MobiCharged Hazard Analysis



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5.2.26 Legal Requirements
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6 Conclusion

1 Revision History

Table 1: Revision History

		100 . 101011 1	112001
Author	Date	Version	Description
All	October 2022	19, Rev 0	Created first draft of document

2 Introduction

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this Hazard Analysis document is to examine the MobiCharged Project in its stage of development to outline all potential hazards. These hazards include, but are not limited to safety risks, areas of failure and security issues. Along with the highlighted areas of potential hazards, solutions to remove these issues (or mitigate these issues at best) will be outlined.

2.2 Background

Engineers are tasked with design in construction to exceed requirements without hindering safety. Safety is a topic that is never missed within the industry and is continuously being highlighted amongst designs; especially as Engineers are reminded of their moral obligations to society by their awarded rings upon graduation.

As a current process, the construction industry places sensors within concrete spaces to continuously test and/or monitor the integrity of buildings during as well as after construction. Ultimately however, these sensors run out of battery and are required to be re-charged. The industry still faces challenges when attempting to charge these sensors with the method of remote charging as the current products that satisfy remote charging abilities are yet to be optimized. There are a significant number of buildings being built in the GreaterToronto-Area, which is emphasized considering that 70% of cranes within Canada are in just the GTA alone. To place innovation in the sub-field of safety within the industry, it is indeed a requirement to

modernize the ability of producing efficient remote charging systems and to have the design process optimized to provide the most effective results.

The system-solution for this will be the development of MobiCharged. This system is separated into two separate components - the software for users as well as the hardware / prototype. The software component of MobiCharged is a machine-learned system that will react to the input of users (in which the input will be the desired outputs / application requirements for the remote charging device) and provide the necessary results (these variables depending on the user inputs can be antenna types, layouts, wavelengths, phases, etc.) in order to satisfy the user's inputs such that they may proceed with producing the devices in a way that it is optimized. This software can be operated in any environment the user chooses such that it can be used in any computing system with sufficient speed, memory the required processors.

The hardware component of MobiCharged is a prototype to be developed for the purpose of demonstration as well as development for the software. This physical component will allow the system to be rooted to the core optimization problem in the real world, as it applies to real products. The physical system will allow placing absolute constraints and limitations into the software for optimal outputs in the software. In addition, this physical system can be implemented for an actual use-case in the field post-demonstrations.

2.3 Scope

The environments in which these physical systems operate are typically from roof-tops and/or high-altitude locations with spacial capabilities to place arrays of these systems. These systems react to user inputted (remotely) data such as the location of the device required to be charged, so that it may orient itself in a manner optimal for that application.

The purpose of the software system, MobiCharge, is a machine learning algorithm that will be used by Mobilite-Power, engineering consultant groups, general contractors and building maintenance teams to optimize the design process required to effectively and efficiently produce the most viable remote charging system. In doing so, this will negate the current process of manually conducting simulations (that requires lengthy computerized numerical calculations), ultimately minimizing cost, manual labor, and the time necessary to produce the required results.

This system will provide users with the optimal configuration of a remote

charging device based on the desired output, encrypt data protecting users when producing design results and use data smoothing to ensure the accuracy of the system in a time efficient manner.

The purpose of the hardware system is to root our algorithms optimization in the real world environment. The production of a physical model will assist in the determination of the absolute boundaries that can be fed into the machine learning algorithm. Variable parameter ranges will be able to be derived from the physical model to determine the magnitude to which the boundaries can be pushed within the simulation. The physical system provides a secondary purpose in the form of data collection and verification. In order to increase the breadth of data that we can feed into the algorithm, we must determine the degree of computational error within the simulation results. A physical model will aid in determining this range and lead to further optimization through the machine learning algorithm.

${\bf 2.4}\quad {\bf Definitions}\ \&\ {\bf Assumptions}$

2.4.1 Definitions

Table 2: Naming Conventions and Terminology

Word	Definition/Context
System Hazard	A hazard associated with the system which
	typically exists regardless of the status of op-
	eration.
Accident	An unintended event which generally leads
	to a form of loss.
Risk	A probability of exposure to danger.
Phase-Shift System	A system designed to alter the waves dis-
	tributed such that it moves the phase of a
	wave.
Antenna Array	A system of antenna designed to distribute
	waves in an organized layout.
ASCII Values	A standard data-encoding format for elec-
	tronic communication between computers.
Output Limitation Timers	A software algorithm module designed to
	measure the time it takes for a process to
	complete and cancel the process if the time
	elapsed exceeds a programmed amount.
Functional Requirement	Requirements that describe what the prod-
	uct is supposed to do
Non-functional Requirement	Requirements that describe qualities that
	product will have
General Contractor	Third party companies that acquire services
	by Mobilite-Power
ECA	The Electrical Construction Association
Data Smoothing	The process of using old data as well as "fu-
	ture" data in order to predict designs.
ML	"Machine Learning" algorithm.

2.4.2 Assumptions

• There is an assumption that the developers will eventually have access to enough processing power to conduct large quantities of simulations.

• A large underlying assumption regarding this system is that the user does not intentionally attempt to enter inputs incorrectly, as well as provide positive feedback to the system when it is not correct.

3 Component Overview

3.1 Software System

3.1.1 Front End User Display

The Front End User Display component is the component in which the user is able to view. This area is where the user navigates through the software, log-in their accounts, enters inputs, requests data and/or verification, and receives outputs.

3.1.2 Back-End Calculations

The Back-End Calculations component of the software system is for the computerized calculations to occur based on the user's inputs. Note that this does not refer to simulations; this component is merely where the user's inputs are calculated to higher level variables such that the software may then be used to process to create outputs.

3.1.3 Machine-Learning Algorithm

The Machine-Learning component of this software system is where the system receives feedback either from the outputs themselves, or from the user in regards to desirable solutions. The more positive feedback it receives, the more of these inputs the system will retain. Similarly, the more negative feedback the system receives, the less of those specific inputs it will retain. As the system continues to learn, the concept of the system providing suggestions, limitations and of course the optimal solutions will become present.

3.1.4 Data Exporting

The Data Exporting component of the software system is the area of the software system where it exports the results. This not only refers to merely

outputting the data to the front-end display component, but also refers to exporting into desirable file systems to be stored as well as encryption processes during transfer.

3.1.5 Server

The Server component will be used to maximize the training available to the machine learner, by having the simulations run on local machines, and passing the data via the online connections to an isolated machine and database, which will encapsulate the Machine-Learning Algorithm component. This will be in a future iteration of the design.

3.1.6 Simulation Integration Software

This component encompasses the pre-existing Matlab simulations with which we will integrate our machine learning algorithm, and the software required to integrate them. It will likely involve a database system as well as kernel modules for real-time polling of said database(s), with a dynamic scheduler.

3.2 Hardware Systems

3.2.1 Power Supply System

The purpose of the power supply system component is to provide usable power to subsequent systems.

3.2.2 Phase-Shift System

This component will work to provide the phase shift required for the antenna array system to properly create wave required interference. The purpose of this is to facilitate constructive interference at the desired location for charging.

3.2.3 Antenna-Array System

This component will contain multiple small arrays and will work in conjunction with the Power Supply system and Phase-Shift System.

3.2.4 System Enclosure

This component is present to enclose the system. Typically, the material of this enclosure is a form of wave-reflective metal. The purpose of the enclosure is such that the waves create a destructive interference in the direction that it is not desired to go towards, and creates an amplified constructive interference in the direction that it is desired in.

3.2.5 Hardware Display System

This component is for the user to understand when the device is operational, functional, etc. The current display system is under development, however, the use of LEDs will most likely be implemented.

3.2.6 Circuits Logic

This will consist of any circuitry required for proper control and use of the overall system.

4 Failure Modes Effects Analysis Table

Below is a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for MobiCharged system.

	D 0 11	77.11		7.00			
Design	Ref.#	Failure	Causes of	Effects of Failure	Detection	Controls	Recommended Action
Compo-		Modes	Failure				
nent	4110	T 4	Т ,	TT :	C C	NT / A	D: 1 C /:
Front	4.1.1.0	Incorrect		Users carry incor-	-Software	N/A	-Display confirmation
End	(PAR1)	Outputs	inputs	rect outputs that	can detect		screen containing in-
User			from user -Incorrect	are later used to	incorrect		puts provided by the
Display			input type	produce the remote charging devices.	input		user -Display/Export the
			Imput type	This results in a	types based on		data of outputs along
			Unintended	device produced	ASCII		with the user's inputs
			indexing in	that is not actually	values		at all times
			Database	the one optimized	-Other		-Create an "Incorrect
			-Race Con-	for certain applica-	forms are		Input" pop-up display
			ditions	tion	not de-		when the user enters an
					tectable		incorrect input type
							-Display examples of in-
							puts for user
							-Display input limita-
							tions
							-Display a "Calculation
							Failed" screen if calcula-
							tion fails (and have pro-
							gram execute fail-safe)
							-Ensure Race Condi-
							tions & Indexing errors
							do not occur by cor-
							rectly writing program
							to avoid it (i.e. using
							"sleep()")
	4.1.1.1	Frozen	-User in-	-Reboot necessary	N/A	N/A	-Avoid incorrect pro-
	(RFTR1)		puts values	-Loss of data	11/11	11/11	gramming that may
	(101 1101)	and/or	exceeding	Loss of data			cause deadlocks and
		Crash	calcula-				ensure robustness in
		0100011	tion ca-				code
			pabilities				-Encourage user to
			(eg;dividing				maintain power to sys-
			$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \\ $				tem during operation
			-Removal				-Limit users from in-
			of power				putting incorrect data
			to software				-Provide users examples
			system				of data types and/or
			during				values that are accept-
			process				able
			-Deadlock				

Design	Ref.#	Failure	Causes of	Effects of Failure	Detection	Controls	Recommended Action
Compo-	1601.#	Modes	Failure	Effects of Famure	Detection	Controls	recommended recton
nent							
Front	4.1.1.2	Incorrect	User	Loss of previous	N/A	N/A	-Generate security
End	(ACR1)	Login In-	forgets	data history for	,	,	questions during ac-
User		formation	password	user			count creation, thus, if
Display			and/or				user forgets password
			username				they can reset it using
							security questions -Make software tied to
							online servers, allowing
							users to get a reset link
							their email address
Backend	4.1.2.0	Failed	-User en-	-Crash of calcula-	N/A	N/A	-Limit the data types
Calcula-	(SR4)	Calcu-	ters values	tions and no out-			users can input based
tions		lations	that lead	puts			on ASCII values
		(unde- fined	to un- defined	-Potentially out- putting incorrect			-Ensure correct and sufficient testing is
		answers)	answers	data without warn-			implemented during
			-User	ing, which could			development
			enters	then be used to			•
			incorrect	produce remote			
			data types	charging devices			
			-User enters ex-				
			treme data				
			values				
Machine	4.1.3.0	Infinite	-Incorrect	-Software crash	-	N/A	-Ensure correct pro-
Learn-	(IR1)	loop	program-	-Computer crash	Computer		gramming to avoid in-
ing			ming	-Reboot system	built-in		finite loops
Algo- rithm			- Nogligoneo	-Loss of data	exiting		-Enter states of polling
11011111			Negligence of exiting		programs -Output		to ensure processing does not exceed time
			loops		limi-		limits
			1		tation		-Create failure states
					timers		within code
	4.1.3.1	Incorrect	-Ineffective	-Incorrect data out-	N/A	N/A	-Produce extensive re-
	(RFTR1)		algorithms	put leading to non-			search to implement
		Smoothing	imple- mented	optimized solutions and devices			the most effective data- smoothing algorithm
			-Limit	-Catastrophic er-			-Increase data set over-
			of data	rors may occur if			time
			present	positive feedback is			
				provided to incor-			
				rect output			

Design Compo-	Ref.#	Failure Modes	Causes of Failure	Effects of Failure	Detection	Controls	Recommended Action
nent Machine Learning Algo- rithm	4.1.3.2 (SR2)	Positive feedback applied to incorrect results (misla- belled data)	-Incorrect algorithms implemented Feedback entered incorrectly, repeatedly	-Catastrophic as incorrect outputs will be produced every time -Incorrect data will be imple- mented when producing re- mote charging devices -System failure	Compariso through data	nN/A	-Apply verification checks periodically to machine-learned algorithm to ensure it matches up correctly to existing solutions and data -Disallow users from directly inputting labelled data (can only be passed as the output to a simulation)
Data- Exporting	4.1.4.0 (SR3)	Unable to export	-Export file type not supported -Exporting process stopped due to higher priority pre- emption or power loss during pro- cess	as a whole -Exporting failed, data is not exported to user -Data is not saved	-Software check - Computer built in exit pro- grams	N/A	-Provide user the requirements of installing the software to ensure the necessary support is present -Deny the installation of the software system if necessary support is not present -Create the programs modular and preemptable such that the process can continue after halt
	4.1.4.1 (SR4)	Incorrect data outputted	-Race conditions -Incorrect indexing through data	Incorrect solution provided	Visual check between correct data dis- played to user and exported data	N/A	-Thorough programming to avoid race conditions -Apply verifications to ensure indexing is correct
	4.1.4.2 (SEC R1)	Vulnerable data	-Data leaks	Possibly critical client data available to malicious parties	Ethical hacking attempts to assess vulnerabilities	N/A	Encrypt outbound data on local machines be- fore transmitting via the server (SR3)

Design	Ref.#	Failure	Causes of	Effects of Failure	Detection	Controls	Recommended Action
Compo-		Modes	Failure				
nent							
Server	4.1.5.0	Server in-	-Server at ca-	-Inability to	An in-	N/A	-Timeout for idle clients
	(SR5)	accessible	pacity	serve users	evitable		on the server
			-server	-Loss of data	hazard,		-Local backups of un-
			hardware		must use		transmitted data
			malfunction		recom-		
			/ internet		mended		
			access re-		actions		
			stricted		as fail-		
					safes		
imulation	14.1.6.0	Inaccurate	-	Our Machine-	-	N/A	If error found to be large,
ntegra-	(SR6)	results	computational	Learning Al-	Developme	ent	alterations of the simula-
on			error	gorithm may	of hard-		tions would be in order to
oftware				only achieve a	ware,		purify the data fed to our
				certain percent	and com-		learner
				accuracy at	parison		
				best, even with	between		
				infinite labelled	Matlab		
				input data	simu-		
					lation		
					output		
					and real-		
					world		
					testing		
	4.1.6.1		-Simulations	Simulation data	Have a	N/A	-Dynamic polling speeds,
	(SR1)	overflow	produce out-	is lost as the	flag for		for increase in clients us-
			puts faster	queue is at ca-	when		ing the server in the fu-
			than can be	pacity	overflow		ture
			processed		occurs		-Third party database
			by the ML				monitoring software,
			algorithm, or				for if simulation speeds
			considerably				greatly increase down
			faster than				the line
			the server				
			polling speed				

Design Compo- nent	Ref.#	Failure Modes	Causes of Failure	Effects of Failure	Detection	Controls	Recommended Action
Power Supply System	4.2.1.0 (RAR1)	No power supplied to subsequent systems	-Fault in power supply -Fault in power supply cables to downstream systems	-System crash -Loss of data	Current measure- ments taken at antenna- array sys- tem	N/A	-Disconnect power supply system from remaining systems -Conduct testing of power supply components to determine mode of failure
	4.2.1.1 (RAR1)	Voltage swell	Large change in loads seen by power sys- tem	System short cir- cuited	Voltage measure- ments taken at antenna- array sys- tem	Protection devices (fuses) down- stream from power sup- ply	Conduct testing of power supply components to determine mode of failure
Phase-	4.2.2.0	Phase	Component	- System	Measurement	N/A	Testing of units prior to
Shift	(IR2)	shifter	break down	failure	of induced		assembly
System	4.2.3.0	component failure Antenna	-Component	- Incorrect phase applied to system and unintended waves will be created - Device intended to be charged may not be charged - System	radio waves Measurement	Protection	-Testing of units prior to
Array	(IR2)	Array	break down	Failure	of induced	devices	assembly
System	(1102)	Component failure	-Over current supplied	- Waves will not be distributed - Devices will not be charged	radio waves	(fuses) to limit current to antenna within operating range	-Monitor power supplied to units

Design	Ref.#	Failure	Causes	of	Effects of Fail	ıre	Detection	Controls	Recommended Ac-
Compo-		Modes	Failure						tion
nent									
System	4.2.4.0	Enclosure	Gap	in	- Waves wil	leak	-	N/A	-Inspection prior to
Enclo-	(RAR1)	"leak"	wave	re-	through the	gap	Measuremen	t	use
sure			flective		and constr	uctive	of induced		-Remove sensitive
			enclosur	e	interference	will	radio		equipment from af-
			system		occur in unin	ended	waves		fected area
					directions		-Visual in-		
					- The in	ended	spection		
					directions fo	r the			
					waves to be	e dis-			
					tributed wil	l be			
					minimized;	device			
					may not be charged				
					due to leng	th of			
					waves not sen	,			
Hardware	4.2.5.0	False in-	Display		- Confusion ar	nongst	Verification	Wire in-	Disconnect the de-
Display	(RAR1)	dication	stuck	in	user		down-	dication	vice from the power
System			"on"	or	- Incorrect	usage	stream to	in line	supply system un-
			"off" sta	ate	may occur by	user	determine	with power	til failure mode has
							state of	supply to	been determined
							device	device	

5 Functional Architecture

As many constraints require feasible prototypes, the requirements are subject to change accordingly. Requirements indicated in bold writing are new additions.

5.1 Functional Requirements

5.1.1 Software System Functional Requirements

SR1. ML Model must optimize inputs faster than the existing process.

SR2. ML Model must be able to develop "new" simulations based on previous optimal models.

SR3. ML Model must be able to encrypt optimized data before exporting.

- SR4. The software system must determine and output the optimized and correct solution.
- SR5. ML Model must be able to process incoming simulation data from multiple source devices.
- SR6. ML Model must be able to interpret data exported directly from Matlab simulations.

5.1.2 Hardware System Functional Requirements

- **HR1.** The system must be able to wirelessly charge device through a reasonable amount of material in between.
- **HR2.** The system must be able to charge a device within a reasonable amount of time.

5.2 Non-functional Requirements

5.2.1 Look and Feel Requirements

5.2.2 Appearance Requirements

APR1. The system will consist of a simple user interface.

5.2.3 Access Requirements

ACR1. Authorized users will have access to the system.

5.2.4 Integrity Requirements

- IR1. The system must be able to store its current state locally in the event of a failure
- IR2. The individual components of the physical system must be inspected and tested.

5.2.5 Style Requirements

N/A

5.2.6 Usability and Humanity Requirements

5.2.7 Ease of use Requirements

EUR1. The system shall be easy to use.

EUR2. The system shall be easy to install.

5.2.8 Learning Requirements

LR1. The system shall be understandable within an hour of use.

5.2.9 Understandability and Politeness Requirements

N/A

5.2.10 Performance Requirements

5.2.11 Speed and Latency Requirements

SLR1. The system must compute optimal configuration within 6 hours.

5.2.12 Safety Critical Requirements

N/A

5.2.13 Precision of Accuracy Requirements

PAR1. The system must have a relative accuracy of 5% compared to current Matlab simulation.

5.2.14 Reliability and Availability Requirements

RAR1. The system must be available at all times.

5.2.15 Robustness of Fault Tolerance Requirements

RFTR1. The system must be able to discard any corrupted data without adding it to the database.

5.2.16 Capacity Requirements

N/A

5.2.17 Operational and Environmental Requirements

5.2.18 Physical Environment

PER1. The hardware system must be able to withstand harsh weather.

5.2.19 Release Requirements

N/A

5.2.20 Maintainability and Support Requirements

5.2.21 Maintenance Requirements

N/A

5.2.22 Adaptability Requirements

ADAR1. The system must be functional on all operating systems.

5.2.23 Security Requirements

SECR1. The system must protect client data.

5.2.24 Access Requirements

N/A

5.2.25 Privacy Requirements

PRV1. The system must encrypt all exported data.

5.2.26 Legal Requirements

N/A

5.2.27 Health and Safety Requirements

N/A

6 Conclusion

Designing a software system is an intricate process, one that requires an inhuman-like insight into the very minute details of various sub-systems, independently nuanced and dependently coupled. For these reasons, they often contain far more mistakes and vulnerabilities than their proud creators suspect or even care to believe. This fact underlines the importance of acknowledging our faults and the likely faults of our current designs, which in turn allows us to not only protect against them but also further iterate on our pre-existing plans for development. By highlighting these hazards, we have been forced to further understand and define the constraints that are laid around our problem space, and how we might work to achieve all of them and the safest system possible. It is also important to notice the cyclical nature of data flow in our system, which can be seen in the various diagrams showing our system context in SRS Rev 0; thus our software system is especially vulnerable to the propagation of errors, and to the injection of poor data. In looking at the vulnerabilities we have been forced to understand the internal communications of all of our main components - the nature of their coupling as well as their own modular behaviour. The state of our problem definition, goals, and development plan are all better for it.

References

We will be referring to documentations provided by Mobilite-Power, however, as of now there are no references to mention.