**1AC**

# 1 off - Disclosure

a) Interp - Teams competing at TOC bid tournaments must disclose ALL evidence read in previous rounds on the current topic on the 2024-2025 Open Caselist PF Wiki at least 15 minutes before the published start time of the round under the correct team name and code displayed on tabroom. To clarify – disclose cases, rebuttals, and evidence read in any other speech.

b) Violation - they don't disclose rebuttals, screenshots prove

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Q80HPTy6vBJeIaeCCAfBHPrrvhrEnbZA582UqNUBWd0/edit?usp=sharing>

**c) Standards**

**1. Foreknowledge - Rebuttal disclosure allows teams to prep frontlines which checks back against bad arguments and forces teams to run arguments that are good and grounded in topic lit instead of catching teams off guard – ‘breaking new blocks’ is impossible every round. That makes debate more educational and fair since big teams with infinite squirrelly args can’t win off them.**

**2. Cross-pollination- Debaters can use and modify the best ideas from each other’s rebuttals, making rebuttals and cases more educational.**

**3. Clash - Disclosure allows opponents to know the arguments their case will face encouraging better ev and internal frontlines. This forces better case research and new rebuttal strats, helping quality and quantity of research which increases education**

**4. Research disparities - Schools with big programs who bring more students will scout more rounds and have more flows; disclosure equalizes that intel disparity and makes debate more fair and educational**

**5. Evidence ethics - Disclosure makes it easier to find misconstrued ev by allowing debaters to check each other’s before the round instead of using prep. Better ev allows for better in round and post round education AND checks against research disparities**

d) Voters

1. Education - its the reasons schools fund debate
2. Inclusion - there’s no benefit to debate when students are excluded from the activity

Drop the debater - Wins and losses control the direction of the activity, teams losing for bad practices incentivizes them to change in the future and sets community-wide norms

Prefer competing interps, reasonability collapses into competing interps and incentivizes judge intervention where judges vote for what they think is more reasonable rather than who won

No RVI’s, don't give them offense for a counter-interp. 3 warrants

1. Illogical: You don’t win for being fair

2. Baiting: RVIs encourage good theory debaters to purposefully be abusive so they can win on theory. This Deters debaters from checking back against real abuses because they’re afraid of losing to an RVI Theory comes first - you have to know the rules before you play the game

Theory comes first (2 warrants):

1. It governs what arguments can and cannot be read in the first place.
2. Fiat is illusory, meaning if you affirm or negate nothing happens. However voting theory lets us set norms in the debate space.

As an underview:

* Don’t led them read **any** disclosure bad arguments - they disclose cases so make them justify why the arbitrary brightline of stopping at constructive is a good norm.

# Case

## SC: Food Aid

**Climate shocks are generating a food emergency in Somaliland.**

**RW 24** [No Author, 9-12-2024, Somaliland: Nourishing vulnerable rural and displaced communities, Relief Web, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somaliland-nourishing-vulnerable-rural-and-displaced-communities] BZ

As a result of **climate-related shocks**, several districts in Somaliland continue to face high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, with women and children worst affected. According to recent IPC data, the food security situation in most of Somaliland can be characterised as ‘stressed’ or level 2, with pockets of level 3 – crisis situation - in Togdheer region. Like the acute food security situation, the acute malnutrition situation is **projected to continue to worsen** until June of this year, with a growing number of areas that are projected to experience Phase 3 – serious malnutrition. ¶ Children are particularly affected by malnutrition throughout the country. Over **1.7 million children** under the age of 5 **need treatment.** Among those, almost half a million are experiencing severe acute malnutrition and are at risk of acute wasting. Acute wasting is a condition where children experience rapid weight loss and malnutrition, often resulting in a dangerously low weight for their age and height. This condition can have severe consequences on their physical and cognitive development, leaving them vulnerable to illness and even death if not addressed promptly. While levels of wasting have improved in some parts of Somalia, they are **projected to deteriorate** from the current Alert to Serious phase among Burao IDPs, who are one of the target groups of this project. ¶ With the support of the French Embassy, Acted, in partnership with Candlelight and Barwaaqo Volunteer Organization BVO, is implementing a one-year project titled “Nourishing Communities: Restoring Resilience Through Enhanced Food and Nutrition Security for Vulnerable Rural and Displaced Crisis-Affected Communities in Somaliland” from October 2023 to September 2024. ¶ The project aims to increase resilience though improved food security and nutrition outcomes for vulnerable, displaced, and rural populations in crisis affected areas in Somalia. The beneficiaries amount to 5,120 households (30,720 individuals) dispersed throughout 18 IDP sites and rural communities in Burco District (Togdheer Region), and Caynaba and Laas Canood (Sool Region).

**However, current food aid to Somaliland is lacking, with recognition being critical.**

**Beaubien 17** [Jason Beaubien, staff writer @ NPR with a focus on global politics and current events, 5-29-2017, Somaliland Wants To Make One Thing Clear: It Is NOT Somalia, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/30/530703639/somaliland-wants-to-make-one-thing-clear-it-is-not-somalia] BZ

Somaliland is being hit by a regional food crisis that the U.N. has described as one of the **largest humanitarian emergencies since 1945**. More than a million of Somaliland's four million people are at risk of starvation yet relief has been slow to come.¶ "We are being treated unfairly," Shire says seated in a conference room of a consulting firm in downtown Washington, D.C. He's in town lobbying American lawmakers for what has become his perpetual cause — official recognition of Somaliland as a nation. "You know by **lumping Somalia and Somaliland together**, it is slowing down the delivery of assistance."¶ Somaliland declared its independence from the failed state of Somalia in 1991, but the world ... for the most part ... has ignored the declaration. The similar names are rooted in colonial history: Somaliland became known as British Somaliland in the 19th century, while the southern region was Italian Somaliland.¶ "We have a functioning democracy. We have our own army. We have our own police. We have our own coast guard. You know, we have our own border police. We have fulfilled all the conditions of a sovereign state," Shire says as he ticks through why Somaliland is its own nation. And there's more. Somaliland has its own currency. It regularly holds elections.¶ "The only thing that's missing is the sovereign recognition," he says.¶ Bronwyn Bruton, the director of programs and studies at the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, says the international community has been uninterested in recognizing Somaliland as a new nation for several reasons.¶ Quite frankly, she says, the first is apathy. Somaliland doesn't have oil or other resources to make other players on the international stage care about it.¶ Second, she explains, is the belief that recognizing Somaliland would undermine international efforts to get a functioning government in Mogadishu, which Somaliland broke away from.¶ "The international community led by the United States and Britain has put a lot of time and effort into trying to build a government in Mogadishu," Bruton says. "And it's perceived that if Somaliland were to be granted its separation it would reflect poorly on that nascent government."¶ Finally the African Union doesn't want to encourage independence movements in other restive regions around the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says lack of recognition is impeding what has already been a slow international response to the food crisis in Somaliland. Aid from international agencies is being **coordinated and routed through war-ravaged Mogadishu** — the Somali capital **900 miles to the south**.¶ "It is affecting us in many ways," Shire says. "We are not present in the forums in which these [aid efforts] are discussed. We **cannot access bilateral aid**. We **cannot get loans**. **We cannot attract international investors**."¶ Because it's not officially a country **Somaliland isn't eligible for loans that the World Bank makes to poor nations**. It **can't get in on other assistance programs** that are traditionally delivered to governments.¶ Somaliland broke away from Somalia to keep from getting sucked down as Somalia disintegrated in to a failed state in the 1990's. It lacked any central government from 1991 to 2006. Pirates took to terrorizing ships in its waterway. Islamist militants set up shop. Somalia is still one of the world's most dangerous countries for international aid groups to work in.¶ And Somaliland continues to be tarnished by its former partner's woes.¶ When aid groups consider working in Somaliland, officials at their head offices in Europe or the U.S. often treat the project as if it's occurring in Mogadishu.¶ "For example a U.S. NGO will go to the State Department website," Shire says. "They look at the traveler advice [for Somalia] and they would be dissuaded by what they see on the screen. This really does not reflect what's on the ground in Somaliland."¶ Africa specialist Bruton says Shire's frustration is justified. Somaliland, she says, has created a relatively stable enclave in a turbulent part of the Horn of Africa.¶ "Somaliland gets a ton of good press for being stable and kind of a peaceful island in a sea of violence that is Somalia," Bruton says. "The reality is that unlike southern Somalia, where you have a lot of violence, Somaliland is essentially a single clan territory. And so what's happening is it's being run as a traditional clan democracy." This has its drawbacks if you aren't part of the dominant clan, she points out, but one of the upsides is stability.¶ "Somalilanders have made an excellent case that because they were a British rather than an Italian colony, they were never really part of Somalia and so they have a right to be separate," Bruton says. The two colonies merged after they each won their independence from the Europeans in 1960. But she says African nations worry that Somaliland secession from the rest of Somalia sets a dangerous precedent on the continent.¶ Foreign Minister Shire says what's dangerous for Somalilanders right now is to stay in international limbo. The lack of recognition is impeding international relief, he emphasizes, and stymying development.¶ Bruton at the Atlantic Council says he definitely has a point: "Somaliland is effectively being held hostage to the chaos in southern Somalia, Which is grossly unfair."

**This food aid is key to combating famine and building long term sustainability.**

**Gautam 18** [Yograj Gautam, geographer and food studies researcher @ the University of Bergen, 12-26-2018, “Food aid is killing Himalayan farms”. Debunking the false dependency narrative in Karnali, Nepal, World Development, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X18304297#s0025] BZ

Irrespective of the prevalent narratives, empirical studies show heterogeneous impacts of food aid. Although some studies note negative nutritional impacts of changing food habits induced by food aid flows (see Maxwell, 1995, Barrett and Maxwell, 2005), other studies find food aid to have **positive effects** on food consumption and nutrition at **national and international scales** (Lentz and Barrett, 2013, Schubert, 1981). Even at a local scale, food aid has evidently assisted food-deficit poor households to meet the deficit (Bishokarma, 2012), to increase dietary diversity by enabling them to save money and buy additional food (Bukusuba, Kikafunda, & Whitehead, 2007), and to reduce child undernutrition, which is a significant challenge facing low-income countries (Quisumbing, 2003). There is also evidence for food aid working as an effective **safety net**, for example by enabling poor households to avoid distress destocking of low value assets in the face of livelihood shocks (Tusiime, Renard, & Smets, 2013). Food aid impacts on local production and market are also mixed. Although food aid led to a decrease in local production in Uganda indicating a negative impact (Ferrière & Suwa-Eisenmann, 2015), it neither depressed prices nor had a significant negative impact on local production in Swaziland and Ethiopia (Abdulai et al., 2005, Mabuza et al., 2009). In the same line, a recent study that analyzed the impact of a large scale social protection program on local grain price in Ethiopia found that cash transfer has no effect on food price. Although food transfers led to a reduction in local grain price, the effect was trivially small (Hoddinott, Stifel, Hirvonen, & Minten, 2018). These results suggest place and context specific impacts of food aid.¶ Subsistence farmers in developing countries are increasingly being vulnerable to food insecurity due to emerging multiple environmental and socio-economic risks (Gautam and Andersen, 2017b, Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011, McCubbin et al., 2015, Morton, 2007, Tschakert, 2007). In this context, ample evidence exists signifying the role of various support programs in serving as effective safety net and also enabling the poor populations to undertake activities to sustainably improve their livelihoods (Banerjee et al., 2015, Fisher et al., 2017, Hidrobo et al., 2018). Arguably, this evidence can be used as a policy lesson to utilize food aid as a resource to safeguard the basic needs of the vulnerable populations in the face of these emerging risks. Policies, however, do not always directly draw on evidence provided by research (Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Robust knowledge regarding the dynamics, uncertainties and complexities inherent with development issues is not always available for policymakers for decision making. In this context, they find policy guidance in development narratives, which simplify the complexity by depicting some realities (and neglecting others) and generalizing the (partial) picture to the whole (Roe, 1991). By brushing-off evidences that contrast them, such narratives maintain a particular way of addressing a problem (Adger et al., 2001, Cornwall and Brock, 2005, Escobar, 2011). Arguably, characterizing food aid as detrimental to long term food security, dependency narratives can create political barriers to integrate such potentially promising programs into food security policies. In addition, highlighting a simplified framework to explain the problem of food insecurity, such narratives may also sideline the importance of examining the dynamic and multiple factors that affect farmers’ wellbeing and ignore their real needs and priorities.¶ This paper contributes to this important issue in development studies by empirically examining the effects of food aid on food security and livelihoods of rural farming communities in Nepal. Drawing on a study conducted in the district of Humla in Karnali zone, it first assesses the role rice transfers under food aid has on decreasing food deficit of the recipient households. It analyzes the disincentive impacts and in particular the alleged ‘dependency’ in terms of food aid impacts on local crop diversity, crop production, and dietary pattern especially in terms of the role of aid transfers in replacing traditional crops/diets. Results show that food aid has had **positive contribution to food consumption** during periods of food shortage, more so in the context of emerging multiple challenges to local agriculture. Despite the free/concessional food transfers, the local farming system not only **maintains traditional crops**, recent **agricultural innovation has actually increased crop diversity**. The local diet pattern is highly diverse and well embedded with locally produced grains, which discredits the alleged changes in food habits. Following on from this, we present a critique to prevalent dependency narrative that conceptualizes food aid as detrimental to local food security. Such conceptualizations are currently occupying policy discussion that advocate for the elimination or reduction of food aid. We caution that such a policy move will not only directly affect many poor farmers’ food access, it will also leave an increased number of Himalayan farmers vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition in the face of emerging climatic and socioeconomic changes challenging local livelihoods.

**Moreover, affirming would enable funding for climate adaptation, solving the root cause of hunger.**

**Moe 24** [Louise Wiuff Moe, associate professor @ Roskilde University, 2024, TOWARDS A ‘PEACE CONTINUUM’ APPROACH TO CLIMATE SECURITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA, Danish Institute for International Studies, https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/23571007/Towards\_a\_peace\_continuum\_approach\_to\_climate\_security\_DIIS\_WP\_2024\_01.pdf, leon + Willie T.]

The most climate change-exposed populations in the region are often also among the most politically marginalised, feeding into climate concerns taking a secondary position – for donors as well as governments in the regions – as other priorities, including those related to conflict dynamics, take precedence (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). In Ethiopia, for example, areas of acute food insecurity in Tigray, Somali and Afar regions overlap with a high occurrence of conflict also involving the Ethiopian forces, and with pastoralists being particularly exposed due to the confluence of climate effects and political as well as socioeconomic marginalisation (Sax et al., 2023). Djibouti’s political dynamics, with an overlay of external competition over military bases, also divert attention away from climate and environmental concerns. And in Sudan, the ongoing war undercuts conditions for addressing pressing climate issues and related impacts such as the recent locust outbreaks (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Meanwhile, in Somalia, prolonged armed conflict, counterterrorism priorities and the series of ineffective central governments have left very limited sustained attention on climate change (Walls, Osuteye and Abdi, 2023). **Somaliland**, **in turn**, has **progressed** in developing **policy frameworks** and **priorities** in the **field** of **climate change**, and also has a **long-established** Ministry of **Environment** and **Climate Change** but the **absence** of **international recognition** renders **Somaliland** ineligible to **engage** in formal **international forums**, and leaves it with **very limited** capacity and **funds** to implement policies (Musse, 2023).2 ¶ This dynamic, of conflict and political fragmentation feeding into climate vulnerability and leaving less capacities to address it, is reinforced by ‘the rule of thumb’ that ‘donors tend to favour safer places’ (Gaston et al., 2023). Due to donor risk aversion, related to for example physical insecurity, high costs, risks of politization and project disruptions, contexts shaped by conflict and fragility generally receive particularly limited external support for climate adaptation and finance. Also, in terms of international projects specifically targeting climate security support, the Horn of Africa has received a remarkably low number even in comparison to other conflict-affected regions, such as the Sahel where terrorism and migration have been high concerns on the international agenda (see numbers presented in Gaston et al. 2023: 15). Accordingly, the Horn of Africa paradigmatically illustrates a recurring pattern: regions grappling with the compound challenges of conflict, political fragmentation and climate change – thereby being particularly in need of support – often receive disproportionately limited external donor engagement and targeted climate finance.¶ In stepping up such engagement, existing grounded knowledge, efforts and priorities needs to be supported and leveraged. This will necessitate adopting more flexible yet strategic and grounded approaches. There are enormous challenges facing such support, given the multitude of conflicting agendas, alliances and politics involved, both globally and within the regional African context. Nonetheless, within this complexity, there are also areas of converging interests and ongoing efforts, offering opportunities for engagement and partnerships.¶ The subsequent sub-sections explore specific opportunities and cases, drawing insights from expert interviews with officials from the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Welthungerhilfe. Additionally, it incorporates insights and case studies based on climate adaptation research in the region.¶ Regional efforts of advancing the climate security agenda¶ Despite their limited resources, as well as internal divisions and divergent agendas among member states, regional organisations play a central role in advancing and shaping a climate security agenda attuned to the region’s specific needs (which often cut across national borders). Moreover, they can serve to provide a level of continuity, sustaining efforts amid challenges like conflict and war dynamics that may hinder national initiatives. Consequently, they offer important potential entry points for establishing partnerships.¶ The **AU** has demonstrated **significant leadership** on the **climate change** agenda. For example, on the very **same day** where **UNSC** did not **reach consensus** for a **climate security** resolution (see part one, above), the AU **Peace** and **Security Council** was able to **speak** with **one voice**, **issuing** a **communique** that **emphasised** the need for ‘a **climate-sensitive** planning **dimension** in **peacekeeping** and **postconflict reconstruction** and **development efforts**’ and moreover highlighted the significance of early warning on climate (in)security (AU Communique 2021, 3; see also Mattheis et al. 2023). The AU also promptly responded to the crisis of food insecurity that hit Africa, and the Horn in particular, in the context of droughts combining with hiking food prices related to Russia’s war in Ukraine (Mattheis et al., 2023: 19).¶ Regarding institutionalisation, **climate change** has been a **cross-cutting** theme in the **African Peace** and **Security Architecture** (2016-2020 Roadmap) since 2016. In 2022, a process was initiated to develop a Common African Position on Climate Security, demonstrating a strong consensus to advance climate security as a core agenda, and recognising that effective responses to climate (in)security require coordinated and context-specific African approaches (Interview, AU official, August 2023). In initiating steps towards a Common African Position, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission identified 15 key messages – based on wider consultations – that were feeding into inputs at Cop27 and Cop28, including advocacy for the Loss and Damage Fund.¶ Another core process informing the development of a Common African Position has been the AU-guided undertaking of an Africa Continental Climate Security Risk Assessment (highlighted in the abovementioned Communique), placing emphasis on the need of more grounded knowledge and insights into the context specific drivers and interconnections between climate, (in)security and peace (personal communication, AU official, August 2023).¶ At the **sub-regional** level, **IGAD**, in **close collaboration** with the **AU**, is at the **forefront** of **advancing** a **climate security** agenda **centred** on the specific **regional needs**. IGAD, formed in 1996, grew out of an intergovernmental initiative in 1986 focused on addressing and reducing the impacts of droughts and natural disasters in the region. The **organisation** thereby has **longstanding** and deep **contextual knowledge** on the **impacts** of **environmental** and **climate change** and has **consistently** sought to **advance** related **institutional knowledge** and **response capacity**. In 2003 the Drought Monitoring Centre-Nairobi (DCMN) was adopted as a specialised IGAD institution, and advanced into the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC). In 2022 IGAD set up a Climate Security Coordination Mechanism, to be integrated within ICPAC.¶ Exemplifying IGAD’s responsiveness to specific regional concerns, the **organisation** has shown **significant initiative** in **addressing** the particular **needs** of **pastoralists**, a **vital** yet **marginalised livelihood** in the **Horn** and **East Africa**, especially **vulnerable** to the **impacts** of **climate change**. In response to drought induced challenges affecting pastoral livelihoods and mobility patterns, **IGAD** established the **IGAD Centre** for **Pastoral Areas** and **Livestock Development** (ICPALD) in 2011. This initiative, aligned with the recognition of pastoralism’s importance among IGAD member states, **aims** to enhance **rangeland management** in **crossborder** areas of **Ethiopia**, **South Sudan**, **Sudan** and **Uganda**; an **approach** that contrasts **donor biases** favouring **crop production** (Interview, Welthungerhilfe Area Manager in Somaliland, August 2023) and policies aiming at restricting migration. In 2021, IGAD Council of Ministers adopted the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance, that focuses on supporting and regulating safe cross-border mobility and use of common rangelands by pastoralists. The **protocol** represents a **proactive approach** to **climate change** adaptation **linked** with **migration** and **mobility**, specifically **addressing** the **interrelated dynamics** of **climate change**, **livelihood insecurity** and **conflict dynamics** (in particular conflicts related to land access). The focus is on demonstrating how providing **adequate support** for **pastoralists** and related **environmental resource** management – in this case **land**, **pasture** and **water** – can **contribute** to **maintaining peace** (Interview, IGAD official, August 2023). Additionally, IGAD’s 2023 Sustainable Ecosystem Management (SEM) project3 aligns with similar aims of the protocol, addressing critical pastoral challenges in a region facing a drought crisis. These **efforts** and **frameworks** have been **strengthened** through **support** and **collaboration** between **IGAD** and **international organisations**, such as the UN, the European Union (EU) and the International Organization for Migration, as well as through bilateral assistance.

**Otherwise, millions are at risk of death.**

**Ross 24** [Steven Ross, Public health reporter @ US News, 1-29-2024, Food Insecurity Tied to Shorter Life, Early Death, US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2024-01-29/study-food-insecurity-tied-to-shorter-life-early-death, Willie T.]

People who experience food insecurity are at greater risk of **dying prematurely** and living a shorter life after age 50, researchers say, underscoring how a fairly prevalent problem can impact individual health. The federal government says food insecurity refers to “limited or uncertain access to adequate food” – an economic and social condition that can lead to hunger. In an analysis published Monday in JAMA Internal Medicine, researchers found 78.4% of more than 57,400 U.S. adults included in the study were fully food secure, compared with 8.5% who had marginal food security, 7.4% who had low levels of food security and 5.6% who experienced very low food security. Researchers also found estimated life expectancy at age 50 was 32.5 years among individuals with full food security, compared with 29.9 years among adults with marginal food security, 30 years among those with low food security and 28 years among individuals with very low food security. That means adults with very low food security lived 4.5 years less once they turned 50 than those with full food security, and researchers said about half of the lost life expectancy could be attributed to deaths from cardiovascular disease and cancer. The analysis, based on survey data from 1999 to 2018, additionally found an association between **even marginal food security** and a **50% higher risk** of premature mortality, defined as a death occurring before a person turns 80. “The present findings may have a great public health implication,” researchers wrote. “Our results suggest that in addition to encouraging people to improve their lifestyle and cardiovascular health, improving food security may also be a way to curb the stagnant life expectancy of U.S. residents.” The new findings come on the heels of provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing average life expectancy in the U.S. rebounded in 2022 by a little over a year following two straight declines, fueled largely by a drop in mortality tied to COVID-19. Overall life expectancy at birth rose from 76.4 years in 2021 to 77.5 years in 2022. By gender, the new study found women with very low food security lived an average of 5.8 years less at age 50 compared with women with full food security. Men with very low food security, meanwhile, had a life expectancy three years shorter than men with full food security at that age threshold.

**2AC**

[No evidence read!]