwan to re-arm. And Taiwan, which is outmatched by China, needs the help.

"The US is emphasising the desperate need to improve our military capacity. It is sending a clear message of strategic clarity to Beijing that we stand together," says Wang Ting-yu, a ruling party legislator with close ties to Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, and to US Congressional chiefs. He says **the $80m is the tip of** what could be **a very large iceberg,** and notes that in July President Biden used discretionary powers to approve the sale of military services and equipment worth $500m to Taiwan.

How China is fighting in the grey zone against Taiwan Taiwan unveils new submarine to fend off China

Mr Wang says Taiwan is preparing to send two battalions of ground troops to the US for training, the first time this has happened since the 1970s. But the key is **the money**, the beginning of what, he says, **could be up to $10bn** over the next five years. Deals involving military equipment can take up to 10 years, says Lai I-Ching, president of the Prospect Foundation, a Taipei-based think-tank. "But with FMF, the US is sending weapons directly from its own stocks and it's US money - so we don't need to go through the whole approval process." This is important given that a divided Congress has held up billions of dollars worth of aid for Ukraine, although **Taiwan** appears to **have** far more **bipartisan support.** But the **war in Gaza** will undoubtedly **squeeze** America's **weapons supply** to Taipei, as has the war in Ukraine. President Biden is seeking war aid for Ukraine and Israel, which includes more money for Taiwan too. Getty Images China now boasts the world's larget navy - its navy missile frigate Yulin (R) and a minesweeper hunter Chibi (C) docked in Singapore in May 2023

Ask the Ministry of National Defence in Taipei what US money will be used for, and the response is a knowing smile and tightly sealed lips. But Dr Lai says it's possible to make educated guesses: Javelin and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles - highly effective weapons that forces can learn to use quickly. "We don't have enough of them, and we need a lot," he says. "In Ukraine, the Stingers have run out very quickly, and the way Ukraine has been using them suggests we need maybe 10 times the number we currently have." The assessment of long-time observers is blunt: **the island is woefully under-prepared** for a Chinese attack. The list of problems is long. Taiwan's army has hundreds of ageing battle tanks, but too few modern, light missile systems. Its army command structure, tactics and doctrine haven't been updated in half a century. Many front-line units have only 60% of the manpower they should have. Taiwan's counter-intelligence operations in China are reportedly non-existent and its military conscription system is broken. In 2013 Taiwan reduced military service from one year to just four months, before reinstating it back to 12 months, a move that takes effect next year. But there are bigger challenges. It's jokingly referred to as a "summer camp" by the young men who go through it. "There was no regular training," says a recent graduate. "We would go to a shooting range about once every two weeks, and we would use old guns from the 1970s. We did shoot at targets. But there was no proper teaching on how to aim, so everyone kept missing. We did zero exercise. There's a fitness test at the end, but we did no preparation for it."

He described a system in which senior army commanders view these young men with utter indifference and have zero interest in training them, in part because they will be there for such a short time.

**Affirming is necessary**

**Grazier-24** [Dan Grazier, 7-16-2024, Dan Grazier is a Senior Fellow for the National Security Reform Program at the Stimson Center. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, he served as the Senior Defense Policy Fellow at the Project On Government Oversight from 2015 to 2024. , "Current Defense Plans Require Unsustainable Future Spending • Stimson Center", Stimson Center,

https://www.stimson.org/2024/current-defense-plans-require-unsustainable-future-spending/] // teddy choe +recut EC

The**U**nited **S**tates **cannot** afford to **approach the next 20 years of defense** policy as **it has the past two decades.** Expansionist defense policy premised on the goal of global military primacy has resulted in endless wars and human suffering. The defense establishment over the past 30 years has produced a succession of warships that can’t fight, aircraft that don’t work properly, and weapons that don’t perform as expected – all with little to no oversight or accountability to the American taxpayer. These issues do not exist in a vacuum. No matter how singular or systemic each may be, these issues ultimately impact force readiness, national security, and economic resiliency. **The United States cannot afford to waste money on systems that the military does not need, and that do not work.** Such misuse of resources relies on destabilizing the threat of inflation. It negatively impacts the economic potential of future generations and escalates global tensions. Policymakers should carefully reconsider current defense plans to prevent the coming fiscal bow wave from turning into a tidal wave. Without prompt action, it is quite possible – even likely – that the American people will remember the days of a $850 billion Pentagon budget request with nostalgia. The simple truth is that national security spending over the next 20 years will skyrocket because of the procurement decisions made today. Instead of the $850 billion proposed fiscal year 2025 Pentagon budget request, we could see the Pentagon budget alone approaching the $1.5 trillion mark annually in the next decade. On the current trajectory, total national security spending will far surpass that figure. **The time to avert future budgetary disasters is now.** A wholesale reevaluation of the nation’s national security strategy must take place based on a realistic appraisal of our security needs.

**There is still time to make** the **trade-offs** necessary **to avoid** falling off **the fiscal cliff, but only if** the **U.S.** government **can root** its national security **policy around** clear principles of**strategic reality**, program effectiveness, **and accountability to** U.S. **taxpayers**.

**Unfortunately, Spending on the Military precludes spending on other sectors**

**Peltier-23** [Heidi Peltier,6-2023, Dr. Heidi Peltier is a Senior Researcher at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, and is Director of Programs for the Costs of War project. "We Get What We Pay For: The Cycle of Military Spending, Industry Power, and Economic Dependence",Watson Institute of Brown University,

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2023/Peltier%202023%20-%20We%20Get%20What %20We%20Pay%20For%20-%20FINAL%20-%200608.pdf] // teddy choe

**Military spending makes up a dominant share of** discretionary **spending in theU**nited **S**tates; military personnel make up the majority of U.S. government manpower; and **military industry is a leading force** in the U.S. economy. As a result, other elements and capacities of the U.S. government and civilian economy have been weakened, **and** military industries **have gained political power. Decades of high levels of military spending have changed U.S. government and society – strengthening its ability to fight wars, while weakening its capacities to perform other core functions. Investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education**, and emergency preparedness, for instance, **have all suffered as military spending** and industry have **crowded them out.** Increased resources channeled to the military further increase the political power of military industries, ensuring that **the cycle of economic dependence continues** – **militarized** sectors of the **econ**omy **see perpetual increases**in funding and manpower **while other human needs go unmet.** The following key findings of this report show some of the primary economic distortions that have come at such a high cost to the more balanced functioning of the U.S. federal government: Almost half of the U.S. federal discretionary budget2 is allocated to the Department of Defense (DoD) ($849 billion out of $1.82 trillion in FY2023),3 and more than half of the for DoD budget authority and total discretionary budget authority. These levels include both

regular and “emergency” funding, such as spending on the Ukraine conflict. The White House, Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/ 2 discretionary budget goes to “defense” overall, which includes not only the DoD but also nuclear weapons programs within the Department of Energy and additional defense spending in other departments. The total allocated to national security is about 55% of discretionary spending when funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Veterans Affairs is included.

Out of Department of Defense spending itself, over half is channeled to military contractors. While the total contract spending of about $400 billion in FY2021 was distributed among thousands of contractors and subcontractors throughout the U.S., the “Big 5” firms received almost 30% of all DoD contract dollars: Lockheed Martin ($39 billion), Boeing ($23B), Raytheon ($20.6B), General Dynamics ($16.6B), and Northrop Grumman ($14.7B). These firms have enormous political power and a vested interest in continuing high military spending. The federal government workforce is comprised of about 3.5 million workers, if we include both civilians and uniformed active-duty personnel. Of this, about 72 percent is defense-related employment, including Department of Defense civilians, uniformed military personnel, and those working in Veterans Affairs. By comparison, the Department of Health and Human Services made up 4 percent of federal employees, and the Department of State only 1 percent. This is another indicator of the degree to which the U.S. economy is skewed towards overdependence on the military, giving more political power to defense companies, which use the fear of job losses to maintain high defense spending, as the cycle of reliance onmilitary industries and growing military industry power is perpetuated. It doesn’t have to be this way. This report further shows that **reducing military funding and increasing funding to** areas like **healthcare, education, infrastructure, or clean energy,will create jobs**. Dollar for dollar, these alternative areas of federal spending create between 9 percent and 250 percent more jobs than the military.**And a** “Just Transition” is possible in order to ease the **transition** for workers and communities that are dependent on military spending, as investments are made and jobs are created in other industries

**Specifically, increased education spending is critical.**

Allegretto 22 --- (Sylvia Allegretto, 7-12-2022, "Public education funding in the U.S. needs an overhaul: How a larger federal role would boost equity and shield children from disinvestment during downturns", https://www.epi.org/publication/public-education-funding-in-the-us-needs-an-overhaul/) //EC

Other studies further affirm the implications of equity-specific funding decisions. Jackson, Johnson, and Persico’s (2016) study assesses the impacts on a range of student and adult outcomes of a series of court-mandated school finance reforms that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Linking information on the reforms to administrative data about the children who attended the schools, the authors found that the increase in school funding was associated with slight increases in years of educational attainment, and with higher adult wages and reduced odds of adult poverty, as well as with improvements to schools themselves—increased teacher salaries, reduced student-to-teacher ratios, higher school quality, and even longer school years (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). Specifically, **a 10% increase in** per-pupi**l spending each year for** all 12 years o**f public schooling leads to** 0.27 more completed years of education**, 7.25% higher wages, and a 3.67 percentage-point reduction in the annual incidence of adult poverty**. As with the other studies, the benefits from increased funding are much greater for children from low-income families: 0.44 years of educational attainment and wages that are 9.5% higher.In another study drawing on data from post-1990 school finance reforms that increased public-school funding in some states, Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2018) estimate the impact of both absolute and relative spending on achievement in low-income school districts, as measured by National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data.17 They find that the reforms increase the achievement of students in these districts, phasing in gradually over the years following the increase in spending/adequacy. While the measures employed to estimate the impact tend to be technical, the authors emphasize that this “implied effect of school resources on educational achievement is large.”18 Similar adequacy-related reforms that resulted from court mandates, rather than state legislative decisions, prompted significant increases in graduation rates (Candelaria and Shores 2019).

**More broadly,**

Dunne 17--- (John Dunne, [*School of Economics University of Cape Town Rondebosch Cape Town 7001 South Africa*] xx-xx-2017, "The Effects of Military Spending on Economic Growth", https://warpreventioninitiative.org/peace-science-digest/effects-military-spending-economic-growth/) //doa11-30-2024 + master chen :)

In this study, the authors consider two main questions: (1) is long-run economic growth affected by military spending; and (2) do other types of government spending have any significant impact on economic growth? The second question is asked to identify if military spending specifically affects economic growth, or if government spending in general affects growth. To further narrow the scope of their research, the authors also break the countries down into different income levels to see if the economic growth/military spending relationship affects wealthy countries differently than less wealthy countries. To build their study, the authors use military spending information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI) dataset. The data includes government spending on current military forces and activities including salaries, benefits, operational expenses, arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, central administration, and command and support. **The SIPRI dataset covers 170 countries and extends back to 1949 for most countries** (1957 for some). Available data from the World Penn Table dataset restricts the authors’ starting year to 1970, but provides country-specific per capita gross domestic product (GDP), private investment, employment growth, and current GDP. This allows the authors to accurately compare a country’s military spending to its economic growth. Their results show that increased military spending has consistently negative impacts on a country’s economic growth**.** This even is the case when analyzing different time periods and countries with varying GDPs, as well as when comparing military spending to other forms of government spending. When analyzing all countries together, the findings show that over a 20-year period, **a 1% increase in military spending decreases economic growth by 9%**. The negative economic impact is especially apparent for most countries in the “Global North,” as seen in the authors’ observation of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states. Although there was also a negative economic impact to military spending in non-OECD countries, the negative economic impact in OECD countries was much more pronounced.

# 1AC - Relations

**The US has been walking on a tightrope between peace and cooperation**

Maizland 22 --- (Lindsey Maizland, [*Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and Director of Fellowship Affairs*], 8-3-2022, "Why relations between China and Taiwan are so tense", https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-relations-between-china-and-taiwan-are-so-tense) //doa12-1-2024 + master chen :)

In **1979,** the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same time, it severed its diplomatic ties and abrogated its mutual defense treaty with the ROC. But the United States maintains a robust unofficial relationship with the island and continues to sell defense equipment to its military. **Beijing has repeatedly urged Washington to stop selling weapons to and cease contact with Taipei.**

The U.S. approach is governed by its One-China policy. It is based on several documents, such as three U.S.-China communiqués reached in 1972, 1978, and 1982; the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979; and the recently declassified “Six Assurances,” which President Ronald Reagan conveyed to Taiwan in 1982. These documents lay out that the United States:

“acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” and that the PRC is the “sole legal government of China” (some U.S. officials have emphasized that the use of the word “acknowledge” implies that the United States doesn’t necessarily accept the Chinese position);

rejects any use of force to settle the dispute;

maintains cultural, commercial, and other ties with Taiwan, carried out through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT);

commits to selling arms to Taiwan for self-defense; and

will maintain the ability to come to Taiwan’s defense, while not actually committing to doing so—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.

The United States’ chief goal is to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and it has implored both Beijing and Taipei to maintain the status quo. It says it does not support Taiwanese independence.

Through its policy of strategic ambiguity, **the United States has for decades attempted to maintain a delicate balance between supporting Taiwan and preventing a war with China.** But President Joe Biden has seemingly rejected the policy, stating several times that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked. White House officials have walked back his comments, saying the policy has not changed, but ultimately, the president gets to decide how to respond. Some experts, such as CFR’s Richard Haass and David Sacks, and several members of Congress have welcomed Biden’s statements, arguing that China’s increased aggression necessitates clarity. Other experts have disagreed with this position. How have recent U.S. administrations approached Taiwan?

**However in recent years - the US has passed unprecedented aid to Taiwan**

Masters 24 --- (Jonathan Masters, 9-25-2024, "U.S. Military Support for Taiwan in Five Charts", https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-five-charts) //EC

Aid. Taiwan was also a significant recipient of U.S. economic and military aid during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, up until the United States normalized relations with China in 1979 and abrogated its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. However, **in late 2022, Congress passed historic legislation enabling Taiwan to receive U.S. military aid** once again—up to several billion dollars a year in loans and grants. Notably, it also allowed Taiwan **for the first time to obtain weapons directly from U.S. defense stocks** (via Presidential Drawdown Authority), although some of the early transfers have gone poorly. Ukraine is the only other partner receiving this type of aid.

**This aid directly violates the One China Policy which is critical for China**

BBC 21 --- (BBC News, 10-6-2021, "What is the 'One China' policy?", https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354) //doa11-30-2024 + master chen :)

It is the diplomatic acknowledgement of China's position that there is only one Chinese government. Under the policy, the US recognises and has formal ties with China rather than the island of Taiwan, which China sees as a breakaway province to be unified with the mainland one day. **The One China policy is a key cornerstone of Sino-US relations. It is** also **a fundamental bedrock of Chinese policy-making and diplomacy**. However, it is distinct from the One China principle, whereby China insists Taiwan is an inalienable part of one China to be unified one day.The US policy is not an endorsement of Beijing's position and indeed as part of the policy, Washington maintains a "robust unofficial" relationship with Taiwan, external, including continued arms sales to the island so that it can defend itself. Although Taiwan's government claims it is an independent country officially called the "Republic of China", any country that wants diplomatic relations with mainland China must break official ties with Taipei. This has resulted in Taiwan's diplomatic isolation from the international community.

**Thus, we have broken the balance and tensions subsequently are skyrocketing**

**Zhuang 24** — (Sylvie Zhuang [Sylvie joined the Post as a reporter in 2023. She graduated from the University of Chicago and earned a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Illinois. Previously, she worked as a researcher for multilateral international organizations, including the World Bank and ADB.], 7-18-2024, "China calls off arms control talks with US over weapon sales to Taiwan", <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3270835/china-calls-arms-control-talks-us-over-weapon-sales-taiwan>, accessed 11-23-2024) //TH

**China** has **cut off** arms control and non-proliferation **talks** with the United States **because of Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan**, the Chinese foreign ministry said on Wednesday. “China has decided to suspend talks with the US on holding a new round of arms control and non-proliferation consultations,” ministry spokesman Lin Jian said. “The responsibility for this situation lies entirely with **the US**.” He said the US’ continued sales of weapons to the island in the face of Beijing’s opposition had “**severely damaged the political atmosphere necessary for** continued arms control **consultations** between the two sides”. China was willing to maintain communication with the US on the issue but only on the condition that “the US must respect China’s core interests and create the necessary conditions for dialogue and exchange between the two sides”, the ministry said. The two countries held their first meeting in four years in November in Washington, where both agreed on the importance of maintaining such communication under the conditions of respect and trust, the ministry said. **But Taiwan has** increasingly **become a sore point** – in addition to tensions over trade, the South China Sea, and technology. Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. The United States, like most countries, does not recognise self-governed Taiwan as independent, but is opposed to any attempt to take the island by force. The US, legally bound by its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to help the island protect itself, has been its top weapons supplier. In April, it passed a US$95 billion foreign aid package that included arms support for Taiwan. And in December, it approved a US$300 million tactical systems upgrade for the island. China and the US resumed their talks on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation less than a year ago following the end of Covid restrictions.

**We can have good relations with China. Even as anti-communist sentiment was at its highest, when we respected the One China Policy, relations were strong**

OTH xx --- (Office of the Historian, xx-xx-xxx, "Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations", https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy#) //EC

Prior to 1979, the United States and the People’s Republic of China had never established formal diplomatic relations. In 1949, Chinese Communist Party forces defeated the Government of the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War and founded the People’s Republic of China, eliminating ROC authority from mainland China. Nonetheless, for the next thirty years, the U.S. Government continued to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole legal government over all of China. During that period, the U.S. and PRC Governments had only intermittent contact through forums such as the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, which began in 1955. A new era began with a rapprochement during Richard Nixon’s presidency. **Nixon and** his aide, Henry Kissinger, found ready partners in **Mao Zedong**, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, who also wanted to **improve Sino-U.S. relations**. Their efforts resulted in the Shanghai Communiqué, **which laid the basis for future cooperation between the two countries even while acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan.** As part of this rapprochement, the two countries opened liaison offices in one another’s capitals in 1973, a time when Taiwan still had an Embassy in Washington. The liaison offices, which in many ways operated as de facto embassies, represented a significant concession by the People’s Republic of China, which opposed the acceptance of “two Chinas” because that implied both were legitimate governments. **The U.S.** Government placated the People’s Republic of China, and **helped set the stage f**or normalization, **by** graduall**y removing military personnel from Taiwan** and scaling back its official contact with the ROC Government.

**Cooperation is essential. When great powers, like the US and China, can overcome differences, groundbreaking developments are possible.**

**Davis 23** — (Steve Davis *[Lecturer and Global Health Faculty Fellow, Stanford University Graduate School of Business; Member, Council on Foreign Relations]*, 8-23-20, "Finding Safe Harbors for Development Impact: Navigating U.S.-China Stormy Waters for the Global Public Good", No Publication, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/finding-safe-harbors-development-impact-navigating-us-china-stormy-waters-global-public>, accessed 11-23-2024) //TH

In West Africa, a new breed of rice that can withstand flooding and drought has allowed farmers to triple their **productivity**, improving local economies and feeding thousands of people. In regions from South America to Scotland, new green technologies are generating an abundance of **clean energy. And** in Southeast Asia, hundreds of millions of children have been protected from deadly Japanese encephalitis through life-saving **vaccines.** Each of these projects is contributing significantly to the collective future of humans and the planet. And all of them **hinge on partnerships** in health, technology, and business **between the U**nited **S**tates **and** its greatest strategic rival: **China**. Take the Green Super Rice feeding thousands in West Africa, for example. It leverages 40 years of Chinese research on rice seeds accelerated with the financial muscle of U.S. philanthropy. Meanwhile, China’s ability to develop and produce low-cost vaccines—for safeguarding the health of its own enormous population as well as supporting millions in the Global South—has been bolstered by know-how and support from the West, particularly through global health research collaborations, assistance with regulatory reforms, and the navigation of global qualification and distribution channels. These examples, but a tiny sample of social impact collaborations underway around the world, remind us that endeavors advancing human health and development often fall beyond the purview of any single country; multinational and multisectoral partnerships are increasingly required. Specifically, they underscore the importance of continued engagement by two of the world’s greatest economic and technological powers, as well as the need to find ways to continue such collaborations in smart, informed, geopolitically sensitive, and mutually beneficial models. Truly **game-changing innovations** and opportunities with great social impact **are within reach**; and yet, **many** will **depend on** initiating, continuing, or **expanding collaborations** between partners in the United States and China **to augment the global public good**. However, this reality sits alongside stark and uncontestable truths: that the relationship between the United States and China over the past 10 years has worsened to one of its lowest historical ebbs, that policy and national sentiment have negatively reshaped the countries’ perceptions of—and working exchanges with—each other, and that we are in an era of aggressive competition that threatens progress in some of this work. As the trajectory of this new great power competition continues to play out, what will happen to the substantial historical legacy of partnership between these two nations on issues of critical social impact? Will it be possible for would-be collaborators on either side of the Pacific to navigate these rocky waters without being immobilized by political risk, thwarted by sanctions, or hamstrung by the potential for reputational damage? The stakes are high. **Between** global **climate change, food insecurity, and** the very real threat of future **pandemics, humanity is facing** truly **existential challenges**. Against that backdrop, it is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives—safe harbors—where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good. This essay explores the reasons such a **dialogue is needed**, the risks at play, and some options for moving forward. Its aim is not to wish away deeply competitive features of the U.S.-China relationship, but rather to accept that these dynamics will persist and then generate understanding of and support for actively reimagining U.S.-China transnational collaborations in key areas of development. It seeks to advance thinking around ways to identify and pursue opportunities that support U.S. interests for multilateral social impact projects with China.[1] It is imperative to examine these opportunities and constraints, then reimagine new mechanisms and narratives—safe harbors—where China and the United States can continue to leverage their collective expertise for the global public good. It does not take an expert to appreciate that the relationship between China and the United States is among the most complex, fraught, and critical on earth. Nor does this paper suggest that U.S. policies toward China—or vice versa—are misguided. Quite the contrary. Albeit without access to much of the intelligence behind the current stances, this is written with full awareness of the many potential threats that each nation perceives in the other. Acknowledging the realities—and the fact that aggressive competition between these two powers is only likely to increase—this essay proposes that we need a new set of principles and mechanisms to guide continued collaboration among scientists and activists in health, climate, food security, and humanitarian relief. The well-being of the world depends on it. China’s Journey toward Global Development Impact Among confrontational policies, rhetoric, and media coverage, it is easy to lose sight of or underappreciate China’s historical and current role in global development. In part, China’s work in countries across much of the Global South, with deep roots in the “South-South” brotherhood of developing economies starting back in the 1950s, is hard to track or understand. China’s historical role in global aid

**In fact, when we had good dialogue - peace and prosperity followed**

Niccum 24--- (Reviewing Our, xx-xx-xxxx, "U.S.-China vaccines", https://news.ku.edu/news/article/us-china-vaccines-collaboration-leads-to-partisan-distrust-study-finds) //doa12-8-2024 + master chen :)

LAWRENCE — Anti-vaccine sentiments are not new. But in recent years, attitudes toward vaccines have increasingly become more politicized along partisan lines. Accompanying such hesitancy is escalating distrust of China, which is where the COVID-19 epidemic originated. A new study titled “The politics of flu vaccines: international collaboration and political partisanship” examines the influence of international collaboration and vaccine developments on people’s attitudes toward vaccines. “Interestingly, **it was the collaboration between the U.S. and China that resulted in our annual flu vaccines,**” said John James Kennedy, a professor of political science at the University of Kansas. Despite the previously successful and effective U.S.-China collaboration in developing vaccines, Kennedy’s study finds that respondents are much less likely to receive a U.S.-China flu vaccine than ones created by a U.S.-Japan collaboration or U.S. alone. It appears in the Japanese Journal of Political Science.

**Moreover,**

Qingguo 22 --- (Jia Qingguo, [*Jia Qingguo is professor and former Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University. He is also Director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding and Director of Global Governance at Peking University.* ] 3-14-2022, "China–US cooperation is the key to peace", https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/14/china-us-cooperation-is-the-key-to-peace/) //doa12-6-2024 + master chen :)

As China rises, such cooperation proved increasingly important and beneficial for the two countries and for the world. **Cooperation between China and the United States was important for world’s efforts to fight terrorism, conduct UN peacekeeping, deal with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and to sign the Paris Agreement on climate change.** But after former president Donald Trump came into office, the **United States changed this policy.** It began with the trade wars that challenged China’s right to development. It then **challenged China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity on** Hong Kong, **Taiwan** and Xinjiang. It initiated an ideological war against China. Confronted with such attacks, China felt that it had no choice but to fight back. This led to cycles of negative reactions between the two countries. President Joe Biden’s ascent to power has not changed this momentum. Out of ideological and domestic political considerations, it has largely inherited Trump’s approach toward China.

**Thus, to quiet the swelling storm, we affirm Today’s resolution.**

They are **Planting weeds to fix barren soil** - Aid to Taiwan only creates sour relations which ruin global cooperation.

## AT: A. Prolif

**[1] They give you no evidence that says Taiwan can create nuclear weapons. It’s because they don’t want to.**

**Spencer 19** (David, an Associate Professor at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Studies “Taiwan has other deterrence options besides costly and controversial nuclear weapons”, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3673904 //JC recut RR)

So, is nuclear the way to go? The first problem is how popular such a program would be at home. There is already a huge movement against the use of nuclear power in Taiwan. Indeed, until the recent round of referendums, the DPP government was committed to shutting down all of **Taiwan’s** nuclear power stations by 2025. In this climate, it seems likely that establishing Taiwan as a nuclear power would be hugely controversial with a domestic audience, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of people would support greater steps to protect Taiwan from Chinese invasion. There is also the fact that Taiwan (as the Republic of China) has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons **which commits the Taiwanese government to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons** and nuclear weapons technology. In practice, this Treaty has proved next to meaningless for many countries, but given Taiwan’s delicate international status, the question of whether it would be wise for Taiwan to break its obligations under an international treaty is an important one. Can Taiwan ever have an ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent? There is also the question of independence. A nuclear deterrent is only really effective if it is truly independent. The government of a nuclear power must have sole control over the decision of if and when their nuclear weapons should be used. There was recently a big public debate in the UK about the merits of renewing their now aged Trident nuclear missile system. One of the strongest arguments against Trident renewal was that it was no longer an independent nuclear deterrent. While the submarines that carry the Trident missile system and the nuclear warheads themselves are made in the UK, the Trident missiles themselves are not. They are made and maintained in the USA. They are even drawn from a joint missile-pool at the US Strategic Weapons facility at King’s Bay, Georgia. There is, therefore, a genuine question over whether, if the UK’s foreign policy ever ventured far from that of the USA, the UK’s nuclear deterrent would still be available or would the US simply pull the plug? This independence is likely to be magnified in the case of Taiwan. Were Taiwan to obtain nuclear weapons, they would almost certainly have to be sourced, in full, from the USA. The likelihood is therefore that the US would maintain a large, if not total, say over when they could be used. It is therefore worth asking whether, if push came to shove, the US would really give the go-ahead for Taiwan to launch a nuclear attack on China? Would that course of action ever really be in the interests of the USA? The huge costs of going nuclear and would it even work? The other big problem of developing a nuclear deterrent is the cost. Nuclear defense programs cost enormous sums of money. Looking back again at the British Trident renewal in 2016, the cost was estimated to be a cool £31 billion (NT$1.2 trillion). This was widely acknowledged to be a very conservative estimate with a £10 billion (NT$400 billion) contingency fund available that most experts suggested would, at least, be used in full. Given Taiwan’s size and the economic challenges it faces, the question of whether this would be a sensible use of public funds is a big one. It is also worth asking if a nuclear deterrent would even work against China?

**Prefer this because only we give you the actual incentive calculus that Taiwan uses in determining their defense policy. They are staunchly anti-nuclear and need to focus on their economic problems.**

**[2] Their own Tamer 22 evidence makes them lose the round on the spot. It doesn’t say that China will use military force against Taiwanese proliferation once in the article. The part they highlighted is a misconstrued rhetorical question.**

**Let’s look at it more closely. (LS reads green, they read blue)**

**Tamer 22** — (Cenk Tamer, 2-9-2022, "What Could Be China's Red Lines in Taiwan? — ANKASAM", ANKASAM | Ankara Crisis and Policy Research Center, https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/cinin-tayvandaki-kirmizi-cizgileri-neler-olabilir/?lang=en%5D) //RR

In the White Paper on Taiwan published on August 10, 2022, **China stated that “reunification” with the island would be achieved peacefully. However**, the **Beijing** administration also stated in the document that it **could resort to the use of force if necessary** and reserved the option to take all measures. [1] So how far would “external powers” ​​have to go before China would resort to the use of force in Taiwan? In other words, what are **the red lines that will lead to the use of military force?**

**China’s Ambassador** to London, Zheng Zeguang, said that if the UK “follows the path of the United States (US)” and crosses the “red lines” on the Taiwan issue, it will face “serious consequences”. [2] **Zeguang said, “Taiwan’s independence means war** and will lead to a stalemate.” [3] **Based on these words, it can be assumed that China’s red line is Taiwan’s independence.** However, the Beijing administration made similar warnings before the visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan. At that time, it was thought that China’s red line was to visit Taiwan. Despite this, Pelosi’s plane landed in Taiwan and Beijing could not do anything about it. Therefore, it has been understood that these visits are not China’s red line.

**Their own evidence proves that the red line for China is the aid that we send to Taiwan because it emboldens them to provoke China.**

**[3] Their impact is about a US-China war going nuclear. But realize, that can only happen if the United States is in the region and escalates. That’s a unique reason to vote for us. By removing aid, we drastically decrease the risk of escalation turning into a nuclear war.**

## AT: B. Alliances

**[1] Their Wang evidence saying that pulling aid out would hurt credibility is super outdated. Prefer our more recent evidence from 2021.**

**Glaser, 21** – Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Co-Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University

[Charles L. Glaser, "Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China," Foreign Affairs, 4-28-2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china, accessed 10-12-2024; EC]

Although the ideological and humanitarian rationales for protecting Taiwan are sound, many analysts go further, arguing that basic U.S. security interests are at stake, too. If Washington were to terminate its commitment to Taiwan, they say, U.S. credibility across the region would suffer. China would question whether the United States would actually come to the defense of Japan or South Korea. Harboring the same doubts, U.S. allies might be tempted to bandwagon with Beijing. Some analysts make a second claim, contending that by controlling Taiwan, China could extend its military reach by basing both its attack submarines and its nuclear-armed submarines there. The ability of U.S. conventional forces to reach China would be reduced; China’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack, increased. But there is good reason to doubt this doomsday scenario. **Even if it ended its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are and that the risks of protecting it were much higher.** Letting go of Taiwan should suggest little, if anything, about the strength of Washington’s commitment to Tokyo and Seoul. What’s more, the United States could take action to reinforce these commitments—for example, stationing more troops in the Indo-Pacific and further integrating military planning and operations with allies.

**Glaser finds that allies understand that the US is fixing a risky policy and making a strategic move. History is on our side. When the US pulled out of Vietnam, we didn’t see our credibility and alliances hurt. In reality, we saw our credibility strengthened because we were fighting an uphill battle that was too costly, ineffective, and damaging our relationships around the world—just like in Taiwan.**

**[2] But, their narrative in this subpoint is that when the US pulls aid out, it magically disappears. Realize that if you affirmed, the US could reinvest its aid to South Korea and Japan, actually strengthening alliances and preventing the need to proliferate.**

**Now is the key time to do that because we’re overstretched between Ukraine and Taiwan in the status quo, and our credibility is down because of faulty aid.**

**Nan 24** --- (Hao Nan, 10-10-2024, "The Restrained US Weapon Supply to Taiwan: A Troubling Signal Amid Es…", https://archive.ph/Oge8m#selection-3233.0-3233.12) //EC

The September 16 announcement marks the 16th arms sale to Taiwan under the Biden administration, yet doubts continue to mount over the United States’ true commitment to Taiwan’s security. The Biden administration’s **sales** have primarily consisted of munitions and sustainment packages delivered in small tranches, **fail**ing **to address Taiwan’s need for** a comprehensive **modernization** of its military, especially **in comparison to China’s rapid space of military modernization.** According to Rupert Hammond-Chambers, the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, the Biden administration appears to be avoiding more substantial military commitments to Taiwan, reminiscent of pre-Trump era policies that capped the value of arms sales to avoid provoking Beijing. In a press release, Hammond-Chambers warned that “U.S. support for Taiwan’s material force modernization has been waning since 2021. It now sits at its lowest point since 2001, bar the Obama Administration’s 4+ year arms sales freeze from 2011-2015, and it is continuing to fall.” Recent arms **deliveries** have also been fraught with problems. A $345 million arms package delivered between November 2023 and March 2024 **included** unserviceable and **expired equipment, some** of which was found to be mildewed and **water-damaged,** according to a report published on September 11 by the Inspector General Office of the **U.S**. Department of Defense. **These revelations undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments to Taiwan** and raise serious questions about the effectiveness of these sales in enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities. **More advanced** and lethal **systems**, such as F-16Vs, **have faced significant delays**, adding to **a backlog of $20 billion in undelivered military hardware**. **U.S. officials have attributed these delays to** the urgent demands of the war in **Ukraine**, **suggesting** that **Washington’s priorities lie elsewhere**, particularly in Europe, **rather than in the Indo-Pacific** region. This **prioritization was** further **underscored by the** urgent **redeployment of the USS Lincoln from the West Pacific to the Arabian Sea** in early August, **leaving a significant gap in aircraft carrier presence in the region** that remains unfilled. Ad The restrained and fragmented nature of U.S. arms supplies to Taiwan sends mixed signals at a time when Beijing’s military posture is increasingly aggressive. China’s Ministry of Defense has pledged that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to intensify its military training and preparations, and will take decisive measures to thwart any attempts at “Taiwan independence” or external interference. China’s actions are not merely rhetorical; they underscore a clear strategy to pressure Taiwan and the United States by both escalating military readiness and undermining the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to Taiwan. Meanwhile, China appears to be taking calculated steps to marginalize the Taiwan issue in its broader strategic relationship with the U.S., particularly during the sensitive U.S. presidential election cycle. With polls showing a close race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, Beijing has publicly maintained a non-interventionist stance, framing the U.S. election as a domestic affair. However, behind the scenes, China is hedging its bets, preparing to navigate both potential outcomes. In the event of a Trump victory, Beijing appears ready to endure economic sacrifices in exchange for strategic leverage, anticipating a transactional approach from a second Trump administration regarding Taiwan. Conversely, Beijing is also exploring opportunities to proactively build diplomatic consensus with Harris, should she win, possibly through side discussions with President Joe Biden at the upcoming APEC and G-20 summits in South America this November. Given Harris’ inexperience on foreign policy, China will be aiming to influence her potential administration. Meanwhile, Beijing is believed to continue strengthening military and political alignment with Russia, thereby complicating U.S. and allied presence in the Western Pacific, and bringing in a Russian factor into potential Taiwan contingency that has been repeatedly mentioned by the United States and Japan in particular. This strategic positioning serves China’s broader goal of diminishing U.S. influence in the region and enhancing its own sphere of control. The consequences of this restrained U.S. approach are stark. Taiwan finds itself in a security dilemma, relying on a defense partner whose commitment appears inconsistent, while facing a China that is more emboldened than ever. This imbalance heightens the risk of miscalculations and unintended confrontations in the Taiwan Strait, with potential implications that stretch far beyond the immediate region. As the United States continues to navigate its broader geopolitical priorities, Taiwan remains caught in a perilous position, where the gaps in its defense capabilities are increasingly visible. The situation illustrates the broader challenges of managing great power competition in a multipolar world where the stakes are high and the margins for error are dangerously thin. The ongoing tensions are not just a test of military resolve but also of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, setting the stage for a potentially transformative period in regional security dynamics

## AT: Cyberattacks

All analytics