Sam Burt Language SAE 2 February 18th, 2018

A. In his first lecture, Kripe notes the nuanced differences between a priori and necessary in order to underscore the differences in truths and statements of reference. He begins by denoting that a priori is "a concept of epistemology" (292). It is a concept that deals with the justification of belief. He follows by changing the traditional definition of a priori that Kant gives. Roughly, Kant claims that a priori truths are "those which can be known independently of any experience" (292). But who can know it completely without experience. The uncertainty causes Kripe to revise the definition of a priori. He claims that we must, "stick to the question of whether a particular person of knower knows something a priori or believes it on the basis of a priori evidence" (292). It is important that saying something can be known a priori, does not mean it must be. This allows for a variety of experiences to reach the a priori truth. Kripe contrast the notion of a priori with necessity. He writes that necessity is concerned with metaphysics, not epistemology. Therefor, for a fact to be necessary is more concerned with its relation to the world. A necessary fact is something that if true, could not be otherwise. If the world were different, this fact would still be true as it is not contingent on how the world is (293). This distinction between necessary and a priori is important in determining truths which we do not have any a priori knowledge of. We can correctly say that something is necessarily true or false because it would follow through logic or law. It looks at contingency to the world to find truth, when a priori is not available.

B. Further in his piece, Kripe designates the differences between rigid designators and non-rigid designators. Rigid designators, as argued by Kripe, are words that in every possible world designate the same object (293). If this object is also of a necessary existence (in terms of how

necessary was defined above), then the designator is defined as being strongly rigid. Non-rigid designators, or accidental designators, are the reverse. The word may refer to a variety of things depending on the world. Kripe then provides the thesis that all names are rigid designators. To prove this, Kripe uses Nixon as an example. One could argue that designating Nixon as the president in 1970 could promote non-rigidity, as a world could exist in which he was not president in 1970. This concept, referred to as transworld identification, is unproblematic for names however. This concept fails because when we rigidly refer to Nixon, we are referring to him under certain circumstances. Therefore, "properties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do with properties used to identify it in the actual world" (294). C. Kripe concludes his piece by reviewing a theory of naming. The 6 theses of naming which he state create conditions on which a name can be applied to something. The first 5 theses deliver a specific picture of naming. Kripe illustrates the image using the example of Cicero and Catiline. He writes that to follow these theses, you first think of someway to describe the term. Once having that description, you know that the name refers to the description and the description (or condition) refers to the name. Using this, you can speak to the possible worlds in which this condition is not held (296). From this point, Kripe goes through the Theses and notes possible errors. For Thesis 2, Kripe argues that at first it seems a priori. You have certain properties in mind and you pick out someone that satisfies these properties. But this has inherent flaws. What if two people satisfy the condition? You have no ground for taking one over the other. Further, in order to satisfy the uniqueness condition, you need to make sure that the individual or concept you are using to define you name is not itself defined by the very name you originally were seeking to define. This discussion would cause the thesis to fail due to circularity. An example of this which Kripe illustrates is defining Einstein as the founder of relativity. This definition fails because relativity is defined as being discovered by Einstein. We then enter an infinite loop trying to define one term by the other (297). It is through this logic that Kripe asserts that thesis 2 fails.