

## **Mobile Security Lab**

21PC35 - Smrithi P

21PC37 - Tharageshwaran S


### **Mobile CTF**





### Note:

If the app doesn't responds properly then we have to wipe the data to work without any interruptions.





### **Challenge 1:**

We are provided with the apk file for the challenge. I'll start by loading it into jadx-gui decompiler. Looking at the Android Manifest we see app info such as the package name, activity etc.

Navigating to the MainActivity and looking at the decompiled code, we note that the application logs several information including the flag.

With the logs streaming in, we tap on the picture of the cat. We then get the flag in the logs.





# Install unknown apps



### **Download Manager**


15


#### Allow from this source







Your phone and personal data are more vulnerable to attack by unknown apps. By installing apps from this source, you agree that you are responsible for any damage to your phone or loss of data that may result from their use.












### **Challenge 2:**


We are provided with the apk which I'll load into jadx.


Looking through the Android Manifest and decompiled code, I eventually found the flag in the strings.xml file in base64 encoded format.



















### **Challenge 3:**

This part of the app is written using Godot games. Only using those Gogot RE (Reverse engineering) tools we are able to find out the flag. Else we can't able to find them





### **Challenge 4:**


Install the apk with ADB

adb install -r click\_me.apk

Decompile it with apktool

apktool d click\_me.apk

```
public final void getFlagButtonClick(View view) {
    Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(view, "view");
    if (this.CLICKS == 999999999) {
        Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), getFlag(), 0).show();
    } else {
        Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "You do not have enough cookies to get the flag", 0).show();
    }
}
```



```
new-instance v0, Lcom/example/clickme/Main/const/4 v1, 0x5f5e0ff
invoke-direct {v0, v1}, Lcom/example/clickme/N
```

instead of the above Substitute the below

```
# direct methods
.method static constructor <clinit>()V
.locals 2


new-instance v0, Lcom/example/clickme/MainActivity$Compani
const/4 v1, 0x0
invoke-direct {v0, v1}, Lcom/example/clickme/MainActivity$Com
sput-object v0, Lcom/example/clickme/MainActivity;->Companic
const-string v0, "clickme"
```

```
1 if (this.CLICKS == 0) {
2    Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), getFlag(), 0).show();
3 }
```

- apktool b click\_me
- keytool -genkey -v -keystore name.keystore -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000
   -alias alias
- C:\Users\smrit\AppData\Local\Android\Sdk\build-tools\34.0.0\zipalign.exe -v -p 4 click\_me/dist/click\_me.apk clicc\_me-aligned.apk
- C:\Users\smrit\AppData\Local\Android\Sdk\build-tools\34.0.0
   \apksigner.bat sign --ks name.keystore --ks-key-alias alias --ks-pass "pass:Smrin@0123" --key-pass "pass:Smrin@0123" --out click\_me-signed.apk click\_me-aligned.apk



# **Challenge 5:**



Inspect using JDAX

By examining the AndroidManifest.xml file, I noticed that the MainActivity is marked as exported, meaning it can be accessed directly without going through the login activity.

To exploit this, I closed the app and used ADB to start the MainActivity directly with the following command:

adb shell am start -n com.congon4tor.todo/.MainActivity

This command successfully launched the MainActivity, bypassing the login screen altogether.

Next, I needed to determine where the notes—and potentially the flag—were stored. Upon analyzing the MainActivity code, I observed that during its creation (onCreate method), it interacts with a database helper. This suggests that the notes, and likely the flag, are stored in a database managed by the app. Further investigation into the database helper would reveal the exact location and contents of the notes, including the flag.

```
public void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {
1
             super.onCreate(bundle);
 2
             setContentView(C0523R.layout.activity_main);
 3
             MyDatabase myDatabase = new MyDatabase(this);
4
             this.f92db = myDatabase;
 5
             this.todos = myDatabase.getTodos();
6
             ArrayList arrayList = new ArrayList();
7
             try {
8
     [\ldots]
9
     [...]
10
     [\ldots]
11
```

```
public class MyDatabase extends SQLiteAssetHelper {
    private static final String DATABASE_NAME = "todos.db";
    private static final int DATABASE_VERSION = 1;


    public MyDatabase(Context context) {
        super(context, DATABASE_NAME, null, 1);
    }

    public Cursor getTodos() {
        SQLiteDatabase readableDatabase = getReadableDatabase();
        SQLiteQueryBuilder sQLiteQueryBuilder = new SQLiteQueryBuilder();
        sQLiteQueryBuilder.setTables("todo");
        Cursor query = sQLiteQueryBuilder.query(readableDatabase, new String[]{"id AS _id", "content"}, null, null, null, null, return query;
    }
}
```

Upon examining the AndroidManifest.xml file, I noticed that the android:allowBackup="true" attribute is enabled. This setting allows the app's data to be backed up using ADB. Leveraging this, I created a backup of the app's data with ADB and successfully extracted the todo.db file, which likely contains the notes and the flag.

Additionally, for those with a rooted device, an alternative approach is to execute a series of commands to directly access the app's data.

```
PS C:\Users\smrit\Downloads\c4> adb shell
emu64xa:/ $ su
emu64xa:/ # cp /data/data/com.congon4tor.todo/databases/todos.db /sdcard/
emu64xa:/ # exit
PS C:\Users\smrit\Downloads\c4> adb pull /sdcard/todos.db .
PS C:\Users\smrit\Downloads\c4> sqlite3 todos.db
SQLite version 3.42.0 2023-05-16 12:36:15
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .headers on
sqlite> .tables
android_metadata todo
sqlite> select * from todo;
id|content
1 ZmxhZ3s1MjZlYWIwNGZmOWFhYjllYTEzODkwMzc4NmE50Dc4Yn0=
2|VXNlIGFjdHVhbCBlbmNyeXB0aW9uIG5vdCBqdXN0IGJhc2U2NA==
sqlite> exit
```



Flag: flag{526eab04ff9aab9ea138903786a9878b}