

# Cryptographic Randomness on a CC2538: A Case Study

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


## CC2538

(http://www.ti.com/product/CC2538)

- ARM® Cortex®-M3
- 512KB, 256KB or 128KB
  Programmable Flash
- 2.4-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 Compliant RF
- Security Hardware Acceleration
- Low Power
- Zigbee/6LoWPAN Support







# Random Number Generators (RNGs)

- True RNG (TRNG)
  - Samples entropy in physical source

- Pseudo RNG (PRNG)
  - Seeded by TRNG
  - Efficient

- Cryptographic Usage:
  - Key Generation, etc



# Example: RNG in EC Key Generation

Example: tinydtls implementation

- Random value as sk.
- pk = [sk]\*G



## Sad Stories...

SATURDAY, JANUARY 9, 2010

# PRNG Vulnerability of Z-Stack ZigBee SEP ECC

by Travis Goodspeed <travis at radiantmachines.com> with neighborly thanks to Nick DePetrillo, concerning version 2.2.2-1.30 of TI Z-Stack and a ZigBee Smart Energy Profile ECC vulnerability.

```
air% hexdumpirandom.binn| greps-+color "7cse1 e8 4e f4 87 00000000 02 01+00;60 e8 2e 7c e1 e8 4e f4 87 62 49 56 fe 0008000 01:000:60:e8_2e:7c:e1se8f4e f4 87 62 49 56 fe 80 0010000 00"60:e8:2e:7c:e1se8f4e f4 87 62:49.56"fe 80 00 0018000 60!e8:2e:7c:e1se8f4e f4 87 62:49.56"fe 80 00 60 air% return;
```

#### rdist

January 11, 2010

#### Smart meter crypto flaw worse than thought

Filed under: Crypto, Embedded, Hacking, Hardware, RFID, Security — Nate Lawson @ 1:08 pm

Travis Goodspeed has continued finding flaws in TI microcontrollers, branching out from the MS the random number generator. Why is this important? Because the MSP430 and ZigBee are found to the control of the control

Travis describes two flaws: the PRNG is a 16-bit LFSR and it is not seeded with very much ent generator be used to create cryptographic keys. It's extremely scary to find such a poor unders off the power to your house.



#### CC2538 PRNG

- Coding Issues in Contiki driver
- 16 bit LFSR (CRC16) as PRNG




Figure 16-1. Basic Structure of the RNG

 $2^{16} = 65536$ 

Far **NOT ENOUGH** for cryptographic security!



# e.g.: Broken ECDHE/ECDSA in DTLS

Build Key Pair lookup table: 65536 entries

#### ECDHE

**Require:** A's secret  $r_A$ , B's secret  $r_B$ , Base Point G

- 1: A sends  $Q_A = [r_A]G$
- 2: B sends  $Q_B = [r_B]G$
- 3: A,B independently computes:  $Q_{AB} = [r_A]Q_B = [r_B]Q_A$
- 4: **return** Shared Secret  $Q_{AB}$
- Revert r\_A from Q\_A and r\_B from Q\_B.
- Compute Q\_{AB}.

#### ECDSA

**Require:** Singer's secret key d, Message to be signed m, Base Point G

- 1: Select random k, computes: kG = (r, y)
- 2: Compute e = SHA 1(m)
- 3: Compute  $s = k^{-1}(e + dr)$
- 4: **return** (r,s) as signature of m
- Revert k from r.
- Extract d given (s,k,e,r).



# CC2538 TRNG: Sampling RF noise




Figure 23-19. FFT of the Random Bytes





Figure 23-20. Histogram of 20 Million Bytes Generated With the RANDOM Instruction

- Passed NIST test tool(\*), but...
- Potentially tamperable.




# Hints of Circuit Design:



CC2420 Manual



- Fixed ADC input fixed ADC output (fixed LSB)
  - Use constant signal (i.e. carrier wave)
  - Challenge: Noises affect LSB





**AGC Circuit** 

- Solution: Saturation (strong signal)
  - Noises became negligible.



## Result







### Conclusion

- Really Not Good RNG:
  - Low entropy PRNG
    - Not recommended for any security usage.
  - Tamperable Entropy Source
    - Needs to be physically protected.
- Use Dedicated RNG:
  - Latest CC Series: