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CROSSFIRE HURRICANE

REDACTED BINDER

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000001

TAB 2



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/09/2017

On Monday, 18 September 2017 and Tuesday, 19 September 2017, CHRISTOPHER STEELE, ORBIS Business Intelligence, was interviewed at The Grosvenor Hotel, London, England, by FBI SSA [REDACTED] and FBI SIA Brian J. Auten. The following information was provided by STEELE over the course of the two-day interview. On 18 September 2017, in the initial part of the interview, STEELE was accompanied by his fellow ORBIS executive, CHRISTOPHER BURROWS. After about 45-60 minutes on 18 September 2017, BURROWS departed, and STEELE remained with SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten for the duration of 18 September 2017 and for the entirety of the interview on 19 September 2017.

On 18 September 2017, BURROWS opened the interview by expressing concern over loose business ends with the FBI. BURROWS explained that he and STEELE were still pretty upset about how the relationship with the FBI concluded because of the time and effort that had been taken to get information to the FBI. BURROWS explained that we had a contract with [REDACTED] adding that maybe the contract had been put together with STEELE serving as the "face" of ORBIS, but that there had been a contractual relationship.

STEELE and BURROWS apologized for going to the press back in the fall of 2016, but STEELE explained that as the election season went on, they as the company were "riding two horses" - their client and the FBI -- and after FBI Director James COMEY's reopening of the Hillary Clinton investigation, they had to pick "one horse" and chose the business/client relationship over the relationship with the FBI. They followed what their client wanted, and they spoke to the press. STEELE and BURROWS described the overall situation as being one where it was "your [FBI] fault" and "our fault." STEELE commented that it was not about the money owed, but BURROWS remarked that STEELE might not be that concerned about the money, but BURROWS was.

Investigation on 09/18/2017 at London, United Kingdom (In Person)File # 372B-SM-2063661Date drafted 11/09/2017by AUTEN BRIAN JAMES

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[REDACTED]

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STEELE and BURROWS were confused over whether SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten represented the FBI or the Office of the Special Counsel. BURROWS made the point, in his former career, he "knew [Robert] Mueller." They wanted to make sure that they were talking to the Office of the Special Counsel.

STEELE and BURROWS indicated frustration by the inclusion of their company's reporting in the United States (US) Intelligence Community's Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of Russia interference in the 2016 election, particularly the ICA "annex" as reported in the media. STEELE and BURROWS felt that they should have had advance warning that the company's reporting was going to be used in the annex. The inclusion of the company's information and the subsequent public leak of the annex put STEELE's name out there and had a "massive impact on our lives." STEELE and BURROWS wanted to know how the US and FGI [REDACTED] governments had worked all of this out, and also wanted to know if the FGI [REDACTED] was told that the information was going in the ICA.

STEELE and BURROWS described President TRUMP as their "main opponent" and indicated that they were fearful about how TRUMP's presidency negatively impacted the historical UK-US alliance and the US-UK special relationship.

STEELE said that GLENN SIMPSON of Fusion GPS was knowledgeable that STEELE was sharing reports and information with the FBI.

STEELE explained that, in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, they provided material to BRUCE OHR and were pushing OHR to do something about the reports.

STEELE said that he had been unsure to whom, FGI [REDACTED] he could provide the election-related reports. He decided against going to his primary FGI [REDACTED], who he did not identify by name to interviewers, but described as having just converted to become the FGI [REDACTED]

STEELE said that his primary subsource for the election reports - who he would not identify by name for the entirety of the interview - had also provided information used in earlier, non-election related reporting provided to the FBI.

STEELE's primary subsource met with Sergey MILLIAN. The primary subsource had shared a photo with STEELE depicting MILLIAN with TRUMP. STEELE tried to have his primary subsource record a meeting between the primary subsource and Millian, but it was not successful. MILLIAN was allegedly at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2013. MILLIAN has lost contact with STEELE's primary subsource. STEELE said that MILLIAN is the



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individual who originally provided the primary subsource with the Ritz Carlton-related information about TRUMP. STEELE's primary subsource followed up MILLIAN's information with three people. ORBIS has the names of the three people with whom the primary subsource followed up.

STEELE said that his primary subsource had drinks with CHARLES DOLAN.

STEELE said that he had never heard of CARTER PAGE or MICHAEL COHEN or GEORGE PAPADOUPOLOS before this whole thing. He had heard of PAUL MANAFORT which STEELE said got the whole thing started. He had heard of REX TILLERSON before this, and told interviewers that he would describe this in greater detail later in the interview.

When asked by interviewers about his vetting and validation of his primary subsource, STEELE said that he knew the primary subsource's background and the current positions of his primary subsource's sub-subsources. STEELE said that his primary subsource's reporting was consistent over multiple projects, which STEELE used as a vetting and validation point of reference. STEELE also confirmed his primary subsource's reporting through other sources.

STEELE said that ORBIS has four discrete, "hermetically-sealed" main agent networks. The biggest of these was the network involved with his primary subsource, which isn't as active now. For one of the older networks, the main agent had died. Another main agent network is up and running and is now starting to get good information. It is based on a new main agent - not the primary subsource for the election reports - and it is being redirected to collect on Russia. STEELE also said that he has a source looking at the Sunny Isles real estate purchase by RYBOLOVLEV. This particular source is someone in public relations/government relations (PR /GR) circles.

STEELE said that his primary subsource feels like it is about time to engage with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE spoke with his primary subsource last night, and the primary subsource is coming along with the idea of talking with Special Counsel, but was not there yet. STEELE is still very concerned to protect his primary subsource. The primary subsource has a very special story, especially how he came to work for ORBIS. The primary subsource was introduced to STEELE and ORBIS by FIONA HILL in or around 2011. The primary subsource was with HILL when HILL was at the Brookings Institution. Emphasizing the sensitivity, STEELE explained that HILL now worked for the White House on the National Security Council. HILL has a very high opinion of the primary subsource, and she told STEELE that he and ORBIS should take a look at him. HILL is one of STEELE's close friends - STEELE later described in the interview





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that his wife went to university with HILL, and that HILL's daughter is named after a now-deceased mutual college friend of HILL and his wife.

STEELE said that his primary subsource is a US resident and is a native Russian, adding that there was no way he could have the kind of access he has without being Russian. STEELE added that someone who was Ukrainian could possibly have the type of access his source has. STEELE's primary subsource has a daughter who was born in the United States.

STEELE trained up his primary subsource, and STEELE described him as a prolific asset. The primary subsource's motivations include the fact that he considers the United States to be his home, the fact that his daughter is US-born, and finances. The primary subsource uses his prior university contacts, and his reporting has become better over time. STEELE was asked by interviewers if his primary subsource had anything happen to him while collecting for ORBIS. STEELE indicated that his primary subsource had reported being hauled in front of immigration authorities in Russia. The primary subsource was shaken down for money - he was forced to go to an ATM and withdraw money and paid the bribe. STEELE took this as a good sign for validation purposes, remarking that things haven't gone smoothly for his primary subsource all the time.

STEELE said that his primary subsource took three trips to Russia in 2016 for collecting information for the election-related ORBIS reports. STEELE said that he was working on memory for some of this, as ORBIS destroyed materials for legal reasons. STEELE said that his primary subsource took trips in June, October and one in between. STEELE would debrief his primary subsource after these trips. STEELE also said that STEELE took three trips himself to the United States in 2016 and talked with his primary subsource. STEELE dated his US trips as occurring in July, early-to-mid September, and October - after STEELE had met with FBI representatives in Rome.

STEELE said that his primary subsource uses [REDACTED] to communicate like [REDACTED]. There was a push to get an audio capture of primary subsource's conversations with one of his own sub-subsources, and they were successful in obtaining audio of a conversation between the primary subsource and his sub-subsource regarding MICHAEL COHEN's meeting in Prague. STEELE told interviewers that he did not have that audio capture in its original form. STEELE explained that he had to be careful regarding legal issues, but they had audio capture and a transcription of the audio capture. There may be an opportunity to obtain more on this because this particular sub-subsource [REDACTED] and in an accessible place. STEELE's primary subsource is having dialogue with that particular subsource, and that individual may be thinking of "coming in."

[REDACTED]

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STEELE described this particular sub-subsource in greater detail. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] part of a pool of journalists and staffers, traveling with Russian leadership in shared planes and hanging out in offices - akin to participation in a White House press pool. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] individual who reported in election-related reports on IVANOV and COHEN's visit to Prague. On the Prague-related reporting, STEELE said that [REDACTED] knew someone in Prague who worked for ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO. [REDACTED] also knows people in the cyber business. Allegedly, ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO was the crucible for the COHEN meeting in Prague [REDACTED]

STEELE said that another, different sub-subsource had provided information on cyber. This particular sub-subsource talked about how the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was able to turn an individual who had been caught money laundering and get him/her to work cyber operations for the FSB. STEELE commented about how this is a typical operating procedure for the FSB.

In reference to a question posed by interviewers about the primary subsource's reporting on St. Petersburg, STEELE said that his primary subsource had traveled to St. Petersburg. The primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg that he is trying to sell. The primary subsource is neither from Moscow nor St. Petersburg, but the property gives him reason to travel to St. Petersburg. STEELE could not recall exactly which of his primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia involved a trip to St. Petersburg, but it may have been on the third one.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's third trip involved him being asked, as an expert, to attend events at the Kremlin. The primary subsource gave a talk or a seminar at the event; he was a contributor, which gave him cover for being there. The third trip occurred at the time that STEELE was meeting with FBI representatives in Rome. This was why STEELE couldn't contact the primary subsource during that time - the primary subsource had said not to contact him because he'd be at the Kremlin. This is the event, STEELE added, during which time the primary subsource collected information about EDWARD SNOWDEN and also a senior FSB officer.

STEELE explained that, when collecting information for ORBIS, his primary subsource plays up his overt, academic interests. It is an "in-between" clandestine and overt cover. The primary subsource does favors for people.



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In fact, STEELE explained that STEELE had helped to recommend the best English language school for one of his primary subsource's sub-subsources.

With respect to the election-related reports, STEELE said that it did not take much effort early-on for his primary subsource to collect information because the whole thing was an "open secret" in Moscow. People would start talking in bars, and the primary subsource could easily elicit information. Later, as 2016 progressed, sources of information started shutting down and it became harder to obtain information.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has sub-subsources with serious access to named people in DMITRIY PESKOV's and SERGEY IVANOV's tight circles.

According to STEELE, the primary subsource has traveled to Volgograd as part of research for ORBIS on a litigation/legal matter. The primary subsource has contacts in different cities - for example, the primary subsource is close to, or has sub-subsources close to, YURIY TRUTNEV, Minister of Resources. STEELE commented that his primary subsource has collected information for many of ORBIS' litigation clients in the energy and mining sectors. The primary subsource has been going back and forth to different cities for years for ORBIS' litigation clients. For the election-related reports, the primary subsource had about three trips to Russia in about 4 months.

STEELE explained that ORBIS' initial interest in the US election-related material stemmed from a litigation-related issue. It involved potential litigation with PAUL MANAFORT, and ORBIS' interest started around May 2016. MANAFORT had disappeared for multiple years and appeared to be hiding from creditors. MANAFORT owed money -- \$100 million to oligarchs and more money to Russians (NFI). STEELE explained that FUSION GPS had a different client for whom it was already doing research on MANAFORT. Around June 2016, STEELE met with FUSION GPS and they decided to start swapping notes. Soon thereafter, the decision was made to have FUSION GPS hire ORBIS on the election-related stuff - FUSION GPS would "take [ORBIS] on for the bigger issue." In June 2016, ORBIS took its own crack at the election-related stuff. STEELE said that it wasn't the only politically-sensitive investigation ORBIS was working at the time. For example, ORBIS was handling an English Football Association (FA) matter regarding a competitor for the bid process. STEELE also said - and emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this example -- ORBIS was also involved in doing work regarding the election campaign for the UN Secretary General post - a client wanted them to work up material on possible voting intentions.



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In June 2016, ORBIS got election-related reporting from the primary subsource, as well as from a different subsource. In early July, STEELE indicated that they got a debriefing about RYBOLOVLEV and the sale of property in Florida. STEELE remembered that the material on RYBOLOVLEV was received before STEELE took a holiday trip to Cyprus.

STEELE said that his primary subsource did a bit of work in the United States on election-related collecting. In the United States, the primary subsource talked to SERGEY MILLIAN and one or two others. Regarding MILLIAN, STEELE said that the primary subsource was introduced to MILLIAN through "some émigré" in Washington, DC. MILLIAN and the primary subsource met in New York and perhaps in Charleston, South Carolina. The primary subsource had two or three meetings with MILLIAN. The primary subsource and MILLIAN discussed a possible business project. The business project wasn't notional - it dealt with some sort of warehouse in Moscow. STEELE recalled seeing some documentation about this business project. STEELE described it as a pretty standard Russian type of thing dealing with land registration or land documentation. STEELE emphasized that it was a pretty typical Russian business endeavor.

STEELE described his primary subsource's sub-subsource networks. While doing this, STEELE drew a diagram for interviewers. See attached.

On reporting regarding CARTER PAGE, STEELE said that it stemmed from Page's speech in Moscow in July 2016. The reporting about PAGE's meetings with IGOR SECHIN and IGOR DIVEYKIN all came from the same sub-subsource - [REDACTED]

On reporting about OLEG GOVORUN, STEELE identified this stream of reporting as stemming from a different sub-subsource --- [REDACTED]

On reporting involving DMITRIY PESKOV's office, this reporting stems from a "friend of a friend" of the primary subsource. Later, STEELE gave the identity of this individual as [REDACTED].

On reporting about Prague and ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO, STEELE said that [REDACTED]

STEELE talked in more detail about his decision to talk to the press. STEELE said that after COMEY's letter reopening the HILLARY CLINTON investigation, FUSION GPS felt like the gloves had come off. STEELE said that he had previous discussions earlier with BRUCE OHR about getting the [REDACTED]

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election-related material out, but OHR had explained to STEELE about US Department of Justice policy about needing to be hands-off prior to elections. FUSION GPS put pressure on ORBIS to talk to Mother Jones. STEELE initially said that his interview with Mother Jones was supposed to have been off-the-record, but then he added that the interview was a combination of off-the-record and on-the-record. STEELE said that, in the end, he should not have given the interview. STEELE said that, subsequently, with the rift that the interview had caused with the FBI, they had no way of getting this information into the hands of people who they believed needed it. That is when they decided to go the route of Senator JOHN MCCAIN and DAVID KRAMER. In the end, however, STEELE believes that the decision to go the MCCAIN and KRAMER route is how Buzzfeed got the material and is why, now, STEELE has the legal problems he has.

BRUCE OHR is aware that STEELE is currently in touch with the FBI. OHR knows about this meeting. STEELE said that he has reached out to OHR and GLENN SIMPSON about the primary subsource.

STEELE believes that his primary subsource is coming around to the idea of meeting with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE only wants that to happen if the primary subsource agrees to it. It needs to be carefully handled. For instance, STEELE said that the primary subsource's parents are still in Russia.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has been doing a bit of work for ORBIS recently. He has been reaching out to some of the same sub-sources. ORBIS has had an interest in the "prophylactic efforts" by the Russian government following the publicity of the dossier.

When asked what type of tradecraft STEELE's primary subsource has used when collecting information for ORBIS, STEELE said that his primary subsource uses [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The primary subsource takes very few written notes. The primary subsource is very thorough when it comes to preparing himself to be debriefed; he takes time before being debriefed to get his thoughts and recollections together. STEELE said that the primary subsource uses [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The primary subsource has used this approach in the past - STEELE mentioned trips that the primary subsource has taken to Samara and Volgograd on behalf of ORBIS' due diligence and legal work, including for clients in the potassium industry. The primary subsource has a very good memory.

STEELE said that only four or five people in ORBIS' office have dealt with the primary subsource. The primary subsource was debriefed the first time [REDACTED]



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in the office, but not after that. STEELE said that ORBIS is now very concerned about bugging, so they wouldn't debrief sources in their office.

STEELE has had substantive debriefings with the primary subsource. STEELE explained that the primary subsource was not just working on election-related collection during the primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia. He was working on multiple projects at the same time. That said, STEELE indicated that the primary subsource definitely collected on election-related materials during his three trips to Russia in 2016.

STEELE said that the primary subsource is currently working through obtaining US work permits and residence permits. The primary subsource hasn't been back to Russia since his 2016 trips.

STEELE said that he is close enough to the primary subsource that the primary subsource would have told him that he'd been interviewed (NFI).

STEELE said FIONA HILL knows that the primary subsource was involved in the dossier. When the primary subsource went to ground in January and February 2017, STEELE contacted HILL and told HILL that he was worried about the primary subsource. STEELE said that she probably guesses that the primary subsource was involved. STEELE remembered seeing HILL in the UK in early 2016, while STEELE's wife was abroad. HILL was still at Brookings. STEELE does not recall the last time he saw HILL.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has a journalist contact in Washington, DC who is the primary subsource's entry into the émigré community.

When asked about STEELE's own validation and/or assessment of hostile control for the primary subsource, STEELE mentioned a number of things which he took to be positive signs. First, there was the incident involving the primary subsource being shaken down for money. Second, the primary subsource exhibits behavior indicative of someone who is scared - the primary subsource would not be talking about coming to the talk to the Special Counsel if there was a problem. STEELE does not believe that the primary subsource exhibits signs or behavior of someone who is under control. STEELE cannot guarantee that the primary subsource's sub-subsources aren't under control. STEELE said that it hasn't been easy for the primary subsource to get information - he has had to dig for it. Moreover, STEELE said that he is not sure why the primary subsource would still be hanging around or be in country if he was under foreign control.

STEELE gave details of a REX TILLERSON-related report from the primary subsource - a report that STEELE is unsure the FBI possesses because



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STEELE didn't provide it to the FBI. STEELE said that in order to explain the report, he has to first talk about earlier ORBIS reporting from approximately 3 years ago, circa 2014. At that time, ORBIS was working on a hydrocarbon project for a client. It became clear from reporting during that project that Exxon-Mobil was well-placed in Russia and that TILLERSON had an atypical type of relationship with SECHIN. It was odd, STEELE said, to the point that STEELE thought that something was going on, particularly with SECHIN. There was more between TILLERSON and SECHIN than just shared hobbies like Harley-Davidsons. STEELE said that the reporting on this subject died down, the client moved on, and the sanctions regime kicked in. Then, circa December 2016, following the election, President-Elect TRUMP was initially flirting with MITT ROMNEY as a possible candidate for US Secretary of State. There was a long hiatus during which time there was general speculation about whether the position would go to ROMNEY or not. STEELE's primary subsource picked up information from sources in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that Washington, DC had received messages from Russia indicating that ROMNEY was an unacceptable candidate and that Russia wanted someone who was more acceptable and who might lift sanctions. TILLERSON's name, according to STEELE, isn't in the report from the primary subsource, but what happened in the end was, to STEELE, surprising given the reporting. STEELE said that this report may have been shared with DAVID KRAMER - STEELE sent it to GLENN SIMPSON with the idea of having it shared.

STEELE explained how he shared the election-related reports with FGI [REDACTED]. He knew FGI [REDACTED] from his previous career. STEELE was trying to figure out the best way of sharing this information with his own government, but wasn't completely comfortable FGI [REDACTED]. In or around 15 November 2016, he met up with FGI [REDACTED]. He had two meetings at FGI [REDACTED]'s house; at the first meeting, they went through all of the reporting, and then they had a follow-up meeting. FGI [REDACTED] in turn talked to FGI [REDACTED] STEELE knows that FGI [REDACTED], which STEELE described as not being easy for him. FGI [REDACTED] STEELE also said that there have been problems (NFI) between him and his former employer.

STEELE is hesitant about sharing his information with FGI [REDACTED] as well as with CIA and NSA. He is concerned about the existence of hostile penetrations and his primary subsource's security. STEELE says that his information needs to be handled in a need-to-know way.

STEELE said that FGI [REDACTED] - was not given as much information regarding the primary subsource's network as he has given to the FBI.

[REDACTED]



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STEELE was asked about his primary subsource's physical security. STEELE said that the primary subsource recently moved because of security concerns. Someone in the primary subsource's apartment complex, or someone at the gym, said something to him that was odd enough to make him decide to move. The primary subsource has a girlfriend - he has now moved into her house, which STEELE said won't leave a trace for him. STEELE said that while the primary subsource's girlfriend doesn't know all of the ins-and-outs of how things have worked between ORBIS and the primary subsource, she does know about the primary subsource's involvement with the dossier and his involvement with ORBIS. STEELE has met the primary subsource's girlfriend a couple of times. [REDACTED] She has not traveled to Russia with the primary subsource. STEELE does not believe that the girlfriend goes back to Russia. STEELE said that the girlfriend came to the UK with the primary subsource once, and they stayed at The Grosvenor Hotel.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of the primary subsource's contact with Russian establishments, STEELE said that the primary subsource had someone over at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC ask the primary subsource about where they could buy furniture, or something like that (NFI). STEELE said that it was strange, but nothing alarming. The primary subsource bumped into MIKHAIL KALGUIN on the street in Moscow. That was how the primary subsource knew that KALUGIN had been withdrawn from the United States. When the primary subsource asked about KALUGIN's leaving the United States, KALUGIN replied with something like, "It was better that I had left at that point." KALUGIN did not explicitly say that he was withdrawn because of the election controversy.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of any journalists who have approached the primary subsource, STEELE said that in the January-February 2017 timeframe, a journalist who, he believed, was from AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, reached out to the primary subsource. The journalist told the primary subsource that he had heard on the London circuit that the primary subsource might have some information about the dossier. STEELE said that the primary subsource gave a bland answer, but the entire situation caused the primary subsource some consternation. The primary subsource took it as a warning that he was found out. This is why, explained STEELE, the primary subsource went to ground in the January-February 2017 timeframe and is why STEELE reached out to FIONA HILL to check on the primary subsource's whereabouts and safety.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of whether any of the primary subsource's sub-subsources knew that their information was used in the dossier, STEELE said that some of the primary subsource's sub-subsources





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have talked to him in a cryptic manner about the reports. In one case, specifically the individual who provided the information to the primary subsource about GUBAREV, a Russian FSB team reportedly showed up asking questions after the dossier came out. STEELE believes that the primary subsource's sub-sources have an idea that their information was used in the dossier.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's mother and father [REDACTED]. STEELE understands that the primary subsource spoke to his parents over the last weekend. They did not indicate that they've had any problems or have experienced any harassment.

STEELE talked about the EROVINKIN situation. EROVINKIN was the former top aide to SECHIN in ROSNEFT who was found dead in December 2016. STEELE said that some people and the press have mistakenly tied EROVINKIN to the dossier - namely as a possible subsource on the SECHIN material. STEELE does not believe that EROVINKIN was one of the primary subsource's sub-sources; nevertheless, STEELE takes this whole situation very seriously and gives him pause. It reminds him of another, recent situation involving TRUBNIKOV, whose reporting is in the dossier. STEELE described TRUBNIKOV as "out there" engaged with Westerners. STEELE believes that there is a general feeling that TRUBNIKOV has been cultivated by Western intelligence. On this note, about three or four months ago, there was a shooting in the restroom of the Moscow restaurant named KOSMOS. The shooting was in broad daylight and an individual named KOSTYA MYASKI or MYANSKIY (sp) was the victim. STEELE believes that this was a warning shot to TRUBNIKOV. The incident occurred in the May 2017 timeframe.

STEELE was asked about ORBIS' business security procedures since the public release of the dossier. STEELE said that they had a situation arise where someone tried to spoof or impersonate the outside contractor who does ORBIS's IT security. There was an attempt to change the password for their internal system, which was detected. The IT security contractor was contacted to determine if the attempt was legitimate. If this had been successful, it could have exposed clients, but not sensitive reporting as that is kept offline.

STEELE was asked if ORBIS has had any situations, post-dossier, where ORBIS thought that it was being offered dangles or was the object of operational games. STEELE said that this question reminded him about the CODY SHEARER situation and the offer of tapes, which STEELE said he would talk about later. STEELE commented that the existence of tapes have been played out of proportion, adding that just the fact that the Russian government has leverage on President TRUMP is a problem. It would be difficult to know if a tape has been doctored. STEELE said that there is a



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concern, following the public release of the dossier, that any situation involving the provision of tapes can be a dangle or a controlled operation. STEELE has heard, and it is his understanding, that the situation involving CODY SHEARER and the tapes parallels something that the US Government has been involved with, but he plans on talking about that in more detail (see below). STEELE added that there are some "dark web" aspects to this, and STEELE asked about who was handling or analyzing "dark web" issues for the FBI.

STEELE did not provide funds to his primary subsource for payment to sub-subsources. STEELE said that he provided a monthly retainer to his primary subsources, and said that a primary subsource might, in turn, pay for food or drinks while collecting information from his or her sub-subsources, but the sub-subsources are not paid for information. STEELE also advised that he sometimes paid for his primary subsources' trip expenses, save for the primary subsource's third 2016 trip to Moscow (which, STEELE remarked, was paid by an organization funded by the Russian Government -- in effect, STEELE summarized, Russia itself paid for his subsource's third trip to Moscow). The fact that sub-subsources are not paid for their information was, to STEELE, an important point when it came to the issue of reporting quality -- STEELE advised that the lack of payment meant there was no incentive for sources to exaggerate their information. In one situation, STEELE advised that his company and/or FUSION GPS were involved in obtaining [REDACTED] for one of his primary subsource's sub-subsources, who was [REDACTED]. STEELE recalled that ORBIS may have provided money [REDACTED], which were then procured by FUSION GPS. [REDACTED] were wiped for prints before being provided to the source (NFI).

STEELE provided some overall comments regarding the election-related dossier reports. The time between ORBIS's receipt of information to report publication was generally quick -- the time could vary, but often a report was generated two days to one week after the debriefing of the primary subsource. In some cases, where the difference between the date of information and the date of published report was within a day, the information for the report had most likely been received via electronic means [REDACTED] rather than through an in-person debriefing with the primary subsource.

In the election-related dossier reports, STEELE said that the commentary labeled "Company Comments" was generated by FUSION GPS. The first report from ORBIS to FUSION GPS was sent via direct courier; however, reports were typically encrypted and sent via email.

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[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

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SSA [REDACTED] SIA Auten and STEELE went over each of the election-related dossier reports, with STEELE providing additional information on each report, as appropriate. STEELE explained that he intentionally left sequential gaps in the numbering of his election-related reports to obscure the actual number of reports being produced on the subject as well as to obscure the timing of the reports:

Company Intelligence Report 2016/80 (dated 20 June 2016)

Under "Detail," STEELE identified the "trusted compatriot" as his unnamed primary subsource. In the same report, Source A was the [REDACTED] [REDACTED], while Source B was [REDACTED]. STEELE said that his primary subsource had a [REDACTED] who introduced the primary subsource to [REDACTED] and the primary subsource had met personally, and according to STEELE, the two had been speaking for a while (NFI). In the report, Source C was a [REDACTED] who was in direct contact with the primary subsource. This [REDACTED] had been a major sub-subsource for a long time on other matters.

In the report, STEELE identified Source D as SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who, according to STEELE, was in direct contact with the primary subsource. Sources E and F, according to STEELE, [REDACTED] STEELE said that his primary subsource personally visited the hotel and spoke directly with these individuals.

Source G was [REDACTED] a "friend of a friend" of his primary subsource. During the primary subsource's trips to Russia, [REDACTED] and the primary subsource would meet for drinks. Later in 2016, [REDACTED] is the one who advised the primary subsource that because things were heating up, there had been a directive given advising that they (NFI) should not speak to anyone regarding Russia's interest in, or involvement with, the 2016 US Presidential Election.

STEELE indicated that the primary subsource collected the information for this report (2016/80) during a trip to Russia

Company Intelligence Report 2016/94 (dated 19 July 2016)

STEELE indicated that the information in this report was collected by the primary subsource from [REDACTED]

In paragraph 3 of the report, according to STEELE, the "compatriot" is a [REDACTED] STEELE's primary subsource's sub-

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[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

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subsource is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The information in this report was not collected during an in-country visit by STEELE's primary subsource. [REDACTED] travels often, and STEELE said that his primary subsource talked to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was traveling. They likely communicated via phone or via Skype.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/100 (dated 5 August 2016)

STEELE referred to this reporting as being derived his primary [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

but STEELE was not sure about the sub-subsource's identity, adding that he [STEELE] had destroyed all of his notes. STEELE offered to try and find out the identity of the unidentified sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/95 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE said that Source E in paragraphs 1 through 5 in this report was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who was speaking to the primary subsource. It was MILLIAN who told the primary subsource the information in this report about MANAFORT, WIKILEAKS, and Russia's use of diplomatic staff and the emigre pension program as "cover."

In paragraph 6 of the report, the "separate source with direct knowledge" was an unidentified individual who was involved in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

STEELE could not remember the exact identity of the individual, but thought that he was [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STEELE again noted that the primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg, which made his travel to the city easy.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/97 (dated 30 July 2016)



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[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

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STEELE said that the "trusted associate" in the first paragraph was his primary subsource, and the "Russian emigre figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate," was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. STEELE said that MILLIAN provided the entirety of this report. MILLIAN provided this information directly to STEELE's primary subsource, including the information in the report about how the "intelligence exchange" between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin went back at least 8 years.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/101 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE advised that paragraphs 1-3 of this report involve the primary subsource's obtaining of information [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] STEELE described this report as dealing with "fallout information" -- that is, information about how the Russian government was dealing internally with the publicity surrounding Russian involvement in the US election.

STEELE indicated that the "Kremlin official involved in US relations" noted in paragraph 4 of the report was possibly MIKHAIL KALUGIN. STEELE said that his primary subsource bumped into KALUGIN in Moscow in August 2016.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/102 (dated 10 August 2016;
handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 in this report -- though he was not 100% sure -- was derived from SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. Based on the date of the report and on the information in the report, STEELE believes that the report was generated through personal contact between MILLIAN and his primary subsource. It also appears to STEELE that the report was generated in the United States. Because there is only one day between the date of information (9 August 2016) and the date of the report (10 August 2016), STEELE said that it doesn't appear that the report was generated following one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia. Instead, it appears that his primary subsource made contact while he [the primary subsource] was in the United States, and could therefore report the information to STEELE right away.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/105 (dated 22 August 2016)

STEELE advised that this report was based on a unique reporting stream. His primary subsource has a relationship with sub-subsource,



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[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of Steele Interview of Christopher [REDACTED], On 09/18/2017, Page 17 of 26

who is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STEELE did not know

where his primary subsource met the [REDACTED] but believed that their original and ongoing interaction was about a different project involving a [REDACTED] dispute and litigation matters. STEELE does not know if his primary subsource [REDACTED]

STEELE also noted that YANUKOVICH had gone to Volgograd.

According to STEELE, the "American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign" noted in paragraph 3 of this report could be CHARLES DOLAN, speaking directly to STEELE's primary subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/111 (dated 14 September 2016)

STEELE described this report as another "fallout" piece -- that is, a report about the Russian government was dealing internally with the public accusations and news stories regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election. The information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's direct contact with multiple sub-sources. These sub-sources included [REDACTED] and, in paragraph 5, a [REDACTED] STEELE explained that his primary subsource had [REDACTED] -- [REDACTED] STEELE's primary subsource had direct contact with all of these [REDACTED] sub-sources -- his contact with them was not brokered.

The "former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider" referenced in the "Company Comment" for this report was [REDACTED].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/112 (dated 14 September 2016)

This report is derived from the [REDACTED] STEELE indicated that he had no doubt that [REDACTED] was the source of the reporting for this entire report. Even though this [REDACTED] travels, and [REDACTED] talks to STEELE's primary subsource [REDACTED] STEELE advised that the information for this particular report was obtained during one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/113 (dated 14 September 2016)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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STEELE advised that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's visit to St. Petersburg in early September 2016. The primary subsource had [REDACTED] in St. Petersburg -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STEELE reiterated that his primary subsource traveled to St. Petersburg because of the apartment he has there -- an apartment he inherited from his aunt. The primary subsource visited St. Petersburg, and STEELE explained that he [the primary subsource] had done other work for STEELE in St. Petersburg. Reflecting on the content of this report, STEELE commented that he had never heard of AGALAROV prior to this report, save for EMIN AGALAROV's music. STEELE did not know much about AGALAROV as he had not crossed paths with him professionally.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/130 (dated 12 October 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's interaction with one of the [REDACTED] -- perhaps the [REDACTED] as well as possibly [REDACTED], but STEELE was not completely sure.

STEELE believes that this report was produced after STEELE's meeting with FBI representatives in Rome, which had happened the week prior, and after the Kremlin event attended by his primary subsource. STEELE's primary subsource gave a presentation at the Kremlin event.

During the Kremlin event, the primary subsource also spoke to a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer at a party. One of the topics brought up during the primary subsource's conversation with the FSB officer was EDWARD SNOWDEN. This contact with the FSB officer was direct -- it was not brokered through another individual.

For the final paragraph of the report (paragraph 4), STEELE was unsure if the information was derived from the "SNOWDEN source" but thought it was unlikely to have been the FSB officer.

STEELE advised that his primary subsource had not had official contact with the FSB, though STEELE believes that his primary subsource may have talked to a local FSB officer about mining litigation.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/132 (dated 13 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that [REDACTED] was the source of the information in this report. This information was collected during the primary subsource's visit to Russia in October 2016 -- the same trip

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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during which the primary subsource collected the information in Company Intelligence Report 2016/130.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/134 (dated 18 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that this information in paragraphs 1-3 of this report is derived from his primary subsource's communication with [REDACTED] about CARTER PAGE. The primary subsource spoke to more individuals than just [REDACTED] about this particular subject. STEELE believes that the primary subsource spoke to a male, who STEELE described as a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

STEELE said that the information about MICHAEL COHEN in the fourth paragraph was derived from his primary subsource's interactions with sub-subsources in the above-mentioned [REDACTED]."

Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 (dated 19 October 2016)

STEELE said that the information in this report was derived from the primary subsource's interactions with sub-subsources in the [REDACTED]. It was through this structure of reporting that the primary subsource was told that MICHAEL COHEN had met with members of the Russian presidential legal team. STEELE believed that his primary subsource had met with a [REDACTED] insider. In STEELE's view, this [REDACTED] must have continued working inside [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Company Intelligence Report 2016/136 (dated 20 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that his primary subsource received this information from his [REDACTED] who lives in a third country, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

STEELE further advised that this [REDACTED]
was scared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Reflecting on the "Company Comment," STEELE emphasized that the information was obtained directly rather than by any of the brokered, [REDACTED] reporting chains. STEELE's primary subsource obtained the information directly from his third-country sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/137 (dated 24 October 2016)

STEELE believes that this report was derived from his primary subsource's communication with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but he was not 100% sure. Logically, STEELE said, since [REDACTED] is the one who reported on IGOR DIVEYKIN in an earlier report, it would follow that this report's material on DIVEYKIN also came from [REDACTED]. STEELE said that SECHIN would have told this sub-subsource about DIVYEKIN. STEELE added that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but also a professional in [REDACTED] own right [REDACTED]. SECHIN originally met [REDACTED] through professional interaction. STEELE believed that [REDACTED] professional work can be confirmed through open sources.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/139 (dated 27 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that the "senior Russian journalist working in the United States" in this report is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STEELE said this journalist seemed to know a lot about Russian emigres in the United States.

STEELE noted that, at this point, SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN had disappeared. STEELE believes that MILLIAN is currently in China or somewhere in the Far East. However, STEELE also knows that MILILAN was present at the US Presidential Inauguration in January 2017, possibly as MICHAEL COHEN's guest at the hotel (NFI).

Intelligence Report, Information Dated 29 November 2016

This report was not included in the material STEELE provided to the FBI; he believes that it was provided to the FBI from Senator JOHN MCCAIN. The information in this report was generated through his primary subsource's communication with a senior MFA official.

Reflecting on what he said earlier about some of the 2014 background of this particular report (see above), STEELE indicated that the earlier, 2014 information has been obtained from his primary subsource's communications with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
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Company Intelligence Report 2016/166, dated 13 December 2016

STEELE advised that this was his "favorite" report, involving MICHAEL COHEN, WEBZILLA, and ALEXEJ GUBAREV. The information on MICHAEL COHEN was obtained by the primary subsource's direct communication [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Company Intelligence Report 2016/086, dated 26 July 2015

First, STEELE was asked about the date of this report, specifically the year. Upon reflection, STEELE said that he believes this is a typo, and that the year was actually 2016 versus 2015.

STEELE advised that this cyber-related report in the dossier had been tasked by the FBI. It had been tasked by MICHAEL GAETA and was passed to the FBI.

Company Note, dated 19 October 2016

This is the CODY SHEARER and JON WINER report. STEELE advised that this was not an ORBIS report. STEELE received this report from JON WINER. The report pre-dates the dossier, and was produced circa April 2016. STEELE advised that SHEARER was an associate of SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. SHEARER is also friends with a Turkish-American businessman with the last name of KHAN (NFI). KHAN was in touch with RUSLAN MANSIMOV, aka ASLAN TURAN, aka ASLAN TURANCI. According to STEELE, MANSIMOV was a "Southern Caucasus mongrel" -- Armenian/Azeri /Russian -- and worked in Turkey and Rome. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV in New York and Istanbul. MANSIMOV worked for the FSB -- STEELE said that MANSIMOV's affiliation with the FSB was not a secret.

STEELE advised that this SHEARER/WINER report was not related to the dossier and was based on long-standing relationships among the identified individuals. STEELE said that the report had pluses and minuses. The "plus" of the reporting was that it chimed with the Miss Universe reporting, the Ritz-Carlton reporting, and the AGALAROVS. The "minus" of the reporting was the fact that MANSIMOV was, according to STEELE, neither the most sophisticated nor impressive person. MANSIMOV's Russian language skills were not that great, as it was not his first language. STEELE opined that MANSIMOV's first language may be Azeri.

[REDACTED]



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After the dossier was published, MANSIMOV was not an active contact. MANISMOV had claimed to be part of a faction in Russia, along with some other FSB officials, who were shocked at the attacks on the US election. MANSIMOV thought that the "crazies" (NFI) were out of control, and that it would blow up in their faces (NFI).

Recently, MANSIMOV has recontacted KHAN and was offering to provide tapes of President TRUMP. At least one of those tapes was related to the Miss Universe event and involved urine. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV. SHEARER and MANSIMOV were actively discussing a deal for the tapes. MANSIMOV wanted money and "good standing" (NFI). MANSIMOV also claimed that an FSB technical officer with the rank of colonel was interested in defecting and wished to speak to them. The FSB officer had difficulty traveling; therefore, it was suggested that they meet in Kazakhstan.

SHEARER and MANSIMOV met in Istanbul and are considering an upcoming meeting in Spain within the coming weeks.

STEELE advised that he wished to keep this interaction "at an arm's length," as he does not want to fall into a trap. STEELE opined that this could be genuine, or a fabrication, or a set-up -- suggesting that it could involve a faction of the Democratic Party and he feared a possible FCPA violation. STEELE advised that WINER was aware of the situation, and was the one who informed STEELE about it. STEELE opined that SHEARER was not acting discreetly. STEELE said that the media was "sniffing" around MANSIMOV.

Additionally, STEELE advised he believed it was doubtful that IVANKA TRUMP was collecting large amounts of money. STEELE was complementary of IVANKA TRUMP and considered her a good friend. STEELE further advised that his colleagues believed he was being naive about this, but he was surprised by the reporting on IVANKA. STEELE said he was skeptical about the IVANKA part of the reporting, but he could believe the rest of the report.

STEELE advised that there was a rumor that a video existed of President TRUMP "roughing up" his wife, MELANIA TRUMP, in an elevator. The rumor further insinuated that the Russians had purchased this tape.

STEELE said that another rumor had also surfaced that an unidentified American who had witnessed an argument about prostitutes at a hotel involved in the earlier-mentioned Miss Universe incident. The desk



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clerks wanted the prostitutes to sign in because of health and safety reasons, but the women refused. STEELE advised that the press could be in touch with the American witness.

STEELE discussed in greater detail DMITRIY RYBOLOVLEV and the property sale in Sunny Isles, Florida. STEELE said that RYBOLOVLEV had a client relationship with a Mongolian female who had been educated at MGIMO. This female worked in the United States with a PR/GR [public relations /government relations] firm. STEELE met her approximately 6 years ago and they worked together. She was very close to SERGEY LAVROV and RYBOLOVLEV. This female spoke with RYBOLOVLEV about the sale of the Sunny Isles property and the TRUMP connection with the sale. RYBOLOVLEV told her that he did not know anything about TRUMP, but the female did not believe him. STEELE sent this information as a report to FUSION GPS, but STEELE was not sure if he passed it to DAVID KRAMER, which is why STEELE believes it was not published publicly. STEELE added that there was a new person working for RYBOLOVLEV until very recently. There was information about this individual in a LE MONDE article. This individual had been kicked out of Monaco and had been involved in bribing officials. STEELE said there was also current reporting involving art fraud -- specifically, paying too much for art, reporting it lost, and laundering money (NFI)

STEELE talked about his other, newly-up-and-coming main agent network and that network's reporting on PAUL MANAFORT. ORBIS received reporting dated circa March-April 2017 regarding MANAFORT's involvement in the plot to elbow out PETRO POROSHENKO. This reporting also talked about the Ukraine peace plan, provided by a pro-Russian deputy - the material that was provided to MICHAEL COHEN and MICHAEL FLYNN. ORBIS pitched the circa March-April 2017 report about MANAFORT to FGI
[REDACTED]

STEELE said there are two memos regarding MANAFORT that were received by this newly-up-and-coming primary subsource. This individual understands that two entities, including the FBI, have received a larger amount of information or a bigger memo on MANAFORT based on access to MANAFORT's Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) file. The information in the FBI's possession talks about how MANAFORT has always been a Russian agent, about how he's always been with the FSB and how he's been run by named Russian case officers. STEELE says that this information is written in an exaggerated way (NFI). ORBIS believes the SBU file on MANAFORT itself has been doctored. The source claimed to know that the file had been doctored. STEELE said that the file has been doctored because that way, Kyiv is able to justify why it had MANAFORT under investigation. STEELE commented that, in Ukraine and all over Europe, they feel pressure from the White House to be able to justify any investigations that have been done.

[REDACTED]



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This information was collected recently - within the last few months - and was post-election. STEELE believes that the new agent network reporting has a mixture of truth and falsehood. The new primary subsource has a good view into things and has reported on things with which he has directly been involved - in the actual room at the time. The new primary subsource is good when being interviewed to state whether he thinks something is right or something sounds wrong. STEELE said that the source is critically assessing another memo regarding MANAFORT -- a memo which is approximately three paragraphs long. STEELE said that ORBIS is receiving more information about this next week. STEELE planned to sit down with his source soon to go over all of the information and the source's assessment of the bigger SBU memo (NFI). When the assessment is complete, STEELE advised he would like to share it with the FBI. STEELE described his source in Ukraine as "top-notch" and advised he has a significant, 3-4 year reporting record. STEELE advised that MANAFORT was still active in Ukraine after the 2017 US Presidential Inauguration.

STEELE has heard separately that two US agencies (NFI) were working together in Germany and that it involved the offer of tapes and other documents. STEELE advised that a Volga German by the name of BITNER (NFI) was an FSB agent under business cover. A US agency was involved in an exchange involving BITNER, but CIA Director MIKE POMPEO pulled the plug at the end of last year. It was unclear to STEELE if this Germany-related information was connected to the earlier-referenced SHEARER-MANSIMOV information. STEELE also said that this was related to information in the "dark web" where, STEELE added, there has been talk that STEELE and the NSA are competing for the same materials (NFI). As with the MANSIMOV information, the media is also "sniffing" around the Germany situation. It is not the same media outlets who are "sniffing" around both stories, however. STEELE said that the media was not asking questions per se, but facilitating (NFI).

STEELE discussed two significant robberies that occurred in villas in the south of France. A total of up to two billion dollars in cash had been stolen from Ukrainian oligarch PINCHUK. PINCHUK's son-in-law had been using a villa. Part of the stolen money originated from a defrauding of Delta, a Ukrainian bank. PINCHUK's son-in-law embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from Delta. The Chechens (NFI) subsequently stole that money, which went back into Russia. STEELE noted that the Chechens are often used by the Russians for such activity. If true, STEELE opined, this whole situation could create a huge slush fund for Russia.

ORBIS has also been getting reporting regarding Russian influence in the French and German elections. Regarding the 2017 French election, STEELE





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[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher

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said that things got perilously close to working for the Russians. STEELE said that it wasn't just about LE PEN, but that there was only one candidate who wasn't untainted by the Russians, and that was MACRON - the person who actually won. All three right-leaning candidates in France were held by the Russians. FILLON was compromised by Russia. One of the candidates was non-competitive. STEELE said the Russians attempted to change their support back to LE PEN at the end of the campaign period. STEELE advised that the Russians were now working on her niece.

Regarding the 2017 German election, STEELE said that the Russians were working on many influence campaigns, but had scaled back. The plan included propaganda about ANGELA MERKEL's health, but reportedly, MERKEL pushed back and spoke to PUTIN personally, warning him not to interfere with the election. PUTIN reportedly scaled back Russia's efforts.

STEELE advised that NIGEL FARAGE had been observed entering the Ecuadorian Embassy in London -- presumably to speak with JULIAN ASSANGE. STEELE believed that Russian funding had been funneling through the United Kingdom to promote Brexit. STEELE said that a young American -- possibly with the name of COTTRELL (NFI) -- had been caught laundering money. STEELE also said that EKATERINA PADERINA and her husband, AARON BANKS were two individuals involved in Russian influence and Brexit. FARAGE, TRUMP, and BANKS go back approximately four years. STEELE further advised that there was a Belize link with this, and that money was being laundered through Belize.

STEELE said that ORBIS was involved in some Kazakhstan-related and Cyprus-related business work, and some of the material from that work obviously falls within the bounds of the Special Counsel. STEELE was working on a Kazakh-related project involving an individual by the name of ABLYAZOV, embezzlement from BTA BANK, pyramid schemes, and connections to FELIX SATER and TRUMP SOHO. STEELE said that they want RICO up and running in the United States (NFI). STEELE brought along a Power Point presentation from the company ARCANUM explaining the SATER connection. STEELE provided a copy of this Power Point presentation to SSA [REDACTED] and SIA Auten (see attached). This information was slated to be provided to the US Department of Justice and the FBI as it involves a corrupt American official (NFI). SATER is also involved with the daughter of ABLYAZOV (NFI).

Regarding Cyprus, STEELE discussed a casino and golf complex. The GOLDEN LADY CONSORTIUM was attempting to put a casino in Cyprus circa 2015-2016. TRUMP, NAVIGANTE and SCENOPLUS (sp) were all involved, but the project failed. TRUMP tried to get a resort deal worth 450 million through RCB, a subsidiary of VNESHORGANK (VTB). The deal was submitted to regulators. STEELE said that there were some references to this deal in the Cypriot

[REDACTED]



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[REDACTED] Interview of Christopher
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press. STEELE himself received this information from an American journalist.

STEELE was available for recontact, and advised that he wished to remain in contact with the FBI. Although STEELE believed the FBI owed money to STEELE and ORBIS for services and travel provided, STEELE believed it was more important that the United States government receive the information. STEELE was willing to provide the information to the FBI regardless of payment. STEELE advised that he would keep the same communication line open for future contact with SSA [REDACTED] as necessary.



From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 10:10 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
They do. They were highlighted when he received them by someone on the McCain side of things presumably.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 8:08 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====
D said they had highlighting on them?

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:27 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====
I should add that none of them are new and all of them are duplicative of reports on your chart below...

J

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:25 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

I have an envelope of crown reports that the D received from John McCain as well that can be added to the chart below.
Brian/Joe, swing by this morning and I'll give them to you to put into the file...

Thanks,

J

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GEFFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016				

95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016				Simpson thumb 7/28/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from Si
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016	██████	██████	██████	
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016	██████	██████	██████	
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016	██████	██████	██████	
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016	██████	██████	██████	
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016	██████	██████	██████	Obtained from Si

██████ Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

██████ FBI received from CROWN

██████ FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: GEESFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) █████ (CD) (FBI) █████ (CD) (FBI) █████ (CD) (FBI); █████ (WF) (FBI) █████ (CD) (FBI) █████ (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Latest CROWN -- █████

Classification: █████

Classified By: █████

Derived From: █████

Declassify On: █████

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III
CI-1 Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)
[REDACTED] (SIPR)
[REDACTED] (SCION)
[REDACTED] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)
[REDACTED] Desk
[REDACTED] STE
[REDACTED] - ((call desk first))

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

CROWN report tracking Matrix

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	FGI	Buzzfeed Published	Comment
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016?	9/19/2016					12/9/2016		It appears file modified on 11/1/16
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016							Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016							
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016							Simpson thumb drive indicates 7/28/16
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016							Obtained from Corn via Baker
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016							
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016							
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016							
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016							Obtained from Corn via Baker
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016							Obtained from Corn via Baker
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016							Obtained from Corn via Baker
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016							Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
130	10/12/2016			10/19/2016						
132	10/13/2016			10/19/2016						
134	10/18/2016			10/18/2016						
135	10/19/2016			10/19/2016						
136	10/20/2016			10/21/2016						
137	10/14/2016			10/24/2016						
139	10/27/2016			10/28/2016						
Winer	10/19/2016			10/19/2016						
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016							Obtained from Simpson via Ohr
166	12/13/2016									

 Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

 FBI received from CROWN

 FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"
97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====



17_29112016 - 36_ProjectSNAK... 24_ComplntRep...
Intel Snippet....

I have not seen the ne [OGA]. Pete had copies of tw [OGA] on Monday, read them to Joe and to me, but kept them.

B-

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 6:18 AM
To: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Can you please help me out this morning and get me copies of the three new CROWN reports (86, 113, and the intel snippet). Electronic on email is fine.

I also need to see any of the ne [OGA] that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means they ended up with you guys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?

Thanks,

J

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GEESFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator McCain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date * 11/1/2016 ?	CROSSFIRE received 9/19/2016	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	Cor
80	6/20/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	12/9/2016	It appears file m
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Simpson thru 7/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		Obtained from

 Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

 FBI received from CROWN

 FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM

To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016	[Red]	[Red]	[Yellow]	Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	Simpson thumb 7/28/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016	[Red]	[Green]	[Green]	Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Red]	[Green]	
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Red]	[Green]	
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016	[Green]	[Red]	[Green]	
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016	[Red]	[Green]	[Green]	Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	[Red]	[Green]	[Green]	Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016	[Red]	[Green]	[Green]	Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016	[Red]	[Red]	[Green]	Obtained from Si

130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016	[Red]	[Red]	[Red]	
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016		[Red]	[Red]	
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016		[Green]	[Green]	
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016		[Red]	[Green]	
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016		[Green]	[Green]	
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016		[Red]	[Red]	
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016		[Red]	[Red]	
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016		[Red]	[Red]	
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016	[Red]	[Red]	[Green]	Obtained from Si

[Red] Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

[Green] FBI received from CROWN

[Yellow] FBI received CROWN report from another source

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From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: GEFFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] (SIPR)

[REDACTED] (SCION)

Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

Desk

STE

[REDACTED] **NSTS** - ((call desk first))

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Image not available for this document, ID: 0.7.5133.211241 000001

Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000021 - DOJ Review
DOJ REVIEW ONLY. DO NOT DISSEMINATE FURTHER WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF FBI OGC

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will know the details

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's prior activities in the city.
2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had been "silenced" i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure, Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia
- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western institutions.
- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of “investment” in his business when visiting Moscow.
- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the "secondary targets", particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents' money laundering operations through the Russian financial system.
3. In terms of the FSB's recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In terms of 'foreign' agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms.
4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional (defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door.

- [REDACTED]
5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' enciphered commercial system as having been of especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use.
 6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally, s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organisations.

26 July 2015

From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:20 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

[Use this version](#)



16_29112016 -
Intel Snippet.do...

From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

<< File: 17_.29112016 - Intel Snippet.docx >> << File: 36_ProjectSNAKE,RussianCyberReport,July2016.pdf >> << File:
24_ComplIntReport,SNAKE,BS3,Sept2016.pdf >>

I have not seen the ne [REDACTED] OGA . Pete had copies of tw [REDACTED] OGA on Monday, read them to Joe and to me, but kept them.

B-

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 6:18 AM
To: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Can you please help me out this morning and get me copies of the three new CROWN reports (86, 113, and the intel snippet). Electronic on email is fine.

I also need to see any of the ne [REDACTED] OGA that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means they ended up with you guys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?

Thanks,

J

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM

To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GEFFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

[REDACTED] (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator McCain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	McCain to Comey	Cor
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				12/9/2016	It appears file m
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016					
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016					Simpson thru 7/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016					

101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016					
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016					
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016					Obtained from
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016					
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016					
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016					
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016					
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016					
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016					
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016					
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016					
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016					Obtained from

 Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

 FBI received from CROWN

 FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GEFFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Report Number	Report Dated	Simpson file date *	CROSSFIRE received	CROWN to FBI	Corn to Baker	Simpson to Ohr	Comm
80	6/20/2016	11/1/2016 ?	9/19/2016				It appears file mod
86	7/26/2016	7/28/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
94	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	9/19/2016				
95	Not dated	7/28/2016	9/19/2016				Simpson thumb 7/28/
97*	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
100	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	9/19/2016				
101	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
102	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	9/19/2016				
105	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
111	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
112*	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	10/26/2016				Obtained from C
113	9/14/2016	9/22/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si
130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016				
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016				
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016				
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016				
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016				
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016				
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016				
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016				
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016				Obtained from Si

 Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

 FBI received from CROWN

 FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM

To: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] (SIPR)

[REDACTED] (SCION)

[REDACTED] Cell - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] Desk

[REDACTED] STE

[REDACTED] NSTS - ((call desk first))

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

Please pass the following - received today - to David Kramer.

BEGINS

Speaking on November 29 2016, a senior official working at the Russian MFA reported that a rumour is currently circulating there that US President-elect TRUMP's delay in appointing a new Secretary of State is the result of an intervention by President PUTIN/the Kremlin. The latter reportedly have asked that TRUMP appoint a Russia-friendly figure to this position, who was prepared to move quickly on lifting Ukraine-related sanctions and cooperation ("security") in Syria.

The source assumes the Kremlin's reported intervention was in response to the possibility that Mitt ROMNEY, viewed as hostile to Russia, might be appointed Secretary of State.

ENDS

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FB [REDACTED])>
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:05 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Thanks! I will take a look today. FYI I have a doctor's appointment tomorrow morning and will be in later around 11.

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst

C [REDACTED] JEH 5045

[REDACTED]

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 PM
To: GEFFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Latest CROWN -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)

[REDACTED] (SIPR)

[REDACTED] (SCION)

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:16 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman ??? UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Brian will have more background, but I got this from Bruce Ohr on Monday following his breakfast on Saturday with Simpson:

[REDACTED] The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. Mikhail Fridman lied in the written statement that he gave to the New York Times and Washington Post. Fridman claimed he never met Trump, however there are pictures to the contrary.

I'll get with Brian and check the story to see relevance to us.

Joe

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:34 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2016 1:34 PM
To: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); DENNEHY, JAMES E. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

We can check but sounds like an oligarch.

From: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:47 PM

To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); DENNEHY, JAMES E. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

Folks

See below. Anyone?

Thanks.

Jen

From: PAARMANN, C. B. (OIO) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:37 PM
T [REDACTED] >; BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FB) [REDACTED]
C [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]>
Subject: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
=====

[REDACTED] Jennifer - BLUF A guy that is like my brother owns an oil and gas company in Texas. Apparently, captioned individual (who according to Open Source is supposedly the second wealthiest guy in Russia) is making my buddy a huge cash offer to buy his company. I figure that a guy with that much money from Russia may very well be a target of yours. Any interest in this guy?

C. Bryan Paarmann
Deputy Assistant Director
International Operations Division, FBI
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From: [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2016 4:15 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Fusion GPS thumb drive [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Got it we'll take a look now, Joe.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2016 4:14 PM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CD) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: Fusion GPS thumb drive -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

I just uploaded to our share drive the documents and files that Bruce Ohr's wife (through Bruce) voluntarily provided to the FBI this morning. They are reports/work she completed for Fusion GPS/ Glenn Simpson (similar to the one she gave us on Manafort last week). They are under the Fusion GPS file on the share drive. Please review (there are approx 85 docs...) and once we have a grasp of what's on there I can submit to the appropriate case files.

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office

[REDACTED] (**NIPR**) - (*Unavail during work hours*)

[REDACTED] (**SIPR**)

[REDACTED] (**SCION**)

[REDACTED] **Cell** - (*Unavail during work hours*)

[REDACTED] **Desk**

[REDACTED] **STE**

[REDACTED] **NSTS** - (*(call desk first)*)

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]
Date: 08/02/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 08/02/2016

Substantive Case File Number

[REDACTED]

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS revised CHS' original reporting (provided 07/05/2016) CHS STEELE report dated 07/07/2016 regarding Russian cuber efforts. Guillermo QUINTERO, a member of the ROSNEFT board of directors, is not Italian. He is from South America and is believed to be Argentinian.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

FD-1023

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000057

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT**HEADER**

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 07/29/2016

Substantive Case File Number

[REDACTED]

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS STEELE provided the following information, obtained from sub-sources, regarding the murder of former Russian Media Minister, Mikhail LESIN: Prior to his death in Washington DC in November 2015, LESIN had been in a dispute with relatives and associates of Yuri KOVALCHUK, a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir PUTIN, regarding the control of Russian media company, NATIONAL MEDIA GROUP (NMG). LESIN had succeeded in having KOVALCHUK's nephew, Kirill KOVALCHUK, removed from the NMG board of directors. LESIN was asserting power and influence and attempting to blackmail Alina KABAEVA, an associate of Kirill KOVALCHUK at NMG and former PUTIN mistress. KABAEVA went to Yuri KOVALCHUK, who decided to "move against" LESIN. LESIN "fled" to the U.S., staying at a hotel in the Dupont Circle area of Washington D.C. LESIN tried to reach out to various Russian business associates and U.S. authorities without success. LESIN was approached by a "representative" of Yuri KOVALCHUK on the evening of November 4, 2015. The two agreed to meet privately in LESIN's room on the 9th floor, where LESIN was later found dead.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By

FD-1023

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000058

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 11/17/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services, however, the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue."

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

FD-1023

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000059

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 05/04/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system.

FD-794b

Page 1 of 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000060

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/30/2015 **End:** 11/30/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Other Miscellaneous	CHS Expense	\$1,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

The total aggregate payment threshold HAS NOT been met NOR exceeded. The CHS has not been paid any payments in this fiscal year. Moreover, the CHS has received a total of \$74000 since being opened in 2013. This DOES NOT reach the threshold. As such this is incorrectly noted above and no additional authority is required.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

Total CHS Services: \$0.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$1,500.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-794b

Page 2 of 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000061

FD-794b

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST**

DRAFT TYPE

Request Type: General

Payment Type: Confidential

Forfeiture or Drug Related: No

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

Official Bureau Name

UEID

Date of Request

Gaeta, Michael

05/04/2016

Field Office

Squad

User Dimension 4

Telephone Number

International Operations

Legat Rome

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE

Payee Name

UEID

Gaeta, Michael

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
STEELE	CE-015	Crown	06/30/2015	11/30/2016	

Financial Justification: Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system.

DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
CHS Expense			Description: Other Miscellaneous	\$1,500.00
			Total For [REDACTED]	\$1,500.00
			Total	\$1,500.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

STEELE CE-015

FBI-HJC119-CH-000062

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
---------------	--------------	------------------	-------------------	-----------------------

Commitment: _____

Obligation: _____

Advance: _____

Expense: _____

Cash Receipt: _____

Cash Receipt –
OTCnet (CRO): _____OTCnet Deposit
Ticket #: _____Debit/Draft/EFT
No.:

Prior Month Advance Balance: _____

This Advance: _____

Less Receipts: _____

Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____

Amount to be Reimbursed: _____

APPROVAL

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA:	<input type="text"/>	5/5/2016 8:10:21 AM
Certified by ASAC:	<input type="text"/>	5/5/2016 9:19:14 AM
Draft Approval Officer:	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

STEELE CE-015

FBI-HJC119-CH-000063

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT RECEIPT

Received from Gaeta, Michael J the total amount of **\$15,000.00** representing **\$15,000.00** for services rendered and/or **\$0.00** for expenses for the period **07/11/2015** from to **02/29/2016**.

, 10350 GBP

Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities.

(CHS's Payment Name initials)

x

Crown

10/05/2016

CROWN

x

Date

CHS Payment Name (Printed)

5/10/2016

x

Date

Paying Agent (Printed)

5/10/2016

Date

Witness (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: Crown

Crown

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000065

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-794b **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
 PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 03/01/2016 **End:** 05/31/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
[REDACTED]	E6	RQ
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$6,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Operational Payment Justification narrative:
Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form **the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed**. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

Total CHS Services: \$6,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-794b | Page 2 of 2 | FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000066

FD-794b

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST**

DRAFT TYPE

Request Type: General

Payment Type: Confidential

Forfeiture or Drug Related: No

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

Official Bureau Name

UEID

Date of Request

Gaeta, Michael

07/21/2016

Field Office

Squad

User Dimension 4

Telephone Number

International Operations

Legat Rome

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE

Payee Name

UEID

Gaeta, Michael

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
STEELE	CE-017	Crown		03/01/2016	05/31/2016

Financial Justification: Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services	\$6,000.00
		Total Fo		\$6,000.00
		Total		\$6,000.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

STEELE CE-017

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
---------------	--------------	------------------	-------------------	-----------------------

Commitment: _____

Obligation: _____

Advance: _____

Expense: _____

Cash Receipt: _____

Cash Receipt –
OTCnet (CRO): _____OTCnet Deposit
Ticket #: _____Debit/Draft/EFT
No.:

Prior Month Advance Balance: _____

This Advance: _____

Less Receipts: _____

Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____

Amount to be Reimbursed: _____

APPROVAL

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA:	<input type="text"/>	7/21/2016 5:31:17 AM
Certified by ASAC:	<input type="text"/>	7/21/2016 9:58:02 AM
Draft Approval Officer:	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

STEELE CE-017

FBI-HJC119-CH-000068

CHS PAYMENT RECEIPT

RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF \$ 6000 FOR
PRINT NAME 4584 6BP
SERVICES RENDERED AND/OR \$ _____ FOR THE EXPENSES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 8/1/10
TO 8/1/10.

X [Signature] CHS INITIALS PAVING OFFICIAL ADVISED THAT MONIES PAID FOR SERVICES ARE CONSIDERED TAXABLE INCOME AND MUST REPORTED TO THE APPROPRIATE TAX AUTHORITIES.

[REDACTED]	DATE	CHS PAYMENT NAME (PRINTED)
	<u>FBI 8/12/2010</u>	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	DATE	PAYING AGENT (PRINTED)
	<u>12/2010</u>	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	DATE	WITNESS (PRINTED)

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 09/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

NA

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000070

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/02/2016

End: 07/30/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$7,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Source has provided intelligence regarding the murder of a Russian citizen in Washington DC that ties back to Russian OC members close to government officials in Russia. CHS has also provided significant cyber intrusion efforts by Russian government officials and private sector (energy) principals against western entities. CHS has also provided significant intelligence regarding criminal espionage efforts between entities in the US and Russia. This intelligence will be the subject of an additional request prepared by CD elements at a later date.

Total CHS Services: \$7,500.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-794b

Page 2 of 2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000071

FD-794b

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST**

DRAFT TYPE

Request Type: General **Payment Type:** Confidential **Forfeiture or Drug Related:** No

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

Official Bureau Name	UEID	Date of Request
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]	09/29/2016
Field Office	Squad	User Dimension 4
International Operations	Legat Rome	Telephone Number

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE

Payee Name	UEID
Gaeta, Michael	[REDACTED]

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
STEELE [REDACTED]	CE-019	Crown		06/02/2016	07/30/2016

Financial Justification: NA

DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		[REDACTED]		
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services	\$7,500.00
		Total For	[REDACTED]	\$7,500.00
			Total	\$7,500.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

STEELE [REDACTED] CE-019

FBI-HJC119-CH-000072

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
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Commitment: _____

Obligation: _____

Advance: _____

Expense: _____

Cash Receipt: _____

Cash Receipt –
OTCnet (CRO): _____OTCnet Deposit
Ticket #: _____Debit/Draft/EFT
No.:

Prior Month Advance Balance: _____

This Advance: _____

Less Receipts: _____

Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____

Amount to be Reimbursed: _____

APPROVAL

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA:	<input type="text"/>	9/29/2016 10:47:26 AM
Certified by ASAC:	<input type="text"/>	10/13/2016 6:39:40 PM
Draft Approval Officer:	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

STEELE CE-019

FBI-HJC119-CH-000073

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID: [REDACTED]

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013

Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

\$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000074

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST
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Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment? No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 07/05/2016 End: 10/03/2016

Payment Request Amount		
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
97F-HQ-2063661	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$15,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

This payment was initiated by SA Brian Gessford and approved by the CD chain of command who are assigned to the captioned 97F investigation. The funds have been transferred to IOD from CD in advance of payment to the CHS. The following statement is from UC Joe Pientka of CD. Team investigators met with CHS in Rome on October 3, 2016.

CHS [REDACTED] STEE provides very interesting and unique reporting specific to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation. His/her reporting is corroborative of Intel we received from a FGI [REDACTED] that predicated our investigation. To date, we have not received Intel from other sources that so closely tracks to the predicate. In addition, the CHS reporting provided PC for a FISA (currently in coordination, but an expedite is expected this week) on a subject of CROSSFIRE HURRICANE – CROSSFIRE DRAGON. The CROSSFIRE HURRICANE Team would like to continue working with you to possibly task your source to provide the FBI with intelligence and evidence in support of our investigation.

Total CHS Services: \$15,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-794b

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST**

DRAFT TYPE

Request Type: General

Payment Type: Confidential

Forfeiture or Drug Related: No

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

Official Bureau Name

UEID

Date of Request

Gaeta, Michael

10/18/2016

Field Office

Squad

User Dimension 4

Telephone Number

International Operations

Legat Rome

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE

Payee Name

UEID

Gaeta, Michael

Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No

Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
STEELE	CE-020	Crown	07/05/2016	10/03/2016	

Financial Justification: \$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.

DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT

Attributable to Agent or CHS	Catalog	File No.	Financial Program/Subprogram	Amount
		97F-HQ-2063661		
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services	\$15,000.00
			Total For 97F-HQ-2063661	\$15,000.00
			Total	\$15,000.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

Org Level 2	Fund	SOC	Sub SOC	BBFY	EBFY	Partition	User Dimension 5
						FBI	

STEELE CE-020

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

FINANCE OFFICE ONLY - SETTLEMENT OF ADVANCE

Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials
---------------	--------------	------------------	-------------------	-----------------------

Commitment: _____

Obligation: _____

Advance: _____

Expense: _____

Cash Receipt: _____

Cash Receipt –
OTCnet (CRO): _____OTCnet Deposit
Ticket #: _____Debit/Draft/EFT
No.:

Prior Month Advance Balance: _____

This Advance: _____

Less Receipts: _____

Funds Returned and/or Cash on Hand: _____

Amount to be Reimbursed: _____

APPROVAL

	Name	Date/Time
Approved By SSA:	<input type="text"/>	10/19/2016 9:58:16 AM
Certified by ASAC:	<input type="text"/>	10/19/2016 10:24:49 AM
Draft Approval Officer:	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

STEELE CE-020

FBI-HJC119-CH-000077

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT	
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

City: London

Date of Report: 07/07/2016

Substantive Case File Number

[REDACTED]

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

Insiders at the Kremlin are very concerned about the current FBI criminal investigation into the Russian athletics doping scandal. Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, referred to whistleblower, Grigory RODCHINKOV, as a "perebezhchik" (defector), who had access to highly sensitive information on Russian doping activities. A Kremlin lawyer stated that the IVANOV and PUTIN were very concerned about the investigation. A Russian public relations consultant with close ties to U.S. firm, KETCHUM, was instructed by the Kremlin to launch a discreet PR counter offensive against RODCHINKOV, the USG, IAAF and IOC, to discredit each.

In June 2016, Russian oligarch and close PUTIN associate, Gennady TIMCHENKO, discussed rumors surrounding the recent deaths of former heads of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency, Vyachslav SINYEV and FNU KAMAYEV. TIMCHENKO is also worried about the criminal investigation. He stated that SINYEV died of natural causes in February 2016. However, TIMCHENKO stated that KAMAYEV had died "like Paul I (Tsar)," who was brutally murdered but presented as having had a sudden medical problem. TIMCHENKO implied that KAMAYEV had been murdered on the Kremlin's orders in order to prevent him from speaking about the Russian state sponsored doping efforts. This also served to terrify Russian sport insiders.

In June 2016, Russian Olympian, Yelena ISINBAYEVA, stated that she had been paid \$100,000 by the Kremlin to lobby against the ban on Russian athletes at the Rio Olympics. ISINBAYEVA put her name to an op-ed piece published in the New York Times on June 15, 2016. Former Russian Athletics Federation head, Valentin BLAKNICHEV, stated that he had been bribed by the Russian Ministry of Sport to cover up various doping cases, to include the one against Olympic gymnast, Alina KABAeva. KABAeva, who became Putin's mistress, had been trained by Irina Viner, Alishir's USMANOV's wife. The bribe to KABAeva allowed her to "lie low" and then return to compete internationally at the highest levels.

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000079

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed
All signatures have been verified by a
certified FBI Information system

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

City: London

Date of Report: 07/07/2016

Substantive Case File Number

[REDACTED]

FD-1023

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000080

UNCLASSIFIED



FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT
Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

A former top level intelligence officer divided Government of Russia (GOR) state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into the following four categories (in priority order): 1) Targeting foreign (western) governments; 2) penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; 3) domestic monitoring of Russian elite, and; 4) attacking political opponents at home and abroad. The FSB is the lead organization within the GOR for cyber operations.

A senior banking official within the GOR who receives cyber generated intelligence, stated the following: there had been only "liimited success" in penetrating "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks. To compensate, massive effort had been made to penetrate with greater success, "secondary targets," particularly western private banks and governments of smaller states allied to the West. Latvia was mentioned in this context. Hundreds of agents, consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been compromised, were recruited in this effort. Many such agents had/have ethnic or family ties to Russia or were incentivized financially (money or contractual favors) to cooperate. The Russian Central Bank is complicit in the funding of this program and aiding in the laundering of these funds. This individual also stated that non-state sponsored cyber crime is becoming an increasing problem inside of Russia for GOR authorities. In 2015, there had been more than twenty attempts at serious cyber efforts to steal funds from corresponding bank accounts held in Russia, comprising several billion Roubles. Additionally, there are over 15 major organized crime groups inside of Russia operating in the cyber "space" which are largely outside of FSB control. Some of these groups are called ANUNAK, BUKTRAP and METEL. No further information was provided.

A Russian IT specialist reported in June 2016 that the FSB used coercion and blackmail to carry out its "deniable" offensive cyber operations. The individual had been caught laundering money for private Russian banks through Latvia by FSB Department K. The FSB threatened the individual with prosecution and prison if he/she did not cooperate with the FSB. Another individual began to cooperate with the FSB after being caught running an illegal pornographic website. The Russian IT specialist stated that Ilya OSSIPOV, a U.S. citizen of Russian/Jewish origin, had been knowingly approached and propositioned by the FSB while on a business trip to Russia. OSSIPOV was originally from Nizhniy Novogrod and developed the IT platform known as "I2I." OSSIPOV was in Russia to attract investors for his new platform to upgrade it onto mobile platforms. The FSB was aware of this and offered to provide capital to OSSIPOV in return for being able to access and modify "I2I" with a view towards targeting priority Turkish and Arab targets. The FSB intended to plant Trojans in the software, OSSIPOV initially refused the offer. The FSB also implied they had had success installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware on targets' PC's and other platforms. It was unknown if there was any further interaction with OSSIPOV. This IT specialist also stated that the "TELEGRAM" enciphered commercial system had been heavily targeted and likely compromised by the FSB because it was used frequently by Russian political activists.

An IT operator inside Russian energy giant ROSNEFT, who had been employed on conventional defensive IT work for ROSNEFT, advised of the following: this IT operator had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a former foreign director of ROSNEFT, Italian citizen, Guillermo QUINTERO. The FSB has successfully penetrated QUINTERO's personal IT and through this had accessed various important institutions in Italy and other countries through the back door, in particular, BANK INTESSA. Former GOR intelligence official and ROSNEFT CEO, Igor SECHIN, wanted QUINTERO's movements and meetings monitored to confirm/corroborate what QUINTERO was advising SECHIN and the ROSNEFT board. This operation has also provided ROSNEFT and the FSB with access to ex-Italian prime minister BERLUSCONI's IT, communications and network of international contacts. According to the IT operator, the technical expectations of this operation by the FSB had already been exceeded. This individual also stated that it was highly likely that a similar FSB cyber operation was conducted against an ExxonMobil member of the ROSNEFT Board (possibly Donald HUMPHREYS).

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000081

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1023

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000082

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



OFFICIAL RECORD
Document participants have digitally signed.
All signatures have been verified by a
certified FBI information system.

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/19/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

The attached document is a memo from the CHS describing intelligence that CHS received from Jon WINER, US Department of State on October 18, 2016. CHS has stated that CHS has a business association with WINER. The memo describes how WINER obtained the intelligence and that it is apparently from a FSB sub-source. The information describes the FSB efforts at successfully compromising Donald TRUMP.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1023

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000083

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT
HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other

Other Contact Type: Skype

Date of Report: 10/18/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 18, 2016, in response to specific tasking from FBI HQ CI representatives investigating the subject matter at hand, CHS STEELE provided handling agent with the following information which was generated by three different sub-sources:

Sub-Source 1:

On July 7, 2016, Carter PAGE gave a high profile lecture in Moscow. On July 8, 2016, PAGE met personally and alone with Rosneft CEO, Igor SECHIN. The meeting may have occurred in the same building as the lecture. During this meeting, SECHIN offered the following deal to PAGE, as a representative of the Donald TRUMP campaign: if TRUMP were to become President, SECHIN/ROSNEFT would offer 19% of ROSNEFT stock to TRUMP's administration to be "brokered" for sale to U.S. investors, as the TRUMP administration would see fit, in exchange for TRUMP lifting U.S. (Ukrainian-based) sanctions against Russia. PAGE's response was, "if my guy gets in, then he will lift sanctions."

Sub Source 2:

Michael COHEN is a private attorney for Donald TRUMP. COHEN is described as a "pivotal figure" in the chain of communication between the TRUMP campaign and the Kremlin. COHEN's wife is Russian. Her father, Yefim Fima SHUSTERMAN, is a successful Moscow-based property developer in Russia. SHUSTERMAN owns a Dacha in Barvikha, Russia outside of Moscow. This area is reserved only for the political and business elite. The Russian political leadership own their Dacha's in Barvikha.

Sub-Source 3:

Within the last few days, Igor SECHIN acknowledged that TRUMP would not win the presidential campaign. Additionally, PUTIN has admitted to senior intelligence officers that the FSB efforts to influence the US Presidential campaign failed and were "fucked up." Those involved were dismayed at the lack of traction of material leaked against Hillary CLINTON. They advised that the most compromising material has been put out but that they will "drip-feed" the remaining material through WIKILEAKS. The communication chain between the Kremlin and TRUMP's campaign is aware of this plan.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000084

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



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FD-1023

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000085

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other

Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Date of Report: 10/21/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 20, 2016, CHS STEELE provided the following information, the body of which is contained in the attached report prepared by the CHS:

Donald TRUMP's personal attorney, Michael COHEN, met with Kremlin officials in August 2016 in the Czech capital of Prague under the cover of a Russian organization called ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO. Pro-PUTIN Russian Duma member, Konstantin KOSACHEV, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee, is reported as the facilitator and a participant of this meeting.

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000086

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File Number: [REDACTED]
Stat Count: 4
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Activities Observed/Detected by CHS
Sub Stat Type: Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity
Agency: N/A
Stat: FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

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FD-1040a

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]
Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/24/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 24, 2016, CHS STEELE provided the following information, summarized below but contained in the attached report:

Igor DIVYEKIN, the main interlocutor between TRUMP CAMPAIGN advisor, Carter PAGE, and the Kremlin, was moved from the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department to Charge d'Affaires at the State Duma to give DIVYEKIN cover and "diplomatic immunity" as protection from the USG and other foreign governments.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1023

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000088

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person
Country: UNITED KINGDOM
Address Line 1: London
Address Line 2:
City: London
ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:
NA

Life Changes:
NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA

Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED

FBI-HJC119-CH-000089

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person
Country: UNITED KINGDOM
Address Line 1: London
Address Line 2:
City: London
ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

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Substantive Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 08/02/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

Substantive Case File Number:

[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA

Life Changes:
NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA

Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division
Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM
Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

Substantive Case File Number:
[REDACTED]

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000092

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA

Life Changes:
NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
After discussion with SA Steve Somma (CD), CHS was made aware that a target of the 97F-HQ-2063661 investigation is aware that two private investigators have been hired to find information on the target. No other information was provided.

Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

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Substantive Case File Number:

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000093

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

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Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000094

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

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Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000095

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:
NA

Life Changes:
NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
NA

Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000096

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-209a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CHS CONTACT REPORT
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

FD-209a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000097

For documentation into the CHS file # **STEELE** code name "CROWN":

As stated by the CHS numerous times and as observed and noted by ALAT Mike Gaeta throughout the course of the relationship with the Bureau, the CHS' original and continuing motivation to engage the Bureau as a CHS was twofold: 1) to provide intelligence to the Bureau regarding high level criminal activity engaged in by Eurasian actors, and 2) to receive compensation for intelligence deemed valuable.

ALAT Mike Gaeta

For documentation into the CHS file # **STEELE** code name "CROWN":

As documented in a FD-1023 dated 11/17/16 and in the source closing document (FD-1040a) dated 11/17/16:

On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services however the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue." At that time, the handling agent advised CHS that the nature of the relationship between the FBI and CHS would change completely and that it was unlikely that the FBI would continue a relationship with the CHS. Additionally, handling agent advised that CHS was not to operate to obtain any intelligence whatsoever on behalf of the FBI. There was no further contact with the CHS and the CHS was closed on November 17, 2016.

The November 1, 2016 conversation was the first and only instance that the CHS indicated to the handling agent a motivation for CHS' actions and engagement with the Bureau other than originally described. This was the first and only instance that the handling agent observed a motivation by the CHS other than originally described.

ALAT Mike Gaeta

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//FOUO) CHS **STEELE** Admonishments

Date: 02/02/2016

From: ROME

Contact: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH, [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

Case ID #: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Synopsis: (U//FOUO) A/Legat Mike Gaeta met in person with CHS **STEELE** on January 25, 2016 and verbally admonished the CHS.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//FOUO) AGG

Details:

On January 25, 2016, A/Legat Mike Gaeta met with **STEELE** to debrief the CHS. After the debriefing was completed, A/Legat Gaeta verbally admonished the CHS with CHS admonishments, which the CHS fully acknowledged, signed and dated. The signed CHS AGG admonishments form is attached to this EC as a 1A.

♦♦

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]