

# Enhancing Security in OpenSearch with Dynamic Authentication methods

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# INTRODUCTION TO YOUR TRULY

## \$whoami

~~Senior s/w Engineer~~ **Learner**  
**Community evangelist** (AWS  
Community Builder)

**Innovator** : Hackathons

**Public speaker**

**Athlete** at heart :    


Off the grid? Catch me just soaking  
up **nature** to recharge for the next big  
idea.









- Introduction to yours truly 
- Why the topic ?
- Static vs Dynamic Creds
- Overview of Dynamic Authentication
- Working of STS Tokens
- Integrating STS with OpenSearch
- Demo time
- SAS token use cases
- Resources
- Q&A





# Why security in OpenSearch matters



## Increasing Compliance Pressures :

**Data Sovereignty:** Ensuring data is stored and accessed in compliance with local laws.



## Multi-Tenant Environments

**Data Isolation:** Preventing unauthorized access between different tenants is so challenging



## Cloud-Native Deployments

**Dynamic Scaling:** Handling the challenges of scaling in cloud environments.

**Ephemeral Resources:** Managing temporary instances and their security.





- **Static secrets** are long lived creds
- Such secrets are predefined
- They do not change unless explicitly modified by an administrator or authorized user.

Examples: API keys, database passwords, or encryption keys unless intentionally rotated.

- **Dynamic secrets** have a short lifespan.
- They are typically generated on-demand
- Automatically revoked after a specified time period or usage.

Examples : Temporary Access, Session Token or Short-lived tokens



# Traditional ways

Create access key

✓

Success

This is the **only** time that the secret access keys can be viewed or downloaded. You cannot recover them later. However, you can create new access keys at any time.

Download .csv file

Access key ID	Secret access key
AKIAQFSK3ANH3UZCB44T	<div>***** Show</div>

Close







# Say no to Static Creds

- Static credentials are **long lived** in nature.
- If compromised, they give attackers **ample time** to exploit the application.
- If they are **stolen** it would be a nightmare to discern which operations are legitimate.
- Thus, the only **fail-safe choice** is to clumsily **rotate the keys** and **redistribute to customers**. This is often overlooked action and adds extra pain for the DevOps.



# Perks of using Dynamic Creds

1



## Enhancing Security

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- Short-lived tokens have a **limited lifespan**, reducing the exposure window for potential attacks.
- Validity period is **short**, minimizing the risk of unauthorized access.
- Regular token expiration forces users to **re-authenticate**, ensuring better security.

2



## Mitigating Token Abuse

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- By making tokens short lived, we limit the time an attacker can use to abuse a stolen token.
- Thus, **minimizing the risk window** significantly

3



## Least Privilege Principle


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- Access to what they absolutely **need** and not what they want.
- When **permissions change** (e.g., user roles or access levels), short-lived tokens **automatically reflect** the updates upon renewal.
- Long-lived tokens may retain outdated permissions, leading to security risks.

```
"responseElements": {
  "credentials": {
    "accessKeyId": "ASIA52LBBISYNJOB70",
    "sessionToken":
      "IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEHsaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQD3qSmqdpasQAdJWJH/Yg0WuSkkvVxq1FZuzuG3j8uQ3QIhAKusdUmLkAQbOLnRjMn6DMJEmiT40K2aKZ8AqH3+g5fNK
      uwCCKT////////wEQARoMMTMyNzY0NDY5Nzk3Igx0D61kLHtcI7YLvDQqwaLQxxRBHheYyehMR1Z4kPnk2YaZIHrDsF/01snPqq4ExmGs7+ABKaduT3aF/jjSWUyV4iQTk9h
      Tbn4m3iB4oScSohSSUkmuk0qXm/41UUQ/6rEKY3gou/h2RnCTP/q27npTYzpgR1/QE+RYqd+fOn+/T4e/EY5drPHrw3VsLVn2MSGU3vXh01uAgm1XoKzH3bkQqAWU26A4B33z
      i8PEI1CIrOUHNHE5XpCBAhAcGAJ4t0hOKdB3rssZ0diN59/V/En2bhoxkndQgf4Vg2JXyA9MapG8CZf8Vg0NqfgwyjT0uukGMooyjwZTUZrnGsXP5Z2IY3lRx6VqCTPSAniDhs
      cnSINZ04kh8uvMCbzfoNYaEOGAZAKRhnv3lvcNdMgzscGe3vXKYnr2bAaAKpoqmK99NHVuKmwtoi+8aMj4rLwiDD9htycBjq+AWihUWMw5D4JsNih7AdPlaw61/GkP1LxmSieq
      8MdECThUsOzt4M/PXEaMK8Fp7penrGBUXdriIInojBEEu/6+PQVrpqCw7T+PXYE/PpVKL0ZZOKHsVHC3behBbxU0NsJY25GbuF5HeJ5fV06010Bhns18twqFePKgxKypRiEF
      tnEno3aI1bRCmyHlJ6REHdmsktl[REDACTED]dr9JiToaQUefOawhA6p/ODZ4k=",
    "expiration": "Dec 12, 2022, 10:48:33 AM"
  },
  "assumedRoleUser": {
    "assumedRoleId": "[REDACTED]CompositionSession",
    "arn": "arn:aws:sts:[REDACTED]:assumed-role/[REDACTED]CompositionSession"
  }
},
```

**I hope I have  
convinced you  
enough to switch to  
Dynamic ways to  
Authenticate !!**





- The Security plugin in OpenSearch allows you to configure two types of authentication tokens:
  - **On-Behalf-Of (OBO) tokens**
  - **Service Account tokens.**





- **Purpose:**
  - Allow extensions or services to perform actions **on behalf of a user**, inheriting the user's privileges for a short duration.
- **Token Type:** JSON Web Token (JWT)
- **Validity:** Configurable window of validity
- **Usage:** These tokens operate "just-in-time," i.e. Issued immediately before required for authentication
- **Configuration:** Defined in the OpenSearch **config.yml** file under the dynamic configuration section







- **Purpose:**
  - Allow extensions to perform actions autonomously, without assuming the role(s) of the active user.
- **Token Type:** Service Account Token
- **Validity:** Configurable window of validity
- **Usage:** Designed for system-level operations
- **Configuration:** Defined in the OpenSearch **config.yml** file under the service account section



**DEMO TIME!**

**...WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO  
WRONG**

Wish me luck






- 1) Create **Opensearch domain** with IAM as master
- 2) Create **IAMUser** : OpenSearchDemoUser1
- 3) Create **IAM Policy** : OpenSearchDemoPolicy
- 4) Attach a IAM policy" OpenSearchDemoPolicy" to the user which allows access to your domain of OpenSearch
- 5) Create **IAM Role** : OpenSearchDemoRole
- 6) Attach Permissions to role
  - AmazonOpenSearchServiceFullAccess : AWS Managed
  - And OpenSearchDemoPolicy : Customer managed
- 7) Set up the **trust relationship** in the role to allow the user OpenSearchDemoUser1 to assume the role



# Dynamic Creds in OpenSearch



# Dynamic Creds in OpenSearch

Component	Role in your setup
IAM User (OpenSearchDemoUser1)	The <i>user being represented</i> in OBO model
IAM Role (OpenSearchDemoRole)	The <i>permissions</i> the user temporarily assumes
STS:AssumeRole	The <i>mechanism</i> to get temporary credentials "on behalf of" the user
OpenSearch	The <i>service</i> being accessed with those temporary credentials





1. Use **AWS CLI** to create sts

```
aws sts assume-role --role-arn  
arn:aws:iam::264481260887:role/OpenSearchDemoRole  
--role-session-name OpenSearchSession --profile OpenSearchDemoUser1  
--duration-seconds 900
```

2. **Hit the endpoint** with STS token thru Postman

GET

[https://search-demo-opensearch-sastoken-ejuoh36c2filvtdykkshqjtayy.aos.us-east-1.on.aws/\\_cat/indices?v](https://search-demo-opensearch-sastoken-ejuoh36c2filvtdykkshqjtayy.aos.us-east-1.on.aws/_cat/indices?v)





OpenSearch / OpenSearchSasTokenRequest

Save

GET

https://search-demo-opensearch-sastoken-ejuoh36c2flvtdydkshqjtayy.aos.us-east-1.on.aws/\_cat/indices?v

Send

Params

Authorization

Headers (9)

Body

Pre-request Script

Tests

Settings

Cookies

Flows

Monitors

History

Type

AWS Signature

AccessKey

ASIAT3FCPYVL66VPIRTZ

SecretKey

BAKc24KfVep0fqOrMWCpyMA+zhtoHnn9 ...

Advanced configuration

Postman auto-generates default values for some of these fields unless a value is specified.

AWS Region

us-east-1

Service Name

es

Session Token

IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBUaCXVzLWVhc3QtMS...

The authorization header will be automatically generated when you send the request. Learn more about [AWS Signature](#) authorization.

Add authorization data to

Request Headers

Body

Cookies

Headers (6)

Test Results

Status: 200 OK Time: 102 ms Size: 871 B Save as example

Pretty

Raw

Preview


Visualize

Text

	health	status	index	uuid	pri	rep	docs.count	docs.deleted	store.size	pri.store.size
1	green	open	.plugins-ml-model-group	14aWqNT7QSCM7Dip0YMSSw	1	2	2	0	37.3kb	11.7kb
2	green	open	.plugins-ml-config	b4rkuQXySB01Cl11Nwj_UA	1	2	9	0	38.2kb	9.8kb
3	green	open	.opensearch-observability	4XLpU69vTfi-ynhml7BLxQ	1	2	0	0	624b	208b
4	green	open	.plugins-flow-framework-state	z1kzlhJ1TguUC620huvBuA	5	2	10	0	52.7kb	16.5kb
5	green	open	.plugins-ml-model	AQ1wzyr_S3iDtqeTRThz-g	1	2	2	0	105kb	35.1kb
6	green	open	.plugins-flow-framework-config	TrLonFkcSyCP7BWGXomEAQ	5	2	1	0	14.2kb	4.7kb
7	green	open	.plugins-ml-agent	SqcMgibhTMGfdUQWMZrtQw	1	2	8	0	532.2kb	177.4kb
8	green	open	.plugins-flow-framework-templates	K10qv1lnS-mguSvAfjMcBQ	5	2	4	0	135.9kb	29.3kb



# After 15 mins



The screenshot shows the Postman interface for a REST client. The request is a GET to `https://search-demo-opensearch-sastoken-ejuoh36c2flvtdykkshqjtayy.aos.us-east-1.on.aws/_cat/indices?v`. The Authorization tab is active, showing an AWS Signature configuration. The response is a 403 Forbidden status with a message: "The security token included in the request is expired".

**Request Details:**

- Method: GET
- URL: `https://search-demo-opensearch-sastoken-ejuoh36c2flvtdykkshqjtayy.aos.us-east-1.on.aws/_cat/indices?v`
- Authorization Type: AWS Signature
- AccessKey: `ASIAT3FCPYVL5YGWISQ`
- SecretKey: `6IiOyL4iv97O15u/1+cKMKO4q4jxFo2U8w5r...`
- Advanced configuration:
  - AWS Region: `us-east-1`
  - Service Name: `es`
  - Session Token: `IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBUaCXVzLWVhc3QtMS...`


**Response Details:**

- Status: 403 Forbidden
- Time: 278 ms
- Size: 339 B
- Body (JSON):

```
{
  "message": "The security token included in the request is expired"
}
```



## 1. Secure Web App Access (Temporary User)

- Scenario: A user logs into a web application, and you want to allow them to view their own data in OpenSearch for the next 30 minutes.
- How it works:
  - User authenticates with Cognito or Identity Provider (IdP)
  - Backend calls AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity or GetSessionToken to get STS credentials
  - Backend uses these credentials with Postman (or SDKs) to query OpenSearch
  - Access is scoped to specific index or document type via IAM/OpenSearch role mapping
-  Ideal for dashboards, analytics, and search in a multi-tenant SaaS platform.





Identity Provider




User/user agent



IAM STS




Amazon OpenSearch Service






## 2. Run Time-Limited Data Ingest Jobs

- Scenario: A scheduled Lambda function pushes data to OpenSearch for 1 hour each night.
- How it works:
  - Lambda assumes a role with AssumeRole and gets temporary credentials
  - Uses these to push logs or metrics into OpenSearch
  - Access expires after job ends (e.g. 1 hour)
-  Great for ETL pipelines and log processing jobs.




# SAS (Shared Access Signatures) Use Case






## 3. Cross-Account Access

- Scenario: Your OpenSearch domain is in Account A, and a script running in Account B needs to query it.
- How it works:
  - Account B assumes a role in Account A using STS
  - Gets credentials valid for 1 hour
  - Uses those credentials to access OpenSearch securely
-  Useful in multi-account AWS orgs or vendor integrations



# SAS (Shared Access Signatures) Use Case



# To know more on Service Account





# Connect with me



# Thank you for being an amazing audience





# That's how I want the hall to look like !!!



# BEDANKT | Thank you



**Until Next time ...**



**Q&A, Bring it on !!**

