

# Mesures de Securite pour l'Escrow Interne

## Document Technique

## 1 SECURITE ARCHITECTURALE

### 1.1 Isolation des Donnees Sensibles

```
+-----+  
|     BASE DE DONNEES PRINCIPALE      |  
| - Table users (id, phone, kyc_status)|  
| - Table offers                      |  
| - Table transactions                |  
+-----+  
|     BASE DE DONNEES SECURISEE (ISOLEE)|  
| - Table wallets (balances, user_id)  | <- CRITIQUE  
| - Table escrow_locks                 | <- CRITIQUE  
| - Table audit_logs                  | <- TOUTES modifications  
+-----+
```

### 1.2 Microservices Separés

```
# Service Wallet (accès restreint)
class WalletService:
    endpoints = ["/wallet/balance", "/wallet/transfer"]
    auth_level = "HIGH"
    rate_limit = "10 req/min"

# Service Escrow (ultra-securisé)
class EscrowService:
    endpoints = ["/escrow/lock", "/escrow/release"]
    auth_level = "MAXIMUM"
    rate_limit = "5 req/min"
    whitelist_only = True # Seulement services internes
```

## 2 MECANISMES DE BLOCAGE DES FONDS

### 2.1 Double Validation des Transactions

Workflow de blocage :

1. User A1 initie échange -> demande de blocage
2. Service Wallet vérifie solde  $\geq$  montant
3. Service Escrow crée un LOCK avec hash unique
4. Base de données : UPDATE avec version locking
5. Audit : log crypté de l'opération

## 2.2 Implementation Technique

```
class SecureEscrow:
    def lock_funds(self, user_id, amount, currency, offer_id):
        # 1. Vérifier signature numérique
        if not self.verify_digital_signature(user_id, offer_id):
            raise SecurityError("Signature invalide")

        # 2. Version locking pour éviter double-spend
        with db.transaction(isolation_level='SERIALIZABLE') as tx:
            # Recupere avec FOR UPDATE (verrouillage)
            wallet = tx.execute("""
                SELECT balance, version
                FROM wallets
                WHERE user_id = ? AND currency = ?
                FOR UPDATE
            """, (user_id, currency))

            # Vérifier solde
            if wallet.balance < amount:
                tx.rollback()
                raise InsufficientFundsError()

            # 3. Créer lock avec UUID cryptographique
            lock_id = self.generate_crypto_uuid()

            # 4. Débiter ET créer lock en une seule opération
            tx.execute("""
                UPDATE wallets
                SET balance = balance - ?,
                    version = version + 1
                WHERE user_id = ? AND currency = ?
            """, (amount, user_id, currency))

            tx.execute("""
                INSERT INTO escrow_locks
                (id, user_id, amount, currency, offer_id,
                 created_at, expires_at, status, hash)
                VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'LOCKED', ?)
            """, (lock_id, user_id, amount, currency, offer_id,
                  datetime.now(), datetime.now() + timedelta(hours=24),
                  self.calculate_hash(user_id, amount, offer_id)))

            # 5. Log d'audit immuable
            self.log_to_immutable_ledger(
                action="LOCK",
                lock_id=lock_id,
                user_id=user_id,
                amount=amount
            )

    return lock_id
```

### 3 SURVEILLANCE EN TEMPS REEL

#### 3.1 Systeme de Detection d'Anomalies

```
class AnomalyDetection:  
    def monitor_escrow_activity(self):  
        rules = {  
            "RAPID_SUCCESSIVE_LOCKS": {  
                "condition": ">3 locks en 60 secondes pour meme user",  
                "action": "FREEZE_ACCOUNT",  
                "severity": "HIGH"  
            },  
            "UNUSUAL_AMOUNTS": {  
                "condition": "montant > 10x moyenne historique user",  
                "action": "REQUIRE_2FA",  
                "severity": "MEDIUM"  
            },  
            "ROUND_NUMBER_PATTERN": {  
                "condition": "5 transactions montants ronds (1000, 2000...)",  
                "action": "FLAG_FOR REVIEW",  
                "severity": "LOW"  
            },  
            "UNUSUAL_TIME": {  
                "condition": "transaction entre 2h-5h locale user",  
                "action": "SMS_VERIFICATION",  
                "severity": "MEDIUM"  
            }  
        }  
    }
```

#### 3.2 Dashboard de Monitoring

+-----+ <td colspan="2">DASHBOARD SECURITE ESCROW</td> <td colspan="2">+-----+</td>		DASHBOARD SECURITE ESCROW		+-----+	
		ALERTES ACTIVES (3)			
		- User#4421: 5 locks/2min (suspect)			
		- XOF: Position nette a 8% (RISQUE)			
		- Serveur DB: CPU a 95%			
+-----+		STATISTIQUES 24H			
		- Locks: 1,452			
		- Releases: 1,448			
		- Echecs: 4 (0.27%)			
		- Temps moyen: 47ms			
+-----+		VERROUILLAGES ANORMAUX			
		- XOF: 12 locks > 1M			
		- EUR: 3 locks > 10K			
		- Anomalie geographique: CI -> SN soudain			
+-----+					

## 4 PROTECTION CONTRE LES ATTAQUES

### 4.1 Protection Double-Spend

```
class DoubleSpendProtection:
    def __init__(self):
        self.pending_locks = {}
        self.lock_timeout = 30

    def attempt_lock(self, user_id, amount, currency):
        key = f"{user_id}:{currency}"

        if self.is_processing(key):
            raise ConcurrentModificationError(
                "Transaction déjà en cours pour ce wallet")

        with redis.lock(f"wallet_lock:{key}", timeout=self.lock_timeout):
            current = self.get_wallet_with_version(user_id, currency)

            locked_amount = self.get_pending_locks_amount(user_id, currency)
            available = current.balance - locked_amount

            if available < amount:
                raise InsufficientFundsError(
                    f"Solde disponible: {available}, demande: {amount}")

        return True
```

### 4.2 Timeouts et Rollbacks Automatiques

Schema de timeout intelligent :

- Lock standard : 24 heures maximum
- Après 6h : Notification “Transaction en attente”
- Après 12h : Notification aux deux parties
- Après 18h : Alert support
- Après 24h : AUTO-ROLLBACK avec notification

## 5 JOURNALISATION ET AUDIT

### 5.1 Ledger Immutable

```
class ImmutableAuditLedger:  
    def log_transaction(self, action, data):  
        previous_hash = self.get_last_hash()  
        current_hash = sha256(  
            f"{{previous_hash}}:{json.dumps(data)}:{timestamp}"  
        ).hexdigest()  
  
        self.write_to_ledger({  
            "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),  
            "action": action,  
            "data": data,  
            "previous_hash": previous_hash,  
            "hash": current_hash,  
            "signed_by": self.get_system_signature()  
        })  
  
        self.backup_to_cold_storage(current_hash)
```

### 5.2 Format de Log Standardisé

```
{  
    "audit_id": "AUD-2024-01-15-xyz789",  
    "timestamp": "2024-01-15T14:30:45.123Z",  
    "event_type": "ESCROW_LOCK",  
    "user_id": "user_12345",  
    "wallet_id": "wal_67890",  
    "amount": 100000,  
    "currency": "XOF",  
    "offer_id": "offer_abc123",  
    "lock_id": "lock_def456",  
    "previous_balance": 150000,  
    "new_balance": 50000,  
    "locked_balance": 100000,  
    "ip_address": "192.168.1.100",  
    "user_agent": "App/1.0 iOS/16.5",  
    "geolocation": "Dakar, SN",  
    "risk_score": 15,  
    "signature": "rsa-2048:abc123def456",  
    "merkle_proof": "0x123abc..."  
}
```

## 6 RESUME DES 10 POINTS CLES

1. **Isolation** : Base de données wallets séparée
2. **Atomicité** : Transactions tout-ou-rien avec rollback
3. **Immortalité** : Ledger crypté pour audit
4. **Surveillance** : Détection d'anomalies en temps réel
5. **Résilience** : Sauvegardes 3-2-1-1-0
6. **Vérifications** : 4 points pour chaque échange P2P
7. **Reputation** : Scores de confiance dynamiques
8. **Tests** : Audit quotidien + mensuel externe

9. **Monitoring** : Dashboard temps reel avec alertes
10. **Urgence** : Procedures documentees et testees

*Quelle partie souhaitez-vous que je detaille davantage ?*