Milestone Five

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Contents

1 Overview

Why Friends and Neighbors? Explaining the Electoral Appeal of Local Roots by Rosie Campbell, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner in the The Journal of Politics aims to answer the driving question of, "Why do politicians with strong local roots receive more electoral support?" by running and analyzing two separate studies. The first study uses a "paired profiles factorial vignette design" by asking subjects to rate hypothetical members of Parliament on a scale from 1 to 10. The hypothetical members have varying levels of local roots as well as varying levels of "behavioral localism"—their track record of constituency service and if they act more so as a trustee or delegate. The analysis which is largely visualized in figure 1 consists of both the raw difference in ratings between varying levels of local roots and across levels of behavioral localism. It then uses models to predict the effect of having local roots which can be seen on display in my "beautiful graphic" In the second study, subjects again considered hypothetical members of Parliament with varying levels of local roots as compared to varying levels of behavioral localism mainly in the first study. In this case, the subjects also received information on their political preferences and partisan loyalties. The first study depicted that the additional information swayed rankings, but local roots still seemed to have an association no matter what. The second study agreed with these results stating that, "even if voters are provided with a rich array of information about politicians' behavior and ideological positioning, the effect of local roots remained positive and notable." The remainder of the article discusses the nuances of these results within the frame of the driving question. It also attempts to contextualize these findings with the broader literature of the effects off in-group/out-group dynamics in the context of localism Campbell et al. (2019).

All analysis for this paper is available in my Github repository for this milestone is in the footnote below.[1]

I used Xie (2019a) and Burzillo (2020) in order to help me complete this milestone.

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[1]https://github.com/SamuelLowry/gov1006-milestone-5.git

2 Beautiful Graphic

I attempted to improve upon part of their figures that was very difficult to understand due to a lack of basic things such as proper titles.

The Estimated Effect of MP Having Local Roots

The subjects of the experiment were given two hypothetical Members of Parliament (MP) to evaluate and asked, 'On a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means very unhappy and 10 means very happy, how happy or unhapp would you be to have each person as your Member of Parliament?'. This graphic depicts the estimated effect of t MP having local roots on that scale differing by the information given about the MP's focus on their immediate community (behavioral localism). The lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

3 References

Burzillo, Maria. 2020. *Final Project.* https://github.com/mburzillo/final_project.

Campbell, Rosie, Philip Cowley, Nick Vivyan, and Markus Wagner. 2019. "Why Friends and Neighbors? Explaining the Electoral Appeal of Local Roots." The Journal of Politics. 81(3), 937-951.

Xie, Yihui. 2019a. *A Single Document.* https://bookdown.org/yihui/bookdown/a-single-document.html.

———. 2019b. *Figures.* https://bookdown.org/yihui/bookdown/figures.html.

———. 2020. *Include Appendix After Bibliography.* https://bookdown.org/yihui/rmarkdown-cookbook/bibliography.html.

A   Appendix

Table from Campbell et al. (2019)

I used Xie (2019b) in order to help me figure out how to input the image. I used Xie (2020) in order to figure out how to put the appendix after references.

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
% Date and time: Sun, Mar 29, 2020 - 23:29:18

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	−0.412***	−0.661***	−0.412***	−0.664***
	(0.057)	(0.128)	(0.057)	(0.125)
Local roots	0.755***	0.759***	0.755***	0.758***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Behavioral localism information	0.683***	0.691***		
	(0.078)	(0.079)		
Behavioral localism: High (vs. no info)			1.395***	1.402***
			(0.098)	(0.098)
Behavioral localism: Low (vs. no info)			−0.007	−0.0002
			(0.085)	(0.086)
Local roots X Behavioral info.	−0.253**	−0.257**		
	(0.110)	(0.110)		
Local roots X High behavioral localism			−0.311**	−0.311**
			(0.140)	(0.139)
Local roots X Low behavioral localism			−0.233*	−0.238**
			(0.119)	(0.119)
Controls for voter characteristics?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,203	5,203	5,203	5,203
R^2	0.036	0.046	0.107	0.116
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.044	0.106	0.114

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Below is the image of the table from the paper itself.

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