#### **Existential threats outweigh 1. Moral Uncertainty -- GPP 17** (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017,<https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for **at least** another **billion years**. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only **a tiny fraction** of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a **fraction of a second**.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “**destroy the future**,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; **it would give them nothing**. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

#### **2. Extinction o/w scope and magnitude, prior question to existence of humanity**

3. Extinction is the only thing that is functionally irrevrisble

# C1—Allies

#### **The US is pulling out of international agreements now. Dixon 2-10**

**Dixon**, Hugo. “The End of the West May Be Nigh.” Reuters, February 10, **2025**. https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/end-west-may-be-nigh-2025-02-10/. //arrguy

LONDON, Feb 10 (Reuters Breakingviews) - China’s rise in recent decades had already put the world’s rich democracies on the defensive. **Now Donald Trump is swinging a wrecking ball at the alliances, values and institutions that underpin Western power.** While it may be possible to salvage something, the omens are not good. The West is less a geographical definition than a geopolitical force and a set of values. It has brought together not just the rich democracies of North America and Europe but also countries such as Japan in a set of overlapping pacts and treaties. Underpinning these have been mutual interests and ideas such as the rule of law, free trade, democracy, standing up to tyranny and working together to solve global problems such as climate change. This ethos has dominated the world since World War Two - and, even more so, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even though its members have often not lived up to its values, it created the conditions for peace and economic growth in large parts of the world. But its geopolitical pre-eminence started to fray when the United States led an unwise invasion of Iraq in 2003, while its economic supremacy eroded after the global financial crisis in 2008. Trump was always going to be a disruptive force. But the returning U.S. president has pummelled the international order with an unexpected vigour in the weeks since he moved back into the Oval Office. The former real estate developer had already hinted that he would use military force to annex Greenland, which is a member of the NATO defence alliance, and take over the Panama Canal. **He has** also **threatened tariffs against the European Union and Canada**, and pushed for the latter to become part of the United States. Most strikingly, he declared last week that the United States would take over Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”, after its two million Palestinians inhabitants were permanently resettled elsewhere. Such a project could violate international law. **As if that’s not enough, Trump has ordered the United States to pull out of the World Health Organization, an international tax treaty and withdraw from the Paris climate agreement for a second time.** He is imposing sanctions on people who work for the International Criminal Court. His administration plans to slash USAID, the humanitarian aid agency that has been a key component of U.S. attempts to woo developing countries since the 1960s, and has ordered a review, opens new tab of U.S. support for all international organisations. The rest of the West is too weak to stand up to him. This is especially so in Europe, which desperately needs U.S. military support to help Ukraine fend off Russia’s invasion. It is also true of Japan and South Korea, which cannot defend themselves against China and North Korea respectively without American help.‌

#### **Thus, China’s ahead. Sun 2-6**

**Sun**, Yun. “China’s Trump Strategy.” Foreign Affairs, February 6, **2025**. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-trump-strategy. //arrguy

In the months since Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in November, policymakers in Beijing have been looking to the next four years of U.S.-Chinese relations with trepidation. Beijing has been expecting the Trump administration to pursue tough policies toward China, potentially escalating the two countries’ trade war, tech war, and confrontation over Taiwan. The prevailing wisdom is that China must prepare for storms ahead in its dealings with the United States. Trump’s imposition of ten percent tariffs on all Chinese goods this week seemed to justify those worries. China retaliated swiftly, announcing its own tariffs on certain U.S. goods, as well as restrictions on exports of critical minerals and an antimonopoly investigation into the U.S.-based company Google. But even though Beijing has such tools at its disposal, its ability to outmaneuver Washington in a tit-for-tat exchange is limited by the United States’ relative power and large trade deficit with China. Chinese policymakers, aware of the problem, have been planning more than trade war tactics. Since Trump’s first term, they have been adapting their approach to the United States, and they have spent the past three months further developing their strategy to anticipate, counter, and minimize the damage of Trump’s volatile policymaking. **As a result of that planning, a broad effort to shore up China’s domestic economy and foreign relations has been quietly underway.** China’s preparations roughly mirror the Biden administration’s China strategy of “invest, align, and compete,” which involved investing in U.S. strength, aligning with partners, and competing where necessary. Beijing’s playbook for riding out the Trump years, meanwhile, focuses on making the domestic economy more resilient, reconciling with key neighbors, and deepening relationships in the global South. Trump may well be able to score some short-term victories, but Beijing’s plans look beyond him. Chinese leaders remain convinced of the country’s historic destiny to rise and displace the United States as the world’s preeminent power. **They think that Trump’s policies will undermine U.S. power and reduce U.S. global standing in the long run. And when that happens, China wants to be ready to take advantage.** REFORM MOVEMENT Fortifying the home front has been a key element of Beijing’s strategy. Expecting that Trump’s presidency will bring volatility in the form of trade, sanctions, and export controls, China has been introducing stimulus measures to boost the real economy and strengthen domestic consumption. On November 8, three days after the U.S. election, Beijing announced a program to distribute $1.4 trillion to reduce local government debts over two years. The International Monetary Fund has estimated that Chinese local government debts total around $9 trillion; addressing the problem represents a major push by the central government to stabilize the economy and instill more confidence in the Chinese market. **A month later, on December 9, Beijing pledged “more active fiscal policies and moderately loose monetary policies,” which in practice entail more government spending, budgetary expansion, and lower interest rates.** This marks a shift away from the belt-tightening policies that have been in place since 2010 and toward economic stimulus. In mid-December, China’s Central Economic Work Conference, a key government meeting that determines the economic policy for the next year, reiterated those promises. Its recommendations included more government spending, interest rate cuts, and other policies meant to generate growth. Beijing has reason to introduce such measures regardless of Trump. **The economic slowdown in recent years and the tepid results of the government’s stimulus efforts so far warrant more substantial intervention. But apprehension about rising tensions with the United States undoubtedly spurred policymakers on.** In its December announcement, the Central Economic Work Conference cited the “deepening negative impact from the changed external environment” as the motivation for its updated fiscal policies. The most significant change to China’s external environment is the outcome of the U.S. election. Trump’s imposition of tariffs seemed to justify China’s worries. Beijing’s push for reform is not just about fixing domestic economic problems, either. It is also an effort to open up new opportunities for international trade. In discussions with members of the U.S. policy community after the November election, Chinese interlocutors expressed interest in fulfilling the Phase One trade deal signed by Beijing and Washington in January 2020, which would see China purchase $200 billion worth of U.S. products. They even brought up the possibility of beginning Phase Two negotiations, which would focus on structural reform, including measures addressing the relationship between the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises. Given Beijing’s sensitivity regarding such topics, progress on these negotiations has long seemed a remote prospect. But with an economic slowdown at home and the trade war with the United States escalating, China is feeling more pressure. China is also looking to diversify its trade options. Over the past few months, statements from the Chinese foreign and commerce ministries have referred repeatedly to China’s effort to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 12-member trade agreement that succeeded the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which stalled in 2017 after the United States withdrew. Members of the CPTPP must meet stringent entry requirements, which in China’s case would require serious structural reform. Beijing recognizes the value of multilateral trade mechanisms: China’s accession into the World Trade Organization in 2001 was probably the single largest factor in China’s economic rise. As countries move away from the WTO and toward alternative arrangements such as the CPTPP, Beijing wants to make sure it is not left out. With Trump in power, inclusion is all the more vital as China seeks to compensate for lost access to U.S. markets. MENDING FENCES China’s preparations for Trump have also involved a diplomatic push. **In anticipation of heightened tension in the Indo-Pacific, China has tried to tie up loose ends with India and Japan, two neighbors with whom China had turbulent relationships for the past several years. Stability in China’s immediate neighborhood will minimize distractions for Beijing and could undermine U.S. efforts to push its partners to pressure China.** Improving ties with both Japan and Australia, too, is a way for China to ingratiate itself with the leaders of the CPTPP. The thaw in Chinese-Indian relations has been notable. In October, China and India suddenly reached an agreement to disengage in the disputed border territory of Ladakh after a four-year military standoff. Following Trump’s election, China invited Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to Beijing for talks about border issues. Doval was even granted a meeting with China’s Vice President Han Zheng—an unusual move and a gesture of goodwill. China offered concrete deliverables to India during the visit, too, including allowing Indian nationals the right of passage to resume pilgrimages to Tibet, cooperation on shared waterways, and trade between the two countries at the Nathu La mountain pass. More important, China pledged to pursue “a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable package solution to the border issue.” Beijing has long deferred a comprehensive agreement on the Chinese-Indian border—a deal New Delhi wants—as it believes that keeping the dispute alive gives it leverage. But now China seems willing to commit. Trump may score short-term victories, but Beijing is looking beyond him. China has made progress with Japan as well, hoping to improve relations with the United States’ most important ally in the region. In September 2024, Beijing announced that it would gradually dismantle the import ban on Japanese seafood it had imposed in August 2023. After Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru in November, China restored visa-free entry for Japanese visitors. And China-Japan ruling party exchanges, which began in 2004 but have been suspended for the past seven years, resumed in January, with China hosting a Japanese delegation in Beijing. During that meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly proposed that Ishiba visit China during the 2025 Asian Winter Games, which China will host. At the same time, China has been making overtures to Australia, unilaterally announcing in late November a 30-day visa-free policy for Australian nationals visiting China. It was not until Trump’s return became a real prospect that Beijing started focusing on outreach to these U.S. partners. Even as China gradually dropped its hostile “wolf warrior” diplomacy after the country’s post-COVID reopening in 2023, Chinese relations with India and Japan in particular remained frosty: border tensions with India continued, and Beijing mounted ferocious criticism of Japan over its release of treated radioactive wastewater into the Pacific Ocean. But when faced with the uncertainty that a second Trump presidency could bring, China set out to improve its relations with both countries. ALTERNATE ROUTES China has also been expanding its cooperation with countries in the global South that offer backdoor access to U.S. markets. As tariffs and supply-chain disruptions break direct trade links between the United States and China, more and more trade happens indirectly. In effect, the same Chinese materials and parts are used in goods exported to the United States—but now the final products are manufactured or assembled in countries other than China. Beijing has accepted this transition to backdoor trade; China’s exports are still strong, with the country’s trade surplus reaching a peak of almost $1 trillion in 2024. Its fastest growing export markets are countries in the global South, including Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, many of which are acting as middlemen by processing Chinese materials and exporting the finished goods to the United States. Over the past few years, China has deliberately facilitated growth in these supply networks through investment in Asia and Latin America. Chinese investment in Vietnam, for example, increased by 80 percent in 2023 to $4.5 billion, and Chinese-Vietnamese bilateral trade reached $260 billion—more than China’s trade with Russia, even with all the oil and gas China has purchased from Russia during the war in Ukraine. In Mexico, according to Xu Qiyuan, a senior economist at the China Academy of Social Sciences, China’s outbound direct investment in 2023 reached as high as $3 billion, ten times more than what the official data reports. Where countries can offer routes into the U.S. market, Chinese companies have been eager to invest. Although China would still prefer to trade directly with the United States, leading a parallel trading system with the global South is an acceptable alternative for Beijing. There is a chance Trump could decide to punish third-party countries for their economic cooperation with China, as he has threatened in the case of Panama. Beijing does not have an obvious, easy solution to this type of disruption. But Trump’s moves may not necessarily harm China’s economic relationships, either—for countries on the receiving end of his ire, practical economic considerations could still prevail. Indeed, after Italy withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative in December 2023, its economic ties to China did not disappear—bilateral trade increased in 2024. For many countries in the global South, lucrative economic deals with China will still have strong appeal. Beijing, furthermore, could reap the benefits if heavy-handed U.S. measures undermine Washington’s relations with key countries. THE LONG GAME China has options for a direct response to additional tariffs or other trade measures Trump may impose: its toolkit includes export controls, sanctions on U.S. companies, Chinese currency depreciation, retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports to China, and more. Which of these measures China deploys and when will depend on what Trump decides to do. Unlike its largely reactive approach during Trump’s first term, however, this time around Beijing will have not only a tactical response but also a bigger strategy. Ultimately, China hopes to use Trump’s policies to its own advantage. Chinese leaders could use a U.S.-instigated trade war to rally various domestic interest groups around meaningful reforms at home and to expand ties to countries the United States alienates, strengthening China’s position in a reoriented global trade system. Unlike in 2016, China’s leadership also knows what to expect from Trump. In his first term, Trump showed Beijing that nothing was off the table. His administration broke taboos when it came to discussing the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan, and it disproved the assumption that U.S.-Chinese relations would not sink below a certain floor. That experience has prepared policymakers in Beijing to take seriously the possibility that the U.S. administration will impose ruinously high tariffs on all Chinese goods or seek to advance U.S. relations with Taiwan. Having witnessed the freefall of bilateral relations in 2020 after the outbreak of COVID-19, Chinese leaders can’t help but feel they have already seen the worst. In effect, Trump has lost the element of surprise. Ultimately, China hopes to use Trump’s policies to its own advantage. After eight years of learning and preparing to mitigate the negative repercussions of Trump’s policies, by investing at home and building partnerships with the global South, Beijing believes it can endure a turbulent U.S. presidency. There may be some wishful thinking driving its strategy. The Chinese economy is in a precarious position, and the country’s overcapacity problem is forcing it to increase exports and creating pushback across the world. China’s economic future is uncertain, and the downturn may not be reversed even with active government intervention, regardless of what the United States does. Yet Chinese leaders remain confident that, even if the country’s economy suffers, four years of Trump is unlikely to send it into a full-blown crisis. And they anticipate that if Trump follows through on his declared policies, such as those on trade and territorial expansion, he could do severe damage to the United States’ credibility and global leadership. Beijing thus sees Trump’s second term as a potential opportunity for China to expand its influence farther and faster. In this view, competition with the United States is not in itself the driving force behind China’s grand strategy. It is instead one component of a larger process: China’s rise and displacement of the United States as the world’s leading superpower, what Xi often describes as “changes unseen in a century.” **Beijing assumes that Washington’s own policies will dismantle the foundations of U.S. global hegemony, even if it creates a lot of turbulence for other countries in the process. China’s top priority, then, is simply to weather the storm.**

#### **Allies are key to reverse this. Jose 2-7**

**José**, Antonio. “How the US Could Undermine Its Biggest Advantage over China.” Thediplomat.com. The Diplomat, February 7, **2025**. https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/how-the-us-could-undermine-its-biggest-advantage-over-china/. //arrguy

The U.S. alliance network is its greatest advantage in the competition with China. But Washington can hardly count on its allies if it treats them worse than the way it treats its systemic rival. 2025 began with unexpected news for the balance of power between Washington and Beijing in the technological field. DeepSeek, a Chinese AI company, went public with a model similar to ChatGPT-4, casting doubt on the United States’ international leadership in this field. **And technology isn’t the only area where the U.S. has seen its relative advantage over China shrink.** Economically, China has been the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP) since 2017, and even militarily, the certainty of a U.S. victory in any potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait has diminished. **Despite these shifts, the United States still holds a key advantage that’s often overlooked: its system of alliances.** After World War II, the U.S. became an “empire by invitation,” as historian Geir Lundestad described it, forging an alliance network in Europe that eventually was also applied – mostly on a bilateral basis – in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, allies like South Korea and Japan have bilateral defense treaties with the United States, while countries such as the Philippines and Thailand are designated as Major Non-NATO Allies. Nowadays, the U.S.-led system of alliances includes 46 allies across all five continents, and combined they account for more than half of the world’s GDP. Thirteen of the 20 largest economies in the world are part of this network. China, on the other hand, has struggled to build and maintain a comparable alliance system. Its alliance with the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1960s, and today its only formal ally is North Korea. Chinese leaders have rejected the idea of forming alliances with other nations, fearing that such commitments might restrict their international maneuverability or embroil them in external conflicts. Of course, having an alliance network doesn’t guarantee that all members will always align with U.S. strategy toward China. There have been several instances of discord. For example, in 2005 Robert Zoellick, then deputy secretary of state under President George W. Bush, criticized the European Union’s proposal to lift its arms embargo on China, saying it was like “painting bull’s-eyes on the backs of U.S. troops.” Similarly, in 2015 the Obama administration tried – and failed – to prevent its allies from joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was seen as a tool for increasing China’s influence in multilateral development in Asia. Still, one of the strengths of the U.S.-led alliance system is its flexibility: Allies agreed to disagree on certain points without breaking the overall alliance, making it a more durable model than the rigid Warsaw Pact. There are also notable successes in mobilizing this alliance system against China. In 2022, for instance, the United States persuaded NATO to label China as a “security challenge” for the first time. The previous year, the AUKUS pact – linking Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – was announced to bolster military positioning in the Asia-Pacific. Washington has also managed to get countries like the Netherlands and Japan to limit their chip exports to China, strengthened its alliance with Tokyo, and formed a military intelligence-sharing agreement with the Philippines, enabling the nation – entangled in the South China Sea dispute with Beijing – to access more advanced weaponry. Furthermore, most U.S. allies have vetoed the deployment in their territory of Huawei’s 5G networks, which is seen by Washington as a national security risk. This has significantly hampered Huawei’s global reach. The importance of U.S. alliances in countering Beijing was underscored by former U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns. In his final days in office, Burns pointed out that the key difference between the two powers is that the United States has allies while China does not. He even singled out the loyalty of nations like Canada and Denmark. The specific mentions of Canada and Denmark were far from accidental. Even before taking office, new U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines by threatening to seize Greenland from Denmark and floated the idea of Canada shedding its sovereignty to become part of the United States. Such statements challenge the principle of territorial integrity that has underpinned the international liberal order – an order the U.S. has championed since the end of World War II. Moreover, once in power, Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff on Canadian products (later suspended after discussions with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau) and threatened a similar 10 percent tariff on the European Union. This spiral of protectionism could eventually hurt U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific as well. For example, the Daiwa Institute of Research estimated that Japan’s GDP might drop by 1.4 percent over the next three years due to tariffs imposed by Trump early in his term. There’s also a risk that future tariffs could target these countries directly – Trump’s previous tariffs on Japanese steel and aluminum and threats against South Korea during his first term are stark reminders of that possibility. Since President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia – and especially as tensions between the United States and China have escalated since the mid-2010s – the rise of China has become the primary international concern for the United States. Today, China is a far more formidable rival than the Soviet Union was during its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, and it is the only power that could potentially displace the U.S. economically and diplomatically in third countries. **However, the United States can hardly count on its allies if it treats them worse than the way it treats its systemic rival.** After all, these allies are the nations that the new U.S. administration has threatened with 25 percent tariffs (while China has only faced 10 percent) or whose territorial integrity has been openly questioned. Such behavior is already yielding results: a recent YouGov poll found that 46 percent of Danish citizens view the United States as a threat – higher than the percentage that sees North Korea (44 percent) or Iran (40 percent) as such. The next four years will serve as a crucial test for the U.S. alliance system. Will the Trump administration limit itself to voicing reasonable criticisms – such as urging allies to boost their defense spending or to pursue a more balanced economic relationship? Or will it escalate tensions by launching a new trade war or even disengage from these alliances that over the past decades have underpinned Washington’s international position? If the latter happens, it could amount to self-sabotage of U.S. interests and a significant blow to its soft power among long-time allies. **Not only might these allies be less inclined to unite against China in the future, but they could also be pushed toward a hedging strategy, deepening their ties with Beijing and viewing the Asian country as a more predictable partner.** Maintaining its current major advantage over its systemic rival is ultimately a choice the United States must make. The ball is now in the White House’s court.

#### **Affirming increases allied coop. Okooboh 20**

**Okooboh 20** [Osebhahiemen Okooboh, lawyer and a progressive foreign policy enthusiast. Ose currently works with the Center for International Policy on their Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative/ Arms & Security Program, 8-26-2020, The US should lead by example and end its attack on the ICC, Responsible Statecraft, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pentagon-budget-2671136308/, accessed 2-13-2025.] //aayush

**It is time for the United States to live up to ideals that it has so eagerly applied to other countries** — particularly China and developing countries — **where there have been incidents of human rights abuse**. **The hardline stance taken by the Trump administration against legitimate ICC officers** in their pursuit of justice leads many countries to wonder why the United States should be granted an exception to the rules that have ostensibly guided much of its foreign policy. The United States would have much to gain by taking responsibility for its action and holding itself to global international standards. **By welcoming a genuine, fair, and transparent enquiry into whether there were human rights abuses committed by U.S. military and CIA personnel in Afghanistan, the United States would send an unfaltering message to the world that it holds itself to international norms and standards**. Allowing the investigation to proceed would make it clear that the it is a reliable and accountable partner that does not tolerate impunity for war crimes. Such a position would encourage other countries to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and enable reconciliation, restitution, and recovery from wars that impose an ever-growing toll on innocent civilians. Already **67 countries have signed a joint letter affirming support for the ICC in response to the U.S. executive order. Some of these countries are key U.S. allies, including France and Canada**. It would be reckless for **the United States to engage in actions that would strain its relationships with allies** who are ICC member countries and have publicly declared their support for the court. The joint letter suggests that **in a U.S.-ICC tussle, the United States should not expect to count on the support of its allies** who are ICC member countries. **In the current global system where multilateral cooperation is fast disintegrating and global leadership is in flux, the ICC remains an important standard-bearer and forum for ensuring that all countries are held to the same set of rules and expectations regarding respect for international law and treatment for non-combatants**. It would be reckless for the United States to engage in actions that would **strain its relationship with allies who are ICC member countries**. The next administration should consider a rescission of the current executive order against ICC officials. This should then be followed by a congressional inquiry into the legal and political implications of a fair and unimpeded investigation into the alleged war crimes. A congressional inquiry would allow a thorough bipartisan discussion on the issue but more importantly, it would allow the American public to have a say on the issue through their elected representatives in Congress.

#### **Otherwise, decline causes transition wars and lashout. Kim 19**

**Kim 19** [Min-Hyung Kim, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea, 2-4-2019, A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future, No Publication, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/itpd-02-2019-003/full/html, accessed 2-11-2025.] //aayush

Since the end of the Second World War, **the USA has undoubtedly been a global hegemon**. With its preponderant military and economic strength, it has created a liberal international economic order and maintained it by promoting global free trade. **USA sudden turn to protectionism under the banner of “America First” in the Trump administration illustrates “US fear” that its hegemony or Pax Americana is declining vis-à-vis China’s growing power**. It also demonstrates that **the USA now seeks to deter China from overtaking its hegemony so as to keep US hegemony as long as possible**. Currently, the USA and China are waging a trade war. What is important to note here is that **the driving force of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is more political than economic**. That is to say, **as China’s economic and political influence in the world vis-à-vis that of the USA increases, US fear about China’s power also grows. Under these circumstances, Washington makes every effort to assert its global dominance by deterring China’s challenge to its hegemony**[13]. **It is this** sort of “US **fear**” **about hegemonic power transition from Washington to Beijing that brought about US policies against the BRI, the AIIB, and Made in China 2015**. The fear of hegemonic power transition is indeed a **driving force for the US-launched trade war**. Understood this way, **the trade war between the USA and China may be a harbinger of a much larger-scale conflict between the two parties**, since as PTT predicts, **war is more likely to occur when the power gap between a declining hegemon and a rising challenger is getting closed**. **As China’s economic**, technological, military **and political rise continues down the road, the USA will try to contain it in order to maintain its global hegemony**. The obvious consequence of this seesaw game is the **intensification of the Sino–US competition over global hegemony**. The USA and China, the two most powerful states in the world, **appear as if they were on a collision course.** What this means is that **so long as US fear about China’s overtaking US hegemony persists, a similar type of conflict between the two hegemonic powers is likely to occur in the future** even if the current trade war is over.

# C2) AI

**Deployments are coming.**

**Tripathi '25** [Aman Tripathi; Reporter for Interesting Engineering; 01-30-2025; "US to deploy ‘hellscape’ of drones in Taiwan Strait by 2025 to counter China"; Interesting Engineering;

https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-confirms-unleashing-hellscape-of-drones; accessed 02-12-2025; brackets in original] leon

**The US seems to be rapidly advancing with its ambitious “Replicator” initiative**. Under this program,**the US aims to deploy swarms of lethal autonomous drones in the Taiwan Strait by August 2025**. Interestingly, **US officials have called this deployment an** “unmanned **hellscape**.”

Captain Alex Campbell, the maritime portfolio director of the Defense Innovation Unit, confirmed the August 2025 target date at the recent West 2025 conference.

“It’s not another [science and technology] project. **It is meant to get to production, meant to field systems**, in this case, in support of [US Indo-Pacific Command],” said Campbell, as reported by the US Naval Institute (USNI).

Networked unmanned systems to create a “hellscape”

**These** unmanned **systems, deployed across air, surface, and underwater, will be networked to form a cohesive force**.

**Affirming bans AI weapons.**

**Hassan ‘23** [F.M. Hassan; PhD in International Criminal Law @ the University of Aberdeen & Law Professor @ University Sains Islam Malaysia; 2023; “AI-Based Autonomous Weapons and Individual Criminal Responsibility Under the Rome Statute”; Journal of Digital Technologies and Law; https://www.lawjournal.digital/jour/article/view/188; accessed 02-12-2025; GZR + Willie T.] \*\*brackets in original\*\*

As for autonomous weapons based on AI which are fully unmanned, orders from the operators have been pre-programmed and as such, the legal responsibility for any actions must be expected to transfer from the operators to the system conducted by the AI. However, a question of legal obligations will arise; whether any decisions made by the weapon will be borne by the weapon or its operators? In this sense, no one can be held accountable if he or she is willing to offend or behave passively. **However, a weapon system’s designer, programmer, or manufacturer could also be held liable** only to the extent if they willfully to contributed to the crime commission (McFarland & McCormack, 2014).

Since autonomous weapons, particularly those which are free of human intervention where AI entirely controls them,**there are no choice for human actors to exercise empathy or judgment**(Gunawan et al., 2022). **Human influence over weapons systems and force use need to meet legal and ethical demands**, as mentioned by the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its statement on the Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) in Geneva on 11 April 2017 to the CCW.

Conclusion

**The advancement of technology has reached a high standard and demand by the international community in order to protect its borders and citizens not only from being invaded and attacked by outsiders**, but also to protect their troops from being targeted and killed. This led to the creation of the new technology in weaponry of autonomous weapons based on AI. However,**such technology does not free from any responsibility under international law** and has received many criticisms and concerns by the international community due to attacks by to be taken and done by autonomous weapons based on AI which could still incur casualties from the non-military objectives. **Since the creation of the ICC in 2002 via the Rome Statute, the latter provides a solution even to the most advanced weapons such as unmanned autonomous weapons** based on **AI whereby individuals behind the creation and manning such weapons would be criminally liable if they went beyond the borders allowed under the law in order to win the war or involved in armed conflicts**.

**That perceptually deters developers.**

**Smith ‘22** [Maggie Smith; US Army cyber officer currently assigned to the Army Cyber Institute @ the United States Military Academy & assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences @ West Point; 06-21-2022; “With Artificial Intelligence, Short-Term Risk Aversion is Long-Term Risk Seeking”; Modern War Institute;

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/with-artificial-intelligence-short-term-risk-aversion-is-long-term-risk-se eking/; accessed 02-12-2025; Willie T.]

Specifically, there **are two key areas of concern**—especially **for the implementation of AI-powered technologies on the battlefield**: AI development and AI implementation. Namely, **it is unclear if developers should wait for a notionally perfect, safe solution before implementing AI technology, or if they should introduce AI technology after it reaches an acceptable level** of proficiency and allow it to organically develop in the wild. For example, the several companies pursuing autonomous driving technology are understandably cautious, and some remain unwilling to make their technology available for public or widespread use. **The hesitancy is**, in part,**related to a desire to avoid fatal accidents and a fear of being held liable for mistakes made by an immature technology**.

**Otherwise, capabilities threaten China’s second-strike causing war.**

**Johnson ’20** [James S. Johnson; Chief Petty Officer; Spring 2020; "Artificial Intelligence: A Threat to Strategic Stability"; Air University;

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14\_Issue-1/Johnson.pdf; ellipses in original; accessed 11-04-2024] leon recut Aaron

Finally, in the **maritime domain**, **u**nmanned **u**nderwater **v**essels (**UUV**), **u**nmanned **s**urface **v**essels (**USV**), and **UAVs** supported by **AI-enabled** intra-swarm **communication** and **ISR systems** could be **deployed simultaneously** in both **offensive** and **defensive** antisubmarine **warfare** operations to **saturate** an **enemy’s defenses** and to **locate**, **disable**, and **destroy** its **nuclear-armed** or **nonnuclear** attack

**submarines**.64 Despite continued advances in sensor technology design (e.g., reduced size and extended detection ranges) to overcome quieting challenges, other technical challenges still remain. These include communicating underwater between multiple systems, processing power requirements, generating battery life and energy, and scaling the system.65

While some experts do not expect a technically reliable and effective capability of this kind will be operational for at least a decade, others are more optimistic.66 From a tactical perspective, drone swarms would not need ocean-wide coverage (or full ocean transparency) to effectively detect and track submarines. According to UK rear admiral John Gower, a relatively even spread of sensors might be sufficient to enable “a viable search and detection plan . . . conceived for the open ocean” (emphasis added).67 Moreover, advances in mobile sensing platforms could enable drones in swarms to locate submarines through chokepoints (or gateways) as they emerge from ports. Due to the current slowness of drones with extended sea ranges, however, trailing them autonomously seems implausible.68 Future iterations of machine-learning-augmented UUVs and USVs may eventually complement, and perhaps replace entirely, the traditional role of general-purpose nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and manned surface vehicles in tracking and trailing submarines of adversaries at chokepoints while simultaneously mounting sparsely distributed and mobile distributed network systems (DNS) sensors on UUVs.69

If a state views the **credibility** of its survivable **nuclear weapons** (especially **nuclear-armed** submarines) to be at **risk**,70 **conventional capabilities** such as **drone swarms** will likely have a **destabilizing effect** at a **strategic level**.71 Thus, even if **swarm sorties** were not **intended** as (or indeed technically **capable of**) a disarming **first strike**, the **perception alone** of the **feasibility** of such an **operation** would be **destabilizing nonetheless**. Moreover, the **speed** of **AI** could put the **defender** at a **distinct disadvantage**, creating **additional incentives** to **strike first** (or **preemptively**) technologically **superior military rivals**. Consequently,the **less secure** a nation **considers** its **second-strike** capabilities to be, the **more likely** it is to **countenance** the use of **autonomous systems** within its **nuclear weapons** complex to bolster the **survivability** of its **strategic forces**. According to analyst Paul Scharre, “winning in swarm combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms” (emphasis added).72

Combining speed, persistence, scope, coordination, and battlefield mass, AWSs will offer states attractive asymmetric options to project military power within contested A2/AD zones.73 Enhanced by sophisticated machine learning neural networks, China’s manned and unmanned drone teaming operations could potentially impede future US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Seas.74 Its air- and sea-based drones linked to sophisticated neural networks could, for example, support the People’s Liberation Army’s manned and unmanned teaming operations. Were China to infuse its cruise missiles and hypersonic glide capabilities with AI and autonomy, **close-range encounters** in the **Taiwan Straits** and the **E**ast and **S**outh **C**hina **S**eas would become more **complicated**, **accident- prone**, and **destabilizing**—at both a conventional and nuclear level.75 China is reportedly developing and deploying UUVs to bolster its underwater monitoring and antisubmarine capabilities as part of a broader goal to establish an “underwater Great Wall” to challenge US undersea military primacy.**US AI-enhanced** UUVs could, **for example**, theoretically **threaten** China’s **nuclear ballistic** and **nonnuclear** attack **submarines**.76

The deployment of new military technology in the nuclear domain, therefore, affects states differently depending on the relative strength of their strategic force structure. Thus, even if **US UUVs** were **programmed** only to threaten China’s **nonnuclear attack** fleets, Chinese **commanders** might **nonetheless** fear that their country’s **nascent** and **relatively small**— compared to US and Russian **SSBN fleets**—sea-based **nuclear deterrent** could be **neutralized** more easily.77 Moreover, advances in **machine learning sensor tech**nology for **enabling** more **accurate detection** of Chinese **SSBNs** would likely **reinforce** Beijing’s **concerns** that it was being targeted by a **militarily superior** power—especially the **United States**. To test the veracity of this scenario, a better understanding of Chinese thinking on the utility of its nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities—and how it could inform China’s attitude to escalation risk—would be required.

**US-China war goes nuclear --- nearby bases create a use or lose on China’s 2nd strike.**

**Hallin** **17** (Columnist for Foreign Policy in Focus, "A Think Tank Without Walls," and an independent journalist. He oversaw the journalism program at the University of California, Santa Cruz for 23 years “How Trump Could Blunder into War With China” accessed online 3/9/17 https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia\_pacific/china-news-donald-trump-chinese-world-news-35405/)

Rather than trying to assuage China’s paranoia, the US made things worse by adopting a military strategy to checkmate “Area Denial.” Called “Air/Sea Battle”—later renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons”—it envisions attacking China’s navy, air force, radar facilities and command centers with air and naval power. Missiles would be used to take out targets deep into Chinese territory. China’s recent seizure of a US underwater drone off the Philippines is part of an ongoing chess game in the region. The drone was almost certainly mapping sea floor bottoms and collecting data that would allow the US to track Chinese submarines, including those armed with nuclear missiles. While the heist was a provocative thing to do—it was seized right under the nose of an unarmed US Navy ship—it’s a reflection of how nervous the Chinese are about their vulnerability to Air/Sea Battle. China’s leaders “have good reason to worry about this emerging U.S. naval strategy [use of undersea drones] against China in East Asia,” Li Mingjiang, a China expert at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told the Financial Times. “If this strategy becomes reality, it could be quite detrimental to China’s national security.” Washington charges that the Chinese are playing the bully with small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, and there is some truth to that charge. China has been throwing its weight around with several nations in Southeast Asia. But it also true that the Chinese have a lot of evidence that the Americans are gunning for them. The US has some 400 military bases surrounding China and is deploying anti-ballistic missiles in South Korea and Japan, ostensibly to guard against North Korean nuclear weapons. But the interceptors could also down Chinese missiles, **posing a threat to Beijing’s nuclear deterrence**. While Air/Sea Battle does not envision using nuclear weapons, **it** **could** **still** **lead to a nuclear war.** It would be very difficult to figure out whether missiles were targeting command centers or China’s nukes. Under the stricture “use them or lose them,” the Chinese might fear their missiles were endangered and launch them. The last thing one wants to do with a nuclear-armed power is make it guess. Embed from Getty Images SUPERPOWER CONFLICT The Trump administration has opened a broad front on China, questioning the “One China” policy, accusing Beijing of being in cahoots with Islamic terrorists and threatening a trade war. The first would upend more than 30 years of diplomacy, the second is bizarre—if anything, China is overly aggressive in suppressing terrorism in its western Xinjiang Province—and the third makes no sense. China is America’s major trading partner and holds $1.24 trillion in US treasury bonds. While Trump charges that the Chinese have hollowed out the American economy by undermining its industrial base with cheap labor and goods, China didn’t force Apple or General Motors to pull up stakes and decamp elsewhere. Capital goes where wages are low and unions are weak. A trade war would hurt China, but it would also hurt the US and the global economy as well. When Trump says he wants to make America great again, what he really means is that he wants to go back to that post-World War II period when the US dominated much of the globe with a combination of economic strength and military power. But that era is gone, and dreams of a unipolar world run by Washington are a hallucination. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “by 2030 Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power based on GDP [gross domestic product], population size, military spending and technological investments.” By 2025, two-thirds of the world will live in Asia, 7% in Europe and 5% in the US. Those are the demographics of eclipse. If Trump starts a trade war, he will find little support among America’s allies. China is the number one trading partner for Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and India, and the third largest for Indonesia and the Philippines. Over the past year, a number of countries like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have also distanced themselves from Washington and moved closer to China. When President Barack Obama tried to get US allies not to sign on to China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, they ignored him. But the decline of US influence has a dangerous side. Washington may not be able to dictate the world’s economy, but it has immense military power. Chinese military expert Yang Chengjun says “China does not stir up troubles, but we are not afraid of them when they come.” They should be. For all its modernization, China is no match for the US. However, defeating China is far beyond Washington’s capacity. The only wars the US has “won” since 1945 are Grenada and Panama. Nonetheless, such a clash would be catastrophic. It would torpedo global trade, inflict trillions of dollars of damage on each side, and the odds are distressingly high that the war could go nuclear.

## Extinction.

**Sargoytchev 8**. (Dr. Stoyan Sargoytchev, Engineering Diploma, PhD in Physics in the Field of Space Research, Worked with European Space Agency, Worked with the Program Intercosmos Coordinated by the Former Soviet Union, Visiting Scientist @ Cornell Univ, Worked in Arecibo Observatory, Currently Works with the Canadian Space Agency, and York University, Editor in Chief. “MANIFESTO: Prevent Nuclear Disaster – Doomsday” Paper Prepared by International Group of Scientists and Engineers, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OMZpbkEkwxqq5jO2Wg0cj1bjr40mugUS/view?usp=sharing] SARG = Stimulated Anomalous Reaction to Gravity

One new physical phenomenon that resulted from antigravity research was reported at the 27 th Annual Meeting of the Society for Scientific Exploration, 25-28 June, 2008, in Boulder, CO, USA [2]. The unique gravito-inertial phenomenon achieved in the laboratory was called Stimulated Anomalous Reaction to Gravity (SARG). It was a result of years of research following successful theoretical predictions, and was supported by international private organizations. The theoretical and experimental research leading to the discovery of this effect were published at a number conferences and international meetings, and is the subject of a patent application [3,4,5]. In parallel with the laboratory experiments, extensive analysis was done on the effects of nuclear tests in the atmosphere using the physics behind the observed SARG effect. **A** **large quantity of** unclassified **nuclear test data** **from** both **the USA and** the former **Soviet Union** was used. Pictures and technical specs, as well as video material, are available via the Internet. The videos are **useful for observing** the **dynamics in the** **first few seconds of** **the nuclear explosion** when unusual phenomena take place. **It was observed that an** **extremely large** **scale** **SARG effect takes place** in the first few seconds or tens of seconds. The effect is stronger when the nuclear explosion takes place in the atmosphere between 200 m to 2 km above the ground. It is less strong at higher altitudes due to the rarefied atmosphere. Even for the non-scientist, **the** **effect of antigravity is apparent** in several videos such as the unclassified documentary movie entitled “Declassified U.S. Nuclear Test Film #70” [6]. The atmospheric nuclear test near the beginning of the documentary occurs at an altitude of 610 m from the ground. **As the plasma from the nuclear explosion** **expands, a thick column of dust and condensed air begins** **to rise from the ground**. It reaches the expanding plasma **in** about 20 sec. **Small**-diameter **tornado-like columns** **also arise simultaneously, and this** phenomenon **is** **very common** **during** atmospheric **nuclear explosions.** Note that the rising main column not only reaches the bulk of expanded plasma but also punches through it. **The SARG effect explains the rising column and surrounding tornados.** The nuclear explosion causes the formation of a vast quantity of expanding plasma. **This plasma affects the physical vacuum in such a way that an antigravity effect is created below the nuclear explosion.** The dust and condensed gases rise because of the antigravity effect. **They obtain a vertical pulse momentum during the existence of the plasma resulting from the explosion**, which may last for a few seconds to tens of seconds. The explosion also creates another detectable effect – a strong EM pulse. (In the laboratory experiment demonstrating the SARG effect, such a pulse is quite weak and is invoked by other means). The rising column and the expanding plasma create the well-known shape of the nuclear mushroom cloud. The same antigravity phenomenon with multiple tornados is also visible in the videos [7,8] of other atmospheric nuclear tests. From 1945 to 1963 the USA conducted an extensive campaign of atmospheric nuclear tests, grouped into roughly 20 test series [9]. USSR also conducted extensive atmospheric nuclear tests in the period from 1949 to 1962. They are summarized in a Catalog of Worldwide Nuclear Testing edited by V. N. Michailov [10]. After the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963, testing by the U.S., Soviet Union, and Great Britain moved underground. France continued atmospheric testing until 1974 and China did so until 1980. In all the available information, there is no indication that simultaneous atmospheric nuclear tests separated by a finite distance have ever been performed. This has been our good fortune, as we will see. **In a single** atmospheric **test, the antigravity effect is** usually **directed** vertically **upward. But what might** **happen if simultaneous tests within a finite time and distance** **were done? The** **disturbance** **of the physical vacuum** **would lead to an antigravity effect that is not vertical.** Additionally, the two disturbances would interact and the columns from the rising dust and gases will be twisted. The new **physics of this phenomenon predicts** **that** **the antigravity effect from** **the** **two explosions will be much stronger. This may cause** **a part of the** **atmosphere to be thrown into space.** Further, it is possible that **a self-supported tornado-like effect** **may extend the life of the phenomenon, so a** **significant fraction of** **the earth’s** **atmosphere** **may be sucked into space.** **This is more than just speculation since** **exactly such an** **effect was observed on the Sun** **by some solar orbit satellites** [11,12]. The video clip on the National Geographic website [13] clearly shows the dynamics of the solar tornado extended into space. Now scientists claim that such a tornado is responsible for throwing large quantities of solar gaseous mass into space [14]. The phenomenon observed at the Sun could happen on the Earth during simultaneous nuclear atmospheric explosions that create similar conditions. To understand the gravity effects, one must have a correct model of the physical vacuum. The model adopted about 100 years ago is now not supported by laboratory experiments. We may think that the space outside the earth’s atmosphere is empty but it still has the properties of the physical vacuum, and many experiments show that it is not void. This new understanding is completely unknown to military advisors and politicians. They don’t have a clear idea what could happen during multiple nuclear explosions in the atmosphere because, fortunately, such experiments have never been done. We must not think that the atmosphere is something permanent and cannot be destroyed. The planet Mars is a good example of an atmosphere’s vulnerability. Once Mars had an atmosphere. This is evident from apparent surface erosion from rivers. Now the atmospheric pressure on Mars is about 0.1% of Earth’s atmospheric pressure. Mars lost its atmosphere probably because of some natural event such as a huge volcanic eruption. If the policy of preemptive nuclear strike is applied during a military conflict, there will likely be multiple cases of simultaneous nuclear explosions within a limited range and time. The probability is high that conditions will be created which can result in the loss of a fraction of the Earth atmosphere. Let us describe the consequences of this worst-case scenario that might develop during the initial phase of the nuclear strikes. If an atmospheric sucking-tornado effect occurs somewhere, the first effect will be a huge windstorm that equalizes the atmospheric pressure. This, of course, will not stop the nuclear strikes. The worst case is that the **global** **atmospheric pressure will drop** **below some critical level. It is well known that** **human** **beings** **are** **quite** **sensitive to changes** **in atmospheric pressure.** (Even a trained mountain climber could not climb a peak higher than 5 km without an oxygen mask). At some low level of atmospheric pressure, **a person** **loses consciousness.** **Since the effect of a** **pressure drop will be permanent, there is no chance of returning** **to consciousness.** Protective measures exist to counter all known effects of a nuclear explosion: i.e., direct radiation, shock waves, and radioactivity. **Protection from reduced** **atmospheric** **pressure,** **however,** **is impossible.** In the worst-case scenario, **there will be no survivors. It does not matter** that **you are** rich or poor, **living in a highly developed or a poor country,** **in an urban or low populated** **area. Everyone** **on Earth will die.** **This may happen** **in a time interval of 1-3 days.** The dead people will lay unburied together with animals. Microbes and fungi will survive while the **biomass of Earth’s human and animal population slowly disintegrates.** This will be a very tragic end to Earth’s civilization; a civilization that reached its apogee in order to destroy itself. **There will be no one left** **to document the end of humankind.**

# C3) DAWs

**Trump gets an Iron Dome**

**Gatopoulos 25** — Alex Gatopoulos, 2-4-2025 [Defence Editor for AlJazeera English. Scottish/Greek Brit. MA grad in War Studies, "Trump’s new missile shield for the US – challenges and dangers," Al Jazeera,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/4/trumps-new-missile-shield-for-the-us-challen ges-and-dangers, accessed 2-4-2025] // aari + cpsof

**A week into office, United States President Donald Trump surprised the world and many of his policymakers by announcing his plans to create a missile defence shield, calling it the “Iron Dome for America”.** At first, the name evoked Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, which is designed to intercept and destroy low-level targets, rockets, mortar shells and cruise missiles over a short range. It is tailored to Israel’s defence needs and size. It soon became apparent that what Trump was advocating on January 27 was the creation of a “**new-generation missile defence shield for the United States, against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks”.** Essentially, it is an updated version of former US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative, or “Star Wars” programme. **The phrase “Iron Dome” is now a synonym for “missile defence shield”.** This new multilayered defence system is envisaged as not just protecting the US but also forward-deployed troops in combat. Reagan’s dream of a missile defence shield remained mostly that, a dream, although billions of dollars were poured into the programme. The problems, both then and now, were that a comprehensive missile shield would be exorbitant in price, barely technically possible and impractical in reality as easily available technologies would be able to spoof or overwhelm the most up-to-date missile defence system. However, the science behind missile defence has advanced greatly in 40 years, and missile defences have now been tested in combat in Ukraine and Israel, and they are increasingly effective. Missile defence – the art of the possible The US already has an early warning and interceptor system in place, but this has limited ability and would be able to stop only the kind of attacks launched by minor nuclear powers like North Korea. It would not be able to stop a large-scale attack by a determined and capable foe like Russia or China. Missile defence has matured rapidly as advancements in missile guidance and detection have increased dramatically over the past decade. The analogy of “hitting a bullet with another bullet” hints at the scale of the challenges for developing a missile defence system, except missiles move at upwards of 20 times those speeds. For a missile defence shield to be viable, incoming missiles need to be swiftly detected and tracked, and all that information must be relayed to interceptor batteries. The interceptor must then be guided to the target, destroying the incoming enemy missile. This, preferably, should be as far away from one’s territory as possible, especially when considering these missiles could very well be nuclear armed. The US and Israel have poured billions of dollars into research, often cooperating, and the results are evident. In the conflicts over the skies of Ukraine and Israel, incoming missiles have been detected and destroyed with increasing frequency. The information gained in actual combat has been invaluable to developers. A next-generation missile shield, according to the White House, would have to defend itself against “ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries”. This is a colossal task. Modern long-range missiles come with decoys and other penetration aids. Their speed is tremendous at 25,000 kilometres per hour (15,500 miles per hour) or faster. Hypersonic missiles are designed to circumvent this and take a randomised path to their targets, making their interception that much harder. Cruise missiles, first developed as offensive first-strike weapons, fly below radar cover and arrive at their targets with little to no warning. The challenges these types of missiles create are enormous, and stopping them would require new networks, capabilities and weapons to be effective. Enter the US Space Force Initially derided, the US Space Force, created by Trump during his first term in office and established in 2019, would be an integral part of this new missile shield along with the US Strategic and Northern commands. Emphasis has been placed on intercepting any missile attack as early as possible, ideally in the first phase, or “boost phase”, of a missile’s flight. Such interceptions would require a network of space-based radar systems to detect the heat plumes of missiles that have just launched. The plan also calls for a series of space-based interceptors that could destroy missiles at this early stage. Whether this means interceptor missiles or introducing space-based laser batteries in orbit remains to be seen. Space-based laser technology

has significantly advanced since the 1980s when such weapons were first proposed. However, it still needs more investment and miniaturisation before it becomes a viable weapons system. What would power a laser with sufficient strength to destroy a missile from hundreds of kilometres away as its target moves at increasing speed? Tactical, short-range laser technology has been used to intercept targets in Ukraine, but the power needed to destroy incoming missiles would be a magnitude greater. Space-based “kinetic kill” missiles could also be used to hit and essentially smash incoming missiles to bits. All these weapons would be in orbit, covering a huge area, as they watch for missile launches and attacks. The placement, coordination and control of this vast network of interceptors and detectors would be controlled by the Space Force, now given an increasing “warfighter” role, using active weapons systems against an adversary. Move and countermove **How would adversaries react? Likely by boosting weapons programmes of their own and dramatically accelerating the arms race that already exists between the nuclear-capable powers. The technology is already out there to easily overwhelm a missile defence shield’s ability to detect and intercept every launch.** No system can be 100 percent effective – so success, or failure, would be a matter of degree. How big a degree depends on the measures used by US adversaries. Apart from decoys, basic countermeasures already exist. Mirrored surfaces would weaken the power of any laser beam aimed at them. Warhead shrouds, fitted with liquid nitrogen coolant, can mask the temperature of incoming warheads, so early warning infrared detectors would not be able to see them. The technologies to trick a system, still in the embryonic stages of development, are much cheaper than the missile defence shield itself. It is increasingly likely that the tens of billions of dollars allocated for research will mushroom into hundreds of billions with every development by the US foiled for a fraction of the cost. Increased danger The colossal cost and technical challenges aside, there is another major issue. **Embedded in Trump’s executive order is a request to pursue capabilities to “defeat missile attacks prior to launch” – in other words, attack first. This puts a very different spin on what has always been billed as a defensive weapons system but will now have an offensive component.** The order also calls for the technology to “guarantee its secure second-strike capability”. The US already has a very robust second, or retaliatory, strike capability: Its fleet of nuclear missile submarines would be able to destroy the planet several times over with the firepower they have. The capability to strike back at an enemy who has attacked the US would be supplemented by surviving land-based missiles, air-launched missiles from airborne bombers and a variety of other delivery systems. The US’s second-strike capability is guaranteed, so why is there a need for a shield? **An effective shield breaks down the decades-old balance of terror on which mutually assured destruction, or MAD, is based: We all can destroy each other, even if attacked first, so let’s not start a nuclear war that would result in everyone’s destruction. This balance is significantly weakened if one party can hide behind an effective missile defence system, safe in the knowledge that if it attacks first, the new and much-improved missile shield could stop the weakened retaliatory response. This shift in balance is particularly dangerous because it sends a signal to near-peer competitor countries, prompting them to take countermeasures of their own. The world has become much more dangerous, and space is about to become much more crowded.**

**It’s quick.**

Rachel**Jewett**, 1-29-20**25**, "Trump Signs Order for Massive ‘Iron Dome’ Missile Defense Project With Space-Based Interceptors," Via Satellite, https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2025/01/29/trump-signs-order-for-massive-iron-dome-missile-defense-project-with-space-based-interceptors/ , accessed 2-12-2025, //coop

President Trump has signed an **executive order for the Pentagon to move out on developing an “Iron Dome for America,” a massive, likely multi-billion dollar project that will**

**utilize space-based interceptors. New Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has 60 days to submit a plan for building out the “next-generation missile defense shield,”** with the White House expecting the project to be **included in the upcoming fiscal year 2026 budget request.** “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield. The United States will deter — and defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against — any foreign aerial attack on the homeland; and the United States will guarantee its secure second-strike capability,” the executive order states. Within 60 days, Hegseth is tasked with delivering a “reference architecture” for the design of the Iron Dome, a capabilities-based requirements document and an implementation plan for the project.

**It’s autonomous**

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https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/2024/02/a-defense-for-guardian-robots-are-defensi ve-autonomous-weapons-systems-justifiable/, Accessed 2-4-2025] // cpsof +aari \*brackets in og

To understand Israel’s relatively low casualty rate, we must delve into the **deployment of the world’s most advanced defensive autonomous weapons system (DAWS), known as the ‘Iron Dome.’** Marco Sassòli, a professor and leading expert on international law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, affirmed that the Iron Dome has helped Israel reduce its civilian casualties despite the arbitrary targeting by Hamas’ traditional rockets. Introduced in 2011, this defense system has been claimed to have a 97 percent success rate in intercepting incoming missiles. Put into context, Israel’s weekly average of around 3,000 incoming missiles translates to approximately 415 successful interceptions daily. To get this number, the Iron Dome operates through three key components: radar, control, and battery. First, its radar detects incoming missiles and other airborne threats, distinguishing their size, velocity, and type. Second, the control acts as the ‘brain’ of the operation, employing algorithms and, more recently, artificial intelligence (AI) to guide interceptor rockets toward their targets automatically, even when the incoming missiles exhibit erratic movements. Additionally, it can prioritize intercepting missiles aimed at populated areas. Lastly, the battery fires two interceptors at each incoming missile and can release up to 20 interceptors at a time.While Israel stands out as a prime example of the application of the world’s most advanced AI-powered DAWS, it is far from being the sole user. **The United States, a co-producer of the Iron Dome, has ventured into testing the system’s application** in Guam. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is making significant progress in developing the DragonFire, a DAWS that harnesses concentrated laser beams to safeguard both land and maritime targets. Israel has taken a similar approach to developing the Iron Beam, which is designed to be a cost-efficient alternative to the Iron Dome. Generally, **autonomous weapons systems (AWS)** have seen decades of use, but not all have been employed exclusively for defensive purposes. Recently, we have witnessed their integration with AI technologies, enabling these systems to operate substantially independently from human interference. **In response to this growing threat**

**to human dignity, there is an uprising movement to limit the further developments of AWS, with some advocating for stopping its development entirely.** Spearheaded by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, this coalition has made significant progress in raising global awareness about the escalating threats posed by autonomous weapons. Particularly noteworthy is the coalition’s Vote Against The Machine campaign, which prompted the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to adopt Resolution L.56, entitled “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security,” in October 2023. Sponsored by 44 states, the proposal has garnered the support of 120 other states, calling for all states to address the humanitarian, legal, and ethical risks posed by AWS. I. The Case for Defensive Autonomous Weapons Systems While extensive discussions and policies have delved into the legal and ethical challenges associated with lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), a noticeable gap exists with DAWS. **In the discourse on AWS, the focus has predominantly gravitated toward LAWS, often overlooking the existence and potential of AWS designed exclusively for defensive purposes**. Furthermore, the terminology used in these discussions has contributed to this oversight. **The term AWS is frequently used interchangeably with ‘Killer Robots,’ emphasizing the perception of autonomy in weapons systems predominantly geared toward offensive actions.** In Resolution L.56 itself, although the title explicitly concerns LAWS, the umbrella term of AWS is still used repeatedly throughout several clauses. It is essential to acknowledge that weapons, in general, are not exclusively developed for offensive purposes. In this context, Black’s Law Dictionary provides an inclusive legal definition of ‘weapon’ as “an instrument of offensive or defensive combat.” In the realm of lexical discourses, **weapons are inherently recognized as serving two opposing functions. However, this duality is often overlooked in legal discussions surrounding AWS.** In light of this reality, this article proposes introducing a new term, ‘Guardian Robots,’ as a synonym for DAWS, aiming to provide a balanced perspective. The differentiation between DAWS and LAWS is crucial because several ethical and legal considerations driving the push for a ban on LAWS are not applicable to DAWS. First and foremost, LAWS are often challenged on the grounds that they cannot comply with IHL, which requires adherence to the principles of humanity, distinction, proportionality, and military necessity. These arguments are based on the fact that current AI technologies are incapable of making decisions to the extent humans can. Indeed, AI is not yet technologically advanced enough to differentiate a surrendering soldier from a civilian who might be carrying weapons for defense. However, DAWS do not even need to make such decisions because of its purpose to exclusively aim at offensive weapons. Conversely, it can help and has helped humans in upholding humanitarian principles. For instance, the Iron Dome’s capability to target only missiles directed at civilian areas can help both the aggressor and the defender align with the goals of the distinction principle in IHL, significantly protecting civilian lives. Another common argument supporting legal limitations on the development and deployment of LAWS revolves around the concept of meaningful human control (MHC). MHC is rooted in the philosophical discussions surrounding AWS, with the primary objective of constraining the reduction of significant human oversight and deliberation in weapons deployment. Two fundamental principles guide the preservation of MHC. The first principle dictates that weapons systems should not be able to apply force and operate without any form of human control. The second principle highlights the notion of ‘meaningful’ control, asserting that pressing a ‘fire’ button falls short of constituting substantive human oversight. Some scholars argue that, while permitted, automation must be largely restricted to ensure significant human control in AWS. Others have pointed out that even a limited role for automated systems in AWS decision-making promotes an authority imbalance, perpetuating automation bias and ultimately influencing the human operator who should be in charge of the system. **Automation bias is a psychological phenomenon in which individuals tend to favor decisions made by automated systems over their own judgments, even when the automated decision is proven inaccurate.** Undeniably, automation bias and systematic errors are not exclusive to LAWS and can also arise in the decision-making of DAWS. However, the substantial benefits of widespread DAWS deployment far outweigh the potential drawbacks. Unlike LAWS, in which error exacerbates its already-destructive nature, DAWS only poses a risk in cases of extreme malfunctions. So far, the Iron Dome’s failures have been linked almost

exclusively to the inability to intercept missiles without any breaches of IHL principles. Moreover, the Iron Dome is classified as a weapon with a very short launch range. This limitation prevents the Iron Dome from becoming lethal. Given the Iron Dome’s exceptionally high success rate, DAWS’s lawful and comprehensive technological development remains unlikely to pose lethal concerns during errors. This proposition can be further argued to assert that, in the evolving landscape of military weaponry, autonomous defenses are not only beneficial but also essential for upholding IHL principles. Even without LAWS and AI technologies, military weapons are developed in increasingly complex ways that often surpass human capacity for effective defense. Due to its precision and rapid response capabilities, DAWS can be strategically deployed in vulnerable areas or sectors where the threats are beyond human control. Even in cases where DAWS fail to completely stop an attack, its role in mitigating its consequences can significantly help uphold IHL’s principle of proportionality. When sufficiently developed, the utilization of DAWS is pivotal in significantly reducing civilian casualties, as evidenced by the Iron Dome. II. The Challenges of Defensive Autonomous Weapons System Nevertheless, the pursuit of lawful development for DAWS while eliminating LAWS is not without its unique set of challenges. **The first fundamental concern revolves around the definition of ‘defense.’ To what extent does the use of AWS qualify as an act of defense?** The Caroline Doctrine provides a clear framework for ‘anticipatory’ self-defense, allowing a response when the need to react is “instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” It readily addresses the permissibility of actions based on whether they constitute an attack or a counterattack. If the counterattack aligns with the criteria outlined in the Caroline Doctrine, it can be considered a lawful and justifiable response to an action initiated by another party. However, this doctrine is only relevant to decide whether or not the start of a defense is justifiable. **The definition of defense becomes increasingly blurry when it comes to the proportion of the counterattack.** Two common yet contradictory parameters are often used to define proportionality in times of defense: the ‘tit for tat’ and the ‘means-end’ parameters. The ‘tit for tat’ parameter suggests that defensive actions are permissible when the counterattack is proportionate to the initial attack. In contrast, the ‘means-end’ parameter focuses on completely deterring the attacker from the ability to launch further attacks, determining the legitimacy of a proportional counterattack based on the objective of using force. The utilization of systems like the Iron Dome aligns more closely with the ‘tit for tat’ approach, where defense matches the scale of the attack. Proponents advocating for the complete prohibition of all forms of AWS may argue that DAWS could potentially be **exploited as LAWS** under the guise of self-defense. The lack of a universally agreed-upon definition for defensive weapons creates a vulnerability, allowing for the manipulation of international law principles and doctrines. However, this concern can be effectively **addressed by** establishing an **international agreement** that outlines the characteristics of DAWS. The international agreement could explicitly define the elements that categorize a weapon as a DAWS to enhance clarity and prevent misuse. Additionally, incorporating the ‘tit for tat’ parameter into the agreement would provide a specific criterion for assessing the legitimacy of an AWS in relation to its defensive or lethal nature. This criterion ensures that the evaluation of autonomous weapons aligns with the principle of proportionality, wherein the defensive response corresponds appropriately to the scale of the initial attack. By deliberately excluding the ‘means-end’ parameter from the assessment criteria, such an agreement would significantly reduce the potential for abuse of DAWS and uphold IHL principles. The second fundamental concern revolves around the danger of reverse engineering. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed on the Russo-Ukrainian war, “We’re concerned also with the possibility that [the Iron Dome] systems that we would give to Ukraine would fall into Iranian hands and could be reverse engineered.” He continued by adding that this is not a theoretical concern, as a similar case has happened previously with other anti-tank systems. **The Iron Dome’s technologies are especially at a heightened risk for reverse engineering due to their high mobility nature.** While this feature is an advantage for Israel to strategically place the weapon in densely populated areas, it means that **it is also severely vulnerable to being captured. Beyond the concern of**

**physical capture, as AI is also a highly adaptive technology, the other party can learn to continuously feed the system with false positives, which intentionally transforms DAWS into LAWS. In this scenario, the aggressor can use human shields and trick the AI into thinking that the ‘human baits’ are weapons to be attacked for defense.** Critics of DAWS may argue that even when adhering to a strict definition of DAWS to govern their permissibility, the inherent unpredictability of machine learning still introduces a great risk of reverse engineering. However, in the case where the adversary employs false positives to reverse engineer the DAWS, this issue can be overcome by continuous and close oversight from humans to evaluate the decisions carried out by the DAWS. Also, DAWS can incorporate mechanisms such as timers before taking actions to allow human intervention when it responds to false positives. While such a mechanism does not equate to MHC as it does not involve human decision in the firing process, it allows humans to override the system’s action when necessary. In addition to temporal safeguards, advanced physical and technical features can be embedded in DAWS to thwart potential misuse, particularly if the system is captured. These measures include a self-destruction feature, rendering the system inoperable if compromised. Moreover, incorporating custom-built proprietary hardware, which is not commercially available, adds complexity to reverse engineering attempts. Continuous code obfuscation, achieved through regularly updating the codebase with intricate modifications, makes understanding the system’s logic and functionality more challenging for those attempting to reverse engineer DAWS. Reverse engineering also presents a unique legal issue surrounding the development of DAWS that is not present in the deployment of LAWS. By design, LAWS are made with the intention to attack, while DAWS are not. This distinction prompts a critical consideration regarding whether an act of reverse engineering can be categorized as an attack when the underlying intent to cause harm is absent. **According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, intention, or mens rea, is an element of finding a war crime in an attack against civilians. In a reverse-engineered DAWS, the two parties’ responsibility for the attack becomes divided. The weapon user becomes accountable for the physical act of the offense, referred to as actus reus, while the party manipulating the system holds the mens rea element.** So far, there is no international law governing reverse engineering. **This dilemma poses another layer of complexity in AWS’s accountability.**

**Trump deregulates.**

Martin **Mackowski**, Wolfgang Maschek, Beth Goldstein, Julia Jacobson, Alan Friel, Matthew Kirk, Pablo Carrillo, 2-10-20**25**, "Key Insights on President Trump’s New AI Executive Order and Policy & Regulatory Implications," Privacy World,

https://www.privacyworld.blog/2025/02/key-insights-on-president-trumps-new-ai-executive-order-and-policy-regulatory-implications/, accessed 2-12-2025, //coop **The Trump EO explicitly frames AI development as a matter of national competitiveness and economic strength, prioritizing policies that remove perceived regulatory obstacles to innovation. It criticizes the influence of “engineered social agendas” in AI systems and seeks to ensure that AI technologies remain free from ideological bias. By contrast, the Biden EO focused on responsible AI development, placing significant emphasis on addressing risks such as bias, disinformation and national security vulnerabilities.** The Biden EO sought to balance AI’s benefits with its potential harms by establishing safeguards, testing standards and ethical considerations in AI deployment and deployment. Another significant shift in policy is the approach to regulation. The Trump EO mandates an immediate review and potential rescission of all policies, directives and regulations established under the Biden EO that could be seen as impediments to AI innovation. The Biden EO, however, introduced a structured oversight framework, including mandatory red-teaming for high-risk AI models, enhanced

cybersecurity protocols and monitoring requirements for AI used in critical infrastructure.**The Biden administration also directed**

**federal agencies to collaborate in the development of best practices for AI safety and reliability efforts that the Trump EO effectively halts.** The two EOs also diverge in their treatment of workforce development and education. The Biden EO dedicated resources to attracting and training AI talent, expanding visa pathways for skilled workers and promoting public-private partnerships for AI research and development. The Trump EO, however, does not include specific workforce-related provisions. Instead, the

Trump EO seems to assume that reducing federal oversight will naturally allow for innovation and talent growth in the private sector. **Priorities for national security are also shifting. The Biden EO mandated extensive interagency cooperation to assess the risks AI poses to critical national security systems, cyberinfrastructure and biosecurity. It required agencies such as the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to conduct detailed evaluations of potential AI threats, including the misuse of AI for chemical and biological weapon development. The Trump EO aims to streamline AI governance and reduce federal oversight, prioritizing a more flexible regulatory environment and maintaining US AI leadership for national security purposes**. The most pronounced ideological difference between the two executive orders is in their treatment of equity and civil rights. The Biden EO explicitly sought to address discrimination and bias in AI applications, recognizing the potential for AI systems to perpetuate existing inequalities. It incorporated principles of equity and civil rights protection throughout its framework, requiring rigorous oversight of AI’s impact in areas such as hiring, healthcare and law enforcement. Not surprisingly, the Trump EO did not focus on these concerns, reflecting a broader philosophical departure from government intervention in AI ethics and fairness – perhaps considering existing laws that prohibit unlawful discrimination, such as Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as sufficient. The two orders also take fundamentally different approaches to global AI leadership. The Biden EO emphasized the importance of international cooperation, encouraging US engagement with allies and global organizations to establish common AI safety standards and ethical frameworks. The Trump EO, in contrast, appears to adopt a more unilateral stance, asserting US leadership in AI without outlining specific commitments to international collaboration.

**Aff regulates it.**

**Beck** et al. **17** — Susanne Beck, Nehal Bhuta, Robin Geiβ, Hin-Yan Liu, Claus Kreβ, Susanne Beck is Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure, Comparative Criminal Law and the Philosophy of Law at Leibniz University Hanover. Nehal Bhuta is Professor of Public International Law at the European University Institute, Florence, and Co-Director of the EUI’s Academy of European Law. Robin Geiß is Professor of International Law and Security at the University of Glasgow. Hin-Yan Liu is Associate Professor at the Centre for International Law, Conflict and Crisis, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. Claus Kreß is Professor of Criminal Law and Public International Law at the University of Cologne, where he is also Director of the Institute of International Peace and Security Law. [2017, Cambridge University Press, p. 117 "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy,"

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hagWg\_dU4L\_Wh23OGoSoxC6aC2Iy\_W8k/edit?usp=sharin g&ouid=102959102857370325762&rtpof=true&sd=true , Accessed 2-4-2025] // cpsof + aari \*\*AWS=Autonomous Weapons Systems

**Another feature that is driven to its extreme by AWS is the unpredictability of attacks. Given that AWS are truly autonomous, they decide themselves who is to be made the object of attack, by using their inbuilt intelligence and without any direct control by a human control unit. This capability makes attacks highly unpredictable and exacerbates the threat issuing from these weapons for civilians. The program** according to which these **robots** function may be **more inscrutable than** the **decisions of soldiers** or

commanders. Differently from the behaviour of human fighters, they are not only beyond the comprehension by commonsense standards and experience but also beyond the powers of even the most sophisticated psychology. **It might be said, therefore, that attacks by AWS have an element of the treacherous** and, in this way, resemble landmines whose destructive **power** is likewise characterized by a high degree of unpredictability. **It is primarily because of the complete lack of control over the destructive effects of these weapons that they have been prohibited** by the Ottawa accord of 1997. In fact, landmines are in many respects an analogue of AWS. They, too, are programmed to detonate autonomously, with the only difference being that they are activated by contact rather than by something as sophisticated as a quasi-decision of their own. It is interesting to note, in this context, that **treacherous attacks, among others, are prohibited as war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute**. Another problem AWS pose is their limited capacity to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and to observe the rules of proportionality. It is clear that such a capacity must be built into auton omous weapons if they are to be in conformity with the laws of war. However, even if weapons of this kind are deployed in areas where there is no certainty about the absence of civilians, the question remains whether the risks of non-discrimination can be sufficiently reduced and robots be entrusted with the task of judging proportionality. Even if targeted against, among others, military machinery manned by soldiers, it has to be questioned whether robots can be expected to master the fine- tuning of aggression that is required by the rules of war. Can a robot, for example, recognize surrender with sufficient reliability? Can a robot be entrusted to know how many victims it has produced and whether the rule of proportionality has been observed? There remains a serious risk that even the most technically accomplished systems malfunction, leav- ing behind them a hecatomb of innocent victims. There is already now some experience from the use of drones in Afghanistan to support what has been rightly called the ‘illusion of accuracy’.18 This risk is the more serious the more probable it is that a certain measure of over-confidence in machinery will distort the judgments of commanders in the future, in the same way it has done in the past.

**It sparks arms racing and Putin preemptively strikes.**

Zachary **Davis**, March 20**19**, “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD An Initial Survey of Potential Implications for Deterrence, Stability, and Strategic Surprise " No Publication, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/CGSR-AI\_BattlefieldWEB.pdf, accessed 2-12-2025, //coop In the classic Cold War movie WarGames, a young hacker breaks into a DOD supercomputer designed to use AI to plan and execute nuclear war. **He engages the computer to play Global Thermonuclear War and accidentally triggers a simulated scenario of nuclear Armageddon**, which is mistaken for the real thing. The computer ultimately learns that for nuclear deterrence, “the only way to win is not to play.” If AI disrupts the central logic of nuclear deterrence, as understood by the nuclear powers, or fundamentally changes the precepts that support it, the strategic consequences could be far reaching—and the prospects that computers will learn to “not play” are uncertain. The following section

highlights potentially destabilizing aspects of AI. **AI may be seen by others as eroding mutual strategic vulnerability, thereby increasing the risk of war. The combination of exquisite ISR with an effective defensive shield could make it tempting to conduct a disarming, decapitating, or blinding first strike at strategic targets,** including nuclear command and control (NC3), early-warning radars, or dual-capable missiles and aircraft.37 Such a revision of deterrence logic might be highly destabilizing. Shared vulnerability and assured retaliation are central concepts of mutually-assured destruction (MAD) deterrence theory.**Switching the theoretical incentive from MAD to improve the odds of successfully conducting a disarming first strike could change the risk calculus that has undergirded strategic stability for decades**.38 Preventing such a revision of nuclear-deterrence logic was the essence of Vladimir Putin’s claim in March 2018 that his new weapons are “invincible against all existing and prospective missile defense and counter-air-defense systems.”39 **By evading perceived U.S. global strike and missile-defense capabilities, Putin’s claims about new AI-guided retaliatory forces were justified as efforts to preserve MAD. Competition to gain advantage will bring uncertainty about the future military balance. Russia, China, and other nations’**

**advances in these same AI-enabled technologies may shift the strategic calculus as well, especially in regional contexts.** For example, while Russian and Chinese A2AD systems designed to defeat U.S. regional forces may **reduce allies’ confidence in American security guarantees, the U.S. ability to defeat these A2AD systems with AI-accelerated ISR,** BMC3I, defensive systems, and autonomous vehicles would demonstrate resolve and provide opportunities for joint U.S.–allied defense cooperation—thereby enhancing stability and deterrence. Reinforcing regional conventional deterrence is also an essential part of strategic stability.40 **However, even the perception of an imbalance that favors striking first can lead to misperception, miscalculation, and arms racing.** Whatever advantages may be attained with AI are likely to evoke countermeasures that mitigate temporary unilateral advantages. Russian and Chinese interest in hypersonic vehicles and counter- space operations may fall into this category. AI systems are vulnerable to flawed data inputs, which can cause unintended consequences. In her book Weapons of Math Destruction, data scientist Cathy O’Neil demonstrates how AI algorithms distort reality and lead to incorrect, misleading, and unjust decisions.41 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to reliance on AI is the age-old problem of data reliability. AI can magnify the “garbage in, garbage out” problem.42 Data comes from many places and is not always carefully collected or curated. Compounding the problem of faulty data and skewed results, AI often reflects human bias43 or creates new biases based on flawed learning from the data provided.44 Computer vision—the AI-informed object- and pattern-recognition software behind Project Maven and many other applications—is easily fooled by misleading data.45 Differentiating between similar objects is difficult,46 and even more challenging unde denial and deception campaigns that may, for example, use camouflage and decoys. Even when data seems accurate, AI sometimes “hallucinates” things that do not exist.47 Transferring the inherent problems of data reliability and interpretation to the battlefield raises critical questions about the safety and reliability that accompany desirable attributes of speed and lethality. Accidentally hitting the wrong targets, for example, could have strategic consequences. Countering many AI applications can be simple and straightforward. Adversarial manipulation of data provides many opportunities for mischief and mistakes.48 The fact that AI is easily deceived invites efforts to sabotage its coveted military benefits.49 By corrupting data in calculated ways, it may be possible to cause catastrophic equipment failures,

miscommunication, confusion, logistical nightmares, and devastating mistakes in AI-reliant systems.**The black-box nature of AI, which makes it hard to understand how and why AI makes decisions, also makes it difficult to recognize whether data is compromised and producing inaccurate outcomes, such as hitting the wrong targets or misdirecting allied forces. Data vulnerability may well be the Achilles’ heel of AI.** Speedy decision making and operational execution may serve the goals of effective crisis management poorly. On October 19, 1962, only three days into the Cuban Missile Crisis, General Curtis LeMay counselled President Kennedy, “I just don’t see any other solution except direct military action right now.”50 Ten days later, the crisis was resolved diplomatically. **If one of the advantages of AI is rapid decision making, that same speed could be a disadvantage if it needlessly accelerates the escalation of conflict from crisis, to war, even to potential nuclear confrontation**.51 The battlefield advantages of AI-driven ISR and autonomous systems could shrink the time available for diplomats to avoid or manage crises. As currently conceived, AI-driven battlefield systems would not include real-time reporting and analysis of national and international diplomacy to avoid, control, contain, or end a conflict—violating Clausewitz’s principle of war as “the continuation of politics by other means.” In many cases, initial logic may dictate striking first, as General LeMay advised. Accelerated decision making could have pushed the Cuban Missile Crisis toward logical, but undesirable, outcomes. In practice, slowing things down can be the key to victory, especially when the options include nuclear weapons. Many of the potentially positive regional deterrence effects that could eventually result from an integrated ISR, defense, and battle-management complex might not be attainable, at least not in the near term. The overarching architecture and strategy for complex, new AI-guided ISR/battle management systems does not yet exist. In fact, a proliferation of AI systems may actually complicate one of the main problems confronting U.S. military forces: effective joint operations. AI-supported weapons, platforms, and operating systems rely on custom-built software and hardware that is specifically designed for each separate system and purpose. There is currently no master mechanism to integrate the scores of AI-powered systems operating on multiple platforms.52 For multidomain ISR, scores of sensors, radars, weapons, and communications systems must be integrated across multiple geophysical domains. If this were not challenging enough, these systems are built and operated by different agencies, commands, and contractors, with various authorities, accesses, and procedures. Adding allies with their own AI systems to this landscape brings further complexity and risk. Without seamless integration, the hoped-for benefits of speed and lethality may prove fleeting, and the credibility of such an unproven

system of systems could be called into question. Massively complex and unproven capabilities would invite problems that might be destabilizing. Big **data and machine learning may not solve the challenge of strategic warning. Designing a multiplex of AI-informed platforms that can communicate in real time requires a new generation of data fusion, integrative software, and command architectures. Pulling these pieces together to develop a holistic threat assessment that provides policy makers with strategic warning will not happen naturally. It will require herculean efforts to collect and analyze the information owned by diverse stakeholders with**

**distinct classification systems, analytic roles, and customer loyalties. Integrating and analyzing sensitive information from diverse sources is already a challenge, especially if it must to be done quickly.** While techniques such as machine learning and computer vision will help sort and prioritize the flood of intelligence information, analysts will still have to base many judgments on incomplete or unreliable information. Developing a fully integrated system capable of strategic warning will take years.

**Reliance causes Trump first strike.**

Ankit **Panda 17**, Senior Editor at the Diplomat, 10/17/17, “Trump's Overconfidence in US Missile Defense Could Lead to a Deadly War With North Korea,”

https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/trumps-overconfidence-in-us-missile-defense-could-lea d-to-a-deadly-war-with-north-korea/

Could a president’s overconfidence in U.S. defensive systems lead to deadly **miscalculation** and **nuclear armageddon? Yes**. Yes, it could. Last Wednesday, referring to potential American responses to North Korea’s missile and nuclear program, President Donald Trump told Sean Hannity “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time, and if you send two of them it’s

gonna get knocked out.” If Trump believes — or is being told — that American missile defenses are that accurate, not only is he factually wrong, he is also very dangerously wrong. This misperception could be enough to lead the **U**nited**S**tates into a costlywarwith devastating consequences.

Here’s why: If Trump believes U.S. missile defenses work this effectively, he might actually think a first strike attempt to disarm North Korea of its missile and nuclear forceswould successfully spare U.S. cities from North Korean nuclear retaliation.**They probablywouldn’t**. Believing that each ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) interceptor can provide anything close to a 97 percent interception rate against retaliation raises the temptation to attempt a so-called “splendid first strike” based on the assumption that missile defenses can successfully intercept any leftover missiles North Korea could then fire at the United States.

In this article, we first lay out the complexity of American missile defenses and explain why it’s way off the mark to believe U.S. ground-based missile defense interceptors are even close to as effective as Trump suggested. We then explain how overconfidence in national missile defense may tempt the president to consider a first strike with no actual guarantee that it can spare an American city — or multiple cities — from potential North Korean thermonuclear retaliation. For a president who has already expressed an inclination to visit “fire and fury” on Kim Jong Un and threatened to “totally destroy” his country, we’re obligated to take Trump’s misplaced confidence in GMD very seriously. His attraction to attempting a first strike will only grow if he is blind to an important gap in U.S. defenses. Not only might he still want to denuclearize North Korea by force, he might think it is actually possible to do so without putting the U.S. homeland at risk.

97 Percent of the Time, It Works Every Time

U.S. strategic missile defense efforts, dating back to President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, **have been colored by myth and overstatement**. And if they don’t work now, it is always the fantasy of them working in the future that keeps the program going decades later.

If North Korea were to fire an ICBM — or multiple ICBMs — at the United States, there is only one system that could take a shot at it. That system is GMD, which would launch its Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), based at Fort Greely in Alaska, to attempt to intercept and destroy the warhead outside the earth’s atmosphere in midcourse flight. (Contrary to common misconception, other missile defense systems such as THAAD and Aegis are in no position to take a shot at ICBMs; they’re designed for other classes of targets.) GMD has been in development for more than two decades in anticipation of precisely such a threat. $40 billion later, GMD remains an immature system, though it became nominally operational in 2004.

So, is GMD’s effectiveness anywhere near the number Trump mentioned? In short, no. In long, terms and conditions apply. There are two primary measurements of a missile defense system’s effectiveness. The first — and the most easily understandable — is the single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) for a given interceptor. Translated, this means just how likely a single U.S. GBI is to make contact with and “kill” an incoming ICBM warhead. Measuring this in itself is tricky. There’s a simple, but unsatisfying method: empirical success rate. In its 18 intercept tests to date, GBI has succeeded 10 times, giving it a roughly 56 percent SSPK.

There are a few caveats that may raise or lower the probability of successful interception.GMD has matured as a system over the course of its testing, but it has **only been tested once** against an ICBM-class target — **and not in a realistic environment**with little warning, countermeasures, or a trajectory that looks anything like a North Korean Hwasong-14. Acknowledging these limitations, last year the Department of Defense’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation was unable to assign a quantitative assessment of the system’s performance, but conceded it possessed a “limited capability to defend the U.S. Homeland” against IRBMs and ICBMs. On the other hand, the newer CE-II Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle at the core of today’s interceptors likely has a higher assumed SSPK than the older CE-I variant, though this number is not publicly known.

A2: NGO

A2: Prolonging Conflicts

A2: Israel

1. **Israel wants to strike Iran in the next four months with US support. Hudson 02/13,** John Hudson, John Hudson is a reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and national security. He was part of the team that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service for coverage of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has reported from dozens of countries, including Ukraine, China, Afghanistan, India, Georgia, Belarus, Pakistan, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Kenya, Nigeria and many more. In 2022 and 2023, he covered the war in Ukraine. In 2008, he covered the war in Georgia. He appears frequently on MSNBC and CNN. “Israel likely to strike Iran in coming months, warns U.S. intelligence” 02-13-2025, Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/02/12/israel-iran-us-intelligence/ accessed 02-13-2025 //dessie **Israel is likely to attempt a strike on Iran’s nuclear program in the coming months in a preemptive attack that would set back Tehran’s program by weeks or perhaps months but escalate tensions across the Middle East and renew the prospect of a wider regional conflagration, according to U.S. intelligence.** The warnings about a potential Israeli strike are included in multiple intelligence reports spanning the end of the Biden administration and the beginning of the Trump administration, none more comprehensive than an early January report produced by the intelligence directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The report warned that **Israel**is likely to attempt a **strike** on **Iran**’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities **in**the **first six months of 2025**. Current and former U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence told The Washington Post that the finding derives from an analysis of Israel’s planning following its bombing of Iran in late October, which degraded its air defenses and left Tehran exposed to a follow-on assault. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss highly classified intelligence. The Israeli government, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment. A spokesman for the White House National Security Council, Brian Hughes, said President Donald Trump “has made it clear: He will not permit Iran to get a nuclear weapon.” “While he prefers negotiating a resolution to American’s long-standing issues with the Iranian regime peacefully, he will not wait indefinitely if Iran isn’t willing to deal, and soon,” Hughes told The Post. Hughes declined to comment on the underlying intelligence. The prospect of a looming Israeli strike creates an early test for Trump, who campaigned on restoring peace and tempering the armed conflicts raging in the Middle East and Europe while also touting his staunch support for Israel. The military intelligence report spelled out two**potential strike** options, each **involv**ing the**U**nited **S**tates providing **supportin the form of aerial refueling as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance**, said those familiar with the document.**Such reliance on the United States in any strike on Iran — even one that yields only modest results —underscores Washington’s leverage** over Israel’s path forward. A distance attack, known as a standoff strike, would see Israeli aircraft firing air-launched ballistic missiles, or ALBMs, outside of Iranian airspace, the intelligence report said. A more risky stand-in attack would see Israeli jets enter Iranian airspace, flying near the nuclear sites and dropping BLU-109s, a type of bunker buster. The Trump administration approved the sale of guidance kits for those bunker busters last week and made a notification to Congress that it had done so. The U.S. assessment found that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would at best set back its activities by months, and potentially only by weeks, said current and former officials.**Any attack also would incentivize Iran to pursue weapons-grade enrichment of uranium, the officials said, a long-standing red line for the United States and Israel.** The six-month time frame for a likely operation and details on the two potential strike scenarios have not been previously reported. The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that Israel is considering a strike on Iran this year. Some Israeli officials disagree with the U.S. intelligence assessments on the anticipated impact of a strike on Iran’s facilities, arguing that it could more substantially set back Tehran’s capabilities. “That was a difference between our intelligence and their assessment,” said a former U.S. official. The revelation coincides with a robust debate within the Trump administration about the proper application of military power in the Middle East. Trump has surrounded himself with an ideologically diverse national security team, including foreign policy hawks such as national security adviser Michael Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, advocates of military restraint including Vice President JD Vance and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and “prioritizers,” such as Elbridge Colby, who seek to reorient U.S. military resources to East Asia to counter China.

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#### **The ceasefire will fail---peace is temporary.**

Thomas **Schmidt 2-08**, 2/08/2025, Associate Professor of Law at Columbia University, Fragile Gaza Ceasefire Nears Collapse Amid Aid Delays and Continued Violence, DOA: 2/09/20205,

https://www.ctol.digital/news/fragile-gaza-ceasefire-nears-collapse-aid-delays-violence/)// JZ

**Ceasefire in Jeopardy**: Israel’s Violations and Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza Threaten Truce

**The fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is teetering on the brink of collapse as reports emerge of Israel’s continued violations of the agreement. Delays in delivering critical humanitarian aid to Gaza, coupled with ongoing military actions resulting in Palestinian casualties, have raised alarms about the sustainability of the truce. Hamas** has **warned** that **these actions** amount to “slow killing” and could **lead to a breakdown of the ceasefire**, even as the group insists it does not seek a return to full-scale warfare. Meanwhile, Israel’s symbolic delegation to Doha for ceasefire talks has further complicated efforts to secure a lasting peace.

Ceasefire Under Strain: Humanitarian Aid Delays and Continued Violence

**The ceasefire agreement**, brokered to bring relief to the war-torn Gaza Strip, **is under severe strain due to Israel’s failure to uphold its commitments.** Essential supplies such as food, medicine, and tents have been delayed, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Reports from international news outlets, including Reuters and AP, highlight that these **delays are not only undermining trust but also deepening the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population.**

Adding to the tension, **Israeli military operations have continued despite the ceasefire, resulting in significant Palestinian casualties.** While Israeli military spokespeople deny intentional violations, observers note a stark discrepancy between the agreed-upon humanitarian protocols **and** the reality on the ground. This **inconsistency is fueling resentment and could be a critical factor in the potential collapse of the truce.**

Hamas political bureau member Basem Na’im has emphasized that these actions constitute a form of “slow killing” and warned that **the ceasefire could unravel if Israel does not comply with its obligations.** Despite these warnings, Hamas has reiterated its commitment to avoiding a return to full-scale conflict, underscoring the precarious nature of the current truce.

Israeli Delegation’s Doha Visit: A Symbolic Gesture with No Substance

In a move that has raised eyebrows, an Israeli delegation traveled to Doha, Qatar, to discuss the second phase of the ceasefire agreement. However, reports from Israel’s public broadcaster and Walla News reveal that the delegation lacked proper authorization to engage in substantive negotiations. A senior Israeli official described the visit as purely “symbolic,” signaling that Israel has no immediate plans to advance discussions on critical issues such as further hostage releases or troop withdrawals.

This development has been interpreted as a reluctance on Israel’s part to commit to the next phase of the ceasefire. Analysts suggest that the delegation’s lack of authority reflects a broader hesitation to address the deeper issues at play, including the release of remaining hostages and the establishment of a longer-term truce. The symbolic nature of the visit has further strained the already fragile trust between the two sides, casting doubt on the future of the ceasefire.

Implications for Future Negotiations: A Fragile Truce Hangs in the Balance

The **ongoing violations and the lack of progress in negotiations have placed the ceasefire in a precarious position. Both Israel and Hamas remain under intense international scrutiny**, with the global community urging both sides to adhere to the terms of the agreement. However, the continued **delays in humanitarian aid and the symbolic nature of Israel’s Doha visit suggest that the path to a lasting resolution is fraught with challenges.**

Hamas has repeatedly stated that it does not seek to reignite the conflict, but its warnings about the consequences of Israeli violations indicate that the ceasefire’s durability is at risk. Analysts have noted that without a clear, mutual commitment to upholding the humanitarian and security aspects of the agreement, **the truce could unravel, plunging the region back into violence.**

**The situation is further complicated by the broader geopolitical dynamics at play.** The international community’s role in mediating the conflict and ensuring compliance with the ceasefire terms will be crucial in determining whether the truce can be salvaged or if the region is destined for further escalation.

Trump’s Middle East Policy: A Game-Changer for Israel and Gaza

**The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has been fundamentally reshaped by U.S. President Donald Trump’s policies**, which have had a profound impact on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Under Trump’s administration, Israel received unprecedented support, including a $7 billion weapons deal, emboldening its military operations in Gaza.

**Trump’s pro-Israel stance has effectively removed any constraints on Israel’s actions, reducing the ceasefire to little more than a smokescreen.** With full U.S. backing, **Israel has little incentive to maintain the truce, leading analysts to predict that the ceasefire is “dead on arrival.”** This shift has left Hamas with dwindling options, as its traditional support networks in Qatar, Turkey, and Iran are being dismantled under U.S. pressure.

#### **A strong ICC ends the war.**

**Hassenstab 24** [Nicole; November 25; Strategic Public Relations at University of Northern Iowa; American University, “What Do ICC Arrest Warrants Mean for Israel and the War in Gaza?” https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20241125-what-do-icc-arrest-warrants-mean-for-israel-and-the-w a r-in-gaza.cfm]

What kind of an effect might these warrants have on both the Israeli government, and the war itself? No immediate effects, **but the ICC** **arrest warrants add to the barrage of criminal and civil lawsuits that Netanyahu and his close circle are** **facing in Israel**. While the investigations in Israel are exactly the reason why he does not want to reach an agreement to end the war and release the Israeli hostages (the war serves as an excuse to delay those trials),**the international one might create an incentive to end the war in order to diffuse the allegations**. In general, **Netanyahu is a famously calculated politician**, and the **increased pressure might lead him eventually to make mistakes that will bring about his fall from** **power**, **likely to result in a speedy agreement to end the Gaza war**.

#### **Arms embargo takes away capabilities for strike — empirically proven biden puts pause on bomb sales but no lash out**

#### **No impact---all sides are restrained.**

Michael **Young 24**, 1/02/2024, Lebanon affairs columnist for The National, 'Unstable stability' reigns on the Israel-Lebanon border – just how everyone wants it, DOA: 1/06/24, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2024/01/02/unstable-stability-reigns-on-the-israel-lebanon-border-just-how-everyone-wants-it/)// JZ

Why does this matter? Because **Hezbollah, and with it Iran, will avoid being drawn into a conflict they think Israel wants to provoke, believing the Israeli leadership may try to use this to extract itself from its predicament**. That perhaps explains how **the party responded to Israel’s** clearly **provocative killing of** a senior Iranian Quds Force commander, Radhi **Mousavi**, in Syria on December 25.

The day after he was assassinated, **there was an uptick of Hezbollah attacks** against Israeli targets along the border and in the occupied Shebaa Farms. For the party, this was necessary in light of Mr Mousavi’s assassination. However, **one day later the party scaled down its response, amid Israeli threats that the situation on the Lebanese front was “unsustainable**”, an idea echoed by its allies in Washington.

**Hezbollah intends to maintain this balancing act for as long as it can**, **aware that the Biden administration considers an Israeli war with Lebanon a red line**, as it could well provoke a regional conflict that pushes the US into a confrontation with Iran. Mr Biden wants to avoid this at all costs in an election year.

This situation of unstable stability may have a paradoxical impact on Israel. On the one hand it will increase Israeli frustrations, creating conditions for a stronger reaction; while on the other, **Israel must realise that opening a Lebanon front would be very risky and lead to more pronounced US-Israeli strains, pushing Israel avoid this outcome**.

At a time when the Israelis are still far from achieving a convincing victory in Gaza, **expanding their conflict to Lebanon and fighting a more redoubtable adversary in Hezbollah make little sense**. This is all the truer if the US opposes it. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin **Netanyahu** is contested at home and **could pay a high price for widening a war that Israelis might view as his opportunistic ticket to political survival**.

A2: Congo

1. Deterrent effect we prevent war from even starting
2. Civilian casualities down

Jo, Hyeran, and Beth A. **Simmons**. “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” SSRN Electronic Journal 70, no. 3 (**2014**). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552820>. //arrguy

**Model 2 looks at the effect of ICC Actions, the three-year moving average of previous preliminary examinations, investigations, and warrants by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). According to the incidence-rate ratio based on Model 2, one additional investigation each year over the three-year term is estimated to reduce intentional civilian killing by a factor of 0.570.** (See Table 1 for an estimate of lives spared, which is substantial). Note that the significant effect of ICC Actions is robust even after including Post-ICC Regime, a variable that captures the Court’s existence, but not its actions. It is therefore quite unlikely that the effect of ICC Actions is merely an artifact of some general violence-reducing temporal trend or the result of a passive court. Rather, ICC Actions represent new information, available to all actors, demonstrating that the ICC is operational, authoritative, and that the prosecutor means to bring perpetrators to justice. What of complementarity? Model 3 demonstrates that improvements in Domestic Crime Statutes – which are themselves influenced by the presence of the ICC124 – are also associated with reduced civilian killing. This effect is robust to the control of Rule of Law, suggesting that it is not merely the capacity to enforce but the substantive legal change that is critical. One categorical shift toward stronger ICC-consistent domestic legal reform is estimated to reduce civilian killing by a factor of 0.61, the substantive impact of which is illustrated in Figure 1. Importantly, ratification of the ICC itself has significantly contributed to these reforms. Knowing the ICC may step in where domestic institutions fail seems to have encouraged domestic legal change, which in turn helps to deter at least some intentional violence against civilians by government forces. Model 4 includes all ICC prosecutorial effects simultaneously. It demonstrates that ratification, ICC signals of strength via prosecutorial actions, and complementarity have all contributed to significant reductions in intentional civilian killing. Our second main hypothesis is that state actors can be socially deterred. Extralegal social pressure at the domestic level is most likely to be of the non-material sort; e.g., challenges to the justness and legitimacy of actions taken by government agents. These challenges are hypothesized to be strongest where law focuses social expectations and draws bright lines that distinguish unacceptable behavior. The interaction term in Model 5 tests this idea. It shows that in addition to whatever effect ratification alone may have, human rights groups are able to capitalize on ICC norms to further hold governments accountable to civil society when their state has ratified the Rome Statute. The combination of ICC ratification and growth in human rights mobilization, captured by the interaction term, is associated with less intentional killing (i.e. a negative coefficient), likely through social deterrence but also because human rights organizations contribute to prosecutorial risks. Our goal is not to disentangle these effects, but to illustrate that they are in fact mutually reinforcing. Interestingly, in the absence of ICC ratification, human rights organizations appear to have far less traction. Figure 2 plots marginal effects of HRO Growth conditional on ratification, based on the estimates from Model 5. The graph shows the change in the predicted count of civilians killed as mobilization increases. Since the number of HROs increases about 2 per year on average and standard deviation is about 25, we report the graph within 2 standard deviations, from -50 to 50 organizations. The marginal effects remain negative between -2 and -7 throughout the entire range [-50, 50], indicating that HRO Growth generally decreases civilian killings. But this civil society effect is substantially magnified by the focal power and jurisdiction of the ICC: the slope given ratification is steeper and more negative than for non-ratifying states. With ICC ratification, adding one more human rights organization is estimated to reduce intentional killing by between 3 and 6 civilians. Without ICC ratification, the effect of increases in HROs is almost flat. Theoretically, this is what we would expect if civil society organizations use highly focal legal values to hold governments more accountable for their actions. Of course, it is possible that both ICC Ratification and HRO Growth are attributable to some third factor, such as political liberalization. To address what is essentially a form of potential omitted variable bias, we control for political regime type in Table 2 and further explore this broader reform thesis in the online appendix using Freedom House measures of changes in civil liberties. The evidence suggests that the connection between ratification and mobilization is likely not spurious: even controlling for broader governance changes (obviously not attributable to ICC ratification), the growth in the number of HROs is strongly connected to the reduction in civilian killing only when a state has ratified the ICC statutes.125‌

1. US knows how to mediate can still do it -leverage prosecution
2. US Stops child soilders in Congo

**Amnesty International**. “Landmark ICC Verdict over Use of Child Soldiers,” March 14, **2012**. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2012/03/landmark-icc-verdict-over-use-child-soldiers/> //arrguy.

**The conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of a Congolese armed group, for using children in armed conflict shows the International Criminal Court (ICC) can bring the world’s worst offenders to justice for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Amnesty International said.** A Trial Chamber made up of three judges delivered the ICC’s first-ever verdict on Wednesday against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for the war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under 15 into the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC) amid armed conflict in the Ituri region of Democratic Republic of Congo between 2002 and 2003. **In the coming weeks, the ICC will sentence Lubanga and hold a hearing on reparation for his victims.** The judgment can be appealed within 30 days. On 17 March 2006, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the first person to be arrested on an ICC arrest warrant. His trial began on 26 January 2009. He was the alleged founder and president of the Union of the Congolese Patriots (UPC) and commander in chief of its armed wing, the FPLC. The FPLC was involved in numerous human rights violations, including the abduction and use of children as soldiers. “Today’s verdict will give pause to those around the world who commit the horrific crime of using and abusing children both on and off the battlefield,” said Michael Bochenek, Director of Amnesty International’s Law and Policy Programme. “It will help to strip away the impunity they have enjoyed for crimes under international law because national authorities have consistently failed to investigate these crimes. This guilty verdict demonstrates that the ICC can step in to bring them to justice.” The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict by foreign and Congolese armed groups continue to this day in the north-east and east of the DRC. The Congolese national army has also used child soldiers. Amnesty International remains disappointed that the ICC’s Prosecutor did not pursue allegations of other crimes committed by the FPLC under Lubanga Dyilo – including crimes of sexual violence against abducted girls, including girl soldiers, and other civilians – potentially denying justice and reparation to many more victims. “The Prosecutor’s office must review its limited investigation strategy adopted in the Lubanga case, especially in light of such decisions precluding victims from participating in trials and obtaining reparation. Lessons need to be learned for future cases,” said Michael Bochenek. The organization also said that the length of proceedings should be reviewed. More than two years passed between the ICC’s decision to confirm the charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo on 29 January 2007 and his trial’s opening on 26 January 2009. The case was twice delayed due to stays imposed by the judges in response to the Office of the Prosecutor’s failure to disclose information to the defence.