

CHS Admonishments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Filing and Security* Administrative* Admonishments* Witness Information* Synopsis Approval Routing* Review 	<p>Header</p> <p>STEELE 4/17/2015</p> <p>GAETA, MICHAEL J. International Operations Legat Rome</p> <hr/> <p>Admonishments</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The CHS's assistance and the information provided to the FBI are entirely voluntary. 2. The CHS must provide truthful information to the FBI. 3. The CHS must abide by the instructions of the FBI and must not take or seek to take any independent actions on behalf of the US Government. 4. The US Government will strive to protect the CHS's identity but cannot guarantee it will not be divulged. <hr/> <p>Additional Admonishments</p> <p>If applicable to the particular circumstances of the CHS, or as they become applicable, the following admonishments must be completed. They need not be given if they have no relevance to the CHS's situation. (For example, the immunity instruction need not be given unless there is an issue of apparent criminal liability or penalties relating to the CHS. The Attorney General's Guidelines emphasize, however, that whether or not these instructions are given, the FBI has no authority to confer immunity and that agents must avoid giving any person the erroneous impression that they have any such authority.) Indicate whether the following instructions were given:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The FBI on its own cannot promise or agree to any immunity from prosecution or other consideration by an FPO, a state or local prosecutor, or a court in exchange for the CHS's cooperation because the decision to confer any such benefit lies within the exclusive discretion of the prosecutor or court. However, the FBI will consider (but not necessarily act upon) advising the appropriate prosecutor of the nature and extent of the CHS's assistance to the FBI. (This instruction should be given if there is any apparent issue of criminal liability or penalty.)* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #1 field is required. 2. The CHS is not authorized to engage in any criminal activity and has no immunity from prosecution for any unauthorized criminal activity. (This instruction is not necessary for CHSs who have such authorization. This instruction should be repeated if the CHS is suspected of committing unauthorized illegal activity.)* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #2 field is required. 3. The CHS is not an employee of the US Government and may not represent himself/herself as such. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except under those circumstances where the CHS previously has been or continues to be otherwise employed by the US Government.)* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #3 field is required. 4. The CHS may not enter into any contract or incur any obligation on behalf of the US Government, except as specifically instructed or approved by the FBI. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except to those CHSs who are otherwise authorized to enter into a contract or incur an obligation on the behalf of the US.)* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #4 field is required. 5. No promises or commitments can be made, except by the Department of Homeland Security, regarding the alien status of any person or the right of any person to enter or remain in the US. (This instruction should be provided if there is any apparent issue of immigration status that relates to the CHS.)* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #5 field is required. 6. The FBI cannot guarantee any rewards, payments, or other compensation to the CHS.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #6 field is required. 7. Each time a CHS subject to the AGGs receives any awards, payments, or other compensation from the FBI, the CHS shall be advised at the time of the payment that he/she is liable for any taxes that may be owed on that compensation.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #7 field is required. 8. Whenever it becomes apparent that the CHS may have to testify in a court or other proceeding, the CHS must be advised of that possibility.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Admonishment #8 field is required. <hr/> <p>Additional Instructions Based on Employment or Position</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If a CHS is in a position to obtain information from a subject who is facing pending criminal charges for whom his/her Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the CHS must be advised not to solicit such information from the subject regarding the pending charges.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Additional Instructions #1 field is required. 2. For CHSs in a position to obtain information from a subject who is represented by counsel or planning a legal defense, the CHS must be advised not to interfere with an attorney/client relationship.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Additional Instructions #2 field is required. 3. If the CHS is an employee of a financial institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act and that the FBI will not knowingly accept information which violates the provisions of the Act.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Additional Instructions #3 field is required. 4. If the CHS is an employee of an educational institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 USC Sec. 1232g) known as the Buckley Amendment.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Additional Instructions #4 field is required. 5. If the CHS is a union official of any rank charged with the duties and obligations under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 (29 USC) (i.e., having responsibilities related to retirement, benefits, or other income benefits of union members) he/she must be advised that he/she remains subject to reporting provisions of the ERISA. The CHS must not operate in a manner which adversely affects the operation of union affiliated pension, welfare, and benefit plans.* <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/> The Additional Instructions #5 field is required.
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CHS Admonishments

Filing and Security*

Administrative*

↳ Admonishments*

Witness Information*

Synopsis

Approval Routing*

Review

Previous

Next

CHS Admonishments	Header
Filing and Security*	STEELE 6/17/2015
Administrative*	
Admonishments*	
Witness Information*	Witness Information
Synopsis	The content and meaning of the mandatory instructions and relevant additional instructions were conveyed to the CHS by the FBI Agent whose electronic signature appears below and were witnessed by the government official named below. The CHS acknowledged his/her receipt and understanding of these instructions.
Approval Routing*	Witness Name: *
Review	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The Witness Name field is required.
	Witness Title:
	Witness Agency:
	Previous Next

Provided verbally in person by ALAT Mike Gaeta on 1/25/16.

CHS

 25/1/16



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(Effective 11-14-2016)

Human Source Validation Report

HUMINT Operations Section, Validation Management Unit

Classified by: [REDACTED]

Derived from: [REDACTED]

Declassify on: [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Human Source Validation Report: STEELE [REDACTED]

(U) Summary

(S//NF) Validation Management Unit (VMU) concurs with the closing of STEELE [REDACTED]. VMU assesses it is likely^a STEELE [REDACTED] has contributed to the FBI's Criminal Program. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence,^b based on the fact that STEELE [REDACTED]'s reporting has been minimally corroborated; his or her access and placement is commensurate with his or her reporting; and on the presence of one major control issue noted in STEELE [REDACTED]'s Delta file. He or she provided information regarding various issues of value to the US Intelligence Community (USIC). However, STEELE [REDACTED] exposed his or her relationship with the FBI. As a result, he or she was closed. VMU has provided a list of recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

(U) Details

[REDACTED] This Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) conveys VMU's validation review and assessment of STEELE [REDACTED] for the period of 30 October 2013 to 01 November 2016.

[REDACTED] (Resides outside US and extra-territorial traveler)

Purpose of Review: Special Request

Primary Reporting Program: Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

Secondary Reporting Program: Counterintelligence Division (CD)

Field Office: Legal Attaché (LEGAT) Rome (RO)

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(U) Administrative

(U//FOUO) Validation is a multi-layered process that may begin before meeting a potential CHS and may not end until sometime after the CHS relationship is terminated. As such, the collection of complete and current biographical data is critical to the accurate validation of the CHS. The Quarterly SSA Source Report (QSSR) ensures the CHS is properly managed; the Field Office Annual Source Report (FOASR) is designed to be the annual review of the CHS by the Special Agent and the Field Office. The FBIHQ VMU CHS validation reviews are prioritized using high-risk characteristics outlined in the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (CHSPG) and the [REDACTED]

^a (U) See Appendix A (Expressions of Likelihood).

^b (U) See Appendix B (Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information).

^c (U) This validation review includes a check of the following databases: Delta, Sentinel, TECS, Automated Case Support (ACS), OGA [REDACTED] and Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), Counterintelligence and HUMINT Requirements Reporting Operations Management Environment (CHROME), and OGA [REDACTED]. VMU conducted database checks on 09 February 2017.

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Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC): [REDACTED]

Handling Agent: Michael J. Gaeta

Date CHS was Opened/Closed: 30 October 2013; Closed 01 November 2016

(U) Background

[REDACTED] STEELE [REDACTED] is a foreign national currently employed at his or her own business. [REDACTED] FGI [REDACTED] He or she came to the attention of the FBI after being referred by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the course of being operated, he or she provided information concerning the bribery scandal for the upcoming 2018 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and its proposed location in Russia, the pending United States (US) election concerning Donald Trump, potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issues, and a cyber-attack from the People's Republic of China (PRC) on a foreign pharmaceutical company. STEELE [REDACTED] was closed on 01 November 2016 due to disclosing his or her relationship to an online publication website. This is the first HSVR completed on STEELE [REDACTED]

(U) Suitability

[REDACTED] VMU assesses it was likely STEELE [REDACTED] was suitable for continued operation at the time based on his or her authenticity and reliability. However, due to the disclosure of his or her relationship with the FBI to an online publication, STEELE [REDACTED] was subsequently closed.

(U) Authenticity

- [REDACTED] According to information contained in the Delta file, there are no reasons to doubt his or her identity. The ALAT has sufficiently verified STEELE [REDACTED]'s identity through background investigations and updated criminal history checks during the operation.
- [REDACTED] VMU conducted a [REDACTED] on 09 February 2017 and verified the existence of STEELE [REDACTED]'s privately owned company.
- [REDACTED] : According to the FOASR, STEELE [REDACTED]'s access is listed as indirect.
OGA
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] provided information through sub-sources. However, the identity of the sub-sources are not fully identified in the reporting. VMU notes should he or she be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends documenting all of the sub-sources' identities in the Delta file. The FOASR also mentions the sub-sources being motivated by money. VMU notes there is no mention if STEELE [REDACTED] is paying these sub-sources. VMU recommends the ALAT follow-up regarding this matter.
- [REDACTED] VMU was able to verify STEELE [REDACTED]'s information on the selectors for the Russian doctor Mikhail KORIAGIN who is attempting to weaponize the Ebola virus.

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- [REDACTED] VMU notes no motivation is documented in the FOASRs from the Delta file. However, the FO has updated the Delta file to include his or her motivation. VMU assesses monetary compensation to be a potential motivation for STEELE [REDACTED]. For the time of being operated, VMU notes STEELE [REDACTED] was paid \$7,000.00 in expenses and \$127,500.00 in payments. However, the closing EC documents paying STEELE [REDACTED] \$95,000.00. Should STEELE [REDACTED] be re-opened in the future, the ALAT is requested to resolve payments issues in the Delta file.

(U) Reliability

- [REDACTED] During STEELE [REDACTED]'s operation, VMU found no issues regarding his or her reliability.
- [REDACTED] VMU did not locate any information to suggest STEELE [REDACTED] fabricated information during the operation.

(U) Control

- [REDACTED] While being operated, VMU did not locate information indicating STEELE [REDACTED] was under the control of an outside entity. Furthermore, VMU noted no indication he or she would divulge their relationship with the FBI to the public.

(U) Production Review/Investigative Support

[REDACTED] VMU assesses it is likely STEELE [REDACTED] has informed the FBI across numerous programs. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence, based on collection requirements addressed, IIRs produced, investigations supported, and minimal corroborated reporting.

- [REDACTED] Since being opened, STEELE [REDACTED]'s reporting resulted in the dissemination of 10 IIRs.
- [REDACTED] VMU notes due to STEELE [REDACTED]'s information in the FIFA scandal, it has resulted in four arrests, three convictions and agreed upon pleas of fraud. There was also pleas on bribery, structuring, tax evasion, fraud, and money laundering. Furthermore, there was approximately \$3.4 million dollars in forfeiture and an "additional unspecified amount of \$3 to \$4 million to be paid in satisfaction of tax debts by one of the defendants." (STEELE [REDACTED] Main-9-Payment EC).
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also notes the information disseminated in one IIR from STEELE [REDACTED] generated interest from an Other Government Agency (OGA) unit (STEELE [REDACTED] Main Serial# 33).

(U) Corroboration

- [REDACTED] According to the FOASR, STEELE [REDACTED] has been corroborated by other intelligence sources (NFI). An FBI HQ IA noted STEELE [REDACTED]'s information as

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“extremely valuable and informative” ([STEELE] Main-8-Payment EC) with regards to Semion MOGILEVICH, an FBI Top Ten Fugitive.

- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Collection Requirements

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) Threat Issues

- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) Key Intelligence Questions:

- [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]
- | [REDACTED]

(U) Compliance Issues

[REDACTED] According to the Delta file, [STEELE] brought an employee during debriefings. VMU notes there was no proper documentation regarding the disclosure of [STEELE]'s

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identity (A-13). According to the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide Section 15.2, SAC approval is required to disclose the identity of the CHS.

████████ Even though STEELE █████ resides outside the US, VMU notes there does need to be concurrence for him or her to travel internationally. VMU notes STEELE █████ traveled to Rome on 03 October 2016. OGA █████

(U) Caveat

(U █████) There are no caveats regarding STEELE █████

(U) Analyst Comments

██████ VMU notes as a result of the disclosure of his or her relationship to an online publishing company, STEELE █████ was closed. VMU notes the ALAT has addressed the following concerns in the Delta file to include STEELE █████'s motivation and the reason behind divulging their relationship with the FBI to the public. Should the ALAT decide to re-open him or her, VMU has provided recommendations below. Furthermore, VMU notes difficulty in fully trusting him or her should they be re-opened in the future.

(U) Recommendations

██████ Should STEELE █████ be re-opened, VMU has provided a list of recommendations below.

██████ VMU notes STEELE █████ has provided much of his or her information through sub-sources. However, there is no documentation on the identities of all of the sub-sources. VMU notes sub-sources are individuals from whom FBI Sources obtain information. The Source, not the sub-source, reports the information directly to the handling agent. Sub-sources are not opened by the FO, are not operated at the direction of the FO, and therefore, cannot be controlled by the FBI. Additionally, they are not subject to the FBI's validation process, and their intelligence cannot necessarily be deemed reliable. Therefore, in order to prevent intelligence from being mistakenly disseminated within the Intelligence Community (IC) with the impression that it is derived from a reliable FBI Source, the information must be appropriately attributed to sub-source whose reliability is unknown. Source reporting must accurately describe the reliability of the information or its origin. As a result, the future handling agent of STEELE █████ should identify all sub-sources providing information reported by STEELE █████ and upload this into the Delta file. The ALAT should evaluate these sub-sources as potential Sources. VMU notes this will ensure the validity of the information being provided.

██████ VMU discourages the use of e-mail to pass sensitive information. VMU recommends the ALAT reference Section █████ for more information on policy requirements regarding communicating with STEELE █████. VMU also recommends making copies of all e-mails received and to pass them to the ALAT for scanning and upload them into Delta.

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VMU notes a lack of operational testing in the Delta file. Should STEELE be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends consulting with the Validation Operational Testing Unit (VOTU) regarding operational testing and uploading the results to the Delta file.

VMU recommends having STEELE refrain from bringing outside individuals to future debriefings. Should the FBI ALAT encounter another individual at future debriefs, VMU recommends providing proper concurrence for disclosure of the Source's identity.

Should there be future international travel for STEELE VMU recommends consulting with HCC prior to STEELE traveling.

According to the file, notes potential information being provided to FBI through STEELE s privately owned company. As a result, recommends consulting with [REDACTED]

Should STEELE be re-opened, VMU recommends documenting any future corroboration and motivation to the Delta file.

[REDACTED] recommends documenting if STEELE has paid his or her sub-sources for the information provided.

(U) Outlook

VMU assesses STEELE has provided valuable information for the FBI and across the USIC regarding multiple issues. However, VMU notes a serious control issue be addressed before re-opening STEELE VMU notes STEELE exposed their relationship with the FBI and has brought an individual to debriefings without prior notification and approval. VMU assesses there is a potential obstacle for the FBI to fully trust in him or her to not divulge the relationship again. Furthermore, VMU notes while STEELE s access has been indirect through sub-sources, there does need to be an identification of them. VMU has provided several recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

(U) Consumers: [REDACTED]

(U) From: VMU

(U) Drafted by: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(U) Approval: [REDACTED]

(U) Contact: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
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(U) This HSVR was prepared by VMU. Please address any comments or questions to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] or to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood (or Probability)

(U) Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance.

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<i>Terms of Likelihood</i>	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
<i>Terms of Probability</i>	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

(U) Unless otherwise stated, the FBI does not derive judgments via statistical analysis.

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[REDACTED]
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(U) Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

(U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

(U) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information, from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

(U) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

(U) **Low confidence** generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

[REDACTED]
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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/080

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than embarrassing conduct. This dossier is controlled by chief Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, on direct orders from PUTIN. It has not been distributed abroad as yet, including to TRUMP team, but PUTIN's intentions for its use remain unclear

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top-level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and



disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics, anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, a senior (western) member of staff at the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top-level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
5. Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's

[REDACTED]

existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by senior Kremlin spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, on the direct instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier had not been made available, as yet, *inter alia*, to any foreigners, including TRUMP and his inner circle. However PUTIN's intentions with regard to the dossier and its future dissemination remained unclear.

20 June 2016

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Summary

- Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight and denying everything
- Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
- Premier MEDVEDEV's office furious over DNC hacking and associated anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
- Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements in Moscow

Detail


1. Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin "team" involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their "elephant in a china shop black PR". IVANOV claimed always to have opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR "team". Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics, IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for the Russian leadership was to "sit tight and deny everything".
2. Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that PESKOV now was "scared shitless" that he would be scapegoated by PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to lay low. PESKOV's position was not helped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details).

3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and state agencies.
4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime opposed to PESKOV and his "botched" operations, at least for the time being.

5 August 2016

8/29/16



COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP's campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US
- TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC e-mails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
- Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP's team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians receiving intel from TRUMP's team on Russian oligarchs and their families in US
- Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves "pension" disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami
- Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
2. Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.



[REDACTED]

The reason for using WikiLeaks was "plausible deniability" and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

3. In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and Miami were using the émigré 'pension' distribution system as cover. The operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian émigré community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involved.
4. In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business oligarchs and their families' activities and assets in the US, with which PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
5. Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP, Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the Democrats' attention away from TRUMP's business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
6. Finally, regarding TRUMP's claimed minimal investment profile in Russia, a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want of trying. TRUMP's previous efforts had included exploring the real estate sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local prostitutes rather than business success.

[REDACTED]

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

- Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlin intervention in US presidential election and outlines leadership thinking on operational way forward
- No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
- Educated US youth to be targeted as protest (against CLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them over to TRUMP
- Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and elite
- Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DIA Director Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the leaked DNC/CLINTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks. Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already had been leaked and make up new content.
2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the educated youth in America as the PA assessed that there was still a chance they could be persuaded to vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a result of this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather than being able to focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia's interests. This also should give President PUTIN more room for manoeuvre in the run-up to Russia's own presidential election in 2018.
3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal reaction to the DNC hack and TRUMP's links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to mark this. In IVANOV's view, the US had tried to divide the Russian elite with sanctions but failed, whilst they, by contrast, had succeeded in splitting the US hawks inimical to Russia and the Washington elite more generally, half of whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidate as a result of Russian intervention.
4. Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented on aspects of the Russian operation to date. Its goals had been threefold- asking sympathetic US actors how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating compromising information ('kompromat'). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political figures, including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from Lyndon LAROUCHE; presidential candidate Jill STEIN of the Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/102

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD

Summary

- TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest) voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP
- Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and media and forced to change course as result
- Need now to turn tables on CLINTON's use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some resentment at Russian president's perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above swinging presidential election

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow's clandestine involvement in the campaign. TRUMP's associate reported that the aim of leaking the DNC e-mails to WikiLeaks during the Democratic Convention had been to swing supporters of Bernie SANDERS away from Hillary CLINTON and across to TRUMP. These voters were perceived as activist and anti-status quo and anti-establishment and in that regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON. This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP's foreign policy adviser Carter PAGE who had discussed it directly with the ethnic Russian associate.
2. Continuing on this theme, the ethnic Russian associate of TRUMP assessed that the problem was that the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change of tactics. The main objective in the short term was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON's successful exploitation of the PUTIN as bogeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and bolster her own (patriotic) credentials. The TRUMP campaign was focusing on tapping into support in the American television media to achieve this, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by them to date.
3. However, TRUMP's associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment within the Republican candidate's team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploit the situation to undermine the US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016

Sept 20, '16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111

RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
- Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and reports IVANOV sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was not involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
- Russians do have further 'kompromat' on CLINTON (e-mails) and considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in late September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
- However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential candidates' opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
- Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA) commented on the political fallout from recent western media revelations about Moscow's intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that president PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei KISLYAK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

[KISLYAK's predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN's decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential election operation/s.

3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now was that the Kremlin had further 'kompromat' on candidate CLINTON and had been considering releasing this via "plausibly deniable" channels after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look "weak and stupid" by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation, although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be taken by PUTIN himself.
4. The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow's intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of shifting the US political consensus in Russia's perceived interests regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate CLINTON away from President OBAMA's policies. The best example of this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to call.
5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans' pensions ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

[REDACTED]

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1 and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV's dismissal, was corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/94

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP

Detail

1. Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
2. According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/135

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP's lawyer COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
- COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
- These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain "plausibly deniable" for Russian regime
- Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VAINO and KIRIYENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin's TRUMP support operation

Detail

1. Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York tycoon's campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN's role had grown following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP's campaign manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the TRUMP side.
2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the full details of TRUMP's relationship with Russia being exposed. In pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain further scandals involving MANNAFORT's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

overall objective had been to "to sweep it all under the carpet and make sure no connections could be fully established or proven"

3. Things had become even "hotter" since August on the TRUMP-Russia track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment of former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/132

RUSSIA: PUTIN NOW REGRETS US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION INFLUENCE OPERATION

Summary

- Top level Russian intelligence figure claims PUTIN now regrets operation to interfere in US presidential election
- PUTIN thought US political system similar to Russian one (corrupt) but now considers this was a big error

Detail

1. Speaking to a colleague in mid October 2016, a former top level Russian intelligence officer and current Kremlin advisor claimed that President PUTIN now regretted Moscow's operation to interfere in the US presidential election in favour of Republican candidate Donald TRUMP. The officer said the operation now clearly had backfired.
2. Continuing on this theme, the former top level intelligence officer opined that PUTIN's mistake had been to regard the US political system as more like Russia (corrupt) than something different and to think he understood it sufficiently well to interfere effectively. The Russian president now realised he had been wrong. The TRUMP influence operation had been one of his biggest mistakes.

Source Comment

The former top level former Russian intelligence officer was not explicit about from whom he had obtained the above information. However he had implied it was either directly from PUTIN himself or someone very close to him in the Kremlin.

13 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/130

RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

- Buyer's remorse sets in with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation in US presidential election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had greater impact in campaign
- Russians have injected further anti-CLINTON material into the 'plausibly deniable' leaks pipeline which will continue to surface, but best material already in public domain
- PUTIN angry with senior officials who "overpromised" on TRUMP and further heads likely to roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next
- TRUMP supported by Kremlin because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who would shake up current international status quo in Russia's favor. Lead on TRUMP operation moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits

Detail

1. Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments concerning the Kremlin's operation to support Republican candidate Donald TRUMP in the US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer's remorse was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate, Hillary CLINTON's hacked e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.
2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin into compliant western media outlets like WikiLeaks, which remained at least "plausibly deniable", so the stream of these would continue through October and up to the election. However s/he understood that the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers to come.
3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate's "over-promising" on the Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of his chances and reliability and being able to cover and/or contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target. Ironically, despite his consistent urging of caution on the issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.
4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP support operation in the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the liberal international status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the MFA to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where it remained, a reflection of its growing significance over time. There was still a view in the Kremlin that TRUMP would continue as a (divisive) political force even if he lost the presidency and may run for and be elected to another public office.

12 October 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/134

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the US
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

Detail

1. Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President and PUTIN ally Igor' SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in Moscow.
2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
3. According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. COHEN had a wife of Russian origin, whose father, Efim SHUSTERMAN, was a leading Moscow property developer.

Source Comment

5. SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

Company Comment

6. It appears that SHUSTERMAN has a country house (dacha) in the settlement of Barvikha, west of Moscow. This village is reserved for the residences of the top leadership and their close associates.

18 October 2016

Company Note

We received this report from Jon WINER, US State Department on 18 October 2016. It is the second in this series we have seen. We consider it potentially significant and apologise in advance for its rough format. The sub-source, as we understand it, is a Turkish businessman with strong Russian, including FSB links. He is in touch with Cody SHEARER, a contact of Sydney BLUMENTHAL, a friend of the CLINTONs, who passed it to WINER. We have no means of verifying the source/s or information but note that some of the reporting is remarkably similar to our own, albeit from a completely different sourcing chain, and therefore could be important collateral, especially on the reported Ritz Carlton incident in 2013; TRUMP's compromise by the FSB (and knowledge of it); and subsequent Kremlin funding of the TRUMP campaign (through the AGALAROVs). We judge that WINER at least would be happy to discuss all this further with you.

19 October 2016

BEGINS

FSB†Interview≠ ≠

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was†talking†to†meÆ†He†responded†that†he†was†c
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UÆSAÆ

He noted that there is a division within the FSB "which the
is part of that thinks the existence of a "pervasive" and
"sophisticated" intelligence operation focusing on
pivotal
US personalities" is widely known^a specifically the Donald
Trump operation. He said the Trump operation was an
"open secret" in Putin's government circles. The
question among FSB employees "he said" is how far this should go.
He described these operations as "utter madness."
He said there are two elements as to why Americans
should care about what the FSB is doing:
1. The Americans are being screwed around with by a
foreign power^a
2. By helping expose and embarrass Putin in regards to
what he has done with Trump. ≠ ≠ ≠
which has spiraled
out of control ≠ ≠
might eventually improve relations
between the USA and Russia^a because what he has
done is dangerous.
He repeated that Trump ≠ ≠

whom he described as a
"delicate target" ≠ ≠ ≠
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Having †seen †the †videos †he †describes †Trump's †be
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"very †dark."
He †said †
† "This †guy †has †mental †issues †with †women. He
doesn't †act †normal." There †is †a †lot †of †penetratio
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†served†as
a†liaison†between†Trump†and†PutinÆ†Anar†Mam

madov" son†of†Azerbaijan†Transport†Minister†Ziya†Mammadov" was†also†involvedÆ†The†presidential†palace†was†used because†Aras†Agalarov's†son"†Emin"†who†got†Trump†to perform†in†a†music†video"†was†married†to†Leylat Aliyeva" the†glamorous†daughter†of†Azerbaijani†President†Ilham Aliyev"†among†other†reasonsÆ†Trump†promised†t o†support President†Aliyev†politically†≠ ≠ ≠ after†he†was†delivered†the §10†million ≠ ≠ and†promised†to†organize†a†visit†of congressmen†to†BakuÆ†My†FSB†source†asked†me †to†look into†the†Trump†congressional†trip†to†Baku†with†some†ll congressmen†from†both†political†partiesÆ

ENDS

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/137

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN MOVE TO PROTECT EXPOSED TRUMP TEAM SECRET LIAISON FIGURE, DIVYEKIN

Summary

- Former TRUMP foreign policy adviser PAGE's secret Kremlin contact, DIVYEKIN, moved from PA to a senior Duma position following his exposure in western media
- New position gives DIVYEKIN diplomatic immunity if he travels abroad, making it harder for the USG to detain or question him. Move assessed by Kremlin insider as unorthodox, unsignalled and therefore as part of Kremlin TRUMP support operation cover-up

Detail

1. In mid October 2016, a mini-reshuffle of key staff took place in the Kremlin. As part of this reshuffle, the deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department, Igor' DIVYEKIN, was moved from this position to a new one as Charge D'Affaires at the state Duma (Russian legislature). This move followed DIVYEKIN, a previously low key but senior Russian official, being exposed in the western media e.g. the Yahoo News story of September 23 2016 as a secret interlocutor of Carter PAGE, the then foreign policy advisor of the Republican US presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP.
2. Commenting on this move to a trusted friend and compatriot after the event in late October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted that DIVYEKIN's move was highly unusual. It did not form part of a wider rotation of staff; had not been prompted by a promotion or gazetted; and DIVYEKIN was not obviously qualified for the job, which required him to have both formal diplomatic skills and knowledge of legislative procedures. The new Duma position however gave him diplomatic immunity, at least in the Russian government's eyes, making it more difficult for the USG or other foreign governments to detain or question DIVYEKIN were he to travel abroad. The Kremlin insider compared the DIVYEKIN move to the manoeuvring of chief Aleksandr LITVINENKO murder suspect, Andrei LUGOVOY, into the Duma as a deputy after he had been exposed as a conspirator by the western media in 2007. LUGOVOY's position also gave him diplomatic immunity.

24 October 2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 07/15/2016
Case Agent Name: MICHAEL J GAETA
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 01/23/2016
To: 04/22/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

01/01/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016 Yes

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [REDACTED] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

OPERATIONAL MATTERS**Date of Last Reporting:** 03/03/2016**Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period?** No**OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)****OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)****Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period?** No**Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period?** No**Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period?** No**Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period?** No**Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period?** No**Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period?** Yes**Date of Approval:** 03/13/2015**Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period?** No**SECTION II CERTIFICATION**

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [REDACTED] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

PAYMENT MATTERS**Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)**

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
03/03/2016	0.0000	0.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-012

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
03/03/2016	15000.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-013
03/03/2016	5500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-012

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
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FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

No data provided.

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence N/A with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file?

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained N/A and retained in the CHS file?

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI N/A special agent or government official?

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, N/A which is maintained in the CHS's file?

Have all payments been reconciled? Yes

SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes
04/22/2016

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via Delta (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

ADMINISTRATION

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel N/A and documented in the CHS file?

Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No

Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO N/A or state or local prosecutor's office?

Has the CHS previously testified? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? No

Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No

Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? No

Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? No

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and N/A ELSUR?

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a Yes government official, and documented in the CHS's file?

Last Admonishments 09/12/2013
Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? N/A

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, N/A has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes
04/22/2016

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via Delta (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

Stat Type	Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	1
Disseminations Based on CHS Information	1

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?

Productivity Value:

Yes

Access:

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

COMMENTS**Comments/Instructions:**

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via [REDACTED] (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

Workflow History

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 08/23/2016
Case Agent Name: MICHAEL J GAETA
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 04/23/2016
To: 07/22/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

03/13/2015

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

	Page 1 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Date of Last Reporting: 07/08/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? Yes

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
07/21/2016	6000.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-017
05/05/2016	1500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-015

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official? Yes

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file. Yes

Have all payments been reconciled? Yes

SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

ADMINISTRATION

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file? N/A

Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No

Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office? No

Has the CHS previously testified? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? No

Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No

Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? No

Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? No

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR? N/A

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file? Yes

Last Admonishments 02/02/2016

Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? N/A

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? N/A

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

Stat Type	Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	4

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Yes

Productivity Value: [REDACTED]

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FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Access:

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS operation to continue.

Workflow History

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661
Stat Count: 1
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)
Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique
Agency: FBI
Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 1

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000148

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661
Stat Count: 2
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)
Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique
Agency: FBI
Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI
Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661
Stat Count: 3
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Activities Observed/Detected by CHS
Sub Stat Type: Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity
Agency: N/A
Stat: FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

Other Comments:

NA

Total stat count claimed on this form: 5

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]

Date: 10/21/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FD-1040a

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000150

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Agent/Asset

Agency: FBI

Stat: NO. FIS AGENT/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Front Cover Organization

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS FRONT COVER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Disseminations Based on CHS Information

Sub Stat Type: Counter Intelligence Information

Agency: FBI

Stat: DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000151

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a	Page 3 of 3	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000152

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
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HEADER

Source ID: STEELE [REDACTED]
Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661
Stat Count: 1
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)
Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique
Agency: FBI
Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI
Substantive Case File Number: 97F-HQ-2063661
Stat Count: 1
Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia
Stat Type: Disseminations Based on CHS Information
Sub Stat Type: Counter Intelligence Information
Agency: FBI
Stat: DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 2

SIGNATURE

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000153

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 11/16/2016
Case Agent Name: MICHAEL J GAETA
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 07/23/2016
To: 10/21/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

03/13/2015

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

	Page 1 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Date of Last Reporting: 10/19/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes

Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) been notified? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? Yes

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

Pursuant to CHS being based overseas, personal international travel is not accounted for.

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
10/19/2016	15000.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	STEELE CE-020
10/13/2016	7500.0000	[REDACTED]	STEELE CE-019

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
<i>No data provided.</i>	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official? Yes

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file. Yes

Have all payments been reconciled? Yes

SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

Pending payment amounts will not be provided to CHS pursuant to specific issues being addressed by FBIHQ and Legat Rome.

ADMINISTRATION

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file? No

Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No

Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office? No

Has the CHS previously testified? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? No

Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No

Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? No

Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? No

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR? N/A

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file? Yes

Last Admonishments 09/12/2013
Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? N/A

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? N/A

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS recently self-disclosed relationship to media and as a result, closure has been directed by FBIHQ.

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

Stat Type	Total Count
Identification(s) and Locate(s)	2

	Page 3 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS		3
Identification(s) and Locate(s)		1

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Yes

Productivity Value:

Access:

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS' recent self-disclosure to the media and resulting media reporting will result in CHS closure. There has been no contact with CHS since closure order by AD IOD and AD CD. Closure will be completed upon completion of this QSSR and pending FOASR.

Workflow History

	Page 4 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE
Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations
Squad: Legat Rome

ADMINISTRATIVE

Legacy Case File Number:

Legacy Symbol Number:

Co-Case Agent(s): [REDACTED]

From: 10/31/2015

To: 10/30/2016

Date of Last FOASR:

Gender: Male

SSN:

Alias SSN(s):

DOB: [REDACTED]

Alias DOB(s):

Country(ies) of Citizenship:

Does the CHS live in, or is he/she operated in the United States? False

Alien Status	Registration Number	Issued Date	Expiration Date
No data provided.			

Race:

Ethnicity, Nationality, and Tribal Affiliations

UK

Language(s) Spoken:

Primary language used during debriefing, if a translator was used, and frequency of use:
English

Prior operational periods of the CHS by the FBI (start with the most recent).

Opened: 10/30/2013

Closed:

Programs to which the CHS has contributed during the review period.

FD-1040a

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000158

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
HQ Division	Program	Subprogram	Primary?
Criminal Investigative Division	TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM	EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES	Yes
Counterintelligence Division	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	OTHER MATTERS - CFC	No
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No

Has any of the CHS's information been provided to an AUSA or DOJ attorney during the review period, for use in furtherance of a prosecution or in a court document?

No

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Highly paid – review period (> \$100,000 in the review period).

No

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.)

Amount Paid During Review Period: \$0.00

Amount Paid During Review Period (non-FBI money): \$0.00

Highly paid – cumulative (>= \$250,000 over entire CHS operation).

No

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.).

Cumulative Amount Paid: \$74,000.00

Cumulative Amount Paid (non-FBI money): \$0.00

If funds other than those calculated above were used, please provide details.

Defector.

No

Recruitment-in-Place or Double Agent.

No

Are there reasonable grounds to believe the CHS engaged in Unauthorized Illegal Activity (UIA), other than minor traffic offenses per CHSPG, within the review period?

No

CHS who resides outside the United States.

Yes

Please provide details (city, state/region, country, etc):

CHS resides in the United Kingdom. Legat London is fully aware and concurs.

Any international travel during the review period?

Yes

Travel Start Date	Travel End Date	Countries	Travel Type
No data provided.			

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT
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Please provide any additional details, including type and frequency of travel:
 CHS traveled to Rome Italy on October 3 to meet with handling agent and FBI reps from HQ - CI/CD.

Former or current subject of FBI investigation(s). No

CHS subjected to polygraph with inconclusive and/or deceptive results at any time. No

CHS who was ever Closed for Cause by the FBI or any other agency. (Note: Other agencies may not refer to this closure as such; however, if another agency closed the CHS for one of the below reasons, it would be considered as closing for Cause.) No

CHS who has ever received immigration benefits from the FBI and/or the USIC for him/her and/or his/her family. No

Score: [REDACTED]

SPECIAL CRITERIA	
Long-Term CHS (5+ consecutive years).	No
Is the CHS a Criminal and/or National Security CHS?	No
Has the CHS been operated by the same Case Agent for 5+ years?	No
Senior Leadership CHS – CHS who is in a position to exercise significant decision-making authority over, or to otherwise manage and direct the unlawful activities of the participants in a group or organization involved with unlawful activities that are nationwide or international in scope or deemed to be of high significance to the FBI's criminal investigative priorities, even if the unlawful activities are local or regional in scope.	No
High-Level Government or Union CHS– CHS is either (a) the chief executive, the office next in succession to the chief executive, or a member of the legislature of the federal or a state government, or (b) a president, secretary-treasurer, or vice-president of an international labor union or the principal officer or officers of a subordinate regional entity of an international or national labor union.	No
Privileged (Attorney, Physician, or Clergy) and/or Media CHS.	No
CHS involved in Group I and/or Group II Undercover Operation (UCO) and/or Asset Business Enterprise during the review period.	No
CHS participated in Tier I and/or Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) within the review period. Do not check if OIA is solely for consensual monitoring in two-party states.	No
Within the review period, was the CHS involved in an operation using sophisticated techniques, other than Tier I/II OIA, Group I/II UCO, or Asset Business Enterprise activities?	No
Opened three or more times.	No
CHS subjected to Level 1 and/or Level 2 Operational Test at any time.	No
Have ANY intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) been generated as a result of the CHS's reporting?	Yes
CHS with 3+ intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and/or 2+ intelligence products which led to investigative action or contained singular information (within review period)	Yes
Please provide the number of products, type of products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and identifying number(s) and name(s) of products.	

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000160

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT		
Product Type	Title	Number (case file, serial, product number, etc)	Product Date
No data provided.			

CHS responsible for recruitment of another CHS.

No

Please provide S number(s) of CHS(s) recruited and S number(s) of any other CHSs affiliated with the CHS. Please describe the nature of the relationship(s) between the CHS and the CHS(s) recruited CHS(s) with whom the CHS is affiliated:

Is the CHS a former or current jointly operated CHS?

No

Has the CHS ever met with, been debriefed by, or been operated by another agency on separate matters?

No

Has the CHS ever been affiliated with a foreign intelligence service, known terrorist group, or criminal organization?

[REDACTED]

Provide details:

FGI
[REDACTED]

How did the CHS come to the attention of the FBI?

Brought to the FBI by a non-FBI agency

If the CHS was brought to the FBI by a non-DBI member, name the agency that brought the CHS.

Agency Name:

Agency Name: DOJ

Is the CHS being utilized jointly with another FBI Field Office/Field Division?

No

Has the CHS or his/her associates (e.g., relatives, former employees, etc.) ever had any other affiliations with another agency?

[REDACTED]

Please provide details:

FGI
[REDACTED]

Has the CHS been the subject of U.S. and/or foreign legal proceedings (e.g. arrested, cited, or detained for any reason)?

No

Source of Income, Amount and Frequency (e.g. Monthly)

No data provided.

Asset and Value

No data provided.

Debt and Amount

No data provided.

HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE FBI

Name	Role	Field Office/Division	Date Assigned	Date Removed
[REDACTED]	Co-Case Agent	International Operations	04/15/2016	

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
[REDACTED]	Co-Case Agent	Philadelphia	04/29/2016	
[REDACTED]	Case Agent	New York	10/24/2013	07/22/2014
Gaeta, Michael J	Case Agent	International Operations	07/22/2014	

Explain reason for change in primary handlers, if within review period, and if known:
CHS was transferred to ALAT Gaeta upon beginning new position at [REDACTED]

Problems encountered during review period either meeting or handling the CHS:

On October 3, 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide espionage related intelligence in support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intelligence to any other party. CHS was advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would compensate the CHS. On November 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision of this intelligence to the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information to which the CHS replied "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.

MOTIVATION

Describe the CHS's motivations for providing information to the FBI and how this was determined:

Have the CHS's motivations changed during the review period?

No

PAYMENTS

Total Payments for Reporting Period

By FBI: \$0.00

By Other Agencies: \$0.00

Lifetime Aggregate Payments

By FBI: \$74,000.00

By Other Agencies: \$0.00

During the review period, was the CHS ever paid without another FBI special agent or government official present?

No

Was SAC authorization obtained and documented?

Identify any benefits the CHS received during the period other than money not already covered by question III-A (e.g., sentencing benefits or immigration benefits)

THE CHS REPORT RE \$ PAID IS INCORRECT. AS FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE, THE CHS HAS BEEN PAID AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF \$95,000 SINCE OPENING IN OCTOBER 2013. AS EVIDENCED AND FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE CHS WAS PAID \$21,000 DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

Describe any instance in which the CHS requested special favors, consideration, or treatment, including, but not limited to

1. Assistance for the CHS's family members
2. Intervention by the FBI in business, employment, or civil matters

NA

REPORTING

Substantive Case File Number: [REDACTED] 97F-HQ-2063661, [REDACTED]

Below are stats claimed during the review period relevant to validation:

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT	
Stat	Reporting Document	
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE	V-048.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI	STEELE	V-050.pdf
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE	V-036.pdf
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	STEELE	V-040.pdf
FIS FRONT COVER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-050.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-046.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-050.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-048.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI	STEELE	V-052.pdf
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-052.pdf
NO. FIS AGENT/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE	V-050.pdf
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CRIM; FBI	STEELE	V-032.pdf

TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION

Describe whether the CHS's information was provided promptly and consistently with the CHS's access; whether the CHS reporting was delayed; or whether the information was historical in nature.

CHS provided reporting as obtained. CHS has sub-sources, some of whom are out of contact for periods of time.

ACCESS

The CHS's access is: Indirect

Describe the CHS's access to information:

Unknown

Is the information obtained through a sub-source?

Yes

Describe the relationship between the CHS and the sub-source:

CHS has had long-standing relationships with sub-sources.

Describe the sub-source's access and motivation:

Sub-sources motivations are primarily money.

Describe actions taken, if any, to independently confirm the sub-source exists and has logical access to the information claimed. If none, explain.

Some of CHS' sub sources have been identified. The sub-sources reside in areas where the Bureau can not operate freely. FBI HQ CI/CD has worked to verify the known sub-sources and their information.

Is the identity of the sub-source known?

No

Is the sub-source aware that the CHS is providing information to the FBI?

No

Is the sub-source a member of a hostile intelligence service or a member of a terrorist or criminal organization?

No

Describe any significant changes during the review period of the CHS's targets or the CHS's access to information:

NA

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

CORROBORATION

Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was verified by circumstances or other intelligence:

Some of CHS' info has been corroborated by other intel sources. The CHS intel is provided to analysts at HQ (CID) for review and assessment as compared to other intel. CHS was the original CHS who provided information regarding the FIFA investigation (281H-NY-305564) and identified others for contact to the case squad. As of this date (February 8, 2016) There have been over 30 individuals indicted and agreed upon forfeiture amounts of approximately \$170,000,000. CHS' intel provided for 97F-HQ-2063661 has been corroborated to an extent by other sources in that case.

Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was not consistent with the facts and the impact of each reporting instance:

NA

RELIABILITY EVALUATION

Discuss any reason to doubt this CHS's identity:

NA

Cite Case Agent observations of the CHS's behavior:

Professional. However, CHS acted unprofessionally in providing information to reporters for MotherJones.com.

Discuss any handling problems including any instances in which the CHS objected to any operational tasking:

CHS never objected to tasking.

Describe any information not previously provided that could reasonably be construed as derogatory. This should include information from other CHS reporting, substantive case documents, other agency reporting, and statements made by the CHS. Ensure that all available information that might materially alter a prior validation assessment, including information pertaining to unauthorized illegal activity by the CHS is included.

On October 3, 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide espionage related intelligence in support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intelligence to any other party. CHS was advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would compensate the CHS. On November 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision of this intelligence to the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information to which the CHS replied "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.

Describe any of the CHS's character traits, habits, or weaknesses that may impact the CHS's reporting
CHS recent disclosure to MotherJones reporters.

Describe any indications of undisclosed control by an entity or individual other than the FBI (e.g., counterintelligence concerns, criminal organization interests, etc).

NA

Is the CHS reasonably believed to be the subject or target of a pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has been charged in a pending prosecution?

No

Are current criminal history checks contained in the CHS's file?

Yes

Date of Record Checks

11/17/2016

Were any new references obtained from FBI database checks during this review period?

No

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FBI-HJC119-CH-000164

UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT		
QSSR Period 1	QSSR Period 2	QSSR Period 3	QSSR Period 4
[REDACTED] 10/24/2015 - 01/22/2016	[REDACTED] 01/23/2016 - 04/22/2016	[REDACTED] 04/23/2016 - 07/22/2016	[REDACTED] 07/23/2016 - 10/21/2016

Average CHS Utility Value = [REDACTED]

COMMENTS

Author's Comments:

CHS will be closed

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 9:30 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
=====

-----Original Message-----

From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:12 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) <JPIENTKA@[REDACTED]> MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) <JCMOFFA@[REDACTED]>
STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) <PPSTRZOK@[REDACTED]>
Cc: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI) <BEGESSFORD@[REDACTED]> SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI)
<SMSOMMA@[REDACTED]> VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI) <MFVARACALLI@[REDACTED]> HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG)
(FBI) <CAHEIDE@[REDACTED]>
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
=====

This email string has now been classified [REDACTED].

All -- I wanted to attach a short write-up from yesterday's CHS meeting to this particular email string b/c it will reference some additional details re: sourcing, especially for CHS report numbers 2016-80, 2016-94, and 2016-95.

1. It would appear that the CHS has one major sub-source, who in turn meets with an assortment of individuals with direct and indirect knowledge and access. It appears that most, if not all, of the sub-source's contacts are unwitting of where their information is going. The CHS's sub-source travels in/out of target country, and appears to be well-connected.
2. The first time CHS debriefed his sub-source regarding the Trump material was 16 June [hence, the customer request for his company's services took place prior to 16 June]. CHS carried a notebook with him to the debriefing here, and he was able to reference the date. CHS's services were originally requested re: doing research and intelligence collection re: FURY's debts, and the DRAGON material, etc. was collected as a result of that.

3. In July 25 [2016-94], the source close to Sechin = Sechin's mistress. She is the one who reported re: DRAGON's secret meeting with "Igor Ivanovich [Sechin]"

4. In July 25 [2016-94], the source to the head of the Russian presidential administration is [REDACTED] related to CHS sub-source [REDACTED] office conversation where DRAGON's meeting with Diveykin was discussed.

5. CHS indicated that some of his sub-sources contacts had been "reporting" for a longer period than others; some of them were fairly new. [REDACTED]

6. In July 5 [2016-80], the "former top level Russian intelligence officer" = [REDACTED]

7. CHS's sub-source has had personal contact with Sergey Millian. Millian appears to be Source E in 2016-95 (and may also be Source D in 2016-80). Millian has had direct interaction with CHS's sub-source. CHS indicated that Millian told his sub-source that DRAGON "played monkey to [FURY's] organ grinder." Millian allegedly heard about FURY, DRAGON and the Russians "at campaign HQ." CHS added, however, that Millian is a "boaster" and an "egotist" and may engage in some embellishment. Millian has been involved in Trump's business dealings, as well as with business dealings for other Russians -- including Russian Duma members. CHS mentioned Millian's involvement in selling condos in Miami, and also said that Millian was involved in [REDACTED] [spelling -- see list of names/terms that came from NY source involving Trump and OC-type stuff] real estate deals.

8. CHS indicated that FURY owes 100 million dollars to a single creditor.

9. CHS had never heard TYPHOON's name. He had not come across TYPHOON's name in his research or reporting.

10. CHS gave a few other names which, he indicated, could be of interest. The first, Greg Hartley (sp), is connected with an outfit called Cloakroom Advisors. CHS described Hartley as a "Republican lobbyist." CHS was somewhat unclear, but there is some connection between Hartley and a pro-Trump and anti-HRC PR campaign financed by Russia [Kremlin]. This information apparently came from Millian, and there was also some connection between Hartley and a Dmitry [Dmitry] Z [CHS couldn't remember the last name] with Novosti in the United States. [This needs follow-up by Gaeta]

11. There were two additional names of US-based individuals provided by CHS who may have information re: Russia/Trump: (1) Charles Doland (sp); and (2) Stephen/Steven Kupka (sp). Another name provided later by CHS re: USPER with knowledge of Russia/Trump was David Giovannis (sp).

12. CHS reiterated information from 2016-95, paragraph 4, re: quid pro quo and "two way flow" of information w/ Trump team -- specifically, collection of information vs. oligarchs and family/asset activity in the United States.

13. CHS suggested that Aras Agalarov -- Azeri businessman with close ties to Trump -- may be someone of interest re: information about Trump's Russian connections.

14. CHS added to FI of interest re: shifting within Russia's Presidential Administration. When discussing the removal of Sergey Ivanov as Chief of Staff and the ascension of Anton Vaino, CHS indicated that public blowback from the DNC/Trump operation was used as the "final straw" by Putin to remove Ivanov. It was CHS's understanding that Ivanov may have gone off the reservation re: Syrian matters -- CHS made an off-hand reference to the involvement of mercenaries/freelancers -- but as a whole, Ivanov was becoming "too big for himself." Vaino's elevation as Ivanov's replacement wasn't a direct consequence of the DNC/Trump operation, but Putin had a close relationship with Vaino and Vaino hadn't been involved in the DNC/Trump op. CHS reiterated that Dmitriy Peskov is very much involved in the DNC/Trump op.

15. CHS reported on an individual he identified as DRAGON's possible "handler" or "case agent" -- Igor Yatsenko. Yatsenko may have had a Gazprom connection and lives "in the West" -- possibly/presumably in London.

16. According to CHS, there is RUMINT that DRAGON has a Russian girlfriend -- a ballerina or opera singer of some sort. CHS did not have a name. CHS had never heard RUMINT that DRAGON was homosexual.

17. CHS provided another name of possible interest -- FNU Temeko. Temeko lives in the UK, and has some sort of former relationship with Yukos. He is close to former head of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev. Temeko has "burrowed himself" into the UK Conservative Party and is a "British version of [Sergey] Millian." Temeko is connected to Boris Johnson, and is tied to Brexit issues. Temeko also has some type of relationship with US politicos.

Upon return, I will write this information up for Gaeta's source file.

Best,

Brian

-----Original Message-----

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 3:48 PM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 8:49 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Joe,

First two. I actually have 4 more that are more on point for you that I am sending in a few min.

Mike

-----Original Message-----

From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2016 5:10 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

Until the EC.

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 ---
Date: Wednesday, October 11, 2017 11:26:23 AM

TRANSITORY RECORD

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 10:05 AM
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome

TRANSITORY RECORD

From: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:13 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI)
Subject: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 --- [REDACTED]

TRANSITORY RECORD

I will send a separate email with CHS ident. Auten took notes regarding specific CHS reporting and will send a sep email covering those notes.

Meeting occurred on 10/3/2016, offsite from USEMB, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had met with ALAT Gaeta prior (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. ALAT Gaeta remained in meeting, also. ALAT advised that CHS volunteered his reporting relationship with USDOS in a previous conversation.

CHS was introduced to CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend meeting. [REDACTED] FGI

[REDACTED] CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appears that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well known that the USIC and "our agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include FURY, RAZOR, and DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON. Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;

2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);
3. Any individuals or sub sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

In regards to the three “buckets” mentioned above, and with the FBI’s future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS’s firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can’t see her involved with this matter.

Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

Investigation continues.

Ben

[REDACTED] =====
[REDACTED] =====
[REDACTED] =====



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U/ [REDACTED]) CHS **STEELE** Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016.

Date: 09/30/2016

CC: Benjamin E. Gessford
Joe Pientka III

From: ROME

Contact: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH, [REDACTED]

Approved By: RAMSEY KIERAN L

Drafted By: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY [REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: (U/ [REDACTED]) CHS **STEELE** Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016 being sent to the instant file.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U/ [REDACTED]) CHS report received July 5, 2016
2. (U/ [REDACTED]) 4 CHS reports received Aug 29, 16
3. (U/ [REDACTED]) 1 CHS Report received July 25, 16
4. (U/ [REDACTED]) 1 CHS Report received September 20, 2016

Details:

On July 5, 2016, ALAT Gaeta met with CHS **STEELE**. CHS advised that CHS had been contracted by GLENN SIMPSON, on behalf of an unnamed Washington D.C. based law firm, to develop and provide information regarding Donald Trump's connections to, and relationships within,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Title: (U/[REDACTED]) CHS **STEELE** Reporting received between July 5 and September 20, 2016.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 09/30/2016

Russia. CHS has obtained information, as described fully in the attached seven reports, detailing these relationships and activities. CHS provided these reports to ALAT Gaeta independently and without tasking. CHS advised that similar information from differnt sources unrelated to the CHS, may already be in the hands of those at a "high level" in Washington D.C.

The attached reports are in the original form as prepared by the CHS and given to the client, SIMPSON. The handwritten dates on the face of each report are the dates that they were received by the handling by ALAT Gaeta. Between July 5 and September 20, 2016, ALAT Gaeta spoke with [REDACTED] (FBINY), [REDACTED] (FBINY), ASAC [REDACTED] (FBINY) and SSA Joe Pientka (FBIHQ) regarding the dissemination of the attached information. As such, it was determined that the attached reporting will be submitted to the instant file.

♦♦



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on **Date:** 11/14/2016
October 3, 2016

From: CLEVELAND

Contact: Benjamin E. Gessford, [REDACTED]

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: Benjamin E. Gessford

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY [REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
[REDACTED] FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To document outside of Delta a meeting held with FBI
CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy, on October 3, 2016

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Details:

[REDACTED] The purpose of this EC is to document, for the record, a meeting held between SA Ben Gessford, SIA Brian Auten, A/Section Chief Mike Varacalli, and Rome ALAT Mike Gaeta with FBI CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy on October 3, 2016. The objective of the meeting was for ALAT Gaeta to introduce CROWN to members of the FBI CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) Team and to assess if CROWN was in possession of additional pertinent information and was willing to enter into an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI.

[REDACTED] The meeting occurred on October 3, 2016, offsite of the U.S. Embassy, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had previously met with ALAT Gaeta prior on the same day (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. After the intial meeting, ALAT advised that CHS

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

volunteered his reporting relationship with the U.S. State Department. Upon initial introductions, ALAT Gaeta remained in the CH meeting.

[REDACTED] CHS was introduced to the CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend the meeting. CHS is a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appeared that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

[REDACTED] CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well known that the USIC and "your agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

[REDACTED] The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of CROSSFIRE TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include CROSSFIRE FURY, CROSSFIRE RAZOR, and CROSSFIRE DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

[REDACTED] The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON.

[REDACTED] Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;
2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);
3. Any individuals or sub sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

[REDACTED] In regards to the three "buckets" mentioned above, and with the FBI's future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial

Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

[REDACTED]
action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS's firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

[REDACTED] Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

[REDACTED] CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

[REDACTED] CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can't see her involved with this matter.

[REDACTED] Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on October 3, 2016
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016

♦♦

[REDACTED]

8/12/16

(Date)

VA

(Location)

M. Tech

(Name)

, authorize

Special Agents Benjamin E Grossford and Stephen M Sommer

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, to utilize the following
(initial all that apply):

M

Body Recorder, microphone, or other recording device on or in the vicinity of my person;

M

Transmitter on or in the vicinity of my person;

m

Recording device or other equipment to capture and record telephone communications, including conversations (voice), text messages, e-mails, Internet, or other communications made or received over any telephone used by me;

M

Utilize Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) or other video equipment located at

to view
 (List address, Name/Location of Hotel, or Description of vehicle etc , or state "on consenting party")

residence S & L, room 1P 10

(If not "on consenting party," describe area to be viewed (i.e. residence kitchen area, restaurant rear table etc))

and/or

M

Other (Specify): _____

(Note "Other" category may not be used to document consent for the monitoring of computer electronic communications. For consent/authorization to monitor computer communications, including the communications of a computer trespasser, refer to the FD-1070 and/or FD-1071, as appropriate.)

for the purpose of monitoring, viewing, listening to, and/or recording any activity I may have with

Crossfire Dragon

(Name of Subject(s))

and others as yet unknown

which I may have on or about 8/12/16 and continuing thereafter until such a time as
 (Date)

either I revoke my permission or the FBI terminates the investigation.

I understand that I must be a party to any communication in order to record or monitor that communication. I therefore agree not to leave the recording or monitoring equipment unattended or take any action which is likely to result in the recording or monitoring of communications to which I am not a party.

AND/OR

Install a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace device in conjunction with the appropriate provider(s)
of electronic or wire communications service and/or long distance carrier for the purpose of
identifying telephone numbers calling and being called by telephone number
located at/subscribed to by _____

(Address) which is used by me.

I have given this written permission to the above-named Special Agents voluntarily, and without
threats or promises of any kind.



(Signature)

Witnesses:



Privacy Act Statement: Any information collected from you on this form, along with any other device provided to you for use on your person, vehicle, or other object, or for use at the designated location listed on this form, will collect information about you, as authorized by law, and will be used to support FBI activities. Your consent to providing information on this form and to the subsequent collection of information in the manner outlined on this form is voluntary. This information is maintained in the system of records FBI-002, FBI Central Records System, and may be disclosed in accordance with published routine uses for the system. The text of FBI-002 and its routine uses may be found on the FBI internet site at <http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-act/systems-records>

FD-1040a

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT****HEADER**

Source ID: **HALPER**
Date: **06/17/2016**
Case Agent Name: **Non SES**
Field Office/Division: **New York**
Squad: **CD 8**
Classified By: **[REDACTED]**
Derived From: **[REDACTED]**
Declassify On: **[REDACTED]**

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: **03/03/2016**
To: **06/01/2016**

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: **02/01/2012**

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Date of Last Reporting:

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes

Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) been notified? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? No

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
No data provided.				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
No data provided.			

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
No data provided.	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official? N/A

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file. N/A

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT****Have all payments been reconciled?**

N/A

SECTION III CERTIFICATION**I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016** Yes**Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:****ADMINISTRATION**

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file? N/A

Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No

Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office? No

Has the CHS previously testified? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? No

Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No

Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? No

Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? No

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR? Yes

Date of Database Checks

04/15/2016

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file? Yes

Last Admonishments 05/11/2015
Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? Yes

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? Yes

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:**CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM**

Is there justification for no contact with CHS during review period? Yes

Justification:
CHS unavailable

Productivity Value:

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Access:

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:

No statistical accomplishments have been claimed for this period.

CHS Utility Value = CHS NOT EVALUATED

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS spends parts of his year in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be in a advantageous position to assist the USIC OGA

CHS was previously closed and re-opened. It is just 5 years now since the re-opening. Follow up with CHS on [REDACTED] case. Continue to operate.

Workflow History

FD-209a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: HALPER
Date: 08/11/2016
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/11/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E. Gessford
SOS Non SES
SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1: [REDACTED]

Address Line 2:

City: [REDACTED]

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**Substantive Case File Number:**

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: HALPER
Date: 08/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/16/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin Gessford
SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1: [REDACTED]

Address Line 2:

City: [REDACTED]

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

CHS was introduced to several recoding devices he will be utilizing during an operation related to CROSSFIRE HURRICANE.

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**Substantive Case File Number:**

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: HALPER
Date: 08/23/2016
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/28/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma
SA Benjamin E. Gessford
SOS Non SES

Type of Contact: In Person
Country: UNITED STATES
Address Line 1: [REDACTED]
Address Line 2:
City: [REDACTED]
State: Virginia
ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: HALPER
Date: 09/05/2016
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 09/04/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

FD-209a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT**HEADER**

Source ID: HALPER
Date: 09/05/2016
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 09/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E. Gessford
SA Stephen M. Somma
SOS Non SES

Type of Contact: In Person
Country: UNITED STATES
Address Line 1: [REDACTED]
Address Line 2:
City: [REDACTED]
State: Virginia
ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
CHS had a recording device for a meeting.

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT**Substantive Case File Number:**

97F-HQ-2063661

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT****HEADER**

Source ID: **HALPER**
Date: **09/22/2016**
Case Agent Name: **Non SES**
Field Office/Division: **New York**
Squad: **CD 8**
Classified By: **[REDACTED]**
Derived From: **[REDACTED]**
Declassify On: **[REDACTED]**

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: **06/02/2016**
To: **08/31/2016**

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: **02/01/2012**

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 08/31/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
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Date of Last Reporting: 08/18/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes

Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) been notified? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? No

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 08/31/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
08/19/2016	5000.0000	0.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER CE-060

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
08/15/2016	5000.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER CE-060

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
No data provided.	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI special agent or government official? N/A

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file. N/A

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Have all payments been reconciled? Yes

SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 08/31/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

One expense still needs to be reconciled. It will be completed this week.

ADMINISTRATION

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?	No
Has the CHS previously testified?	No
Is the CHS expected to testify?	No
Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR?	Yes

Date of Database Checks

04/15/2016

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file? Yes

Last Admonishments 05/11/2015
Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? Yes

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? Yes

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 08/31/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

Stat Type	Total Count
<i>No statistical accomplishments have been claimed for this period.</i>	

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Did the CHS provide actionable intelligence which was memorialized in a Source Reporting Document (Actionable intelligence is defined as intelligence which generates investigative activity and/or responds to national or local collection requirements)? Yes

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Yes

Productivity Value:

Access:

[REDACTED]

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:



CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:



COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS spends parts of his year in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be in a advantageous position to assist the USIC OGA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHS was previously closed and re-opened. It is just 5 years now since the re-opening. CHS is currently assisting on a high priority/sensitive investigation (CROSSFIRE HURRICANE). Due to the sensitivity of that case, CHS' reporting is not being put into Delta at the request of FBIHQ.

Workflow History

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT****HEADER**

Source ID: **HALPER**
Date: **12/13/2016**
Case Agent Name: **Non SES**
Field Office/Division: **New York**
Squad: **CD 8**
Classified By: **[REDACTED]**
Derived From: **[REDACTED]**
Declassify On: **[REDACTED]**

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: **09/01/2016**
To: **11/30/2016**

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached? Yes

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: **02/01/2012**

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
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Date of Last Reporting: 09/06/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No

Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes

Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) been notified? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No

Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No

Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period? No

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
09/29/2016	25000.0000	0.0000	97F-HQ-2067748	HALPER CE-062
09/08/2016	15000.0000	0.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER CE-061

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
09/06/2016	25000.0000	97F-HQ-2067748	HALPER CE-062
09/01/2016	15000.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER CE-061

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
No data provided.	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file? N/A

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained and retained in the CHS file? N/A

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Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI N/A special agent or government official?

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, N/A which is maintained in the CHS's file.

Have all payments been reconciled? Yes

SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

ADMINISTRATION

Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file? N/A

Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No

Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office? No

Has the CHS previously testified? No

Is the CHS expected to testify? No

Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? No

Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No

Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? No

Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? No

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR? Yes

Date of Database Checks

04/15/2016

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file? Yes

Last Admonishments 05/11/2015
Date:

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? Yes

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? Yes

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016 Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

Stat Type	Total Count
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

No statistical accomplishments have been claimed for this period.

Did the CHS provide actionable intelligence which was memorialized in a Source Reporting Document (Actionable intelligence is defined as intelligence which generates investigative activity and/or responds to national or local collection requirements)? Yes

Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Yes

Productivity Value:

[REDACTED]

Access:

[REDACTED]

Access Value:

[REDACTED]

CHS Utility Value:

[REDACTED]

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

[REDACTED]

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS spends parts of his year in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be in a advantageous position to assist the USIC [REDACTED] OGA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHS was previously closed and re-opened. It is just 5 years now since the re-opening. CHS is currently assisting on a high priority/sensitive investigation Due to the sensitivity of that case, CHS' reporting is not being put into Delta at the request of FBIHQ. More information is available upon request.

Workflow History

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: **HALPER**
Date: 02/27/2017
Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 02/25/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):
SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:
None

Other:

SA Somma spoke with CHS to set-up a meeting for 2/28/2017.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION