

# Audit Report October, 2024





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## **Executive Summary**

Project Name Fuelup.fun

Project URL <a href="https://fuelup.fun/">https://fuelup.fun/</a>

Overview Fuel Up is a meme coin launchpad and marketplace for fair

buying, selling, and trade of meme coins. Assets Fuel Up

Network is 100% safe and secure with no pre-mint sale or team

allocation to prevent rug pulls. Get started:

Audit Scope https://github.com/LYNC-WORLD/fuelup-fun-smart-contracts

**Language** Sway

**Blockchain** Fuel

Method Manual Analysis, Functional Testing, Automated Testing

First Review 18th oct 2024 - 25th oct 2024

**Updated Code Received** 18st oct 2024

Second Review 25th oct 2024

## **Number of Security Issues per Severity**



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	3	2	1
Acknowledged Issues	0	0	0	0
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0

## **Checked Vulnerabilities**

Arbitrary write to storage

Centralization of control

Ether theft

Improper or missing events

Logical issues and flaws

Arithmetic Computations
Correctness

Race conditions/front running

Re-entrancy

Malicious libraries

Address hardcoded

Divide before multiply

Integer overflow/underflow

ERC's conformance

Missing Zero Address Validation

Revert/require functions

Upgradeable safety

Using inline assembly

Style guide violation

Parallel Execution safety

UTXO Model Verification

FuelVM Opcodes

Cross-Chain Interactions

Modular Design

Access Control Vulnerabilities

Denial of Service (DoS)

Oracle Manipulation

Signature Replay Attacks

Improper Handling of External Calls

Proxy Storage Collision

Use of Deprecated Functions

## **Techniques and Methods**

Throughout the audit of smart contracts, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments, match logic and expected behavior.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

#### **Structural Analysis**

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

#### **Static Analysis**

A static Analysis of Smart Contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

#### **Code Review / Manual Analysis**

Manual Analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

#### **Gas Consumption**

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

#### **Tools and Platforms used for Audit**

Remix IDE, Foundry, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.

#### **Types of Severity**

Every issue in this report has been assigned to a severity level. There are four levels of severity, and each of them has been explained below.

#### **High Severity Issues**

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

#### **Medium Severity Issues**

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

#### **Low Severity Issues**

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

#### **Informational**

These are four severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

#### **Types of Issues Open**

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

#### Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

#### **Acknowledged**

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

#### **Partially Resolved**

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

#### **Finding Details**

#### F-1. Asset Reserves Update Mechanism

**SEVERITY: Medium** 

**REMEDIATION: See DESCRIPTION** 

**STATUS:** fixed, commits

#### **DESCRIPTION:**

The **remain\_asset\_reserves** function lacks a proper update mechanism. Once the contract is live, it cannot adjust or update funds, which may lead to significant calculation errors and operational impacts. **Impact**: Inaccurate reserve tracking over time could compromise the integrity of the protocol.

```
remain_asset_reserves: 0
```

#### **Recommendation:**

- ☐ Implement a proper update function for reserves.
- ☐ Add validation checks for reserve updates.

#### F-2. Uncapped Fee Percentage

**SEVERITY: Medium** 

**REMEDIATION:** see <u>description</u>

STATUS: fixed

#### **DESCRIPTION:**

The fee percentage only checks for values less than or equal to 100 but lacks a reasonable upper limit. This could potentially allow the system to charge users a 100% fee, resulting in users being unable to withdraw funds. The absence of a defined upper limit may lead to centralization and power concentration among those who can afford high fees, creating additional security risks. It is crucial for the system to properly define an upper limit on fees to protect user funds and maintain trust in the contract.

```
require(cfg.fee_percent <= 100, "fee-percent-cannot-exceed-100");
storage.cfg.write(cfg);
initialize_ownership(owner);</pre>
```

#### Impact:

The protocol can charge 100% of user funds as fees.

#### Recommendation:

require(cfg.fee\_percent <= 30, "Fee percentage cannot exceed 30");</pre>

#### **Add Additional checks**

#### **F-3 Missing Reentrancy Protection**

**SEVERITY: Medium** 

**REMEDIATION:** see <u>description</u>

STATUS: fixed

#### **DESCRIPTION:**

There is a lack of reentrancy guards in functions that perform external calls. The code does not consistently follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern.

#### **Impact**

this vulnerability could lead to reentrancy attacks, allowing attackers to drain funds from the contract.

#### **Recommendation:**

- ☐ Implement a reentrancy guard modifier.
- ☐ Follow the CEI pattern strictly.

#### F-4 Fee Amount Validation

**SEVERITY: Low** 

**REMEDIATION:** see <u>description</u>

**STATUS:** fixed

#### **DESCRIPTION:**

There is no validation for zero fee amounts before transfer.

```
let fee_amount = (eth_amount * fee_percent) / 100;
transfer(fee_receiver, AssetId::base(), fee_amount);
transfer(msg_sender().unwrap(), asset_id, amount_out);
```

#### **Impact**

The code may attempt to transfer zero fees to the receiver, which could be a logical error.

#### **Recommendation:**

```
if fee_amount > 0 {
    // Proceed with fee transfer
}
```

#### F-5 Missing Zero Address Check in Withdraw Function

**SEVERITY: Low** 

**REMEDIATION:** see <u>description</u>

STATUS: fixed

#### **DESCRIPTION:**

The withdraw function does not validate the recipient address, potentially allowing transfers to the zero address.

```
#[storage(read, write)]

fn withdraw_assets_from_pool(pool_asset: AssetId, to: Identity){
```

#### **Impact**

This could result in permanent loss of funds if assets are transferred to the zero address..

#### Recommendation:

```
fn withdraw(to: Address, amount: u64) {
    require(to != Address::from(zero), "Cannot withdraw to zero address");
    // Rest of the function
```

#### F-6 Unused Timestamp Import

**SEVERITY: Informative** 

**REMEDIATION:** see <u>description</u>

**STATUS:** <u>fixed</u>

**DESCRIPTION:** 

There is an unused import of block::timestamp.
While there is no security impact, this affects code cleanliness and readability.

## **Automated Tests**

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity.

## **Closing Summary**

In this report, we have considered the security of Griffy. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of informational severity were found, which the Griffy Team has Fixed.

## **Disclaimer**

SafeEdges Smart contract security audit provides services to help identify and mitigate potential security risks in Griffy. However, it is important to understand that no security audit can guarantee complete protection against all possible security threats. SafeEdges audit reports are based on the information provided to us at the time of the audit, and we cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this information. Additionally, the security landscape is constantly evolving, and new security threats may emerge after the audit has been completed.

Therefore, it is recommended that multiple audits and bug bounty programs be conducted to ensure the ongoing security of Griffy Safe. One audit is not enough to guarantee complete protection against all possible security threats. It is important to implement proper risk management strategies and stay vigilant in monitoring your smart contracts for potential security risks.

SafeEdges cannot be held liable for any security breaches or losses that may occur subsequent to and despite using our audit services. It is the responsibility of Griffy to implement the recommendations provided in our audit reports and to take appropriate steps to mitigate potential security risks.

## **About SAFE EDGES**

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**500+**Audits Completed



**\$3B**Secured



**600k+**Lines of Code Audited

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# Audit Report

October, 2024









